UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs

Judicial review is undergoing an unprecedented crisis in several regions of the world. It is criticized for its politicization related to its purpose, effects, and how judges are appointed, as well as the power of obstruction it holds over the law. Questions about the compatibility of judicial review with democracy are not new, but they have rarely been as sensitive. The problem lies not in these legitimate questions, but from their political instrumentalization and their transformation into an electoral promise: that of restoring sovereignty to the people and protecting its identity by removing any obstacles that could hinder the adoption of measures to which citizens consented at the time of the election or that enjoy strong support among the population. It is in this type of discourse, which plays on the opposition between the people and the elites, that the justifications for bypassing the constitutional judge are found, as the judge is the one who blocks public decision-making and thus hinders the exercise of sovereignty. The purpose of this Article is to analyze, through concrete examples (Canada, the United States, Hungary, Israel, Poland), how this distrust towards the judiciary oper-ates in both illiberal and liberal democracies and to construct a critical discourse to identify possible solutions.