UC Irvine

As Kaplan’s ‘Quantifying In’ is a series of reflections prompted by Quine’s ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, so this paper is a series of reflections prompted by Kaplan’s ‘Quantifying In’ together with Hintikka’s ‘Semantics for Propositional Attitudes’ and ‘On the Logic of Perception’. The general perspective I adopt here includes much that is developed in an extended project with Ronald McIntyre, from which I have benefited greatly, our book Intentionality and Intensions: Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Semantics of Intentional Modalities. I rely especially on details of my specific contributions thereto on the modes of aboutness of de re belief, which appear in Chapter VIII. I also rely, sparingly, on some results of my own more recent studies on perception and its ‘demonstrative’ content, indicated here in the bibliography.