UC Riverside

When thinking about the good life, we probably first think of things like a comfortable home, a satisfying career, meaningful relationships, good food, and involvement in worthwhile causes like reducing world hunger or improving education. But literature and life are replete with individuals who have these things but still find their life lacking. Tolstoy’s crisis recounted in Confession, for example, arose in the midst of a flourishing estate, recognized masterpieces, and a provided-for family. The supposed elements of a rich and satisfying life still lacked the meaning he had hoped for. On reflection, then, the good life involves more than a checklist of desirable things and activities. We don’t just want meaningful relationships and successful careers. We want something more. But what exactly is this elusive extra? Often, people describe it as our desire to live lives that are truly our own or, more technically put, to live autonomous and/or authentic lives.

In this dissertation, I examine autonomy and authenticity as ways of explaining how an action or a life could be an agent’s own. On my account, autonomy and authenticity both depend on one’s practical identity. Autonomy is a matter of acting in conformity with one’s practical identity and authenticity is a matter of the agent taking ownership and responsibility for her practical identity. After developing accounts of autonomy and authenticity, I examine two further questions. I first examine how autonomy and authenticity can come into conflict in an individual. For example, how can living autonomously threaten an agent’s ability to live an authentic life? And, second, I examine the relationship between a self-conception and a practical identity and their effect on an agent’s ability to live an autonomous and/or authentic life.

I suggest that both autonomy and authenticity highlight important aspects of a rich human life. And if we ignore either, it will be to our conceptual peril, holding us back from a fuller understanding of the ways our lives can be (or, conversely, can fail to be) our own.