- Main
Introduction: Improvements, Complements, and Alternatives to Quantitative Analysis in Competition Law and Industrial Regulation
Abstract
The fundamental legal, normative, and politico-economic assumptions underpinning both competition law and administrative governance are in a period of considerable flux (Harris and Varellas 2020, 3; Britton-Purdy et al. 2020, 1801-02; Khan 2019; Rahman 2018). Past calls for a renewed economic analysis of law are striking a chord with present scholars. In this issue of the Journal of Law and Political Economy, we commence a specially edited series of articles focused on the value, shortcomings, and potential improvement of quantitative analysis in competition law and regulatory decision-making. This multi-year project aims to provide guidance and insight to advocates, judges, and regulators on the proper nature and scope of quantitative methods in several important areas of law and policy.
Main Content
Enter the password to open this PDF file:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-