UCLA Law & Economics Series
Parent: UCLA School of Law
eScholarship stats: Breakdown by Item for September through December, 2024
Item | Title | Total requests | Download | View-only | %Dnld |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
5tc4j0qn | The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance | 166 | 43 | 123 | 25.9% |
9fj1m40z | Unavoidable Accident | 83 | 6 | 77 | 7.2% |
78z9w8b0 | Causation and Foreseeability | 76 | 21 | 55 | 27.6% |
5c1246c7 | Bondholders and Securities Class Actions | 75 | 6 | 69 | 8.0% |
0wp5r2gr | The Borat Problem In Contract Law: Fraud, Assent, And Standard Forms | 69 | 3 | 66 | 4.3% |
2313h061 | Proximate Cause Decoded | 52 | 21 | 31 | 40.4% |
0zq5p2wx | The Negligence Dualism | 42 | 7 | 35 | 16.7% |
9wf582c0 | Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New Zealand Company Law as Compared to U.S.A. Corporate Law | 41 | 0 | 41 | 0.0% |
5qd2w3r0 | BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages | 40 | 3 | 37 | 7.5% |
0w33z22h | The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance | 39 | 2 | 37 | 5.1% |
1nw4d3hs | Corporate Directors in the United Kingdom | 34 | 0 | 34 | 0.0% |
3w7521mn | Retiree Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending: A Study of Expert Views, Consumer | 30 | 6 | 24 | 20.0% |
9rc92037 | A Course Correction for Controlling Shareholder Transactions | 30 | 15 | 15 | 50.0% |
8hx9p46p | On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board) | 26 | 5 | 21 | 19.2% |
16p3n0m2 | Do We Need a Restatement of the Law of Corporate Governance? | 23 | 3 | 20 | 13.0% |
6266q2sg | The Parable of the Talents | 23 | 0 | 23 | 0.0% |
761892pc | Fee Shifting: Delaware's Self-Inflicted Wound | 21 | 0 | 21 | 0.0% |
553455cf | On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can A Transplant Take? | 20 | 3 | 17 | 15.0% |
0jf6x07z | Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law | 19 | 5 | 14 | 26.3% |
3gh1h2rn | Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8's Ordinary Business Exemption: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement by Proposal | 19 | 0 | 19 | 0.0% |
5jv5q8tf | DExit Drivers: Is Delaware’s Dominance Threatened | 19 | 3 | 16 | 15.8% |
6j85h1dc | Relative Value Health Insurance: A Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Medical Care Cost Crises | 19 | 6 | 13 | 31.6% |
6z0992jz | On the Nature of Corporations | 18 | 1 | 17 | 5.6% |
11h7g8hb | Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night Watchman State: A Comment on Strine & Walker | 17 | 0 | 17 | 0.0% |
6kv8n72t | Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy | 17 | 0 | 17 | 0.0% |
1dk6n25s | Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder Interventions | 15 | 0 | 15 | 0.0% |
82n3b1t1 | Managerial Judging Goes International But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the Reforms to Expedite the Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia | 15 | 2 | 13 | 13.3% |
2js5w2wk | Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust | 14 | 4 | 10 | 28.6% |
8469g9s7 | Multiple Claims, <em>Ivanhoe</em> and Substantive Consolidation | 14 | 0 | 14 | 0.0% |
0rs1s039 | A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in <em>Hobby Lobby</em> and <em>Conestoga Wood</em> | 13 | 0 | 13 | 0.0% |
34w486jm | Textualism's Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions | 13 | 0 | 13 | 0.0% |
7657h82b | A Third Way: Examiners as Inquisitors | 13 | 0 | 13 | 0.0% |
8q4061b8 | Must Salmon Love Meinhard? <em>Agape</em> and Partnership Fiduciary Duties | 13 | 0 | 13 | 0.0% |
9cv5v753 | Ethics for Examiners | 13 | 0 | 13 | 0.0% |
223601qw | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part I | 12 | 2 | 10 | 16.7% |
6qx8862q | Comments on the HHS' Flawed Post-Hobby Lobby Rules | 12 | 0 | 12 | 0.0% |
8g86k7nb | When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s | 12 | 0 | 12 | 0.0% |
39d3r8kb | The Best of All Possible Worlds? - A Rejoinder to Justice Liu | 11 | 0 | 11 | 0.0% |
92p2j4fm | The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight | 11 | 0 | 11 | 0.0% |
98p7d0wz | The Free Radicals of Tort | 11 | 1 | 10 | 9.1% |
9mp482qr | Securities Regulation and Big Business | 11 | 1 | 10 | 9.1% |
01r4913q | The Problem with Preferences | 10 | 0 | 10 | 0.0% |
02f4p0cm | The SEC as an Entrepreneurial Enforcer | 9 | 0 | 9 | 0.0% |
1c58t4zf | Creditors' Committees as Estate Representatives in Bankruptcy Litigation | 9 | 0 | 9 | 0.0% |
4mm4s894 | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part II | 9 | 0 | 9 | 0.0% |
4b2876hh | Opinions First - Argument Afterwards | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0.0% |
2h66k2dd | No Conflict | 7 | 0 | 7 | 0.0% |
33c994dv | Climate Policy Reform Options in 2025 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 0.0% |
5p23j13b | Board Control of a Charity’s Subsidiaries: The Saga of OpenAI | 7 | 0 | 7 | 0.0% |
Note: Due to the evolving nature of web traffic, the data presented here should be considered approximate and subject to revision. Learn more.