UCLA Law & Economics Series
Parent: UCLA School of Law
eScholarship stats: Breakdown by Item for October, 2024 through January, 2025
| Item | Title | Total requests | Download | View-only | %Dnld |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5tc4j0qn | The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance | 136 | 50 | 86 | 36.8% |
| 9fj1m40z | Unavoidable Accident | 79 | 5 | 74 | 6.3% |
| 5c1246c7 | Bondholders and Securities Class Actions | 75 | 9 | 66 | 12.0% |
| 0wp5r2gr | The Borat Problem In Contract Law: Fraud, Assent, And Standard Forms | 68 | 4 | 64 | 5.9% |
| 78z9w8b0 | Causation and Foreseeability | 66 | 22 | 44 | 33.3% |
| 2313h061 | Proximate Cause Decoded | 55 | 24 | 31 | 43.6% |
| 0w33z22h | The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance | 54 | 8 | 46 | 14.8% |
| 9rc92037 | A Course Correction for Controlling Shareholder Transactions | 51 | 30 | 21 | 58.8% |
| 5jv5q8tf | DExit Drivers: Is Delaware’s Dominance Threatened | 45 | 16 | 29 | 35.6% |
| 1nw4d3hs | Corporate Directors in the United Kingdom | 44 | 0 | 44 | 0.0% |
| 9wf582c0 | Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New Zealand Company Law as Compared to U.S.A. Corporate Law | 44 | 0 | 44 | 0.0% |
| 0zq5p2wx | The Negligence Dualism | 43 | 4 | 39 | 9.3% |
| 5qd2w3r0 | BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages | 43 | 2 | 41 | 4.7% |
| 3w7521mn | Retiree Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending: A Study of Expert Views, Consumer | 34 | 7 | 27 | 20.6% |
| 553455cf | On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can A Transplant Take? | 26 | 10 | 16 | 38.5% |
| 6kv8n72t | Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy | 25 | 0 | 25 | 0.0% |
| 0jf6x07z | Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law | 24 | 6 | 18 | 25.0% |
| 8hx9p46p | On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board) | 23 | 7 | 16 | 30.4% |
| 16p3n0m2 | Do We Need a Restatement of the Law of Corporate Governance? | 22 | 5 | 17 | 22.7% |
| 9mp482qr | Securities Regulation and Big Business | 20 | 6 | 14 | 30.0% |
| 6j85h1dc | Relative Value Health Insurance: A Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Medical Care Cost Crises | 19 | 6 | 13 | 31.6% |
| 02f4p0cm | The SEC as an Entrepreneurial Enforcer | 18 | 2 | 16 | 11.1% |
| 6266q2sg | The Parable of the Talents | 18 | 0 | 18 | 0.0% |
| 761892pc | Fee Shifting: Delaware's Self-Inflicted Wound | 18 | 0 | 18 | 0.0% |
| 11h7g8hb | Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night Watchman State: A Comment on Strine & Walker | 17 | 0 | 17 | 0.0% |
| 223601qw | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part I | 17 | 4 | 13 | 23.5% |
| 6z0992jz | On the Nature of Corporations | 17 | 2 | 15 | 11.8% |
| 82n3b1t1 | Managerial Judging Goes International But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the Reforms to Expedite the Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia | 17 | 4 | 13 | 23.5% |
| 3gh1h2rn | Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8's Ordinary Business Exemption: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement by Proposal | 16 | 0 | 16 | 0.0% |
| 2js5w2wk | Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust | 15 | 4 | 11 | 26.7% |
| 01r4913q | The Problem with Preferences | 14 | 0 | 14 | 0.0% |
| 1dk6n25s | Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder Interventions | 14 | 0 | 14 | 0.0% |
| 4mm4s894 | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part II | 14 | 0 | 14 | 0.0% |
| 8469g9s7 | Multiple Claims, <em>Ivanhoe</em> and Substantive Consolidation | 14 | 0 | 14 | 0.0% |
| 8g86k7nb | When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s | 14 | 2 | 12 | 14.3% |
| 92p2j4fm | The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight | 13 | 0 | 13 | 0.0% |
| 0rs1s039 | A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in <em>Hobby Lobby</em> and <em>Conestoga Wood</em> | 12 | 0 | 12 | 0.0% |
| 5p23j13b | Board Control of a Charity’s Subsidiaries: The Saga of OpenAI | 12 | 1 | 11 | 8.3% |
| 98p7d0wz | The Free Radicals of Tort | 12 | 1 | 11 | 8.3% |
| 9cv5v753 | Ethics for Examiners | 12 | 0 | 12 | 0.0% |
| 33c994dv | Climate Policy Reform Options in 2025 | 11 | 1 | 10 | 9.1% |
| 6qx8862q | Comments on the HHS' Flawed Post-Hobby Lobby Rules | 11 | 0 | 11 | 0.0% |
| 8q4061b8 | Must Salmon Love Meinhard? <em>Agape</em> and Partnership Fiduciary Duties | 11 | 0 | 11 | 0.0% |
| 7657h82b | A Third Way: Examiners as Inquisitors | 10 | 0 | 10 | 0.0% |
| 1c58t4zf | Creditors' Committees as Estate Representatives in Bankruptcy Litigation | 9 | 0 | 9 | 0.0% |
| 4b2876hh | Opinions First - Argument Afterwards | 9 | 0 | 9 | 0.0% |
| 34w486jm | Textualism's Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0.0% |
| 39d3r8kb | The Best of All Possible Worlds? - A Rejoinder to Justice Liu | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0.0% |
| 2h66k2dd | No Conflict | 6 | 0 | 6 | 0.0% |
Note: Due to the evolving nature of web traffic, the data presented here should be considered approximate and subject to revision. Learn more.