UC San Diego

How do private sector actors respond to the political incentives of climate policy? I address three distinct questions in this area of inquiry. First, I look at how the preferences of the public as consumers factor into climate policy views. I argue that when climate policy is framed as targeting a particular "lifestyle good", consumers of that good will respond more negatively to the policy. Using the cases of red meat and large gas-powered vehicles, I show that targeting climate policy to particular consumer goods affects patterns of support in substantively meaningful ways. This is not only because consumers face higher pocketbook costs from the policy than non-consumers do, but because of subjective, preferential attachments to particular goods.

Second, I investigate how changes in the regulatory environment can alter firms' propensity to voluntary pledge to reduce their emissions. I assemble a comprehensive dataset of emissions reduction targets with firm-level covariates, which I use to test how responses to an increased likelihood of public regulation vary by a firm's expected adjustment costs. I show that firms are more likely to set targets when the likelihood of regulation increases; but, crucially, they are less likely to do so as their prospective costs from regulation increase. I conclude that this is evidence of a cooperative relationship between public and private regulation.

Third, I study whether & when local clean energy interests can supersede partisanship to drive voting on congressional climate legislation. Looking at the case of tariffs on solar imports, I highlight how the clean technology trade issue produces a split in the economic interests of solar businesses, as solar manufacturers benefit from trade protections, whereas solar developers and installers stand to lose out. This split in clean energy interests provides rhetorical space for legislators to justify defecting from the party line. Accordingly, I find that legislators representing solar industry interests were more likely to defect from the party line – but only when they represent solar manufacturers.