Humans use prior knowledge to efficiently solve novel tasks, but how they structure past knowledge during learning to enable such fast generalization is not well understood. We recently proposed that hierarchical state abstraction enabled generalization of simple one-step rules, by inferring context clusters for each rule. However, humans' daily tasks are often temporally extended, and necessitate more complex multi-step, hierarchically structured strategies. The options framework in hierarchical reinforcement learning provides a theoretical framework for representing such transferable strategies. Options are abstract multi-step policies, assembled from simpler one-step actions or other options, that can represent meaningful reusable strategies as temporal abstractions. We developed a novel sequential decision-making protocol to test if humans learn and transfer multi-step options. In a series of four experiments, we found transfer effects at multiple hierarchical levels of abstraction that could not be explained by flat reinforcement learning models or hierarchical models lacking temporal abstractions. We extended the options framework to develop a quantitative model that blends temporal and state abstractions. Our model captures the transfer effects observed in human participants. Our results provide evidence that humans create and compose hierarchical options, and use them to explore in novel contexts, consequently transferring past knowledge and speeding up learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Humans have the exceptional ability to efficiently structure past knowledge during learning to enable fast generalization. Xia and Collins (2021) evaluated this ability in a hierarchically structured, sequential decision-making task, where participants could build “options” (strategy “chunks”) at multiple levels of temporal and state abstraction. A quantitative model, the Option Model, captured the transfer effects observed in human participants, suggesting that humans create and com- pose hierarchical options and use them to explore novel con- texts. However, it is not well understood how learning in a new context is attributed to new and old options (i.e., the credit assignment problem). In a new context with new contingencies, where participants can recompose some aspects of previously learned options, do they reliably create new options or overwrite existing ones? Does the credit assignment de- pend on how similar the new option is to an old one? In our experiment, two groups of participants (n=124 and n=104) learned hierarchically structured options, experienced different amounts of negative transfer in a new option context, and were subsequently tested on the previously learned options. Behavioral analysis showed that old options were successfully reused without interference, and new options were appropriately created and credited. This credit assignment did not depend on how similar the new option was to the old option, showing great flexibility and precision in human hierarchical learning. These behavioral results were captured by the Option Model, providing further evidence for option learning and transfer in humans.

Computational cognitive models have been used extensively to formalize cognitive processes. Model parameters offer a simple way to quantify individual differences in how humans process information. Similarly, model comparison allows researchers to identify which theories, embedded in different models, provide the best accounts of the data. Cognitive modeling uses statistical tools to quantitatively relate models to data that often rely on computing/estimating the likelihood of the data under the model. However, this likelihood is computationally intractable for a substantial number of models. These relevant models may embody reasonable theories of cognition, but are often under-explored due to the limited range of tools available to relate them to data. We contribute to filling this gap in a simple way using artificial neural networks (ANNs) to map data directly onto model identity and parameters, bypassing the likelihood estimation. We test our instantiation of an ANN as a cognitive model fitting tool on classes of cognitive models with strong inter-trial dependencies (such as reinforcement learning models), which offer unique challenges to most methods. We show that we can adequately perform both parameter estimation and model identification using our ANN approach, including for models that cannot be fit using traditional likelihood-based methods. We further discuss our work in the context of the ongoing research leveraging simulation-based approaches to parameter estimation and model identification, and how these approaches broaden the class of cognitive models researchers can quantitatively investigate.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) models have revolutionized the cognitive and brain sciences, promising to explain behavior from simple conditioning to complex problem solving, to shed light on developmental and individual differences, and to anchor cognitive processes in specific brain mechanisms. However, the RL literature increasingly reveals contradictory results, which might cast doubt on these claims. We hypothesized that many contradictions arise from two commonly-held assumptions about computational model parameters that are actually often invalid: That parameters generalize between contexts (e.g. tasks, models) and that they capture interpretable (i.e. unique, distinctive) neurocognitive processes. To test this, we asked 291 participants aged 8-30 years to complete three learning tasks in one experimental session, and fitted RL models to each. We found that some parameters (exploration / decision noise) showed significant generalization: they followed similar developmental trajectories, and were reciprocally predictive between tasks. Still, generalization was significantly below the methodological ceiling. Furthermore, other parameters (learning rates, forgetting) did not show evidence of generalization, and sometimes even opposite developmental trajectories. Interpretability was low for all parameters. We conclude that the systematic study of context factors (e.g. reward stochasticity; task volatility) will be necessary to enhance the generalizability and interpretability of computational cognitive models.

As we transition from child to adult, we navigate the worlddifferently. In this world, many of the relationships betweenevents are unclear or uncertain because they are probabilisticin nature. We wanted to know how learning about probabilis-tic relationships changes with development and to interrogatethe underlying processes. We investigated these questions in aprobabilistic reinforcement learning task (The Butterfly Task)with 302 participants aged 8-30. We found performance in thistask increased with age through early-twenties, then stabilized.Using hierarchical Bayesian methods to fit computational rein-forcement learning models, we showed that this performanceincrease was driven by 1) an increase in learning rate (i.e. de-crease in integration time horizon); 2) a decrease in exploratorychoices. By contrast, forgetting rates did not change with age.We discuss our findings in the context of other studies and hy-potheses about adolescent brain development.

In the real world, many relationships between events are uncertain and probabilistic. Uncertainty is also likely to be a more common feature of daily experience for youth because they have less experience to draw from than adults. Some studies suggest probabilistic learning may be inefficient in youths compared to adults, while others suggest it may be more efficient in youths in mid adolescence. Here we used a probabilistic reinforcement learning task to test how youth age 8-17 (N = 187) and adults age 18-30 (N = 110) learn about stable probabilistic contingencies. Performance increased with age through early-twenties, then stabilized. Using hierarchical Bayesian methods to fit computational reinforcement learning models, we show that all participants' performance was better explained by models in which negative outcomes had minimal to no impact on learning. The performance increase over age was driven by 1) an increase in learning rate (i.e. decrease in integration time scale); 2) a decrease in noisy/exploratory choices. In mid-adolescence age 13-15, salivary testosterone and learning rate were positively related. We discuss our findings in the context of other studies and hypotheses about adolescent brain development.