Cognitive scientists of religion argue that religious ideas are widespread because they are minimally counterintuitive. Traditional lab studies have found support for a better memory for minimally counterintuitive concepts. This paper presents an in-depth case study of the spread of a counterintuitive religious idea in the real world. It finds that counterintuitiveness alone is not sufficient to guarantee persistence of a religious belief. Novel religious beliefs have to be painstakingly woven into the cultural fabric of a group’s shared social identity to ensure its survival.

We carried out two category norming studies (repeating MacRae 2005) to empirically examine Barrett’s (2008) notion of intuitive expectation sets as a coherent set of categorical expectations that are strongly correlated with each other. The studies validate some aspects of Barrett’s handcrafted list of intuitive sets and suggest removal as well as addition of some properties. The revised table of intuitive expectation sets is presented below: Solid Objects (a) are hard, rigid, and firm (b) are heavy (c) have a mass (d) are tangible (e) are visible Living Things (a) breathe (b) eat food (c) reproduce (d) move (e) grow (f) vulnerable to injury & death Animals (a) have limbs (b) have blood & heart (c) have a mind (d) have a mind (e) have emotions Mental Beings (a) think (b) are human (c) are animals (d) are intelligent (e) perceive (f) self-aware (g) talk to others (h) understand language.