Considerable research has demonstrated the power of the current positive or negative frame to shape people's current judgments. But humans must often learn about positive and negative information as they encounter that information sequentially over time. It is therefore crucial to consider the potential importance of sequencing when developing an understanding of how humans think about valenced information. Indeed, recent work looking at sequentially encountered frames suggests that some frames can linger outside the context in which they are first encountered, sticking in the mind so that subsequent frames have a muted effect. The present research builds a comprehensive account of sequential framing effects in both the loss and the gain domains. After seeing information about a potential gain or loss framed in positive terms or negative terms, participants saw the same issue reframed in the opposing way. Across 5 studies and 1566 participants, we find accumulating evidence for the notion that in the gain domain, positive frames are stickier than negative frames for novel but not familiar scenarios, whereas in the loss domain, negative frames are always stickier than positive frames. Integrating regulatory focus theory with the literatures on negativity dominance and positivity offset, we develop a new and comprehensive account of sequential framing effects that emphasizes the adaptive value of positivity and negativity biases in specific contexts. Our findings highlight the fact that research conducted solely in the loss domain risks painting an incomplete and oversimplified picture of human bias and suggest new directions for future research. (PsycINFO Database Record

A growing literature on reframing effects has identified a robust negativity bias: Under many circumstances, people's attitudes change less when framing switches from negative to positive (vs. positive to negative). Like other basic psychological biases, this one is often assumed to reflect a general human tendency, but there are theoretical reasons to expect boundary conditions on when and for whom it operates. In this article, we zero in on age as one important potential moderator, and test competing predictions from different perspectives. Using a large, highly powered data set that synthesizes across multiple past studies ( N = 2,452; aged 18-81 years), we fit multilevel models to test the moderating impact of age on reframing effects, as well as single-shot framing effects. We found that (consistent with socioemotional selectivity theory), the negativity bias in reframing attenuated as age increased. We discuss implications for the aging literature and for understanding valence biases more broadly.

Humans evolved to attend to valence and group membership when learning about their environment. The political domain offers a unique opportunity to study the simultaneous influence of these two broad, domain-general features of human experience. We examined whether the pervasive tendency for negatively valenced frames to “stick” in the mind applies to both intergroup and intragroup political contexts. In a preregistered experiment, we tested the effects of negative-to-positive (vs. positive-to-negative) reframing on people’s candidate preferences, first in the absence of party cue information and then in two partisan contexts: an intergroup context (analogous to a U.S. general election between opposing political parties) and an intragroup context (analogous to a U.S. primary election between candidates of the same party). We observed a persistent negativity bias in reframing effects, even in the presence of party cues. The results pave the way for future research at the intersection of psychology and political science.