Fast-acting smart inverters that utilize preset operating conditions to determine real and reactive power injection/consumption can create voltage instabilities (over-voltage, voltage oscillations and more) in an electrical distribution network if set-points are not properly configured. In this work, linear distribution power flow equations and droop-based Volt–Var and Volt–Watt control curves are used to analytically derive a stability criterion using Lyapunov analysis that includes the network operating condition. The methodology is generally applicable for control curves that can be represented as Lipschitz functions. The derived Lipschitz constants account for smart inverter hardware limitations for reactive power generation. A local policy is derived from the stability criterion that allows inverters to adapt their control curves by monitoring only local voltage, thus avoiding centralized control or information sharing with other inverters. The criterion is independent of the internal time-delays of smart inverters. Simulation results for inverters with and without the proposed stabilization technique demonstrate how smart inverters can mitigate voltage oscillations locally and mitigate real and reactive power flow disturbances at the substation under multiple scenarios. The study concludes with illustrations of how the control policy can dampen oscillations caused by solar intermittency and cyberattacks.

Volt-VAR and Volt-Watt functionality in photovoltaic (PV) smart inverters provide mechanisms to ensure system voltage magnitudes and power factors remain within acceptable limits. However, these control functions can become unstable, introducing oscillations in system voltages when not appropriately configured or maliciously altered during a cyberattack. In the event that Volt-VAR and Volt-Watt control functions in a portion of PV smart inverters in a distribution grid are unstable, the proposed adaptation scheme utilizes the remaining and stably-behaving PV smart inverters and other Distributed Energy Resources to mitigate the effect of the instability. The adaptation mechanism is entirely decentralized, model-free, communication-free, and requires virtually no external configuration. We provide a derivation of the adaptive control approach and validate the algorithm in experiments on the IEEE 37 and 8500 node test feeders.

The increasing penetration of DER with smart-inverter functionality is set to transform the electrical distribution network from a passive system, with fixed injection/consumption, to an active network with hundreds of distributed controllers dynamically modulating their operating setpoints as a function of system conditions. This transition is being achieved through standardization of functionality through grid codes and/or international standards. DER, however, are unique in that they are typically neither owned nor operated by distribution utilities and, therefore, represent a new emerging attack vector for cyber-physical attacks. Within this work we consider deep reinforcement learning as a tool to learn the optimal parameters for the control logic of a set of uncompromised DER units to actively mitigate the effects of a cyber-attack on a subset of network DER.