Why do authoritarian states selectively control religious freedom? In China, what explains the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s tendency to repress some Protestant churches while allowing other Protestant churches to operate?

Upon the rapid growth of this Western religion, the atheist Communist Party has controlled and repressed Protestant churches and churchgoers. However, contrary to the expectation that persecution should simply target all unregistered churches, the government has varied in the tactics and amount in repressing both registered and unregistered churches. In addition, the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs passed under the Xi administration in 2018 has tightened the government’s grip on religion. Here, two questions arise. First, why are not all registered churches safe from repression, and why are not all unregistered churches repressed? Second, how should we understand the government’s selective repression of churches in light of the recent changes in religious policies?

Through a three-part theoretical framework, I argue that selective repression occurs when actors at different levels of society are mired in relationships that motivate and constrain their decisions toward repression. Specifically, the central government is lodged between domestic and international audience, juggling domestic control and international reputation which leads to selective prioritization of religious control; the local officials are caught between the central government above and the society below as they selectively implement repressive policies; and the religious communities are stuck between abiding by government rules and obeying God’s commands, which explains variations in their religious behavior and experience of repression.

I test these theories using a mixed-methodology approach. Using machine learning techniques on an original dataset of official news articles from 2016 to 2021, I demonstrate that as both domestic and international pressures increased and changed in nature, the central government’s prioritization of religious policies also increased, with directions shifting from selective repression in the early to mid 2010s to indiscriminate repression starting in the late 2010s. Additionally, I use process tracing and qualitative case studies to illustrate that when religious control is not communicated as a national priority by the central government, local officials have more discretion over how and on whom to implement restrictive regulations, leading to selective implementation of repressive policies. Finally, based on insights from over 120 interviews I conducted with Chinese pastors from 2016 to 2019 and 30 supplementary interviews with missionaries and academics from China, South Korea, and the United States, I show that pastors choose a style of ministry that increases the risk of repression due to their beliefs about God and the government.

Explaining selective repression helps to understand not only the kinds of religious activities that are discouraged by the state, but also the specific characteristics of civil society and particular ideologies that the government is unwilling to tolerate. The ways in which different levels of an authoritarian government tackle the threat of religion also reveal the innerworkings of central-local relations as well as national and local policymaking and implementation. At the same time, observing Chinese pastors as they operate in a repressive environment provides insight into the various minds of the religious people. In this way, this research also contributes to the broader discussion of civil rights, repression, and state-society relations in the context of a strong authoritarian state.