Brief use of a tool recalibrates multisensory representations of the user's body, a phenomenon called tool embodiment. Despite two decades of research, little is known about its boundary conditions. It has been widely argued that embodiment requires active tool use, suggesting a critical role for somatosensory and motor feedback. The present study used a visual illusion to cast doubt on this view. We used a mirror-based setup to induce a visual experience of tool use with an arm that was in fact stationary. Following illusory tool use, tactile perception was recalibrated on this stationary arm, and with equal magnitude as physical use. Recalibration was not found following illusory passive tool holding, and could not be accounted for by sensory conflict or general interhemispheric plasticity. These results suggest visual tool-use signals play a critical role in driving tool embodiment.

Two decades of research have demonstrated that using a tool modulates spatial representations of the body. Whether this embodiment is specific to representations of the tool-using limb or extends to representations of other body parts has received little attention. Several studies of other perceptual phenomena have found that modulations to the primary somatosensory representation of the hand transfers to the face, due in part to their close proximity in primary somatosensory cortex. In the present study, we investigated whether tool-induced recalibration of tactile perception on the hand transfers to the cheek. Participants verbally estimated the distance between two tactile points applied to either their hand or face, before and after using a hand-shaped tool. Tool use recalibrated tactile distance perception on the hand-in line with previous findings-but left perception on the cheek unchanged. This finding provides support for the idea that embodiment is body-part specific. Furthermore, it suggests that tool-induced perceptual recalibration occurs at a level of somatosensory processing, where representations of the hand and face have become functionally disentangled.