Evaluations along a positivenegative dimension can be measured either explicitly (via self-report) or implicitly (via re-sponse interference tasks). Whether implicit evaluations encode relational information (e.g., A causes B) or only co-occurrence information (AB) has been debated extensively. 1,082 participants observed a machine being activated bycausally responsible stimuli and dispensing rewards in the presence of merely associated, but not causal, stimuli. Eval-uations of causally responsible vs. associated stimuli were measured implicitly and explicitly. Explicit and implicitevaluations of causally responsible stimuli were more positive than those of associated stimuli, both in the presence (Study1) and absence (Study 2) of verbal instructions about the operation of the machine. Study 3 eliminated temporal primacyand overshadowing as explanations of the effect. Supporting propositional theories, these findings suggest that implicitevaluations are sensitive not only to co-occurrence but also to relational information, whether conveyed verbally or learnedsolely from experience.

From the earliest ages testable, children and adults show similar mean-levels of implicit social attitudes. Nevertheless,meaningful change may exist in how attitudes are acquired across the lifespan. This project explored developmental changein implicit attitude formation by comparing the separate and joint effects of two learning modalities: evaluative statements(ES; purely verbal information about upcoming stimulus pairings) and repeated evaluative pairings (REP; exposure topairings of category members with valenced images). Like adults (N=2,198, Mage=37 years), children (N=281, Mage=9years) rapidly formed robust implicit attitudes towards novel groups following ES and ES+REP interventions. Unlikeadults, children showed no learning following REP. Follow-up studies suggest that inattention to category membership orstimulus valence are unlikely to account for no learning in REP. These findings demonstrate the early-emerging power ofverbal instructions to create implicit attitudes, while also revealing developmental change in the capacity for supposedlylow-level associative learning.

Implicit attitudes are often defined as residing beyond conscious awareness. This definition has been challenged by robust evidence demonstrating highly accurate predictions of implicit attitudes. However, relevant tests have all been conducted using well-known targets (e.g., racial groups), about which participants possess ample relevant knowledge. Therefore, accurate predictions may have emerged from inferential mechanisms rather than privileged first-person awareness. Here we probe participants' (N = 4,448) ability to report their own experimentally created implicit attitudes across four studies where implicit attitudes and their explicit counterparts (representing an obvious source of inference) were manipulated to shift in opposite directions. Predicted and actual implicit attitudes were either unrelated to each other, or predictive accuracy was limited to participants whose implicit and explicit attitudes were aligned. Echoing classic and contemporary accounts, these data suggest that implicit attitudes are (largely) unconscious, and successful implicit attitude predictions are likely subserved by inference rather than introspection.

Five studies examined implicit (IAT) attitudes toward the slurs n***er and n***a among Black and White Americans (total N = 3,226). Both groups showed strong implicit negativity toward n***er/a combined relative to socially acceptable contrast terms such as Black or African American. Controlling for baseline Black–White race attitudes, Black Americans who engaged in conscious reappropriation exhibited similar implicit negativity toward n***er/a as White Americans. When the rhotic and non-rhotic forms were directly contrasted, n***er was more implicitly negative than n***a, with Black Americans distinguishing the two more strongly than did White Americans. However, even Black American reappropriators showed implicit negativity toward n***a relative to Black. In sum, both n***er and n***a evoke automatic negative meaning in a broad sample of Americans today. At the same time, the relatively more positive meaning of n***a over n***er demonstrates the power of reappropriation to wrest control of word meaning.