Background

Men who have had sex with men (MSM) since 1977 are permanently deferred from donating blood. Excluding only men who engaged in male-to-male sex within either the prior 12 months or 5 years has been proposed. Little is known about infectious disease risks of MSM who donate blood.

Study design and methods

Weighted analyses of data from an anonymous mail survey of blood donors were conducted to examine the characteristics of men reporting male-to-male sex during specified time periods.

Results

Of the 25,168 male respondents, 569 (2.4%) reported male-to-male sex, 280 (1.2%) since 1977. Compared to donors who did not report male-to-male sex, the prevalence of reactive screening test results was higher among donors who reported the practice within the past 5 years (< or =12 months odds ratio [OR] 5.3, 95% confidence interval [CI] 2.6-10.4; >12 months to 5 years, OR 7.1, 95% CI 1.2-41.7); however, no significant difference was found for donors who last practiced male-to-male sex more than 5 years ago (>5 years-after 1977, OR 1.4, 95% CI 0.7-2.6; 1977 or earlier, OR 1.6, 95% CI 0.7-3.7). The prevalence of unreported deferrable risks (UDRs) other than male-to-male sex was significantly higher for all donors who reported male-to-male sex with ORs ranging from 3.1 to 18.9 (p < or = 0.01).

Conclusions

No evidence was found to support changing current policy to permit donations from men who practiced male-to-male sex within the past 5 years. For donors with a more remote history of male-to-male sex, the findings were equivocal. A better understanding of the association between male-to-male sex and other UDRs appears needed.

BACKGROUND: Monitoring genotypes of HIV infections in blood donors may provide insights into infection trends in the general population. METHODS: HIV RNA was extracted from plasma samples of blood donors confirmed as HIV positive by blood screening nucleic acid and antibody tests. HIV genome target regions were amplified using nested real time-polymerase chain reaction followed by next-generation sequencing. Sequences were compared to those in the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) database. Sequences were also assessed for drug resistance mutations (DRM) using the Stanford HIV DRM Database. RESULTS: From available HIV-positive donations collected between 1 September 2015 and 31 December 2020, 563 of 743 (75.8%) were successfully sequenced; 4 were subtype A, 543 subtype B, 5 subtype C, 1 subtype G, 5 circulating recombinant forms (CRF), and 2 were subtype B and D recombinants. Overall, no significant differences between blood donor and available LANL genotypes were found, and the genotypes of newly acquired versus prevalent HIV infections in donors were similar. The proportion of non-B subtypes and CRF remained a small fraction, with no other subtype or CRF representing more than 1% of the total. DRM were identified in 122 (21.6%) samples with protease inhibitor, nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor and non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor DRMs identified in 4.9%, 4.6% and 14.0% of samples, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: HIV genetic diversity and DRM in blood donors appear representative of circulating HIV infections in the US general population and may provide more information on infection diversity than sequences reported to LANL, particularly for recently transmitted infections.

UNLABELLED: Risk assessments of transfusion-transmitted emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) are complicated by the fact that blood donors demographics and behaviors can be different from the general population. Therefore, when assessing potential blood donor exposure to EIDs, the use of general population characteristics, such as U.S. travel statistics, may invoke uncertainties that result in inaccurate estimates of blood donor exposure. This may, in turn, lead to the creation of donor deferral policies that do not match actual risk. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: This article reports on the development of a system to rapidly assess EID risks for a nationally representative portion of the U.S. blood donor population. To assess the effectiveness of this system, a test survey was developed and deployed to a statistically representative sample frame of blood donors from five blood collecting organizations. Donors were directed to an online survey to ascertain their recent travel and potential exposure to Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). RESULTS: A total of 7128 responses were received from 54 256 invitations. The age-adjusted estimated total number of blood donors potentially exposed to MERS-CoV was approximately 15 640 blood donors compared to a lower U.S. general population-based estimate of 9610 blood donors. CONCLUSION: The structured donor demographic sample-based data provided an assessment of blood donors potential exposure to an emerging pathogen that was 63% larger than the U.S. population-based estimate. This illustrates the need for tailored blood donor-based EID risk assessments that provide more specific demographic risk intelligence and can inform appropriate regulatory decision making.

Presymptomatic plasma samples from 1596 donors reporting coronavirus disease 2019 infection or symptoms after blood donation were tested for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) RNA and anti-S and anti-N antibodies. Prior infection and vaccination both protected from developing SARS-CoV-2 RNAemia and from symptomatic infection. RNAemia rates did not differ in the Delta and Omicron variant eras.

Respiratory viruses such as influenza do not typically cause viremia; however, SARS-CoV-2 has been detected in the blood of COVID-19 patients with mild and severe symptoms. Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in blood raises questions about its role in pathogenesis as well as transfusion safety concerns. Blood donor reports of symptoms or a diagnosis of COVID-19 after donation (post-donation information, PDI) preceded or coincided with increased general population COVID-19 mortality. Plasma samples from 2,250 blood donors who reported possible COVID-19-related PDI were tested for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA. Detection of RNAemia peaked at 9%-15% of PDI donors in late 2020 to early 2021 and fell to approximately 4% after implementation of widespread vaccination in the population. RNAemic donors were 1.2- to 1.4-fold more likely to report cough or shortness of breath and 1.8-fold more likely to report change in taste or smell compared with infected donors without detectable RNAemia. No infectious virus was detected in plasma from RNAemic donors; inoculation of permissive cell lines produced less than 0.7-7 plaque-forming units (PFU)/mL and in susceptible mice less than 100 PFU/mL in RNA-positive plasma based on limits of detection in these models. These findings suggest that blood transfusions are highly unlikely to transmit SARS-CoV-2 infection.

BACKGROUND: In 2021, four patients who had received solid organ transplants in the USA developed encephalitis beginning 2-6 weeks after transplantation from a common organ donor. We describe an investigation into the cause of encephalitis in these patients. METHODS: From Nov 7, 2021, to Feb 24, 2022, we conducted a public health investigation involving 15 agencies and medical centres in the USA. We tested various specimens (blood, cerebrospinal fluid, intraocular fluid, serum, and tissues) from the organ donor and recipients by serology, RT-PCR, immunohistochemistry, metagenomic next-generation sequencing, and host gene expression, and conducted a traceback of blood transfusions received by the organ donor. FINDINGS: We identified one read from yellow fever virus in cerebrospinal fluid from the recipient of a kidney using metagenomic next-generation sequencing. Recent infection with yellow fever virus was confirmed in all four organ recipients by identification of yellow fever virus RNA consistent with the 17D vaccine strain in brain tissue from one recipient and seroconversion after transplantation in three recipients. Two patients recovered and two patients had no neurological recovery and died. 3 days before organ procurement, the organ donor received a blood transfusion from a donor who had received a yellow fever vaccine 6 days before blood donation. INTERPRETATION: This investigation substantiates the use of metagenomic next-generation sequencing for the broad-based detection of rare or unexpected pathogens. Health-care workers providing vaccinations should inform patients of the need to defer blood donation for at least 2 weeks after receiving a yellow fever vaccine. Despite mitigation strategies and safety interventions, a low risk of transfusion-transmitted infections remains. FUNDING: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, and the CDC Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity Cooperative Agreement for Infectious Diseases.