In standard decision theory, rational agents are objective,
keeping their beliefs independent from their desires (Berger,
1985). Such agents are the basis for current computational
models of Theory of Mind (ToM), but this fundamental as-
sumption of the theory remains untested. Do people think that
others’ beliefs are objective, or do they think that others’ de-
sires color their beliefs? We describe a Bayesian framework
for exploring this relationship and its implications. Motivated
by this analysis, we conducted two experiments testing the a
priori independence of beliefs and desires in people’s ToM
and find that, contrary to fully-normative accounts, people
think that others engage in wishful thinking. In the first ex-
periment, we found that people think others believe both that
desirable events are more likely to happen, and that undesir-
able ones are less likely to happen. In the second experiment,
we found that social learning leverages this intuitive under-
standing of wishful thinking: participants learned more from
the beliefs of an informant whose desires were contrary to his
beliefs. People’s ToM therefore appears to be more nuanced
than the current rational accounts, but consistent with a model
in which desire directly affects the subjective probability of
an event.