In this paper I discuss six special features of China's trade and direct investment. These characteristics include an extensive role played by foreign-invested firms, a large percentage of re-exports and processed exports, a geographical concentration of trade and investment, a growing importance of high-technology trade and wholly foreign-owned enterprises being the dominant mode of investment.

As a developing economy, China is unusual in playing two important roles for the United States and for Asia-Pacific economies in general. It is a competitive, low-cost export platform. At the same time, it is a large and growing market. Japanese and U.S. affiliates located in China typically sell about half or more of their products produced in China in the domestic Chinese market.

U.S. government data show that U.S. affiliates in China are becoming more and more profitable. China has also become an important link in the global supply chain. There is a thick and growing production network among China and other East and Southeast Asian economies. Because of such a network, foreign direct investment flows to China tend to be positively related to foreign direct investment flows to other Asian economies.

In this paper I discuss six special features of China's trade and direct investment. These characteristics include an extensive role played by foreign-invested firms, a large percentage of re-exports and processed exports, a geographical concentration of trade and investment, a growing importance of high-technology trade and wholly foreign-owned enterprises being the dominant mode of investment.

As a developing economy, China is unusual in playing two important roles for the United States and for Asia-Pacific economies in general. It is a competitive, low-cost export platform. At the same time, it is a large and growing market. Japanese and U.S. affiliates located in China typically sell about half or more of their products produced in China in the domestic Chinese market.

U.S. government data show that U.S. affiliates in China are becoming more and more profitable. China has also become an important link in the global supply chain. There is a thick and growing production network among China and other East and Southeast Asian economies. Because of such a network, foreign direct investment flows to China tend to be positively related to foreign direct investment flows to other Asian economies.

Is China taking direct investments away from other Asian economies? Theoretically, a growing China can add to other countries’ direct investments by creating more opportunities for production-networking and raising the need for raw materials and resources. At the same time, the extremely low Chinese labor costs may lure multinationals away from other Asian sites when the foreign corporations consider alternative locations for low-cost export platforms. In this paper, we explore this important issue empirically. We use data for eight Asian economies (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand) from 1985 to 2001 and control for the determinants of their inward direct investment. We then add China’s inward foreign direct investment as an indicator of the “China Effect”. Due to issues of simultaneity, we use a random effects simultaneous equation model to estimate our coefficients. We have three results: (1) The level of China’s foreign direct investment is positively related to the levels of these economies’ inward direct investments; (2) the level of China’s foreign direct investment is negatively related to the direct investments of these economies as shares of total Asian foreign direct investments; (3) The China effect is not the most important determinant of the inward direct investments of these economies. Policy and institutional factors such as openness, corporate tax rates and corruption can be more important.

Magnetic particle imaging (MPI) is a sensitive, high contrast tracer modality that directly images superparamagnetic iron oxide nanoparticles (SPIOs), enabling radiation-free theranostic imaging. With zero tissue signal, persistent biosafe tracers, and no ionizing radiation, MPI has shown great promise for cell tracking, vascular imaging, and imaging applications. Indeed, its capability for multi-month studies and exquisite contrast position itself uniquely for immune-cell based diagnoses and extended monitoring of immunotherapies. However, MPI resolution is currently limited by scanner and particle constraints. Recent tracers have experimentally shown 10x resolution and signal improvements, with dramatically sharper M-H curves. Experiments suggest that this results from interparticle interactions, conforming to literature definitions of superferromagnetism. We thus call our tracers superferromagnetic iron oxide nanoparticles (SFMIOs). While SFMIOs provide excellent signal and resolution, they exhibit hysteresis, with non-negligible remanence and coercivity. In my dissertation I provide the first report on MPI scanning with remanence and coercivity, including the first quantitative measurements of SFMIO remanence decay and reformation using a novel multi-echo pulse sequence. We also describe an SNR-optimized pulse sequence for SFMIOs under human electromagnetic safety limitations. I separately investigate ex vivo and in situ labeling neutrophils and macrophages and tracking to inflammation and immune activity with XY Zhou and P Chandrasekharan. I demonstrate the first antibody MPI (Ab-MPI) images using antibody-conjugated SPIOs (Ab-SPIOs), showing bone marrow and sites of lipopolysaccharide-induced myositis. Through bioluminescent imaging, electron microscopy, flow cytometry and histopathology, I confirm labeling and tracking of neutrophils and macrophages. Excitingly, our images are able to differentiate between the acute inflammation response from neutrophils, and the chronic response from macrophages. With the resolution improvements from SFMIOs, which could be used to reduce hardware costs by 100x, and the demonstrated applications of Ab-SPIOs, MPI demonstrates incredible potential for clinical diagnosis and immunotherapy monitoring.

In this paper, we examine whether hard infrastructure in the form of more highways and railroads or soft infrastructure in the form of more transparent institutions and deeper reforms lead to more foreign direct investment (FDI). We use data of FDI from the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea to various regions of China from 1990 to 2002. We control for the standard determinants of FDI--regional market sizes, wage rates, human capital and tax policies. Then we add indices of hard and soft infrastructures. We found that empirically soft infrastructure consistently outperforms hard infrastructure as a determinant of FDI.

In this paper, we examine whether hard infrastructure in the form of more highways and railroads or soft infrastructure in the form of more transparent institutions and deeper reforms lead to more foreign direct investment (FDI). We use data of FDI from the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea to various regions of China from 1990 to 2002. We control for the standard determinants of FDI--regional market sizes, wage rates, human capital and tax policies. Then we add indices of hard and soft infrastructures. We found that empirically soft infrastructure consistently outperforms hard infrastructure as a determinant of FDI.

Is China taking direct investments away from other Asian economies? Theoretically, a growing China can add to other countries’ direct investments by creating more opportunities for production-networking and raising the need for raw materials and resources. At the same time, the extremely low Chinese labor costs may lure multinationals away from other Asian sites when the foreign corporations consider alternative locations for low-cost export platforms. In this paper, we explore this important issue empirically. We use data for eight Asian economies (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand) from 1985 to 2001 and control for the determinants of their inward direct investment. We then add China’s inward foreign direct investment as an indicator of the “China Effect”. Due to issues of simultaneity, we use a random effects simultaneous equation model to estimate our coefficients. We have three results: (1) The level of China’s foreign direct investment is positively related to the levels of these economies’ inward direct investments; (2) the level of China’s foreign direct investment is negatively related to the direct investments of these economies as shares of total Asian foreign direct investments; (3) The China effect is not the most important determinant of the inward direct investments of these economies. Policy and institutional factors such as openness, corporate tax rates and corruption can be more important.

China in recent years has emerged as the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world. Many analysts and government officials in the developing world have increasingly expressed concerns that they are losing competitiveness to China. Is China diverting FDI from other developing countries?

Theoretically, a growing China can add to other countries’ direct investment by creating more opportunities for production networking and raising the need for raw materials and resources. At the same time, the extremely low Chinese labor costs may lure multinationals away from sites in other developing countries when the foreign corporations consider alternative locations for low-cost export platforms.

In this paper, we explore this important research and policy issue empirically. We focus our studies on East and Southeast Asia as well as Latin America. For Asia, we use data for eight Asian economies (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand) for 1985-2002 while for Latin America, we use data for sixteen Latin American economies (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) for 1990-2002. We control for the standard determinants of their inward direct investment. We then add China’s inward foreign direct investment as an indicator of the “China Effect”. Estimation of the coefficient associated with the China Effect proxy gives us indications about the existence of the China Effect.

We have three results: (1) The level of China’s foreign direct investment is positively related to the levels of inward direct investments of economies in East and Southeast Asia, while the China Effect is mostly insignificant for Latin American nations; (2) the level of China’s foreign direct investment is negatively related to the direct investment of these economies as shares of total foreign direct investments in the developing countries; (3) The China Effect is generally not the most important determinant of the inward direct investments of these economies. Market sizes and policy variables such as openness and corporate tax rates tend to be more important.

China in recent years has emerged as the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world. Many analysts and government officials in the developing world have increasingly expressed concerns that they are losing competitiveness to China. Is China diverting FDI from other developing countries?

Theoretically, a growing China can add to other countries’ direct investment by creating more opportunities for production networking and raising the need for raw materials and resources. At the same time, the extremely low Chinese labor costs may lure multinationals away from sites in other developing countries when the foreign corporations consider alternative locations for low-cost export platforms.

In this paper, we explore this important research and policy issue empirically. We focus our studies on East and Southeast Asia as well as Latin America. For Asia, we use data for eight Asian economies (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand) for 1985-2002 while for Latin America, we use data for sixteen Latin American economies (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) for 1990-2002. We control for the standard determinants of their inward direct investment. We then add China’s inward foreign direct investment as an indicator of the “China Effect”. Estimation of the coefficient associated with the China Effect proxy gives us indications about the existence of the China Effect.

We have three results: (1) The level of China’s foreign direct investment is positively related to the levels of inward direct investments of economies in East and Southeast Asia, while the China Effect is mostly insignificant for Latin American nations; (2) the level of China’s foreign direct investment is negatively related to the direct investment of these economies as shares of total foreign direct investments in the developing countries; (3) The China Effect is generally not the most important determinant of the inward direct investments of these economies. Market sizes and policy variables such as openness and corporate tax rates tend to be more important.

This paper examines the qualitative impact and the degree of effectiveness of several labor market policies when domestic union’s wage response and economic integration are explicitly taken into account. The employment policies considered include payroll tax cuts, unemployment benefits cuts, aggregate demand expansion and wage subsidies. It is shown that with endogenous wages and an open economy, these policies can in some cases become more potent. But in other instances, they become less effective. In fact, under some conditions derived in this paper, employment policies can even be counterproductive, leading to a drop in domestic employment.