En proposant une nouvelle écriture du passé sur le mode de la “résurrection intégrale” et de la réparation historique, Jules Michelet a joué un rôle prépondérant dans le renouvellement historiographique postrévolutionnaire et la mise en place de cadres historiques dont se réclamera “la nouvelle histoire”. Or c’est par le biais du récit et de l’histoire avec un petit “h” que ce changement du discours et de la pratique historienne se met en place. Prenant pour appui la réflexion de Jacques Rancière (Les Noms de l’histoire) sur la filiation paradoxale entre l’historien souvent qualifié de subjectiviste et l’école des Annales, et la révolution scientifique que représente l’historien romantique, cet article prend pour objet les volumes consacrés à Louis XIV – incarnation de la gloire de la monarchie absolue – contre lequel Michelet semble s’acharner de manière symbolique et significative. L’article entend montrer que le changement épistémologique qu’opère l’Histoire de Michelet est une mise à mort poétique du roi, qui ne se fait pas simplement au profit d’une idéologie ou d’un désir de mémoire républicain, mais bien d’une histoire républicaine. En effet, l’historien ne se contente pas d’user de procédés littéraires pour subvertir la vision du passé véhiculée par l’historiographie classique : il en bouleverse les techniques de narration et propose une nouvelle manière de dire l’histoire qui inverse les instances souveraines du roi et du peuple, au profit d’un nouveau récit national qui laisse entendre la voix des documents et les voix oubliées du passé.

Introduction

Methods

Results

Discussion

Those of us who worked with Rosalie Pinto Robertson were privileged to know a woman who would arise from the sick bed to help another person and who saw neither tribe, race, creed, nor national boundary if a call came for help. She worked consistently to improve understanding and justice for all peoples.

My doctoral dissertation begins with this puzzle: why do large, moderate parties sometimes select leaders who seem to help improve their parties' electoral performances, but other times choose unpopular leaders with more extreme policy positions, in expense of votes? I argue that leadership selection is dependent on both the electoral institution that a party finds itself in and the intra-party dynamics that constrain the party. Due to a high degree of seat-vote elasticity that is characteristic of majoritarian systems, replacing unpopular leaders is a feasible strategy for opposition parties in these systems to increase their seat shares. In contrast, in proportional systems, due to low seat-vote elasticity, on average opposition parties that replace their leaders suffer from vote loss. My model of party leadership selection shows that since party members can provide valuable election campaign effort, they can coerce those who select the party leader (the selectorate) into choosing their preferred leader. When selectorate members are moderate, extreme leaders may emerge if non-selectorate members credibly threaten to withhold campaign effort. The more that the extreme non-selectorate members value issue advocacy over the party's electoral welfare, the more extreme the chosen party leader is.

Two original datasets on 12 parliamentary democracies of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), one comprised of the dates of party leadership tenure, and the other on leadership election results, highlight my research question's empirical relevance. These data reveal that on average, new opposition party leaders in single-member district (SMD) systems increase their parties' vote share, but the reverse occurs in multi-member district (MMD) systems. Through field research in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, I interviewed 72 members of parliament (MPs), 7 former party leaders and party leadership candidates, and 18 senior party officers. These interviews serve to support my model's predictions.

My dissertation offers an explanation for why parties sometimes seem to injure themselves in the electoral arena by choosing unpopular leaders. It underscores the importance of electoral systems in understanding the dynamics of intra-party politics and the feasibility of different electoral strategies. In addition, intra-party policy conflict influences election outcomes. Moreover, it highlights how, paradoxically, large parties that prioritize their parties' electoral welfare sometimes sacrifice voter representation in order to mobilize party activists.

Although I have not seen the slicks described by True and Waugh (1981:84-115), a notable slick exists on a vertical rock face near the north end of Rincon Reservation which I will describe.