I compare the predictions of three variants of the altruistic-parent model by Barro and Becker for the relationship between child mortality and fertility. In the baseline model, fertility choice is continuous, and there is no uncertainty over the number of surviving children. The baseline model is contrasted to an extension with discrete fertility choice and stochastic mortality, and a setup with sequential fertility choice. The quantitative predictions of themodels are remarkably similar. While in each model the total fertility rate falls as child mortality declines, the number of surviving children increases. The results suggest that factors other than declining infant and child mortality are responsible for the large decline in net reproduction rates observed in industrialized countries over the last century.

Every industrialized country once underwent a transition from Malthusian stag-nation to growth, accompanied by a demographic transition from high to low fertility. Even though the overall pattern is repeated, there are large cross-country variations in the timing and speed of the fertility decline that accompanies the transition. This paper explores whether differences in policies that affect the opportunity cost of edu-cation, namely child-labor restrictions and education subsidies, can account for these differences. A model is developed which delivers an endogenous transition from Malthusian stagnation to growth. A calibrated version of the model shows that ed-ucational policies have large effects on the fertility transition. While the effects of education subsidies are minor, accounting for child-labor regulations is crucial. The same policies that affect fertility decline also have large effects on the evolution of the income distribution in the course of development.

In every developed country, the economic transition from pre-industrial stagnation to modem growth was accompanied by a demographic transition from high to low fertility. Even though the overall pattern is repeated, there are large cross-country variations in the timing and speed of the demographic transition. What accounts for falling fertility during the transition to growth? To answer this question, this paper develops a unified growth model that delivers a transition from stagnation to growth, accompanied by declining fertility. The model is used to determine whether government policies that affect the opportunity cost of education can account for cross-country variations in fertility decline. Among the policies considered, education subsidies are found to have only minor effects, while accounting for child labor regulation is crucial. Apart from influencing fertility, the policies also determine the evolution of the income distribution in the course of development.

Following a phase of near-constant living standards lasting from Stone Age until the onset of the Industrial Revolution, a large number of countries have experienced growth takeoffs, in which stagnation gives way to sustained economic growth. What causes some countries to enter a growth takeoff, while others remain poor? We discuss three mechanisms that can trigger a growth takeoff in a country previously captured in a poverty trap: fertility decline, structural change, and accelerating technological progress.

The British Industrial Revolution was a time of major socio-economic transformations. We review a number of recent economic theories which analyze the transition from a preindustrial world characterized by high fertility, stationary standards of living, and rigid social hierarchies to modern capitalism. One of the key social transformations that accompanied the Industrial Revolution was the economic decline of the aristocracy. Standard theories of wealth inequality cannot explain why the aristocrats, in spite of their superior wealth and education, failed to be the main protagonists and beneficiaries of industrialization. We discuss recent research based on a model of endogenous preferences that is consistent with the demise of aristocracy.

In this paper we investigate the positive and normative consequences of child-labor restrictions for economic aggregates and welfare. We argue that even though the laissez-faire equilibrium may be inefficient, there are usually better policies to cure these inefficiencies than the imposition of a childlabor ban. Given this finding, we investigate the potential political-economic reasons behind the emergence and persistence of child-labor legislation. Our investigation is based on a structural dynamic general equilibrium model that provides a coherent and uniform framework for our analysis.

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous policy choice to analyze the adoption of child labor laws. The key mechanism in our model is that parents’ decisions on family size interact with their preferences for child labor regulation. If policies are endogenous, multiple steady states with different child labor policies can exist. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive correlation between child labor, fertility, and inequality. In addition, the theory implies that the political support for regulation should increase if a rising skill premium induces parents to choose smaller families. The model replicates features of the history of the U.K. in the nineteenth century, when regulations were introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided with rapidly declining fertility rates and an expansion of education.

We argue that one major cause of the U.S. postwar baby boom was the increased demand for female labor during World War II. We develop a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility and female labor-force participation decisions. We use the model to assess the long-term implications of a one-time demand shock for female labor, such as the one experienced by American women during wartime mobilization. For the war generation, the shock leads to a persistent increase in female labor supply due to the accumulation of work experience. In contrast, younger women who turn adult after the war face increased labor-market competition, which impels them to exit the labor market and start having children earlier. In our calibrated model, this general-equilibrium effect generates a substantial baby boom followed by a baby bust, as well as patterns for age specific labor-force participation and fertility rates that are consistent with U.S data.

In most democracies, the majority of education expenditures is financed by the government. In non-democracies, we observe a wide variation in the mix of public and private funding of education. In addition, countries with high inequality tend to rely more heavily on private schooling. We develop a theory which integrates private decisions on education and fertility with voting on public schooling expenditures. The theory is able to account for the facts mentioned above. Countries with high inequality exhibit more private education expenditures since rich people opt out of the public system. In non-democracies, concentration of political power leads to multiple equilibria in the determination of public education spending.

We assess the merits of different education systems in a framework that accounts for the joint decision problem of parents regarding fertility and education. Specifically, we compare the implications of a public and a private schooling regime for economic growth and inequality. We find that private schooling leads to higher growth when there is little inequality in human capital endowments across families. In contrast, when inequality is high, public education yields higher growth by reducing fertility differentials. Our analysis highlights the importance of accounting for endogenous fertility differentials when analyzing educational policies. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.