INTRODUCTION Northern Canada is a complex and fragile homeland blessed with physical and natural resources which are now subject to modern land claims agreements. An important public policy issue that receives little attention in the academic literature relates to the various models of governance that will be established once aboriginal claims are settled in Canada's north. For northerners, however, claims settlements represent the single largest item on the public policy agenda. Most of the research on native claims focuses upon the normative foundations for the claims, the unique cultural and environmental dimensions, and the quantification of actual entitlements in the form of cash and land transfers. This paper transcends the debate over entitlements and seeks to refocus the dialogue around those issues relating to post-claims governance. Admittedly, this paper is a polemic. My objective is to generate discussion and, hopefully, further research concerning what might be termed the implementation phase of the claims process. This is particularly important for the Dene/métis of the Mackenzie region of the Northwest Territories, the Inuit of the eastern Arctic, and the Council for Yukon Indians in the Yukon.

INTRODUCTION The development of sound financial strategies that both guarantee native autonomy and assure continued program financing is one of the most complex yet vital components to aboriginal self-government. Unfortunately, history has demonstrated that the failures in this area tend to overshadow any successful inroads made in aboriginal people’s efforts to attain self-determination. In fact, many native groups operate in an environment that can best be described as continual financial exigency. This phenomenon is not unique to the United States. The aboriginal population in Canada has also experienced difficulty in acquiring the resources needed to govern themselves. Examples include the financial difficulties that arose out of the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), the 1978 James Bay and Northern Quebec agreements, and the 1984 agreement signed with the Inuvialuit of the western Northwest Territories. All of these examples explicitly demonstrate that, for those groups in the process of negotiating claims settlements, the development of a sound financial strategy is inextricably linked to the successful negotiation of aboriginal claims settlements. In Alaska, the creation of a series of corporate structures that were antithetical to native culture, the lack of investment opportunities, the cost of capital-intensive projects in the North, the high cost of venture capital, and the lack of training programs for natives charged with managing their new public administration infrastructure all contributed to the expenditure of the nearly one billion dollars in compensation received under ANCSA. Now that the money is gone, Alaska Natives fear the loss of their lands as well. The financial woes of the Inuvialuit and the Cree and Naskapi of northern Quebec continue. On an annual basis, the latter are required to negotiate program funding for current fiscal year operations with no less than nine separate federal and Quebec government agencies.

INTRODUCTION Economic and social problems on Indian reservations in the United States and in other countries are well documented. Hundreds of reports generated by government entities, private research firms, and Indian groups provide a detailed litany concerning poverty, alcohol and drug abuse, juvenile delinquency, inordinately high crime rates, inadequate educational facilities, and a myriad of other problems. Tribal governments continue to press for change and greater Indian self-determination in an effort to deal effectively with the problems confronting their people. The argument, of course, is that tribes are sovereign entities and, by definition, are responsible for their own affairs without interference from other governments. Self-determination-the ability to determine one’s own destiny-is a central component of sovereignty. The passage of the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) is viewed by some as one vehicle whereby at least a small amount of self-determination can be realized. Others argue, however, that federal legislation permitting gaming on reservations amounts to yet another intrusion into tribal sovereignty.

INTRODUCTION The theme of this paper is that greater tribal self-rule, though favored by tribal populations and a goal of federal Indian policy, comes with a social price. Exercising tribal sovereignty, North Dakota tribal governments, along with other tribal governments across the country, initiated reservation “high stakes gambling.” These tribal “high stakes” gambling enterprises have been praised as examples of successful tribal self-rule and reservation economic development, but that is only part of the story. The other side of the story is that self-rule is accompanied by potential increases in reservation social problems, and, in this case, the problems can be exacerbated by unanticipated gambling-related social dysfunctions. This paper explores a relatively new and uncharted component of Indian gaming. Through primary empirical research, we examine whether there appears to be a positive correlation between the rapid growth in the numbers of tribal casinos and the incidence of pathological gambling activity in two North Dakota Indian tribes—the Devils Lake Sioux of the Fort Totten Reservation and the Chippewa of the Turtle Mountain Reservation. We then compare the rate of pathological gambling activity in the Indian population to the rates for the general population of North Dakota as well as the rates for the general population of Fort Totten, North Dakota, and Belcourt, North Dakota, the major communities on the two reservations. The paper concludes with a discussion of alternative strategies that might be employed to address compulsive gambling behaviors.