A key aspect of human intelligence is our ability to learn very quickly. This ability is still lacking in artificial intelligence. This article will highlight recent research showing how bringing together the fields of artificial intelligence and cognitive science may benefit both. Ideas from artificial intelligence have provided helpful formal theories to account for aspects of human learning. In return, ideas from cognitive science and neuroscience can also inform artificial intelligence research with directions to make algorithms more human-like. For example, recent work shows that human learning can only be understood in the context of multiple separate, interacting memory systems, rather than as a single, complex learner. This insight is starting to show promise in improving artificial agents’ learning efficiency.

Often the world is structured such that distinct sensory contexts signify the same abstract rule set. Learning from feedback thus informs us not only about the value of stimulus-action associations but also about which rule set applies. Hierarchical clustering models suggest that learners discover structure in the environment, clustering distinct sensory events into a single latent rule set. Such structure enables a learner to transfer any newly acquired information to other contexts linked to the same rule set, and facilitates re-use of learned knowledge in novel contexts. Here, we show that humans exhibit this transfer, generalization and clustering during learning. Trial-by-trial model-based analysis of EEG signals revealed that subjects' reward expectations incorporated this hierarchical structure; these structured neural signals were predictive of behavioral transfer and clustering. These results further our understanding of how humans learn and generalize flexibly by building abstract, behaviorally relevant representations of the complex, high-dimensional sensory environment.

Study of human executive function focuses on our ability to represent cognitive rules independently of stimulus or response modality. However, recent findings suggest that executive functions cannot be modularized separately from perceptual and motor systems, and that they instead scaffold on top of motor action selection. Here we investigate whether patterns of motor demands influence how participants choose to implement abstract rule structures. In a learning task that requires integrating two stimulus dimensions for determining appropriate responses, subjects typically structure the problem hierarchically, using one dimension to cue the task-set and the other to cue the response given the task-set. However, the choice of which dimension to use at each level can be arbitrary. We hypothesized that the specific structure subjects adopt would be constrained by the motor patterns afforded within each rule. Across four independent data-sets, we show that subjects create rule structures that afford motor clustering, preferring structures in which adjacent motor actions are valid within each task-set. In a fifth data-set using instructed rules, this bias was strong enough to counteract the well-known task switch-cost when instructions were incongruent with motor clustering. Computational simulations confirm that observed biases can be explained by leveraging overlap in cortical motor representations to improve outcome prediction and hence infer the structure to be learned. These results highlight the importance of sensorimotor constraints in abstract rule formation and shed light on why humans have strong biases to invent structure even when it does not exist.

In the real world, many relationships between events are uncertain and probabilistic. Uncertainty is also likely to be a more common feature of daily experience for youth because they have less experience to draw from than adults. Some studies suggest probabilistic learning may be inefficient in youths compared to adults, while others suggest it may be more efficient in youths in mid adolescence. Here we used a probabilistic reinforcement learning task to test how youth age 8-17 (N = 187) and adults age 18-30 (N = 110) learn about stable probabilistic contingencies. Performance increased with age through early-twenties, then stabilized. Using hierarchical Bayesian methods to fit computational reinforcement learning models, we show that all participants' performance was better explained by models in which negative outcomes had minimal to no impact on learning. The performance increase over age was driven by 1) an increase in learning rate (i.e. decrease in integration time scale); 2) a decrease in noisy/exploratory choices. In mid-adolescence age 13-15, salivary testosterone and learning rate were positively related. We discuss our findings in the context of other studies and hypotheses about adolescent brain development.