Current psychological accounts of causal representation and
reasoning do not capture phenomena related to causation by
omission (e.g., “The absence of breathing causes death”),
with one exception (Wolff, Barbey, & Hausknecht, 2010). We
describe a novel theory of omissive causation that posits that
people build discrete mental simulations – mental models – of
causal relations (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird 2001). The
theory states that causes by omission refer to a set of
temporally ordered models of possibilities. Reasoners tend to
focus on only one of those models, i.e., the possibility in
which breathing does not occur and death subsequently does.
Likewise, the theory posits that reasoners distinguish between
omission in the context of causation, enabling conditions, and
prevention. We describe some initial predictions made by the
model-based account, contrast it with an alternative
psychological theory based on the transmission of causal
forces, and set out directions for further research.