The current research examines what types of change are perceived as allowable versus disallowable in the self while still maintaining a sense of personal continuity. We find that overall, improvements are seen as more allowable than worsening or unspecified change, although this difference varies in magnitude based on the centrality of the trait being considered. Additionally, valence interacts with expectations of change, such that the differential impact of positive versus negative change on self-continuity is largest when positive change is expected, but is attenuated when negative change is expected.

A large literature implicates time preference (i.e., how much an outcome retains value as it is delayed) as a predictor of a wide range of behaviors, because most behaviors involve sooner and delayed consequences. We aimed to provide the most comprehensive examination to date of how well laboratory-derived estimates of time preference relate to self-reports of 36 behaviors, ranging from retirement savings to flossing, in a test-rest design using a large sample (N = 1,308) and two waves of data collection separated by 4.5 months. Time preference is significantly-albeit modestly-associated with about half of the behaviors; this is true even when controlling for 15 other demographic variables and psychologically relevant scales. There is substantial variance in the strengths of associations that is not easily explained. Time preference's predictive validity falls in the middle of these 16 possible predictors. Finally, we ask time preference researchers (N = 55) to predict the variation in the relationship between time preference and behaviors, and although they are reasonably well-calibrated, these experts tend to overestimate the predictive power of time preference estimates. We discuss implications of invoking time preference as a predictor and/or determinant of behaviors with delayed consequences in light of our findings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

We investigated people’s assessments of their own personal change over time, comparing predicted, actual, and recalled change in personality, values, and performance. On average, participants underestimated the absolute magnitude of their personal change in both prediction and recall. However, people specifically neglected negative future change, resulting in overly optimistic predictions of improvement. In contrast, recall of positive and negative change was relatively more balanced, such that assessments of past improvement were better calibrated on average. Our findings provide insight into how people think about their own identity over time and address disparate theories in the literature regarding predictions of personal stability versus improvement.

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that people moralize at least six distinct kinds of virtues. These virtues are divided into “individualizing” and “binding” virtues. Despite widespread enthusiasm for MFT, it is unknown how plausible it is as a model of people’s conceptualizations of the moral domain. In this research, we take a bottom-up approach to characterizing people’s conceptualization of the moral domain, and derive a taxonomy of morality that does not resemble MFT. We find that this model more accurately reflects people’s theories of morality than does MFT.

We investigate the age-old questions of what makes us whowe are and what features of identity, if changed, would makeus a different person. Previous approaches to identity havesuggested that there is a type of feature that is most definingof identity (e.g., autobiographical memories or moralqualities). We propose a new approach to identity thatsuggests that, like concepts in general, more causally centralfeatures are perceived as more defining of the self-concept. Inthree experiments, using both measured and manipulatedcausal centrality, we find that changes to features of identitythat are perceived as more causally central are moredisruptive to both the identity of the self and others.