Will people maintain their initial intuitive decision even when they know the rational answer is different? Some dual-process models assume that there is a process of detection and correction of initial intuitive biases. But do these models also account for patterns of behaviour that some people exhibit when they return to their initial intuitive response, even after acknowledging the rational response? Over four studies we tested for acquiescence by asking participants to solve congruent and incongruent problems utilising a three-response decision paradigm, manipulating base-rate and ratios as well as measuring both Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) responses. Results suggest that for incongruent problems participants demonstrated acquiescence across all studies. In addition, although individuals appear to be more rational, and can explicitly recognise the rational response, in some case when moderated by task characteristics, and cognitive reflection, they are unable to supress their initial intuitive decision.

The purpose of these studies was to investigate the role of distributed cognition in defusing the impact of evaluative pressure caused by performance-approach goals on mental arithmetic performance. Performance-approach goals can generate worrying thoughts that can deplete working memory resources. However, some of these working memory limitations can be compensated by off-loading the internal cognitive process to the external environment. We tested this prediction in two experiments. Participants carried out modular arithmetic tasks in a performance-approach goal or mastery- approach goal condition crossed with interactivity or no interactivity. Performance-approach goal manipulation hampered cognitive performance (accuracies), (Experiment 1). However, these negative effects were defused with the help of interactivity (Experiment 2). Interestingly, the mastery-focused individuals had a performance drop in the interactive condition (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2). Finally, experiment 2 reported higher maths anxiety levels for the performance- focused individuals. Reasons for the findings and future implications will be discussed.

The purpose of the current study was to investigate the role of interactivity (the use of pen and paper) in defusingthe impact of stereotype threat on difficult mental arithmetic tasks, covering all four operations of mathematics. Eighty-four16-year-old girls from secondary schools in South East England (UK) participated in this study. Participants carried out (in aneducational setting) difficult, multi-digit mental arithmetic tasks in a stereotype threat or control condition, crossed with interac-tivity or no interactivity. The primary dependent variables were the overall performance of the participants in accuracy, latencyto solution, working memory, and mathematics anxiety. Increased interactivity enhanced mental arithmetic performance. Girlsin the stereotype condition performed worse in the working memory test than the participants in the control condition. However,there was no causal role of working memory in reduced mathematics performance under stereotype threat. Reasons for thisfinding and recommendations for future studies are discussed.

Despite progress in understanding the sources of difficulty in solving insight problems, how new ideas are discovered, implemented, and learned is poorly understood. We report an experiment testing a theory of how individuals use failed attempts to discover new ideas. We compared performance on the nine-dot problem with a variant requiring solution using three lines rather than four. Results supported predictions that the three-line variant is easier than the four-line, and that transfer of solution knowledge from the three- to the four-line version is facilitative, but not vice-versa. Additionally, varying the spacing between dots facilitated discovery and transfer of solutions in both variants. Our theory specifies a priority order for seeking new ideas that offers a partial solution to the frame problem. Individuals first seek ideas from the problem statement and attempts they make. Only when these sources fail do they resort to searching memory or the external task environment.

A number of frameworks for capturing insight phenomena have been proposed, but there are no executable models of knowledge-lean insight problem-solving. Here, an ACT-R model is presented for the nine-dot problem, which implements the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress theory for this problem. The model has two main components: a mechanism for searching for possible moves in the problem representation, and a mechanism for expanding the search to discover new moves not immediately available in the initial problem representation. The model accounts for key phenomena including impasse, fixation and the ‘aha’ moment, as well as predicting the relative difficulty of different problem variants.