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Open Access Publications from the University of California

Scholarly Works (2 results)

  • Thesis
  • Peer Reviewed
UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations (2015)
The Internet has become an engine for growth and innovation and has been responsible for the heretofore unprecedented scale of sharing and access to information. However, today the Internet is also used for the illegal exchange of copyrighted materials. The fast changing nature of the Internet meant that the traditional copyright law was ill-equipped to handle this infringement. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was introduced as an attempt to address the changing needs of the copyright law. One of the salient additions of the law was an extra-judicial mechanism to remove allegedly infringing content. This thesis examines the takedown process in practice in a structured fashion. As part of this work, we analyze the takedown notices made available to the public, in particular the Chilling Effects repository. We also run active measurement studies to understand the actions and reactions of the system as a whole. In addition to this, we address questions about the DMCA Section 512 process and the entities involved in this process. Finally, we also make specific observations and recommendations in an attempt to structure the future work in addition to summarizing the results of this work. In particular, we find that while the process is not able to take down all the infringing content, it is able to make it less accessible to a casual user
    Cover page: A New Look at the DMCA Section 512 Takedown Process
    • Thesis
    • Peer Reviewed
    UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations (2022)

    DNS infrastructure hijacks are a class of attacks wherein the attack is theresult of an attacker controlling part or all of the DNS infrastructure for a domain. These hijacks are typically a byproduct of attackers exploiting errors and inconsistencies in how nameserver delegations are specified, or attackers gaining authority to update delegation records on behalf of the domain owner. Significantly, attacks on DNS infrastructure can impact nearly all users of a domain. Thus, understanding DNS infrastructure hijacks is of critical importance given that it undermines trust in services hosted at the hijacked domain.

    In this dissertation, I directly address the challenges inherent in identifyingDNS infrastructure hijacks. In particular, I demonstrate it is feasible to infer hijacks as a third-party by leveraging large-scale measurements of the DNS ecosystem supplemented by a wide array of complementary data sources which help provide a broader context for interpreting the DNS measurements. In doing so, I show how large-scale measurements can help not only identify instances of high-value domains being hijacked, but also uncover long-standing operational practices exposing large numbers of domains unbeknownst to the domain owner. I first describe a large-scale measurement study across the Internet to comprehensively identify the extent of errors and inconsistencies in nameserver delegations and how it affects the security and efficiency of the resolution process. In the course of this first study, I discovered long-standing operational practices that exposed nearly half a million domains over nine years to the risk of hijack. In a second study, I then explored in depth the domain hijacking risk caused by these undocumented operational practices in the DNS ecosystem. While the two studies highlighted opportunistic hijacks wherein the security of the DNS infrastructure is undermined due to actions of the domain owner or registrar, in a final project, I explored targeted hijacks wherein an attacker actively takes control of DNS configuration for the domain. Overall in this dissertation, I present a qualitative and quantitative exploration of DNS infrastructure hijacks.

      Cover page: Identifying DNS Infrastructure Hijacks using Large Scale Measurements
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