UC Berkeley
IURD Working Paper Series

Title
Critical Planning: The Autonomy of Social Movements

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9z21z50f

Author
Stryker, Sean D.

Publication Date
1992-04-01

Working Paper 574

Critical Planning: The Autonomy of Social Movements

Sean D. Stryker

April 1992

University of California at Berkeley

Critical Planning: The Autonomy of Social Movement

Sean D. Stryker

CRITICAL PLANNING: THE AUTONOMY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Sean D. Stryker
University of California at Berkeley

PLANNING AND CRITICAL THEORY

The American reception of German critical theory has been limited so far mainly to the academic professions of sociology and political science, where figures such as Marcuse, Horkheimer, and Habermas have gained a small following of young scholars interested in linking neo-Marxist theory with broader critiques of modern culture and technology.[1] Recently, however, with John Forester's work, critical theory has taken a more practical turn.[2] Forester applies the social philosophy of Habermas to the practice of urban planning, policy analysis, and public administration. To compensate for structural inequalities in capitalist society through "a political democratization of daily communication,"[3] Forester advocates a new, participatory democratic style of public decision-making based on "communicative action," or "undistorted communication," in the planning process. He challenges planners and analysts to move beyond technical problem-solving and strategic bargaining strategies —"to work toward effective equality, substantive democratic participation and voice, and... away from the perpetuation of systematic racial, sexual, and economic domination."[4]

Forester actually brings together two different trends in planning research and education: a growing concern with the problem of knowledge in planning, and the emergence of advocacy planning. The first trend is associated with the "interpretive" critique of positivist methodology in the social sciences. The second is an extension of the left and community movements of the 1960s. The convergence of these trends raises the central problem of critical theory— the problem of "knowledge-power" relations — in a policy-oriented context. Along with Habermas and other critical theorists, Forester asks how the construction and use of knowledge is related to the exercise of power in society; but Forester also asks a more essential question: what constitutes "critical practice?"

The problem of knowledge in planning can be traced to the decline of the "classical model" of comprehensive, long-term planning.[5] As early as the 1950s, researchers began pointing out discrepancies between the ideal concept of the "master plan" and the realities of public decision-making in complex political environments.[6] Questions about the value of large-scale models[7] and planners' ability to solve "wicked problems"[8] have contributed to growing skepticism about formal systems and methods, but no other single technique has been established in place of the general plan.

Instead of relying exclusively on general plans, today most planners combine a variety of formal techniques of analysis and design with political strategies for achieving limited objectives through "satisficing"[9] or "disjointed incrementalism."[10]   Attempts have been made to find a new basis for comprehensive planning — for example, through a "middle-range bridge" for comprehensive planning,[11] or by making planning *procedurally,* if not substantively, systematic.[12] These efforts do not address a more fundamental, underlying problem in the methodology of the policy sciences, however.

The failure of comprehensive planning has become linked to the "interpretive" critique of positivist methodology in the social sciences. Since the 1970s, critics have challenged the view that social scientific problems are best solved through methods of empirical hypotheses testing by induction or falsification.[13] Some theorists investigating the actual practice of scientific research have argued that this methodology is based on a false or misleading conception of natural science.[14] Others, drawing on the traditions of phenomenology, hermeneutics, cultural anthropology, or Weberian sociology, have maintained that the object of knowledge is different in the "human" or "cultural" sciences. Unlike physicists or biologists, social scientists must discover the meanings of symbolic representations or cultural practices, according to this view. Because these meanings are socially constructed through human interaction, an "interpretive" methodology is needed to gain access to the publicly constituted understanding participants have of themselves in the social world.[15]

The interpretive critique of positivism has been carried over into the policy sciences. Researchers investigating the actual practice of policy analysis have argued that it is not, as conventionally believed, the application of "objective" scientific knowledge to social problems, but rather a complex, discursive process linked to politics and ideology.[16] Attempts have also been made to re-think the foundations of policy analysis from an interpretive perspective emphasizing the implications of policy research for the identities and values of human subjects.[17]

John Forester's work is aligned with this trend. He emphasizes that planners are not neutral scientific observers investigating objective facts, but that they help people develop common understandings of social problems through processes of symbolic interaction that are linked to values, politics, and ideology. Planners are not, he observes,

> apolitical problem-solvers or social engineers. Instead, they are actually pragmatic critics who must make selective arguments and therefore influence what other people learn about, not by technically calculating means to ends . . . but by organizing attention carefully to project possibilities, organizing for practical political purposes and organizational ends . . .[18]

Unlike other interpretive theorists of the policy sciences, however, Forester's attack on the "scientific" model of planning is connected with a critique of social power. Planners are not technical

problem-solvers, but they must also do more than negotiate bargaining arrangements among elected officials, business leaders, and other elite stakeholders. Instead of confining themselves to the role of professional mediators, Forester adopts the view of advocacy planning— that professionals should actively engage in politics on behalf of the poor and disenfranchised.[19] Like Davidoff, who argues that planners should represent the interests of the underrepresented within the political arena, Forester calls for professionals to work against prevailing structures of power. Because capitalist elites exercise unfair influence in the governmental process, in his view, they should adopt a critical orientation.

Forester combines the perspective of advocacy planning with the interpretive critique of scientific policy analysis by addressing how power is exercised through control over knowledge and communication. His proposals for practice are focused on ways to re-design the communicative process in public decision-making. Habermas's concept of "systematically distorted communication" plays an important role here. "The control of capital by the relatively few in society means more than the possession of wealth," Forester tells us.

> It means access, time, and expert ability to press positions and arguments in both formal-bureaucratic and informal settings; it spells a systematic distortion of the possibilities of all affected people coming to terms with events shaping their lives. In their daily work, then, planning analysts face a recurrent political choice: to anticipate and partially counteract such distorted claims, or to acquiesce in the face of them, to be complicit in obscuring them from public view.[20]

Elites discourage active citizen participation by controlling agenda-setting and decision-making in the governmental process. More importantly, they influence citizens' own awareness of their problems and interests. The public's understanding of policy issues, trust in government, consent to political decisions, and knowledge of the economic and administrative structures that affect everyday life are manipulated through "systematically distorted communication." As a consequence, in spite of formally democratic institutions, the ruling class is able:

> (1) to legitimate and perpetuate itself while it seeks to extent its power; (2) to exclude particular groups systematically from decision-making processes that affect their lives; (3) to promote the political and moral illusions that science and technology, through professionals and experts, can solve political problems; and so (4) to restrict public political argument, participation, and mobilization regarding a broad range of public welfare-oriented policy alternatives that are incompatible with existing patterns of ownership, wealth, and power.[21]

Forester's solution is to have planners correct or mitigate distorted communication through "the careful, political organization of attention that can counteract these influences."[22] When confronted with the effects of power, planners should organize knowledge and communication in a way

that encourages a more equitable and democratic participation. Thus, like advocacy planning, Forester's critical planning is aimed at correcting inequalities that are deeply rooted in the structures of capitalist society; to overcome these inequalities, however, the planner's role is not so much to advocate specific positions on behalf of the powerless as it is to maintain the conditions for free speech, equal participation, or "undistorted communication" in the planning process.

Forester's work is an important advance toward a theory and practice of critical planning, but it suffers from certain problems carried from Habermasian theory. To assess Forester's contribution to critical planning, it is necessary to review Habermas's work, then consider how the concepts he employs can be applied to the actual experience of participatory democratic organizations in contemporary society. Habermas's categories are useful analytic tools, but his theory is not adequately grounded in historical experience. Only through an examination of evidence drawn from practical attempts to institutionalize communicative action can Forester's work be evaluated properly.

THE CRITICAL THEORY OF HABERMAS

Habermas's critique of scientific positivism and his theoretical claims for an alternative moral or "practical" form of reason reflect a lasting concern with the role of the public in contemporary society and politics. In an effort to recover the original intent of Enlightenment thinkers to ground law and policy in the rationality of its citizens, Habermas advocates an emancipatory politics based on the active participation of citizens in the governmental process. Against the encroachment of scientific or technical reason in public life, he calls for a "radical reformism" that stakes the claims of community solidarity against the market and the state "through a wide range of democratic forums and institutions."[23]

In his earliest major work, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas argues that mass parties and interest groups have displaced the "public sphere" as the basis of state law and policy in liberal democratic societies.[24] With the institutionalization of parliamentary democracy, state policy had come to depend upon the moral-rational consensus of private citizens in the 18th century, but an inherent conflict between liberal ideology and capitalist property relations undermined the integrity of the public sphere when workers, tenants, and small farmers succeeded at mobilizing public opinion against the bourgeois state and capitalism itself. In the 19th century, when justice could no longer be guaranteed by negative restrictions on state power, active government intervention in civil society was required to guarantee the conditions of equal opportunity and participation by "unpropertied masses," so the state undertook to regulate economic production and exchange in civil society. At the same time, however, powerful private citizens formed new kinds of political association to influence state policy. Popular struggles were

defused, according to Habermas, by divesting the public of its original role in legitimating government authority. In the 19th century, he tells us, the state and civil society

> intermeshed without involving any rational-critical public debate on the part of private people. The public was largely relieved of this task by other institutions: on the one hand by associations in which collectively organized private interests directly attempted to take on the form of political agency; on the other hand by parties which, fused with the organs of public authority, established themselves, as it were, *above* the public whose instruments they once were. The process of politically relevant exercise and equilibration of power now takes place directly between the private bureaucracies, special-interest associations, parties, and public administration. The public as such is included only sporadically in this circuit of power, and even then it is brought in only to contribute to its acclamation.[25]

Habermas carries this analysis further in later writings, where he argues that the interdependence of science, technology, industry, and government administration in contemporary society has transformed politics into a "technical" enterprise.[26] Government is no longer concerned with achieving a good society, he says; it has ceased to be concerned with "the realization of practical goals" and become preoccupied with discovering "the solution of technical problems."[27]

> Old-style politics was forced, merely through its traditional form of legitimation, to define itself in relation to practical goals: the 'good life' was interpreted in a context defined by interaction relations. The same still held for the ideology of bourgeois society. The substitute program prevailing today, in contrast, is aimed exclusively at the functioning of a manipulated system . . . . The solution of technical problems is not dependent on public discussion. Rather, public discussion could render problematic the framework within which the tasks of government action present themselves as technical ones. Therefore, the new politics of state interventionism requires a depoliticization of the mass of the population. To the extent that practical questions are eliminated, the public realm also loses its political function.[28]

In *Knowledge and Human Interests,* Habermas attempts to establish theoretical grounds for an alternative to "technical reason." He develops a scheme of categories which define three different forms of knowledge based on their respective functions or utilities in the natural history of the human species. Thus, Habermas distinguishes between: (1) a *technical interest* in achieving control over objectified natural processes, associated with work; (2) a *practical interest* in achieving understanding with respect to shared norms and values, associated with language, and (3) an *emancipatory interest* in achieving freedom from conditions of domination, associated with power.[29]

Each of the "knowledge-constitutive interests" is institutionalized, according to Habermas, in a corresponding type of science. The technical interest formalizes the "empirical-analytic" sciences, where inquiry "stabilizes purposive-rational, feedback-monitored action in an environment objecti-

fied from the point of view of possible technical control."[30]   The practical interest is institutionalized in the "historical-hermeneutic" sciences, where investigation is concerned, not with explaining facts, but with understanding meanings. "Whereas empirical-analytic methods aim at disclosing and comprehending reality under the transcendental viewpoint of possible technical control, hermeneutic methods aim at maintaining the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding in ordinary-language communication and in action according to common norms."[31]   Finally, critical sciences, such as psychoanalysis, formalize rules for the emancipatory interest. Critical inquiry combines interpretations of meaning with empirical analysis to discover meanings not consciously recognized or intended. Like psychoanalysis, in the critical sciences the subject of knowledge is a process of reconstructing "distorted information" (symptoms) where "*the act of understanding* to which it leads is self-reflection."[32]

> A critical social science . . . is concerned . . . to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed. To the extent that this is the case, the *critique of ideology,* as well, moreover, as *psychoanalysis,* take into account that information about lawlike connections sets off a process of reflection in the consciousness of those whom the laws are about. Thus the level of unreflected consciousness, which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can be transformed.[33]

This scheme is revised in *The Theory of Communicative Action,* where the critique of technical reason is carried out at the institutional level through the concepts of "system" and "lifeworld."[34] The technical and practical orientations are no longer defined as "quasi-transcendental" categories of knowledge in the language of Kantian metaphysics, but are now recast as types of "rationality" in language. The empirical-analytic sciences and formal economic and administrative institutions are here both associated with purposive-rational, or teleological action. "The actor attains an end or brings about the occurrence of a desired state by choosing means that have promise of being successful in a given situation. The central concept is that of a *decision* among alternative course of action, with a view toward the realization of an end . . ."[35] The market and the state are organized through a special type of teleological action, which Habermas calls "strategic." *Strategic action* involves "at least two goal-directed acting subjects who achieve their ends by way of an orientation to, and influence on, the decisions of other actors." Each participant "is oriented to his own success and behaves cooperatively only to the degree that this fits with his egocentric calculus of utility."[36]

Together, markets and bureaucratic institutions constitute what Habermas calls the *system* of strategic action in modern society. He contrasts the system with the *lifeworld,* where interaction is based on *norms* instead of *goals.* The lifeworld is "a cultural stock of knowledge" consisting of the "interpretive work of preceding generations."[37] Two types of action are possible here. Where

norms are given to actors in the form of traditions, action is *normatively regulated;* the lifeworld provides "situation definitions that are presupposed by participants as unproblematic."[38] Norms are not always given *a priori,* however; they can also be socially constructed through interaction. Where actors negotiate consensus on the validity of norms through dialogue, instead of simply accepting them as given, Habermas speaks of *communicative action.* Communicative action "permits interactions that are not guided by normatively *ascribed* agreement but—directly or indirectly—by communicatively achieved agreement."[39] It involves

> the interaction of at least two subjects . . . who establish interpersonal relations . . . . The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of *interpretation* refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situation which admit of consensus.[40]

These categories are useful analytic tools for the study of modern society. Unfortunately, Habermas develops a teleological theory of history using these categories, instead of examining the actual relationship between them in historical experience. Norms in a traditional society are associated with religious-metaphysical worldviews, Habermas argues. They are removed from the possibility of rational criticism. With the transition to modernity, however, traditional beliefs and values are "decentered"; that is, subject to rational criticism. Thus, in contrast to ancient religious law, modern law is based on "a consensus that is achieved communicatively, that is, agreed upon."[41] Habermas characterizes the development of modern society as the "rationalization of the lifeworld."

This characterization, which is based more on Hegelian metaphysics than empirical reality, has at least two major problems. First, it relegates traditional societies to the status of *irrationality,* a perspective that is admissible only as an ethnocentric perspective. More importantly, however, Habermas's rationalization thesis implies that normatively regulated action is not important, or does not exist, in modern society. Believing that all norms are or should be negotiated through communicative action, Habermas is unable to admit the necessity of institutionalizing normative systems in order to coordinate strategic action effectively.

Habermas's failure to recognize the extent to which strategic interaction depends upon stable cultural norms in turn leads to a paradoxical theory of "internal colonization." The rationalization of the lifeworld makes it possible for laws or norms to be grounded in principles of justice for which there are good reasons, but it also imposes new burdens on actors to achieve rational agreements. Evidently, the rationalized lifeworld is unequipped to handle these burdens, since other mechanisms—money and power—take over the function of coordinating action in a modern, functionally differentiated society. By structuring social organization through strategic

interaction, these non-linguistic steering media "spare us the costs of dissensus because they uncouple the coordination of action from consensus formation in language . . ."[42]

The paradox is this: while institutionalized systems of strategic interaction are functionally necessary in modern society, they are also culturally and historically contingent, arbitrary forms of domination. On the one hand, strategic action systems are functionally necessary due to the inherent limitations of communicative action. On the other, they overstep their appropriate boundaries by "colonizing" the normative sphere of the lifeworld. When systems of strategic action interfere with the normal functions of symbolic reproduction in the lifeworld, Habermas writes, "systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social integration even in those areas where a consensus-dependent coordination of action cannot be replaced, that is, where the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld is at stake. In these areas, the *mediatization* of the lifeworld assumes the form of a *colonization*."[43]

> [A] progressively rationalized lifeworld is both uncoupled from and made
> dependent upon increasingly complex, formally organized domains of action,
> like the economy and the state administration. This dependency, resulting
> from the *mediatization* of the lifeworld by system imperatives, assumes the
> sociopathological form of an *internal colonization* when critical disequilibria
> in material reproduction . . . can be avoided only at the cost of disturbances in
> the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld— that is, of "subjectively"
> experienced, identity-threatening crises or pathologies.[44]

The system-lifeworld relationship has an ambiguous status in Habermas's theory. The categories of "mediatization" and "colonization" are used to distinguish between a normal and pathological relationship between lifeworld and system, but it is not clear how this distinction applies in practice. The same dilemma is reflected in the problematic "quasi-transcendental" status of the knowledge-constitutive interests.

The fundamental problem here is that the distinction between those structures of strategic action which are functionally necessary, on the one hand, and those which represent arbitrary and damaging invasions of the social lifeworld, on the other, has to be decided through *praxis*. Because Habermas does not investigate how his analytic categories are actually related in practice, however, he is unable to distinguish clearly between necessary and contingent aspects of existing social organization. To assess his claim that a more democratic basis for modern social organization can be established by restoring the functions of communicative action in the social lifeworld, therefore, it is necessary to consider how communicative action can be practiced in a concrete, empirical way.

COMMUNICATIVE ACTION IN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

Habermas's analysis of technical rationality is purely theoretical. He does not investigate the problem at a level sufficiently empirical to assess the validity of his own theoretical constructions. This lack of a grounding in actual historical experience is carried over into John Forester's planning theory. Forester overlooks the degree to which communicative action undermines the institutionalization of collective norms, efficient decision-making, and the achievement of strategic goals—practical necessities for any formal organization—largely because Habermas's approach, confined to the level of an abstract theory of language, does not examine the concrete organizational forms of communicative action.

An examination of the actual historical experience of participatory democratic organizations in industrial societies suggests that certain internal contradictions make it very difficult, if not impossible, to build formal organizations on the basis of communicative action. This can be seen in the experience of three "left-libertarian" organizations: the Students for a Democratic Society, the Green Party in Germany, and the American Greens' Committees of Correspondence. Participants in each of these social movement organizations have established conditions for exercising communicative action through innovative new forms of collective group structures and decision-making processes.

The American New Left

Three decades ago, the American Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) called for "a democracy of individual participation governed by two central aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and the direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and promote the media for their common participation."[45] Breaking with existing social democratic, trade union, and Marxist-Leninist groups, SDS sought to create a "new left" in the United States. They attempted not only to change society through external strategies, but also to create a new model of participatory democracy for alternative social institutions.[46]

After several years of intellectual ferment and urban community organizing activities, SDS rode a wave of student activism against the Vietnam war and draft to the leading anti-war organization in the United States during the 1960s. Over the course of the decade, participants gradually adopted radical new forms of internal organization and self-governance. The New Left activists sought to create a formal organization based on communicative action. By eliminating formal rules and structures, they sought to establish the conditions for equal participation in the discussion of goals, strategies, structure, and process —to open a space in which all participants were free to criticize

9

and debate, not only the legitimacy of American social institutions and policies, but also the internal validity claims of the organization of SDS itself.

Several authors have described the open, informal, non-hierarchical style of organization within SDS, but Wini Breines's distinction between "prefigurative" and "strategic" orientations is particularly insightful. *Prefigurative* politics opposes "hierarchy and centralized organization" with "community" —"a network of relationships more direct and more personal than the formal, abstract and instrumental relationships characterizing state and society."[47] According to Breines, SDS activists attempted to build an organization based on "connectedness, meaningful personal relationships, and direct participation" which could exercise "control over economic, political and social institutions based on the needs of the individual and the community . . ."[48] In practice, this meant dismantling formal, bureaucratic structures of authority: "the distance between leaders and participants, between national officers and membership, was vigorously solved by eliminating leaders, office functions, the division of labor, centralized decision making, formal democracy."[49]

Breines observes, however, that some members, especially the national leadership, felt a need for more formal organization. These activists were committed "to building organization in order to achieve major structural changes in the political, economic, and social orders. Organization-building and strategic thinking were central to strategic politics . . ."[50] But the strategic orientation was difficult to reconcile with the movement's communicative action orientation. Encouraging debate on its internal validity claims undermined SDS's ability to response to strategic imperatives: "participatory democracy presented difficulties in a large organization that was feeling pressured to *lead,* to fix priorities, to focus on specific programs and policies, to incorporate masses of people, in other words, to utilize their energies in an effective and focused manner."[51] At the same time, the necessity of establishing a permanent normative order and mobilizing resources for effective strategic action undermined the conditions for equal participation: "New leftists, committed to the values embodied in participatory democracy, were unable satisfactorily to operationalize participation, particularly decision-making, in a mass political organization. In some cases they attempted to utilize participatory democracy inappropriately, unintentionally producing elitism and making it almost impossible to make decisions."[52]

SDS actually started with a relatively conventional structure and decision-making process inherited from its parent organization, the League for Industrial Democracy. More decentralized structures and less formal decision-making processes were gradually adopted through a series of "internal revolutions" as new members joined the organization in opposition to the Vietnam war. Although many local chapters were successful, the commitment to communicative action proved to be incommensurable with the strategic and normative imperatives associated with mobilizing

10

effective mass opposition to state policy at the national level. Unable to achieve or even define their collective goals in the face of government repression, intransient liberal politics, and public apathy, and unable to define workable internal rules of order, a division of labor, or leadership responsibilities, frustrated student activists turned to ever more militant strategies during the 1960s. Efforts to reach agreements of common strategies, identities, and rules of organization were made through a search for a theory that could relate the position of university students to the Marxist analysis of capitalism, but SDS's open, informal style made it susceptible to takeovers by more disciplined, hierarchical groups, such as the Progressive Labor Party, whose norms and strategies, as defined by traditional Marxist ideologies, were removed from the possibility of rational criticism.

The internal contradictions between formal organization and communicative action contributed to SDS's demise: it broke up into a variety of revolutionary cadre-style factions in 1969. Certainly historical events, demographic trends, government repression, and other external factors contributed to the particular experience of the American New Left, but it is equally clear that SDS's original experiment in participatory democracy ultimately failed. Arguably, activists did succeed at bringing about significant changes in American society and foreign policy, but they did not demonstrate how participatory democracy could serve as the basis for a new society. They were unable to institutionalize communicative action within a formal organization.

The German Green Party

After the decline of the New Left, the practice of participatory democracy was carried on with less public visibility in the feminist, ecology, and anti-nuclear protest movements of the 1970s. These movements spawned new initiatives in electoral politics in Western Europe during the 1980s. Again, "left-libertarian" activists attempted to combine a prefigurative orientation with strategic political action —this time in the parliamentary arena.

The Green Party was formed after a period of rapid growth in the "citizen initiatives" in what was then West Germany. These local administrative lobbying and litigation campaigns initially addressed collective consumption issues —such as housing, education, health care, and public transportation —but increasingly gave way to more militant, nonviolent protests against national energy, environmental, and nuclear policies in the 1970s. Activists began running as "greens" and "alternative" candidates in the early 1980s.[53] The national Green Party sought to "supplement" the extra-parliamentary activists of the grassroots disarmament, anti-nuclear, feminist, and ecology movements through "work in the municipal councils, state parliaments, and *Bundestag*."[54] Like the new social movements, the Greens adopted a participatory democratic form of organization;

11

unlike traditional parties, the Green Party was conceived as an "anti-party party." The "theory of two legs" called for a dual organization:

> With one leg, we stand firmly in the citizens' initiative movement and partici-
> pate actively in discussions and in actions. With the other leg, we want to be the
> yeast in the dough of the established parties, bring new incentives for thoughts
> into parliament and be the parliamentary vote for the political ideas and wishes
> of the citizens' initiatives.[55]

Attempting to incorporate communicative action into a formal electoral organization created organizational problems similar to those encountered by the American New Left, but with different consequences. The Green Party found itself split between "realists" (*Realos*) and "fundamentalists" (*Fundis*). The fundamentalists viewed the party as a vehicle for extending the educational and protest activists of the new social movements into the parliamentary arena. The realists, on the other hand, wanted to exercise power through strategic legislative action, which required entering into bargaining agreements and coalition governments with other parties.

This ongoing factional conflict has mirrored problems of internal organization. Kitschelt describes these as the "perverse effects" of grassroots democracy. The organization of the Green Party "caters to ideological sensibilities by preserving a fluid, informal participatory dynamic," he observes; it is designed to encourage "communicative skills that maintain participatory openness and flexibility in spite of the perverse effects ..."[56] To become "effective political players," however, the Green Party has needed "a cohesive, disciplined party organization and a consistent, moderate political strategy that appeals to marginal supporters."[57] External relations, which are "geared toward the realities of political power and party competition," require an "instrumental strategic capacity for coping successfully with political adversaries and exercising influence over public policy."[58]

The Green Party has not experienced the same kind of "implosion" as the New Left, which operated in a more volatile political environment. Nevertheless, the rejection of centralized bureaucratic control in favor of loose, decentralized structures, informal decision-making procedures, and restrictions on the powers of party functionaries has undermined effective decision-making and the achievement of strategic goals. Kitschelt observes that "open, participatory conferences without central direction or methods for aggregating preferences ... bring about unintended consequences some militants interpret as deficiencies in the rationality and legitimacy of decision procedures."[59] Not only is the decision-making process "inconsistent and chaotic" but often "the rules of decision making themselves become the object of countless controversies."[60] The party leadership is frequently blamed for these deficiencies, which "paralyzes effective decision making altogether ..."[61] Because leaders are widely perceived as a threat to participatory democracy, those who are willing to become party officials are often inexperienced or worse; local party executive committees have

been describedas "organizational miscarriages," "rearguards of activists," and "collections of incompetents."[62] While rank-and-file members are called upon to participate actively in running the organization, many activists do not contribute at the needed level of effort. "Instead of a solidary, participatory, integrated party," according to Kitschelt, "a disjointed party with considerable membership turnover and small cliques of political entrepreneurs engaged in rapidly shifting battles and coalitions emerges."[63]

The conflict between communicative and strategic action orientations has also resulted, paradoxically, in unintended concentrations of power, since activists with greater skills and more resources tend to dominate internal politics. Without formal structures, Kitschelt observes, "power and influence move into a zone of informal communication and networking, where political entre-preneurs with wide personal power resources hold sway over conventions and parliamentary groups and over access to the mass media."[64] Because party officials are relatively weak, municipal councilors and parliamentary representatives have become *de facto* "informal elites."

Differences in the political environment, national culture, and historical period help explain variations in the consequences of attempting to institutionalize communicative action within the formal organizations of the American New Left and German Green Party. The Green Party was created in a nation with a parliamentary system of government, and during a period without a massive, spontaneous mobilization of students opposed to a neo-colonial war and draft. Partly in response to the German New Left's degeneration into militant revolutionary factions, the Greens deliberately chose a more reformist path, pursing electoral victories within the existing political system. Nevertheless, the essential contradiction can be observed in both cases: in order to establish the conditions for the unrestricted public debate, both SDS and *Die Gruenen* adopted decentralized, non-hierarchical structures, and open, informal decision-making procedures. Sanctioning the public criticism of internal validity claims through these practices undermined the normative foundations and strategic effectiveness of both national organizations, however.

The American Green Movement

When an attempt was made to launch a national Green political organization in the United States in the 1980s, similar problems ensued in an even more debilitating fashion.[65] The American Greens benefitted neither from a spontaneous grassroots mobilization nor from a relatively strong consensus on electoral goals. Recognizing that the American system of government discourages small parties, "realists" were unable to define a workable strategy for electoral action, and "funda-mentalists" gained control at an early stage of development. The Committees of Correspondence

(CoC), as the organization called itself, concentrated on non-electoral "movement" activities, such as public education, protest, and "alternative institution-building."

The internal governance of the CoC was deliberately modelled on the organizational principles of Murray Bookchin's anarchist philosophy of social ecology.[66] Bookchin argues that "an assembled public, united as free and autonomous individuals, can deal in a competent, face-to-face manner with the direction of public affairs."[67] To enable citizens to act as morally rational agents of self-government, however, Bookchin argues that it is necessary to replace the state and the market with political associations based on direct, face-to-face relationships of solidarity, mutual aid, and moral responsibility in small groups and local communities. The practice of direct democracy can be carried over to a larger scale, according to Bookchin, through mechanisms of "assembly" and "confederation."

Bookchin's philosophy was put into practice by the American Greens under the influence of Howard Hawkins, who drafted the original version of the CoC's Constitution (later renamed "Working Guidelines"). "An independent Green alternative cannot be a party in the traditional sense of a State out of power," according to Hawkins and Guy Chichester. "It has to be a new kind of party— a movement that is committed to re-empowering individuals and communities by re-institutionalizing grassroots power in the form of face-to-face assemblies of direct democracy . . ." The Greens should not seek to gain control of the state through either electoral work or revolutionary struggle. "The fundamental objective must be to democratize and decentralize the structure of governance itself, from one of rule by an elected few to one of self-government in community assemblies . . ."[68]

> The Green alternative would replace representative government as currently practiced —rule by an elected or self-appointed few—with direct democracy— self-government in face-to-face assemblies. Social functions requiring a scale larger than the face-to-face assembly would be coordinated from the grassroots up by confederal councils of deputies from the assemblies who are in regular consultations with and act under the imperative mandate of the assemblies.[69]

Thr powers of the national organization, designated the "Inter-regional Committee" (IC) in order to reflect its decentralized nature, were deliberately limited to sharing information among local groups. In principle, basic policy was decided by locals "at the grassroots base," and decisions made at regional and national levels were "determined from below though mandated and recallable representatives to conventions and coordinating bodies."[70] The Greens also made decisions by consensus, a process, inherited from the New Left, which was designed to promote democracy by guaranteeing that all minority viewpoints are dealt with before motions can be approved. Delegates to regional and national meetings were rotated, in principle to prevent a consolidation of elite power, and male-female teams were encouraged to promote gender balance (although in practice

14

local groups routinely violated the rules of delegate selection). Only formal delegates had the right to vote (in the case of a consensus failure, most groups allowed decisions to be approved by an 80 percent majority), but participation in discussions was open to everyone, and distinctions among voting members, non-voting members, and observers were rarely made in practice. As John Rensenbrink observes, the Greens have deliberately resisted adopting formal rules of order:

> The Interregional Committee (IC) during the past two years gradually, then more and more resolutely, resisted efforts to adopt a detailed, highly structured and formalized set of by-laws. Wishing, instead, to preserve and stimulate informality, direct relationships, grassroots initiatives, and flexible networking, we shied away from formal and abstract procedures . . . [W]e have simply resisted all efforts to saddle ourselves with elaborate formalities.[71]

The CoC was "restructured" in 1991. The IC was dissolved and replaced with a somewhat more centralized and formal organization after problems associated with the CoC's decentralized structure, informal rules of order, and consensual decision-making culminated in a widespread crisis of confidence within the movement. A series of mishaps and debacles at the national level had called widespread attention to the failure of the original model as the IC began to undertake complex projects, such as the development of a national platform, management of national office staff and finances, and filing for nonprofit 501(c)(3) status with the IRS. The limitations of "grass-roots democracy" had become apparent: With high rates of turnover among delegates, decisions at one meeting were being forgotten, ignored, or overturned at subsequent meetings. Attention was often being directed away from strategic and programmatic proposals toward ever-recurring questions of internal organization. Local, regional, and national groups were finding themselves extensively preoccupied with structural and procedural problems such as delegate seating, representation, and the process for deciding questions. Brian Tokar, a leading figure in the movement, described IC meetings as a series of "endless debates over organizational procedures, decision-making styles, membership rules, and fundraising strategies."[72] Charles Betz, coordinator of the restructuring process, agreed with this assessment:

> [T]here are some deep-seated structural problems with decision-making on the IC. The body spends most of its time debating administrative issues and little if any time on substantive political issues, such as endorsements, action campaigns, issue positions, and so on. And perhaps most importantly, the GCoC still lacks any mechanism for empowered response to the pressing issues of the day.[73]

And Betty Zisk observed similar problems in local groups:

> Almost every Green group has gone through a period of near-anarchy as people struggle to balance self-expression with self-discipline, to distinguish between creative and repressive leadership . . . and to develop norms for conducting their

business. At the local level, Greens have commented that they sometimes labor for months over a decision, only to have new people who walk in 'off the street' reopen the whole question . . . . One result of this difficult process is individual frustration and often a drop in membership. Some groups have split or disappeared after continued disagreement. In addition, allies may become impatient as deadlines pass for sponsorship of an event or filing candidate papers.[74]

The American Greens sought to demonstrate the viability of an alternative, participatory democratic, non-hierarchical type of political organization, but the CoC's decentralized structure limited the effectiveness of the movement's leadership. More importantly, since rules of order, membership criteria, decision-making, and other internal norms were deliberately kept open to debate, it was difficult for participants to reach agreement on goals, structures, and procedures. The structure and process were designed to allow participants to criticize the legitimacy of their own organization. No individual or group was given authority to make collective decisions, and none could be held accountable for actions in which all were involved to some extent. Everything was left open to debate in order to guarantee the necessary conditions for communicative action. But the consequences were serious. The American Greens were unable to mobilize labor, money, information, or other resources effectively. Without closure on internal validity claims, they were unable to institutionalize functional rules of order or reach agreement on strategic goals. Like the New Left and the German Green Party, the Committees of Correspondence experienced fundamental problems in attempting to create a formal organization based on communicative action.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING THEORY

The decline of comprehensive planning and the interpretive critique of scientific policy analysis point to fundamental limitations inherent in formal methods of bureaucratic public administration. Although planning analysts' theories, concepts, and methods for generating and organizing knowledge are useful, even indispensible, for specific purposes, they presuppose an *a priori* structure of thought which cannot reflect upon the conditions of its own possibility. Whether these limitations are inherent in human reason as such, or only in specific cultural and historical forms of rationality, it seems clear that the classical ideal of a perfectly complete and consistent system for the analysis of social problems and design of policy solutions is impractical.

Moreover, the actual use of "cognitive technologies" such as general planning, cost-benefit analysis, forecasting, and modelling is inextricably linked to the exercise and reproduction of power. In the absence of any absolute, positive ground for scientific knowledge, the policy sciences are unable to separate themselves from the institutional contexts from which they derive their

legitimacy. For this reason, the validity of planning and policy decisions cannot refer exclusively to the knowledge of scientific experts.

The limitations of the rationality of bureaucratic public institutions imply that the legitimacy of public choices must be grounded in a prior, normative consensus of private citizens. But this cannot be achieved through formal bureaucratic mechanisms. The moral-juridical foundations of planning, policy analysis , and public administration must either be determined by traditional beliefs, values, and practices, or through democratic processes of communicative action. Social movements play a central role in this determiniation. Through critical discourse about the legitimacy of state law and policy — often dramatized through protests, demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and other forms of collective action— social movements raise public consciousness about the value-rational claims of society's formal institutions and their activities. They mobilize the claims of ordinary citizens against the normative foundations of institutionalized systems of strategic action whose consequences they perceive to be unjust.

John Forester's conception of communicative action as something that can be practiced within formal government organizations under the control of professionals overlooks the problem of incommensurability. Although one cannot over-generalize, the history of the left-libertarian organizations reviewed in this paper suggests that communicative action cannot be practiced extensively within formal organizations. It can be exercised within decentralized, informal groups and networks — that is, in social movements — but communicative action tends to destabilize formal organizations by undermining the normative foundations for effective boundary maintenance, functional differentiation, and strategic action.

In the American New Left, the German Green Party, and the Committees of Correspondence, widely held beliefs concerning the importance of private citizens actively questioning the legitimacy of established institutions sanctioned public criticism of existing social, political, and economic policies, but the very same principle also sanctioned the criticism of *internal* validity claims of the movement organizations themselves. When applied to their own formal organizations, the communicative action orientation of participants undermined the specification of membership criteria, divisions of labor, efficient decision-making, goal-setting and achievement, and the mobilization of resources. We have seen that the problem resulted in different consequences, depending upon specific historical, cultural, and geographical circumstances, but its essential features were the same in each case: a fundamental incommensurability of communicative action with the normative and strategic requirements for "rational" organization.

17

The contradictions between communicative action and formal organization have two major implications for critical planning theory. First, because it is impossible to fully institutionalize communicative action, social movements must be regarded as necessary agents of social change. It is impossible to "plan" the transformation of the normative foundations of the planning agency itself. The legitimacy of public institutions must be addressed at a level prior to these institutions themselves. Secondly, because it is impossible to create viable formal organizations based on communicative action, social movements themselves have only a limited capacity to bring about social change. These organizations are inherently inefficient and unstable, at least in a complex, large-scale society. Consequently, public criticism of the legitimacy of existing institutions, though necessary for social change, is not sufficient. Movements must be "institutionalized" through the development of workable formal organizations.

Together, these two general conclusions point to a different view of critical planning. As opposed to Forester's conception of a new breed of professional advocacy planner, who manages communicative action within an institutional setting, critical planning should be conceived as the mobilization and rationalization of social movements. The breakdown and reconstruction of public institutions is a volatile, dynamic process which no single actor can expect to regulate or control. The process simply cannot be planned. Perhaps it can be "facilitated," but the agency resides in the first instance with citizens working outside government, and the process involves working out new institutional structures and relationships through unpredictable interaction with powerholders.

Perhaps the success of this model of planning as the mobilization and institutionalization of social movements depends not so much on the design of better public institutions, as on recognition by planning analysts that their theories and methods are inherently limited in ways that are impossible for them to know, together with an understanding among movement activists that their public criticism of existing institutions must be translated somehow into practical alternatives. Together, perhaps, planners and activists can begin to work out a common understanding of the nature of this process and how it can be facilitated in a democratic society. Certainly this is an important direction for research and education in critical planning theory.

NOTES

[1] A good overview of German critical theory is provided in David Held's *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980). For more in-depth work on Habermas, see Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981). More recent works on Habermas include David Ingrahm, *Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), and David M. Rasmussen, *Reading Habermas* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1980).

[2] The major citation is John Forester, *Planning in the Face of Power* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989). Previous journal articles by Forester whose contents were incorporated into this text include "Critical Theory and Planning Practice," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 46 (July 1980): 261-74; and "Questioning and Organizing Attention: Toward a Critical Theory of Planning and Administrative Practice," *Administration & Society* 13 (August 1981): 161-201.

[3] Forester, *Planning in the Face of Power*, 21.

[4] Ibid., 60-61.

[5] For reviews of the literature on planning theory, see: Richard S. Bolan, "Emerging Views of Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 33 (July 1967): 233-45; John Friedmann and Barclay Hudson, "Knowledge and Action: A Guide to Planning Theory," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 40 (January 1974): 2-16; Barclay M. Hudson, "Comparison of Current Planning Theories: Counterparts and Contradictions," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 45 (October 1979): 387-398; Judith Innes de Neufville, "Planning Theory and Practice: Bridging the Gap," *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 3 (Summer 1983): 35-45; and John Friedman, *Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

[6] See Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, *Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1955); Lawrence D. Mann, "Studies in Community Decision-Making," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 30 (February 1964): 58-65; Alan Altschuler, "The Goals of Comprehensive Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 31 (August 1965): 186-95.

[7] Douglas B. Lee, Jr., "Requiem for Large-Scale Models," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 39 (May 1973): 163-78.

[8] Horst W. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences* 4 (1973): 155-169.

[9] James Q. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959).

[10] David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963).

[11] Martin Meyerson, "Building the Middle Range Bridge for Comprehensive Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 22 (Spring 1956): 58-64.

[12] Andreas Faludi, *Planning Theory* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1973).

[13] The inductivist perspective is well represented by William Fielding Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Sociology*, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964). The falsificationist view is advanced by Karl Popper in *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1959). See also Popper's *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1963).

[14] See Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (London: Verso, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

[15] Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958); Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967). Overviews of some of these issues are provided in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds., *Interpretive Social Science: A Reader* (Berkeley and Los Angeles:

University of California Press, 1979); and Richard Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976).

[16]See Carol Weiss, "Research for Policy's Sake: The Enlightenment Function of Social Research," *Policy Analysis* 3 (1977): 531-545; M. Rein and S.H. White, "Policy Research: Belief and Doubt," *Policy Analysis* 3 (1977): 239-71; Lawrence Tribe, "Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?" *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 2 (1972); Judith Eleanor Innes, *Knowledge and Public Policy: The Search for Meaningful Indicators* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishing, 1990).

[17]Bruce Jennings, "Interpretive Social Science and Policy Analysis," in Daniel Callahan and Bruce Jennings, eds., *Ethics, the Social Sciences, and Policy Analysis* (Plenum, 1983); John Dryzek, "Policy Analysis as a Hermeneutic Activity," *Policy Sciences* 14 (1982): 309-329; Paul Healy, "Interpretive Policy Inquiry: A Response to the Received View," *Policy Sciences* 19 (1986): 381-396; Richard S. Bolan, "The Practitioner as Theorist: The Phenomenology of the Professional Episode," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 46 (July 1980): 261-74; J. Friedman and G. Abonyi, "Social Learning: A Model for Policy Research," *Environment and Planning A* 8 (1976): 927-940.

[18]Forester, *Planning in the Face of Power,* 18.

[19]For more on advocacy planning, the seminal article is Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 31 (November 1965): 331-338. See also Paul Davidoff and Thomas A. Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 28 (May 1962): 103-115; Earl M. Blecher, *Advocacy Planning for Urban Development* (New York: Praeger, 1971); Kenneth E. Corey, "Advocacy in Planning: A Reflective Analysis, *Antipole* 4 (July 1972): 46-63; Allan David Heskin, "Crisis and Response: A Historical Perspective on Advocacy Planning," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 46 (January 1980): 50-63.

[20]Forester, *Planning in the Face of Power,* 22.

[21]Ibid., 141.

[22]Ibid., 252.

[23]Jürgen Habermas, "What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking on the Left." *New Left Review* 183 (1989): 19.

[24]Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Sociology,* translated by Thomas Berger (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).

[25]Ibid., 176.

[26]Jürgen Habermas, "Dogmatism, Reason, and Decision: On Theory and Praxis in Our Scientific Civilization" and "Technology and Science as Ideology" in Steven Seidman, ed., *Jürgen Habermas on Society and Politics. A Reader* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989).

[27]Habermas, "Technology and Science as Ideology," in Seidman, ed., 252.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). The status of the knowledge-constitutive interests is problematic: on the one hand, they are rooted in the natural history of the species, specifically in the experience of work, language, and power; on the other hand, they are also posited socially constructed hence alterable aspects of human social organization. Reflecting this ambiguity, Habermas describes them as "quasi-transcendental" categories of knowledge.

[30]Ibid., 133.

[31]Ibid., 176.

[32]Ibid., 228.

[33]Ibid., 310.

[34]Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action,* 2 vols., translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).

[35]Ibid., 1: 85.

[36]Ibid., 1: 87-88.

[37]Ibid., 1: 70.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Ibid., 1: 340.

[40]Ibid., 1: 86.

[41]Ibid., 1: 255.

[42]Ibid., 2: 263.

[43]Ibid., 2: 196.

[44]Ibid., 2: 305.

[45]Students for a Democratic Society, *The Port Huron Statement* 1962, cited in James Miller, *Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 333.

[46]The standard history of Students for a Democratic Society is Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (New York: Random House, 1973). See also James Miller, *Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Edward J. Bacciocco, Jr., *The New Left in America: Reform to Revolution 1956 to 1970* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1974); Nigel Young, *An Infantile Disorder? The Crisis and Decline of the New Left* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977); Gregory Nevala Calvert, *Democracy from the Heart: Spiritual Values, Decentralism, and Democratic Idealism in the Movement of the 1960s* (Eugene, Oreg.: Communitas Press, 1991).

[47]Wini Breines, *Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962-1968: The Great Refusal* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

[48]Ibid., 7.

[49]Ibid., 51.

[50]Ibid., 7.

[51]Ibid., 64.

[52]Ibid., 62.

[53]For research on the German Green Party, see: Werner Hülsberg, *The German Greens: A Social and Political Profile,* translated by Gus Fagan (New York: Verso, 1988); Herbert Kitschelt, *The Logic of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany,* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Horst Mewes, "The West German Green Party," *New German Critique* 28 (Winter 1983): 51-85; Donald Schoonmaker, "The Greens and the Federal Elections of 1980 and 1983: Is the Opposition Waxing?" in Karl H. Cerny, ed., *Germany at the Polls: The Bundestag Elections of the 1980s* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990).

[54]Die Grünen, *Programme of the German Green Party* (East Haven, Conn.: LongRiver Books, 1983), 6.

[55]Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever, cited in Eva Kolinsky, *Parties, Opposition and Society in West Germany* (London: Croon Helm, 1984), 296.

[56]Kitschelt, *The Logic of Party Formation,* 281.

[57]Ibid., 40.

[58]Ibid., 281.

[59]Ibid., 124.

[60]Ibid., 124.

[61]Ibid., 179-80.

[62]Ibid., 153.

[63]Ibid., 143.

[64]Ibid., 196.

[65]The evidence for this case is derived from the author's informal participant observation as a member of the San Francisco Greens and the East Bay Green Alliance, as well research on primary documents pertaining to the national organization. (See Sean D. Stryker, *The American Green Movement: Problems in the*

Democratic Reconstruction of the Public Sphere, Master's Thesis, Department of City and Regional Planning, University of California at Berkeley, 1991.)

[66]Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy* (Palo Alto: Cheshire Books, 1982); *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1971); *Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1989).

[67]Bookchin, *Ecology of Freedom,* 133.

[68]Howard Hawkins and Guy Chichester, "Green Politics in New England? An Invitation from the New England Committees of Correspondence" (New England Committees of Correspondence, photocopy, 1984).

[69]Ibid.

[70]Green Committees of Correspondence, Organizing Packet (Unpublished, 1987).

[71]John Rensenbrink, "Inclusivity and What It Means for the Eugene Regional Gathering," *Green Letter* (Fall 1988), 36.

[72]Brian Tokar, "Into the Future with the Greens," *Z Magazine* 3 (November 1990), 62.

[73]Charles Betz, "Report on the Greens Restructuring Process to the IC Bulletin," *IC Bulletin* (September 1990), 23.

[74]Betty Zisk, "The Greens: Facing Problems, Making Progress." *Peacework* (September 1987), 7.