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Author

Smith, Richard Keith

Publication Date

2024

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Until the Music Stopped: The Second Concert in European
Inter-State Relations, 1878-1908

By

Richard Keith Smith

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor John Connelly, Chair

Professor Daniel Sargent

Professor Jason Wittenberg

Summer 2024

Abstract

Until the Music Stopped: The Second Concert in European Inter-State Relations, 1878-1908

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Richard Keith Smith

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The causes of the First World War remain a central preoccupation for international relations scholars. Some find them in the actions of particular aggressors, others in the logic of zero-sum competition between bipolar alliance blocs. Still others describe how an ever more mechanical European state system became increasingly inflexible until it seized up and exploded. I turn this perennial query on its head, asking not why war erupted in 1914, but how Europe's political class was able to avoid wars during the thirty-three years of pan-Great Power peace stretching from the Berlin Congress (1878) to the Italo-Turkish War (1911).

I argue that the Berlin Congress founded an international regime, which, like its predecessor founded at the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), was framed as a "Concert of Europe," and was predicated not on a balance of power but on normative principles of international relations, chief among them being the inviolability of member state territorial integrity and sovereignty. Like its Vienna predecessor, this Second Concert recognized subordinate principles, namely minority protections, national self-determination, and human rights. By surveying reportage on the Concert during the regime-challenging crises these subordinate, and state-challenging, principles instigated, I show how the Concert-loyalty of the regime's member states led to affirmations of the supremacy of the territorial state, thereby preserving both the Concert regime and general peace. This era of tranquility ended with the Bosnian Crisis (1908-09), which saw the first violation of Concert principles by one of its members since the regime's founding, resulting in the Concert's dissolution. Europe, plunged back into an international state of nature in which power alone ruled, experienced rapidly escalating violence that culminated in general war.

I would like to thank the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, the Fulbright Program, and the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation for their generous support of my research, and Professors John Connelly, Daniel Sargent, and Jason Wittenberg for their keen guidance and kind encouragement of my writing.

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Introduction

What follows is a discussion of peace, how Europe's great powers avoided going to war for a nearly unprecedented more than thirty year span between 1878 and 1911. It will not be a discussion of *Realpolitik* machinations or material geopolitical calculations in European inter-state relations, either known at the time or assessed retrospectively. Such dimensions of these relations are well documented. Rather, the discussion below focuses on formalities, technicalities, and abstract principles, that is, on international regimes in inter-state relations, on common commitment thereto or rejection thereof, and of the material consequences that obtained. I discuss the birth, life, and death of the Second Concert of Europe, an actor whose critical role in shaping European inter-state relations during the final decades preceding the First World War has thus far been neglected by scholars.

Of special concern are the principal threats to the Concert, which emerged not from material considerations such as *raison d'état* and balance of power, but from values that were, like those of the Concert, abstract, but which were at odds with the Concert's principles, namely national and human rights. Rather than discuss these rights in terms of how Europeans self-identified personally, of how they defined their communal identities, or how they conceived of their localities, fellow citizens, ruling regimes, and states, the analysis below zeroes in on external relations and foreign policy making, a space that sometimes requires those making such policy to act on assumptions and commitments that diverge radically from those they might recognize in other spaces.

Finally, what follows asks how a comprehensive commitment among the foreign policy makers of all the Concert's member states to the regime and its principles played a critical role in their successful negotiation of repeated crises that threatened the Concert with dissolution and Europe with general war. I try to show how materialist geopolitics ultimately proved to be the wrecking ball that smashed the Concert, and how, among the anarchy of its ruins, Europe careened into just such a war.

The Second Concert of Europe: Model and Theory

The Second Concert of Europe that emerged after 1878 – succeeding that of 1815-1853 – was composed of seven full member states: the United Kingdom, the French Republic, the German Empire, the Kingdom of Italy, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. The representatives of these states established the Concert's principles, at the pan-European great power Berlin Congress of 1878, enshrining them the treaty that this Congress framed.

The principles of this Berlin Concert resembled those of the Concert founded more than six decades before at the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) in three critical respects. In the first place, the plenipotentiaries at the Berlin Congress did not merely seek to restore a 'balance of power' among otherwise atomized states in a system whose actors would remain, after the Congress's signing of its treaty, in the condition of an international state of nature. Rather, the Berlin Treaty's frames founded an *international regime institution*, one that was in some respects within but in others above the European state system. That is, its jurisdiction was Europe, and the regime did not apply to actors or events outside of, or the dealings of its member states, even with each other, beyond, the continent. On the other hand, the regime was above the state system in that its full members exercised a 'collectively hegemonic' supervision over all of Europe's

Map 1: Europe During the Second Concert of Europe




Source: Alexander Altenhof, "Europe in 1878, after the Congress of Berlin and the territorial and political rearrangement of the Balkan Peninsula," Wikipedia, last accessed April 9, 2022, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:KaterBegemot>

non-member states.

Secondly, as with its Vienna predecessor, the Second Concert was not merely concerned with its collaborative rule over Europe's lesser, non-Concert member states. Rather, it established implicit principles for intra-regime relations between and among Concert members themselves. And, like the Vienna Concert before it, the supreme principle of intra-Second Concert relations was the inviolability of each member state's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a prohibition against violence as a legitimate means of crisis resolution, with recourse instead to comprehensive mediation.

Third, like those of the First Concert, the framers of the Second implicitly admitted subsidiary principles into their international regime. The Second inherited from the First a recognition of national communities as existing in, and thus being a legitimate principle of, European inter-state relations. However, the Second Concert also discarded one of the First Concert's subsidiary principles, namely its commitment to legitimist conservatism, while adopting a more robust recognition of Enlightenment-inspired toleration and human rights. In doing so the framers of the Berlin Concert, like those of Vienna, admitted self-contradictory principles into their regime and thereby inspired actors who, in appealing to these principles, would drive some of the most serious challenges to the Second Concert throughout its existence.

Map 2: Second Concert Member States



Source: blank map from: xGeograd, "Blank Map of Europe 1900," DeviantArt, last accessed April 9, 2022, <https://www.deviantart.com/xgeograd/art/Blank-Map-of-Europe-1900-574963028>

However, the Second Concert also departed from the First in two key respects. In the first place, its framers did not found an international organization to physically embody, and ensure the realization of, their international regime. Secondly, the Second Concert recognized the Ottoman Empire as a full member of the regime. Indeed, any understanding of what the Second Concert regime was, how it operated, and why it failed is impossible absent a presumption of the Ottoman Empire having been a member of it.

All of the major crises to rock Europe's intra-continental inter-state relations throughout the Second Concert period revolved around questions of Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity. In doing so, these crises starkly illustrated that while the Ottoman Empire was a member of the Concert, that membership was in practice the most suspect of any. Nevertheless,

so long as it existed the foreign policy makers of the Second Concert ensured that the regime's supreme commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its member states, especially of its Ottoman member state, superseded, at least *de jure*, any values or interests that might threaten that commitment. And this supreme commitment thus determined the solutions to these crises.

Statistical Evidence for a Second Concert


Carsten Holbraad, a renowned theorist of international relations observed that “‘the European Concert’ or ‘the Concert of Europe’... became common in the English language [only] in the second half of the [19th] century,” meanwhile “in the earlier part of the century this notion appeared under various synonyms.”¹ The discussion that follows affirms Holbraad's observation while refining it in several critical respects. In the first place, few commentators in English or German employed the term “Concert of Europe” or “European Concert” to refer to the idea of an international regime supervising European inter-state relations during the First Concert era (Germans said *Pentarchie*, or rule of the five). And it is equally clear that the term became definitive for this idea during the Second Concert era. Yet it is also strikingly clear that the term was neither adopted gradually nor employed evenly across the second half of the 19th century.

Rather, between 1815 and 1914 there were three acute periods during which commentators intensively employed the term “Concert of Europe.” The first and last of these periods, respectively during the late 1870's/early 1880's and late 1900's/early 1910's, coincided precisely with the events that I contend founded and dissolved the Second Concert, namely, the Berlin Congress (1878) on the one hand and Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908) on the other. At the same time, while commentators less explicitly invoked a “Concert of Europe” between these three intensive periods, they still tended to employ the term more often throughout the entire 1878-1908 period than they ever had during the pre-Second Concert era (see figures 1-5).

It bears noting that these statistical analyses of journalistic references to a “Concert of Europe” represent just the tip of the iceberg in terms of discussion of the Concert during this period. As Holbraad notes, the regime went by many names and euphemisms, such as ‘the confederacy (of Europe),’ ‘the federation (of Europe),’ ‘the European system,’ ‘the great alliance,’ ‘the union (of Europe),’ ‘the council of Europe,’ ‘the Holy Alliance,’ ‘the Areopagus of Europe,’ ‘the great European combination of Powers,’ ‘the Powers of Europe,’ the ‘Powers in Concert,’ or simply ‘the Powers,’ to name only a few.² However, we need not conclude that when commentators employed such language they intended to reference an international regime, and, if they did so intend, that they intended the species of regime imagined by this discussion. Thus, the below statistical surveys of journalistic discussion of ‘the Concert,’ and those presented later in this discussion, limit themselves to only those terms that were unambiguously in reference to a Concert international regime, and which largely intended the model of regime adopted by this discussion.

This sudden explosion in discussion of a “Concert of Europe” in the British and German speaking Austro-Hungarian press, together with a simultaneous, nearly unprecedented period of unbroken peace among all of the alleged member states of that Concert strongly suggests the existence and influence of an international regime on Europe's inter-state relations during this period. However, such correlation is in itself insufficient to prove the point. Rather, it is

Figure 1: Number of References to a “Concert of Europe” in the German-Speaking Habsburg Press each Year: 1815-2020



Results of search for “Concert of Europe” on Austrian National Library’s Online Database for Historical Newspapers and Journals (*ANNO-Suche*).

Note: includes all spellings and declensions, e.g., “*Europäisches Konzert*,” “*Europäischen Konzert*,” “*Europäisches Concert*,” “*Europäischen Concert*,” etc.


Source: ANNO Historische Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, last accessed April 9, 2022, <https://anno.onb.ac.at/anno-suche#searchMode=simple&from=1>

Figure 2: Number of References to a “Concert of Europe” in the British Press each Year: 1815-1950




Source: British Library Newspapers, Gale Primary Sources, last accessed April 9, 2022, <https://go-gale-com.libproxy.berkeley.edu/ps/ngram?inPS=true&userGroupName=ucberkeley&prodId=BNCN#/1815/1950/offset/22Concert%20of%20Europe%22/>

Figure 3: Number of References to a “European Concert” in the British Press each Year: 1815-1950




Source: British Library Newspapers, Gale Primary Sources, last accessed April 9, 2022, <https://go-gale-com.libproxy.berkeley.edu/ps/ngram?inPS=true&userGroupName=ucberkeley&prodId=BNCN#/1815/1950/off/%22European%20Concert%22>

Figure 4: Number of References to a “European Concert” in *The Times* (of London) each Year: 1800-2014



Source: The Times Digital Archive, 1785-2014, Gale Primary Sources, last accessed April 9, 2022, <https://go-gale-com.libproxy.berkeley.edu/ps/ngram?inPS=true&userGroupName=ucberkeley&prodId=TTDA#/1800/2014/off/%22European%20Concert%22>

Figure 5: Number of References to a “Concert of Europe” in *The Times* (of London) each Year: 1800-2014



Source The Times Digital Archive, 1785-2014, Gale Primary Sources, last accessed April 9, 2022, <https://go-gale-com.libproxy.berkeley.edu/ps/ngram?inPS=true&userGroupName=ucberkeley&prodId=TTDA#/1800/2014//of/f/%22Concert%20of%20Europe%22>

necessary to engage in a ‘thick,’ cultural investigation of the actual discussions comprising the above statistical surveys in order to determine whether the parties to them actually acknowledged the existence of such a regime, whether they understood it in the same terms as asserted by this discussion, and whether they ascribed real influence to it. And, as we shall see, indeed they did.

What follows is such an investigation, beginning with chapter one, which provides a survey of the theories, historiographies, narratives, and concepts that were integral to, and intersected in, the Concert, and thus whose understanding is critical to any discussion of the regime. Chapter two then examines the Second Concert’s founding instruments themselves, namely the Treaty and Congress of Berlin. Then follows two case studies of the Concert in action, as the regime supervised European inter-state relations during two major intra-continental crises that rocked European inter-state relations during of the *fin de siècle*, namely, in chapter three, the Egyptian Crisis (1881-82), in chapter four, the Bulgarian Crises (1885-87). These case studies will demonstrate the degree to which the Concert, and its principles were a significant factor in, and served as a basis for the resolution of, these Crises.

Chapter 1: Core Concepts

Introduction

The juncture in European great power relations that occurred at Berlin in 1878 was a transition in those relations from a condition of an international state of nature to that of an international regime, the Second Concert of Europe, a regime predicated on the territorial, and not the national, state. The principal challenges to this regime over the next thirty years would arise from actors who mainly appealed to two competing principles, namely human and national rights. As a precondition to a discussion of the birth, life, and death of this regime it is necessary to clarify concepts intrinsic to the Second Concert, namely: the sovereign state and its system, a balance of power, an international state of nature, an international regime, the 'First' Concert of Europe, the 'Berlin System' school, nation, nationalism, and nationhood, and human rights.

The Sovereign State System

Europe's sovereign state system emerged out of medieval inter-polity relations of kingdoms, principalities, imperial estates, *Parlements*, great noble houses, guild leagues, free cities, bishoprics, monastic orders, etc., in western and central Europe, all of which belonged to supra-polity regimes that set their member polities apart from non-member polities and which dictated the principles for acts on the intra-regime, inter-polity stage. Two of Europe's universalist regimes, namely the (Catholic) Church and the ('Holy Roman') Empire regulated relations among the geographically and administratively overlapping and hierarchically ranked polities that fell under these regimes' oversight. At that time 'ambassadors' representing these Catholic and/or imperial polities were understood neither to speak solely for the polity they represented nor to further its exclusive interests. Rather, such 'ambassadors' served Latin Christendom or the Empire, and strove for peace and stability throughout both regimes regardless of whether the terms of such were fully in the interests of the particular polity that the 'ambassador' represented. This proved a lofty aspiration whose mere existence was significant despite rarely being realized in practice.¹

This universalist condition of European inter-polity relations broke down among the city-states of renaissance-era northern Italy. As Garrett Mattingly demonstrates in his classic *Renaissance Diplomacy*, a mutually destructive inter-regime struggle for supremacy between Papacy and Empire, within and among city-states, resulted in a disintegration of both regimes as an administrative, intellectual, and emotional supra-polity framework. Over the course of the 15th century city-states responded to this inter-polity state of nature by developing a principle of *raison d'etat*, that is, a form of inter-polity relations in which city-states, and their ambassadors, adopted a narrowly city-state-based secular-sovereign self-interested orientation in inter-city-state relations.²

It is unnecessary to question the accuracy of Mattingly's narrative here, nor must we question the validity of his causal mechanism, namely that the evolution of European diplomacy and that of the European state system were interdependent and that the former was the engine of the latter's development. Rather, it is important merely to note that no one has overturned Mattingly's principal claim, that is, by the mid-16th century, and with the advent of the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and the European Wars of Religion, a general and

accelerated erosion of Church and imperial influence and authority as supra-polity regimes became recognizable across Western Christendom.³

Such an acute trend away from Church and imperial universalism and toward sovereign state atomism in Western Christian inter-polity relations is clear enough in the two most transformative treaty regimes founded during the era, namely the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648). However, it is important not to exaggerate this point, especially in light of recent historiographical developments. Recent scholarship has, for example, demonstrated that Augsburg's principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* [whose realm, his religion], though *prima facie* an affirmation of a sovereign's sovereignty, was never systematically realized either in practice or in principle. That is, the letter of Augsburg's agreements provided numerous *ad hoc* protection guarantees to enumerated minority confessional communities among the Empire's signatory polities, thus establishing an international regime that limited a sovereign's sovereignty.⁴

Meanwhile the old orthodoxy that the "Westphalian System" is historically synonymous with the advent of the "European state system" has in several critical respects been debunked as unhistorical oversimplification and distortion. In the first place, Westphalia was not an affirmation but an abrogation of *cuius regio, eius religio*, and the Peace systematized and universalized what had been Augsburg's *ad hoc* toleration of recognized confessions as a formal principle of European inter-polity/state relations. In doing so it guaranteed toleration for these recognized confessions among all of the Peace's signatories (or at least all of its imperial signatories) irrespective of the religion of their sovereign. Second Powers that participated in the Peace but which were outside of the Empire, especially the kingdoms of France and Sweden, sought to dissolve all practical imperial authority, and thereby establish a *de facto* state of nature among atomized and largely lilliputian (and thus easily dominated) states in a what would thenceforth be a strictly *de jure* imperial realm. Yet Westphalia's imperial participants were focused on both preserving and even restoring the Empire and clarifying its constitutional framework, goals which they saw as mutually reinforcing.⁵

In 1648, and for more than a half century after, commentators across Europe, and especially those within the Empire, spoke of integration within the hierarchy of a supra-polity/state, pan-Christian commonwealth (soon to include even Eastern Orthodox Christian powers such as Russia). Notably, this was a commonwealth in which polities/states occupied varying ranks in a gradation of prestige and authority. And there were significant continuities in the pre- and post-Westphalian domestic and foreign affairs of the dizzying variety of polities that were parties to the Peace. Indeed, elite sub-, supra-, non-, and trans-state actors continued for most of the next century to exert a degree of formal authority in foreign and domestic policy making that would be intolerable for, though not entirely alien to, modern states. Meanwhile confession *per se*, i.e., not as shibboleth for some other principle or community (such as class or nation), would be a critical, if unofficial, dimension of such relations for even longer, even, in fact, to the Second Concert era.⁶

Yet, regardless of whether Westphalia itself was a moment of historical juncture in the evolution of the modern state, in its aftermath a system of sovereign states became recognizable in Europe. This system was predicated on *raison d'état* and composed of polities that enjoyed: a permanent population, a clearly demarcated territory, a ruling regime that possessed a "monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force" (i.e., sovereignty) over both populations and territories, and which faced no substantive checks on its ability to determine its relations with other polities of the same type.⁷

And if such a system had not been inaugurated at Westphalia, it certainly attained an apotheosis in the Peace of Utrecht (1713/15), whose framers assumed that sovereign and legally equal states had by then become the primary, in fact sole, legitimate personalities of European inter-polity relations and negotiations. Indeed, unlike Westphalia the Utrecht Peace did not require its agreements to be ratified by any sub- or supra-state polity or institution but assumed that a state's ruling regime was vested with the sole and absolute authority to determine its acts on the inter-state stage.⁸

Balance of Power

The Utrecht Peace was notable in one further respect. Confronted by the effective abrogation of the Church and Empire as universalist, supra-polity regimes for regulating the increasingly atomized system of sovereign and formally equal state actors, the framers of Utrecht recognized a 'balance of power' in the emergent state system. That is, they recognized that no one state should be able to establish hegemony over all the others, often framed at the time as efforts to establish a 'universal monarchy.' Such a hegemon would destroy the system by rendering all other states in it into mere vassals and clients, whose sovereignty the hegemon could dominate at will. Yet, while this principle of balance could preserve sovereign states, i.e., by preventing the rise of a hegemon, it could legitimize their destruction.

It was possible that the power of one state could rise or decline drastically while the power of other states remained essentially unchanged. This could occur in such a way that no new combination of alliances within the state system could reestablish a balance while at the same time the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity remained in force. Were this to happen the restoration of a balance might demand discarding the principle of the sovereign state and either partitioning a real or potential hegemonic state into several and weaker successor states or partitioning a weaker state out of existence and distributing the proceeds among the remaining states in such a way as would restore the balance.

In fact, the latter would in the event occur between 1772 and 1795 as the Kingdom of Prussia, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Russian Empire incrementally partitioned the once great but by then militarily and administratively abject Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth out of existence, distributing the spoils among themselves. Notably, these partitions were, unlike nearly all wars of the period, not a temporary exception to the state paradigm after which normative principles between perhaps territorially altered but still extant sovereign states could resume. Rather, it was the wholesale and permanent elimination of a state from the system, an act perfectly consistent with a balance of power principle but one at odds with the principle of the sovereign state, as everyone, to include its perpetrators, recognized.⁹

Yet while the principle of the sovereign territorial state and a balance of power principle were distinct values, sometimes in harmony and sometimes in tension, they were indistinguishable in respect to war, itself an egregious violation of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both values admitted it as a legitimate act between states. This is most evident in the fact that between 1648 and 1815 the longest uninterrupted peace among the European Powers was fifteen years, with many respites being far shorter. Moreover, during this era war was almost as common as was universal peace and Europe saw more years of war than of undisturbed peace (see figure 6).

Figure 6: War and Peace 1648-1815

General wars among most or all principal parties to a comprehensive European treaty regime (i.e., among most or all mutually recognized European Great and Major Powers)

- Franco-Dutch War, 1672-1678
- War of the League of Augsburg, 1688-1697
- War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714
- War of the Quadruple Alliance, 1718-1720
- War of the Polish Succession, 1733-1735
- War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748
 - Seven Years' War, 1756-1763
- French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815

- Total years of general war in Europe: 70 years
- Longest period of continuous general war: 23 years
- Shortest period of continuous general war: 2 years

Other wars between at least 2 such parties (i.e., European Great and Major Powers)

- Franco-Spanish War, 1648-1659
 - Second Bremen War, 1666
- War of the Reunions, 1683-1684
 - Anglo-Spanish War, 1727-1729
- War of the Bavarian Succession, 1778-1779
 - Russo-Swedish War, 1788-1790

- Total number of years that saw war during the period: 88 years*

Years of unbroken universal peace among all parties to a comprehensive European treaty regime (with each treaty regime period terminating at the outbreak of the next general war)

- Treaty of Westphalia, 1659-1666 & 1666-1672
- Treaties of Nijmegen, 1678-1683 & 1684-1688
 - Treaty of Ryswick, 1697-1701
 - Treaty of Utrecht, 1714-1718
- Treaty of the Hauge, 1720-1727 & 1729-1733
 - Treaty of Vienna, 1735-1740
 - Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748-1756
- Seven Years' War treaties, 1763-1778, 1779-1788, 1790-1792*

- Total years of unbroken peace among all parties to an agreement: 80 years
 - Longest period of unbroken peace: 15 years
 - Shortest period of unbroken peace: 2 years

* Does not include European conflicts related to the American Revolution

International State of Nature

Throughout the 18th century European foreign policy makers accepted a system of equal and sovereign states as normative for inter-polity relations. However, as the pervasive and perennial warfare of this period illustrates, there was no attempt to establish an inter-state social contract binding all parties to ensure that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each were respected in practice. The state system of this era was thus one in which an “international state of nature” prevailed among states.¹⁰ In other words, states became parties to agreements but did not become member states of international regimes. In fact, that the European state system existed in a state of nature during the 17th and 18th centuries was a consensus shared throughout the period by Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and a legion of lesser-known *philosophes*.¹¹

This is not to say that a polity's inclusion or exclusion from the state system was a purely theoretical distinction. After all, respect for state prerogatives was usually presumed as the basis for non-extraordinary, normative, peaceful relations between members of the European state system. By contrast such an assumption did not exist in relations between Christian and non-Christian states, even when the latter were patently European, such as with the Ottoman Empire.

True, the Ottoman Empire was sometimes an informal partner of convenience with one or another Christian regime and an object of the latter's informal respect and even admiration. However, European Christian states and the Ottoman Empire understood each other as being ruled by infidels, ergo officially lacking both a – notably divine – sanction to rule and, consequently, right to exist. Thus, agreements between them could never officially be permanent and binding compacts, let alone formal alliance, and were at best temporary truces, formally granted as an act of magnanimity or mercy by whichever party happened to be dominant at the time, and respites from an official normative condition of perpetual holy war.¹²

Admittedly, some *philosophes* embraced Hobbes's assumption of the state of nature as one of a permanent war of all against all, and therefore presumed war also to be the normative condition in relations even between members of the 'Christian commonwealth' of states; peace and respect for state prerogatives was an extraordinary condition, a respite during which states prepared to return to the natural state of the next general war. Yet not all Enlightenment-era thinkers were ready to accept war as an essential practice of the European state system.¹³

Some, such as Samuel von Pufendorf, who took a rosier view of human nature and sociability than did Hobbes, argued states did not need to forge social contracts for peace to be a normative condition. Even if the states of his day were at war more often than at peace, the very fact of the latter demonstrated that peaceful relations were possible absent a social contract.¹⁴ Meanwhile other *philosophes* imagined that states would, like individuals, inevitably agree to an inter-state social contract founding a single world state. This might eventuate, as Abbé de Saint-Pierre argued, by incremental evolution as rulers gradually came to understand that the principal object of their wars, i.e., their own security, could be achieved only by submitting to a state-like leviathan, federal in nature with an assembly in which all states-*cum*-provinces enjoyed representation.¹⁵ For Prussian nobleman-*cum*-French revolutionary, self-declared representative of humanity, and Jacobin (later guillotined enemy of the people), Anacharsis Cloots, this could take the form of a sudden, violent, and revolutionary overthrow of the existing state system to be replaced by a single and socially just world state.¹⁶

A Theory of Inter-State Social Contract

Meanwhile, Immanuel Kant agreed that the state of nature was one of a permanent war of all against all. Yet Kant also contended that it was not therefore "the case that one was caught between the Scylla of a world state and the Charybdis of perpetual war."¹⁷ In 1795 Kant published a pamphlet entitled "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" in which he outlined the preconditions for a regime ensuring a permanent, or at least a durable, peace while preserving sovereign states in a multi-state European state system.¹⁸ And this was no mere intellectual exercise, as had been the case with Rousseau thirty years before with his own scheme for perpetual peace, largely based on the Saint-Pierre's world state model.¹⁹ Instead, Kant's "Perpetual Peace" provided a theoretical articulation of international regime that the framers of the First and Second Concerts would later attempt to put into practice (with some of the First Concert's framers directly relying on Kant for both inspiration and blueprint).²⁰ Indeed, many of the core features of all later international regimes were anticipated in Kant's work.²¹

One of these was a principle that was both as mutually reinforcing and as antithetical to the principles of the sovereign state and the balance of power as these two latter principles were to each other. And it was precisely where the sovereign state and balance of power principles were in harmony, namely in preventing the rise of a hegemon, that Kant's regime principle undermined both. Kant's regime was partly grounded on an absolute guarantee of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its member states, with resolution of conflicts by means of comprehensive consultation rather than coercion or violence, thereby preventing the rise of a hegemon by means of its territorial expansion. However, this guarantee also prohibited its members from intervening against a potential hegemon whose material power rose by means other than territorial expansion.²² Kant's regime thus compelled its members to watch passively as this species of hegemon upset the balance of power of, then dominated, and ultimately in effect abrogated their system of sovereign states.²³

Kant's regime might seem irrational from the perspective of those committed to the principles of either a state system or a balance of power, the former presuming a system of equal, sovereign, and atomized state actors and the latter preserving that system at the expense of sacrificing one or another of those actors. However, it must be recalled that Kant's end was peace and the sovereign state was only the most realistic and practical means of achieving that end. Conversely, in a state system the end was preservation of state sovereignty, while the balance of power principle's end was preservation of a state system, with peace being in both cases but one means of achieving these ends. In fact, while Kant was explicit that preemptive or preventative war, such as against a rising hegemon, was a legitimate act in the condition of an international state of nature, he was equally explicit that such an act would be illegitimate under the conditions of his regime.²⁴

The Deluge and the First International Regime

The timing of Kant's work is notable. Only three years before his pamphlet's publication the French made the first republican regime to rule a European great power. That republic's successive governments increasingly adopted the principle that the monarchical *ancien régimes* ruling the other states of the European state system lacked the sanction of popular sovereignty and thus had no legitimate right to exist. Conversely, the ruling regimes of the other European states maintained, though with varying degrees of intensity, that as the French Republic and Empire derived their authority (at least formally) from popular, i.e., human, will, and therefore were without divine sanction or dynastic legitimacy, they also had no right to exist. Thus, what had appertained to the Ottoman Empire in its relations with the European state system now applied to the French Republic and Empire in its relations with the same, the former still infidel and the latter now godless.²⁵


What followed from this was a factual, rather than merely theoretical, decades-long perpetual general war, punctuated by periods of temporary truce and transitory opportunistic *modus vivendi* among some or all of the combatants. And this in turn resulted in an abrogation of both the state system and, due to the battlefield victories of an almost invincible French army and the associated rise of a Republican and then Napoleonic hegemon, the balance of power.

Thus, the moment at which Kant penned his pamphlet was not one in which the European state system was evolving into a more integrated and complex regime, one committed to upholding the state prerogatives of its members and one in which its members were ruled by diverse regimes that were morally, ethically, and 'ideologically' indifferent toward each other's constitutions and internal affairs generally. Nor was it merely sustaining its existence in an international state of nature. Rather, during this period the actors of the erstwhile European state system engaged in a Manichean struggle of annihilation, wherein each faction presumed the other's permanent existence, at least in their existing conditions, to be unthinkable. Yet this deluge of perpetual war between the forces of revolutionary liberation and those of a divinely sanctioned and ancestral order did not, like the European Wars of Religion, culminate in something like the compromises, toleration, and ultimate coexistence between factions embodied in the Augsburg and Westphalia Peaces. Rather, on the fields of Waterloo the protagonists of divinely sanctioned and ancestral order triumphed where the partisans in the Wars of Religion had failed, and in doing so restored the *status quo ante bellum*.²⁶

However, as they gathered at the Congress of Vienna in 1814 the representatives of the victorious regimes did not imagine a return to pristine antediluvian conditions. In some respects,

such recognition resulted in merely territorial and administrative innovations, most notably with declining to restore the (Holy Roman) Empire, which had been dissolved by its last emperor in 1806. More significantly, there was also a general recognition that a simple return of the state system to the condition of an international state of nature was neither desirable nor possible. That is, at least not if the nightmare of perpetual revolutionary wars was to be reliably forestalled and the grotesque specters of a world republican state, a universal revolutionary monarchy or tyranny, or a commonwealth of popularly sovereign and secular republican nation states was to be reliably dispelled. Rather, to ensure the peace that would in turn preserve a traditional system of sovereign, territorially inviolable states ruled according to the ancient principle of dynastically legitimate and God-anointed monarchs the victors would have to embrace innovation. And the framers of the Treaty of Vienna, known as its “Final Act” (1815), agreed that founding a Kantian international regime was the best and perhaps only means of achieving such an end.²⁷

The framers of the Final Act accordingly founded just such an international regime which in English and French became known as the “Concert of Europe” (*Concert européen*) and in German as the “*Pentarchie*” (i.e., the rule of five, namely: the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of Prussia, the Austrian Empire, the Russian Empire, and, ultimately, the Kingdom of France under




a Bourbon restoration). However, while this Concert regime mostly followed Kant’s model it also departed from it several noteworthy respects.

First, the Concert’s principles, norms, and strictures did not apply equally to all the states of the European state system but only to the five states mutually recognized as being full members of the Concert regime. Conversely, the Concert recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all other European states only conditionally (with the contrasting resolutions to the 1823 Spanish and 1830 French crises especially demonstrating the practical implications of this two-tiered hierarchy).²⁸ Secondly, the Concert’s framers simultaneously founded a formal and permanent international organization, termed the “Congress” or “Vienna System,” to physically embody their regime.²⁹

Third, the framers of the Vienna Concert admitted two self-contradictory principles into their regime. The first of these derived from the fact that one of their principal aims in founding both an international regime and associated international organization was to ensure that all its member states maintained monarchical regimes, which, if not absolutist, were at least dynastically legitimate and formally based on the principle of divine right. Likewise, to ensure that these monarchical regimes were willing and able to suppress any reformist, let alone

Map 4: Vienna Concert Member States



Source: blank map from: Paul Werth, “Europe in 1815: Blank Map,” History 106: European Civilization: 1648 to Present, last accessed April 9, 2022,

revolutionary, attempts to introduce liberal and popularly sovereign, which is to say national, rule. Yet this principle of legitimist conservatism was in tension with the Concert's supreme commitment to the state prerogatives of its members. For, if the subjects of a member state's ruling regime succeeded in forcing the latter to accept a formal written and participatory constitution, or worse yet deposed their prince and founded a liberal republic, the Concert could not maintain its commitment both to the prerogatives of the state and legitimist conservatism.³⁰

At the same time, the Final Act's first article declared that "the Poles, who are respective subjects of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, shall obtain a Representation and National Institutions, regulated according to the degree of political consideration, that each of the Governments to which they belong shall judge expedient and proper to grant them."³¹ The framers of this article thus guaranteed members of the Polish nation a special, asymmetrical, and particularistic communal right distinct from any enjoyed by their fellow subjects in the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian states (notably full Concert member states all), and placed this guarantee under the supervision of the Concert international regime. In doing so they implicitly admitted the nation as a legitimate principle in inter-state relations irrespective of the Concert's supreme commitment to its members' state prerogatives.

The tension between these principles, namely state prerogatives on the one hand and legitimist conservatism and the nation on the other, would lie at the heart of some of the most serious challenges to the Concert of Europe throughout its existence. Indeed, such challenges were inevitable as this self-contradiction was woven into the fabric of the Vienna Treaty and thus its international regime. However, so long as the Concert existed, in all these challenges its supreme guarantee of its members' state prerogatives prevailed over the regime's subordinate commitments, at least as concerned its full member states.³²

Interregnum: A Return of the State System to an International State of Nature, 1853-1878

That the Concert suffered a complete breakdown and dissolution during the mid-nineteenth century is best demonstrated by the differing scope and frequency of warfare among Concert members/Europe's great powers during three eras in European inter-state relations, i.e., a pre-1815, an 1815-53, and an 1853-78 period. As noted, frequent general war among these Powers characterized the first of these periods. Conversely, during the second there was an unprecedented, thirty-eight-year-long unbroken peace among all of the Concert's full member states, more than double the length of any such peace during the pre-Concert period, a peace notably unaffected by the breakdown of the Congress/Vienna System in the mid-1820's. And this peace remained intact even through the pan-continental 1848-49 revolutions against Europe's established domestic and inter-state social, cultural, economic, and political order, the so-called 'springtime of the peoples.' That is, throughout the violence and upheaval that shook almost the whole of Europe between 1848-49 no Concert member state violated the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another except at the latter's formal request.

And this period of undisturbed pan-great power/Concert member peace in turn contrasts with the frequency with which these states were at war during the third period, i.e., the quarter century between the Crimean War of 1853 and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 (see figure 7). Some scholars attempt to explain away the five major wars between erstwhile Concert member states during this period by framing them as merely arising from, and being a limited consequence of, the processes of German and Italian unification.³³ Yet such an argument ignores key historical realities, namely that only three of these wars, i.e., the Franco-Austrian

Figure 7: Wars Between Concert Member States 1853-1878

Wars between Concert Member States

- Crimean War (1853-1856)
 - Concert Combatants:
 - Russian Empire
 - Second French Empire and the United Kingdom (notable allied combatants: the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Ottoman Empire*)

- Franco-Austrian War/Second Italian War of Independence (1859)
 - Concert Combatants:
 - Austrian Empire
 - Second French Empire (notable allied combatants: the Kingdom of Sardinia**)

- Austro-Prussian War/Third Italian War of Independence (1866)
 - Concert Combatants
 - Austrian Empire***
 - Kingdom of Prussia and the Kingdom of Italy

- Franco-Prussian War (1871)
 - Concert Combatants
 - Second French Empire
 - The Kingdom of Prussia****

- Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878)
 - Concert Combatants
 - Russian Empire
 - Ottoman Empire

* The Ottoman Empire is formally admitted to a Concert regime

** The Kingdom of Italy is founded under the aegis of the Kingdom of Sardinia and is admitted to the Concert

*** The Austrian Empire reforms into the Austro-Hungarian Empire/Dual Monarchy

**** The German Empire is founded under the aegis of the Kingdom of Prussia and takes Prussia's place in the Concert

Number of Times Concert Member State was at War with One or more Others during this Period

French Empire: 3
 Russian Empire: 2
 Kingdom of Prussia: 2
 Austrian Empire: 2
 Ottoman Empire: 2
 United Kingdom: 1
 Kingdom of Italy: 1 (as a Concert member)

War/Second Italian War of Independence, the Austro-Prussian War/Third Italian War of Independence, and the Franco-Prussian War, were a cause or consequence of these processes. Meanwhile two of these wars, i.e., the Crimean War and Russo-Ottoman War, were related to German and Italian unification only very indirectly, if at all, thus betraying a more systematic breakdown in European inter-state relations, that is, an abrogation of the Concert regime.

Such scholars also attempt to play down the mid-19th century wars by framing them as limited engagements that resulted in little bloodshed. Yet the frequency and scale of the violence during this era challenges both such a modest characterization of these wars and the existence of any international regime during this period. Indeed, over the course of this era all of the defunct Concert's member states would go to war against at least one other, most doing so more than once, and this era would see no more than seven years of unbroken universal peace, and sometimes far shorter than that, among all erstwhile Concert member states. And these wars would touch almost every region of Europe, including its west (Franco-Prussian war), center (Austro-Prussian War), east (Crimean War), south (Second and Third Italian Wars of Independence), southeast (Russo-Ottoman War), and north (though Concert members were not antagonists in it, the First and Second Schleswig Wars were more than mere skirmishes), leaving only the Iberian Peninsula unscathed.

Meanwhile, according to a recent, well-regarded, and meticulous accounting just over one million soldiers perished in these wars, just over 320,000 of them on the battlefield, a tabulation that takes no account of soldiers maimed, civilians deliberately or accidentally killed or maimed, or civilian deaths due to war-related disease, malnutrition, insurrection, banditry, etc.³⁴ True, this scale of human destruction may be modest when compared to the charnel houses of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on the one hand and the First World War on the other. Yet this level of violence during Europe's mid-19th century international state of nature is

within the neighborhood of slaughter seen over similar timespans when the continent was last in this condition during the 17th and 18th centuries. Nor is the Vienna Concert's dissolution only clear in retrospective analysis. Rather there were many during the period itself who noted the breakdown and dissolution of the international regime.³⁵

Attempts at International Regime during the Interregnum

Among the great power foreign policy makers of the period there were some who were unsatisfied with the condition of an international state of nature. And such policymakers sometimes attempted, on at least two occasions quite seriously, to found – notably not *re*-establish – a new Concert. These mid-19th century European experiments at international regime played a critical role in shaping the Berlin Treaty, the Berlin Congress, and the Second Concert of Europe. And this was especially so as regarded the composition of their membership, their principles, norms, and strictures, any hierarchy thereamong, and of some of the specific articles and stipulations in the Berlin Treaty, and thus of the Second Concert.

The first of these attempts occurred in the immediate aftermath of the war that had itself marked the Vienna Concert's abrogation, namely the Crimean War. At its conclusion representatives of the combatant states, as well as those of the European great powers and erstwhile Vienna Concert member states that had not participated in the conflict, gathered at the Congress of Paris to reestablish an international regime over European inter-state relations.³⁶

The resulting treaty, i.e., the Treaty of Paris (1856), and international regime, i.e., the ‘Paris Concert,’ diverged from its Vienna predecessors in three notable respects. In the first place its founders did not establish an international organization to ensure its realization. Second, one of the Paris Treaty’s signatory states not only constituted itself on a revolutionary and national, even popularly sovereign, basis, but was ruled by an emperor Bonaparte, namely Napoleon III. Thus, while the Paris Concert had not come to embrace something like ‘whose realm, their constitution’ (all of its member states were monarchies) it had shed the Vienna Concert’s commitment to legitimist conservatism, to which a regime espousing a Bonapartist ideology would have been anathema. Third, the Paris Concert’s framers extended the principle of deconfessionalization beyond the Christian states by admitting the Ottoman Empire into their international regime as a full member.

Yet while Paris Concert discarded Vienna’s supplementary commitment to regimes predicated on dynastic legitimacy and rule by the divine sanction of a Christian God, it inherited wholesale the latter’s embrace of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and mediation rather than war as its fundamental principles. Article 7 of the Paris Treaty declared, for example, that

the Sublime Porte [is] admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public [i.e., international] Law and System (*Concert*) of Europe [original language’s emphasis]. Their Majesties [of all other Concert members] engage, each on his part, to respect the Independence [i.e., sovereignty] and the Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire; Guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest.³⁷

Meanwhile article 8 declared that

if there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other Signing Powers, any misunderstanding which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte, and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other Contracting Parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their Mediation. (Note that we shall have occasion to return to these articles later)³⁸

In the course of formally admitting the Ottoman Empire into its Concert the Paris Treaty thus in effect defined what it meant to be a member of that regime, namely, that a member state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity was guaranteed by all other members and enjoyed recourse to pan-Concert consultation, rather than coercion or violence, when resolving conflicts between itself and one or more other members. Thus, the Ottoman Empire, not only the newest and most tentative as well as among the most materially and militarily weakest of the Paris Concert’s member states, but a member that had hitherto been alien even to the European state system, thus enjoyed an explicit guarantee of its state prerogatives and to mediation rather than war. There could thus be no doubt that its other member states enjoyed identical guarantees.

Yet that the parties to the Paris Treaty were ultimately unwilling to enter into a social contract and commit to an international regime, preferring instead to return to an international state of nature, is underscored by the violence and skepticism that followed the Congress of Paris. Indeed, within only three years of the Paris Treaty’s signing two members of its short-lived Concert, namely the Second French and Austrian Empires, were at war with one another.

And much the same was true of the Conference and Treaty of London (1871), which was the second comprehensive congress and resulting treaty of this period that included all Vienna and Paris Concert members, which seriously attempted to found an international regime, and which enshrined the state prerogatives of its full members as being the supreme basis of European public law. Yet, within six years two of the fleeting ‘London Concert’s’ member states, i.e., the Russian and Ottoman Empires, were at war.³⁹

The Concert of Europe: Theories, Analyses, and Historiographies

The model and narrative of the Concert expounded above do not reflect a scholarly consensus on, but rather align with one of the major schools of thought about, this regime, namely the ‘medium’ Concert school. And this school is evident in the two academic disciplines that have engaged in the most serious study of the Concert; history and international relations theory.

One key theorist, Robert Jervis, frames the Concert as having been a “security regime.”⁴⁰ Meanwhile for Charles Kupchan, it was a “security community,” that is, “a more advanced or ‘thicker’ form of international society.”⁴¹ Jennifer Mitzen similarly refers to “concerting” and frames the Concert as “the first modern international security institution and thus a precursor to international governance as we know it today.”⁴² Likewise, Matthias Schulz speaks of a “culture of peace” and an “international security culture,” and defines the Concert as an “*international institution*, namely a nineteenth-century version of a ‘security council’ [original emphasis].”⁴³ Meanwhile Eckhart Conze observes a transition from a “Vienna System” (i.e., an international organization) to a “Vienna Order” (i.e., an international regime), which together represented different phases in a “security regime” spanning from 1815 to the middle of the nineteenth century.⁴⁴

These formulations point to diverse insights each theorist provides into both a model of the Concert and the degree of influence it exerted on decision makers over the course of its existence. They emphasize how different actors imagined the Concert at the time and how it might be viewed retrospectively, what it was understood to do or not do at the time and what it actually did and did not do. These arguments share a consensus with the above claim that the Concert of Europe is best comprehended as an “international regime,” distinct from a ‘balance of power’ principle, and for this and other reasons its founding resulted in a novel, indeed revolutionary,⁴⁵ transformation of European inter-state relations.⁴⁶

The Concert was a new form of ‘institution,’ but not in the material sense of being, like the Congress/Vienna System, officially recognized in legal statutes and formally represented by human beings who consciously self-identified with it, who deliberately acted on its behalf, resided in physical structures bearing its name, and were in its employ and pay. Rather, it was an ‘institution’ in the looser, sociological sense of being a set “of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”⁴⁷ And it is worth adding that this assumption of the Concert as an innovative international regime institution is broadly shared among prominent political scientist and international relations theorists who do not attempt to introduce novel phraseology into their study of it.⁴⁸

This scholarship also agrees that the Concert operated on the basis of a hierarchy between member and non-member states, with only the former enjoying an absolute guarantee of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and a right to mediation rather than recourse to coercion or violence, and with the latter being under the collective supervision of the former. Schulz, for example, refers to “a system of *plurilateral*, institutional cooperation.”⁴⁹ Andreas Osiander likewise describes a “great power principle” exercising a “joint hegemony” and operating according to a “rule of coordination” in which the great powers were “invested with a supervisory function.”⁵⁰ Meanwhile John Ikenberry argues that the founders of the Concert sought “to facilitate joint management of European order—to create, in effect, a sort of

oligarchic system of management.”⁵¹ And in what is the most concise formulation Ian Clark refers simply to the Concert’s “collective hegemony.”⁵² As with the discussion of the Concert as institution and international regime, it is worthwhile to note that this assumption of the regime’s “collective hegemony” is broadly shared among political scientists and international relations theorists of the Concert who do not attempt novel terminology to describe it.⁵³

However, political scientists and international relations theorists also disagree about the Concert’s principles, and even its sheer existence, with the most significant disputes being between adherents of the ‘institutionalist’ (to which all of the Concert theorists noted above belong) and ‘realist’ schools.⁵⁴ The latter share a consensus that denies the existence of the Concert as an international regime institution. Rather, they argue that European actors at the Congress of Vienna and thereafter were guided solely by calculations of relative material and military strength, that Concert apologies were nothing more than a façade to thinly veil this reality, and thus that the Concert international regime and the principle of ‘balance of power’ were one in the same thing. 1815 is therefore not in the realists view a historical juncture, but at most marks the introduction of a Concert discourse into European inter-state relations, wherein diplomats learned to ‘speak Concert’ while pursuing the same ends and employing the same means as they had at least since the Peace of Utrecht. Meanwhile the European state system as a whole simply returned in that year to its pre-Napoleonic, pre- revolutionary international state of nature condition.⁵⁵

Turning to the second academic discipline that engages in substantial study of the Concert, namely that of history, in its Concert historiography there are three competing narratives that can best be described as the ‘short,’ ‘medium,’ and ‘long Concert’ schools. The first of these, i.e., the ‘short Concert’ school, advanced by such historians as Adam Zamoyski, asserts that, if a Concert regime existed at all, then it survived a barely a decade and dissolved simultaneously with the abrogation of its associated Vienna/Congress System international organization in the mid-1820’s.⁵⁶ Meanwhile scholars of the ‘medium Concert’ school, such as Paul Schroeder, Mark Mazower, and Brian Vick, argue that the Crimean War (1853 -1856) was the moment of the Vienna Concert’s abrogation and Europe’s return to an international state of nature.⁵⁷ Alternatively, scholars of the ‘long Concert’ school, such as Mark Jarrett and René Albrecht-Carrié, give the Concert a century-long existence and argue that the international regime founded at Vienna in 1815 did not dissolve until the outbreak of Europe’s next general war in 1914.⁵⁸

None of these scholars are self-conscious or self-declared members of their ‘school’ and placing them into such a ‘school’ schema obscures much of the contributions each makes to an understanding of the Concert of Europe and European inter-state relations.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, this schema reveals several critical assumptions about the Concert that the historians of each school tend to share.

Adherents of the ‘short Concert’ school tend to assume that if a Concert regime existed at all then it was coextensive with, and dependent on, the Congress/Vienna System and that enforcement of legitimist conservatism was its paramount, and even sole, purpose. Meanwhile, adherents of the ‘medium Concert’ school tend to assume that the Concert regime’s commitment to the state prerogatives of its members was at least as important as, if not superior to, its commitment to legitimist conservatism. Moreover, they also tend to allow for still further, if subordinate, principles or projects under the Concert regime’s aegis, such as the management of national movements rather than their categorical suppression and the pursuit of humanitarian missions such as the abolition of the slave trade. Scholars of the ‘long Concert’ school tend to

assume that contemporaries mainly understood the term ‘Concert’ to simply denote *ad hoc* comprehensive consultation for crisis resolution among Europe’s great powers. Insofar as they recognized the existence of a Concert institution at all, it was primarily, even solely, understood as a means of maintaining a balance of power.

Most ‘long Concert’ literature adopts a vague narrative framework for the Concert and speaks of the Concert as having existed ‘sporadically’ or ‘intermittently,’ with no distinct eras of continuous Concert existence or dissolution. However, among some authors of this school there is a penumbra of recognition of successive and definite Concert epochs in European inter-state relations during the long nineteenth century, with one set of authors actually framing, in effect, a ‘second concert’ era, though they do not explicitly recognize it as such.⁶⁰

One such author is René Albrecht-Carrié, who posits three Concert eras, namely an “Age of Metternich” (1815-51),⁶¹ an ‘Age of the Second French Empire’ (1852-70),⁶² and ‘the remainder’ (1871-1914).⁶³ Yet Albrecht-Carrié’s narrative and model of the Concert suffers from ambiguity, and while he is clear about the regime’s means, namely conflict resolution by comprehensive mediation, he is unclear about the regime’s ends, be that a balance of power, a guarantee of its members’ state prerogatives, legitimist conservatism, protection of national or other minorities, national self-determination, human rights, or whatever else.⁶⁴ In the last analysis Albrecht-Carrié’s Concert was thus ultimately nothing more than a form of conflict resolution and in effect merely a synonym for comprehensive multilateral mediation. Carsten Holbraad likewise recognizes three successive Concert eras (which largely conform to Albrecht-Carrié’s periodization), though these were for him based on evolving and competing theories about what the Concert was and what it did, namely a “conservative theory,”⁶⁵ a “balance of power theory,”⁶⁶ and a “progressive theory.”⁶⁷ In so arguing Holbraad comes closer than Albrecht-Carrié to recognizing a series of international regimes predicated on principles, norms, and strictures.⁶⁸

Yet, of all long Concert scholarship it is F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen’s textbook that most clearly recognizes distinct ‘First’ and ‘Second Concert’ ‘international regimes’ separated by an equally distinct period of an ‘international state of nature,’ though they never use such terminology themselves.⁶⁹ While Bridge and Bullen’s narrative and model of the Second Concert share many features with the Concert model expounded by this discussion,⁷⁰ the two Concerts also diverge in many key respects.⁷¹ Most critically, the Concert of this discussion: was a byproduct of comprehensive, pan-great power ‘Concert diplomacy’ at the Berlin Congress (and not of a bi-laterally negotiated treaty at Frankfurt); was based on a common commitment to the regime’s principles by all of its members irrespective of any balances or imbalances of power that may have existed among them (and not on a *Pax Germanica*); and that the Ottoman Empire was a full and formal member of the regime. In so arguing this discussion offers a novel explanation for how Europe’s great powers successfully negotiated intra-European crises and kept the peace over the thirty years between 1878 and 1908.

This peace was not uncontested. Yet, those seeking to challenge the Concert did not justify their attempts to do so on competing material concerns such as the balance of power or *raison d’état* and immediate state self-interest. Rather, they appealed to two values that were, like those of the Concert, abstract, but which were in tension with the Concert’s principles, namely to national and human rights.

What is a Nation?: Historiography of Nation, Nationalism, and Nationhood

As regards the first of these, namely ‘the nation,’ there remains no scholarly consensus as to what it was (or, indeed, is), or what those during the ‘long nineteenth century’ (1789-1914) believed it to be, nor on the degree to which beliefs about, and loyalties to, the nation shaped modern European history. Given this scholarly debate and confusion, and that beliefs about, commitments to, and fears of, the nation would play a central role in shaping the Berlin Congress and Treaty, the Concert founded by this Congress and Treaty, and many of the crises that challenged them, it is critical to establish some general understanding of the major academic schools of thought on this phenomenon. Likewise, to clarify which school of thought in this debate is most supported by the birth, life, and death of the Second Concert.

In the most recent anglophone literature that addresses questions of nation, nationalism, and nationhood one encounters a historiography consisting of three alleged generations of scholarly assumption and narrative.⁷² The first of these generations, the recent literature argues, emerged in the aftermath of the First World War and until the mid-1970’s defined scholarly attempts to make sense of how nationalism and nationhood shaped Europe’s long nineteenth century.⁷³ According to the recent literature, this first generation of scholars grounded their inquiries on assumptions directly and uncritically inherited from the chief objects of their investigation, namely from the founders of national movements themselves, as well as the activists and politicians who followed them and took up their causes. These shared assumptions were that humanity distinguished among itself first and foremost by nationality, that nations were primordial and objectively existing social structures or institutions, that the boundaries between nations were clearly delineated, and that the individual persons who comprised nations belonged to and were constituent parts of them regardless of whether or not they were conscious of that belonging or even aware of their nation’s existence.⁷⁴

The recent literature likewise maintains that the first generation of scholars produced histories that accepted an unabridged narrative superstructure from the nationalists they studied. This narrative began in the Middle Ages when a supranational feudal caste of nobility and royalty reduced Europe’s nationally conscious *Urvölker* [the communities of purportedly endogamic, ethnically and culturally ‘pure’ tribal ancestors of various nations] to a state of stupefied national hibernation, degrading them by caste into a pancontinental mass of undifferentiated serfs. However, during the waning days of the Enlightenment a vanguard of scholars became inspired by the theories of Johann Gottfried Herder and the later writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as well as by the increasing influence of a nascent Romanticism. Drawing on these sources these vanguard scholars rediscovered their national ancestry, recognized that the national essence of that ancestry unconsciously endured among their national kin, and began the work of ‘reawakening’ that kin to their shared national spirit.⁷⁵

However, it was not always the case that one national scholar’s revelations automatically led them to respect those of another. Many concluded that some nations, which they esteemed as having never been more than savage in the past and as remaining culturally stunted in the present, were properly subordinate to and ruled by nations that were, and always had been, greater and more illustrious. As national activists, politicians, and other ethnopolitical entrepreneurs⁷⁶ took up and advanced the national causes of philosophers and scientists, they embraced these prejudices. Thus, some nations sought to overthrow feudal royalty and nobility not to abolish oppression and found a comity of equal nations but to usurp their place of lordship over nations, so that they could enthrone master races over subject peoples.⁷⁷

The second generation⁷⁸ of scholarship, which according to the recent literature emerged in the mid-1970’s and prevailed until the mid-1990’s, is said to have distinguished itself from the

first generation by its reassessment of the latter's supposedly unchallenged 19th century nationalist assumptions of nation, nationalism, and nationhood.⁷⁹ The recent literature asserts that this second generation discovered that nations are not primordial and that it was not a reawakening of unconscious nations that had driven the rise of national movements. Rather, nations were novel institutions invented by the national scholars themselves and then built by national activists, politicians, and ethnopolitical entrepreneurs who followed them. That is, the scholars of this generation are alleged to have realized that "it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round."⁸⁰ Or, to highlight one prominent case in point, that it was only during the late nineteenth century that culturally and linguistically heterogeneous peasants living on the territory that had come to be called France for the first time became homogeneous national Frenchmen.⁸¹ Moreover, that the invention and evolution of this nation-producing nationalism was itself a consequence of the unprecedented historical processes of modernity, and especially of the industrial revolution.⁸²

Nor did the second generation understand these constructed nations to be objective institutions. Rather, nations were "imagined communities" that existed nowhere but in the minds of those who chose to self-identify as belonging to them.⁸³ Neither was this constructed and self-conscious nationhood an essential and permanent identity, or even always the most important communal loyalty. Rather, national self-identity was ambiguous, and individuals always adapted their particular national loyalties to maximize their personal gains and minimize their personal risks in contingent political, economic, social, and cultural circumstances. Indeed, national self-identity itself rose and ebbed in importance relative to other communal loyalties as personal opportunities and dangers favored emphasizing one or another identity.⁸⁴

While the recent literature alleges that the second generation of scholarship revolutionized assumptions of nation, nationalism, and nationhood, this literature also asserts that the second generation, like the first, accepted the narrative superstructure of 19th century nationalists. The fact that national scholars invented, and national activists built, their nations did not require them to be conscious of their work as acts of invention and construction. In the actual event they genuinely believed their own primordial and objective national assumptions. Likewise, the rise of national movements may have mainly been a byproduct of modernity and industrialization, such as the need to establish mass common languages and mass cultures for mass labor and consumer markets and the need of capitalist elites to consolidate resources against other industrializing polities. However, according to the second generation of scholarship, this was only clear in hindsight. To the national activists, politicians, and ethnopolitical entrepreneurs at the time the process really was one of overthrowing an alien and irreconcilable feudal royalty and nobility for the sake of national liberation.⁸⁵

That national identity was in theory, and initially in practice, ambiguous, contingent, and convertible, and that it was but one among many possible communal loyalties did not alter its triumph as the hegemonic self-identity of the long 19th century from being anything other than inevitable. Neither did the fact that the nation was invented and at first ambiguous inoculate the national movements from national chauvinism. And the narrative superstructure of the second generation of scholarship, like that of the first, is supposed to have ended with nations seeking to usurp rather than eliminate the nobility and enthrone master races over subject peoples.⁸⁶

The alleged contribution of the recent literature itself, being the third generation of scholarship, has been to take what it asserts were the second generation's novel national assumptions, which it embraces, and apply them to a revolutionized long 19th century narrative superstructure.⁸⁷ This narrative superstructure, dominant since the mid-1990's, holds as

unhistorical any story driven by an invention and evolution of nationalism and nations.⁸⁸ If the nation is held to have had any historical force whatsoever, it derived only from a faction within the urban bourgeois elite. This faction either found national ideology congenial to its worldview, and therefore sincerely embraced it, or found it expedient for attaining some other end, and therefore cynically exploited it. Regardless, to the extent that nations and nationalism shaped the narrative that was due to historical accidents or the machinations of this bourgeois faction. And in either case the result was that this faction found itself in a position to impose national institutions and national solutions on a European society overwhelmingly uninterested in both.⁸⁹

The third generation argues that the vast majority of Europeans during this period were aware, either consciously or unconsciously, that nations were constructed, ambiguous, and contingent abstractions. Most Europeans therefore concerned themselves with other group loyalties and identities far more than that of their nation, if they troubled themselves about national questions at all. It is only because the nationalist faction within the bourgeois elite was disproportionately prolific in its production of national apologias that later historians, who this generation asserts did not bother to examine the perspective of subaltern masses, retrospectively and inaccurately wrote this faction's national assumptions into the minds of all Europeans. In doing so these later historians allegedly ascribed to long 19th century Europeans national motives and beliefs that they did not actually hold at the time.⁹⁰

The cleavage in generational evolution of national assumptions that both the recent literature and the second generation allege as having occurred between themselves and the first generation is thus highly exaggerated. While not seeking to belittle or discount the significant contributions the second generation has made to national scholarship, which has considerably complicated and advanced knowledge of the phenomena of nation, nationalism, and nationhood, it is important to note that no such cleavage took place. Rather, the second generation merely recast the first generation's assumptions as one of its own discoveries.⁹¹

Yet a significant break has, in fact, occurred between the narrative superstructure shared by both the first and second generation of scholarship and the recent literature's narrative of national indifference. However, some scholars have started to question this recent literature and its national indifference claims, and in doing so these scholars reassert the first and second generation literature's narrative of constructed national identities and loyalties triumphing as a powerful, even hegemonic, engine of long nineteenth century European political, cultural, and social development.⁹² And the birth, life, and death of the Concert will affirm these critiques of the recent literature and its claims about the national indifference of long 19th century Europeans.

Civic/Western Nationalism vs. Cultural/Ethnic/non-Western Nationalism

Yet, during the long nineteenth century there was, and there still is, more than one archetypal paradigm of nation. Nearly all of the discussion above focuses on a 'cultural' or 'ethnic' nation, which can be distinguished from a 'civic nation.' Unlike the cultural/ethnic nation, which, though drawing from some late Enlightenment theorists, is supposed to be mainly grounded on Romantic era thinking, according to its theorists the philosophical foundations of the 'civic nation' lay entirely in the Enlightenment, especially in the work of such *philosophes* as Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu.⁹³ Yet civic nationalists also challenged their Enlightenment philosophical patrimony in several critical respects, most notably by embracing the principle of popular sovereignty. And civic nationalism is supposed to have found its earliest and purest political expression in the pre-19th century revolutions, especially the American and French

revolutions (as concerns the latter, at least under the pre-terror Constitution of 1791 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen).⁹⁴

And like their late eighteenth-century antecedents, the mid and late nineteenth century champions of the civic national ideal, especially the so-called ‘classical liberals,’ are supposed to have advocated for the rights of individual citizens of states and taken as their *beau idéal* a society of atomized, rationally self-interested, self-responsible, and self-reliant individuals. Nevertheless, they are also not understood to have disavowed the principles of national community, national belonging, and national rights. Yet, civic nationalists are supposed to have presumed that their nation was bound together solely by a common commitment to an exhaustive set of abstract laws and political principles. Notably, as the civic nation was founded on the principle of popular sovereignty, the laws and principles that bound the civic nation together could not be imposed by decree but only established through a participatory process that included many or most, though rarely all, of its members. Thus, civic nationalists were, unlike most Enlightenment *philosophes*, emphatically opposed to absolutism. This also meant that the members of the civic nation were united not merely by their shared humanity but distinguished from the mass of the latter by, and notably only by, both their common commitment to their nation’s laws and principles and their enjoying a formal status of membership, i.e., citizenship, in their nation. Likewise, any rights enjoyed by the members of the civic nation did not derive from the simple fact of their humanity but from that status of formal membership in their nation.⁹⁵

The civic nation was thus coextensive with its nation-state, in that the nation had not existed, and its members had had no relationship whatever to each other, before the state institutions and laws that simultaneously founded both state and nation were duly established. Likewise, the civic nation would, along with its members’ interrelationship and interdependence, cease to exist the moment that their state, and its laws and institutions, disappeared. The civic nation was therefore nothing more or less than a community of individuals agreeing in what Ernest Renan famously framed as a ‘daily plebiscite’ to continue their mutual association within and under the auspices of a single state.⁹⁶

It is unnecessary to resolve here whether a purely civic nation has ever existed in actual practice, any more than has a purely cultural or ethnic nation, or whether, in a world where all nations exhibit characteristics of both, such concepts are useful even as purely heuristic archetypes. Notably, the consensus among the second and third generations of national scholarship is that it is not.⁹⁷ And these scholars have a point. Many Europeans at the time believed, and many modern historians still assert, that France was at one and the same time both the Western/civic nation-state *par excellence* signatory, and perhaps the only fully and unambiguously ethnicized nation-state signatory, of the Berlin Treaty.⁹⁸

Nevertheless, the plenipotentiaries at Berlin would grapple with these competing paradigms of the nation when framing their treaty, and hence the Concert of Europe. That is, they grappled with whether to recognize nations based on ethnic communities bound together mainly by a common culture or to recognize nations populated by aggregated but otherwise atomized individual citizens bound together solely by common law. In the end they chose neither but rather recognized states that, at least from the point of view of inter-state relations, were in no sense national. At the same time, they recognized states defined strictly by territory, and which drew their legitimacy from, and were accountable to, the international regime founded at Berlin, as the sole entities existing in, and as the only legitimate basis of, European inter-state relations. In doing so they ensured that their Concert regime would confront repeated challenges from those appealing to one, the other, or both conceptions of the nation. Yet, so long as it

existed, the foreign policy makers of the Concert's member states subordinated these appeals, at least formally, to the paradigms and principles of inter-state relations established at Berlin, above all the supreme commitment to the state prerogatives of the Concert's member states.

Congress of Berlin Historiography: The Rise of the Nation in Inter-State Relations?

However, such an assessment of the 'system' established at Berlin, namely that it was formally indifferent and even hostile to the nation as a legitimate principle in, or basis of, European inter-state relations, is at odds with the current scholarly consensus on the Congress and Treaty of Berlin. That is, such an assessment is at odds with the scholars of the "Berlin System" school.⁹⁹

This school posits a tri-epochal periodization and theoretical model consisting of successive and evolving "Vienna" (1815-1878), "Berlin" (1878/85-1918), and "Paris" (1918-today) systems. Each of these systems is supposed to have been established by multilateral, great power-comprehensive congresses or conferences and to have contributed to the incremental evolution of Europe from a system of sovereign territorial states to a system of sovereign ethnic national communities. And the Berlin Congress, together with Berlin Conference (1884-85), is asserted to have played a critical transitional role in this process by introducing for the first time into inter-state relations and law a novel, systematic, and formal recognition of ethnic national communities as such. It did so, the school argues, in part by recognizing new states that the Berlin Treaty established or conditionally recognized as ethnic nation-states *per se*, by enumerating specific minority communities within these states whose security was to be guaranteed both by the Treaty's signatories and the new states themselves, and by framing these minority communities in ethnic national terms.

In what follows I concur with the Berlin System school that the Berlin Congress and Treaty were a significant juncture in the history of European inter-state relations, there the consensus ends. Indeed, this discussion challenges this school's other principal claims. In the first place, while the Berlin Congress admitted the national principle into the international regime it founded and defined, it did so neither formally nor systematically but only implicitly and cursorily. That is, Treaty and Congress consistently ignored or denied both the idea that a state's ruling regime governed on behalf of and spoke for entire national communities and the proposition that the national principle was a legitimate basis for proposed or realized acts on the inter-state stage. Secondly, it is true that both the Congress and Treaty introduced rights and protections in the states they founded or conditionally recognize. Yet these were overwhelmingly universal individual rights extended to the individual citizens of these states as both individuals and citizens (i.e., liberal rights). Meanwhile, to the limited extent that the Congress and Treaty recognized communal minority rights or protections, these were extended not to nationally- but religiously-defined communities *per se*, that is, communities defined by denomination as such and not as shibboleth for some other community such as nationality.

The turning point that occurred at Berlin in 1878 was thus a transition from the condition of an international state of nature to that of an international regime, with the latter being a regime predicated on the territorial, and not the ethnic-national, state. That is, predicated on state (and not national) sovereignty, state territorial integrity (irrespective of the national loyalties or national demography of those living on that territory), and liberal (i.e., state-based, universal, equal, uniform, and individual) rights (and not special, asymmetrical, and particularistic communal guarantees granted to specific and enumerated communities). However, the Berlin

Treaty's and Concert's formal indifference, even hostility, to national communities was not a reflection of the personal indifference of either the Treaty's framers or the foreign policy makers of the Concert member states to national questions. Nor was it a reflection of their assumption that either their fellow citizens, or those of the polities they established or recognized at Berlin, were so indifferent. In fact, it reflected the opposite. That is, it was precisely because the framers of the Berlin Treaty and foreign policy makers of the Concert recognized the social, cultural, and political power of, and were thus deeply anxious about, national identities and loyalties that they eschewed any formal recognition of them.

An Era of Human Rights?: Human Rights during the Second Concert Period

It is academically controversial even to reference 'human rights' as an idea during the Second Concert era. This is because there remains considerable scholarly debate as to whether *human rights per se* existed during the long nineteenth century, or whether it is a novel and modern concept born contemporaneously with the neo-liberalism of the late 20th century.¹⁰⁰ Given this scholarly debate, that the plenipotentiaries at Berlin would implicitly recognize human rights, and that, not coincidentally, many of the crises that challenged the Concert would be driven by appeals thereto, it is critical to clarify what, if anything, 'human rights' meant during this period, especially as regards its relationship to, and tensions with, the principle of popular sovereignty.

Like nationalism and liberalism, the ideal of popular sovereignty is a legacy of the Enlightenment era. However, unlike nationalism and liberalism, which as intellectual offspring of the Enlightenment were fully articulated only after this era gave way to other philosophical projects, popular sovereignty was known to but largely rejected by Enlightenment *philosophes* themselves.¹⁰¹ This did not mean that Enlightenment thinkers were conservative defenders of traditional medieval institutions or the principle of rule by the grace of a Christian God alone. Rather, their paradigm was mainly that of rational rule according to the laws that nature itself had designed for human society. As the legitimacy of these laws derived from nature, and neither the will of God nor the will of the people, natural law was, like divine right, incompatible with popular sovereignty. Indeed, in their discussion of natural laws many *philosophes* concluded that nature endowed all humans with a number of natural rights, almost always among them the right to freedom of religious expression. According to these Enlightenment thinkers, humans could be alienated from these rights neither by the will of princes, acting on behalf of God, nor by the will of the people, even when expressed unanimously. Although some *philosophes* were unready to accept the principle of natural rights, hence an absolute and inalienable individual right to an unbounded freedom of religious expression, all agreed that a degree of religious toleration was consistent with natural law.¹⁰²

And while it was clear to Enlightenment *philosophes* that they themselves were the people best suited to uncovering and elaborating natural laws, they were ready to furnish their support, intellectual legitimacy, and praise to any ruler who seemed willing to entertain their conclusions and prescriptions. Meanwhile, once they discovered that the principle of natural law could be as hostile to popular sovereignty as was divine right, and as amenable as divine right to monarchy in even its absolutist variety, as well as the expedient benefits of a rationalized state administration, many Enlightenment-era princes were happy to accept this bargain.

However, by embracing the principle of an individual natural right to religious toleration both Enlightenment philosophers and enlightened absolutists recognized a still greater ideal, one

belonging even more peculiarly to the Enlightenment project. And one of the best scholarly analyses of this Enlightenment ideal is provided by Hannah Arendt in her study of its relationship to western and central European Jewry during Age of Enlightenment.¹⁰³

As Arendt makes clear, peculiar to the Enlightenment and what lay at its foundation was a concern for universal humanity, though a concern that insisted upon and celebrated a humanity that was by its nature composed of diverse elements. Chief among these diversifying elements was belief, during the Age of the Enlightenment as yet framed exclusively as religious belief. Given their fundamental principle was universal humanity, the concern of Enlightenment thinkers was not, like those who framed the Peaces of Augsburg and Westphalia, for the protection of a narrow collection of formally recognized creeds but for all creeds everywhere, regardless of whether they were expressed by majority or minority communities, or even by single individuals. And Enlightenment proponents of this philosophy framed its principle of humanity as a self-evident and absolute natural law, a law beyond the purview of any state-ruling regime or body politic.¹⁰⁴

More recent commentators have complicated and evolved Arendt's arguments. They demonstrate that as the Enlightenment project gave way to the 'secular creeds'¹⁰⁵ it begot (and which would go on to compete with, and largely supplant, the Abrahamic creeds), such as political ideology (e.g., liberal, socialist, etc.) and national identity, some of those whose values remained fixed in the Enlightenment presumed that its principle of toleration ought to apply to these secular innovations.

Yet unlike Enlightenment *philosophes*, whose thinking remained rigidly grounded on the sovereign territorial state, some 19th century proponents of universal, pan-human toleration of secular creeds, as expressed both by communities (especially minority communities) and individuals, were willing to contemplate the supersession of state sovereignty and territorial integrity to enforce such toleration. And such contemplation of a supra- and trans-territorial state jurisdiction of a human right to express one's political or national ideology or identity was a consequential innovation.

Indeed, Samuel Moyn demonstrates how both Enlightenment philosophers and enlightened absolutists during the 17th and 18th centuries held as axiomatic that the actual realization of rights or toleration was a strictly domestic question to be adopted in law by state-ruling regimes on a voluntary basis. Insofar as principles of toleration or natural rights had any place in inter-state relations, both princes and *philosophes* agreed that the only acceptable and legitimate means for their realization was by uncoerced persuasion. Thus, while the principles of toleration and humanity were a legacy of the Enlightenment, those who wished to apply them to the novel secular creeds of the 19th century departed from and challenged the theoretical foundations of their intellectual patrimony in several critical respects, most notably *vis-à-vis* the supremacy of the state and its prerogatives. In doing so such advocates of humanity and toleration developed conception of modern, secular, and universal human rights."¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, other commentators, such as Gary Jonathan, Michael Barnett, Davide Rodogno, Alexis Heraclides, and Ada DiIalla, demonstrate how over 19th century the European great powers, i.e., the sometimes member states of sometimes Concert regimes, increasingly donned the mantle of guardian and guarantor of universal human toleration, and even of human rights. As they did so they adopted arguments ever more explicitly couched in the language of this Enlightenment-inspired 'humanity' to justify proposed or realized coercive and state prerogative-violating acts on the inter-state stage, actions which we would today describe as 'humanitarian interventions.' Though it should be noted that these same commentators

demonstrate that this concern for the individual rights of universal humanity was always but one of several principles that lay behind proposed or realized 19th century humanitarian interventions. The principles of racial solidarity, of national rights (especially those of national minorities), of protections for other secular ideologies, of religious (especially Christian) solidarity, and of the state self-interest of the intervening Power(s) always manifested in these interventions as well. Indeed, they played a significant role in determining when and where a rhetorical concern for humanity would appear, occurrences that were always capricious but never arbitrary.¹⁰⁷

The debates that surrounded the framing of the Berlin Treaty, and the challenges faced by the Second Concert of Europe, will affirm these authors who find antecedents for modern, neo-liberal human rights and humanitarian intervention during the classical liberal era of the *Belle Époque*. They will also demonstrate that, in upholding their supreme commitment to the state prerogatives of the Concert's member states, the Concert's foreign policy makers would demonstrate an indifference, even hostility, to human rights as a legitimate principle in, and basis of, inter-state relations that was equal to their indifference, and even hostility, to the principle of popular sovereignty everywhere.

Conclusion


In the mid-1870's the principles of the sovereign territorial state, a balance of power, an international state of nature, an international regime, nation, nationalism, and nationhood, and human rights would collide in southeastern Europe as the region erupted into a maelstrom of insurrection, massacre, and war, the so-called "Great Eastern Crisis" (1875-1878). What emerged out of this violence, the latest during Europe's mid-19th century international state of nature to threaten the continent with general war, was the most serious attempt in a quarter century by the principal makers of foreign policy among Europe's great powers to establish the sort of institution that would forestall such catastrophes and dangers. That is, what emerged was an attempt to found an international regime that would reconcile these various principles and supervise European inter-state relations, a regime that was forged at the Congress, and enshrined in the Treaty, of Berlin.

Chapter 2: The Congress and Treaty of Berlin

The Great Eastern Crisis (1875-1878) and the Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878)

In the summer of 1875, discontent unsettled frontier regions of the Ottoman Empire. As had been the case since the late 18th century, but especially since the Ottoman regime launched its ambitious program of administrative, legal, and infrastructural modernization, the ‘Tanzimat’ (1839-76), liberalizing reforms promised at the imperial center had failed to materialize in practice at the imperial periphery. Throughout the Empire, but especially in its Balkan territories, such disappointments were dangerous, especially among the *kmet/raja*, (by the 19th century, and in the Ottoman Balkans, both terms, the former of Slavic origin and later of Turkish, largely overlapped in their reference to a non-Muslim, largely Christian, tax-paying, landless, sharecropping, and quasi-enslaved peasant under-estate). All the more so as *kmet/raja* were always more informed about these promised reforms than local Ottoman elites might have preferred. At the same time the Ottoman regime, ever starved for the state revenues that it both collected through the inefficient mechanism of tax farming and which it desperately needed to realize its modernization program (to include that of its tax collection system itself), put ever greater pressure on those local Ottoman elites to raise such revenues. And 1875’s harvest had been a bad one. The result was an explosion of peasant unrest.¹

Map 5: The Ottoman Balkans in 1875



Source: AbdurRahman AbdulMoneim, “Vilayets and Sanjaks of the Ottoman Empire in 1875,” Wikipedia, last accessed September 25, 2023, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ottomans_1875.png

The conflagration exploded in perennially restive Herzegovina, the southern *sanjak* (district) of the *vilayet* (province) of Bosnia, where mainly south-Slavic speaking and largely Orthodox Christian *kmet/raya* refused to pay, and sometimes assaulted, tax collectors who were demanding sums beyond the value of their entire year's harvest. Local Ottoman officials responded by recourse to helter-skelter violence, destruction, rape, and murder, setting off a torrent of refugees into both neighboring Austria-Hungary, mainly the south-Slavic speaking provinces of Austrian Dalmatia and Hungarian Croatia-Slavonia, and the nearby Slavic, Orthodox, and *de facto* independent Principalities of Serbia and Montenegro. Within Herzegovina itself, whose unrest quickly spread throughout the rest of Bosnia, the violence only served to transform *kmet/raya* demands for simple tax relief into calls for more sweeping reforms, albeit while accepting that any such reforms would come under the aegis of the Ottoman state. That is, they called for liberal protections and guaranteed Christian representation in the province's gendarmerie and in an autonomous provincial administration, calls which met with a receptive audience among senior Ottoman officials both in the Sarajevo and in Istanbul/Constantinople.²

Yet reconciliation proved impossible as local Christian and Muslim militias increasingly took matters into their own hands. At the same time, extra-provincial reinforcements poured into Bosnia, in the form both of regular Ottoman army troops and paramilitary bands (especially the notorious '*bashi-bazouks*') on behalf of the Ottoman regime and its local, mainly south Slavic-speaking Muslim, allies, and, on behalf of insurrectionists, of mainly south Slavic-speaking Christian, especially Orthodox, volunteer patriots and soldiers of fortune from Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Montenegro. Violence on all sides was soon beyond the control of any senior leadership and assumed the character of an inter-ethnic civil war as it increasingly spread throughout the Ottoman Balkans and internationalized.³

At first Serbia and Montenegro's ruling regimes restrained their subjects from slipping into Bosnia to join the growing maelstrom, mostly out of fear of Ottoman retaliation. Yet these efforts became increasingly half-hearted as the number of dead, refugees, and tales of horror multiplied. By July of the following year (i.e., 1876), and amid a frenzy of public expressions of Christian and pan-south-Slav solidarity and outrage, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on, and were promptly crushed by, the Ottoman Empire. Yet the Ottoman army's resounding victory failed to restore security to the region.⁴

As early as the previous spring violence had spilled into the Vilayet of the Danube (an Ottoman province largely covering the northern half of what is today Bulgaria). By April several communities of Orthodox *kmet/raya* in the Rhodope Mountains region of the province broke into open rebellion, with many doing so in the name of a Bulgarian national revolution. This was an especially perilous locale for such an uprising. A large portion of such Circassians (a Caucasian and largely Muslim people) as had survived the brutal ethnic cleansing campaign carried out against them by the Romanov regime in their – now Russian – Caucasus homeland had been settled there by successive Ottoman regimes. The latter had hoped to transform local demographics, overwhelmingly Christian and south Slavic-speaking, into more of what it perceived to be in its favor and buttress local stability and security by introducing a population whose recent trauma had, it was hoped, radicalized them in support of their new and co-religionist Ottoman patron. This calculation was spectacular in its predictable failure.⁵

These survivors were now confronted with the prospect of their new homeland's secession to the rule of yet another Christian regime, hence inevitably being made refugees in

what for most of them would be the second time in less than two decades. Unsurprisingly, many Circassians now streamed into, and made up a disproportionate element in, bands of *bashi-bazouk* (roughly translated as “broken” or “damaged” head, i.e., leaderless and disorderly) militias locally mobilized to assist a regular Ottoman army overstretched by the insurgency in Bosnia and impending war against Serbia and Montenegro. Meanwhile other local *bashi-bazouk* volunteers, such as Turkic- and south Slavic-speaking Muslims, although most of them had suffered less than their Circassian compatriots, shared their comrades’ justified dread at the prospect of falling under the rule of a regime dominated by Christians. The result was a wholesale and systematic slaughter of thousands of, overwhelmingly civilian, Christian men, women, and children, in the notorious “Batak Massacre” (May, 1876).⁶

At first the butchery seemed propitious. By mid-May the insurgency in the Danubian Vilayet had been liquidated and three months later Serbia and Montenegro were neutralized as regional threats. Yet, as is so often the case with such desperate acts, these atrocities ultimately precipitated the very catastrophe that they were intended to forestall. By the autumn of 1876 knowledge of the carnage became general throughout Europe. Vociferous public expressions of outrage and revulsion were universal, nowhere more than in Britain, the Ottoman Empire’s most critical, if informal, ally, where William Ewart Gladstone, a renowned human rights and liberal firebrand and former prime minister, poured his righteous oratory into a widely read pamphlet entitled “Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East.”⁷

The great powers that had hitherto supported the Ottoman Empire now abandoned it while the others became more overt in their hostility toward it. And these anti-Ottoman sentiments were placated neither by a series of coups that would over the summer of 1876 see three Ottoman sultans in as many months nor by the promulgation of a liberal-democratic Ottoman constitution, one that guaranteed the inhabitants of the Bosnian and Danubian Vilayets, including their Christian populations, both liberal rights and proportional representation in the Ottoman government, albeit within a more unified Ottoman state.⁸

In December representatives from all six of Europe’s Christian great powers met in Istanbul/Constantinople. Their diktat imposed on the Ottoman regime internal and external territorial alterations and far-reaching administrative reforms, mainly predicated on provincial autonomy, both of which were incompatible with the new Ottoman constitution. The new constitution Ottoman regime, still believing that the force of its own arms was such that it need not accept partition of its territory or tutelage to any outside Power, refused these demands. The Romanov regime, heady from a tonic of crusading zeal for Christian solidarity, pan-Slav romanticism, the juicy geopolitical opportunity of a suddenly, and surely temporarily, isolated Ottoman Empire, and a not-insincere hint of humanitarian interventionism, could not resist taking up the challenge. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 began on 24 April.⁹

Yet the axiom, widely shared among Russian foreign policy commentators and makers, and those of all the great powers, of the Ottoman Empire being a decrepit and moribund ‘Sick Man of Europe’ was divorced from reality, a reality that would four decades later also inflict much woe at Gallipoli on a British regime still unable to fathom it. As it had in its war against Serbia and Montenegro, the Ottoman army proved formidable as wave after wave of Russian columns broke upon the redoubts of its fortifications at Plevna (today in northern Bulgaria) before they were able to overcome it. But, after almost five months of bloody siege (July-December 1877), and with some assistance from both the army of a Romania that had in May declared independence from the Ottoman Empire and from local Bulgarian militias, overcome it

they finally did. Meanwhile, in December, Serbia and Montenegro rejoined the fighting in their respective neighborhoods, insofar as there was any.¹⁰

By January the exhausted Russian army had marched to the gates of Istanbul/Constantinople and was able to enforce unilateral decrees on the Ottoman Balkans, while the remnants of the Ottoman army, in even worse shape than its Russian antagonist, had its capital directly at its back, and behind that the Anatolian heartland, out of which fresh reinforcements flowed. It seemed that the Bosphorus might thus remain tantalizingly just beyond Russia's grasp. Meanwhile, the British navy loitered at the mouth of the Dardanelles.¹¹

Confronted by the prospect of Russian occupation of the Turkish Straits, Britain's Disraeli government suddenly recalled that the geopolitical utility of the Ottoman Empire was of more compelling interest to it than the application of humanitarian scruples to imperial excesses. Accordingly, this government ordered British warships to stand ready to steam at short notice to Istanbul/Constantinople and, if necessary, prevent the Russian army from entering it. The Romanov regime was now amenable to Ottoman appeals for a cessation of hostilities, and a truce was signed on 31 January 1878.¹²

The other great powers happily allowed their Romanov peer to dictate the final peace terms to its defeated Ottoman adversary in bilateral negotiations, and to allow the former to aggrandize itself at the latter's expense. Indeed, on what grounds could any of them have objected to Russia's doing so? Europe was then in an international state of nature, and it was therefore legitimate that Russia seize as much Ottoman territory as it could, and as much by right of conquest as by Christian solidarity, pan-Slav nationalism, human rights, or whatever else. The only proviso was that St. Petersburg's plunder not be excessive, that is, that it not upset the balance of power in the European state system, this being the sole universal and comprehensive inter-state principle in existence at that time.¹³

Yet the Romanov regime, drunk from a victory that it was only starting to realize might prove pyrrhic, did not heed the warning. The "Treaty of San Stefano" (3 March 1878), named for the Istanbul suburb in which it was negotiated and signed, created an enormous Bulgaria. One that would unilaterally dominate all other non-great power Balkan states, whose ruling regime and people would presumably be loyal and obedient to their Russian Tsar-liberator, and which would become the object of fanatical Bulgarian nationalists' irredentist dreams for more than a century after 1878.¹⁴

Meanwhile, within weeks of signing the truce Sultan Abdülhamid II dissolved the Ottoman constitutional regime, which was thus at once the culmination and swan song of the Tanzimat, whose rule during a disastrous war, humiliating as much to Islam as to the Empire, had fatally weakened its legitimacy. In its place he reestablished absolutism. At the same time, he exiled, imprisoned, or executed the constitution's supporters, who were mainly secular, liberal, and civic nationally minded Ottoman elites, among which those belonging to a clique known as the "Young Ottomans" were especially prominent. Abdülhamid was thus not in a political, and still less a military, position to reject the Russian terms. And in any case, they merely reflected material realities established on a battlefield that the Ottoman army could not hope to shift solely by the force of its own arms.¹⁵

Yet the other Christian great powers were horrified, none more than the Disraeli government and the Habsburg regime. The former saw in San Stefano a momentary steppingstone to effective Russian domination of the Straits, while the latter was unwilling to see its last arena for imperial expansion and influence, namely the Balkans, definitively closed. Meanwhile, Otto von Bismarck declared neutrality in this dispute between Germany's mutual

Map 6: San Stefano Bulgaria



Source: Alexander Stoyanov (@Al_Stoyanov), “144 years ago, Russia and the Ottoman empire sign the Treaty of San Stefano. Bulgaria is reestablished on the political map of Europe after 481 years of foreign rule,” X, 26/09/2023, https://twitter.com/Al_Stoyanov/status/1499324694209646592

allies (i.e., Russia and Austria-Hungary) in the “League of the Three Emperors” (1873-78). The Romanov regime, for its part, was increasingly aware of its army’s incapacity to continue the war against the Ottoman Empire, let alone defend itself against new hostilities from either Britain or Austria-Hungary, and still less against a coalition of both, especially in the context of the general European war into which the ongoing crisis seemed at ever greater risk of plunging the continent.¹⁶

Map 7: Partition of San Stefano Bulgaria



PROVISIONAL AND REVISED BORDERS OF BULGARIA (1878).

ACCORDING TO THE PRELIMINARY TREATY OF SAN STEFANO AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> San Stefano borders of Bulgaria Berlin borders of Bulgaria Berlin borders of Eastern Rumelia (unified with Bulgaria 1885) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To Ottoman Empire (Berlin) To Serbia (Berlin) To Romania (Berlin) |
|--|---|

Soure: Krizerion (u/Krizerion), r/Europe, "Bulgaria according to the treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin," Reddit, 26/09/2023,
https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/7x7zhc/bulgaria_according_to_the_treaty_of_san_stefano/

Bereft of German help and realizing the degree of its isolation, St. Petersburg agreed to comprehensive negotiations to be held in Berlin in July 1878. The ensuing Berlin Congress would impose on its Russian participant a radical reduction of 'San Stefano' Bulgaria returning most of it to Ottoman rule either directly or, in the case of a novel and autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia established by this Congress, indirectly. Yet this partition was hardly among this Congress's principal achievements, achievements which it enshrined in the compact to which all of its full participants comprehensively committed themselves, namely the Treaty of Berlin.¹⁷

Map 8: The Balkans Established by the Treaty of Berlin



Source: Alexander Altenhof, "Europe in 1878, after the Congress of Berlin and the territorial and political rearrangement of the Balkan Peninsula," Wikipedia, last accessed April 9, 2022, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:KaterBegemot>

The Congress and Treaty of Berlin

Historical literature that devotes serious attention to the Congress and Treaty of Berlin mostly declines to engage with the language employed in the Treaty itself or by its authors at the Congress, and instead primarily relies on the work of earlier scholars.¹⁸ The scholars of the "Berlin System" school are an exception in that they devote considerable attention to the text of the Treaty, though they largely misread that text while doing so.¹⁹ Yet even these scholars mostly decline to engage directly with the language of the Congress that drafted that Treaty. What follows is an attempt to fill this gap by faithfully analyzing the Treaty's text as well as the language employed at the Congress.²⁰

What follows is, in effect, a series of textualist and originalist analyses of the Berlin Treaty. As such, this discussion does not closely analyze the personal, and especially not the private, assumptions and intentions of one, another, or a clique of several of the Congress's

participants. Such a basis of analysis seems unnecessary for a covenant that was a compromise among many authors whose assumptions about the meaning of its language and the intentions of its stipulations diverged and were sometimes even at odds, and none of whom enjoyed so hegemonic a position as to impose their personal assumptions and intentions on all the rest. Rather, central to my analysis are the formal and comprehensive consensus meanings and intentions arrived at by the covenant's authors, as these were the only ones universally available not only to all of these authors themselves, but to all foreign policy makers and commentators who did not directly participate in penning the covenant.²¹

And such a point bears mentioning as the current Berlin Treaty literature, including among scholars of the Berlin System school, does not fail to consult documents from the period, including those that appealed to, communicated with, or were written by one, another, or a few of the Treaty's authors. However, that these scholars only consult the personal views of individual participants, or a clique of several of them, rather than consensus views formulated at the Berlin Congress itself, leads to distortions in their analyses of the Treaty. For example, and as shall be noted again later, much of the recent literature concludes that the Treaty guaranteed special, asymmetrical, and particularistic communal guarantees to specific and enumerated communities when in fact the consensus meaning, and consensus intention, of the relevant stipulations were to guarantee universal, equal, and individual rights.²²

What will emerge from the textualist and originalist analyses elaborated below is a Treaty that was not a set of unrelated, *ad hoc*, and geographically or administratively circumscribed agreements, but a comprehensive, inter-related, and for the most part internally consistent paradigm of inter-state relations, if only a formal one. And the latter point bears mentioning, for, as will be noted throughout the discussion, many of the Treaty's stipulations and the Congress's consensus agreements were *de jure* formulations that almost certainly diverged from what many, and perhaps most, of their authors and participants themselves, let alone the persons and peoples to whom they applied, believed were the realities on the ground. Likewise, many of these stipulations and agreements formally claimed, or were predicated on the assumption that, the Congress, the Treaty, and any international regime these might found possessed authority that their authors and participants recognized could not be realized in actual practice. Nevertheless, that formal technicalities in inter-state relations are of critical material relevance to such relations and ignored at the peril of those who do so is a central assumption of this discussion, borne out by the life and death of the Second Concert.

The framework of the Treaty took as its first principle a guarantee of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all its signatory states, and recourse to comprehensive, pan-signatory consultation rather than coercion when resolving conflicts. It founded a two-tier state system composed primarily of Treaty signatories and, secondarily, of states whose sovereignty, territorial integrity, and sheer existence were under those signatories' supervision. It was predicated on states defined by territory and avoided recognition of nation states. Insofar as it addressed the citizens of states themselves, it primarily extended to them individual rights rather than communal protections. Insofar as it guaranteed communal protections at all, it extended them to communities defined strictly by confession and not on such secular bases as culture or nation and was indifferent and even hostile to the principle of popular sovereignty. However, it also implicitly admitted the self-contradictory value of human rights, and cursorily admitted the equally self-contradictory value of national rights, as legitimate principles in inter-state relations. The following discussion will address these points more or less in this order. More importantly, it

was precisely this framework that would serve as the basis of the Second Concert over the next three decades of its existence.

The Supremacy of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

The Treaty

On the basis of its length the Treaty of Berlin appeared as the most significant compact enacted in European inter-state relations between 1815 and 1918. True, its 64 articles were only just over half as many as the 121 that made up the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna.²³ Yet this was still almost twice as many as in the Treaty of Paris (34), and was more than seven times as many as in the Treaty of London (9), which were, as noted, the only other strictly European agreements between 1815 and 1918 signed by all of the mutually recognized European great powers and which sought to reestablish a pan-continental international regime.²⁴ It was, moreover, almost twice as many articles, or several times more than that, than contained in any other treaty signed during that century.²⁵

Of all the Berlin Treaty's 64 articles its penultimate one was the most significant in its implications. This article (article 63) declared that "the Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, as well as the Treaty of London of March 13, 1871, are maintained in all such of their provisions as are not abrogated or modified by the preceding stipulations." The framers of this article were thus clear that the Berlin Treaty contributed to a coherent and distinct tradition based on the Treaties of Paris and London, which constituted a Treaty corpus discrete from any other in European inter-state relations.

It is critical to recall, from the previous chapter, that article 7 of Paris Treaty declared [The United Kingdom, the Austrian Empire, the French Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia, the Russian Empire, and the Kingdom of Sardinia] declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public [i.e., international] Law and System (*Concert*) of Europe [original language's emphasis]. Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the Independence [i.e., sovereignty] and the Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire; Guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest.²⁶

And that article 8 declared that

if there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other Signing Powers, any misunderstanding which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte, and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other Contracting Parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their Mediation.²⁷

In the course of admitting the Ottoman Empire to the Concert, the Paris Treaty had thus defined what it meant to be a member of that regime, namely, that a member state's sovereignty and territorial integrity were guaranteed by all other members and that it enjoyed recourse to pan-Concert consultation, rather than coercion, when resolving conflicts between itself and one or more other members.

While, as shall be described below, several provisions of the Treaty challenged or undermined articles 7 and 8 of the Paris Treaty, none modified, let alone abrogated them. In fact, whenever directly addressing a matter that fell under the purview of these articles, the Berlin Treaty affirmed, at least *de jure*, its signatories' collective commitment to the supremacy of the

principles that underlay these articles, and, in doing so, subordinated any other principles that the Berlin Treaty might recognize to those embodied in articles 7 and 8. Thus, the framers of the Berlin Treaty also affirmed that it, like the Treaties of Paris and London, was not an *ad hoc* collection of miscellaneous agreements among differing amalgamations of parties who engaged only with those questions, and committed themselves only to those solutions, that interested them, and who stood aloof of all others. Rather, they agreed to “consider any act tending to [the Berlin Treaty’s] violation as a question of general interest.” That is, they founded a comprehensive, integrated, binding, and collectively guaranteed international treaty regime among all of its acceding member states.

The Congress

While at the Berlin Congress the plenipotentiaries were themselves categorical on this point, and that the jurisdiction of this comprehensive, integrated regime was not confined to purely regional Balkan matters but was of pan-signatory and trans-continental European scope. Otto von Bismarck was especially consistent on this point throughout the Congress, a position made all the more notable given his recent quip, expressed before the Imperial *Reichstag* in 1876 and expounding an exactly opposite view, that no Balkan question was “worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.”²⁸ Meanwhile British plenipotentiary, and then-British prime minister, Lord Beaconsfield (i.e., Benjamin Disraeli) was empathic about the Congress creating a new regime during the Congress’s discussion of Romania,²⁹ and nearly all the plenipotentiaries affirmed it at one time or another while at Berlin.³⁰ And they were equally unambiguous that their discussions at Berlin contributed to a treaty corpus based on the Treaties of Paris and London.³¹

Yet, more significant was their consensus first principle at the Congress and, hence, about the first principle of any treaty they might frame and, thereby, any inter-state paradigm and comprehensive and integrated regime they might found. This principle was a guarantee, if only formally, of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the Congress’s fully participating states and recourse to pan-Congress consultation rather than violence when resolving disputes. Naturally, this principle did not apply to polities established or conditionally recognized by the Congress (e.g., Serbia, Romania, etc.). These were under the Congress’s supervision and thus their borders, their domestic and international laws, the nature of their ruling regimes, and indeed their very existence were subject, at least *de jure*, to the collective oversight and approval of the Congress, a point stressed by both Bismarck³² and French plenipotentiary (and future French prime minister) William Waddington,³³ whose sentiments were endorsed by the rest of the Congress.³⁴ Rather, the Congress’s first principle applied only to those states whose plenipotentiaries were full participants in the Congress, especially the Ottoman Empire.

True, there had been occasions on which a Congress consensus solution had challenged Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty *de facto*, but that the plenipotentiaries always affirmed it in principle, and often in actual practice, was significant. The British plenipotentiaries were especially emphatic on this point, with (then-British Foreign Secretary) Lord Salisbury declaring that “the most striking effect... of the Treaty of San Stefano... is to reduce Turkey to a level of absolute dependency upon the Power [i.e., Russia] which has imposed this Treaty.” Conversely, the Congress’s paramount aim was “to restore to her [i.e., the Ottoman Empire] a relative independence which shall permit her efficaciously to protect the strategical, political, and commercial interests of which she is to remain the guardian.”³⁵ Meanwhile Salisbury’s

compatriot, Beaconsfield, declared that “it remains established, in fact, by unanimous assent, that the Sultan, as a member of the political body of Europe, is to enjoy a position which shall secure to him the respect of his sovereign rights” and that “in the opinion of all, one of the principal bases of [European] peace is the independence of the Sultan as a European Sovereign.”³⁶ Yet the plenipotentiaries most clearly elucidated their consensus assumption on the, at least formal, supremacy of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the Congress’s fully participating states, including and especially as regarded its Ottoman participant, during their closing discussions at Berlin.

The occasion for this explicit affirmation of this principle was a challenge issued against it by the Russian plenipotentiaries. Notably, while formulating this challenge these plenipotentiaries underscored the ephemeral existence of the Paris and London Treaty regimes, emphasized the costs (especially the inter-signatory wars) and the dangers (especially of a general war) that had followed from their swift abrogation and dissolution, and stressed how critical it was that the “structure” (i.e., the treaty regime) raised at Berlin be of a stronger and more durable character.³⁷

In an ostensible effort to realize this end Russian plenipotentiaries proposed a succession of schemes, all of which were predicated on an abrogation of Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity, subordinating these to the Congress’s oversight. Other plenipotentiaries greeted these schemes with usually overwhelming opposition.³⁸ The first proposed to establish a permanent international organization, to be composed of representatives from all Berlin Treaty signories, in which the Berlin Treaty regime would be physically embodied, and which would supervise and enforce all Treaty stipulations. However, given that many such stipulations oversaw Ottoman territory and citizenry, and that no amount of any other signatory’s population or territory was so regulated by a Treaty stipulation, this proposal amounted to a wholesale abrogation of Ottoman state prerogatives and rights. That is, such a proposal degraded it *de jure* to the second rank in the two-tier state system established by the Congress.³⁹

Next, the Russian plenipotentiaries suggested a mechanism by which the full Treaty regime, *ad hoc* coalitions, or even unilateral actors might be authorized to intervene in, and thus violate the state prerogatives of, the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁰ Finally, they proposed expanding the jurisdiction of this mechanism from a strictly Ottoman mandate to one covering all Berlin Treaty signatories. Such an expansion would have resulted in a general erosion of state sovereignty and territorial integrity throughout the Berlin Treaty regime by providing a pretext, however dubious, for any member to intervene against any other. However, as many Berlin plenipotentiaries also noted, given that the only Treaty stipulations that addressed the territory or population of a signatory state applied exclusively to the Ottoman Empire, such a mechanism could only in practice apply to that Empire alone, and thus third proposition was just the second in new clothes.⁴¹

The Congress’s consensus solution was to reject these proposals *in toto*, and, while doing so, the non-Russian plenipotentiaries employed such language as to render unambiguous that the Congress did not intend to guarantee merely Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty, but that of all its fully participating states. The Ottoman plenipotentiaries were emphatic on this point, with Karatheodori Pasha declaring that “the signing of a Treaty of Peace provides... the most solemn and binding form for the stipulations therein contained... The Ottoman Government has, besides, given assurance in the Congress that its resolutions would be put into execution with the least possible delay,”⁴² that “all the Powers who take part in a Treaty ought to be on a

footing of equality in all its obligations; that a Treaty ought to be, in fact, obligatory on all the States who sign it,”⁴³ and that

The wording of the Russian [proposal] imposes on all the Contracting Parties the mutual duty of controlling the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty: the Porte would thus find itself obliged to admit within its own limits the control of other states, and in turn to exercise a control in other States having the same engagements... the Porte is ready to carry out the Treaty in so far as it is itself concerned, but as to exercising a control, or submitting to the same, it declines, considering that this obligation is novel and too weighty for a Government which seeks neither the burden involved thereby nor the benefit occurring therefrom.⁴⁴

Karatheodori Pasha was thus clear that the Berlin Treaty established a comprehensive, integrated, binding, and collectively guaranteed treaty regime among all of its signatory states, but argued that no policing international organization was necessary. The Congress’s consensus agreements and solutions, the treaty it framed, the international regime it founded, and the corpus of international law that it constituted were enough in themselves. And he was equally clear that the first principle of this treaty regime was the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its members, a principle that superseded any territorial, administrative or legal reform, communal protection or privilege, individual or collective right.

Yet no plenipotentiary held a stronger position on this issue than Bismarck, whose response to the Russian plenipotentiaries’ proposals was of such clarity, and was embraced by all non-Russian plenipotentiaries to such an extent, and thus established the Congress’s consensus understanding of the Treaty to such a degree, that it is quoted here at length,

In his [i.e., Bismarck’s] opinion... it is evident that if the Powers are agreed on questions which have occupied the attention of Europe for nearly a century, and which for the last twenty years particularly have roused her solicitude, they do not intend to produce an inefficacious work, and ought all to watch and control the execution of the stipulations which form a whole of which it is impossible to accept a part and reject the remainder; but [Bismarck] is not of opinion that each State separately should be obliged to use force for the execution of these arrangements, and that a substantial and collective guarantee [of the Treaty] should exist... Prince Bismarck does not believe that it is possible to find a formula which would guarantee Europe absolutely against the recurrence of those matters which have disturbed her, and, if the Powers engaged themselves jointly to use force at need, they would risk the provocation among themselves of grave disunion...

The Congress can perform only a human work, subject, like every other, to the fluctuations of events... [Yet,] Prince Bismarck is convinced that [Russian plenipotentiary] Prince Gortchacow would be satisfied by a draft indicating that the sum total of the obligations signed in the future Treaty shall form a whole the execution of which the Powers would oblige their representatives at Constantinople to watch over, reserving themselves the right of taking counsel, in case this execution should be defective or slow...

[Gorchakov has] in view [i.e., the Russian plenipotentiaries’ proposals are especially motivated by] the stipulations of the high assembly [i.e., the agreements of the Berlin Congress] relative to the protection of the Christians [in the Ottoman Empire]; but Prince Bismarck does not think that beforehand the Congress can be supposed to imagine that the resolutions, taken solemnly by all Europe united, would not be executed. It would be necessary to wait for an infraction in order to take notice of it, and in this case the Powers, warned by their Representatives at Constantinople, could arrange to appeal to new diplomatic assemblies.⁴⁵

Several of Bismarck’s assumptions and arguments bear special emphasis. First, he was emphatic that the Congress’s treaty was not an *ad hoc* collection of miscellaneous agreements among various groups of interested parties, in which a party might “accept a part and reject the

remainder.” Rather, this treaty constituted a comprehensive, binding, and collectively guaranteed whole among all of the Congress’s participants. He was just as clear in denying violence as a legitimate means of resolving disputes. Rather, agreements could be enforced, and conflicts resolved, only by the Congress’s participants ‘taking counsel’ and ‘appealing to diplomatic assemblies,’ that is, by comprehensive consultation among all of the Congress’s participating states. And, while he recognized that “the Congress can perform only a human work,” he was categorical that the regime founded at Berlin must be more durable than either of regimes established over the preceding twenty years, namely those established at Paris and London.

As will be demonstrated below, Congress consensus solutions that addressed domestic Ottoman affairs either left the implementation of such solutions strictly to the Ottoman regime, or established committees that were empowered by the Congress merely to observe, and not enforce, such implementation. That is, these Congress consensus solutions assiduously avoided placing any domestic Ottoman territory, people, or persons under the supervision of the Congress or of any commission it might establish.⁴⁶ Bismarck now affirmed that these solutions were, in his view, sufficient. He thus recognized the Ottoman regime as being able to handle its domestic affairs as much as the ruling regime or any other state fully participating in the Congress, and that Ottoman state prerogatives ought to therefore be accorded the level of respect commensurate with that status. In doing so, he also affirmed that the principle of Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty, and indeed that of all the Congress’s fully participating states, ought to supersede any other principle or concern, such as, say, the principle of individual rights or communal protections as concerned Ottoman Christians.

Notably, the Russian plenipotentiaries had in the course of their advocacy for their proposals been compelled to frame them in a written proposition, which suggested that

Europe having given her most solemn and biding sanction to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, the High Contracting Parties regard the totality of the Articles of the present Act as forming a combination of stipulations, the execution of which they engage to control and superintend, while insisting on their being carried out entirely in conformity with their intentions.

They reserve to themselves the right to come to an understanding, in case of need, as to the requisite means to ensure a result which neither the general interests of Europe nor the dignity of the Great Powers permit them to leave invalid.⁴⁷

The other plenipotentiaries recognized a distinction between the first and second paragraph of this proposal. The first, they argued, imagined a comprehensive, binding, and collectively guaranteed treaty that would thus found a corresponding international treaty regime. And this regime would leave the implementation of such of its stipulations as concerned the domestic sphere of its member states to the ruling regimes of those member states themselves, and would thus rely solely on the force of international law, and not any material coercion, for their realization. In the view of the non-Russian plenipotentiaries, the second paragraph established a mechanism for authorizing either the entire regime, a faction thereof, or even a single member, to intervene coercively against one or more others so as to realize the implementation of one or another Congress solution.⁴⁸ And it was for this reason that they unanimously rejected proposal’s second paragraph. Indeed, even its author, namely Russian plenipotentiary (and then Russian foreign minister) Prince Alexander Gorchakov tacitly recognized the distinction between his own first and second paragraphs.

However, Gorchakov’s compatriot, Russian plenipotentiary (and then Russian ambassador to London) Count Pyotr Shuvalov, remained defiant, and with equal vigor both

insisted that no meaningful distinction existed between the two paragraphs and demanded that the Russian proposition be accepted in full, arguing that

Russia asks for no interference in the state of affairs of Turkey, as soon as the stipulations of the Treaty shall have been executed, but until then there is interference, and such interference emanates naturally from all the decisions of the Congress. Can it be sustained that there is no interference in Turkey, when there is in existence a network of European Commissions in Roumelia, in the Greek Provinces, in Armenia, &c.?... [I] hope that, at an early date, this interference will have ceased; but as for the present, [I] look upon it as being indispensable, as proceeding from the results of the Congress... This right [to violate Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity] being established, the Plenipotentiaries of Russia do not see why things should not be called by their names, and why the control and superintendence which they demand should be refused.⁴⁹

Notably, this was not the first time that Shuvalov had openly and directly addressed an uncomfortable fact that the other plenipotentiaries uniformly left unspoken, namely that the Congress had on some occasions challenged and eroded Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty *de facto*.⁵⁰

Yet Shuvalov was mistaken. There was, as all the non-Russian plenipotentiaries well understood, a world of difference between a handful of circumscribed and implicit violations of Ottoman state prerogatives in practice, nearly all of which lacked coercive mechanisms of enforcement, and what Shuvalov proposed.⁵¹ The former allowed the Ottoman Empire to remain a full member of a treaty regime, enjoying all the guarantees that derived, at least *de jure*, therefrom. The latter placed the Ottoman Empire as whole under the collective supervision of that regime, thereby relegating the Empire to the second tier in the two-tier state system that this regime established, that is, to the status of, say, Montenegro or Bulgaria (a paradoxical circumstance, at least officially, given that Bulgaria itself remained in some sense a *de jure* Ottoman territory). Such a demotion would be both an innovation in European inter-state relations and an unprecedented wholesale abrogation of Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Indeed, Waddington explained his vote against the Russian proposition in full by echoing Salisbury and asserting that “either [the two paragraphs] add nothing to the authority of the Treaty, or else they have too extended a bearing.” Moreover, in his opinion,

The Congress, in asking Turkey to consent to important sacrifices, had in view the preservation of the sovereignty of the Sultan from all assault in the reduced but compact cohesion of the provinces which will henceforth constitute his Empire. Now the wording proposed [by the Russian plenipotentiaries] appears to consecrate a species of permanent tutorage imposed upon the Ottoman Government. The Treaty which the Powers are about to sign contains a very large number of clauses, which might become, under the action of a control decreed by the Congress, as series of pretexts for an incessant interference in all the acts of the Sublime Porte... to inaugurate a right of general control over so large a number of clauses of very unequal importance would be a peril for the future, and the Congress would be running the risk, in entering upon such a course, of introducing elements of discord among the Powers who have just constructed a work of peace and concord.⁵²

The Russian plenipotentiaries had doggedly pursued their schemes for a subordination of Ottoman state prerogatives to the Congress’s, and thus its treaty regime’s, oversight, efforts that spanned four Congress sessions.⁵³ Notably the plenipotentiaries had devoted such prolonged attention only to two other issues at the Congress, namely those of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, both of which also acutely touched on questions of Ottoman state principles and both of which were universally acknowledged by the plenipotentiaries to be the most serious raised at the Congress. Yet in the end Congress’s consensus solution was to reject all these schemes in

full. In doing so the Congress left no doubt about its, at least formal, commitment to the supremacy of Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity, and thus to that of all its fully participating states.

The Territorial and the Ethnic Nation-State

The Treaty

The Berlin Treaty was recognized the legitimacy of, territorial states, that is, states that in their relations with others defined their citizenry solely by the fact that the latter were legal citizens of the state that just so happened to enjoy sovereignty over the territory that these citizens called home. In other words, these states were seen as populated by an undifferentiated citizenry and has having no claim to an interest in the citizens or communities of any other state, whose populations would, for the purposes of their inter-state dealings, also be taken as undifferentiated. Notably, any claims to legitimacy that the ruling regimes of such states might make, or how they might define their body politic, citizenry, or communal identity, in the strictly domestic arena was immaterial to that state's status as 'solely defined by territory' in their inter-state relations so long as they adhered to the above standards in those relations.

In this 'territorial' states differed from, say, nation-states, especially ethnic nation-states. The latter operated not in the equal interest of all of its undifferentiated citizenry but in the special interest of the national community on which that state was based, that is, in the special interest of its *Staatsvolk* [state-people]. And, in its inter-state relations, ethnic nation states claimed an interest in such citizens of other states as belonged to the principal national community of their state (i.e., who were members of that state's *Staatsvolk*), and claimed an equal interest in whichever territories such co-national might be found. In short, while 'territorial' states reified administrative and territorial boundaries between states, ethnic national states eroded them.

The Berlin Treaty's recognition of solely territorial states was one of its most essential characteristics and one that would prove critical to European inter-state relations over the next three decades. During this period challenges to this territorial state principle would constitute the principal basis of successive crises, each of which would endanger the Treaty and the Concert regime it founded, and, in doing so, simultaneously and consequently threaten the European state system with general war. In all these crises foreign policy makers in all of the Treaty's signatory states would, on account of their loyalty to the Concert, the Treaty that founded it, and thus to the territorial state paradigm on which both were predicated, without exception affirm (if only formally) this species of state as the sole legitimate basis of European international relations.

Yet the claim that the Berlin Treaty recognized only territorial states is controversial, contested mainly by scholars of the Berlin System school. This school asserts that, when the authors of the Berlin Treaty referred to states or the populations on which they were based, they intended ethnic nation-states and ethnic national communities.⁵⁴ Eric Weitz, for example, contends that "when the great powers denoted Bulgarians, Romanians, Serbs, and so on they were clearly thinking of them as nations or even races (to use common nineteenth-century parlance), and not as religious communities."⁵⁵

It is certainly true that when the Berlin Treaty's framers used such language they did not intend, and no one understood them as signifying, religious communities. That is, they did not refer to, and no one understood them as referring to, the Greek, Montenegrin, Bulgarian,

Romanian, or Serbian Eastern Orthodox Churches and their associated confessional communities.⁵⁶ However, it does not therefore follow that when the framers publicly referred to a “Bulgaria,” “Romania,” “Serbia,” “Montenegro,” or “Greece” they intended ethnic nation-states.

Indeed, the framers’ references to their own states challenge this contention. Take, for example, their reference in the Treaty’s preamble to an “Emperor of all the Russias,” and not to an “Emperor of all *the Russians*” (my emphasis), and contrast this with the title of the recently deposed Napoleon III, “Emperor of *the French*,” or, indeed, that of his predecessor Louis Philippe, “King of *the French*” (my emphases).⁵⁷ Such language underscored that the framers understood the Treaty’s Russian signatory state to be predicated on territory and not on a people or peoples, let alone a nation. In fact, the Treaty designated all the heads of state, except for the Ottoman Sultan and, of course, the President of the French Republic, as rulers of territories rather than of peoples or nations.⁵⁸

And the noted Ottoman exception proves the rule. That is, while the Treaty’s reference to “his Majesty Emperor of the Ottomans”⁵⁹ seemed to recognize the Sultan as the ruler of a people rather than of a territory, it also raised the question: who exactly were these Ottomans? At the time of the Treaty’s signing it was common for those inside and outside of the Ottoman polity to refer to it as “Turkey” and to its subjects as “Turks,” despite that a large proportion of these subjects neither spoke a Turkic language nor culturally self-identified as Turkish. However, other than the Ottoman royal family itself and perhaps a few “Young Ottomans,” virtually no one referred to its people as, and virtually no Ottoman subjects national self-identified as, “Ottomans.” It could therefore hardly be the case that the polity of which “His Majesty” was emperor was that of a culturally homogeneous Ottoman people, and still less of an Ottoman ethnic nation-state.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, among the framers of the Berlin Treaty themselves there were those whose self-identity and sheer existence were irreconcilable with the ethnic nation-state paradigm. Alexander Karatheodori Pasha, for example, was a Christian and nationally Greek Ottoman of Phanariote descent and would thus find his existence at best problematic in an Islamic ethno-confessionally or Turkish ethno-linguistically defined Ottoman-Turkish ethnic nation-state. And it was still more inconceivable that he would enjoy such positions as he then did, namely as a plenipotentiary at the Berlin Congress, or would in the future, namely as a provincial governor (Karatheodori Pasha was twice *Wali/Vali*, i.e. governor, of Crete), in such an ethnic nation-state. It is difficult to imagine such a framer participating in the recognition of what would for him be the suicidal principle of the ethnic-nation state in so significant an international legal instrument as the Berlin Treaty, let alone acquiescing to enshrining this principle as a legitimate basis of inter-state law.⁶¹

Similar confusion abounded broadly in most, and perhaps all, of the Treaty’s signatory states, such as in Germany, Britain, Russia, and, above all, Austria-Hungary, many of whose citizens did not self-identify as being culturally or nationally either German, British, Russian, Hungarian, or Austrian.⁶² True, some recent historians have argued that, for example, an ‘Austrian’ identity was pervasive in at least that half of the Austro-Hungarian polity that was governed from Vienna (i.e., in ‘Cisleithania’). Yet even these scholars agree that this was only true in a sense of state, imperial, or perhaps even cultural, but certainly not ethnic national, belonging.⁶³ Only in France and Italy, and perhaps not even there, might one at this time have encountered among the signatory states a ruling regime, bureaucracy, and citizenry that universally and unambiguously understood their polity to be an ethnic nation-state.⁶⁴

Indeed, the ruling regimes of the Treaty's signatory states sometimes went to great lengths to avoid an even implicit recognition that such a thing as an ethnic nation-state existed anywhere in Europe. The Treaties of Zurich (1859) and of Vienna (1866) are cases in point. While these treaties resulted in the transfer of Lombardy and Venetia, respectively, to the Kingdom of Sardinia-*cum*-Italy, the Austrian Empire, hitherto the ruler of these territories, did not cede them directly to the former. Doing so, the Habsburg regime reasoned, might suggest that Sardinia/Italy had a right to them by some other principle than that of right of conquest alone. And such an alternative principle could only be that Sardinia/Italy was an Italian ethnic nation-state whose ruling regime spoke for, and ruled in the interests of, all Italians everywhere, and, consequently, that all Italians, including those living in Lombardy and Venetia, ought to be united in a single Italian state. And this would in turn imply a recognition of the ethnic nation-state's legitimacy in inter-state relations broadly, all the more so given the national revolutionary rhetoric that was pervasive throughout Italy during the wars that ended with these treaties.

The Habsburg regime was especially sensitive to these implications. Even after the transfers mandated by these treaties, several Habsburg Crownland provinces, especially the Austrian Littoral and the Kingdom of Dalmatia, maintained large populations of self-identified national Italians. But of far greater concern was that the ethnic nation-state principle itself likely posed a threat to the very existence of the Austrian state, a polity that one renowned historian described as "a vast collection of Irelands."⁶⁵

Thus, in the ancient tradition of rulers who held territories, and any people or peoples who happened to reside thereon, almost as personal property, Austria's Emperor Franz Josef transferred (or perhaps gifted) Lombardy and Venetia to French Emperor Napoleon III, who then transferred them to the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel II.⁶⁶ While not impossible, it is highly implausible that the various ruling regimes involved in these elaborate legal fictions, that so assiduously avoided an even implicit recognition of the ethnic nation-state, would in 1878, and thus a bare twelve years after Treaty of Vienna, agree to a public recognition of it at Berlin by submitting to sign a Treaty that deliberately founded ethnic nation-states in the Balkans. Indeed, as in the case of Lombardy and Venetia, and given its interests in, and anxieties about, the Balkans, this especially applied to the Habsburg regime

At the same time, it is also worthwhile to note that these episodes demonstrate the degree to which the ruling regimes of Concert member states assumed that inter-state formalities and technicalities were not trivialities and mere window dressing for *de facto* geopolitical realities on the ground. That is, it provides stark evidence of the extent to which these Concert regimes rejected the idea that inter-state formalities and technicalities could be recognized or ignored without material consequence. Rather, it illustrates the depth of their appreciation that such formalities and technicalities held significant real-world implications whose accommodation was worth the expenditure of serious diplomatic energies and political capital, and perhaps even of blood and treasure.


Meanwhile, as concerns the territorial state principle and the Balkan polities themselves, one notes the distinctly non-ethnic-national character of the dynasties whose rule over their respective kingdoms and principalities the Berlin Treaty's framers recognized as legitimate. Take, for example, the Prince of Romania, Karl von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who was born and raised in Germany and who pretended to no Romanian national identity. The same applied to the ruler of Greece, George I (born Prince Christian Wilhelm Ferdinand Adolf Georg von Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg), who, though styled "King of the Hellenes" (i.e., the monarch of a people and not of a territory) had been born and raised in Denmark and

pretended to no Greek national identity. So too Alexander *von* Battenberg, the future Prince of Bulgaria, who had been born in Habsburg-ruled northern Italy and largely raised in various German territories, who could, like most of Europe’s royal and high noble caste, trace his various ancestral origins to almost everywhere in Europe except for the Balkans, and who thus pretended to no Bulgarian national identity.

Conversely, while the family of Prince Nikola Petrović-Njegoš of Montenegro had been for centuries native to the territory of their state, and while they and nearly everyone else understood them as belonging to the principal national community of that state, that national community was ‘Serbian’ and not ‘Montenegrin.’ Only in Serbia was the Prince’s family both native to their territory and self-identified as belonging to the ethnic national community on which any Serbian ethnic nation state would be based and after which that state would be named.

That the framers’ endorsement of these non-national ruling dynasties was not a mere recognition of existing and unalterable geopolitical realities but reflected a deliberate preference is best illustrated by article 3 of the Berlin Treaty. This article empowered the Treaty’s signatory

Map 9: A Contemporary Ethnographic Map of the Balkans




Source: Ernst Georg Ravenstein, “Ethnographical Map of Turkey in Europe (1870),” Wikipedia, last accessed June 20, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_Berlin#/media/File:Ernst-Ravenstein-Balkans-Ethnic-Map-1880.jpg

states with the ultimate authority to determine who Bulgaria’s ruler would be. And its framers adopted this language with the conscious and universal expectation that the Treaty’s signatory regimes would ensure that this ruler would be a foreign, that is to say not a national, prince, which, in the event, proved to be the case. That is, when it was within the framers’ capacity to decide questions of regime, they actively opted to install and endorse non-national rather than national rulers.

And the framers’ indifference, even hostility, to the idea of establishing ethnic-nation

Map 10: Alternative Ethnographic Map of the Balkans



Source: Carl Sax, “Ethnographische Karte der Europäischen Türkei und ihrer Dependenzien zu Anfang des Jahres 1877,” Wikipedia, last accessed June 20, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pomaks#/media/File:Ethnographic_map_of_European_Turkey_from_1877_by_Carl_Sax.jpg

states was visible in their treatment of the territories and populations, and not just the rulers, of the Balkan polities they established or conditionally recognized, as is especially evident from Berlin Treaty articles 1 and 2. These reduced the Greater Bulgaria established by the Treaty of San Stefano to the rump Bulgaria defined by these articles, thus stripping from the truncated Principality territory whose inhabitants were overwhelmingly Bulgarian, as everyone, to include both those inhabitants and the framers themselves, recognized at the time.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, instead of uniting these Bulgarians with what all agreed were their national kin in the Principality, the framers of articles 13-18 segregated them into a distinctly non-national polity, defined solely by territory and termed “Eastern Rumelia,” and placed them under the rule of a regime that was in no conceivable sense national, namely that of the Ottoman Empire. That is, when it was within the framers’ capacity to decide questions not just of regime but also of territory and people, peoples, and nations, they rejected the idea of integrating national peoples into unified ethnic nation-states. Rather they opted to segregate national populations into discrete polities defined strictly by territory and ruled by non-national regimes

By 1878 foreign policy makers throughout the Berlin signatory states, to include the framers of the Berlin Treaty, recognized that French, Italian, German, Russian, and even British national identities and loyalties either already existed or were rapidly materializing. And it was manifestly the case that by 1878 there were places on maps and globes called Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Britain. However, this did not mean that these foreign policy makers were willing recognize these polities as being *de jure* ethnic nation-states, and thus to extend to them the inter-state prerogatives and considerations that would derive therefrom. They were even less prepared to recognize as ethnic nation-states, and to extend the rights and prerogatives thereof, to states that occupied the subordinate grade in the two-tier state system established by the Treaty, states such as Romania, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. And this despite that many, and likely most, such foreign policy makers also recognized that Romanian, Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian national identities and loyalties either already existed or were rapidly materializing

Indeed, this exacting commitment to the territorial state principle in no way reflected the framers’ own indifference to ethnic national questions, nor their belief that their fellow citizens, the subjects of polities they established or conditionally recognized, or Europeans in general were so indifferent. In fact, this commitment to the territorial state demonstrated the opposite, namely the framers’ recognition of the existing and rapidly growing political potency of national identities and loyalties, and their acute anxieties about the consequences these identities and loyalties portended for European inter-state relations.

The Congress

Two interrelated discussions at the Berlin Congress affirm that the Treaty successfully captured the plenipotentiaries’ consensus on territorial states. The first of these concerned the Kingdom of Greece and whether the plenipotentiaries would permit it to join the Congress as a participating state, and the degree of participation that would be granted to the Kingdom if it were admitted.

In the event, the Congress swiftly arrived at a consensus to reject a motion by Lord Salisbury granting the Kingdom full admission to the Congress as an equal participant, thus leaving no doubt that Greece would occupy the lower strata on the two-tier state system established by the Congress. However, thereafter a lengthy debate ensued over whether Greek representatives would be allowed to address the Congress at all and, were they admitted, the

geographical and administrative scope they would be permitted to discuss. The debate hinged on two possible phrasings of the protocol that would admit the Greek representatives: whether they would be permitted to comment on “Greek provinces,” i.e., any Ottoman province in which large numbers of Greeks were presumed to reside, or whether they would be restricted to commenting only on “[Ottoman] border provinces of the Kingdom of Greece.”⁶⁸

The question thus raised was whether Kingdom’s regime ruled not in the equal interest of an undifferentiated citizenry, but primarily, even exclusively, in the interest of its Greek citizens, was patron, spokesperson, and security guarantor of all Greeks everywhere, and thus had an interest in all territories inhabited by Greeks. Conversely, whether the Kingdom’s regime ruled, like all sovereign states, exclusively in interest of its own citizens, but did so without regard for any nationalities and confessions thereamong, and thus had an interest only in those extra-state populations that might directly concern its undifferentiated citizenry, namely, those populations residing directly on the borders of its state. That is, the debate hinged on whether the Kingdom of Greece was a national or territorial state.

The British and the French plenipotentiaries were the principal antagonists in the ensuing contest. The former advocated that the Congress allow Greek representatives to address all ‘Greek provinces’ of the Ottoman Empire, and thus to recognize the Kingdom of Greece as being, and enjoying the prerogatives of, an ethnic nation state. Meanwhile, the latter agreed to permit Greek representatives to address the Congress, but remained resolute in their argument that the Congress strictly limit these representatives to discussing only those Ottoman provinces that bordered the Kingdom, and thus that the Kingdom was, and enjoyed only those prerogatives of, a territorial state. In the event, the other plenipotentiaries joined their French colleagues in rebuffing British attempts at compromise and embraced the French position as constituting the Congress’s, consensus. Thus, whatever one or another plenipotentiary might personally or privately have assumed or argued, so far as the Congress was concerned The Kingdom of Greece was a solely territorial, and in no respects a national, state.⁶⁹

The Congress’s consensus on the territorial state was equally evident in its discussion of San Stefano’s Greater Bulgaria and the principle both by which it would be partitioned and according to which its successor polities would be territorially and administratively defined. In this discussion the Russian and British plenipotentiaries were the main contenders. Unsurprisingly, the former argued that the territory and population of a state ought to be determined by “racial,” which is to say ethnic national, demography and “ethnographical conditions,” that the Bulgaria established at San Stefano accorded exactly to such demography and conditions, and that the Congress should therefore endorse this Bulgaria to the greatest possible extent. Moreover, that if the Congress nevertheless arrived at a consensus for partition, the polity ceded from rump Bulgaria ought to be termed “South Bulgaria,” even if this polity remained, either in reality or merely *de jure*, an Ottoman territory under Ottoman rule, so as to reflect that polity’s ethnic national character. That is, the Russian plenipotentiaries argued that the Congress should recognize the existence and legitimacy of a Bulgarian ethnic nation-state in European inter-state relations.⁷⁰

The British plenipotentiaries did not respond to the Russians’ proposition, as the French had done in their discussion of Greece, by simply refusing to recognize the existence of ethnic nations. Indeed, their rejection *in toto* of a Russian proposal to either admit Bulgarian representatives to the Congress as full participants or to permit such representatives to address the Congress on a circumscribed basis rested on a species of ethnic national argument. Namely, that as Bulgarians and Russians belonged to the same Slavic “race,” the former was in effect

already represented at the Congress (how wrong they were in their assumption of Russo-Bulgarian Slavic solidarity is addressed in this discussion's chapter on the Bulgarian Crises).⁷¹

Rather, British plenipotentiaries, like their Russian colleagues, argued that the Congress ought to recognize 'racial' demography and 'ethnographical conditions,' but that it ought to draw opposite conclusions therefrom. Namely, that the Congress, while recognizing that Bulgarians were the majority national community throughout the territory of San Stefano Bulgaria, ought also to recognize that this Bulgaria took in many ethnic national minority communities (especially Greeks) and that these communities would inevitably be subjected to coerced assimilation or violent expulsion. Thus, they argued, the Congress ought to reduce Bulgaria to a rump, and ethnically homogenous, polity, restoring its national mixed territories to a regime that was committed to, and to state that was large, powerful, and demographically heterogeneous enough, to rule on supra-national basis, that is, on the basis of a citizenry undifferentiated by nation and defined solely by territory. And the British plenipotentiaries were clear that a reforming Ottoman Empire was precisely this sort of regime and state. In fact, the British plenipotentiaries implied that in their view the most ideal, if unattainable, solution would be one that restored Bulgaria itself, and indeed all erstwhile Ottoman Balkan states, to Ottoman rule (notably, in the event the Congress did place Bulgaria itself under a vague and tenuous species of *de jure* Ottoman oversight, that is, as an Ottoman 'tributary,').⁷²

In restoring Macedonia and much of the *Vilayet* of Edirne/Adrianople to Ottoman rule, and by constituting the latter not as 'South Bulgaria' but by the more nationally ambiguous title 'Eastern Rumelia,' the Congress rejected the Russian, and adopted the British, paradigm as their consensus solution. Notably, this was a paradigm in which polities were predicated not on ethnic national communities but solely on the basis of territory, and which denied the legitimacy of the ethnic nation state in European inter-state relations.

Nor would these be the only occasions on which a contest arose at the Congress between competing solutions respectively predicted on ethnic national and territorial states. When discussion the question of Bar/ Antivari, for example, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries argued that the Congress ought to consider the "the wish of [Bar/ Antivari's] population," "ethnographical" conditions, and the "racial" dimensions of the question, and that the Congress ought therefore to reaffirm Ottoman rule over what they claimed was this Muslim- and Albanian speaking-majority municipality. Yet, the Congress, as it did almost without exception with all such questions, arrived at a consensus indifferent, if not hostile, to the principle of ethnic national communities in inter-state relations and ceded Bar/Antivari to the Principality of Montenegro.⁷³

The course followed by the Congress's plenipotentiaries in their discussions of territorial and ethnic nation-state paradigms in inter-state relations was torturous and riddled with hypocritical self-contradictions. The Russian plenipotentiaries were in favor of recognizing ethnic nation-states as regarded Bulgaria, but denied the legitimacy of such a principle in inter-state relations when discussing Greece and Bar/Antivari.⁷⁴ Now, in their discussion of Greece, the British plenipotentiaries recognized ethnic nation-states, now, in their discussion of Bulgaria, they refused such recognition and insisted that only territorial states and polities existed in inter-state relations.⁷⁵ Now, in their discussion of Greece and Bulgaria, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries recognized only territorial states, now, in their discussion of Bar/ Antivari, they appealed to the principle of ethnic national legitimacy.⁷⁶

Yet, regardless of the preferences this or that plenipotentiary might express on this or that question, and regardless of the personal and private assumptions this or that plenipotentiary might hold about this or that territory, population, or issue, the Congress's consensus was almost

always consistent.⁷⁷ And this consensus was that ethnic national states were neither a legitimate basis of inter-state relations, and that such relations were predicated on states defined solely by territory. Indeed, by the Congress's 7th session so clear and consistent had this consensus become that Shuvalov felt the need to render it explicit that it had become a general principle of the Congress, declaring that, regrettably in his view, "the Congress... [has] sought to efface ethnographical frontiers and to replace them by commercial and strategical frontiers."⁷⁸

The Congress had effaced national states and replaced them with states defined by such purely territorial considerations as those borders most expedient for commerce and most advantageous for military strategy, and it had done so not just in the questions of Grece or Bulgaria, but as a general rule. In fact, nowhere was the triumph of the territorial state principle more conspicuous than when the Congress turned from vague territorial agreements to formulating exact borders and assigning specific communities to one or another polity or state. In all of these, with one trivial and idiosyncratic exception,⁷⁹ the plenipotentiaries either ignored or explicitly rejected ethnic national, and formulated their consensus solutions strictly according to territorial, considerations.⁸⁰

The plenipotentiaries' indifference, even hostility, to ethnic nation states was not a consequence or expression of their own, personally and privately held indifference to national identity, national communities, and national questions or their shared assumption that the people and peoples they addressed at the Congress were so indifferent. There can be no conceivable doubt that the intersection of clashing Balkan national aspirations and the realpolitik great power machinations that lay behind the discussions detailed above rendered clear to the plenipotentiaries the breadth, depth, and political potency of national identities and loyalties in the Balkans, and the material consequences these had for European inter-state relations.⁸¹ And the plenipotentiaries often expressed a broadly shared "fear" and "anxiety" about the "dangers" and "disturbances" that they believed would inevitably arise from a recognition of the nation as being a legitimate principle of inter-state relations. Indeed, it was precisely this fear that that drove their repeated consensuses to ignore or reject this principle in such relations.⁸²

Liberal Rights

The Treaty

Nowhere is current scholarship on the Congress and Treaty of Berlin more confused than in its misreading of the rights, protections, and privileges that it argues the Congress bestowed to the persons and peoples of the new Balkan polities. This misreading has several significant implications. It is, for example, the principal basis on which much of this scholarship substantiates its claim that the Congress and Treaty introduced a novel recognition of ethnic national communities into European inter-state relations, a claim directly at odds with the assumptions and arguments of this discussion. Moreover, in misunderstanding these rights, protections, and privileges this literature fails to grasp the principles that the Congress and Treaty either ignored or actively rejected, and thus did not admit into European inter-state relations, and those that they did recognize and admit, and what if any hierarchy existed among the latter. And a clear comprehension of such is critical to understanding why and how the crises that threatened the Concert with dissolution, and Europe with general war, arose during the next three decades, and how and why the Concert succeeded in resolving them over this period.

The Berlin System scholarship takes note, either directly or indirectly, of Berlin Treaty articles 5, 27, 35, and 44, which applied respectively to the Principalities of Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania.⁸³ This scholarship devotes special attention to articles 27 and 35, which are supposed to have granted a communal minority protection guarantee to Muslims,⁸⁴ and above all to article 44, which is supposed to have made a guarantee to Jews.⁸⁵ Yet, despite the consideration given to these articles, this scholarship fails to note that they shared nearly identical language. Given such similarity there is only need to directly examine one of them here, namely the much-noted article 44:

In Roumania the difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and honours, or the exercise of the various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever.

The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship shall be assured to all persons belonging to the Roumanian State, as well as to foreigners, and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organization of the different communions, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs.

One immediately obvious feature of the article is that it makes no mention of Jews nor any other specific confessional community. In fact, “Jews” are not directly mentioned anywhere in the Treaty of Berlin.

While the framers did not explicitly mention Jews either in article 44 or anywhere else in the Treaty, they may nevertheless have intended for these articles to apply to the Jewish community living in Romania, a possibility that will be explored at greater length in the discussion of the Congress. Its only necessary to note here, in an analysis of the Treaty itself, that the identical language article 44 shared with all the other articles renders such a specifically Jewish intention invisible to all foreign policy makers who were not intimately acquainted with its framing. And this is especially the case given that the Jewish population in the polities to which the other articles applied was either tiny, such as in Bulgaria, or insignificant, such as in Montenegro and Serbia.⁸⁶

This is not to say that considerable and even violent interconfessional confrontations were alien to these non-Romanian polities. On the contrary, the ferocity and ubiquity of interconfessional violence in all of them was, more than any confrontation in Romania, the direct cause of the war that the Berlin Treaty sought to bring to a conclusive end. Nor had these communities or confrontations disappeared by the time the Treaty’s signing. These articles’ confessional language was thus a serious concern in all of the uniformly internecine, multi-confessional polities to which they applied, and could not be understood, as some authors allege, as the trivial matter of copying specifically Jewish protections into states where Jews did not live.⁸⁷ Conversely, this language, and that the Muslim population of Romania was minuscule, would challenge any assertion that article 44 was in Romania a trivial matter of extending essentially Muslim communal protections to a Romanian state largely empty of Muslims.

In fact, articles 5, 27, 35, and 44 extended rights neither to any confessional, let alone any ethnic national, minority community nor to any community, however defined. Rather, they guaranteed *individual* rights that applied uniformly, equally, and universally to all individual citizens, both as individuals and, notably, as citizens, of their respective states. That is, they guaranteed neither novel nor innovative communal ethnic national minority protections but ensured what were by then long and well-established liberal rights, namely the already quintessential liberal right of an individual’s freedom of religious expression. The simple

language of the articles makes this plain enough. They speak of a guarantee for “any person” to “civil and political rights... in any locality whatsoever” and of the “exercise of all forms of worship” as “assured to all persons.” They do not speak of specific confessional or ethnic national minority communities enjoying protections or privileges. And the same was true of other Treaty articles that employed similar language as adopted in articles 5, 27, 35, and 44, such as article 20, which declared that “the Sublime Porte undertakes to enforce [in Eastern Rumelia] *the general laws* of the Empire on religious liberty in favour of *all forms of worship* [my emphasis].” Meanwhile, article 62 guaranteed that: “*all persons* shall be admitted, *without distinction of religion*, to give evidence before the tribunals,” that “the monks of Mount Athos, *of whatever country they may be natives*, shall be maintained in their former possessions and advantages, and shall enjoy, *without any exception, complete equality of rights and prerogatives*,” and that “ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks *of all nationalities* travelling in Turkey in Europe, or in Turkey in Asia, shall enjoy *the same rights, advantages, and privileges* [my emphases].”

The latter article, i.e., article 62, is also notable for its explicit use of the term “nationalities”.⁸⁸ This was one of only three instances in which the Treaty explicitly used the term “nation,” the other two being in reference, on the one hand, to the establishment of autonomous Bulgaria’s “national militia” (article 1), and, on the other hand, to closing the port of Bar/Antivari to warships “of all nations” (article 29). On these other occasions the term was emphatically colloquial, holding the same meaning as “state,” “country,” etc., much as “nation” was and is typically understood in the term “international” (law, relations, travel, etc.). Only in the context of article 62, with its guarantees of “rights, advantages, and privileges,” did the term “nation” potentially express some recognition of communal national rights *per se*. However, in its guarantee of identical rights to all individual members of all nations, in what was the single instance of its explicit recognition of distinct national communities as such, the Treaty of Berlin prohibited, rather than avowed, particular or special treatment of them.

Scholars of the Berlin System school thus fundamentally misread articles 5, 27, 35, and 44, misconstruing the classical liberal, that is, uniform, equal, universal, state-based, and individual rights guaranteed in them as introducing novel and innovative communal protections for ethnic national minorities. And this, and that they largely or exclusively rely on these articles to substantiate their claims, is responsible for their equally fundamental misunderstanding of the Berlin Treaty, the model of the regime it founded, and the nature of the historical juncture it initiated in *Belle Époque*-era inter-state relations.

The Congress

The origins of articles 5, 27, 35, and 44 lay in the Congress’s discussion of Bulgaria, during which the French plenipotentiaries proposed two articles respectively declaring that

All Bulgarian subjects, whatever their religion may be, shall enjoy complete equality of rights. They shall be eligible for all public employments, functions, and honours, and their difference of creed shall not be brought forward against them as a ground for exclusion. The exercise and public celebration of all creeds shall be entirely free, and no restriction shall be placed either upon the hierarchical organization of the different communions, or upon their relations with their spiritual chiefs.

And that

A full and entire liberty is guaranteed to foreign Catholics, members of religious orders, and to foreign Catholic Bishops, for the exercise of their religion in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. The exercise of their rights and privileges shall be secured to them, and their possessions shall be respected.⁸⁹

This launched lengthy debate during which the Congress's plenipotentiaries arrived at a consensus to drop the proposition's second article, with its more particularistic language, in favor of an unambiguous endorsement of the first article and its principle of, in the words of Karatheodori Pasha, "toleration for all forms of worship equally."⁹⁰ That is, in formulating what would become Treaty articles 5, 27, 35, and 44, the plenipotentiaries were clear that their consensus was not in favor of a special, asymmetrical, and particularistic communal protection guarantee granted to a specific and enumerated minority community, with the community so enumerated notably being (foreign) Catholics and neither Muslims nor Jews. Rather, this consensus was unambiguously in favor of an equal, universal, and individual right.⁹¹

These articles, and the principle that underlay them, next arose at the Congress during its discussion of Serbia, with the French plenipotentiaries proposing that the Congress admit "the independence of Serbia, but on the condition of the following proposition identical with that which the Congress [had] accepted for Bulgaria." Thereafter, they expounded a proposition whose language, formulated by Congress consensus, was now exactly that ultimately employed by Treaty articles 5, 27, 35, and 44.⁹² However, this proposition now encountered stiff resistance from the Russian plenipotentiaries, especially Gorchakov, who, while insisting that they acted "without manifesting any opposition to the general principles" of the French-*cum*-Congress proposal, proceeded to make manifest their direct opposition to those general principles by declaring that

If the question is solely one of religious liberty, Prince Gortehakow declares that it has always been in application in Russia; for his own part he gives the most absolute adhesion to that principle, and would be ready to develop it in its widest sense. But if civil and political rights are concerned, his Serene Highness begs that the Jews of Berlin, of Paris, of London, or of Vienna, to whom there could be no question of refusing any political or civil right, may not be confounded with the Jews of Serbia, of Roumania, and of some Russian provinces, who are, in his opinion, a real scourge to the native populations.⁹³

Gorchakov thus read the Congress's consensus proposition as introducing not a universal and individual, but a particularistic and communal principle as regarded a specific and enumerated minority community, namely Serbian Jews. However, it was clear to all non-Russian plenipotentiaries that it was not their own, but the Russian proposition that introduced such a principle to the Treaty. Yet, what the Russians proposed was not positive discrimination of the sort Gorchakov alleged lay behind the Congress's consensus, one that would provide a parallel and reinforcing affirmation of a universal and preexisting individual right to which Serbian Jews, as citizens of Serbia, were already entitled. Notably, this would be an affirmation that individual Serbian Jews would enjoy solely by virtue of their being members of Serbia's Jewish community, and which might or might not necessarily be enjoyed by the individual members of any other community or sub-category of Serbian citizens. Rather, what the Russian plenipotentiaries now proposed was negative discrimination that explicitly excluded Jews from a right that was otherwise universally enjoyed by all other Serbian citizens.

The Congress's consensus response to the Russian counterproposal was a nearly unanimous rejection of it (with only the Ottoman plenipotentiaries abstaining). And the language of this consensus rejection was significant, with Bismarck proclaiming that "Germany is always given to any motion favourable to religious liberty," Lord Salisbury arguing that "it would be

opportune to stipulate for the great principle of religious liberty,” Waddington declaring that “[he] considers it important to seize this solemn opportunity to procure an affirmation by the Representatives of Europe of the principles of religious liberty,” the Italian plenipotentiary (and then Italian ambassador to Germany) Edoardo de Launay affirming that “in the name of Italy, he hastens to support the principle of religious liberty, which forms one of the essential bases of the institutions of his country,” and with Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary (and then-Habsburg foreign minister and future prime minister of Hungary) Gyula Andrassy explicitly endorsing all of these views.⁹⁴

Yet what was just as notable as the universalist language employed by these rejections of the Russian, and affirmations of the Congress consensus, propositions was what the plenipotentiaries left unsaid. That is, none of them made a specific reference to Jews, either explicitly or implicitly, but rather carefully and unanimously avoided any particularistic and communal, and employed only universalist and individual, language, thus leaving no doubt about the consensus principle on which their proposition was based.⁹⁵

The Congress would again affirm its consensus when it turned to its discussion of Romania, with the French plenipotentiaries, whose universalist language was notable, again asserting that

faithful to the principles which have hitherto inspired them, the French Plenipotentiaries demand that the Congress shall grant the independence of Roumania on the same conditions as that of Servia. His Excellency [i.e., the French plenipotentiary] does not conceal from himself the local difficulties [i.e., the Jewish minority] which exist in Roumania, but, after a careful examination of the arguments which may be made use of on one side and on the other, the French Plenipotentiaries have thought it better not to depart from *the grand rule of the equality of rights and freedom of worship* [my emphasis].⁹⁶

At this point the Congress’s endorsement of the French proposition, and the principle that underlay it, became, and would thenceforth remain, unanimous, with even Gorchakov declaring that “[in] referring to the expressions which prompted the French proposition, and which give the greatest latitude to religious liberty, [Gorchakov] ranges himself entirely on the side of the said proposition.”⁹⁷ Thus, whatever one or another plenipotentiary might privately have preferred, so far as the Congress was concerned, articles 5, 27, 35, and 44 established not a communal protection guarantee for one, another, or indeed any specific community, however defined, but a universal right for undifferentiated individual citizens.

However, while affirming the Congress’s consensus for Romania the French plenipotentiaries also departed from the Congress rule of recognizing only undifferentiated citizenries in the states and polities it addressed, observing that

As for the local difficulties [i.e., the persecution of Romania's Jewish minority], the French Plenipotentiary deems that they [i.e., the ‘local difficulties’] will be more easily surmounted when those principles [i.e., a universal, equal, uniform, and individual right to religious expression] shall have been recognized in Roumania, and when the Jewish race shall have learnt that it has nothing to hope for but from its own efforts and from the union of its interests with those of the indigenous populations.⁹⁸

The French plenipotentiaries thus adopted an assimilationist position regarding Romania’s Jewish minority, which, with its unanimous endorsement of it, became the consensus position of the Congress. However, this position was predicated on the assumption that Romania was civic national in character. That is, it is implausible that, after having so strenuously argued in favor of a universal right to religious expression, the French plenipotentiaries now intended

for the Jewish confession, as an aggregate of individuals professing faith therein, to disappear from Romania.

Rather, the plenipotentiaries accepted that the Romanian citizenry was composed of several distinct cultural communities that might, as part of a statist program of assimilation, be compelled to surrender such of their cultural customs as were not necessary for their religious practices, such as, say, a distinctive language, style of dress, etc. Such communal, especially ethnic national, concerns were immaterial to a Congress consensus indifferent to ethnic nations, and indeed all communities, and interested only in aggregated individuals of civic nations possessing a universal 'civil and political right' to religious expression. In fact, the preservation of a distinct Jewish community that maintained secular cultural and communal characteristics and existed apart from an otherwise undifferentiated and legally equal citizenry was if anything an anathema to the liberal rights and civic national paradigm on which articles 5, 27, 35, and 44 were based.

Notably, in the event even Romania's ruling regime would, after a fashion, accept the Congress's consensus on a universal individual right to religious expression. That is, this regime did not admit Jews as fellow citizens and then deny them civil and political rights on the basis of their Jewish faith. Rather, the regime simply refused to recognize Jews living on its territory as being citizens at all and instead simply declared them to be foreigners, then created a virtually insurmountable process of naturalization.⁹⁹ Throughout the Second Concert period Romanian Jews were therefore not denied civil and political rights on the basis of a confessional identity any more than on an ethnic national or racial one. Rather, they were denied such rights on the basis of their being foreign non-citizen aliens living in Romania. Thus, the 'Jewish problem' in Romania, whether framed religiously, nationally, or racially, did not lay in a Jewish refusal to assimilate, as the Russian, and even French, plenipotentiaries suggested, but in the Principality of Romania's refusal to allow them to do so.

And this point bears mentioning as regards the final occasion on which the Congress addressed the principle that underlay articles 5, 27, 35, and 44, namely when the Congress's drafting committee presented these articles for final ratification by its plenary (the fact of the articles being presented collectively itself being notable). After affirming that the prospective fifth article of the Berlin Treaty "deals with the equality of rights and freedom of religious worship... [and that] this Article, in fact, applies equally to Bulgaria, Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania," the committee explained that it had been "particularly difficult to make [the principle underlying these articles] comprehend the Roumanian Jews, whose situation is undetermined in point of nationality."

To resolve this confusion de Launay suggested that article 44 also declare that "the Jews of Roumania, in so far as they do not belong to a foreign nationality, acquire the full right of Roumanian nationality." In response, Bismarck, acting in his capacity as President of the Congress, noted that such a declaration would constitute a substantive modification of the principle adopted by the Congress for article 44 and in doing so reopen the question for debate. Moreover, as the Congress had already resolved this question and as the reopening of questions for debate was not on the Congress's concluding agenda, Bismarck ruled de Launay's proposal inadmissible on procedural grounds. At the same time, French plenipotentiary Felix Desprez, speaking for the drafting committee, argued that article 44's existing language already "[conciliated] all the interests concerned," thus ending the discussion.¹⁰⁰

Three aspects of this exchange bear particular note. First, both the drafting committee and de Launay clearly understood "nation" to be synonymous with a civic nation and a territorial

state, with “nationality” indicating the status of either citizenship, or non-citizen alien resident, of that state. That is, while there can be no doubt that considerable confusion existed among the plenipotentiaries as to national the communal belonging of Jews, here the drafting committee merely intended to note that the ‘situation’ of Romanian Jews was as yet ‘undetermined in point of *citizenship*.’ Meanwhile, de Launay’s did not seek to resolve the abstract and vexing question of Jewish national identity, but rather merely proposed that ‘the Jews of Roumania, in so far as they *are not citizens of a foreign state*, acquire the full right of Roumanian *citizenship*.’ Secondly, the existing language of article 44 did not, as Desprez claimed, “conciliate all interests concerned.” As noted, the Congress’s refusal to clarify the ‘nationality,’ i.e., citizenship, of Romania’s Jews practically resulted in the vast majority of them being swiftly rendered stateless, an upshot that would have catastrophic consequences for them, both as Jews and as individuals.

Third, and of greatest interest to the current discussion, is that Bismarck was quite correct that de Launay’s proposal fundamentally transformed the nature of article 44. The inclusion of de Launay’s language introduced a particularistic communal protection guarantee for a specific and enumerated community, namely Romanian Jews (of which, it should be said, they were sorely in need). This would differentiate article 44 from articles 5, 27, and 35 and the latter’s guarantee of a solely universal right granted to the aggregated individuals of an undifferentiated citizenry. And, in accepting a consensus to exclude de Launay’s language from article 44, the Congress made clear that it was not so differentiated.

Thus, in their final discussion of these articles the plenipotentiaries provided one last consensus affirmation of the principle both on which these articles were based and which would, consequently, play a significant role in European inter-state relations over the next thirty years. That is, far from introducing a novel and substantive recognition of ethnic national communities as existing in, and being a legitimate principle of, European inter-state relations, the authors of these articles declared that the only thing to note about such communities was that they were invisible to such relations.

Communal Protections

The Treaty

The idea that individual citizens of a state possess by virtue of that citizenship a universal right to religious expression was a hallmark of a ‘classical liberalism’ that was at the time of the Berlin Treaty’s signing at the zenith of its ultimately fleeting political power in all of the Treaty’s signatory states.¹⁰¹ As such liberalism is not incompatible with ‘civic’ nations and ‘civic’ nationalism, but is generally regarded as an essential feature of them.¹⁰² This raises the question: was this the end of these articles? That is, did these articles collectively articulate a principle, namely liberal and civic national rights, that would be a legitimate consideration in inter-state relations under the regime founded by the Treaty? And, if so, what was the relationship of this principle either to the Treaty’s recognition of the supremacy of its signatories’ state prerogatives or to any other principle developed elsewhere in the Treaty?

In fact, many of the actors seeking to challenge and violate the Berlin Treaty and the Second Concert, especially as regarded the supremacy of its signatories’ and members’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, would over the next three decades pretend to legitimize their proposed challenges and violations precisely on this basis of liberal and civic national rights. However, others would do the same by going beyond the liberal and civic national rights defined

in articles 5, 27, 35, and 44, seeing in them merely a partial formulation of a still more universal value, one that only comes into complete view with a consideration of the principle articulated in Berlin Treaty articles 12, 30, and 39.

These articles applied, respectively, to Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia (due to their specific focus on Muslims and Islamic institutions, it is unsurprising that Romania, whose Muslim community was, as noted, tiny, was not contemplated), and because they employed identical language it is only necessary to examine one of them here, namely article 30:

Mussulmans or others possessing property in the territories annexed to Montenegro, who may wish to take up their residence outside the Principality, can retain their real property either by farming it out, or by having it administered by third parties.

No one shall be liable to be expropriated otherwise than by legal process for the public welfare, and with a previous indemnity.

A Turco-Montenegrin Commission shall be appointed to settle, within a period of three years, all questions relative to the mode of alienation, working, or use, on the account of the Sublime Porte, of property belonging to the State and religious foundations (Vakoufs), as well as of the questions regarding the interests of private parties engaged therein.¹⁰³

The principle introduced by the article's first paragraph diverged sharply from any thus far encountered, because it was predicated on a special communal protection granted to Muslims. And a comparison of the article's first and second paragraphs underscores the degree to which the former was an innovation. That is, paragraph two, like articles 5, 27, 35, and 44, guaranteed a state-based, universal, and individual (i.e., liberal) protection to each and every citizen of Montenegro against that state's arbitrary expropriation of their property. Meanwhile paragraph one extended a separate and additional protection guarantee against expropriation to the Principality's Muslims, notably not by virtue of their being a citizen of the Montenegro but by virtue of their being members of a distinct, confessionally-defined Muslim community. That the framers of article 30 felt it necessary to enact separate and distinct paragraphs that extended essentially identical rights demonstrates a recognition of the different entities to which these paragraphs applied (i.e., individual citizens versus a minority community) and the differing principles on which these paragraphs were based. Thus, article 30 extended precisely the sort of parallel and reinforcing guarantee to Montenegrin Muslims that the Congress withheld from Romania's Jews when framing article 44.

Notably, articles 12, 30, and 39 did not extend similar additional, parallel, and reinforcing communal rights to any other community in their respective jurisdictions. They applied to their Muslim communities and to these communities only. The individual members of other communities, say, for example, of their Jewish communities, therefore had to rely solely on the guarantees extended to them as individual citizens and irrespective of their membership in any non-, extra-, or trans-state community, however defined.

Other articles also adopted this same principle of particularistic communal rights. For example, articles 1 and 13, which applied respectively to the Principality of Bulgaria and the province of Eastern Rumelia, guaranteed the Christian communities of these territories that the former would "have a Christian Government" and the latter "a Christian Governor-General." Likewise, when discussing the establishment of a native gendarmerie in Eastern Rumelia article 15 proclaimed that "in forming these corps... regard shall be paid in the different localities to the *religion* [notably, not the language, culture, nationality, ethnicity, or race] of the inhabitants [my

emphasis].” And while article 62 guaranteed several communal protections to confessional communities, it extended none whatsoever to national ones, affirming that “*ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks* of all nationalities traveling in Turkey... shall enjoy the same rights, advantages, and privileges,”¹⁰⁴ that “the right of official protection by the Diplomatic and Consular Agents of the Powers in Turkey is recognized both as regards the above-mentioned persons and their *religious*, charitable, and other [notably, not national, cultural, or linguistic] establishments *in the Holy Places* and elsewhere,” and “*the monks of Mount Athos*, of whatever country they may be natives, shall be maintained in their former possessions and advantages, and shall enjoy, without exception, complete equality of rights and prerogatives [my emphases].”¹⁰⁵

The language of these articles also underscores yet another inconsistency in Berlin System scholarship, especially as concerns the nature of the communities that the Treaty did, in fact, systematically recognize, and to which it guaranteed rights. Primarily on the basis of articles 5, 27, 35, and 44, Berlin System scholars argue that the communities so recognized were secular ethnic nations. However, as demonstrated above, much of the Treaty language that this scholarship relies on referenced not nations but confessions, even according to this scholarship’s own reading of it. That is, in its reference to these articles this scholarship claims (mistakenly as we have seen), that articles 27 and 35 extended communal protections specifically to *Muslims* (and not, say, to Romanians or Turks), and article 44 extended such to *Jews* (and not, say, to Greeks or Serbs). In order to maintain their claim that the Treaty systematically recognized ethnic national minorities this scholarship relies on a presumption that the Treaty’s framers understood a synonymous meaning between confessional community and ethnic nation.

However, also as observed above, this scholarship itself argues that the Treaty’s framers held no such understanding, that is, “when the great powers denoted Bulgarians, Romanians Serbs, and so on they were clearly thinking of them as nations or even races... and not as religious communities.”¹⁰⁶ And such a presumption of interchangeability of meaning applied still less to the much broader categories of “Muslims,”¹⁰⁷ and least of all to “Christians.” In fact, the term “Christian” was not synonymous with, but encompassed distinct Bulgarian, Romanian, Serb, and other ethnic national communities, with this, critically, often being the case within shared territories. That is, the Treaty could not speak of “Christians” in Eastern Rumelia and clearly denote ethnic ‘Greeks’ or ‘Bulgarians,’ because members of both the Greek and Bulgarian Churches and nations lived together in that province. Absent some further qualifier, such as explicit mention of the Greek Patriarchate or the Bulgarian Exarchate, in Eastern Rumelia “Christian” could only mean just that. And the Treaty at no point provided such a qualifier, that is, the Treaty at no point referred to different Christian Churches, but only recognized undifferentiated “Christians,” “Jews,” and “Muslims.” And, in any case, the articles these scholars cite extended not communal protections to specific communities (however defined), but universal, state-based, and individual rights.

Particularistic communal protections granted to specific and enumerated minority communities is a principle incompatible with the paradigm of an undifferentiated aggregate of individual citizens on which a civic nation-state is based. Thus, in framing articles 1, 12, 13, 15, 30, 39, and 62, which, unlike articles 5, 27, 35, and 44, did, in fact, systematically recognize this communal species of rights, the authors of the Berlin Treaty indicated that this Treaty, and the regime it founded, was in no sense national (either ethnic or civic). However, in recognizing both communal and individual rights insofar as, and only insofar as, regarded confession, the Treaty’s framers did point to a higher value, one that comprehend both individuals and communities and

one that would serve as the basis for repeated challenges to the Treaty and the Second Concert over the next thirty years, namely human rights.

The Congress

That the plenipotentiaries were themselves aware that they had arrived at a consensus to recognize two distinct principles at the Congress was best demonstrated Karatheodori Pasha, who, during the Congress's final ratification of the Treaty's language, raised

some objections to the express mention of the Christian religion of the Governor [of Eastern Rumelia]. His Excellency [i.e., Karatheodori Pasha], in alluding to the principle of equality of rights established by the Congress, considers that this clause is not in conformity with the sentiment manifested in general terms by the High Assembly [i.e., the sentiment manifested in articles 5, 27, 35, and 44].¹⁰⁸

No plenipotentiary questioned the accuracy of Karatheodori Pasha's analysis that this communal privilege extended to Eastern Rumelia's Christians was at odds with the "principle of equality of rights established by the Congress."

However, whether the plenipotentiaries had arrived at a consensus not only to recognize communal rights, but to extend these to, and hence to recognize the existence and legitimacy of, national communities in inter-state relations depends on the answer to this question: when the plenipotentiaries used such religious language as "Christians," "Muslims," or "Jews" were these shibboleths for essentially secular national communities defined by, and concerned with, such profane and earthly characteristics as language, culture, territory, and so on? Or did these terms have their *prima facie* meaning, that is, confessional communities *per se*, the protection of which would extend to its members regardless of their coincidental and diverse languages, cultures, nationalities, etc.

In fact, Salisbury raised this very question at the outset of the Congress, and, in doing so, demonstrated that, so far as he was concerned, apparent confessional questions were mere euphemisms for secular national questions, with Salisbury declaring that

The Christians of these regions [i.e., Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia] are divided into two parties [i.e., Greeks and Bulgarians], whose interests are not identical and whose sympathies are not in harmony...the Slavs who formerly recognized the authority of the Greek Patriarch have given their adherence to a new ecclesiastical organization which has claimed their submission. In a considerable portion of the territory inhabited by the Greek race the right of possessing churches and schools has given rise to disputes, often even to collisions, between the populations of the two races...It was a matter of more than mere divergence of opinion on questions of ecclesiastical government.

The Greeks fear, and with reason, the subjection of their Church, the suppression of their language, and the gradual absorption and disappearance of their race, if their rivals should gain preponderant influence... their fate depends on the form which the Congress shall give to the arrangements which will be decided upon with the object of protecting the Christians and securing order and security to the provinces of European Turkey.¹⁰⁹

According to Salisbury adherents to the Bulgarian Exarchate and Greek Patriarchate were in fact members of distinct and secular Bulgarian and Greek ethno-linguistically defined national communities. Moreover, adherence to one or the other Church automatically denoted, and was therefore synonymous with, membership in one or the other national community. And while the disputes between these communities might at first glance seem to be over ecclesiastical

questions, they were in fact existential confrontations hinging on profane questions of national identity, national loyalty, and national territorial aspirations. Thus, it truly was the case that the fate of these nations depended “on the form which the Congress shall give to the arrangements which will be decided upon with the object of protecting the ‘*Christians*’ [my emphasis].”

Conversely, Gorchakov was the principal advocate that the Congress adopt a strictly confessional, *prima facie* understanding of its confessional language, with Gorchakov avowing that the Russian plenipotentiaries had only come to the Congress “to give to the Christian subjects of the Porte an autonomous existence,”¹¹⁰ and that

Russia has always had in view in Turkey the interests of the Christians without regard to race... the Imperial Government of Russia does not recognize any well-founded reason for the antagonism of races which has been pointed out and which cannot have its origins in religious differences. All the nationalities belonging to the Eastern Church have successively claimed the right of having their autocephalous Church, that is to say, their independent ecclesiastical hierarchy... there is no sign that this has led either to the rupture of the bonds which unite these independent Churches with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, or to any antagonism whatever between the races.¹¹¹

Moreover, that

His Highness [i.e., Gorchakov] is anxious that the Congress should look upon the Representatives of Russia, not as exclusively concerned with the interests of the Slavs, but as taking an interest in all the Christian populations of Turkey... the object of his [i.e., of the Russian] Government is to draw these two [Christian] races [i.e., Bulgarians and Greeks] closer to each other. With regard to the religious question to which Lord Salisbury has alluded, his Highness [i.e., Gorchakov] must observe that there is, as regards all essential points, no religious dissidence between the Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate; it is solely a question of liturgy which has brought about the separation of the two Churches.¹¹²

While Gorchakov recognized that “Slavs” and “Greeks” constituted distinct “races,” i.e., ethnic national communities, he disavowed treating them as such and urged the Congress not to give any special or greater attention to one or the other community. Rather, his object was “to draw these two races closer to each other” on the basis of their shared membership in Christendom, which in his view was the only community to which the Congress ought apply its attention and force. Meanwhile, spiritual and ecclesiastical disputes between Christian communities were precisely that, and were quibbles that were neither euphemisms, nor provided explanations, for such trivial disputes as existed between the nations of Christendom.

In fact, Gorchakov argued that the principal confrontation with which the Congress ought to concern itself was one between different faiths, namely an effectively united Christendom against an essentially monolithic Islam, and that the Congress should act accordingly. That is, it should not waste time worrying about, or granting protection guarantees to, ethnic nationally defined minority communities, especially those sharing a Christian faith. This was because, in the first place, it was unnecessary to do so and, in the second, it might, in calling attention to differences otherwise unimportant to the communities concerned, if anything create problems where none currently existed. Instead, the Congress should devote its attention to the intercommunal confrontation that was at heart of the conflict, namely between undifferentiated Christians and homogenous Muslims, and exert its power in favor of the former.

This is further affirmed in light of the special attention Gorchakov devoted to the Jewish communities of Serbia and Romania, who, like Muslims, he sought to exclude from the Congress’s extension of rights and guarantees. On the other hand, even as Gorchakov fretted over Serbia’s minute Jewish community he was indifferent to Serbia’s sizable self-identified

ethnic Romanian minority (about 10.5% of the total population according to Serbia's 1866 census).¹¹³ Neither did he trouble himself about granting Dobrogea/Dobrudsza to the Principality of Romania despite its non-trivial Bulgarian population.¹¹⁴ At all events these were uniformly Christian peoples and therefore could be expected to be content so long as they were living in a polity ruled by Christians. In short, when Gorchakov employed the terms "Christian," "Muslim" and "Jew," Christian, Muslim and Jew are what he meant.

In the Congress discussions that followed it became clear that "the form which the Congress [gave] to... protecting... the Christians" was the one proposed by Gorchakov. That is, the plenipotentiaries formulated such communal protections as they recognized as to apply to Christians as such, and not to Christians as synonyms or shibboleths for different nations, as seen, for example, in Shuvalov's,¹¹⁵ Bismarck's,¹¹⁶ and Mehmed Ali Pasha's,¹¹⁷ among others',¹¹⁸ consistent adherence to this principle, and Salisbury's¹¹⁹ incremental evolution toward it. Thus, whatever this or that plenipotentiary might personally or privately have assumed, argued, or preferred, so far as the Congress was concerned the only communities admitted into, and recognized by, its discussions were those defined strictly by confession *per se*, and lacked any secular ethnic national dimensions.

Still, the distinction between this particularistic communal principle and the principle of universal individual rights remained. However, while, as noted by Karatheodori Pasha, these principles could be in tension and even at odds, there was a still higher value that united them in harmony. And this was a value that the Berlin Treaty would itself implicitly recognize as a legitimate principle in European inter-state relations, and to which actors seeking to challenge, violate, and undermine the Berlin Treaty would, not coincidentally, appeal over the next thirty years.

Popular Sovereignty and Human Rights

The Treaty

This value, which comprehended and accommodated both the Treaty's individual- and communal-based confessional protections, was religious toleration. That is, toleration of diverse confessional communities on the one hand, and toleration of heterodox religious expression by individuals on the other.¹²⁰ And this principle of religious toleration derived neither from then-ascendant liberalism nor the nationalism that was increasingly challenging and would soon overwhelm it. Rather, it was a principle of the Enlightenment, a philosophical project out of which these two ideologies later evolved.¹²¹

And this was not the only feature of the Treaty to be grounded in, and reflect the paradigms of, Enlightenment thought. Like the European state system during the classical Enlightenment era (i.e., the 17th and 18th centuries, or from circa the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia to circa the American and French Revolutions) the regime framed by the Treaty was oblivious to nations, however defined, and predicated on sovereign, and solely territorial, states. And like Enlightenment era *philosophes*, with their theories of natural law and predilections for monarchical rule, including and sometimes even especially of the absolutist variety, the Treaty's framers demonstrated indifference, and even hostility, to the principle of popular sovereignty.¹²² In fact, when it was within their theoretical and practical power to do so, these framers founded enlightened monarchical regimes that, if not absolutist, at least did not depend on popular

sovereignty for their legitimacy, a preference especially evident in the Treaty's provisions for the Principality of Bulgaria.

As observed above, article 3 of the Berlin Treaty bestowed its signatory states with the ultimate authority to determine who Bulgaria's ruler would be. This ensured that, irrespective of the preferences of those who were to actually be ruled by them, its ruler would be a foreign and not a native, that is to say not a national, prince.¹²³ And it was, moreover, inconceivable to this article's framers that Bulgaria's head of state could be anything other than a prince. That is, the article did not allow Bulgarians to choose a republican regime or elect some manner of republican office holder.¹²⁴ Notably, this was so despite that one of the Treaty's signatory states, namely France, was itself a republic and that the founding of a republic would not have been an innovation in the region (revolutionary Greece, for example, had been a republic from 1822 to 1832). In fact, the framers ensured that Bulgaria would be the very antithesis of a republic in that its ruler was effectively chosen not by its people, but chosen by, drew their legitimacy from, and was accountable to, the regime founded by the Treaty.

Meanwhile, article 4 proclaimed that "an Assembly of Notables of Bulgaria, convoked at Tirnovo, shall, before the election of the Prince, draw up the Organic Law of the Principality."¹²⁵ That is, the body convoked at Tirnovo was to be neither a "congress," "parliament," "senate," "*assemblée nationale*," "*reichstag*," or any other species of modern legislature, nor a "constituent assembly" or "constitutional convention," all which are explicitly, if sometimes only formally, grounded on the principle of popular sovereignty and all of which were very familiar to the Treaty's authors. Rather, this body was to be an archaic "Assembly of Notables," a term denoting councils of the sort known since classical antiquity and which were incompatible with or indifferent, and even hostile, to, any idea of popular sovereignty.¹²⁶

Likewise, whatever an "Organic Law" might have been, it was not a constitution, which, like a modern legislature, is predicated explicitly, if sometimes only formally, on the principle of popular sovereignty.¹²⁷ And it was unlikely that such language was accidental or coincidental, given background political realities about which it is inconceivable the Treaty's framers would have been ignorant.¹²⁸ Thus, while the 'Assembly of Notables' that convened at Tirnovo would in the event transform themselves into a genuine constituent assembly and found, at least on paper, a modern, liberal-democratic constitution worthy of the name, this went well beyond what the authors of the Berlin Treaty imagined.¹²⁹

Even article 5, with its guarantee of enlightened toleration for heterodox religious expression by individuals, was in tension with, and could even be in opposition to, popular sovereignty. This article circumscribed the freedom of Bulgaria's Assembly of Notables, and hence the freedom of Bulgarians (insofar as the former could be said to represent the will of the latter), to draft their foundational laws as they saw fit. That is, it prohibited the Assembly from, say, declaring Christianity as a state religion and establishing a professed Christian faith as a prerequisite to holding offices of state or enjoying rights provided by the state. And it was plainly the case that most Bulgarians passionately desired such declarations and prerequisites.

Yet the Treaty's indifference and even hostility to the principle of popular sovereignty was not restricted only to its provisions for Bulgaria. In fact, such a posture was nowhere starker than in articles 2, 14, 28, 36 and 45-47, which respectively delineated the borders of Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania. What is made conspicuous by its complete absence in all of these articles is any mechanism by which the persons, peoples, or nations living alongside, inside, or outside of these borders might have made known the polity to which they would have preferred to belong and whose ruling regime they recognized as legitimately their

own. Nor did the borders outlined in these articles take any account of demographic analyses such as of languages spoken, nationalities claimed, and so on. Rather, the Treaty was clear that it was not persons, peoples, or nations but itself, its framers, and the international regime it founded that had sole authority to bestow the regimes it recognized or established with the territories, persons, and communities over which they would rule.

More broadly, the Treaty was clear that, while it was not the instrument that founded them, the states whose independence it established became so only by satisfying certain preconditions of rule, most notably that their rule include enlightened religious toleration (articles 34 and 43, which recognized the independence of Serbia and Romania, respectively, are especially clear in this regard). That is, the Treaty presumed that the authority that sustained these states' existence, and hence from which they drew their legitimacy, was not the popular will of their own citizenries but the international regime established by the Treaty, a regime that would thenceforth supervise the states thus conditionally recognized.¹³⁰

And while such an assumption would have had significant implications for European inter-state relations even if it were held merely in theory, that it was held not only so, but in fact had effective and material force behind it, was evident from events surrounding the Congress. For the mere threat of this regime's bayonets was enough to determine, without the slightest regard for the majority popular will of those living in the territory, the existence of Bulgaria, driving Russian soldiers and Bulgarian patriots from what all agreed was the Bulgarian territory of Eastern Rumelia. Moreover, there could be no conceivable doubt that it was within the collective capacity of Europe's great powers (i.e., the Treaty's signatories and Concert's member states) to wipe one, another, or indeed all of the states conditionally recognized by the Treaty off of the map should they comprehensively and collectively determine to do so.

The framers' commitment to Enlightenment era paradigms of thought thus reinforced their supreme principle, namely a guarantee of its signatory states' sovereignty and territorial integrity. That is, by curtailing any threats that might arise thereto from the demands of popular sovereignty, national self-determination, or national rights, and by affirming territorial states as the sole legitimate basis of, and as the only entities existing in, inter-state relations. However, in another respect the framers' commitment to Enlightenment thought was in tension with this supreme principle, a tension especially clear in Treaty article 25.

This article declared that Austria-Hungary would occupy and administer the Ottoman *vilayet* of Bosnia, though the province would remain under Ottoman sovereignty. Such an occupation and administration could not have been justified on the basis of ethnic national claims.¹³¹ Likewise, article 25 provided for no consultation with Bosnians themselves, that is, the occupation and administration also had no plausible basis in popular sovereignty. Nor did the article declare that the Habsburg regime had any legitimate dynastic claims to the province. The Habsburg military had not even conquered Bosnia, but was merely authorized to occupy it, and thus could not justify its rule over the province by appeal to sheer right of conquest.

In fact, the Habsburg regime's occupation and administration of Bosnia could only rest on two interrelated bases of legitimacy. The first was a presumption that this occupation and administration would establish 'good governance,' one that adhered to the standards of 'civilized rule,' and for this reason would bestow upon Austria-Hungary a mandate for a 'civilizing mission' in the province. Crucially, the civilization in question was neither national, nor one of constitutional and liberal-participatory rule (the province would have neither a constitution nor a pan-provincial legislature until after its annexation in 1908), nor even a medieval order of caste and Church, but one defined by the Enlightenment and its values, not the least of which was

religious toleration. Meanwhile, the second base of legitimacy derived from the sole denominator that was common to: all of the province's culturally heterogeneous population, the article's framers, and the rulers, officialdom, and all citizens of the Habsburg and Ottoman states, namely their common humanity.

That article 25 thus violated Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty *de facto* while preserving both *de jure* is notable for this discussion in two respects. First, such a formulation would become a hallmark of Concert solutions to crises over the thirty years. Secondly, the condition that had prompted the framers to permit this *de facto* violation of a signatory's state prerogatives was their conclusion that these prerogatives were incompatible both with a principle of toleration and with upholding some bare minimum of humanity and human rights. In doing so, the framers had both remained faithful to Enlightenment values and admitted as a legitimate principle in inter-state relations, if only implicitly, a principle, namely humanity and human rights, that was in tension with, and even hostile to, the Enlightenment paradigm of territorial states and their own supreme commitment to the signatories' state prerogatives.¹³²

The Congress

That the Congress's consensus was both to mandate Austria-Hungary with a 'civilizing mission' in Bosnia, and to legitimize this mandate on an appeal to humanity and human rights (what we today might call a 'humanitarian intervention' followed by a 'transformative occupation') is evident from the plenipotentiaries' discussion of article 25. Salisbury, for example, was especially clear on this point, declaring that

The social condition and geographical position of Bosnia and Herzegovina are equally deserving of the attention of the Congress. They are the only provinces of Turkey in which the proprietors of the soil have, almost without exception, a different *religious* belief to that of the peasants [emphasis]. The insurrection which has resulted from this antagonism has given rise to the war which has lately devastated Turkey, and the animosities which separate the two classes of the population are not less strong than they were three years ago. They have been exasperated by the passions of the civil war...

For this purpose [of restoring order] there would be need of a Government which should have... the means necessary for the establishment of a good administration... For these motives the Government of the Queen proposes to the assembled Powers that the Congress should decide that the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary.¹³³

And, while supporting the proposal of his compatriot, Beaconsfield was equally clear that the plenipotentiaries were "striving to do justice to all races" and that Habsburg rule would, in his view, achieve the ends "of maintaining order, securing and establishing prosperity" in the province.¹³⁴ Meanwhile, Waddington expressing the French view, expounded similar assumptions and motives, arguing that "the plan pointed out by the English Cabinet was the only one which can secure a peaceful existence to the populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so much torn by political, religious, and social [but, notably, not *national*] hatred... In a word, he [i.e. Waddington] considers the intervention of the Government of Austria-Hungary as a measure of European police."¹³⁵

What is notable about the consensus such arguments established is that it based its interest in the inhabitants of Bosnia neither on their being members of any particular religious community, and still less on their being members of any specific national community, nor as being citizens of a territorial state. In fact, as concerns the latter, namely Bosnians as

undifferentiated citizens of a particular state, the plenipotentiaries' consensus solution for Bosnia ensured that any state-based, i.e., liberalizing, reforms they might contemplate could not reach the people of Bosnia. That is, any Ottoman reforms, either imposed on the Ottoman regime by the Congress or freely adopted by that regime, would not and could not apply to, and improve the lives of, those who remained Ottoman citizens in Bosnia, but who were now under Habsburg administration (a fact that would become significant in 1908). At the same time, the plenipotentiaries' consensus to deny the Habsburg regime any authorization to fully annex Bosnia meant that their concern for the people of Bosnia, still Ottoman citizens, could not be expressed as for the citizens of an Austro-Hungarian state.

Rather, the plenipotentiaries' consensus solution for Bosnia's inhabitants was based on the only non-state denominator common to all of them, indeed a denominator also common to both the plenipotentiaries and to the citizens of the states they represented. That is, their common humanity. Indeed, the plenipotentiaries were clear that they sought to protect Bosnians from violence and oppression on such bases as their "political, religious, and social"¹³⁶ as well as "national, religious, and geographical"¹³⁷ beliefs or identities. In doing so they recognized a humanity whose individual members held such a complex and varying array of political beliefs and identities that no single extra-state communal principle could comprehend the whole, be it faith, nation, caste, class, political party, political ideology, or any other identity or belief that touched on human relations.

Thus, the only possible means of ensuring "a good administration" and "peaceful existence," as well as "establishing prosperity," for all Bosnians was to recognize a shared humanity and extend a universal freedom of conscience to every individual inhabitant of the province. In Bosnia this concretely meant allowing each inhabitant to express their views, without fear of reprisal, as adherents of Catholic or Orthodox Christianity, of Islam, of Judaism, of Serbian, Croatian, or pan-Yugoslav nationalism, of supra-national Bosnian regionalism, of supra-national Ottoman or Habsburg patriotism, of *kmet/raya* solidarity against the landlords, of propertied order and the *status quo*, or of whatever else. And it was on this putative basis of humanity and human rights that the plenipotentiaries legitimized their solution for Bosnia.

However, it bears stressing that the plenipotentiaries were unambiguous that their commitment to a principle of humanity was predicated on an indifference, even hostility, to that of participatory rule and popular sovereignty. Andrassy, for example, repeatedly stressed that his interest in guaranteeing a freedom of conscience to all Bosnians was matched with an equal interest in ensuring the "pacification" of, and establishing "stability" in, the province, an end that could only be achieved by "a strong and impartial power."¹³⁸ Salisbury expressed a similar interest, adding that any lasting and satisfying solution required an administration possessing "forces sufficiently preponderating to suppress every kind of disturbance," one that could "succeed at once in establishing stable and strong administration in those regions."¹³⁹ Bismarck concurred, noting that "only a powerful State, and one having at its disposal the necessary forces within range of the seat of disorder, will be able to establish order there, and give security to the lot and future of these populations."¹⁴⁰ Waddington also agreed, asserting that "only a neighboring Power, sufficiently strong to be impartial... can establish peace in those desolated provinces."¹⁴¹ Beaconsfield joined the chorus, arguing that it was critical to establish stability and order, an end in his view best achieved "in the action of a great neighbouring Government, powerful, of Conservative opinions."¹⁴² Even Karatheodori Pasha defended continued Ottoman rule of Bosnia on the basis that "the Sublime Porte will be able to concentrate all its forces and attention to the re-establishment of order in this country...to repress this cupidity."¹⁴³

The plenipotentiaries were in unanimous agreement that stability and order were not merely of equal concern as freedom of conscience, but in fact that the former were *sine qua non* preconditions for the latter. At the same time, all the plenipotentiaries were certain that any form of rule that admitted the participation of, let alone predicated its rule on the consent of, the inhabitants of Bosnia themselves was irreconcilable with such stability and order, an argument that would have found ready concurrence from any 18th century enlightened absolutist or despot and most Enlightenment *philosophes*. Indeed, all the plenipotentiaries agreed that stability and order could only be achieved through the absolute rule of an enlightened Bosnian administration with sufficient strength to impose both order and freedom of conscience on the inhabitants of the province. The debate only hinged on which regime was strong enough to establish such an administration, namely either the Ottomans or the Habsburgs. And the plenipotentiaries agreed that it was the latter.

Yet the plenipotentiaries were emphatic that their consensus solution for Bosnia could not be construed as having removed the territory from Ottoman rule and annexed it to Austria-Hungary, with Beaconsfield declaring, in what was readily accepted by the plenipotentiaries as constituting the Congress's consensus, that

An erroneous opinion [has] attributed to the Congress the intention to proceed to the partition of a worn-out State (“Etat vicilli”) [i.e., the Ottoman Empire], and not to strengthen, as the high assembly has done, an ancient Empire which it considers essential to the maintenance of peace. It is true that often after a great war, territorial rearrangements are brought about... [but] the word ‘partition’ cannot be applied to such arrangements and retrocessions... His Excellency [i.e., Beaconsfield] took this occasion to repel the insinuations of a part of the press which has described as a partition the decision of the Congress upon the subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is, on the contrary, for the purpose of preventing a partition that this decision has been taken. Numerous historic precedents justify it: Bosnia, abandoned to herself, without the elements of good government, surrounded by independent or semi-independent States [i.e., especially, Serbia and Montenegro], would have been in very short time the theatre of sanguinary struggles [e.g., a Serbian conquest of Bosnia]. In this state of affairs Great Britain made an appeal to a neighbouring Power, strong, and interested in the maintenance of peace; Europe, sharing the same view, confided to Austria-Hungary the occupation and administration of Bosnia. [Beaconsfield] recalls that on several occasions, both in neighbouring countries and elsewhere, a similar mission has been intrusted to Austria [e.g., Austria-Hungary's temporary occupation of the Danuban Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia-*cum*-Principality of Romania during the Crimean War]; the initiative of Great Britain does not, therefore, prove that she is favourable to partition.¹⁴⁴

Far from authorizing or facilitating an incremental transfer of Bosnia from Ottoman rule to that of some other state, Beaconsfield argued that the Congress's consensus solution for the territory expressly intended to prevent such an eventuality. It is at the same notable, so far as regarded the Principality of Bulgaria, that the plenipotentiaries, especially Salisbury and Karatheodori Pasha, were clear throughout the Congress that the Principality had not been granted full independence but remained a “tributary autonomous” Ottoman polity. Thus, the Congress's consensus was that any declaration of independence by the Principality of Bulgaria itself or recognition of such independence by other states, especially Treaty signatory states, would constitute a violation of the Treaty and its regime.¹⁴⁵

However, it could not be denied that the plenipotentiaries consensus solution for Bosnia constituted a *de facto* violation of Ottoman territorial integrity and abrogation of Ottoman sovereignty, and that the plenipotentiaries had justified this violation and abrogation at least partly on an appeal to humanity, and thus, implicitly, to human rights. In doing so they

introduced humanity and human rights as legitimate principles in, and bases for, European interstate relations. And over the next thirty years many actors would follow the plenipotentiaries' example and appeal to human rights while seeking to abrogate the plenipotentiaries' supreme principle, namely a guarantee of the state prerogatives of all the Berlin Treaty's signatory states, including and especially that of its Ottoman signatory.

National Communities

Yet such Enlightenment-inspired principles as humanity, human rights, and toleration was but one of two points at which the Treaty's authors admitted a self-contradictory exception to both their supreme principle and to their general paradigm of solely territorial states. The other was a cursory departure from their otherwise systematically observed rule of indifference, and even hostility, to ethnic national communities, an entity whose existence they recognized in only two articles, namely articles 4 and 61. Article 4 declared that "in the districts where Bulgarians are intermixed with Turkish, Roumanian, Greek, or other populations, the rights and interests of these populations shall be taken into consideration as regards the elections and the drawing up of the Organic Law." Meanwhile article 61 declared that "the Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds." That only two of the six enumerated communities shared their names with Churches then enjoying autocephaly (i.e., Greeks and Armenians) underscored that both articles applied to, and were predicated on a recognition of, ethnic national communities.

In a way these articles' recognition of the ethnic national communities actually proves the rule of the Treaty's authors otherwise maintaining systematic indifference and even hostility toward them. That is, if the Treaty's framers were willing to recognize the existence of ethnic national communities in these articles, why did they employ language so ambiguous, indifferent, and even hostile to such communities in all of the Treaty's other articles? Why, for example, refer to "Mussulmans" and not to "Turks," "Bosnians/Bosniaks,"¹⁴⁶ or "Pomaks" (articles 12, 30, and 39)? Likewise, why refer to "Christians" and not to "Bulgarians" or "Greeks" (articles 1, 13, and 15), a consideration of no small material importance in such provinces as Eastern Rumelia wherein one of the principal inter-communal confrontations was, as the plenipotentiaries themselves recognized, between these two Christian communities. Such questions demonstrate the degree to which the Treaty's ambiguity, indifference, and even hostility toward national communities in all articles other than 4 and 61 was systematic, and thus neither accidental nor coincidental.

However, that the Treaty's framers employed language indifferent and even hostile to national communities was not a reflection either of their own national indifference or their assumption that most of their fellow citizens or those of the polities they established or conditionally recognized were so indifferent. In fact, it was precisely because they were acutely aware of and anxious about the existing and rapidly growing political power of national consciousness and national loyalties, including within most of the signatory states themselves, that these framers were careful to avoid recognition of it everywhere else in the Treaty. And such acute awareness and anxiety was especially evident in the latter of the two questions posed above, namely as concerned references to "Christians" in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.

The framers of articles 1 and 13 recognized just how explosive it would be to read their religious language, i.e., "Christian," as being a synonym or shibboleth for one or another secular,

national community. That is, they recognized just how explosive it would be to read “a *Christian* Government [of Bulgaria]” and “a *Christian* Governor-General [of Eastern Rumelia]” in the Treaty’s text and adopt a consensus interpretation of this language as practically expressing “a *Greek* Government” and “a *Greek* Governor-General,” “a *Bulgarian* Government” and “a *Bulgarian* Governor-General,” and so on. This is because the Greek populations of these territories would have found it as intolerable to live under an even *de facto* Bulgarian ethnic national regime as the Bulgarian populations would have found it to live under a Greek one. Thus, their consensus had to be that when the Treaty framed a confessional identity or community, such as “Christian” or “Muslim,” a confessional identity or community, i.e., “Christian” and “Muslim” *per se*, is exactly what the Treaty meant.

The recognition that framers granted to national communities in the Treaty was cursory, limited to almost passing references in just two articles. Indeed, the only notable feature of the plenipotentiaries’ discussion of these articles at the Congress, especially considering how contentious and exacting were their discussions of other issues, was the degree to which they were perfunctory.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, these framers and plenipotentiaries had introduced national communities as a legitimate principle in European inter-state relations. Over the next three decades many actors would follow their example and appeal to national rights when seeking to abrogate the Treaty’s supreme principle, namely a guarantee of the state prerogatives of all its signatory states, including and especially that of its Ottoman signatory.

Weakest Point in the Structure: The Ambiguous Status of the Ottoman Empire

That the Treaty and Congress repeatedly violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the polities they established or conditionally recognized (e.g., Serbia, Bulgaria, etc.) was problematic neither for the Treaty nor the international regime it founded. This was because these polities were not full and coequal participants in, parties to, or members of the Congress, the Treaty, or their regime, but were rather under the collective and collaborative supervision of these participants, parties, and members. However, that the Congress and Treaty occasionally violated, always *de facto* but never *de jure*, the Ottoman Empire’s state prerogatives was problematic. This was because such violations rendered the Empire’s status as a full and coequal member in that regime ambiguous or suspect despite its having been a full participant in and signatory of the Congress and the Treaty. In practically undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of such a full participant and signatory the others called into question the degree to which their regime guaranteed the state prerogatives of any or all of them. That is, they called into question the *raison d’etre*, even the existence, of both the Treaty and its regime as an element in European inter-state relations.

That the Ottoman regime was a full participant in the Congress was manifest, especially when contrasted with states that had been granted participation on a temporary, conditional, and circumscribed basis (such as Greece and Romania),¹⁴⁸ whose participation been proposed but denied (like Bulgaria),¹⁴⁹ or whose participation had never even been considered (like Montenegro, or, for that matter, Denmark, the Netherlands, or Portugal). Likewise, that the Ottoman Empire was a full and coequal signatory of the Treaty was evident from the fact that no distinction whatsoever existed between the Ottoman signatures on that document and those of the other six acceding states.

However, the Congress and Treaty occasionally seemed to challenge this coequal status, and articles 20 and 62 are especially illustrative cases in point. The former declared that “the

Sublime Porte undertakes to enforce [in Eastern Rumelia] the general laws of the [Ottoman] Empire on religious liberty and in favour of all forms of worship.” Meanwhile the latter was an ostensible “spontaneous declaration” by the Sultan that guaranteed religious toleration both for individual citizens, as individuals, and for various, enumerated confessional communities. *Prima facie* both articles imposed no novel obligations on the Ottoman regime, merely “took note” of the Sultan’s declaration, and simply committed the Ottoman state to enforcing its own existing laws. Nor did the article recognize any outside actor as being competent to express approval, criticism, or rejection of the Sultan’s declaration or how the Ottoman regime interpreted it in the Empire’s territories, institutions, and laws. In this, articles 20 and 62 were distinct from, say, articles 34 and 43, which *de jure* preconditioned Serbia and Romania’s independence, indeed their sheer existence, on these states guaranteeing precisely the religious toleration that the Ottoman regime granted solely by its own free and uncoerced will in articles 20 and 62.

Yet it cannot be ignored that the ruling regime of no other signatory state felt compelled to make similar declarations in the text of the Treaty. Indeed, that outside actors considered themselves competent to remind a sovereign state about its own laws was scarcely consistent with the principle of state sovereignty. Much more significant was that, given that they were included in the text of the Treaty, such articles could be taken by some foreign policy actors as *ipso facto* having placed their provisions under the purview of the Treaty’s international regime. And as article 62 applied to all Ottoman territories and to all Ottoman citizens, the scope of this international regime’s authority to enforce the enlightened and humanitarian provisions of this article could be considerable. Meanwhile, it is also notable that neither article 20 nor 62 pretended to remind the Ottoman state about its own laws in general, nor any other particular area of its law, other than that of religious toleration.

And this ambiguity was equally evident in the Congress discussions that led to the framing of article 62. Fully aware of the implications of admitting even ‘free’ and ‘spontaneous’ declarations into such legal instruments as the Congress’s protocols, let alone the text of the Treaty, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries had struggled across several Congress sessions to avoid any such admission. While doing so they had argued that unofficial Ottoman affirmations that such toleration was already long and well established throughout the Empire should be sufficient to satisfy any plenipotentiary’s alleged concerns. Only when faced with the imminent prospect of the other plenipotentiaries arriving at a consensus to impose a declaration of religious toleration on the Empire on the Congress’s, and not on the Ottoman regime’s, authority did the Ottoman plenipotentiaries agree to making an official declaration in which the Ottoman regime would ‘freely’ recognize this principle as a basis of its rule. And such formulations, which violated Ottoman state prerogatives *de facto* even while affirming them *de jure*, were notable in that this model would become a standard feature of crisis resolutions over the next thirty years.¹⁵⁰

Nor were articles 20 and 62 the only ones to practically undermine Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity even while respecting it. In article 61, for example, the Ottoman regime granted a communal protection guarantee to Ottoman Armenians, which, though ostensibly implemented under its own authority, by virtue of its inclusion in the Treaty’s text implicitly admitted a degree of oversight by other Congress participants, Treaty signatories, and regime members. Meanwhile, article 25 placed Bosnia under Habsburg administration and occupation, while maintaining Ottoman rule over the province. Nor were articles 20, 25, 61, and 62 alone in respecting, but practically undermining, Ottoman state prerogatives. In fact, the Congress and Treaty established a three-tiered hierarchy over Ottoman territory across which its sovereignty incrementally declined.

Map 11: Post-Berlin Ottoman Territory in the Balkans



Source: (part of) AbdurRahman AbdulMoneim, “he Vilayets and Sanjaks of the Ottoman Empire around 1317 Hijri, 1899 Gregorian,” Wikipedia, last accessed April 9, 2022, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanjak>

At one end of the hierarchy were Ottoman territories (e.g., the *Vilayets* of Kosovo, Edirne, or Bursa) that were not mentioned in the text of the Treaty and over which the Ottoman regime enjoyed full sovereignty.¹⁵¹ Next came Ottoman territories to which the Treaty granted autonomy (e.g., Eastern Rumelia or Crete). In such territories: the local population did not participate in an administration that was under the direct authority of the Porte, the Ottoman military maintained its presence, and the Ottoman regime continued to manage the province’s commercial enterprises.¹⁵² At the same time, the Treaty declared that its international regime either oversaw or was an equal partner in the design, though not in the functioning, of these territories’ administrations. It also restricted the types of personnel the Ottoman military could employ in, and confined that military to the frontiers of, such territories, orienting it toward possible invasion from without rather than imposing order within.¹⁵³

Next were territories (e.g., Bulgaria or Bosnia): that while officially Ottoman were *de facto* independent, whose local population participated in its administration (at least formally), from which the Ottoman military was entirely prohibited, and which assumed control of any hitherto Ottoman commercial activities.¹⁵⁴ In such territories the Treaty established the

international regime as a permanent co-suzerain whose highly circumscribed powers were equal to that of the Sultan's own very limited authority.¹⁵⁵ Yet these *de facto* independent polities were distinct from the sovereign states whose independence the Treaty conditionally recognized (i.e., Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania). The former, unlike the latter: continued to make regular payments of tribute to the Ottoman regime and were prohibited from renegotiating with the relevant outside actors any preexisting laws, policies, regulations, tariffs or commercial activities that it inherited from the Ottoman regime.¹⁵⁶ In fact, one could have physically traveled across this Ottoman sovereignty hierarchy were one to have traveled north from Istanbul/Constantinople, through the *vilayet* of Edirne, the *vilayet* of Eastern Rumelia, the Principality of Bulgaria, and on into Principality of Romania.

That the degree of Ottoman sovereignty varied across several of its territories was neither an innovation for the Empire nor unusual when compared to its ostensible peers in the Treaty's international regime. That is, before 1878 one could find Ottoman polities that were roughly analogous to those at every level of the sovereignty hierarchy established at Berlin.¹⁵⁷ Meanwhile, all the other signatory states, save perhaps the more national among them like Italy and France, already maintained, would adopt, or would seriously consider adopting such arrangements, notably within their European territories, during the international regime's existence.¹⁵⁸ Where the Ottoman polities established by the Treaty differed from similar ones found among its fellow signatory states was that in the latter these arrangements of asymmetrical sovereignty were a strictly domestic concern. Conversely, that the Treaty, and not the Ottoman regime itself, directly and indirectly established these arrangements in the Ottoman state meant that their maintenance, amendment, and enforcement was not an internal affair but rather within the purview of the Treaty's international regime, a fact at odds with Ottoman sovereignty.

Conclusion

It was in this space of uncertainty over the Ottoman Empire's status as a full and coequal member of the Concert of Europe that the self-contradictions in the Treaty of Berlin, namely its implicit and cursory admission of human and national rights on the one hand and its supreme commitment to the prerogatives of territorial states on the other, would manifest and pose the most serious challenges to the international regime's existence. Indeed, no serious challenge to the Treaty's principles would arise between or within any other Concert member states throughout its existence. This is hardly surprising, for it is only natural that ruptures in an otherwise sound structure should appear where that structure is weakest and most incongruously fashioned. And such challenges were likely inevitable given that the self-contradictions of human and national rights were woven into the Congress's negotiations, and the text of the Treaty, themselves. Yet, although foreign policy makers among the Concert's member states would, like the Treaty, allow occasional *de facto* violations of the Treaty and Concert's supreme commitment to all of its member states' sovereignty and territorial integrity, including and especially as regarded its Ottoman members state, they never permitted a violation of this principle so long as the Concert existed. And it is to the first of these trials of the Treaty, and the Concert that it founded, that we must now turn.

Chapter 3: Egyptian Crisis (1881-82)

Egypt in the Early 1880's

At the time of the 1881-82 Crisis Egypt was a land of complex, diverse, and dynamic associations and identities within, across, and among: classes, castes, confessions, linguistic communities, political ideologies, economic sectors and industries, urban and rural living spaces, civil and military bureaucracies, state and civil society institutions, nativist and cosmopolitan partisans, and traditionalist and modernizing activists. While a comprehensive inspection of this social, cultural, political, and economic landscape is beyond the scope of this discussion, it is necessary to provide an account of the four institutions that formed the fulcrum of the Crisis, namely (in the order addressed below), ex-mamluk Turco-Circassian elites, the Alawiyya regime, the 'indigenous' Arab Egyptian community, and the European, especially British, great power states and expatriates thereof.

As concerns the first of these, since its conquest of the 'Mamluk Sultanate' in the early 16th century, Ottoman rule over Egypt and its people had rarely been direct or comprehensive. This was not because centralized authority in Egypt was weak or undeveloped. Rather, successive Ottoman regimes, especially from the early 17th century onward, opted to leave Egypt's administration largely intact and less integrated than with more direct methods of rule that the Ottomans practiced elsewhere, and to appoint a small Ottoman cadre more to monitor than to direct that administration. Excepting a few extraordinary moments, for most of its Ottoman history the value of Egypt to the Porte was not as a base of political, social, cultural, nor administrative strength but as a tributary polity. It was in the first place, as a prolific source of revenue, the largest of any province of the Empire, and, in a distant second place, a modest supplier of supplementary military forces, more for intra-imperial policing (especially for *Hajj* pilgrims in the Hejaz) than offensive or defensive campaigns.¹

Under this effectively devolved rule the recently vanquished mamluks, a Turkic-speaking institution composed of 'slave' soldiers and administrators largely of Caucasus, especially Circassian, origin or descent, reclaimed a predominate place in Egypt's administration and economy. Nor would this be the last time that this 'mamluk' caste experienced defeat followed by *de facto* restoration to ascendancy in Egypt. And the author of the second mamluk downfall, namely Muhammad/Mehmed Ali, would in effecting it found another of the institutions that would play a critical role in the Egyptian Crisis of 1881-82, namely the Alawiyya regime.²

Born to an Albanian-speaking family in the Ottoman Balkan *eyalet* (province) of Rumelia, by 1801 Muhammad/Mehmed Ali rose to become a local notable in command of a *bashi-bazouk* outfit composed mainly of Albanian co-linguists from his province. For this reason Ottoman Sultan Selim III invited Ali to join an expedition in 1801 to reimpose order in an Egypt then roiling from the chaotic aftermath of Napoleon's disastrous campaign there. By the time Napoleon was fleeing another catastrophe in Russia (1812), Ali had succeeded in coopting, expelling, or killing his Ottoman rivals in Egypt, destroying the mamluks as an institution, subordinating all other Egyptian institutions to his rule, and securing from the Porte an appointment as *Wali/Vali* (governor) of Egypt.³

As *Wali/Vali* Ali, whose court language was neither Albanian nor Egyptian Arabic but Ottoman Turkish, soon found himself relying primarily on surviving mamluk, and especially Turco-Circassian, grandee clans for his regime's administrative, military, and economic elite. Meanwhile, 'indigenous' Arabic speaking Egyptians largely continue to enjoy the same social

positions and roles as they had for centuries, namely villeinage (the *fellah*), conscripted labor, or foot soldiery. Under these auspices Ali launched a ferocious, radical, and autocratically imposed campaign of unabashed Westernizing modernization in Egypt. So transformative were the economic and, above all, military dimensions of this program that Egypt rapidly effectively rose from being an autonomous province of, to a *de facto* junior partner in an alliance with, the Ottoman regime.⁴

By 1840, and after waging two successful wars against his Ottoman suzerain-*cum*-senior partner, Ali compelled the Porte to both recognize his dynasty as hereditary *Wali/Vali*'s of Egypt and to accept a greatly expanded degree of domestic Egyptian administrative and fiscal autonomy, relegating the Porte to a still more passive, though not wholly negligible, actor in these spaces. Yet, as regarded what was doubtlessly the Ottoman regime's principal concern, Ali reaffirmed Egypt's status as a tributary polity. Indeed, annual Egyptian payments to Istanbul/Constantinople actually grew under Alawiyya rule.⁵

Alawiyya regime zeal for reform and modernization survived Ali, with his grandson Isma'il being notable both for the scale of his ambitions and the role these would play in the events of 1881-82. Among other programs, Isma'il: established a (largely ceremonial) Egyptian parliament composed mainly of Turkic speaking land magnates; lobbied the Porte to recognize his elevation to the title 'Khedive' (roughly equivalent to the rank of 'prince' or 'grand duke'); and invested lavishly in social, cultural, and, above all, infrastructural projects, most notably in the French-founded Suez Canal Company. These projects were heavily underwritten by European, especially British and French, state and private lenders whose loans were, like many extended to regimes and businesses throughout the world during the mid-19th century, heavily deducted by fees and commissions, staggering in their sums, and unsustainable in their interest. The global speculative bubble burst in 1873, and the costs of the ensuing worldwide financial crisis and decades-long 'depression' would never be far from the minds of Egypt's creditors or the great power states during the 1881-82 Crisis. Not even the sale of Egypt's entire stake in the Canal Company to Britain could not stave off Alawiyya regime bankruptcy.

British interest in Egypt, though ancient, had steadily grown during Alawiyya rule owing to three factors: by the 1870's Britain consumed most Egyptian exports and provided a plurality of its imports; British shipping made up the vast preponderance of Canal traffic; and the Canal had become strategically critical to the object of maniacal British imperial fixation, namely India. With their acquisition of Egypt's Canal Company shares, thereby becoming overnight the Company's largest stakeholders, interest by the British state and British lenders in Egypt, including and especially domestic Egyptian administration and finances, intensified apace. Accordingly, a British and French-led consortium of European creditors and state-ruling regimes compelled the Alawiyya regime to accept a committee of bondholders (the "Public Debt Commission") to both restructure Egyptian debt and assume control of Egyptian state revenues, fully half of which were thenceforth pledged to both the Ottoman tribute and the servicing of European arrears. At the same time the British and French induced Isma'il to establish a cabinet of ministers, two of which would both hold fiscal portfolios and be occupied by an unremovable and veto-empowered representative of the British and French states, respectively (together with the Debt Commission, a system known as 'Dual Control').⁶

Meanwhile, as an instrument of his modernization program Isma'il had invited large numbers of Europeans to staff the upper echelons of Egypt's bureaucracy and officer corps, and to disseminate their presumed expertise therein. Attracted by generous remuneration – at levels notably above those earned by Egyptians of equivalent rank – and ensured a degree of supra-

legal immunity – falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of extra-territorial, capitulatory tribunals (the so-called ‘mixed courts’) – many Europeans accepted this invitation. At the same time, Europeans enjoyed an ever-greater share of influence in, and profits from, the Egyptian industrial and mercantile sectors. These trends only accelerated and expanded with European seizure of Egyptian finances.⁷

Such was the condition of Egypt on the eve of the Crisis. An ever more autonomous tributary polity of the Ottoman Empire that nevertheless formally remained under Ottoman sovereignty. One ruled by a collaborative, though sometimes contentious, economic, military, and administrative ascendancy, composed, on the one hand, of European, especially British and French, state representatives and expatriates and, on the other hand, of a Turkic speaking, especially Turco-Circassian and Alawiyya regime, elite; where Arabic-speaking communities, acknowledged to be the most authentically ‘native’ of the region and constituting the vast majority of the population, were marginalized and exploited.; where a large proportion of its annually produced wealth was transferred to powerful European states and wealthy European creditors (and this at a time of global economic malaise); where successive waves of state-driven modernization, lately bearing a particularly cultural and social emphasis, together with increasing European penetration had disseminated such ideas as broadly participatory rule of a secular state, constitutionalism, liberalism, and nationalism as well as rejections thereof. In short, this was a polity ripe for social unrest, rebellion, and revolution.⁸

The Egyptian Crisis of 1881-82

The first signs of crisis emerged in 1879 as a disaffected, despondent, and politically and administratively marginalized Khedive Isma’il reacted with indifference to increasingly vociferous popular Egyptian agitation against European ascendancy and even his own rule. In fact, Isma’il even encouraged such activism, most notably by dismissing ‘his’ self-appointed (i.e. the Dual Control-appointed) cabinet and replacing it with an ‘elected’ one, albeit one elected by and composed of Turkic-speaking elites, and by calling both for cabinet responsibility to his Potemkin parliament and the founding of a quasi-constitutional Egyptian ‘organic law.’ This proved to be the last straw for Egypt’s European stakeholders, who pressured the Ottoman regime to replace Isma’il with his presumably more pliant son Tewfik. Though this step seemed to affirm Ottoman authority over Egypt, people knew that the European Powers had provided the iron fist inside the velvet Ottoman glove sweeping Isma’il from his throne.⁹

While the new Tewfik regime, under the preponderant influence of the absolutist-minded premier Riyad Pasha, proved deferential to European interests, it also took up the Alawiyya tradition of state building, especially: by successfully lobbying for a reduction in interest rates on outstanding Khedivate loans (even while raising already grueling taxes in order to pay for them); by abolishing many feudal coercive and corporal punitive practices against the *fellah*; by including two Arabic-speaking deputies in ‘its’ cabinet; and with a series of token promotions of Arabic-speakers among (non-military) Khedivate officialdom. Yet these paltry reforms failed to satisfy the more assertive anti-European and Khedive-critical elements of Egyptian society, led especially by Arabic-speaking military officers, especially and their rapidly emerging spokesperson, Ahmed Urabi (sometimes Orabi or Arabi).¹⁰

Having gained notoriety during the Isma’il-condoned 1879 agitation, by 1881 Urabi had risen to occupy a central place in the growing opposition movement. Indeed, in January of that year he publicly denounced, and then led a successful effort to bring down, the Khedivate’s

Turkic-chauvinist minister of war. Over the next nine months Urabi proved to be an adept political operator, gaining popularity among the politically active Arabic speaking population as a 'voice of the people' while charming key actors of the Turkic speaking elite who were for one reason or another hostile the Tewfik regime. In September 1881, when Tewfik and Riyad moved to expel Urabi from Cairo so as to forestall his mounting influence, Urabi organized demonstrations leading to Riyad's dismissal and the appointment of a new cabinet, one that was less hostile to Urabi's political program.¹¹

At this point France, then under the premiership of the Radical-*cum*-Moderate Republican and fierce opponent of empire-*cum*-French imperialist Léon Gambetta, and Britain, led by the Liberal Party government of the sometimes-imperialist William Gladstone, intervened to transform what had been a moderate program for reform into a full-blown revolution. In January 1882 the Turkic-speaking land magnate dominated Egyptian parliament was presented with a joint Anglo-French note declaring the Khedive's unassailable authority to rule in whatever manner he saw fit, i.e., as anyone who harbored doubts were in that moment made to understand, declaring the authority of the Khedivate's Anglo-French patrons to rule in whatever manner *they* saw fit. The note ignited a firestorm of protest in the Egyptian parliament that soon spread across Egyptian society, resulting in the collapse Tewfik's (i.e., the Dual Control's) cabinet, which Tewfik, under duress, then replaced by an Arabic speaking-majority ministry with Urabi himself as minister of war.¹²

Even under these conditions the Urabist program was hardly a radical one. He and his allies called for: a genuine constitution, a more broadly participatory legislature, greater access for Arabic speaking Egyptians to the upper echelons of the Khedive's military and administration, the forced retirement of a number of Turkic speaking (though, notably, not European) officials in the same, and greater Egyptian participation in determining how to allocate that half of the Khedive's budget not earmarked for Ottoman tribute and European debt payment. Yet, influenced in part by reports from their anti-Urabist informants on the ground, the Gambetta and Gladstone governments became convinced (quite wrongly) that what the Urabists called for was: the wholesale de-Europeanization of the Khedive's military and administration; the repudiation of all Egyptian debt; and perhaps even the nationalization of all foreign holdings, to include the Suez Canal.¹³

On the basis of this flawed intelligence, by late May 1882 Britain and France, the latter now under the premiership of Gambetta's Moderate Republican colleague Charles de Freycinet, dispatched a combined fleet to Egypt with orders to blockade the port of Alexandria and demand the dissolution of the Urabist cabinet and exile of its members. Given Alexandria's large European population on the one hand and, on the other, the concern of the city's Arab majority that they were about to experience violent invasion, occupation, and colonization (as suffered by Tunisia just the year before), tensions ran high in the city on the morning of 11 June 1882. The result was a spontaneous riot in which frenzied European and Egyptian mobs attacked one another and hapless passersby, leaving fifty Europeans and some two hundred and fifty Egyptians dead and thousands more injured.¹⁴

Urabi responded by dispatching an Egyptian army contingent to Alexandria with a mandate restore order and to suppress any further sectarian agitation, while Tewfik, along with droves of Europeans from the Egyptian interior, fled to the coast and the protection of Anglo-French naval guns. Both Urabi and Tewfik simultaneously appealed to the Ottoman Sultan, each asking that he dismiss the other and to send an Ottoman force to support their respective causes. Yet the Porte remained aloof.¹⁵

A stalemate thus ensued for the rest of June and into early July when, under the flimsy pretext that Egyptian forces were positioning themselves to threaten the combined Anglo-French fleet, British admiral Beauchamp Seymour issued an ultimatum demanding Egyptians dismantle their coastal defenses. With the coastal defenders ignoring British demands, and as the French, demurring any violence, withdrew their fleet, on 11 July British ships bombarded and destroyed the coastal fortresses, employing their guns with such reckless indifference that they destroyed much of Alexandria itself. Thereafter Seymour sent marines to occupy the ruins of Alexandria as Urabist forces withdrew. By 29 July what remained of a rapidly disintegrating, increasingly informal, and generally confused Urabist regime in Cairo, largely abandoned by Turkic-speaking elites alarmed by the socially progressive and Arabist dimensions of the Urabist program, deposed Khedive Tewfik. On 7 August, as British forces probed south along the Nile, Tewfik returned the favor from what was left of Alexandria and declared Urabi a rebel and an outlaw. The two factions were now in an irreconcilable and existential civil war.¹⁶

Meanwhile in London, Gladstone, publicly agonizing over the irreconcilability of his celebrated commitment to liberalism, national self-determination, and human rights with naked imperialism, nevertheless concluded that though it might be a sin against Egyptians and perhaps humanity to order a British invasion of Egypt, it would be a still greater sin against Britain if he did not (he was, perhaps, aided in this calculation by fact that 37 percent of his personal portfolio was [then] in Egyptian stock). While Freycinet's government and the French National Assembly refused to authorize any French participation in a bi- or unilateral intervention in Egypt, the British Parliament approved funding for the campaign. The result was a swift British victory in what amounted to little more than a parade march through Egypt, with the British expeditionary force overcoming Urabi's disorganized, inadequately supported, and erratically directed army, which was still further hampered by an indecisive and bickering regime in Cairo, and scoring a decisive and near bloodless victory at Tell El Kebir on 13 September 1882. Meanwhile, ten days earlier (on 2 September), and as the crisis's conclusion became increasingly forgone, the Ottoman regime cast its die in the prevailing political colors and affirmed Urabi's attainment. Less than a week after Tell El Kebir, Urabi surrendered to the British.¹⁷

In a December 1882 ruling, dictated by the Gladstone government but pronounced by the Tewfik regime, Urabi and his 'co-conspirators' were sentenced to death, then commuted to life in exile, and expelled from Egypt at the end of month. Egypt's administration was formally restored to the *status quo antebellum*, but in reality all vestiges of meaningful participation in the actual governance of Egypt by Egyptians of whatever background, let alone Ottoman influence in that governance, was expunged, though Egypt would continue to transfer its full annual tributary payments to Istanbul/Constantinople until the Ottoman regime's declaration of war on Britain in 1914. All actual administrative power in Egypt now lay exclusively in the hands of whatever government sat at Downing Street, a fact that would poison Franco-British relations for the next seventeen years, with this Egyptian-based Anglo-French antipathy constituting one of the key elements of European, and indeed global, geopolitical relations throughout this period.¹⁸

From a material standpoint, the crisis had altered little for the Ottoman regime. All that had changed was that actual rule of its Egyptian possession had transferred from one set of actors that it could not control to another set of actors that it could not control. More significantly, after the invasion, an act for which the Gladstone government had notably sought, and obtained, Ottoman acquiescence, Britain neither annexed the territory nor established a protectorate over it.¹⁹ Officially, Egypt remained under the Sultan's sovereignty. Rather, the Gladstone government instituted an informal, *de facto* method of British rule that would, employing boorish Orientalist

word play, become known as the ‘veiled protectorate.’ Under this ‘veil’ representatives of the British state, ultimately answering to a succession of ‘Consuls-General of Egypt,’ reigned behind the thin veneer of an enthralled but formally governing Khedivate officialdom that remained *de jure* subordinate to the Ottoman regime.²⁰

In doing so the crisis’s resolution was orchestrated such as to affirm the Ottoman regime’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in theory even while this resolution violated it in practice. The realpolitik machinations and material calculations behind these developments were widely known or suspected at the time and have been confirmed by historians ever since. Yet there was another factor at play: a commitment by key decision makers in the ruling regimes of Berlin Treaty signatory states and by their informed publics to the Concert of Europe and its principles, norms, and strictures, amounting to a guarantee of the, at least formal, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Concert member states, including its Ottoman member state, as well as recourse to consultation rather than war among members. While historians have tended to minimize the Concert regime’s role in these events, a survey of the contemporary Austro-Hungarian and British presses reveal the degree to which those at the time recognized the Concert as having been a critical element in them.²¹

And more than with any other crisis examined in this discussion the sheer fact of such pervasive recognition of the Concert regime’s existence, of its having jurisdiction in the crisis, and of its having been founded by and of its being based on the Berlin Treaty, is by itself significant. This is because the Berlin Treaty referenced Egypt and the communities residing therein only very obliquely or not at all. Nevertheless, during the crisis commentators recognized that a Concert regime founded by and based on the Berlin Treaty was the sole institution that could legitimately authorize non-Ottoman actions on Egyptian territory, and that any such Concert authorization required unanimous approval by all of its member states.

This assumption was predicated on the rationale that as Egypt was an Ottoman territory, and as the Ottoman Empire was a member state of the Concert, Egypt fell under the jurisdiction of the regime. Of all the manifestations of the Second Concert explored in this discussion, this dimension of the Egyptian Crisis is the best demonstration that the Berlin Treaty was no mere collection of *ad hoc* and circumscribed agreements, but an instrument that founded a comprehensive, pan-continental, integrated, and collectively guaranteed international regime among all of its signatory states. This crisis is the best illustration that the Treaty of Berlin was more than the sum of its parts.²²

The Austro-Hungarian Press and Habsburg Decision Makers

The Press

That the German speaking Habsburg press appreciated the role of the Concert in this crisis is evident from the fact that this press made 297 direct references to it, in at least 25 different journals, over the course of the crisis’s 548 days (01 August 1881-31 January 1883). That is, the interested Habsburg public could on average encounter a direct discussion of the Concert’s role in the crisis, usually in a paper’s front-page article, slightly more than once every other day. Meanwhile during the period of most acute crisis, namely between 1 June and 15 September 1882, discussion of the Concert was even more intensive, with papers directly referencing the regime 220 times in 106 days, or on average about twice a day.²³

Given the implications noted above about references to the Concert in the context of the Egyptian Crisis, this depth and breadth of Concert discussion in the Austro-Hungarian press, both by this press itself and by non-Habsburg newspapers quoted in or referenced by it, as well as by Habsburg and non-Habsburg actors quoted in or referenced by that press, is by itself significant. Although one of the international regime's member states, namely Britain, at various times *de facto* violated the Concert's principles, almost no actors took this to mean that the regime was so abrogated *de jure* as to cease being worth frequent and robust discussion of it.

A qualitative analysis that delves beyond this – in itself significant – quantitative illustration of the Concert's discursive influence during the crisis, that is, one that investigates what the "Concert of Europe" actually meant to those who referenced it, is still more revealing. Qualitative analysis demonstrates that key actors maintained a commitment to the international regime. Indeed, critical actors insisted that, irrespective of the actions of others, their own state's, principal consideration was loyalty not merely to the letter of the Concert (though this alone would be noteworthy), but to its spirit.

One Austro-Hungarian newspaper committed to applying the Concert's principles to Ottoman Egypt during the Crisis was the bourgeois-liberal-oriented, Vienna-based journal whose reporting on foreign affairs was preeminent among the Dual Monarchy's mass-circulating German language press, namely the *Neue Freie Presse* (*NFP*). As early as 7 May 1882 the *NFP* asserted that:

Without a doubt the Sultan is the best guarantor for Europe when it comes to the question of preserving, by means of his rule, both his [i.e., the Sultan's] sovereignty and that of Europe's over Egypt, for Abdul Hamid is not in the position to be in Egypt something different from what he is in Europe. Here [in Europe] as there [in Egypt] he is a ruler who depends on the European Concert... And so, the attempt to procure a diplomatic solution to the Egyptian affair, which arose from a French initiative, has found the provisional approval of Europe...

One can without any reserve endorse this [French] line for the future Egyptian policy of the European Concert. It is fair for France to step into the foreground, and it is also very prudent [that, in adopting the French policy, extra-French actors] thereby strengthen the Freycinet Cabinet, which loyally pursues a peace policy, in its own country by increasing [that cabinet's] European prestige. But it is further just that the Sultan's suzerainty over Egypt is also recognized... and in all of this the necessity of European consensus is maintained as an essential condition.²⁴

When employing the term "Europe" the *NFP* meant to contrast the comprehensive, collective authority of the European great powers from factional multi-, bi-, or unilateral acts by one or several of them. That is, "Europe" was synonymous with the "Concert of Europe," with the *NFP* using both terms interchangeably. The paper was thus clear that while the Concert's French member state had proposed what the journal itself saw as a desirable solution to the Crisis, one that was non-violent and non-coercive and respected Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt, this solution could only legitimately be realized in practice with the approval of the Concert regime. That is, had the Concert not arrived at a consensus to adopt the French proposal, the only legitimate response by the regime's member states would have been to reject and oppose the acts contemplated therein. Yet, with Concert adoption of the French policy it became, and drew its legitimacy from the fact that it now was, not a French but a Concert program.

True, the *NFP* both presumed that 'Europe' enjoyed a degree of "sovereignty/suzerainty/supremacy [*Oberhoheit*]" over Ottoman Egypt that was equal to that of the Porte itself and viewed as desirable "preserving [*wahren*]" this shared Concert-Ottoman sovereignty over that portion of Ottoman territory. Yet in the face of a looming Anglo-French

intervention in Egypt this assertion of Concert prerogatives in one of its member states' provinces was not a challenge or subordination, but an affirmation, of Ottoman sovereignty. That is, such an assertion amounted to a Concert prohibition of any British, French, or Anglo-French violation of Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity in Egypt.

It is also true that the *NFP* asserted that the Sultan “depended [*abhängen*]” on the Concert, i.e., for the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of his state. But, whether the *NFP* was aware of it or not, the ruling regimes of all Concert member states also depended, as they themselves admitted, on the Concert. As we have seen and will continue to observe, key decision makers and commentators in every Concert member state presumed that their state could never survive an assault collectively and simultaneously undertaken against it by all, or even merely several, other Concert members. Such commentators and decision makers likewise fully expected to suffer violations of their state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity were the consequences of the Concert’s abrogation, i.e., an international state of nature and, inevitably, a general war, to eventuate. Perhaps the Ottoman regime, given its relative material weakness, was more dependent on the Concert for the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity than any of its other member states, but this was, as was generally, if implicitly, recognized at the time, a difference of degree rather than fundamental condition. In effect, all Concert member states were, as the *NFP* styled the Ottoman Empire, “vassals” of the international regime.²⁵

Nor was the *NFP* above criticizing its own state’s ruling regime for what it saw as that regime’s machinations, machinations which, if actually accomplished, would have the effect of undermining, even abrogating, the Concert, with the paper arguing on 13 September 1882 that

It is not surprising when, in view of the Egyptian imbroglio and the impotence revealed by Turkey in the face of English action, on all sides, where one still has an old account to settle with the Porte or wishes to open a new one, secret desires coyly come to light. Indeed, it has been suggested, even flatly alleged, many times that Austria-Hungary itself also has a wish list to present, and indeed with the addition that something like this suggestion had been raised in the first instance by Vienna in Berlin, and this is only now becoming manifest in an apparently official communique, which was transmitted to Prussian provincial newspapers by the *Wolffsche Telegraphen-Bureau* [the German news agency counterpart to British Reuters]. This communique states that Austria-Hungary would like to request that the settlement of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian Question also be placed on the agenda of the conference, or of any possible future congress, to which the resolution of Egyptian affairs is reserved...

But even if the German Chancellor [Otto von Bismarck] was very disposed to remedy the discomfort of a closely allied Power [i.e., the Habsburg regime], and to give into Austria’s wishes to put the settlement of the Bosnian Question on the agenda now, then the entire laboriously achieved peace work of the Berlin Congress would at the same time easily be called into question, for it is not enough that the Porte alone renounces its sovereign rights. The mandate [to occupy and administer Bosnia] granted to Austria was an integral part of the Treaty of Berlin, which can only be modified by the unanimous consent of the Congress Powers. There is no doubt, however, that if Germany and Austria-Hungary approached either the conference or a congress on this point [i.e., with a proposal to change the Berlin Treaty resolutions *vis-à-vis* Bosnia] Russia, above all other Powers, but then also France, Italy, and certainly Greece too, would demand to see the Berlin Treaty of 1878 revised in their interests [and at Ottoman expense]...²⁶

Several of the *NFP*’s assumptions and arguments here bear emphasis. First, the paper presumed that the ruling regimes of few Concert members were fully satisfied with the stipulations of that Congress regime. Each one, especially Austria-Hungary, harbored interests that could be realized only were the Concert disregarded. Yet the *NFP*, in rejecting, and chiding the Habsburg regime for opportunistic Bosnian machinations, expressed a commitment to the

Concert that exceeded the attractive pull of *raison d'état*, which could be realized only in the atomized inter-state condition of an international state of nature.

Secondly, the paper argued that an abrogation of a part of the Berlin Treaty would result in an abrogation of the whole. The Treaty constituted not a collection of unrelated and *ad hoc* agreements whose pieces could be amended willy nilly, but a comprehensive and mutually interdependent covenant among its signatories that had to be preserved immaculately or not at all (and such an assumption was rich with implication for the events of 1908). Indeed, not even the Ottoman regime (say, in response to surreptitious pressure exerted on it behind the scenes) could unilaterally renounce, either in Bosnia or elsewhere, its sovereignty, because that sovereignty was not dependent on the Ottoman regime alone. Rather, like that of all its member states, Ottoman sovereignty was collectively guaranteed by, and under the comprehensive responsibility of, all Concert members.

Finally, the paper alleged that the Habsburg regime, despite enjoying absolute effective control of Bosnia's territory, inhabitants, resources, and revenues, still actively pursued *de jure* annexation.²⁷ In fact, decades after the crisis, on 21 February 1904, the *NFP* would publish an account of an episode that occurred during the Berlin Congress and which was highly revelatory of the intensity of these annexationist ambitions. According to the *NFP*, by way of its quoted sources, the Habsburg regime, in particular Emperor-King Franz Josef acting through his obedient emissary, the then-Habsburg foreign minister and Berlin Congress plenipotentiary Count Gyula Andrassy, had during the Congress publicly demanded full annexation of Bosnia. Yet Ottoman plenipotentiary Alexander Karatheodori Pasha, acting on orders from the Sultan, responded that, were Bosnia annexed to Austria-Hungary, he and the Ottoman delegation would withdraw from the Congress and refuse to accede to the Treaty *in toto*. The Ottoman delegation would do so even at the cost of resuming hostilities in the Russo-Turkish War, the Empire's desperate situation in that War notwithstanding.²⁸

In response to this hardline position, and due to immense pressure exerted by Bismarck, Andrassy and Franz Josef relented, and agreed to a merely *de facto* annexation, with Bosnia-Herzegovina officially remaining Ottoman territories.²⁹ However, as the *NFP* argued was the case in the Egyptian Crisis, and as historians have argued was the case throughout the period of the Second Concert's existence, the Habsburg regime never reconciled itself to the Bosnian *status quo* established at Berlin. And, in every geopolitical crisis in which it was involved during this period, the Dual Monarchy never failed to explore the possibility of contriving annexation of Bosnia.³⁰

The upshot of these perennial, and perennially unsatisfied, ambitions for annexation are twofold. First, they demonstrate the geopolitical paradox of the Habsburg regime's posture toward the Berlin Treaty, and thus the Concert. Austria-Hungary, through its *de facto* annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, derived more material benefit from the Treaty than any other signatory. Yet, at the same time, given its schemes to annex Bosnia it was one of the Treaty's most persistent revisionist signatory states. Second, these efforts at annexation demonstrate that it is not this discussion alone that operates on the axiom that formalities in inter-state relations are no mere trivialities that can be ignored without consequence so long as critical material realities are realized *de facto* and informally respected by other key actors. Rather, both Franz Josef, who expended considerable political capital in an effort to realize in *de jure* law circumstances that already existed in Bosnia in all but formal name, and Sultan Abdülhamid, who was willing to risk significant material costs for the sake of technicalities, also shared this conviction about the material significance of inter-state formalities.

Returning to the Egyptian Crisis, in its analysis of a debate in the French Parliament the liberal *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ)*, a journal that was by way of its editor, Theodor Hertzka, a child of the *NFP*, reported on 02 June 1882 that

The debates on Egypt which took place today in the French Chamber of Deputies will, by the way, have a good effect—namely, to increase confidence in the preservation of peace. Mr. de Freycinet has not once, but thrice stressed his firm resolve to act only within the European Concert, and has guarded against any adventurous policy. Mr. Gambetta hurled some accusations in his face with great energy, and Mr. de Freycinet then retreated, or more correctly advanced a few steps, declaring that [only] under certain circumstances could France decide, if necessary, to use force in Egypt, namely [only] in agreement with Europe. France alone cannot and does not want to assume responsibility for the use of force... Despite the objections of Gambetta and the anti-Gambettist Deputy Ribot, this program seemed to please the Chamber of Deputies for they gave the [Freycinet] ministry a vote of confidence by an enormous majority. That's really the best thing about the whole debate, for the preservation of the Freycinet cabinet is a matter of necessity. Should it fall, it would be replaced by [an anti-Concert, pro-unilateral interventionist] cabinet under Gambetta's influence, and then the [international] situation would be much worse.³¹

And the next day that

The debate which took place yesterday in the French Chamber of Deputies... will contribute nothing to bringing the Egyptian question closer to a solution; the vote that followed it, on the other hand, has one good effect, it has removed the imminent threat of a ministerial crisis in France and thereby brought a certain element of stability to the European situation. A fall of the Freycinet ministry would have been a real misfortune for Europe; distrust would have immediately become powerful in Berlin and the European Concert would have indeed been broken up at the moment when it was most needed. We already gave our opinion in the last midday paper on the statesmanlike value which one may attribute to the stance of Herr de Freycinet.³²

What is noteworthy here is not so much Freycinet's Concert loyalty and, in what amounted to the same thing, his rejection of unilateral violations of Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty, nor the French parliament's, and ergo the French state's, embrace of it, about which more will be said later, but the *WAZ*'s endorsement and approbation of this Concert loyalty and rejection of unilateralism.

Nor did the *WAZ* exhibit its own Concert loyalty and its presumption of Concert jurisdictional supremacy in the Egyptian Crisis only with its endorsement of Freycinet and his arguments in the French parliament, as demonstrated in a 29 June 1882 article in which the paper reported that

Despite the determined opposition of the Porte to the conference [of all Christian great powers, i.e., all non-Ottoman Concert member states], one does not give up hope that this conference will succeed in maintaining harmony between the cabinets, and that finally the Porte, in order not to end up in a completely isolated position, will be moved to take this harmony into consideration. The way for communication with the Porte is still open to the ambassadors, if not in the name of the conference, then in their capacity as ambassadors, and they will certainly enter into [this communication] in the spirit of striving to preserve the European Concert for as long as possible and thereby to prevent the Porte or any other Power from falling out of it.³³

The *WAZ*, which took Ottoman membership in the Concert for granted, thus argued that the Ottoman regime was not only entitled to be, but, out consideration for its own material interests and those of all other Concert member states, ought to be a full participant in a pan-regime conference commissioned to collectively, collaboratively, and non-coercively resolve the Crisis. The journal also asserted that, aside from resolving the crisis in this manner, the conference, or at

least its constituent representatives (i.e., the ambassadors), should also strive to ensure the comprehensive integrity of the Concert as a worthwhile end in itself.

On the other hand, rather than demonstrating its Concert loyalty and its presumption of Concert jurisdiction in the Egyptian Crisis through its acclaim of statements by, or the acts of, other Concert actors, the partially state-owned *Die Presse* did so through criticism of such statements or acts, reporting on 11 July 1882 that

According to the statements of Granville [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs], one might be led to assume that the English, after a temporary occupation of the [Alexandrian] forts for the purpose of disarming and destroying them, will withdraw to their ships and [thereby], in spite of this incident, try to preserve their position in the "European Concert." However, *The Daily News*, the leading paper among Gladstone's followers, asserts, as we reported in the morning paper, the necessity of occupying Cairo. This would seriously complicate the [Egyptian] Question.³⁴

So far as *Die Presse* was concerned, Britain's continued status as a member state of the Concert regime was mutually incompatible with its continued violation of Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty in the form of British occupation of Egyptian territory. Granville could either maintain that status and surrender the occupation or *vice versa*, but he could not do both.

Yet, *Die Presse*'s support for and assumptions about the Concert in this crisis were still more evident in a 19 September 1882 article that both praised and criticized the ruling regime of another Concert member state, namely Russia. And the factor determining whether the paper praised or criticized a particular Russian statement or act was the extent to which that act or statement seemed to demonstrate either loyalty to or disregard for the Concert, with *Die Presse* describing how

Russia has put the Greek-Turkish border dispute on the European agenda... The proposal set by the Petersburg Cabinet is to transfer the arbitration of the dispute between the Porte and Hellas to the Conference of Ambassadors in Constantinople; not, of course, that conference that was formed on the occasion of the Egyptian affair and which, as is well known, concerns itself exclusively with this [Egyptian] subject. One of those ambassador meetings is to take place which, after the Berlin Congress, have formally acquired the character of a permanent institution, and whose stated purpose is, on a case-by-case basis, to try to resolve any conflicts that arise from the implementation of the Berlin Treaty provisions...

Admittedly, even the opponents of Russia must acknowledge that for a year and a half she has formally held herself immaculately to the European Concert and hardly taken an official step in pending Oriental Questions of which she could be directly reproached. When the great border adjustment of Thessaly and Epirus took place, she settled the conflicts arising therefrom together with the other Powers, and since the Egyptian Question has become acute, it has also brought no material disruptions to the course of the conference proceedings, although it has taken on a special role in this process.

This role, which incidentally is very distinctive for Russian aspirations, manifests in St. Petersburg statesmen setting for themselves the place of high watchman for the sanctity of treaty law and the preservation of harmony in the European Concert. Russian diplomacy played the faithful Eckhardt; hardly a day has passed these last months in which the "Journal de St. Petersburg" did not raise a warning finger, now against both Western Powers [i.e., France and Britain], now against England [alone], that is, to effect pacification in Egypt but only such as would be in agreement with both Western Powers and with the most conscientious observation of the national treaties...

So far, the official and ostensible attitude of the Petersburg Cabinet [toward the Concert and Egypt] would be quite irreproachable, if one did not have to suppose the obvious ulterior motive that if England somehow wanted to bring the Egyptian Question to a conclusion by bringing it before Europe, Russia would be

determined to take compensation of its own into consideration and to obtain, especially in High Armenia [i.e., Ottoman eastern Anatolia], satisfaction for alleged curtailment of its interests in the Suez Canal and in Egypt... The object of this tactic is clear: the Porte should be brought into contradiction with the European Concert and in particular with the active power of England, which would result in a conflict, and thus a new disintegration of Ottoman territory and a further weakening of the Ottoman Empire. The frailer Turkey is, the sooner Russia can realize its plans for the Orient...

The official policy of the Petersburg cabinet does not, of course, coincide with the direction mentioned; but, so far as the latter is concerned, she attends to her interests, such that she is excessively on her guard, under the pretense of being passionate about harmony in the European Concert, and eagerly attentive to even the slightest dissonance lest it end in piercing discord. This role of a diplomatic vigilance committee also offers Russia the not inconsiderable advantage that it can step out of its reserve again and again with the most innocent expression while appealing to the memory of the Oriental peoples as the sympathetic Power, as now with the proposal for a conference for the Hellenes.³⁵

Several features of *Die Presse*'s analysis bear particular note. First, the paper asserted that it was 1878 and the Berlin Congress, and no earlier or later moment or event, that marked the juncture at which conferences, composed of all Berlin Treaty signatories (and only of Treaty signatories) and commissioned to resolve crises among their members through consultation rather than violence, emerged as a permanent institution in European inter-state relations. That is, *Die Presse* assumed that the Berlin Treaty marked the founding of a comprehensive, pan-continental, integrated international regime, of which the noted conferences were a permanent institutional expression and physical embodiment. Secondly, the journal alleged an ostensible Russian adherence both to the Concert regime and generally praised Russia's inter-state relations on this basis. In particular, the paper cited what it saw as Russia's commitment to the conferences, and their principle of comprehensive, non-coercive consultation, as being especially laudable.

On the other hand, the journal also castigated Russia, and based its denunciations on what it concluded were St. Petersburg's secret machinations to undermine the Concert regime and to destabilize, and to violate the state prerogatives of, the regime's Ottoman member state. Whether this latter criticism was accurate or justified need not detain us. Rather, what is of note is that the paper responded to such perceived Concert disloyalty with neither grudging admiration, tacit approval, nor indifference, but with active censure. And this was all the more accentuated when contrasted with what the paper itself praised, namely energetic support of the Concert regime.

Nor was such Concert loyalty among the Habsburg press limited to liberal-orientated, cosmopolitan, and trans-imperially circulated journals published in Austria-Hungary's Cisleithanian/Austrian capital of Vienna. Given the constraints of space, two provincial papers will have to suffice to demonstrate this point. One, the *Prager Abendblatt*, which spoke to and for the predominately bourgeois and increasingly *völkisch* German-speaking minority in Bohemia reported on 20 May 1882 that

The telegraphically announced circular of the Porte, which declares any foreign intervention in Egypt to be incompatible with the Sultan's rights and instructs his ambassadors to work towards the removal of any naval expedition, has already reached its intended recipients. Yet, in practice this circular has already been rendered obsolete by the fact that English and French ships have presently been dispatched to Egyptian waters. Nevertheless, it must not be overlooked that voices are also being raised from St. Petersburg and Rome that bear witness to the emergence of both Russian and Italian reservations about the competence of the Western Powers [to bilaterally resolve this crisis on their own].

One may draw the conclusion that, although it has been recognized that the Western Powers [i.e., France and Britain] have special interests to represent in Egypt, this could not be construed as being tantamount to granting them the authority to simply disregard the Porte's right to intervene [on its own] or to proceed in such a manner as would amount to excluding the Porte from this right. In any case, the steps taken by the Western Powers have made it necessary to discuss questions of a fundamental nature, and in the interest of both settling the Egyptian Question and preserving peace, one can only wish that in this discussion the parties thereto may succeed in maintaining the European Concert in that unanimity that must be considered as the indispensable condition for peaceful solutions to pending issues in general.³⁶

In raising 'concerns' about the 'competence' [*Kompetenzbedenken*] of France and Britain to intervene in Ottoman Egypt, the *Prager Abendblatt* surely did not mean to suggest that they lacked the collective material capacity to do so. Rather, both the journal and, it seems, key Russian and Italian decision makers agreed that in acting outside and interpedently of the Concert, and solely on the authority of their factional, bilateral, *ad hoc* coalition, France and Britain lacked the legitimate authority to undertake such an intervention, a legitimacy that could only be bestowed by a comprehensive mandate from the Concert regime. And, on a similar note, they were in equal agreement that the Ottoman regime's authority took precedence, both in theory and in actual practice, over all other actors on its Egyptian territory.

Given these observations, i.e., that some Concert member states contemplated violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another outside of and perhaps even against the wishes of the Concert, the paper argued that the Crisis had raised 'questions of a fundamental nature' [*Fragen prinzipieller Natur*] about European inter-state relations. That is, it raised questions about the degree of influence, or even existence, of a Concert regime in those relations. Yet, so far as the *Prager Abendblatt* was concerned, the best means of resolving this Crisis, as in all crises in European inter-state relations, was according to the Concert regime, and by means of the Concert principle of comprehensive, collaborative, non-violent, and non-coercive consultation among all its member states.

Nor did the crisis's actual events do much to alter the *Prager Abendblatt's* views on inter-state relations, chief among which was its commitment to the Concert, which it again articulated in a 27 July 1882 article, notably after the British fleet had bombarded Alexandria and British marines had occupied the ruined city, with the declaring that

Even if today the "Times" blusters and proclaims England's future protectorate over Egypt, such doings are not so bad as they appear; England still has a long way to go to complete the occupation of Egypt, and she will not overlook the fact that she will still have to reckon with Europe even after such occupation has been fully realized... The Powers that want to preserve the peace place great hopes in the Porte's latest position. For, from the moment wherein action can again be taken in Egypt with the consent of the Sultan and with the cooperation of the Porte, the European Concert is at the same time reestablished and we are again dealing with the Egyptian Question as a European one.

And from that same moment forward fears concerning the isolated action of England, and about the further conflicts to which this might lead, are also simultaneously diminished. Add to this that when the Sultan joins Khedive [Tewfik] in declaring Urabi Bey a rebel – and, by returning the anti-Urabist Circassian officers to Alexandria, the Sultan has shown that he will do this [i.e., declare Urabi a rebel] – [Urabi] will no longer be able to wave his flag in the name of the caliph, and so the danger of the fighting in Egypt taking on a religious character would at the same time also seem to diminish. So, one has every reason to regard the situation as calmer for the time being.³⁷

Several of the *Prager Abendblatt's* assumptions and arguments in this article bear emphasis. First, the paper drew a material distinction between a *de facto* and ongoing British

occupation of a still *de jure* Ottoman-ruled Egypt on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the British state's establishing a protectorate over the territory. While the former was, in the paper's view, bad, the latter was a cause for much greater concern. Moreover, the journal assumed that if Britain was able to occupy Egypt that fact would not abrogate 'Europe's,' i.e., the Concert of Europe's, legitimate oversight over that occupation.

Secondly, the *Prager Abendblatt* acknowledged that a unilateral British intervention in Egypt was permissible according to the Concert's principles. But such would only be legitimate were the Ottoman regime to grant permission for, and cooperation with, that intervention and were that intervention to aim at a restoration of the Porte's authority in Egypt. That is, such an intervention would be legitimate were British intervention to target not Ottoman authority but, in cooperation with Ottoman authority, only the indigenous Urabist 'insurrectionists.' Absent such Ottoman permission, invitation, and cooperation, any unilateral British intervention in Egypt was in the paper's view outside of, and was a violation of, the Concert regime, that is, was illegitimate. Moreover, by risking Europe's sliding into an international state of nature, such an illegitimate intervention would also be a serious threat to pan-European peace in general.

Like the *Prager Abendblatt* the similarly provincial (*Linzer Tages-Post*, primarily circulated throughout the Cisleithanian/Austrian province of Upper Austria, expressed an equally firm commitment to the Concert regime, and an even more vociferous denunciation of what it saw as a British violation thereof, proclaiming on 15 July 1882 that

The statesmen of the Egyptian national party will not be the only ones somewhat dismayed by England's action in Alexandria. Even the friends of that doctrine, reminiscent of the craft of thieves and robbers, that every European Great Power has the universal right, so far as their resources permit, to render so-called "barbarians" into their vassals and to take from them land and property solely by virtue of the principle of might as right; even the friends of this doctrine will concede that in the Egyptian affair England's right to action – and above all to an isolated action – is in no way recognized... The Sultan is the sovereign of Egypt, and he has not yet spoken. Europe keeps him under a species of guardianship, and Europe has not yet found any reason to take extreme steps – but England resorts to violent action, which is a mockery of all international conventions, a mockery of the simplest laws of justice, and of any notion of possession and property...

With the same right with which England shells Alexandria today, Germany could shell Copenhagen tomorrow, and Austria-Hungary Belgrade. There is absolutely no reason why the United States of North America should not likewise introduce a new order of affairs in Ireland at the first opportunity that suits her, and Russia, feeling offended by Romania, could with equal rights let her soldiers take a stroll to Bucharest.

The example set by England can, under all circumstances, lead only to a series of the most fatal consequences. The romantics of European accords and European mandates will well learn from England's example that nothing but the accomplished fact commands respect in the eyes of the European Powers, and that this applies in all circumstances. Even Russia would never have dared to undertake a military action so completely unjustifiable, so without any semblance of legitimacy, as that which England has embarked upon, and England, which at the same time knows how to use the European Concert so well for its own profit, also knows how to get rid of European [i.e., the Concert's] constraints with the same verve for its own profit.³⁸

Meanwhile on 9 August 1882 the paper concluded that

It was a great error that European diplomacy accepted without a word the military outrage in Alexandria. For, since the British lion tasted the cheap blood of weak prey, its audacity has known no bounds. Ever since England laid a great and prosperous commercial city to ashes and rubble and handed over many

hundreds of Europeans to the frenzied fury of unfettered popular passion [in the 11 June riots], it has, as has often been the case before, also offhandedly thrown the statutes of international law to the scrap heap; in this case in particular it has learned anew how splendidly one can unite a politics of the high hand with pious insertion into the European Concert, how one can at the same time give full scope to one's predatory desires and take part in the academic discussions of the conference with a formally straight face, while overlooking that it is not customary among civilized peoples to attack the provinces of a peaceful state without a declaration of war...

The Egyptian affair certainly affords the European peoples an opportunity to become well acquainted with English customs and manners... British ironclads stand menacingly between the rightful sovereign [i.e., the Ottoman regime] and its province [i.e., Egypt], and the English newspapers announce this jubilantly... as England outwits the Concert of Europe again and again.³⁹

The *Tages-Post* was categorical that Britain's intervention in Ottoman Egypt was illegitimate, perhaps downright criminal. First, it was undertaken unilaterally, without appeal to any supra-state authority or law, and grounded on the only principle of an international state of nature, namely that of might as right. Moreover, Britain had not undertaken this extra-legal intervention out of necessity, that is, due to the absence of a supra-state institution to which it could have appealed. Rather, its intervention had been indifferent to, indeed disdainful of, just such an institution (i.e., the Concert) that not only existed but to which Britain was at every liberty to petition, and which could have, and in time might have, but had simply not yet, authorized such "extreme steps" [*äußersten Schritte*]. Second, Britain's intervention violated the sovereignty of Egypt's ruling regime, namely the Ottoman regime, a regime whose security was, like that of all the Concert's member states, collectively guaranteed.

The *Tages-Post* also predicted that the example Britain set in Egypt could lead to "the most fatal consequences" [*verhängnißvollsten Konsequenzen*], that is, it might undermine, and could even lead to the abrogation of, the Concert regime itself. And, were this to happen, the principles that underlay the British intervention in Ottoman Egypt, namely might as right, legitimacy by *fait accompli*, and the absolute supremacy of *raison d'état* under the conditions of atomized and lawless inter-state relations, i.e., an international state of nature, could not long be contained to the Concert's recently cashiered Ottoman member state alone. Rather, such principles would in short order intrude into and proliferate across the entire European state system, leading, inevitably, to general war. And such an assessment was both laden, given the events of 1908-1914, with dramatic irony and prescient bordering on clairvoyant.

Nor were Habsburg journals alone among the press of Concert member states during the Egyptian Crisis in assuming the existence and jurisdiction of, and expressing a commitment to, the Concert, as demonstrated by extra-Austro-Hungarian newspapers. And, although it was far from unique, the press of Austria-Hungary's German ally was especially notable in this regard, which two articles, given the constraints of space, must suffice to illustrate, with *Die Presse* highlighting in a 24 May 1882 article how

The Berlin newspapers have, in conjunction with the [German] Imperial Chancellery, expressed themselves with particular reserve concerning the Egyptian Question. Today, however, there is a more detailed and noteworthy discussion of the same in the "*Berliner Pol. Nachrichten*." The noted correspondence reports:

The settlement of oriental turmoil by means of international treaties has rendered services too numerous and too beneficial to the preservation and strengthening of world peace as to make it appear desirable to the widely recognized interests of the general public to break up the established system in this crisis instigated by Urabi Pasha and his comrades, and all the less so when one realizes how doubtful appears the result of the Western Powers' [i.e., the Anglo-French] naval demonstration. The latter was and still is one of those

pis allers [last resorts] to which one accommodates oneself only under certain conditions and with particular reservations.

The precedence given to the Western Powers' [i.e., Anglo-French] interests must of necessity be transferred to the European Concert precisely at that moment when the former appears to be indulging in exclusive tendencies. One may well assume that such or similar considerations may not have been far from the thoughts of those who inspired the Turkish circular when the Turks decided to register their claims from the Egyptian liquidation process with the Areopagus of Powers [i.e., the Concert of Europe]. Once this is done [i.e., one 'Turkey' has so registered its claims], a consideration [of the 'Turkish' claims] is merely a duty of justice and equity [by all the members of the Concert]. In Berlin and Vienna, at least, there is absolutely no reason why Turkey's undeniable interests on the Nile should be condemned in advance to the role of Cinderella.⁴⁰

Meanwhile the (*Neuigkeits*) *Welt Blatt* related on 16 September 1882 how

[Britain's proposal to determine the future of Egypt by unilateral diktat decreed both to the Ottoman Empire and to all other Concert member states] is already being met with protests raised from all sides, for the time being in the journals. An official Berlin organ recalls that at the time when the Russians fought and conquered alone and dictated the Peace of San Stefano England was of a very different opinion. Perhaps England will now have the same experience as Russia did in 1876, namely, that the European Concert allows its members to play a solo part only to a certain extent.

Another Berlin organ writes in the same spirit: "it cannot be expected that the Powers will make the concession to England today that they withheld from the Russian Empire only a few years ago. Otherwise, the Powers would no longer consider themselves bound by the European Concert and would pursue oriental politics entirely on their own initiative, which, in view of the many Questions to be solved on the Balkan Peninsula and in Asia Minor, would threaten the peace of Europe at every moment."

The French journals, with few exceptions, outdo each other in expressions of displeasure with England and sharply rebuke the Paris government for so swiftly congratulating Queen Victoria on the victory of her arms; likewise, the Italian press gives open expression of its ill humor towards England. Everywhere it is declared, in more or less sharp words, that the English should not be allowed to have *carte blanche* in Egypt.⁴¹

And the Russian press was as emphatic as that of Russia's then-Austro-Hungarian and German allies in its belief in and commitments to the Concert, as the *Grazer Volksblatt* noted in an 8 September 1882 article in which it reported that

Since the "European Concert" has been pretty much put on hold by the adjournment of the [Concert] conference [of ambassadors in Istanbul/Constantinople], it is left to the officials of the individual countries to throw the Egyptian Question to one another as the common bone of this European Concert... [The Russians have since been reserved on this issue], it was only the English who, through the "*Times*," repeatedly banged on the Russian bush to find out what kind of birds were hatched there.

The "*Times*," as is well known, thought that Russia was lying in wait and was scheming a policy of her own with regard to Egypt. The reply from Russian officials was rather cold. Now, however, the [Russian newspaper] "*Journal de St. Petersburg*" stonily remarks both to the [British] "*Globe*," which preaches the irrelevance of treaties, and to the "*Times*," which perceived revenge for the Berlin Congress in Russia's stance in the Egyptian Question, that in 1878 Russia paid respect to treaties and the authority of the European Concert of Powers. [The *Journal de St. Petersburg* noted that] the English cabinet had also promised to submit the settlement of Egypt's fate to the European Concert [and that it] confidently awaits the fulfillment of this promise. To proclaim treaties as worthless scrawl is to proclaim violence as the *ultima ratio* [last resort] in international relations. Civilization and humanity would gain nothing from this.⁴²

The *Journal de St. Petersburg* argued that at the Berlin Congress the Romanov regime had presumed itself to be operating neither under the condition of an international state of nature nor in a balance of power system. Thus, Russia had submitted neither to England, nor to any bi- or multi-lateral coalition aligned against it, and the sheer threat of violence that would have been the sole basis of covenants constituted under such conditions or in such a system. Instead, in 1878 Russia had been unequivocal in its commitment both to the rule of treaties, that is, to the rule of inter-state law, and, more particularly, to the supremacy of an international regime, namely the Concert of Europe. And, the paper asserted, Russia had remained faithful to that Concert in its inter-state relations ever since.

At the same time, the *Journal de St. Petersburg* accused the British press of advocating to undermine, and possibly even to abrogate, the Concert regime and even the principle of inter-state law itself. That is, of advocating to plunge Europe back into either a balance of power system or an international state of nature, which in either case would restore power, either its balance or its preponderance, and resort to violence as the final, and possibly even the sole, legitimate bases of all inter-state relations. Yet the journal also noted that, the British press's lobbying to disregard, undermine, or abrogate the Concert notwithstanding, the Gladstone government had committed itself to submitting its Egyptian actions, and the Egyptian Question generally, to the oversight and arbitration of the Concert regime. And, in the name of that international regime, the *Journal de St. Petersburg* affirmed its resolute and nonnegotiable expectation that the British state would in the end do so.

The Decision Makers

A survey of the Austro-Hungarian press reveals that such assumptions about the Concert regime were not confined to journalists. Rather, key foreign policy makers, both in Austria-Hungary and in other Concert member states, publicly expressed similar beliefs about and loyalties to the international regime, as observed in Habsburg newspaper articles that directly quoted, paraphrased, reported on, and analyzed such actors. One case is a 10 June 1882 article in the *Prager Abendblatt*, which, in contrast to the *NFP* reporting on the Habsburg regime's Bosnia-driven machinations noted above, described how

On the Egyptian Question, the Vienna Cabinet seems to have maintained its reserved, wait-and-see attitude and to place the greatest importance on ensuring that the European Concert is not disturbed. For this reason, the proposal for a [pan-Concert] conference was approved [by Vienna]. One would not err in assuming that it would also be in the interests of the Porte to agree to the same, since the sovereignty rights of the Sultan would be fully safeguarded and upheld therein. In fact, should [Ibrahim] Dervish Pasha's mission [to lead an Ottoman intervention in Egypt] fail, the Conference would give these [Ottoman sovereign] rights no less emphasis than the general interests of Europe or the special interests of the Western Powers [i.e., France and Britain]. On the other hand, should the Turkish mission to Egypt prove successful, then the Sultan's sovereignty over Egypt would only receive a stronger affirmation from such a conference. Therefore, it is only to be regretted that the Porte has rejected the suggestion [for a pan-Concert conference]. But the Eastern Powers [i.e., those of the Three Emperors' Alliance, namely Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia] would not agree to a conference without Turkey's participation, if only because such a conference would obviously be directed against the Porte.⁴³

So far as the *Prager Abendblatt* can be believed, the principal object of the "Vienna Cabinet" [*Wiener Kabinet*] throughout the Egyptian Crisis was to preserve the integrity both of the Concert regime and, in what amounted to the same thing, that of the Ottoman Empire, a goal

which in this Cabinet's view could best be realized by means of a comprehensive, pan-regime conference. True, the Porte rejected any participation in, and even the legitimacy of, such a conference for resolving the Egyptian Crisis, most likely on the completely justified assumption that even a simple inter-state discussion of one of its territories was an attack on its sovereignty. It was unimaginable, for example, that the Gladstone government would ever countenance even the suggestion that the Irish Question was an issue under the jurisdiction of, a supra-state, or indeed any non-British, institution, or that this government would ever agree to participate in a pan-Concert conference.

Yet, whatever the Porte's disposition, for its part the Vienna Cabinet assumed that the Concert, which would be physically embodied in the proposed conference, was predicated on guaranteeing the integrity of its Ottoman member state, as it did for all its member states. Indeed, the "Eastern Powers" [*Ostmächte*], to which Austria-Hungary belonged, refused to participate in any Concert conference from which its Ottoman member state was absent. And it would abstain on the assumption that any *sans*-Ottoman conference would be predicated on eroding Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity and expelling the Ottoman Empire from the Concert, which the Vienna Cabinet repudiated in principle.

Nor were the Vienna Cabinet's commitments to the Concert, the conference, Ottoman participation therein, and, hence, to preserving Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity merely ephemeral or academic interests, as demonstrated in a 1 July 1882 *Prager Abendblatt* article in which the paper reported that

After the situation had, over the last few days, quite acutely come to a head, on the one hand due to English armaments and, on the other hand, due to the Porte's resistance to taking part in the conference, to which was added still more alarming news from Egypt, a somewhat calmer mood seems to be taking hold today. This reversal, which for the time being is only hinted at, should primarily be attributed to Turkey's somewhat more conciliatory disposition toward the conference, whilst, on the other hand, London bankers' dispatches are known to report of reassuring statements by [then British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire] Lord Dufferin in yesterday's conference session, especially in regard to the Sultan's sovereignty rights.

Perhaps this mutual concession will finally lead the Porte to get in touch with the conference; for the moment, however, no verifiable news yet exists that would confirm such yielding. But should a confirmation of such a reality arrive within the next twenty-four hours – as is often assumed – one would not err were they to attribute Turkey's reproachment with the European Concert partly to the influence of Austria and Germany, whose principal concern, above all others, is to eliminate, so far as possible, any cause for conflict.⁴⁴

According to the *Prager Abendblatt*, such was the Habsburg regime's commitment to the Concert that it worked just as actively not only to constrain the British perpetrator but coax the Ottoman victim in the Crisis to resolve that Crisis by and through the Concert and its principle of pan-regime, comprehensive consultation.

Meanwhile *Die Presse* recognized, in a 22 November 1882 article, a German commitment to a Concert regime founded at, and defined by, the Berlin Congress, noting that

Incidentally, German policy follows such transparent paths in the Orient and so completely avoids any semblance of a separate understanding, be it with the Turks or be it with one of the other Powers, that it cannot come as a surprise when its main points finally become known... In the Egyptian Question in particular, German policy has finally emerged clearly and with unambiguous force, even for the Turks. At present the Sultan sees that Germany really pursues only one policy, namely that of the Berlin Congress. At

the latter Germany had spoken out in favor of preserving the Turkish Empire and for the European Concert, and even now she is pursuing this double program.⁴⁵

Recalling that the Berlin Congress, and thus any international regime founded by it, addressed Egypt only very indirectly, *Die Presse*'s assessment that the Wilhelmine regime also presumed the Concert's jurisdiction in Ottoman Egypt, if accurate, was significant for both Congress and Concert. That is, such a presumption could only be predicated on the assumption that the Berlin Treaty was more than the sum of its individual parts and that the Congress founded a comprehensive, pan-continental, integrated, and collectively guaranteed international regime among all of its signatory states. *Die Presse* also left no doubt about a Wilhelmine presumption that this international regime, founded at and defined by the Congress, was predicated on collectively preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its member states, including and especially that of its full Ottoman member state.

Meanwhile the *NFP* was more specific when on 27 June 1882 it reported that If Berliners employ the catchphrase that the conference can at the same time decide nothing without but also nothing against Turkey, this indicates the direction of German policy clearly enough. Bismarck agreed to the conference because, on the one hand, he wanted to support the cabinet of [French prime minister] Freycinet and, on the other hand, he wanted to replace the Western Power alliance [i.e., Anglo-French *ad hoc* coalition] with the European Concert [*vis-à-vis* the Egyptian intervention], and [in agreeing to the conference] he [i.e., Bismarck] in no way intended to abet the preponderance of English and French [influence] over Egypt.⁴⁶

That is, Bismarck's policy, and hence that of the German Empire, during the Egyptian Crisis was one of commitment to the Concert's supremacy in European inter-state relations, particularly over any factional, *ad hoc* coalition of two or several of the international regime's members arrayed against another. And, in what amount to the same thing, Bismarck was equally committed both to the participation of its Ottoman member state in resolving the Crisis, by means of comprehensive, pan-regime consultation, and to the preservation, at least formally, of that member state's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, for reasons that will be made clear shortly, Bismarck's other policy, namely that of supporting the Freycinet cabinet, was also a strong expression of support for the Concert regime in European inter-state relations.

Such assumptions about the Concert also prevailed, according to the Habsburg press, in the ruling regimes of both allies that Austria-Hungary and Germany mutually shared in their two overlapping alliance blocs. That is, they prevailed in the Romanov regime (then allied to both Germany and Austria Hungary in "Three Emperors' Alliance," 1881-1887), as *Das Vaterland* noted in a 3 August 1882 article in which it reported that

The communication of the Anglo-French naval demonstration had been received by Russia with the remark that they did not want to oppose, but also never encouraged isolated action. This is still the position of the Russian cabinet today, whose policy, in union with the [other Concert] Powers, is aimed at enabling the English cabinet to reintegrate itself into the European Concert and, on the basis of the conference resolutions, to join its [own British] action with the action of the Porte.⁴⁷

And similar assumptions and commitments abounded in Italy (then allied to both Germany and Austria-Hungary in the "Triple Alliance," 1881-1914, notably founded during the Crisis), as was evident in an interpellation in the Italian Parliament, widely reported in the Habsburg press, in which

[then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Pasquale Stanislao] Mancini replied that the special difficulty and uncertainty of the Egyptian crisis, as well as considerations of propriety towards the other cabinets with whom Italy maintains a lively exchange of views, impose on him [i.e., Mancini] an absolute reserve. He [i.e., Mancini] could therefore not accept these inquiries and also not determine the moment when they could be discussed. However, he assured the Chamber that he devotes his full vigilance upon the matter; the government considered itself bound to the European Concert and would not fail to take such measures as demanded for the security of the Italian nationals and the protection of Italy's interests.⁴⁸

Such Concert solidarity across both permanent alliance blocs provided a vivid demonstration that factional supra-state institutions could serve as much to supplement and support a comprehensive international regime, as the Three Emperors' and Tripple Alliances did for the Concert in this Crisis, as they could to undermine and threaten it, as did the Anglo-French *ad hoc* coalition.

Yet in no other Concert member state did actors' assumptions about and commitments to the Concert play a more decisive role in shaping that state's foreign policy, and indeed its domestic politics, during the Crisis than in the French Third Republic. In fact, the French parliament, and indeed the Republican Union Party itself, with which both Gambetta and Freycinet identified at the time of the Crisis, were divided in their stance toward the Concert regime. And a 20 July 1882 account, published by *Die Presse*, of a debate between the two statesmen provides an effective illustration of their contrasting positions, describing how

Yesterday in the French Chamber of Deputies, during the discussion of the armaments credit, the great rhetorical duel between Freycinet and Gambetta took place, which, considering its possible consequences not only for internal [French] developments, but also for the shaping of things in the Orient abroad, was awaited with no less excitement [here in Austria-Hungary] than in France. The whole world knew that the two politicians fought over two contradictory principles of French foreign policy, that Mr. Gambetta advocated France's withdrawal from the European Concert and an uncompromising initiative in favor of its [i.e., France's own unilateral] interests, while Herr von Freycinet concentrated all his efforts on keeping France in the European Concert and protecting French claims within the framework of European politics... The outcome of the fight was hardly unexpected... and in view of this fact it could no longer be a matter of a decisive vote, but only of two speeches expounding about what motivated their respective points of view – a theoretical debate. At least this one turned out to be interesting enough to deserve some illumination.

The [joint Anglo-French, or if need be unilateral French] intervention [in Ottoman Egypt], which the ex-dictator [i.e., Gambetta] advocated by himself and on his own initiative, only seemed to justify Herr von Freycinet after the terrible events in Alexandria and when formal violence in Egypt vanished from the scene. And at this moment [i.e., in the aftermath of the Alexandria bombardment, Freycinet] came to an understanding with England for the protection of their mutual interests in both the Canal and the Nile; but [Freycinet] also notified Europe that no action would be taken without her [i.e., Europe's] consent... And this will be the policy that France must pursue for a long time to come if it does not want to founder on dangerous cliffs in the hunt for a Fata Morgana [i.e., mirage] such as Gambetta allowed [French] chauvinists to see in the mirror yesterday. If the Chamber is happy to listen to fantasies and opts for realpolitik [i.e., opts for a joint Anglo-French or unilateral French intervention in Egypt], then it is only acting in accordance with the mood of the nation.⁴⁹

Two of *Die Presse's* assumptions bear particular note. First, that Freycinet's commitment to the principle of international regime was a policy distinct from, and possibly antithetical to, that of "realpolitik," i.e., the strictly materialist *raison d'etat* policy of an international state of nature. Secondly, that Freycinet's policy of Concert-loyalty was, in *Die Presse's* view, at variance "with the mood of the nation" [*mit der Stimmung der Nation*], i.e., at variance with French public opinion. But an observer of the Habsburg press need not have relied only on *Die Presse's* interpretation of the assumptions and arguments of the two French statesmen. Rather, a

subscriber could engage with their words directly, such as in a 13 July 1882 *Die Presse* article that described how

The speech that Mr. Gambetta gave before the election of the committee to examine the armament credits is now available in full. “The committee,” he said, “must finally give expression to the will prevailing in the Chamber [of Deputies] with regard to the Egyptian Question. So far, whenever this question has been touched upon, he [i.e., Gambetta] has refrained from speaking for personal reasons; but he could only be grateful to the President of the Councils [i.e., Freycinet] for now giving the signal for a great debate. It is idle to revisit the past, since recriminations lead nowhere; but there is no doubt that with a little more energy things could have gone better. He was an opponent of the Constantinople Conference [i.e., the Concert conference composed of its respective ambassadors], just as he had been an opponent of the Berlin Congress, for the simple reason that [then, as now,] Europe no longer existed.” Gambetta went on “... The country must finally see clearly. Its material and economic interests are most immediately concerned in the Mediterranean basin. If France retires from there, it [i.e., France] will have no shortage of happy heirs [to that basin].” At the end Gambetta repeated that an hour of strength would have sufficed to settle the Egyptian Question, and to strengthen France’s influence on her future ventures.⁵⁰

Gambetta thus disavowed broadly comprehensive, collaborative consultation among European states as a means of resolving either the Egyptian Crisis or disputes among such states in general. What is more, he rejected the very principle of a permanent international regime among European states. And he did so based on the assumption that ‘Europe,’ that is, Europe as a comprehensive, integrated entity united by the social contract of an international regime, did not then exist, had not existed in 1878, and perhaps had never existed nor could ever exist. Rather all crises could only be solved by a balance of power or disproportionate accumulation thereof. Indeed, crises were for France best solved either when it took no part whatsoever in them or when it exploited all opportunities in which it enjoyed access to disproportionate power to decisively, and if need be violently, resolve them in accordance with its most material interests, thus enlarging its own power base and hence its capacity for further unilateral expansion.

Yet, Gambetta’s time at the head of the French state was short-lived, even by the standards of the Third Republic’s infamously transient, revolving door premiership, lasting a mere 66 days and brought down by scurrilous rumors that he schemed to establish a tyranny. His foreign policy program of resolving the Egyptian Crisis by means of an extra- and even anti-Concert intervention undertaken bilaterally with the British Empire was therefore similarly fleeting. This is not to say that it was insignificant. It had contributed substantially to French participation in the joint Anglo-French note that so offended the Egyptian parliament and pushed Urabists further down the path toward revolution. And it contributed equally to setting in motion the combined Anglo-French fleet’s mission to Alexandria.

However, by 30 January 1882 Gambetta was out of power and Freycinet had taken the helm. And on 1 June, immediately before the Crisis’s most critical phase, the new President of the Council of Ministers made explicit the degree to which his own foreign policy program differed from that his predecessor during an address to the French Chamber of Deputies, widely covered and quoted in the Habsburg press, which reported how

Today’s session of the Chamber, in which Delafosse’s interpellation in relation to Egypt was discussed, began with lively agitation and took a stormy course. The tribunes of the meeting room were overcrowded, almost the entire [foreign] diplomacy was represented... After Delafosse, Prime Minister Freycinet took the floor amid general tension... the minister [i.e., Freycinet] said: “You ask, why the English alliance?... Mr. Delafosse has reproached us [i.e. the Freycinet government] for dispatching our ships [alongside those of Britain]; soon he would have reproached us for exceeding constitutional limits, as if it would not be the right of the government to dispatch ships as soon as its nationals were in danger... And would you [i.e.,

Delafosse] not have exclaimed yourself: how, when our nationals face imminent danger or are in actual danger, have you lost a minute? (Lively agreement)...

We [then] had to address the appeal [for further action] to Europe, because there are indeed special interests in Egypt that affect only us [i.e. France], but there is a question of a higher order for which we must not revive isolated action at all. If we recognize that Egypt is an integral part of Turkey, may we be fatuous and rash enough to decide this Question alone against the wishes of Europe? (Stormy applause). In that case we would have neglected all duties. Therefore, we appealed to the European Concert, which is solely competent [to legitimately authorize further action in Egypt itself], and not to Turkey alone... We said to ourselves that the hour had struck for the appeal to the European Concert so that the peaceful solution that we desire might be guaranteed. (Applause.) In order to rid ourselves of the European Concert, we must [first] be able to impose our resolutions on the [whole] world. Well, I don't think that France today has any desire to throw itself into such adventurous undertakings. (Loud applause and continuous uproar.)

In speaking thus, I agree with the whole Cabinet. Not a single one of my colleagues will fail to endorse my words, not one will sympathize with the politics of adventures into which some wish to plunge us... I repeat, I expressed this opinion on behalf of the entire Ministry, whose homogeneity some would like so much to destroy. We will never make ourselves servants to an adventurer's policy. (On the right: neither will we!) – Freycinet (continuing): Then you must give me a vote of confidence. A guarantee for a peaceful, intelligent, dignified policy is [one of] consultation with Europe, including Turkey. France has no isolated role to play. We shall never consent to isolated military action in Egypt. (Applause on the extreme left, tumult on the right and in the space of the Union Republicans; even in the center this statement causes some sensation). Among all means there is one which I foreclose; it is the military intervention of France alone in Egypt. (Applause and tumultuous noise)."

... At this Gambetta takes the floor in order to direct a violent attack against the government. "I assure you," he [i.e., Gambetta] said, "that I had no intention of entering into the debate... When I heard that one does not merely want to abandon the special position that tradition and [Ottoman] firmans grant to France; that one wanted to bring before the European Concert an interest that did not belong before it and could have [otherwise] been sustained with the least firmness [excised by France alone]... When I heard all this, I recalled the words of Berryer, who said of an analogous policy: "Don't talk like that! One does not speak so of France!" (Loud applause and prolonged uproar).

Freycinet replied: "I am astonished and deeply regret that Mr. Gambetta expected me to have an opinion only so that he could then protest against it... The real view of the government is, as Monsieur Gambetta knows only too well, that we reject only isolated intervention in Egypt. In taking part in the European Concert, the Government will act in conformity with the decisions of that Concert."⁵¹

Three key assumptions and arguments of Freycinet's address bear emphasis. First, he admitted that he embraced and continued Gambetta's policy of participation in the joint Anglo-French naval operation to Alexandria, but claimed that he did so for very different reasons than that of his predecessor. Rather he was sending the fleet with a strictly delimited mandate, namely, to provide security for French nationals in Egypt during a period of domestic social unrest.

Second, Freycinet argued that the Egyptian Crisis entailed "a question of a higher order" [*eine Frage höherer Ordnung*]. That is, he assumed as an indisputable fact of inter-state relations and law that Egypt was an "integral part of the [Ottoman state]" [*ein integrierender Teil der Türkei*]. And, based on this assumption, he asserted that in violating Egyptian territorial integrity and sovereignty France would be violating Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty, and that this would in turn entail France confronting the combined material opposition of "Europe" (i.e., of the Concert of Europe). Such an argument could only be predicated on the assumptions that the existence of a Concert international regime was a material fact in European inter-state relations, indeed one of the most compelling facts therein, that this regime's first principle was a

collective guarantee of all its member states' sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that the Ottoman Empire was a full member state of this regime.

Third, Freycinet assumed that the only authority that could legitimate France's undertaking action in Egypt was the Concert of Europe, an authorization that would, in part, have to be issued by the Ottoman regime itself. However, Freycinet was clear that the Ottoman regime could not by itself have authorized France to intervene on its own territory, given that Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty was, as for all its member states, the collective responsibility of all Concert members and not of the Ottoman regime alone.

More generally, Freycinet's address to the Chamber, the Habsburg press reportage on Freycinet detailed above, and much other Habsburg reporting demonstrated a fundamental element in the Egyptian Crisis. For most of the Crisis Freycinet was simultaneously France's prime minister and foreign minister, and was thus the most decisive actor in the French state's foreign policy making. He refused to authorize the French fleet's participation in the bombardment of Alexandria, withdrew that fleet from Egyptian waters, and renounced French participation in a bilateral Anglo-French intervention in Egypt itself. According to his own unambiguous public statements, the principal reason why he did and did not do these things was his tenacious commitment to the Concert regime.

Yet, although Freycinet's Concert-loyalty may have been enough to determine French adhesion to the international regime throughout the Crisis's most critical moments, Freycinet was far from alone in harboring such assumptions about and commitments to it. The then-minister of the interior and future prime minister René Goblet, for example, expressed similar views, such as in the same 13 July 1882 article of *Die Presse* in which Gambetta was quoted above, an article that also noted Goblet, in response to Gambetta, as

[indicating] that that the [Freycinet] cabinet's policy aimed at liberating France from her isolation and preserving her place in the European Concert. The conference [of ambassadors in Istanbul/Constantinople] had been convened for this purpose; but as long as this [conference] was conferring, the [Freycinet] government cannot say more about its intentions. France had not taken part in the bombardment of Alexandria, because it did not deem the English action justified; and because it did not want to break away from the European Concert.⁵²

Meanwhile, the then-member of the Chamber of Deputies and fiery critic of empire, and the later great French statesman and French imperialist (thus precisely following Gambetta's own evolution), Georges Clemenceau declared to the Chamber, as quoted in a 21 July 1882 *NFP* article, that

As regards the ultimate [Anglo-French] common interest, that of the Egyptian state-creditors, it has rightly been said that not a drop of French blood should be shed for it. Egypt has been systematically exploited by usurers. I can only praise Monsieur Freycinet for having stayed away from the bombardment of Alexandria and for remaining ever faithful to the European Concert. Under the present circumstances, we must not disregard the will of Europe; nativist patriotic slogans cannot change this necessity.⁵³

And such French Concert loyalties were of special significance in this Crisis, given that France, together with the United Kingdom, was one of the two principal agents in it. And, with this consideration in mind, we now turn our discussion to examining the degree to which assumptions about and commitments to the Concert regime shaped foreign policy in that other principal agent during the Crisis, and the manner in which it did so.

British Decision Makers

That the British press, and to a larger extent British parliamentarians, recognized the Concert regime as a significant factor in the crisis is evident from the fact that this press made 1,886 direct references to it, in 52 different journals, over the course of the crisis's 548 days. That is, the interested British public could on average encounter a direct discussion of the Concert's role in the Crisis about three and half times a day. Meanwhile during the period of most acute crisis discussion of the Concert was even more intensive, with papers directly referencing the regime 1,043 times in 106 days, or on average just under ten times a day.⁵⁴

And such depth and breadth of Concert discussion would be significant even had the British press largely or unanimously referenced the regime only to disparage it or deny its existence. For institutions about whose non-existence or insignificance there is broad consensus do not endure extensive public discussion or require frequent public denunciations. And such a point bears mentioning as throughout the Crisis British parliamentarians were sharply divided over whether the Gladstone government had, or ought to have, remained faithful to the Concert, or whether it had, or it ought to have, broken with, acted independently of, and even actively sought to undermine or abrogate the regime.

Yet, until the ill-considered joint Anglo-French note was presented to the Egyptian parliament on 10 January 1882, there was little discussion of the Concert in the British press as regarded Egypt or events therein. Rather, such discussion of the Concert as took place on the pages of British newspapers between August 1881 and January 1882 mainly consisted of competing claims to having played a principal role in founding the regime, and thus to political ownership of it. Given the constraints of space, just a few examples of such public pretensions to Concert authorship by British parliamentarians, all of which were widely reported in the British press, will serve to demonstrate the point.

One illustration was with Stafford Northcote, a former Secretary of State for India, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Leader of the House of Commons, a current Tory MP for Devonshire North, and a future Foreign Secretary, who on 3 September 1881, at a Conservative Party rally at Sheffield, argued that

The present [Gladstone] Government came in [to power, in 1880], not in the difficult position in which the late Ministry [i.e., the Disraeli Government, in which Northcote himself had been a senior minister] had been for two or three years [i.e., 1875-1878, during the Balkan uprisings and the Russo-Turkish War] when we [i.e., the Disraeli Government] knew not what might be the result of tremendous hostilities, and when we were obliged from day to day, and from hour to hour, to take care that the interests of the British Empire did not receive injury. (Cheers.) They [i.e., the Gladstone government] came in after peace had been made [i.e., at the Berlin Congress], after the concert of Europe, which they seem to imagine now that they first brought about (hear, hear), but which I think we [i.e., the Conservative Party in general, and the Disraeli Government in particular] had established some time before (loud cheers) – they came into power when the concert of Europe had produced the great settlement of the Berlin Treaty (cheers).⁵⁵

Northcote was by no means alone in making such claims to Tory authorship of the Concert. Richard Assheton Cross, a then-Conservative MP for South West Lancashire and a former (in a Disraeli government) and future (in a Salisbury government) Home Secretary, declared to a Tory rally in his county constituency that

He [i.e., Cross] was glad to find that they [i.e., the Conservatives of Lancashire] had shown such strong adherence to those principles which were dear to them all. They [i.e., the Conservative Party] were determined to maintain those principles, because they did not think the Government of this country [i.e., the

Gladstone government] was being carried on on proper lines. – (Applause.)... With regard to the great Eastern Question, which had interested the whole world for years, their opponents [i.e., the Liberal Party] had always abused them [i.e., the Conservative Party] for not having taken care to do what they could to preserve the concert of Europe. But they [i.e., the Liberal Party] always forgot and put behind the door that which was most important – that is was mainly by the action of the Conservatives that the concert of Europe took place and that the Treaty of Berlin was signed.⁵⁶

Meanwhile at a Tory rally at Woodstock on 19 January 1882, and thus in the immediate aftermath of the Gladstone government-orchestrated Anglo-French joint noted to the Egyptian parliament, a Lord Robert Bulwer-Lytton moved a motion that “this meeting... views with concern that in the present critical condition of foreign affairs her Majesty’s Government [i.e., the Gladstone government] have conspicuously abandoned the vital principle of the concert of Europe, and is further of the opinion that their [i.e., the Gladstone government’s] present policy... has been disastrous to the best interests of the people.”⁵⁷

And, while seconding this motion, Henry Drummond Wolff, then a Tory MP for Portsmouth about whom more will be said later, noted that “the policy of the present [i.e., Gladstone] Government had been one of reversal and spite, and what our American cousins would call ‘everlasting smash’ (laughter, and hear, hear)... with regard to foreign affairs, the concert of Europe, which had been secured by the Treaty of Berlin, had been entirely upset by the action of Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues.”⁵⁸

Two points of agreement among the Conservative Party elites noted above bear emphasis. First, Northcote argued that it was the Concert of Europe that had founded the Treaty of Berlin (and hence the Berlin Congress), while Cross and Wolff argued, and indeed this discussion itself argues, that it was in fact the other way around. Nevertheless, all agreed that the Berlin Congress and Treaty on the one hand, and Concert of Europe on the other, were fundamentally interrelated.

Second, both the Conservative and Liberal Party leadership claimed authorship of the Concert (a reality that by itself demonstrates the degree of the regime’s influence on British foreign policy making during the Crisis). What was less clear but what would increasingly become so was that both claims could to an extent be valid. That is, in these early days of the Second Concert regime’s supervision of European inter-state relations, there was as yet no clear consensus among key foreign policy makers about what the ‘Concert’ regime was or ought to be. The Concert could yet be many things to many actors. And, as we shall see, the ‘Concert’ paradigm conceived of by Gladstone and Britain’s Liberal Party diverged in many critical respects from the model of international regime that had both been founded by the Congress and which was embraced by most foreign policy makers among Europe’s great powers.

Thus, at the moment when the Egyptian Crisis broke onto the scene of European inter-state relations, Tory parliamentarians were busy loudly proclaiming that it had in fact been Britain’s (Tory) plenipotentiaries to the Berlin Congress (i.e., Disraeli and Salisbury) and the Conservative Party, and not, as the Liberals contended, Gladstone and the Liberal Party, that had played a special and leading role in founding the Concert. Given such public and emphatic avowals to ownership of the international regime, it is unsurprising that allegations of the Gladstone government’s having challenged the Concert formed one the principal bases upon which Tory parliamentarians criticized, in addresses that were almost always widely reported across the British press. Throughout the Crisis Tories of great renown, of middling fame and rank, and at the periphery of their Party joined in such criticisms.

One Tory of the latter class who was vehement and unrelenting in his condemnation of the Gladstone government on this basis was Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, Conservative MP for Eye,

who as early as 7 February 1882, in the immediate aftermath of the Anglo-French joint note to the Egyptian parliament, asked the Gladstone government

Whether the representatives of four Great Powers – Germany, Austria, France, and Russia – have addressed a communication to the Porte to the effect that the four Governments desired to maintain the *status quo* in Egypt in accordance with existing treaties, and with the firmans of the Sultan, and that any modifications of the *status quo* would require the assent of all the Great Powers, and of the Sultan; and whether, in view of such a communication, it is the intention of Her Majesty's [i.e., the Gladstone] Government to withdraw the joint Note of two, which they, in conjunction with France, addressed to the Khedive, without consulting the Sultan, and in breach of the "concert of Europe?"⁵⁹

And, less than ten days later, on 15 February, in an address to the House of Commons Ashmead-Bartlett declared that

The protest of the Porte has been publicly backed up by four Great Powers [i.e., Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia] who have formally stated that they will suffer no interference with the *status quo* in Egypt as regulated by Imperial firmans (the exact claim made by the Sultan in his protest), and that no alteration in the relations of the Porte to Egypt can be made save by the assent of all the Powers in conjunction with the Suzerain [i.e., the Ottoman regime]. It is a painful position for the British [i.e., Gladstone] Cabinet. The Anglo-French note is defied by the Porte and rejected by the other [Concert] Powers. This is an application of "the concert of Europe" to its author [i.e., Gladstone or, perhaps, Britain] with a vengeance. The engineer is most beautifully hoist on his own petard...

But, sir, the answer of the [Gladstone] Government to these criticisms will probably be, as the hon. gentleman [i.e., the Liberal Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Charles Dilke] has already tried to prove, that they [i.e., the Liberal Party] have only followed the precedent of their predecessors [i.e., the Conservative Disraeli government]. This is not the case. The joint control established by Lord Beaconsfield's [i.e., Disraeli's] Government in Egypt was not a political one, it was purely financial. It was most wise and most beneficial. You [i.e., the Gladstone government] have gone far beyond this, not only in kind, but in degree. Your note of January 10 was not only a duet of interference in the political affairs of Egypt, but it was done without consulting the Sultan, who is Sovereign of Egypt, and without referring even to the other Powers... I defy the hon. gentleman [i.e., Dilke] to show any instance of such a note as you have sent guaranteeing the Khedive his throne and threatening alike the Porte and the national and military parties of Egypt. Every step taken by Lord Salisbury [who had been Foreign Secretary in the Disraeli government] was taken with the full knowledge and assent of the Porte. Yours are taken under directly opposite conditions.⁶⁰

Meanwhile the Tory-oriented *Morning Post*, in its reporting on Ashmead-Bartlett's speech, concluded that

As regarded Egypt, by their [i.e., the Gladstone government's] unfortunate alliance with France, they had broken up the concert of Europe, had alienated the Porte, and had exposed themselves to a rebuff from the other Powers... Under existing circumstances the blind reliance of the [Gladstone] Government on France is a source of weakness rather than strength to this country. It makes against, rather than for, the preservation of that European concert which [Liberal] Ministers profess to have so much at heart... that the [Gladstone] Government should hope to preserve the European concert by such means shows how incapable they are of understanding what are the real bases upon which alone that concert can permanently rest.⁶¹

Even months later, on 13 July 1882, as British gunboats pounded Alexandria, Ashmead-Bartlett again harangued the Gladstone government by describing how

It [i.e., the Gladstone government's Egypt policy] began with a "joint" action, which proved its inability to accomplish anything. It irritated native feelings by its insufficiency, and looked on idly during the sanguinary massacre of the 11th [of June, i.e., the riots in Alexandria] and has now culminated in the still more sanguinary bombardment of Alexandria. Its [i.e., the Gladstone government's] end remains to be seen. So much for the hon. baronet [i.e., Sir Charles Dilke] and his "concert of Europe."⁶²

To be sure, Ashmead-Bartlett was no reliably loyal friend to any Concert regime. In fact, throughout the Crisis he made clear that he would have much preferred that Britain cleave closely to what he saw as its traditional relationship with the Ottoman Empire. That is, a purely bilateral relationship in which the two were *de jure* staunch and equal allies, with Britain always demonstrating fastidious respect for Ottoman state prerogatives, but in which the Ottoman empire was a *de facto* junior partner, even quasi-dependency, of Britain, with the former informally and privately acquiescing to any and all demands made by the latter. Nevertheless, Ashmead-Bartlett attacked the Gladstone government's foreign policy on what he saw as its own, and not his, terms.

That is, he was arguing that the Gladstone government professed commitment to an international regime predicated in the first place on a collective guarantee of all its member states' sovereignty and territorial integrity, and on the principle of crisis resolution by means of comprehensive consultation rather than violence. He contended that the Gladstone government's Egypt policy during the Crisis had violated the principles of this regime. As we have seen and shall continue to observe, while Gladstone professed an ill-defined commitment to a species of Concert regime, it was largely not the one Ashmead-Bartlett ascribed to him. Yet, so far as concerned the Concert model that Ashmead-Bartlett framed, and which he accredited to Gladstone, his criticisms rang true.

At the same time, another peripheral, but more Concert-loyal, Tory figure who joined in Ashmead-Bartlett's attacks on the Gladstone government was the Conservative MP for Haddingtonshire, Francis Charteris, then styled Lord Elcho, who on 26 July 1882 argued that

The House [of Commons], while ready to vote for whatever supplies might be necessary for the protection of the Khedive and the security of the Suez Canal, was not prepared... to enter upon a war for that purpose, except in conjunction with the forces of the Sultan... He [i.e., Lord Elcho] thought the situation was indeed a grave one, both with regard to our [i.e., Britain's] position in Europe and to the aspect of this question in Egypt itself. They [i.e., the House] had heard from the Prime Minister [i.e., Gladstone] that the object of his foreign policy had been to bring about the concert of Europe, and, failing that, to secure that if England acted alone she should act as the mandatory of Europe. The right hon. Gentleman [i.e., Gladstone] had failed in both objects, and now they [i.e., the government] were satisfied with having what they believed to be the "moral support" of Europe... Of course, he [i.e., Lord Elcho] must assume that victory in some form or another would crown our [i.e., British] efforts, but... the concert of Europe... would [then] come forward and expect to have a share in the arrangements [of conditions in Egypt].

The Prime Minister said his object was to save Egypt from anarchy and military crimes; but were we quite sure that the sympathies of the natives were not on the side of Arabi [Urabi]?... He [i.e., Lord Elcho] admitted that we [i.e., Britain] had the obligation of safety of the Khedive and the safety of the Suez Canal, and he [i.e., Lord Elcho] should be prepared to agree to any vote that might be necessary for those two purposes. But our responsibilities stopped there, and as regarded the restoration of order in Egypt, why should we do what was really the duty of the Khedive? He [i.e., Lord Elcho] should not, indeed, object to our undertaking the task if we could have by our side the forces of the Sultan, who was the legitimate head of the Mussulman power and religion. Without this he [i.e., Lord Elcho] was not prepared to enter upon the war, and therefore, he would move the following resolution: – "That this House [of Commons], while ready to vote whatever supplies may be necessary for the protection of the Khedive and the security of the Suez

Canal, is not prepared... to enter upon a war for the restoration of the authority of the Khedive in Egypt unless in conjunction with the forces of the Sultan.”

Mr. [Joseph] COWEN [the radical Liberal MP for Newcastle upon Tyne] seconded the resolution.⁶³

And the next day Henry de Worms, Conservative MP for Greenwich and later Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies,

[in reference] to the speech of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs [Sir Charles Dilke], remarked that [this speech] was distinguished rather by what it left unsaid than what it said. The hon. Baronet [i.e., Dilke] did not condescend to treat the House [of Commons] to an exposition of the Foreign Policy which had led the country to the present disastrous crisis...He [i.e., de Worms] complained that the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had given no explanation of the line of policy adopted by the [Gladstone] Government. What had that policy led to? The European Concert, if with regard to this particular question it had ever existed, did not now exist.⁶⁴

Such backbench Conservative MPs as Ashmead-Bartlett, Lord Elcho, and de Worms, representing the Tory rank and file, thus made clear that their principal complaint against British policy during the Crisis was that it undermined the Concert regime. Indeed, Lord Elcho recognized the practical authority of the Concert regime in the Crisis and, in what amounted to the same thing, the illegitimacy of violating Ottoman state sovereignty and territorial integrity in Egypt except with the authorization and cooperation of the Concert, the Porte, or, ideally, both.

Meanwhile the more celebrated Henry Drummond Wolff, then a noted Conservative firebrand, and later, from 1885 to 1887, both Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Ottoman Porte and High Commissioner to Egypt, was more persistent in his attacks. On 27 July 1882, for example, Wolff decried

That now, when we [i.e., Britain] were about to undertake hostilities of a serious character, the Concert of Europe had disappeared, and we were left without an ally. We were going to do what the Prime Minister [i.e., Gladstone] had more than once protested against in the case of Austria. Having quarreled with the Constitutional party in Egypt [i.e., the Urabists], we were going to maintain the Sovereign [i.e., the Khedive] against it.⁶⁵

And, on 14 November 1882, in the immediate aftermath of Urabi's downfall and as the Crisis drew to a close, Wolff interpellated the Gladstone government with just three concise and pointed questions, namely

Whether, inasmuch as no machinery existed for consulting the wishes of the people of Egypt as to their future Government, [British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire] Lord Dufferin would be instructed in concert with the Government of the Khedive to devise such machinery before the final arrangements were concluded; secondly, whether Lord Dufferin had been instructed to make provision in any arrangements for the settlement of Egypt, to which her Majesty's Government would be a party, for the establishment of institutions in which the Egyptian people should be represented, and giving to their representatives control over the legislation, administration, and expenditure of the country; thirdly, whether it was intended before any new arrangements are promulgated to submit them to the sanction of the Sultan and concert of Europe?⁶⁶

Given that the Gladstone government's answer to each question was an obvious and unequivocal 'no,' such an interpellation could only have been intended to embarrass and criticize that government on the basis of these negative responses. Moreover, as late as 18 February 1884 Wolff proclaimed that

He desired to point out a specimen of arguments on which the coalition Government between Gladstone and Bradlaugh [the latter being a Liberal Party member and frank atheist who Conservatives in general, and Wolff in particular, relentlessly vilified and with whom Wolff incessantly sought to link Gladstone in an effort to undermine him and his government] (hear, hear) had endeavored to base a justification of their proceedings. Mr. Gladstone had told them [i.e., the House of Commons] that the cause of their [i.e. the Gladstone government's] policy in Egypt was the adoption of the Dual Control established by Lord Salisbury. He [i.e., Wolff] was never much astonished at anything Mr. Gladstone might say... [but] if the right hon. gentleman [i.e., Gladstone] had examined the question of Dual Control he would have seen that, though it was instituted in the time of Lord Salisbury it was instituted as a result of the mandate of Europe, which was proclaimed in what was called the Commission of Liquidation, which decided to place in the hands of France and England the control of the finances of Egypt. Lord Salisbury, therefore, had done what Mr. Gladstone had not done, although he [i.e., Gladstone] was constantly advocating the concert of Europe, for he [i.e., Gladstone] had broken up the Dual Control in disregard for the mandate of Europe.⁶⁷

And shortly after this, on 26 March 1884, Wolff had a telling exchange with the Liberal MP for Calne, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, in which the latter asked the Conservative opposition

As to the European Concert, he [i.e., Fitzmaurice] should like to ask his hon. friends opposite [i.e., of the Conservative Party] how long it was since they became converts to the European Concert, which hitherto had been a favourite object of their ridicule?

(H. D. Wolff: What about the Treaty of Berlin?)

He [i.e., Fitzmaurice] did not know what the hon. gentleman [i.e., Wolff] meant. That was not a matter before the House.⁶⁸

Given the claims to authorship of the Concert that the Liberal Party ascribed to itself, it is unsurprising that Fitzmaurice would fail to comprehend a fundamental link between the Berlin Treaty and the Concert of Europe., all the more so as the former had been penned under the auspices of a Tory government. Yet it was clear to Conservatives such as Wolff, who after all ascribed authorship of the Concert to Disraeli, Salisbury, and the Conservative Party in general, that such a link existed. In other words, the Berlin Congress and Treaty had been the founding instruments of, and were the basis of, the Concert of Europe.

Meanwhile the more prominent Frederick Stanley, a former Secretary of State for War, a current Conservative MP for North Lancashire, and a future Secretary of State for the Colonies, President of the Board of Trade, and Governor General of Canada (and probably best known today as the founder of the National Hockey League trophy that bears his name) on 26 July 1882 also asked the House of Commons whether

the [Gladstone] Government [had been] sufficiently careful... to show that their enterprise [in Egypt] was in no way a crusade, and... recognized the rights of [Egypt's] Mahomedans as well as of [its] Christians? (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gentleman [i.e., Gladstone] cheered that [i.e., Stanley's] sentiment, and showed that that [i.e., Stanley's] consideration must have been present in the minds of the Government; but many on that [i.e., Conservative] side of the House hoped for more than that, and trusted that it was not only on the assurance given by the right hon. gentleman [i.e., Gladstone] last night, but on the strength of something more definite, that Turkey was to be told to regard the right hon. gentleman as, after all, her best friend.

It was true that previous Governments [including one, namely the Disraeli government, in which Stanley himself had had been a senior minister] had not found the same necessity for war [in Egypt], but it was to be remembered that the Government of the year 1879 [i.e., the Disraeli government] also had their

difficulties with the then ruler of Egypt [i.e., Khedive Isma'il] – difficulties which it was their duty to confront, and which involved a change in the rulership of the country [to the current Khedive, namely Khedive Tewfik]. But it was neither by their own unassisted efforts nor by calling the other Powers of Europe into concert and ignoring the Sultan that the deposition of Ismail Pasha was accomplished, and the appointment of his successor achieved.⁶⁹

And at a Tory rally at Chelsea on 18 April 1883, and thus after the Crisis's resolution, Stanley expounded his retrospective assessment of the sum result of Gladstone's Crisis policies by moving

That this meeting is of opinion that the general scope of the policy of Her Majesty's Government at home and abroad is detrimental to the best interests of England, and is deserving of condemnation." He [i.e., Stanley] acknowledged that [this] resolution was of a sweeping character and was a strong condemnation of the [Gladstone] Government; but the facts would bear out the indictment. Three years ago, when the late [i.e., Disraeli] Government left office, a great war which threatened the peace of Europe had been brought to a close, the concert of Europe had been obtained, and England's influence stood then in the councils of Europe as high as it had ever stood... [that] state of affairs was in great contrast to the present condition of things.⁷⁰

Stanley thus consistently adhered throughout the Crisis to five fundamental assumptions. First, the ministers of the Disraeli government had founded (or "obtained") the Concert regime during the late 1870's (i.e., at the Berlin Congress) and had remained loyal to that regime ever since. Second, the Ottoman Empire was unquestionably a member state of that Concert regime.

Third, any action (such as, say, removing Isma'il as Khedive and replacing him with Tewfik or intervening against the Urabist regime) undertaken by the Concert, or any mandate bestowed (e.g., "by calling the other Powers... into concert") to one of the Concert's member states to undertake an action, on what was the territory of a Concert member state (say, for example, Egypt), was neither legitimate nor practically prudent if that action "ignored" the sovereign prerogatives of that territory's ruler (e.g., the Ottoman Sultan). Still less legitimate would be for the ruling regime of one Concert member state to undertake such an action against the territory of another by "unassisted efforts" (i.e., unilaterally and without regard for, and outside of, the Concert).

Rather, only if the ruler of such a territory participated in authorizing such an action, a process that in Stanley's view could only be valid were it to involve all Concert member states, could that action be legitimate. Fourth, that the Gladstone government's actions in Egypt had broken with this third fundamental assumption (so assiduously maintained by its Disraeli predecessor) by pursuing a unilateral path without regard for, and even in active opposition to, the Concert regime. Finally, the Gladstone government actions in Egypt were worthy of "condemnation," both for their violating this third fundamental assumption and for what Stanley expected to be the consequent material costs they would inflict on Britain.

Meanwhile, the still more prominent Lord Randolph Churchill, currently a Conservative MP for Woodstock and a future Secretary of State for India, Leader of the House of Commons, and Chancellor of the Exchequer (and father of the much more renowned Winston), likewise joined in such criticism of the Gladstone government, arguing before a Tory rally at Edinburgh on 19 December 1883 that

The Prime Minister [i.e., Gladstone] has stated over and over again that we [i.e., Britain] went to Egypt with no selfish aim or object, but only in the interests of Europe and for the benefit of the Egyptian people. Certainly Mr. Gladstone has a curious way of promoting the interests of Europe and of benefiting the

people of Egypt. As the original inventor of the concert of Europe [read irony in this language], he [i.e., Gladstone] summoned Europe to Constantinople to deliberate upon Egyptian affairs; but no sooner had the Powers entered into conference than Mr. Gladstone seized upon Egypt with horse, foot, artillery, and dragoons, and the various Powers, feeling extremely foolish, abandoned their deliberations in disgust.

I do not think he will find it easy to collect them again. (Laughter and cheers). I do not think he will find it easy to appeal again to that concert of Europe to which, by so many tremendous pledges, he bound himself when he preached to you [i.e., the residents of Edinburgh] at Midlothian three years ago.... So much for the interests of Europe as promoted by Mr. Gladstone – so much for the attitude of the European concert, for which Mr. Gladstone took out his own special patent [again, read irony]. (Laughter.)

But now let us look at the Egyptian people, whom Mr. Gladstone declares he only wished to do good to. I will say no more about Alexandria. I will say nothing of the thousands of Egyptians who were slaughtered by his humane efforts; I will say nothing of the hundreds whom Mr. Gladstone's Judges have either hung [*sic*] or condemned to penal servitude or sentenced to a living death in the regions of the White Nile. All this I say nothing about, though the poor Egyptians might like to say something about it if you gave them the chance. (Hear, hear.)⁷¹

While on 13 February 1884 Churchill would inquire of Gladstone

As to the whole of the Egyptian policy of the [Liberal] Government, he [i.e., Churchill] would ask how far it could be reconciled with the former devotion of the Prime Minister to the concert of Europe? The effect of their [i.e., the Liberal government's] policy in the East had been to break up the concert utterly. – (Hear, hear.)⁷²

Even as late as 26 March 1884 Churchill would ask of the Gladstone government

What had the Government done to carry out the policy of setting up such a stable Government in Egypt as would enable them [i.e., the British army] to leave that country?... He [i.e., Churchill] asked the [Gladstone] Government whether they could give a slight sketch of their policy with regard to Egyptian finance. He believed it was impossible to settle this matter without a Congress of European Powers. The great original and fatal blunder which the Prime Minister [i.e., Gladstone] made was when he abandoned the Concert of Europe, and he (Lord R. Churchill) did not believe that it would be possible to have a stable settlement with Egypt until they recurred to the European Concert.⁷³

Yet among the members of the Conservative Party no professions of commitment to the Concert, and denunciations of the Gladstone government for its alleged lack thereof, were more significant, and perhaps more strident, than those that came from the party's leader, and thus the then Leader of Her Majesty's Most Loyal Opposition, namely Lord Salisbury. As early as 8 February 1882 Salisbury publicly reacted to the joint Anglo-French note to the Egyptian parliament by declaring to the House of Lords that

I hope, however, that we may hear from the [Gladstone] Government that they are prepared, whenever they think right, to say that they will co-operate with the Sultan, and recognise thoroughly the position which the Sultan occupies in respect to Egypt... [And] there is one thing more which I would press upon the Government. I have heard rumours about the opposition of the European concert to [Gladstone's] management of Egypt. In one sense there is no doubt the Powers of Europe all have an interest in Egypt. They are all guarantors of the Treaties of Paris and Berlin, and undoubtedly, so far as they have commercial interests in the settlement of the law of liquidation and judicial tribunals, we recognise that claim.⁷⁴

Salisbury was thus unequivocal both that Egypt was an Ottoman territory, and, as the Ottoman Empire was a signatory of the Treaties of Paris and Berlin, that the Ottoman Empire was a full member state of the Concert regime. Ergo, even absent such extra-Concert material concerns as

their commercial interests in Egypt and their and their citizens' respective stakes in Egyptian state debt, all Berlin Treaty signatories, and thus all Concert member states, including and especially the Treaty's Ottoman signatory and the Concert's Ottoman member state, had a legitimate role in resolving the Egyptian Crisis. And, thus, any solution to this Crisis that did not consult with and receive a degree of ratification from all such signatories, again including and especially the Ottoman regime, would be illegitimate.

Meanwhile Salisbury was even more spirited in his assertion of Ottoman state prerogatives, and the prerogatives of the Concert, in the Egyptian Crisis some months later, namely on 23 June 1882, that is, after the riots in, but before the bombardment of, Alexandria, declaring before the House of Lords that

Of course, my Lords, it is very easy to say that this Conference [i.e., the pan-Concert conference of ambassadors in Istanbul/Constantinople] is not intended as a mark of any want of respect towards the Sultan, but it is hardly possible to inflict a more flagrant affront upon the Sultan – (Opposition cheers.) The Sultan of Turkey is admitted by the Treaty of Paris to the concert of Europe, and is entitled to all the marks of respect, and to the benefit of all international traditions, which affect the other signatories to the Treaty. There is no doubt that to assemble a Conference at the capital of the Sultan to deal with the subjects of that Sultan against his will is about as flagrant an interference with his independence as it is possible to conceive. We have the authority of the Prime Minister [i.e., Gladstone] for saying that no difference should be made between weak powers and strong powers. What therefore is right for the weak is right for the strong. [Yet] what should we think if Musurus Pasha were to summon a Conference at London against the wish of the Queen to consider the present condition of Ireland?⁷⁵

However, Salisbury's affirmation both of Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity and of the ultimate authority of the Concert over European inter-state relations, and indeed of the interrelationship of the two, would reach its most full-throated proportions only in the aftermath of the Crisis's resolution and in Salisbury's retrospective assessments of the Gladstone government's actions, such as in an 7 May 1884 address to House of Lords wherein Salisbury argued that

I do not know, when the noble earl [i.e., Lord Granville, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] talks of the duty of consulting other Powers when you [i.e., the Gladstone government] wish to modify an international right, [whether] he [i.e., Granville] intends that doctrine to be rigorously applied. Is he going to apply it in all its integrity to Turkey? Turkey is not only one of the Great Powers, and admitted to the concert of Europe by the Treaty of Paris, but Turkey has a special claim to be heard in the disposal of Egyptian questions... If you [i.e., the Gladstone government] are to consult other Powers, as the noble earl says, whenever you intend to interfere with matters on which they have international right, the first Power that should be consulted, and from whom consent should be obtained, is the Empire of Turkey.⁷⁶

Meanwhile at a Tory Party rally at Dumfries on 21 October 1884 Salisbury declared that

The Government [i.e., the Gladstone government], which has always been so proud of the concert of Europe, has contrived by an act of illegality – to which they have added features unnecessarily harsh and repulsive – by an act of illegality they have contrived to unite Europe against them and cannot now count on the countenance of any European Power in solving this difficult problem which they have made for themselves in Egypt.⁷⁷

Yet just as significant as Tory public avowals of loyalty to the Concert was the power of such commitments to unite widely disparate forces in British politics in a common defense of the Concert regime. One such curious bedfellow with the staunchly Conservative Salisbury was, as

we have seen, the zealously anti-imperialist (to include support of Irish home rule), secularist, and radical Liberal Joseph Cowen. Cowen was joined in his Gladstone government-critical Concert advocacy by fellow radical Liberal Wilfrid Lawson, then the MP for Cockermouth, even more fanatical than Cowen in his secularism, radical liberalism, and anti-imperialism (again, to include Irish home rule). Indeed, Lawson's vociferous agitation in parliament against unilateral British intervention in Egypt represented perhaps the acme of his contrarian celebrity, and included such denunciations against his fellow Liberals in government as, on 12 July 1882 and thus in the midst of the British navy's bombardment of Alexandria, his declaration that

I protest against what took place yesterday, and say deliberately that it was an act of international atrocity. ("oh, oh," and cheers from Irish members.) It was a cowardly, a cruel, and a criminal act. (Cheers.) And how did we [i.e., Britain] lead up to it? Look back at the last few weeks. You [i.e., the Gladstone government] sent your fleet into Egyptian waters. What for? To overrule the people of the country, and to establish a Government which you are in favour of, but which there is no evidence that the Egyptian people are in favour of... What is the result of this interference? You [i.e., the Gladstone government] have managed to ruin Egypt. The Europeans are flying for their lives, and the news has come now that the Suez Canal has been stopped for shipping... Having done that, and having got rid of the Europeans, you have set to work to shoot the natives who were left (Cheers from the Irish Members.) I cannot conceal my indignation at England being dragged into this proceeding. Where is the concert of Europe? What has become of that? (Ironical Cheers.)⁷⁸

Likewise, two weeks later, on 25 July, Lawson again attacked the Gladstone government for what he argued were its violations of the Concert regime, describing how

At a meeting of the Birmingham Liberal Association, resolutions were passed expressing regret at the retirement of Mr. Bright and sympathy with the [Gladstone] Government in the difficulty they had to deal with in Egypt, and expressing a hope that the Government would secure a solution of the Egyptian question by means of the European concert. Those resolutions remind him [i.e., Lawson] of a good book he once read called "Making the Best of Both Worlds." (Laughter.) They [i.e., the Gladstone government] seemed to hold with the non-interventionists and to hunt with the Jingoists; peace with the late Chancellor of the Duchy [i.e., Mr. Bright], and glory and gunpower with the President of the Board of Trade [i.e., also Mr. Bright].⁷⁹

Meanwhile the Irish Parliamentary Party MP for County Mayo (Ireland), then (clandestine) President of the Irish Republican Brotherhood paramilitary organization, and self-declared working-class and Catholic activist and Irish nationalist, John O'Connor Power, asked parliament on 27 July 1882

Whether those who had hailed the accession of the Liberal party as the termination of Jingoism had not seen their hopes disappointed. The right hon. gentleman the Prime Minister [i.e., Gladstone] laid great stress upon the fact that the Government was guided and controlled in their policy by international engagements, and he also asserted that one Government was bound by the engagements of its predecessor. He [i.e., O'Connor] asked, then, was one Government bound by the policy of its predecessor? He had thought the distinct issue raised at the last general election was the foreign policy of the late [i.e., Disraeli] Government [i.e., Disraeli's purported jingoism, interventionism, and imperialism] (Hear, hear.) If not, that was simply to say that a great deal of eloquent indignation was wasted [i.e., by Liberals in general and Gladstone in particular] upon the hustings, and had produced no profitable result to the people of the country [i.e., Britain].

The hon. member of Ripon [i.e., the Liberal MP George Goschen] put this view the strongest light because he insisted on the necessity of maintaining the continuity of Governments. If that were so, then where was the justification for the strong language used in denouncing the policy of the late [i.e., Disraeli]

Government which they had listened to from the Liberal party but two short years ago? (Hear, hear.) A good deal of reliance was placed on the European Concert. But, why, when that Concert was deliberating [i.e., via the conference of ambassadors in Istanbul/Constantinople] did Her Majesty's Government take the matter into their own hands? It appeared to him [i.e., O'Connor] that if international law and right were to be observed they [i.e., the Gladstone government in particular and Britain in general] must consider themselves at the present moment not so much at war with the Egyptian army as with the Sovereign power of Egypt – the Sultan of Turkey. He [i.e., O'Connor] did not see where their right to bombard Alexandria arose unless their relations with Turkey justified that conclusion. The right hon. gentleman the Prime Minister had said that if we landed troops we should be guilty of disloyalty to Europe and of a breach of international law.⁸⁰

That O'Connor would be a passionate opponent of British imperialism is obvious. That he would publicly espouse a commitment to the Concert regime, and condemn Gladstone for his apparent lack thereof, is less obvious but hardly surprising. Yet what is especially notable is that such was the power of Concert loyalty in the British parliament that it could unite such parliamentarians as the elitist Tory Salisbury, the populist Tory Churchill, the radical Cobdenite liberal Lawson, and the Irish nationalist O'Connor fully into a common cause.

On the other hand, it is to some degree surprising that the Liberal Party would with equal vehemence both deny that it ever violated the Concert and insist that it had always remained faithful to the regime throughout the Egyptian Crisis. This is surprising considering both the statements by Concert-loyal parliamentarians noted above and the *prima facie* facts of the Gladstone government's actions and policies during the Crisis. But it was also foreseeable considering that in the early 1880's the Liberal Party loudly proclaimed its authorship of, and loyalty to, the Concert regime. Yet, whether surprising or not it was the case that throughout Egyptian Crisis the Liberal Party, and its leader Gladstone, both denied that any of their policies or actions violated the Concert and pledged their commitment to the international regime.

One such Liberal Party apologist for the Gladstone government's policies and actions was George Goschen, then the MP for Ripon, a former and future First Lord of the Admiralty, a future Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, like so many other Liberals opposed to Irish home rule, a future Tory by way of Liberal Unionism. While addressing parliament on 26 July 1882 Goschen "maintained... that though hon. Members [of the Conservative Party] might sneer at the European concert, it had rendered efficient service to the cause of peace in Europe, and had strengthen the position of the [Gladstone] Government whenever they appealed to it."⁸¹

Meanwhile the at times openly republican, working class advocate, feminist, and radical liberal, yet vigorous British imperialist, Sir Charles Dilke, then a Liberal Party MP for Chelsea and Britain's Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was even more ardent in his affirmations of the Liberal government's commitment to the Concert and refutations of its ever having violated the regime in any respect. As early as 10 February 1882, in the aftermath of the Anglo-French joint note to the Egyptian parliament, Dilke engaged in a testy exchange with Tory parliamentarians, including Ashmead-Bartlett. While responding to Tory suggestions that the Gladstone government risked violating, or had already violated, the Concert and risked setting, or had already set, Britain against the regime, Dilke argued that

The hon. member [i.e., Ashmead-Bartlett] has correctly stated the purpose of the verbal communication made by the Dragomans of the four Powers to the Porte [i.e., that there could be no modification of Egypt's *status quo* or intervention in Egypt without the unanimous consent of all Concert Powers, explicitly and especially to include the Ottoman regime]. It is not the intention of her Majesty's Government to withdraw the communication made to the Khédive by the English agent, in conjunction with the French agent, and her Majesty's Government cannot accept the truth of the criticism contained in the words the hon. member

has just added to his question [i.e., Ashmead-Bartlett's assertion that the joint note was a "breach of the concert of Europe"]...

Mr. MACFARLANE [Irish Parliamentary Party MP for County Carlow; interjecting] – Was the Sultan consulted?

Sir. C. Dilke – Sir, it was no breach of the concert of Powers. We followed, in making the communication [i.e., the joint note], the precedent set by the late [Disraeli] Government. ("Hear, hear," from the Ministerialists.)

Sir [Henry Drummond] Wolff – I should like to ask the hon. baronet [i.e., Dilke] whether any communication was made to the Porte. The right hon. gentleman the Prime Minister [i.e., Gladstone] yesterday laid great stress on the sovereignty or the suzerainty of the Sultan.

Sir. C. Dilke – The precedent followed was that set by the late [Disraeli] Government. (Hear, hear.) He [i.e., Disraeli] also addressed the Khédive without informing the Porte in exactly the same manner.

Mr. [Edward Temperley] Gourley [Liberal MP for Sunderland] asked if, without detriment to the public service, the hon. baronet [i.e., Dilke] would be good enough to inform the House [of Commons] of the nature and object of the two Anglo-French notes addressed to the Khédive of Egypt relative to the joint financial control of the country; if they were issued with or without the consent of the signatories of the Berlin Treaty...

Sir C. Dilke –... the identical communication recently made by the English and French agents to the Khédive has already been presented to Parliament... As the matter was not one which came under the Treaty of Berlin, the consent of the signatories of the treaty was not asked.⁸²

And, a week later, Dilke again defended the Gladstone government against Bartlett's accusations of its Concert disloyalty, declaring that

The hon. member [i.e., Ashmead-Bartlett] had further told the House that with regard to Egypt the present [i.e., Gladstone] Government had broken up the concert of Europe by forming an alliance with France, and had received a rebuff from the other four Powers. That was exactly the charge which members of the Liberal side of the House had always applied to the late [i.e., Disraeli] Government with regard to what they did in establishing the Anglo-French control over Egypt. Many members of the Liberal party thought the formation of an alliance with only one Power [i.e., France] rather unfortunate, but the present [i.e., Gladstone] Government had loyally accepted the policy of the late [i.e., Disraeli] Government in regard to Egypt, and all they had done had been to try to carry out that policy...

The hon. member [i.e., Ashmead-Bartlett] had said nobody believed in the concert of Europe, but the [Gladstone] Government certainly believed in it as a means of maintaining peace and promoting the interests of Europe such as no other machinery afforded. There certainly had been some difficulty through the refusal of Lord Salisbury to admit Austria, Germany, and Italy to a share in the control of Egyptian affairs, but the [Gladstone] Government had admitted that those Powers should have a voice in the political affairs of Egypt, and they [i.e., the Gladstone government] did not despair of seeing the concert of Europe used with regard to Egyptian affairs. They [i.e., the Gladstone government] thought they had maintained and successfully used the concert for the settlement of difficult questions by peaceable means.⁸³

Nor did the British navy's bombardment of Alexandria cause Dilke to reconsider his argument or weaken his insistence of the Gladstone government's loyalty to the Concert, with Dilke proclaiming to parliament on 12 July 1882 that

During the five weeks that elapsed since the first erection of the new fortifications and the new guns bearing on the ships down to the moment at which action was taken they [i.e., the Gladstone government]

were reproached day by day and night after night in that House [i.e., of Commons] and in the other House [i.e., of Lords] for not taking action. They had been asked what had become of the concert of Europe. The concert of Europe was as active at this moment –

Mr. ASHMEAD BARTLETT: As it had ever been. [read irony] – (Laughter.)

Sir C. DILKE: Yes, the Concert of Europe had successfully settled the Dulcino difficulty. It had successfully settled the Greek difficulty, despite the prophecies of the hon. member [i.e., Ashmead Bartlett].

Sir [Henry Drummond] Wolff: I say it had nothing to do with settling the Greek question.

Sir C. DILKE: That was not the belief of Her Majesty's [i.e., the Gladstone] Government, nor the belief of the vast majority of the House. It was his [i.e., Dilke's] firm belief and conviction that the concert of Europe would prove as efficacious in the present case as it had proved in the past. It was said that they [i.e., the Gladstone government] had violated it [i.e., the Concert] by their action yesterday. [Yet] reservations were made in regard to the necessity of actions of this kind which covered the case of yesterday.⁸⁴

Even as last as 25 July, as a full scale unilateral British invasion of Egypt, and in all probability a successful one, became an increasingly forgone conclusion, Dilke continued to contend that

The leader of the Opposition [i.e., Salisbury] had said that we [i.e., Britain] ought not to go [into Egypt] alone... the right hon. gentleman [i.e., Salisbury] yesterday, after making use of that phrase, had spoken of the attitude of the other Powers, and asked what evidence there was that we had the moral support of those Powers. The right hon. gentleman had asked the question in such a way as to imply some doubt whether we had such support. He [i.e., Dilke] could only, therefore, assure the right hon. gentleman [i.e., Salisbury] that the Secretary of State [i.e., Earl Granville] had used the term "moral support" after careful consideration with the fullest grounds for the statement. The words of the Foreign Secretary [i.e., Earl Granville] were that we had the good will, and the good wishes, and, he might also add, "the moral support" of other Powers. The leader of the Opposition [i.e., Salisbury] had then asked whether, in going on with this [Egyptian] war with the doubtful support of the Powers, we were not condemning the policy of a European concert. But we should have been in a very different position at the present time, in an adverse sense, had the European concert not been consulted (Hear, hear.)⁸⁵

Given the reportage on display in the Habsburg press above, such claims by Dilke and Granville about the "moral support" of the other Concert members for a unilateral British invasion of Egypt were dubious bordering on duplicitous.

Yet among all the Liberal Party elites then in government no denials of having violated the Concert, nor affirmations of loyalty to the Concert, were more significant, or perhaps stronger, than those voiced by Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone himself. For instance, on 12 July 1882, and in the midst of the bombardment of Alexandria, Gladstone argued that

My hon. friend [i.e., Wilfrid Lawson] says we are drifting into war in Egypt, but nothing has happened in this matter except on the fullest deliberation, and on the full and exclusive responsibility of her Majesty's [i.e., my] Government. With regard to the original intervention in Egypt [i.e., the Anglo-French joint note], that is not a matter on which I ought to enter at this moment. It is not for me to explain how far the steps taken by the [i.e., my] Government are links in the chain which runs back to the period of the former [i.e., Disraeli] Administration; but undoubtedly if my hon. friend considers – and he is quite justified in considering – me as most responsible in the office I have the honour to hold for what has now taken place, it is not because I am friendly on general principles to intervention such as that which has taken place in Egypt. He seems to think that I am a general apostle of non-intervention. I don't know why he said so. He quoted nothing. On the contrary, if he will recollect all my objections to the conduct of the late [i.e., Disraeli] Government... he will find that they were expressly founded on the charge that we had not intervened enough [i.e., against the Ottoman regime and on behalf human rights and national self-

determination for Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians, etc.]... My hon. friend says we are at war with Egypt. I do not admit that we are at war with Egypt

Mr. [Joseph] COWEN [interjecting] – With whom are we at war then?

Mr. GLADSTONE – I do not admit we are at war with Egypt or with anybody. (Laughter from the Irish members.) Hon. gentlemen [i.e., the Irish members] think that statement ridiculous. That is the position I hold, and the position which I am prepared to defend, not by laughter and jeering – for I think that an unsatisfactory method of defending grave propositions – when the time for argument arrives... It is no such paradox as the hon. member for Cavan [i.e., Joseph Biggar, an Irish nationalist and Irish Parliamentary Party MP who had joined in laughter at Gladstone's statement] and his friends – who thought proper to jeer at me – perhaps may suppose it to be; and I recommend the hon. member for Cavan a little study of the analogous cases that have occurred in the history of international law before he gives vent to what I may call his untutored feelings. (Laughter)...

My hon. friend [i.e., Lawson] asks what has become of the concert of Europe. What has become of the concert of Europe is exactly what has become of the navigation of the Suez Canal. The concert is in force, and we are not aware that anything has been done to weaken it. We have not departed from it, and we do not know that anyone means to depart from it. We have not the least reason to suspect that anyone else supposes we have departed from it or done anything to impair it. (Ministerial cheers.) The navigation of the Suez Canal is where it was, and the concert of Europe is where it was, so far as our information at the present time goes.⁸⁶

And Gladstone would maintain his convoluted and self-contradictory rationalizations purporting his government's unblemished and steadfast adherence to the Concert, even after Crisis's resolution, declaring to parliament, for example, on 25 May 1883 that

I am bound to ask myself what substantive objection there is [to the motion then before Parliament and to which Gladstone was reacting], and I most frankly say there is no objection but one, which would be removed by the withdrawal of a few words. The motion asks that her Majesty's Government will do certain things "in conjunction with the other Powers of Europe signatories to the Treaty of Berlin." I do not in the least degree hesitate to accept from the House [i.e., of Commons] a general instruction as to our duty under the Treaty of Berlin and under the Anglo-Turkish Convention, nor do I in principle object to accept an instruction which points out to us in a somewhat definite manner the duty of making application to other Powers of Europe to confer with us; but, on the other hand, I would say that this is not a subject which has escaped our notice.

I may refer to what took place in 1880 with respect to the Montenegrin frontier and to the efforts we made to bring the concert of Europe to bear upon the settlement of the Egyptian Question as clear proofs that we do not recede from the broad and general proposition that whenever the concert of Europe can be had it is our duty to seek it. Frequently that concert has been the means of obviating dangers which could not otherwise have been met, and of settling questions which could not otherwise have been adjusted.

On the other hand, my hon. friend [James Bryce, then a Liberal MP for Tower Hamlets] will agree with me that a latitude must be left to us [i.e., his government in particular and the British state in general] as to the time when that application [to the Concert] should be made, and I will venture to say that I do not think it would be convenient or conducive to the purpose which my hon. friend – and the House generally – has in view that we should at this moment receive from the House any particular direction on this subject. And therefore, if this motion is to be adopted by the House, I could not make any objection to it if my hon. friend will amend it by withdrawing the words "in conjunction with the other Powers of Europe signatories to the Treaty of Berlin."⁸⁷

Liberal Party elites responded in one, another, or both of two ways to accusations that their actions in Egypt had violated the Concert. First, by curtly denying that they had done so and

blithely asserting their unbroken observance of, and adherence to, the Concert. Second, by claiming that, if they had done so, then they had only followed an earlier precedent set by the Tories themselves, that is, that if they were scofflaws, so was everyone else and that in committing the second in a series of two wrongs they were somehow in the right. Yet, Liberal parliamentarians expounded either or both apologies perfunctorily, and supported them either with tendentious, even specious, arguments or evidence, or made no attempt whatsoever to so support them. Nevertheless, that Gladstone and other elite Liberal parliamentarians then in government made such pretensions to Concert loyalty was significant.

This is so for two principal reasons. The first is that it underscored the degree to which the Concert's ethical virtue and practical and material utility were taken as axiomatic by British parliamentarians of every political stripe and color. Disregard for, or hostility and opposition to, the Concert were beliefs held, or actions undertaken by, other, and 'bad,' actors. Conversely, all British parliamentarians from across the political cosmos felt the need to frame themselves as unwaveringly loyal to the Concert, no matter how such professions might seem at variance with reality. Secondly, such elite Liberal pretense to Concert loyalty would have significant implications for Crisis reportage by the Conservative-friendly British press.

While Tory, radical liberal, and Irish nationalist parliamentarians may have expressed skepticism, sometimes bordering on incredulity, at elite Liberal Party apologies in defense of their Concert loyalty during the Crisis, the Conservative-oriented British press was more willing to take such Liberals at their word. However, curiously it was precisely this sincere belief in Liberal Party loyalty to the Concert that served as the principal basis of this press's criticism of the Gladstone government and its Crisis actions and policies, as articles by just two prominent, mainstream Tory-affiliated journals must, due to the constraints of space, suffice to demonstrate. The Conservative-friendly *Morning Post*, for example, published an article on 2 June 1882 in which it decried how

“On the proposal of the French Government” a European Conference [of ambassadors in Istanbul/Constantinople] is to assemble and undertake the supreme supervision of Egyptian affairs, and England has concurred in the proposal of France. How long shall we have to wait for the decision of the European Areopagus [i.e., the Concert of Europe] thus called into meddlesome existence [to declare] that it is contrary to the state of international neutrality in which Egypt is henceforth to be placed for British war ships and Indian reinforcements to pass freely through Egypt in war as well as peace? The subordination of English interest in Egypt, for this is precisely the real subject in dispute, to a convocation of European representatives – some bitterly hostile, others indifferent, and none over friendly [to Britain] – such is the last shift of the Gladstonian mismanagement of our foreign affairs.

As drowning men clutch at straws, so it may be argued that her Majesty's present advisers [i.e., the Gladstone government] may lawfully claim stress of sore necessity in extenuation of their adoption of a course so perilous as the appeal to the concert of Europe to determine the future of Egypt. Even were we to accept the excuse [i.e., of necessity], it would not diminish the gravity of the situation. A few years ago... fortified by our traditional alliance with the Ottoman Empire, we were hardly less secure on the Nile than in one of our acknowledged dependencies. Under the influence of Mr. GLADSTONE and the Birmingham school we broke violently with Turkey, and now we are suppliants, it appears, at the bar of a tribunal of European arbitration...

What is to be understood by “a pledge” to protect the KHÉDIVE when no [actual and material] precautions whatever are taken to protect that unfortunate Prince? What conclusion even is to be drawn from the sketch of a new programme which was vouchsafed to the House [i.e., of Commons] by sir CHARLES DILKE? “I may,” said the UNDER SECRETARY for FOREIGN AFFAIRS [i.e., Dilke], “state that her MAJESTY's Government [i.e., the Gladstone government] had suggested to the SULTAN that it is desirable, under the

new aspect of affairs, that the flag of the Sovereign [i.e., the Ottoman regime] should be displayed in Egyptian waters, and that a Turkish man of war should convey a Turkish commissioner to Egypt.”

What on earth is the meaning of that? Is Turkish intervention to be effective or is it to be illusory? Is the flag of the Sovereign [i.e., the Ottoman regime] only to be displayed in Egyptian “waters.” And must the Egyptian mainland be free from any exhibition of the SULTAN’s authority? What is the sense of these trivialities?... Did France and England obtain the previous consent of the Porte to the proposal calling in the concert of Europe to sit in judgment upon an integral province of the Ottoman Empire which had never previously been subjected to such an extraneous control? Has the SULTAN professed his readiness to further the scheme of reducing his authority in every quarter of his empire to a pale copy of the resolutions of some European conclave or other? How have France and England sought to get over the difficulty... that their previous conduct in regard to Egypt and to the Egyptian crisis has already provoked a decided protest on the part of the Porte against their unauthorized interference between the KHÉDIVE and his mutinous subjects, and especially against their absurd and mischievous “naval demonstration,” which is now seen to be useless, or even injurious, as the Porte pronounced it to be illegitimate into the bargain?...

It was plain that the pretension of France and England to interfere in Egypt had resulted in nothing but failure and danger, and it was obvious that some alteration of the original programme of the Anglo-French control must be introduced. Briefly speaking, the only possible alteration took the form of an alternative proposition. Either the Porte was to be approached with a frank recognition of its sovereign rights in Egypt and with a fitting request to intervene with authority and to remedy the evils of an intolerable situation, or, on the other hand, the most dangerous and dubious alternative of calling in the rivalries and jealousies and opposite views of the European concert was to be adopted at whatever risk to England’s prestige and to the future peace of the East.

Wise and patriotic statesmanship pointed to the former course... [But] the British Government [i.e., the Gladstone Government] has most unfortunately taken no course so wise and dignified... It has voluntarily called into the arbitrament of the question all those rival European interests which it had been the constant and unvarying object of British policy to exclude altogether from the Valley of the Nile.⁸⁸

The *Morning Post*’s preferred means of resolving the Crisis was on the basis of Britain’s traditional, pre-Berlin Treaty (and hence pre-Concert) relationship with the Ottoman Empire. That is, as noted, a purely bilateral relationship in which the two were *de jure* allies, but in which the Ottoman empire was a *de facto* junior partner, even quasi-dependency, of Britain. Yet this preference is not of special interest to the present discussion. Neither is the paper’s assumption, ultimately proven misplaced, that the Ottoman regime would be eager to intervene militarily in Egypt in the interest of, and at the tacit behest of, European Christian imperial great powers so as to suppress what was widely seen as a struggle by exploited and oppressed Muslims against foreign Christian domination. Nor is the journal’s assumption that the Concert’s principal function in the Egyptian Crisis was to undermine and erode, rather than guarantee and defend, Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity. Rather, what is of special note is that, so far as the *Morning Post* was concerned, Gladstone’s professions of commitment to the Concert regime, however dubious in their rationale or incongruent with the facts of his actions and policies, were in paper’s view sincere, a conclusion that the paper lamented.

Nor was the *Morning Post* the only Tory-aligned British journal to presume, and at the same time deplore, the earnestness of Gladstone’s Concert loyalty. *The Standard* also attacked Gladstone on this basis, such as in an article, published the same day as that of the *Morning Post* noted above, in which *The Standard* fumed how

A European Conference [of Concert ambassadors in Istanbul/Constantinople, in regard to] Egypt, though a lame and impotent conclusion to an Ultimatum which spoke of “exacting a due fulfilment” of its terms, is the natural, the inevitable, sequel of the course pursued by our [i.e., Gladstone’s] Foreign Office... We

shall, perhaps, hear once again of those lofty principles of morality that forbid England to act either singly or with any other Power in demanding special rights and privileges for itself, and that impose upon us the Christian duty of consulting the wishes and acting according to the advice of all the Great European States. The sublime political virtue of abiding by the European Concert will again be aired for the benefit of an embarrassed Administration [i.e., the Gladstone government]. Plain persons, however, will scarcely be deterred from enquiring when the duty of deferring to the other Powers began, and at what date it became a moral obligation to remit the Egyptian Question to a Conference at Constantinople.

How is it that our Government brought itself to send ironclads to Alexandria without obtaining the assent of the other Powers, if it be our duty not to act without their approbation? How is it that the Earl GRANVILLE committed the shocking offence of informing the Egyptians that he would exact the due fulfilment of conditions that had never been submitted to the European Concert, and that had not even been placed before the SULTAN? How is it, if a Conference is now proposed in the interests of political justice, and in deference to the imperative dictates of an improved political morality, that it was not proposed before the English and French ironclads were sent to Alexandria?...

Read in its natural sense, the demand for a Conference is a full and final surrender of the doctrine that this country [i.e., Britain] has any interests or rights in Egypt apart from those of the other European Powers. The affairs of the British Empire – for the Egyptian Question is a portion, and an important portion, of the affairs of the British Empire – are, like the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, to be henceforth regulated by the European Concert. To this complexion has our Foreign Policy come at last.⁸⁹

There was thus a glaring incongruity between the Tory parliamentarians' criticism of the Gladstone government, namely of that government's presumed hostility to the Concert, and of criticism of this in the Tory-oriented press, namely for exactly opposite reasons, that is, of that government's presumed commitment to the regime. This incongruity was notable in two respects. First, while Conservative parliamentarians were actors who actually made British foreign policy, Conservative-friendly journalists were not. And secondly, this incongruity illustrated to the degree to which Conservative parliamentarians were indifferent to, even contemptuous of, their own constituency as regarded the making of such policy.

Yet, there can be no doubt that the Gladstone government's actions during the Crisis violated the Concert regime. In fact, British actions and policies during the Egyptian Crisis would (together with, perhaps, France's near-simultaneous *de jure* separation of a long-*de facto* independent Tunisia from Ottoman rule and its founding of a protectorate over the territory) prove to be the most egregious material violation of the Concert until the regime's abrogation in 1908. Yet it is equally apparent that the Gladstone government ultimately adhered, if only formally, to the Concert and the letter of its principles. That is, the Gladstone government neither annexed Egypt nor established a protectorate over it (again, a notable contrast from French actions in Tunisia). Rather, Egypt *de jure* remained as much an Ottoman territory as it had been before 1881, and Ottoman sovereignty over the Egyptian administration was also *de jure* unchanged from what it had been in 1881 (or, for that matter, what it had been under the effective rule of the Alawiyya regime).

Admittedly, neither the Gladstone government, nor any that succeeded it up to 1914, ever made any public statements, at least none reported in the British and Habsburg presses, that directly linked their commitments to the Concert to their disinclination, or assumed material incapacity, to simply and unilaterally either annex Egypt or sever it *de jure* from Ottoman sovereignty and impose an British protectorate over it (as the Asquith government would in fact do in 1914 in response to the Ottoman Empire's declaration of war on Britain). Notably, neither the Gladstone government, nor any *Belle Époque*-era British government, would demonstrate any such disinclinations or assumptions as regarded any other territory in Africa (or, indeed, Asia

and Oceania). Yet, whether or not it was due to conscious Concert commitments and concerns, the Gladstone government was in the end disinclined to undertake such actions as would violate the principles of the Concert not merely in practice but formally. And such disinclinations and assumptions would contrast markedly from those demonstrated by the principal actors in the events of 1908.

Thus, given the source base of this discussion, it is impossible to state here with absolute certainty that that the Gladstone government's upholding the letter of the Concert, even as it violated it in practice, was a consequence of the Concert itself. Yet, it is inconceivable, given the vehemence with which British parliamentarians of every political color and stripe, including and especially those in the Gladstone government itself, publicly, often, and loudly proclaimed their commitment to the Concert, that the regime failed to exercise some, and likely considerable, constraint on the Gladstone government, and those that followed it, in their Egyptian policies and actions.

Chapter 4: The Bulgarian Crises (1885-87)

The Crises

In 1885 Alexander I *von* Battenberg, then in the seventh year of his reign as Prince of the recently-founded Principality of Bulgaria, found himself entangled in an delicate, opaque, and dynamically evolving balancing act among various factions whose confrontations were then roiling the Principality's politics and society, with the most notable contests being between: modernizers/Westernizers and traditionalists; liberals and conservatives; constitutionalists and absolute royalists; pan-Slav Russophile devotees to the tsar-liberator and those who wanted Bulgaria to be nobody's satellite (no matter the past services rendered to Bulgaria by the would-be Russian guardian angel); and irridentists advocating an immediate Bulgarian national unification by means of aggressive territorial expansion of the state and those who feared the destructive consequences of adventurist foreign aggression and favored consolidation and development within the state's existing borders.

And so it was that the Battenberg regime looked on with uneasy uncertainty when, on 18 September 1885, public demonstrations broke out in several towns of the neighboring, Ottoman, autonomous, and Bulgarian-majority province of Eastern Rumelia, demonstrations organized and led by agents of the Bulgarian Secret Central Revolutionary Committee. As with most Balkan organizations of this sort during the period, i.e., quasi-covert nationalist paramilitaries, this outfit was only loosely associated with, and typically acted largely independently of, the regime under whose direction, and on whose behalf, it purportedly operated.

Quickly forming armed bands, the ringleaders of the uprising then marched on the Rumelian capital of Plovdiv, seized control of the provincial militia, dissolved the provincial administration, and declared the province's unification with the Principality. Both the provincial militia and administration submitted to the bloodless coup with alacrity, being led and mostly staffed by self-identified national Bulgarians who harbored aspirations of such unification.

Meanwhile in the Principality itself, the Battenberg regime initially greeted the putsch, about which it had been informed ahead of time but whose realization it had not taken seriously, with equivocation. Yet, after a few days delay, and figuring that the greatest threat to the regime came from being politically outflanked by nationalists, the regime concluded that the least terrifying course of action was to accept such a flagrant violation of the Berlin Treaty as unification constituted. Accordingly, it embraced the *fait accompli*, publicly appealed to the supreme legitimacy of national rights and national self-determination in inter-state relations, and recognized Bulgaria's unification with Eastern Rumelia.¹

Among states that were not signatories of the Berlin Treaty, the strongest responses to the Rumelian coup were, naturally, regional, especially those undertaken by Serbia and Greece. Both were indifferent to the unification insofar as it was a violation of the Berlin Treaty, but both demanded compensation, preferably at Ottoman expense, for what they claimed was Bulgarian aggrandizement that had upset the Balkan balance of power. By the end of November 1885 Serbia's Obrenović regime had removed itself as an actor in the Crisis by undertaking a disastrous invasion of Bulgaria, which resulted in so complete a destruction of the Serbian army that Belgrade required Habsburg diplomatic intervention to save it from Bulgarian military occupation. Meanwhile, the government of Theodoros Deligiannis raised Greek claims to the Ottoman territory that the Kingdom had failed to secure in 1881 (i.e., during the Ulcinj/Dulcigno Crisis), namely to Epirus, and, as in 1881, began preparations to seize this territory.²

The ruling regimes of all Berlin Treaty signatory states initially condemned the coup as a gross and impermissible violation of that Treaty. However, only Russia maintained a demand for a strict return of Eastern Rumelia's administration to the *status quo ante* condition delineated in the Berlin Treaty. Conversely, the views of most non-Russian foreign policy makers quickly softened, especially upon realizing, with Russia's surprisingly staunch anti-unification position, that the Battenberg regime was not the Russian puppet that they had been presumed to be. Some decision makers, especially those in Britain, went so far as to advocate in favor of unification, thereby, it was hoped, aggrandizing what now appeared, quite shockingly given the extent of Russian blood and treasure expended on its behalf during the recent Russo-Turkish War, a Russia-neutral, and possibly even Russia-hostile, regional actor, and perhaps even securing thereby Bulgaria as their own client state. Yet, in the event, the Berlin Treaty signatory regimes resolved the crisis at a pan-signatory conference in Istanbul/Constantinople, which convened in early November 1885, and which ultimately produced the 'Tophane Agreement,' signed on 5 April 1886.³

According to the terms of this Agreement, whoever was appointed as Prince of Bulgaria simultaneously served as Eastern Rumelia's provincial Governor-General. The process of appointment for both offices was the one expounded in the Berlin Treaty, with a candidate being nominated by the Ottoman regime, after consultations with, and with the approval of, the other six Treaty signatory regimes, and then 'elected' by Bulgaria's National Assembly.

That Bulgaria's Prince and Rumelia's Governor-General were therefore a joint, though not hereditary, office, and not, in the dynastic tradition of personal union, united only by Alexander himself, would promptly prove materially significant. For, while Alexander fell victim to a Russian-directed coup less than six months later (in September 1886), according to the terms of the Tophane Agreement his successor, Ferdinand *von* Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, ascended to the Bulgarian throne and the office of Rumelia's Governor-General simultaneously. That is, with his ascent to the throne Ferdinand simply began to simultaneously serve out the rest of what had been Alexander's first term as Governor-General.

Meanwhile the agreement restored the province of Eastern Rumelia itself to the status of a *de jure* territorially and administratively separate entity from the Principality of Bulgaria, the former again an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire and the latter still a tributary suzerainty of that Empire. Thus, according to the Tophane Agreement while Alexander and Ferdinand were in Bulgaria they were princely executives of a quasi-sovereign state, deriving authority *de jure* from the territory and citizens of that state (though deriving their authority *de facto* from the principal instrument of their appointment, namely from the Berlin Treaty signatory, i.e., Concert member, states). However, while in Eastern Rumelia both Alexander and Ferdinand were, if only formally, at the same time mere Ottoman civil servants and vassals of the Porte, who were responsible to, and derived their authority from, the Ottoman regime.⁴

Yet, the practical effect of the Tophane Agreement was, as everyone at the time well understood, the *de facto* administrative and territorial unification of Rumelia with Bulgaria. In their actual administration of Eastern Rumelia the regimes of both Alexander and Ferdinand accepted no guidance from, and demonstrated no concern whatever for the interests of, the Ottoman regime, and so integrated all aspects of the Rumelian and Bulgarian administrations as to substantively unify them. For its part, the Ottoman regime adopted an aloof posture, and neither attempted to reaffirm nor renounce its sovereignty in Eastern Rumelia. Thus, the Tophane Agreement preserved the letter of the Berlin Treaty, if only on paper, and, in what amounted to the same thing, affirmed, if only formally, Ottoman sovereignty and territorial

integrity, and, in doing so, subordinated Bulgarian national rights to these Ottoman state prerogatives. Yet, in effect, the Agreement violated both the Treaty and these prerogatives, implicitly in the name of Bulgarian national rights and national self-determination.⁵

Meanwhile, as the Berlin Treaty signatory regimes penned their names to the Tophane Agreement, matters between them and the Kingdom of Greece came to a head. From the start of 1886 through to the early spring of that year the signatory regimes had unanimously issued a series of increasingly stern collective notes to Sofia, Athens, and Belgrade. These notes called on the latter to demobilize and disarm their militaries, and, as concerned Greece and Serbia, to do so absent any territorial compensation. All three had initially refused, though the annihilation of the Serbian army had by that point already rendered Belgrade's obstinance materially irrelevant. By early April 1886, with the signing of the Tophane Agreement and the concomitant demobilization and disarming of the Bulgarian army, only Greece's Diligiannis government continued meaningful defiance of the signatories' collective will.⁶

At the same time, since February 1886 warships from all Treaty signatory states save the French Republic had assembled in Crete's Souda Bay for a naval demonstration intended to compel Athens's compliance. Still, the Diligiannis government refused to capitulate, spurred on in part by public Russian and French prevarications over the demonstration and partly by the Republic's attempts at separate, extra-Concert, bilateral Franco-Greek negotiations, albeit aimed toward the identical end of Greek demobilization and disarmament without territorial compensation.

Consequently, the Concert fleet steamed to Piraeus and their collective notes began to include ultimatums threatening a blockade of Greek ports should Athens refuse to relent. By 10 May 1886 Russian and French foreign policy makers ended their public equivocations and parallel negotiations and returned to uniform action with the other Treaty signatories. Meanwhile, the day before, and despite the fall of the Diligiannis government (and with it meaningful Greek resistance), the Treaty signatory regimes withdrew their ambassadors from Athens and their combined fleet began its blockade. Within a month the Kingdom of Greece had demobilized and disarmed its army and the combined fleet lifted its blockade on 5 June 1886. Thus, however much elements in one or another Berlin Treaty signatory regime may have assumed the legitimacy of Greek national claims to Epirus, these regimes' consensus commitment to the Berlin Treaty, and the supremacy of the territorial state principle on which it was founded, had been, both in theory and in practice, more compelling.⁷

Meanwhile in Bulgaria, in late August 1886 Russian agents, in a desperate attempt to preserve what was left of Russian authority over Bulgaria's affairs and operating under the mistaken presumption of widespread and deep Russophilia among Bulgaria's people and parliament, and thus that the sole obstacle to Russian predominance in Bulgaria was Alexander and a small clique of his supports, orchestrated an ill-considered coup. The upshot was mutual destruction, that is, both Prince Alexander's permanent resignation from office (in September 1886) and the dissipation of the last vestiges of Russian influence in the Principality. In keeping with the letter and spirit of the Berlin Treaty, the determination of who was to fill the resulting vacancy was made by means of pan-Treaty-signatory consultations that settled on Prince Ferdinand. And, with Ferdinand's simultaneous ascent to Bulgaria's throne and Rumelia's office of Governor-General in July 1887, the Bulgarian Crises of the mid 1880's drew to a close.⁸

The realpolitik machinations and material calculations behind these developments were widely known or suspected at the time and have been confirmed by historians ever since. Yet there was another factor at play. That factor was a common commitment, both by key decision

makers in the ruling regimes of Berlin Treaty signatory states and, as expressed in the press of such states, by their informed publics, to the Concert of Europe. A guarantee of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Concert member states, to include its Ottoman member state, as well as recourse to consultation rather than war. While historians have tended to neglect, minimize, or ignore the Concert regime's role in these events, a survey of the contemporary Austro-Hungarian and British presses reveals the degree to which those at the time understood the Concert as having been a major factor in them.⁹

The Austro-Hungarian Press and Habsburg Decision Makers

The Press

That the German speaking Habsburg press appreciated the role of the Concert in the Bulgarian Crises is evident from the fact that this press made 204 direct references to it, in at least 18 different journals, over the course of the Crises' 688 days (18 September 1885-07 August 1887). That is, the interested Habsburg public could on average encounter a direct discussion of the Concert's role in the Crises, usually in a paper's front-page article, about once every three days. Meanwhile during the period of most acute crisis, namely between 1 February and 30 September 1886, discussion of the Concert was even more intensive, with papers directly referencing the regime 163 times in 241 days, or on average slightly more than once every other day.¹⁰

As with the British press during the Egyptian Crisis, and for the same reasons, such depth and breadth of Concert discussion in the Habsburg press would be significant even had this press largely or unanimously referenced the regime only to disparage it or deny its existence. And such a point bears mentioning as throughout the Crises the Habsburg press was ambivalent about the significance or influence of the Concert in European inter-state relations. That is, in the crucible of the Crises, when the Concert was under its greatest strain and faced its greatest risk of dissolution, commentators in the Habsburg press often questioned the commitment of key foreign policy makers to the Concert regime and its principles, norms, and strictures. Yet, it is at the same time noteworthy that both this press, and the Habsburg officials quoted in, or reported on by, it, never questioned their own Concert loyalty nor that of their ruling (Habsburg) regime, but only the Concert loyalty of other actors in other Berlin Treaty signatory states. As had been the case with British parliamentarians during the Egyptian Crisis, the Concert's ethical virtue and practical and material utility was axiomatic across the Habsburg press and throughout the Habsburg regime, and thus disregard for, or hostility and opposition to, the Concert was the exclusive preserver of other, non-Habsburg, and 'bad' actors.

And a 24 April 1886 article by *Die Presse* reporting on the Crises' Bulgarian dimension serves as a case in point of this Concert ambivalence. In it *Die Presse* highlighted what it deemed to be excessive resentment in the Russian press for what that press interpreted as a humiliating Russian diplomatic defeat. Accordingly, the Russian press had widely adopted the view that the Romanov regime must

make up for the alleged mistakes and misfortunes in the blink of an eye, which would be easiest to initiate if Russia punished all the guilty as thoroughly as possible. Of course, Battenberger is the greatest evildoer and must be expelled from Sofia... Then the Concert of Europe, but above all Austria-Hungary and Germany, are to blame for Russia's defeat - so away with the European Concert and... war on the two neighboring imperial states [i.e., on Germany and Austria-Hungary]!¹¹

Yet, *Die Presse* argued that neither Alexander nor any Berlin Treaty signatory state, least of all Germany or Austria-Hungary, were to blame for Russophobic developments in Bulgaria. Rather it was the Romanov regime's own efforts to reduce Alexander, and the Principality itself, to, in *Die Presse*'s words, a "Russian satrapy," a status incompatible with "the independent and national development of the Balkan states," that had led to "Bulgarian ingratitude."¹² Meanwhile, Germany and Austria-Hungary had always been firm in their recognition of preponderant Russian influence in Bulgaria, and only rejected a total Russian monopoly of power and the, in *Die Presse*'s view, "pan-Slavism and pan-Russianism" that lay behind it.¹³ Were it to tolerate some degree of collaboration with other Berlin Treaty signatory regimes in supervising Bulgaria and to allow some degree of effective domestic autonomy for the Principality's ruling regime, *Die Presse* assured the Romanov regime that it would find its preponderate influence accepted, indeed endorsed, by Bulgarians, Alexander, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the "Concert of Europe."¹⁴

And so far as the Concert itself was concerned, far from being directed against Russia, "since the coup [i.e., declaration of Bulgarian-Rumelian unification] in Philippopolis [i.e., Plovdiv], hadn't Russia, with its slogan of the *status quo ante*,... occupied the leading role in the European Concert, despite the objections of the English and Italian sides?"¹⁵ More significantly, did

[Mikhail] Katkov and comrades [i.e., in *Die Presse*'s view, did the chauvinist Russian press] believe that without the help of the Concert of Europe the Bulgarian-Turkish agreement [i.e., the Tophane Agreement] would have undergone such a modification as was the case at the last Ambassadors' Conference [i.e., from recognizing unification between, to preserving the formal separation of, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, and restoring *de jure* Ottoman rule over the latter]?¹⁶

Eight assumptions and arguments that underlay *Die Presse*'s reportage bear particular note. First, and most important, the paper assumed that the Concert had been a key agent in realizing the Tophane Agreement, with all the latter's implications for the Treaty of Berlin, for Ottoman state prerogatives, for the supremacy of the territorial state principle in European inter-state relations, for the subordination of the national principle in the those relations, and, hence, for the Concert of Europe.

Second, the paper assumed that decision makers in St. Petersburg were sufficiently committed the Concert as to accept the legitimacy of, and feel themselves bound by, what they themselves understood to be a humiliating defeat inflicted on them to a large degree by the Concert itself. True, *Die Presse* described the Russian press as pressuring the Romanov regime to abrogate the Concert, by, say, unilaterally invading Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, by thereby reinstating the *status quo ante* and ousting Alexander by force of arms, and by making war on both Germany and Austria-Hungary. Yet, in the event, Russia did none of these. Thus, the Romanov regime's commitment to the Concert superseded not only the regime's own preferences but, if *Die Presse* is to be believed, much of, and perhaps the preponderance of, Russian public opinion.

Third, the paper assumed that the Romanov regime had failed to realize its ambition of a full and effective return of Bulgaria and Rumelia to the *status quo ante*, together with the argument that by acting by and through the Concert, and assuming a "leading role" therein, Russia had stymied the alluded-to British and Italian opposite ambitions of instituting full unification. That is, Russia had not stymied the latter's ambitions through violent unilateral

action, or by means of accumulating preponderant power through factional alliances or coalitions, but by and through the comprehensive, pan-continental, integrated, and collectively guaranteed instrument of the Concert, and on the basis of consultations under that regime's auspices.

Fourth, the paper assumed that the Romanov's regime's principal sin in Bulgaria had not been that of attempting to subordinate the territory, its people, and its ruling regime to great power tutelage, but that of excluding other Berlin Treaty signatory, i.e., Concert member, states from collaborating in that tutelage. Fifth, the paper assumed that unwavering Austro-Hungarian and German fidelity to the Concert was one of the principal virtues that distinguished them from the perfidy supposedly advocated by the Russian press. Sixth, the paper assumed that Berlin Treaty signatory states and Concert member states were one and the same thing. Finally, the paper assumed that the Battenberg regime, the Principality of Bulgaria, and Bulgarians broadly were primarily animated in the Crises by aspirations for national liberation, national self-determination, and national rights, through during the Crises these were in the paper's view directed against presumed Russian domination and neither the Concert nor the Ottoman regime.

Nor was *Die Presse* alone among Habsburg papers in concluding that Romanov regime commitment to the Concert had been that regime's first principle throughout the Crises. Moreover, that such Concert-loyalty superseded such concerns as Bulgarian and Greek national rights and national self-determination, Russian public opinion, or such of their own preferred policy alternatives as were driven strictly by immediate material self-interests. Such assumptions were also on display, for example, in the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, which on 14 May 1886 reported that

The Russian position in the Greek question does not find any sympathy among its [own] local population, which had hoped to support their Greek [i.e., Eastern Orthodox] coreligionists against the Turks, and a part of the Russian press expresses itself in this sense. It is stated that Russia, through its participation in the European Concert, has found itself in a position that contradicts its [own] political, ecclesiastical, as much as its [own] military traditions, in short, a position that is contrary to its own interests. [In Russia] one regrets that Greece did not receive the – at least secret – support that it, like Bulgaria, ought to have been entitled to count on, but which it did not receive.¹⁷

Meanwhile on 21 April 1886 the *Neue Freie Presse* [*NFP*], described how

France is unable to take an initiative. It will not withdraw the matter from the European Concert, but rather continue to work within the same [i.e., within the Concert] in a peaceful sense... Unlike in Paris, in Petersburg one gets down to business. There people grumble against the European Concert, and they would like to see Russia separate itself from it in order to regain 'freedom of action' in the Orient.¹⁸

Three of the *NFP*'s assumptions in this article bear emphasis. First, like *Die Presse* and the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, the *NFP* assumed that the Romanov regime's policy of Concert loyalty was at odds with, and was thus maintained without regard for, that regime's own (Russian) public opinion. Second, the *NFP* also presumed, in apparent agreement with Russian public opinion, that a state's membership in the Concert was mutually incompatible with that state's enjoying "freedom of action" [*Actions-Freiheit*] in inter-state relations. That is, both the paper and Russian public opinion understood that there was a fundamental distinction between inter-state relations under the atomized, unregulated, anarchic, and "free" conditions of an international state of the nature and such relations constrained by the principles of an international regime, in this case explicitly constituted in the "Concert of Europe." It was, as the

NFP and Russian public opinion agreed, only by “separating itself” [*sich von demselben trennen*] from the latter that Romanov regime, and Russia, could “regain” [*wider erlangen*] the former.

Third, the *NFP* concluded that, in late April 1886, and thus at the moment of truth for both the Crises’ Bulgarian and Greek dimensions, i.e., during the immediate aftermath of concluding the Tophane Agreement and at the most critical phase of the Greek blockade, French foreign policy makers had arrived at a consensus to act within the Concert. Moreover, that they would do so “in a peaceful sense” [*in friedlichem Sinn*], that is, by, and according to, the fundamental Concert principle of conflict resolution by resort to comprehensive consultation rather than violence.

A general assessment of the Concert’s role in the Crises expounded by the *NFP* three days later arrived at similar conclusions. Namely, that the ruling regimes of all Concert member states, but especially those of Russia and France, were reluctant in their commitments to the regime, but that none had publicly withdrawn from it. Such conclusions were typical of those expressed by the German-speaking Habsburg press throughout and immediately after the Crises, that is, the conclusion that the Concert may have bent, but it remained unbroken.¹⁹

Moreover, this 24 April 1886 article went on to also conclude that the Concert’s Ottoman member state

had satisfied [itself] with the accomplished facts in Eastern Rumelia after Prince Alexander [formally] recognized [its, i.e., the Sultan’s] sovereignty and entered into direct negotiations with him. The ‘representative of the messenger of God’ [i.e., the Sultan] has only one pride, that he will not be ignored in decisions about his empire and its interests, so that he may not lose the respect of his faithful. When he rides to the Selamlık [i.e., the reception hall of his Dolmabahçe Palace] on Friday [i.e., to greet the faithful for Friday prayers] he still feels himself in the sovereign role that Islam assigns to the Caliph, and makes resolutions [e.g., to recognize Alexander of as Eastern Rumelia’s Governor-General] out of free will and not for reasons of external coercion.²⁰

The *NFP* thus argued that the Ottoman regime, like the *NFP* itself, understood that a far greater catastrophe for that regime than the *de facto* loss of Eastern Rumelia’s territory, population, and resources would be for the Concert to sanction a violation, such as the Concert’s sanction of Bulgarian-Rumelian unification would constitute, of Ottoman state prerogatives. Likewise, for the Concert to publicly exclude the Ottoman regime from the Concert consultations that would arrive at such a resolution.²¹

Such actions would be tantamount to expelling the Ottoman Empire from the Concert regime, thereby reducing the Ottoman state to the status of states under the Concert’s collective supervision (e.g., Bulgaria, Greece, or, for that matter, Belgium and Denmark). That is, states whose sovereignty and territorial integrity the Concert did not guarantee, if only *de jure*, but merely recognized conditionally, a status that would inevitably invite still further internal and external material challenges to Ottoman state prerogatives. The Ottoman regime, like the *NFP* itself, thus understood that inter-state technicalities mattered as much as, and perhaps even more than, inter-state practical realities.

It was therefore enough for the Ottoman regime that Alexander had recognized Ottoman rule over Eastern Rumelia and that he (i.e., Alexander) was an Ottoman subject and servant in that province, namely by “recognized his [i.e., the Sultan’s] sovereignty and entering into direct negotiations with him” [*seine Souveränität anerkannt und sich mit ihm direct in Verhandlung gesetzt hatte*]. It also sufficed the conditions of the Tophane Agreement had not been imposed on the Ottoman regime “for reasons of external coercion” [*aus Gründen äußeren Zwanges*], but that the latter had agreed to the former “out of free will” [*aus freien Stücken*]. Indeed, such

technicalities were enough for the Ottoman regime no matter the degree to which they diverged from practical realities on the ground.

Meanwhile, as concerned the Crises' Greek dimension, on 27 April 1886 the Catholic-conservative, federalist, anti-German nationalist, and frequently foreign-policy oriented *Das Vaterland* condemned what it perceived as continued efforts by the French Republic to insinuate itself as a mediator between Greece and the Concert. Happily, *Das Vaterland* reported,

the other Powers, it seems, decidedly reject this mediation and insist on the position that the complex of oriental questions is a European matter in which no single European Power can appear as a mediator. This disloyal attempt by the French Republic to break up the European Concert will hopefully have no other success than to enrich the diplomacy of the French Republic with a glaring failure.²²

In the event, the French Republic's diplomacy was so enriched. Notably, *Das Vaterland* rejected the alleged French treachery not because it was contrary to the interests of Austria-Hungary or the Three Emperors' Alliance, but because it was, in *Das Vaterland's* view, contrary to the principles of the Concert of Europe.

Conversely, in a report describing how the Diligiannis government had submitted to an extra-Concert and unilateral French request for Greek demobilization, but how the Concert had nevertheless issued a fresh (and seemingly redundant) ultimatum demanding precisely such a demobilization on pain of a naval blockade, the *NFP* was more amenable to what it saw as French aspirations and Greek sensitivities, declaring on 24 April 1886 that

I maintain [i.e., this *NFP* correspondent maintains] that the presentation of the ultimatum, after Greece had submitted to the French intervention, was unmistakably directed against France [i.e., rather than Greece itself]... One would not like to explain the actions of the Powers with the ultimatum as being out of jealousy of French diplomatic success, but it is otherwise difficult to guess why the Greek government is not granted an 'honorable retreat.' The ultimatum results only in an annoying delay, which would have easily been avoided, if the so-called European Concert could have denied itself the cheap satisfaction that it, and not France alone, should be credited with the settlement of the Greek affair.²³

However petty this *NFP* correspondent may have found the compulsion, it was clear to this correspondent that foreign policy decision makers in all Concert member states, naturally excepting France itself, were driven by a need to affirm that the Concert, and not France alone, was the author and instrument of solving the Crises' Greek dimension. Likewise, that these decision makers, unlike the *NFP* correspondent, understood that technicalities in inter-state relations mattered as much as material realities and practical results in such relations, and that thus such formalities were worth material cost to enforce.

It is notable that, in the event, the French Republic refused to accept Greece's unilateral submission to its extra-Concert request, and that this marked the end of the Republic's attempts at bilateral, extra-Concert mediation with Greece during the Crises, and that henceforth during this Crisis the Republic acted assiduously within the Concert. And it is equally notable that the solution whose authorship the Concert was so determined to deny to France, and secure for itself, was one that, both in theory and reality, suppressed Greek national rights and Greek nation self-determination in the name of affirming Ottoman state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

While the Crises' events were actually taking place the Austro-Hungarian press raised suspicions about the commitment of (notably non-Habsburg) Concert member states (i.e., especially, Russia, France, Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Italy) to the regime and expressed concern for the Concert's very survival. However, there was a marked change in this press's retrospective assessment of events during the Crises' immediate aftermath involving an

appreciation for the degree to which a general commitment to the Concert by all its member states had determined the course of the Crises' events and shaped the framework of its final resolution. Likewise, these assessments affirmed the Concert's continued significance for European inter-state relations, albeit with some lingering suspicion that the zeal of some Concert member states in for the regime did not match that maintained by the Dual Monarchy itself.

A 22 April 1886 article in the *Morgen-Post* is a case in point. In it the *Morgen-Post* analyzed the Crises' recently resolved Bulgarian and Serbian dimensions and concluded that

Prince Alexander of Bulgaria undertook the *coup d'etat* of Philippopolis [i.e., Plovdiv], the king of Serbia went to war for his injured interests. But in the end both submitted to the commands of Europe... Prince Alexander also submitted to the decisions of the Constantinople Conference [i.e., to the Tophane Agreement], although they have created a dangerous situation for him... with the passage of time, so we hope, the small states in the Balkans will [like the Great Powers themselves] also find the institution of a court of arbitration, which the Concert of Europe represents, to be a blessing.²⁴

Notably, in the *Morgen-Post*'s view, Bulgaria and Serbia had not "submitted" [*sich unterwerfen*] to the unilateral will of one or another great power or to the combined force of a factional alliance or coalition among several of them. Rather, both had submitted "to the commands of Europe," [*dem Gebote Europas*], that is, as any informed Habsburg citizens would have well understood, to the "Concert of Europe." At the same time, the *Morgen-Post* left little doubt as to its own assessment of the Concert's ethical virtue and material utility.

Meanwhile on 02 May 1886, in the wake of France's return to uniform action with the other Concert member states, the liberal and Francophile *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, notably the highest circulating paper in Vienna, was even more emphatic in its conclusion that the solution to the Crises had first and foremost been determined by, and was a triumph for, the Concert. Even as the combined Concert fleet prepared for it's the pending blockade, the *Tagblatt* reported that

It is very notable that France deemed it especially necessary to bring to the attention of the great conductor of the European Concert that it had never wanted to place this Concert out of tune. France owes it primarily to Bismarck that it was led back into the European Concert at the hands of the Greek [i.e., Epirus] Question and the ill feeling, which its position had caused during the recent time not only in Berlin but in the other courts, might suggest to France that in order to break up the Concert, which finds itself under such tight management, more favorable terrain [than the Greek/Epirus Question] would have to be found...

In Berlin, therefore, one does not admit that the European Concert was out of tune. The treaties by which Turkey is protected are adhered to and one assumes that Russia will, like the other Powers, respect these treaties to the same extent. This premise was certainly strengthened to some extent by the course of the Franco-Greek episode.²⁵

That the *Tagblatt*, like Berlin, did "not admit that the European Concert was [ever] out of tune" [*Man gibt... nicht zu, daß das europäische Konzert verstimmt sei*] is significant. That is, despite the – in the *Tagblatt*'s view superficial – appearances of British, Russian, and, above all, French diplomacy during the past seven or so months, the ruling regimes of all Concert member states, to include those of Britain, Russia, and even France, had never wavered in their commitment to the Concert. Nor had the Concert ever faced any serious threat of dissolution during this period. In fact, the opposite had happened, and the Crises had reaffirmed and strengthened the commitment of all Concert member states to the regime.

Yet, still more significant were the *Tagblatt*'s assumptions about exactly what the Concert's principles were, and about the regime's principal *raison d'être*. That is, the Concert's

mandate was, in the the *Tagblatt*'s view, to enforce the sanctity of those treaties "by which Turkey is protected" [*durch welche die Türkei geschützt ist*], i.e., those treaties that guaranteed Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity (and, hence, that of all their signatory states), namely the Treaties of Paris and, especially, Berlin. What is more, the Concert's commission was to police and compel "adherence" to such treaties [*man hält an den Verträgen fest*] by all states. Happily, in the *Tagblatt*'s assessment, such Concert objectives would be easily realized given that all signatory states, including Russia, were, of their own free will, equally committed to "respect these treaties" [*achten diese Verträge*]. And it is notable that during the "the course of the Franco-Greek episode" [*Verlauf der französisch-griechischen Episode*] these objectives were principally realized by suppressing Greek national rights and national self-determination in the name of Ottoman state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Admittedly, not all commentators in the Habsburg press were as convinced as the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* about the ironclad loyalty of all the Concert's member states to the regime. Even as they shed any concern about its imminent dissolution, some still doubted that all the regime's member states would be happy and eager to accept its constraints and expected that diplomatic pressure would remain a necessary intra-Concert tool for the foreseeable future. And a 17 September 1886 article in the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* is typical of this continued, if somewhat assuaged, skepticism. In its reportage the *Zeitung* argued that Bismarck had gone as far as he was prepared to go to soothe wounded Russian feelings over Bulgaria. Henceforth, the *Zeitung* reported,

[Germany] leaves Bulgarian affairs to 'Europe,' and since such a thing still exists, at least on the green table [*am grünen Tisch*, i.e., at least in theory], Russia will either behave as a part of Europe and submit as such or will have to openly take up arms. It does not appear to want the latter for the time being, since it is not inclined to get bound up with Austria. So, as is generally assumed today, it will at present limit itself to appearing in Bulgaria only as a closer adviser, as a 'guardian' to a people who were liberated by a Concert of Europe that will not completely abandon them [i.e., a people liberated from a tyrannical Russian 'guardian' by a Concert that will not abandon them back to domination by that Russian 'guardian'].²⁶

As most of its informed readers would have been aware, the *Zeitung*'s affirmation that "Europe" ... still exists" [*'Europa', und da ein solches*] was an allusion to, and refutation of, an exasperated outburst uttered fifteen years ago by Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust (erstwhile Habsburg interior minister, foreign minister, and sometimes prime minister of the Dual Monarchy's Austrian/Cisleithanian regime, who was at that moment on his deathbed). On the occasion of his inability to prevent the Franco-Prussian War, Beust had famously declared that 'Europe no longer existed.' That is, Europe as a comprehensive and integrated whole operating within the – by then defunct – First Concert international regime.²⁷ Now, fifteen years later, the *Zeitung* was clear that "Europe" existed again, and that the international regime within which it operated was once again the "Concert of Europe."²⁸

Two of the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*'s other assumptions also bear emphasis. First, that the Concert had both the theoretical right and material capacity in Bulgaria to supplant the unilateral authority of the Russian 'guardian' with the collective authority of the full Concert. That is, the Concert had the right in principle, and the material wherewithal, to supplant the extra-Concert authority of any Concert-member, who enjoyed, or attempted to establish, patronage and domination over a European non-Berlin signatory/non-Concert member state, with the collective, collaborative, and comprehensive authority of the full Concert.

Second, in its approach to inter-state relations Russia had but two choices, either to "submit" [*sich benehmen*] to "Europe," i.e. to the Concert of Europe, or to "openly take up arms"

[*offen zu den Waffen greifen*]. That is, Russia could remain within the condition of an international regime, as a constituent member state of that regime, by adhering to that regime's principles. Conversely, Russia could enter a condition that was irreconcilable with the international regime, namely that of an international state of nature, in its relations with all states, and to do so by appealing to the supreme, and indeed only, legitimate principle of an international state of nature, i.e., recourse to might as right and force of arms. Notably, in the event Russia chose the former option.

Meanwhile, *Die Presse* also continued to expound the assumption that itself and the Habsburg regime were the most faithful of all actors to the Berlin Treaty and the Concert of Europe, an especially clear demonstration of which was to be found on the front page of its 8 October 1886 edition. On it *Die Presse* scolded the "Western Powers," namely Britain, France, and Italy, for what it saw as their isolationist tendencies. "After all," *Die Presse* argued, "the Western Powers belong to the European Concert, and this [i.e., the Concert] must suffer if some voices constantly fall silent or only speak up when the Concert no longer needs them." At the same time, *Die Presse* was heartened that presently

there are increasing signs that England, France and Italy are thinking of looking around their Oriental spheres of interest and registering their claims in the European Concert...and it is just as certain under today's conditions that balancing colliding interests will be easier and lead to lasting results if not Austria-Hungary and Russia alone, but all Berlin signatory Powers, share the heavy burden of the great Oriental Question among themselves.²⁹

Yet such scolding language, which after all ultimately recognized a general and increasing interest in the Concert by the hitherto somewhat reticent Western Powers, was far from the anti-Concert sentiment that the paper had presumed to be predominate among nearly all non-Habsburg member states just five months before. It is, moreover, notable that *Die Presse* assumed both that the Treaty of Berlin was the founding instrument of the Concert and that the regime's membership was composed of, and limited to, that Treaty's 'signatory Powers.' Likewise, such was the *Die Presse*'s commitment to the Concert that it was not only open to the 'Western Powers' involving themselves in the matters of its own regional backyard, nor did it merely invite these Powers to so involve themselves, but the paper positively insisted that they do so (naturally, only so long as this was done within the Concert).

Indeed, months before this chastisement of the Western Powers *Die Presse* had in its retrospective assessment of the Crises been unequivocal about both the significance of the Concert's role in these Crises, and the regime's continued vitality in European inter-state relations, concluding that

The past diplomatic campaign in the Orient has yielded positive evidence. Namely, it has demonstrated that in the Eastern Question there really is a Europe and that this Europe is strong enough to realize its will. In various phases of the last Oriental turmoil we have drawn attention to all kinds of factors that gave reason to fear that one or the other signatory Power would jump out of the European Concert. Yet this Concert lasted until the end of the Greek tragicomedy, and that is not only for the moment but hopefully also for the future an extremely practical benefit...

The European Concert, already practiced repeatedly since the Treaty of Berlin, can in the future also do its duty in a positive direction, namely in cases when it is not merely a matter of maintaining peace, but of solving the entire Oriental question...

We stress this positive and active nature of the European Concert not without reason... For all of these complications [of the Eastern Question], as wholly unpredictable in their origins as in their consequences, diplomacy can find a guarantee in the continued existence of the Concert of the signatory Powers. That is, a guarantee, on the one hand, that in the Orient no permanent state of affairs could arise without the will of those Powers and, on the other, that the Eastern Question would be stripped of any acute character threatening European peace through the unanimous attention of the Great Powers.³⁰

Die Presse owned that in the midst of the Crises it had expressed skepticism about the Concert loyalty of the regime's member states. Yet the paper's retrospective analysis left little doubt that the course of the Crises' events, and the ultimate form of their resolution, had principally been determined precisely by such loyalties in those member states. Likewise, that the Concert not only continued to exist among, but remained a significant, and perhaps preponderant, force in, European inter-state relations, a condition that *Die Presse* both celebrated and for whose perpetuation it advocated. And the paper was equally clear that among the Concert's aims the universal preservation of peace across all its member states was perhaps the highest. Yet what is most notable for the present discussion is *Die Presse's* recognition that "the Concert had been practiced repeatedly since the Treaty of Berlin" [*Das europäische Concert, seit dem Berliner Vertrag schon wiederholt geübt*], but, implicitly, had not been practiced before that Treaty. That is, *Die Presse's* recognition that the Concert's founding instrument, and the instrument that determined that regime' membership, was the Treaty of Berlin.

The Decision Makers

Yet a survey of the German speaking Austro-Hungarian press reveals that such assumptions and arguments about the past role, present place, and future significance of the Concert in European inter-state relations were not confined to Habsburg journalists alone. Rather, during the Crises Austro-Hungarian decision makers publicly and emphatically espoused such assumptions and arguments themselves, with language that was either directly quoted in, or reported on by, the Habsburg press. One case in point was the then-prime minister of the Transleithanian/Hungarian regime of the Dual Monarchy, namely Kálmán Tisza. In a 1 October 1886 article *Die Presse* recapitulated and summarized a recent speech that Tisza had delivered to the Hungarian parliament, describing with notable approval how

The remarks minister *von* Tisza delivered today... distinguish themselves above all by their clarity and simplicity. They present a momentarily very reassuring picture of the continental situation and sketch very easily comprehensible contours for the position which our Monarchy just now takes in the Eastern Question, and especially in the Bulgarian affair...

The policy of the leading Great Powers thus manifests itself as an eminent peace policy and it appears, if one judges it solely from the position of Austria-Hungary, as a policy of the defensive, which is built on the basis of the Berlin Treaty and the European Concert. The Berlin treaty is well perforated in many ways. It has remained unfulfilled in many respects. It has undergone various violations and alterations over the past eight years. And yet it forms the sole constitutional [*staatsrechtliche*] basis for any action or defense in the Eastern Question, and for any further development of the situation on the Balkan Peninsula. So long as the Berlin Treaty still has hooks on which political and diplomatic threads can be hung and spun, it is the only possible basis for a Treaty-loyal and defensive politics.

For the moment we [i.e., Hungarian parliamentarians] accept the policy of [Habsburg Foreign] Minister Kalnoky in its full scope. However, this is not because it adheres above all to the Berlin Treaty, but because, in view of the continental situation and the aggressive aspirations of Russia, the Treaty-loyal

policy appears for the moment to best protect the interests of our Monarchy. For the moment this policy also has the advantage that every cabinet [i.e., of every Treaty signatory state] is most likely to be won over to the same [i.e., to Kalnkoy's Treaty-loyal policy], especially as no state likes to bring on itself the reproach that it intentionally disregards or violates an existing and generally respected international treaty.

The thought may not be so far off: might it not be better to adopt the policy of the initiative [i.e., the policy of unilateral or factional intervention] rather than that of the defensive [i.e., the policy of remaining within the strictures set by the Berlin Treaty], might not agreements that must necessarily go beyond the strictures of the Berlin Treaty better preserve the great oriental interest of our Monarchy than strict loyalty to Treaty legitimacy? At the moment we are not able to answer these questions with complete confidence, probably because they only can be answered with apodictic certainty after years and indeed only by way of a retrospective criticism. For the moment the situation has the appearance, given how things have developed in the last four weeks, that any more clearly sweeping initiative on the part of Austria-Hungary would have aroused all sorts of aspirations by other Powers...

Yet if one endorses the defensive and Treaty-loyal policy as being one at the same time the policy that, under present conditions, is relatively best at preserving the interests of our Monarchy, then one must accept Tisza's other remarks as natural and self-evident consequences therefrom. Whosoever defends the Berlin Treaty, or rather its innermost constitutional essence, must repudiate, as much for Austria-Hungary as for Russia, all plans of conquest. Today it gives us particular satisfaction to be able to affirm that we, even while lacking any definite knowledge of the intentions that were decisive in the Vienna *Ballplatze* [i.e., the Habsburg foreign ministry] over the past four weeks, have, in the interests of our Monarchy and with the same determination as Minister Tisza, spoken out against the policy of conquest.³¹

Admittedly, both *Die Presse* and Tisza were explicit that the Monarchy ought to remain faithful to the Berlin Treaty and, in what amounted to the same thing, to the Concert not because these were worthwhile ends in themselves but because these served what they saw as Austria-Hungary's particular material self-interests. Notably, such a conclusion about the convergence of Austro-Hungarian material self-interests and the preservation of the European Concert contrasted sharply from the assumptions Habsburg decision makers would adopt twenty years later. Meanwhile, *Die Presse* and Tisza voiced concern that any abrogation of the Berlin Treaty, such as, say, one resulting from "a policy conquest" [*Eroberungspolitik*], i.e., an annexationist policy, in the Balkans, would arouse "all sorts of aspirations by other Powers" [*allerlei Aspirationen bei anderen Mächten*], indeed aspirations whose scope might rapidly extend beyond the Balkans itself. And such a concern contrasted just as sharply with the indifference that Habsburg decision makers in 1908 would demonstrate regarding the potential consequences of an annexationist Balkan policy.

It is also worthwhile to point out that the opposition that Tisza "the elder" now expressed to a policy of Habsburg conquest and annexation on the Balkan peninsula, precisely like that expressed by Tisza "the younger" (i.e., Kálmán's son István) in 1908, was not based solely on what they both assumed were Austro-Hungarian state interests as a whole, but on interests of the Kingdom of Hungary in particular. That is, Kálmán, like István (in 1908, a once and future Hungarian prime minister) harbored misgivings about any addition of still more Slavic lands and peoples to the Dual Monarchy, as this would further erode a Magyar plurality that was for the moment second only to that of the Germans in Austria-Hungary as a whole. More acutely, Kálmán maintained an entirely justified fear that any such addition would inevitably lead to constitutional innovations in the Monarchy. Namely, the creation of a 'trialist' Austro-Yugoslav-Hungarian state that could, by presenting Hungary with a untied Austro-Yugoslav front, only weaken the leverage Budapest currently enjoyed against Vienna under the 'Dual' Monarchy's existing constitutional, administrative, and territorial order. Indeed, such a 'trialist' scheme might

even result in a loss of Hungarian territory, population, and fiscal resources to the new Habsburg-Yugoslav entity.³²

Yet several of Tisza's more general assumptions and arguments also bear special emphasis. First, that hitherto the Treaty of Berlin may have been bent, but it was as yet unbroken. Second, that the Treaty was constitutional in nature and that it harbored a "constitutional essence" [*staatsrechtliches Wesen*] that was more than the sum of its parts. That is, the Treaty was not a mere collection of *ad hoc* agreements but formed an indivisible and mutually interdependent whole, in which were enshrined fundamental principles of inter-state relations, and which founded a comprehensive, pan-continental, integrated, and collectively guaranteed international regime – explicitly, the "Concert of Europe" – among all of the Treaty's signatory states. Third, that a bedrock of Austro-Hungarian decision making throughout the Crises had been both a commitment to the principles delineated the Berlin Treaty and an equal commitment to working within the Concert. Finally, that all Concert member states ultimately would, if only by reason of peer pressure, ground their decision making on similar commitments.

Thus, irrespective of Tisza's material rationale for Austria-Hungary's commitment to the Treaty and Concert, he assumed that European inter-state relations were ruled neither by sheer and immediate material state self-interest nor simple calculations of preponderant or balanced material power. Still less were they governed solely by resort to arms in a permanent war of all against all. That is, European inter-state relations were not in the condition of an international state of nature, but were supervised, in effect if not by conscious intent, by an international regime and ruled by a common commitment of all Berlin Treaty signatory states to that regime's principles.

While both *Die Presse* and Tisza could in early October 1886 only speculate about the assumptions and intentions that had actually driven decision making in the Monarchy's foreign ministry during the Crises, in mid-November *Die Presse* provided more concrete insight into that ministry's thinking. In a 14 November 1886 article *Die Presse* reported on a public address delivered by Habsburg foreign minister Count Gustav Kalnoky (namely to the foreign affairs committee of the Hungarian parliament's delegation to the Austro-Hungarian joint committee observing the common ministries, of which the Monarchy's foreign ministry was one). This article affirmed that *Die Presse* and Tisza's endorsement of "the policy of Minister Kalnoky in its full scope" [*die Politik des Ministers Grafen Kalnoky ihrem vollen Umfange*], voiced six weeks before (i.e., in the report quoted above) was not misplaced and, as it had done with Tisza's address, *Die Presse* reported with approval that

Count Kalnoky's statements, in the committee of the Hungarian delegation... will be received with great satisfaction wherever there is a sincere wish for the preservation of European peace. The program which Count Kalnoky developed with diplomatic polish and caution in the face of the somewhat prejudiced and agitated Hungarian delegates is a quite constitutionally correct peace program, which seeks its foundation in the Berlin Treaty and its aid in the consent of the signatory Powers. It is the policy of abstemious legitimacy and the European Concert...

In order to keep Russia in such a position [i.e., of non-intervention in Bulgaria], that is, in order to secure the cause of peace, one might offer our Monarchy no stronger diplomatic basis than that of the Berlin Treaty. So long as the leading Great Powers continue to maintain this Treaty, Austria-Hungary is even ready, according to the statements of Count Kalnoky, to take an active stand in its defense...

As far as the details concerning the presently very acute Bulgarian Question, Count Kalnoky refers to Minister Tisza's address of September 30th [i.e., the address quoted above] in which the protection of the

independence and free development of the Balkan states – naturally only on the basis of the Berlin Treaty – was laid down as one of the axioms of Austria's Oriental policy...

The friends of the great initiative policy, those delegates who deny the diplomatic and constitutional viability of the Berlin Treaty (admittedly much riddled with holes), will have all sorts of complaints about Count Kalnoky's policy. Yet anyone who has ever experienced how difficult and dangerous it is to conduct politics outside of, and without, any constitutional [*vertragsmäßige*] basis, how varied are the attitudes in the European Concert, how easily wars break out, but how difficult their consequences are to be borne, no policy will seem more incomparably valuable than that which seeks its strength in the support of Germany and the majority of the signatory Powers and holds the preservation of peace as its end and interest.³³

Much of what was said above about Tisza's address can, as Kalnoky himself made clear, be said about Kalnoky's address as well, thus affirming both Tisza's and the *Die Presse*'s hopes that the program Tisza had laid out 6 weeks earlier was precisely the one guiding Habsburg foreign policy making throughout the Crises. Namely, that a bent but unbroken Berlin Treaty was the constitutional basis for a Concert regime the preservation and defense of which served as the fundamental basis of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy making throughout the Crises.

Yet, Kalnoky was even sharper than Tisza had been in his criticism of "the friends of the great initiative policy" [*die Freunde der großen Initiativ-Politik*], that is, of the advocates of unilateral or factional extra-Concert intervention, of Balkan conquests and annexations, and, thus, of abrogating the Concert. Likewise as regarded his reproof of "those delegates who deny the diplomatic and constitutional viability of the Berlin Treaty" [*diejenigen Delegirten, welche dem... Berliner Vertrag den Werth einer diplomatisch und staatsrechtlich tragfähigen Grundlage absprechen*] and, hence, of those delegates who denied the diplomatic and constitutional viability of the Concert of Europe.

And, while expounding these criticisms and reproofs, Kalnoky was also clearer than Tisza about "how difficult and dangerous it is to conduct politics outside of, and without, any constitutional basis" [*wie schwer und gefährlich sich Politik außerhalb und ohne jede vertragsmäßige Basis macht*], that is, how difficult and dangerous inter-state relations were outside of, and without, the condition of an international regime and in the condition of an international state of nature. Indeed, Kalnoky highlighted how, in the latter's permanent war of all against all, wherein might as right and recourse to violence were the sole legitimate bases of inter-state relations, "how easily wars break out, but how difficult their consequences are to be borne" [*wie leicht Kriege entbrennen, wie schwer aber deren Folgen zu tragen sind*].

Thus, Kalnoky was more emphatic even than Tisza that "no policy will seem more incomparably valuable than that which seeks its strength in... the majority of the [Berlin Treaty] signatory Powers and holds the preservation of peace as its end and interest" [*dem wird doch eine Politik ungleich werthvoller erscheinen, welche in... die Mehrzahl der Signatarmächte ihre Stärke, in der Erhaltung des Friedens ihr Ziel und ihren Vorzug sucht.*] That is, no policy would seem more incomparably valuable than that of loyalty to the Concert and its principles, one of the most fundamental of which was that of universal peace among all its member states. And, given that, though he was a significant political and policy figure in the Dual Monarchy, Tisza's bailiwick was primarily in the domestic (Hungarian) sphere, while Kalnoky was one the principal makers of Habsburg foreign policy, that the latter's sentiments were stronger in these regards was noteworthy,

Yet, the Habsburg press's recognition that during the Crises key decision makers demonstrated a commitment to the Treaty and Concert was not limited to the Habsburg regime alone, and this despite that press's latent but chronic suspicion of non-Habsburg states' fidelity to

both Treaty and Concert throughout this period. Given the Germanophile sentiments expressed in some of the reportage explored above, to say nothing of the strength of the “Dual Alliance” (i.e., between Austria-Hungary and the German Empire, 1879-1918), it is hardly surprising that the German speaking Habsburg press was particularly aware of such Concert loyalty in Germany.

And this awareness was especially evident in a 30 May 1886 *NFP* article that recognized a general commitment by the German Empire’s foreign ministry to both the Treaty and the Concert, but which especially highlighted such loyalties of two German officials. Namely, Herbert *von* Bismarck (son of the famous Otto and then the German Empire’s ‘State Secretary for Foreign Affairs,’ i.e., the Imperial foreign minister) and Maximilian *von* Berchem (during the Crises, first a director of Germany’s commercial policy department and then an undersecretary of state in Germany’s foreign office).³⁴

Meanwhile on 21 July 1888, and thus in the Crises immediate aftermath, *Die Presse* reported

As is self-evident, the sanctioning of such [Russian] proposals [i.e., for resolving the remaining Bulgarian questions] could result only from the intervention of all the [Berlin Treaty] signatory Powers [i.e., the comprehensive intervention of the full Concert], and therefore the position of a portion of the German and Russian press is quite incorrect, namely that Bulgarian questions would be handled merely by an accommodation of Austro-Russian differences [i.e., extra-concert, bilateral, and factional accommodations]. There are in our opinion no specifically and particularly Austro-Hungarian interests in Bulgaria. Our Monarchy has only one interest: that no arrangement on either side of the Balkans be made in a manner contrary to the Berlin Treaty and its legal consequences.

We know very well that this quite correct stricture is not to the liking of the Russian chauvinists, but they may be convinced that no other solution to the Bulgarian question can be achieved in the European Concert. The most recent polemical articles in the “*Nordd Allg Ztg*” fully confirm this view and they stand with Prince Bismarck’s speech of February 6th.³⁵

Thus, Germany’s famously realpolitik ‘Iron Chancellor’ (i.e., Otto *von* Bismarck), both through his journalistic mouthpiece, namely the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, and directly and publicly, namely “in his speech of February 6th” [*in seiner Rede am 6. Februar*], expounded Germany’s commitment to the Berlin Treaty, to conducting its inter-state relations within the Concert, and to adhering to the principles of both.

Meanwhile the Habsburg press also recognized, notwithstanding the ‘betrayal’ alleged in the reportage noted above, Treaty and Concert loyalty among French foreign policy decision makers, especially that of Charles de Freycinet. That the latter would express, and act according to, such loyalties would hardly have come as a surprise to the interested Habsburg public. Freycinet had been a vociferous defender of, and been steadfast in his loyalty to, the Concert during the Egyptian Crisis, a policy program that had led to the downfall of his government. Now, having regained the office of primer minister, Freycinet directed French foreign policy making throughout most of the Bulgarian Crises as well (i.e., from 7 January to 16 December 1886), including during nearly all of the Crises most decisive moments, e.g., the signing of the Tophane Agreement, the blockade of, and capitulation of, Greece, the demobilization of the Bulgarian, Greek, and (what was left of the) Serbian armies, and Alexander’s resignation as Prince of Bulgaria. Of particular note to this press – Freycinet’s words were reported in at least 8 different Habsburg papers – was an exchange in the French Chamber of Deputies on 20 April 1886 in which Freycinet proclaimed that

on the Greek question, he [i.e., Freycinet] considers a French initiative [i.e., extra-Concert, unilateral or factional French intervention] as impossible, since there [already] exists for all Eastern affairs a very definite arbiter: the European Concert. To suggest some other court of arbitration would mean taking the matter out of the hands of the European Concert. Yet only this [latter] court of arbitration actually exists, given that the Powers are endeavoring to settle the Turkish-Greek question amicably.³⁶

Notably, within weeks of Freycinet's statement the French Republic ceased its, admittedly never wholly extra-Concert, let alone Concert-hostile, machinations and rejoined uniform action with the other Berlin Treaty signatory, i.e. Concert member, Powers.

Yet of all non-Habsburg Berlin Treaty signatory states none received greater attention in German speaking Austro-Hungarian Crises reportage than the United Kingdom, reporting on which easily dwarfed that of any other non-Habsburg Treaty signatory.³⁷ However, for obvious reasons, this discussion will not address British assumptions and arguments about the Concert and its place in the Crises through the medium of the Habsburg press, but will do so directly and presently.³⁸

The British Press, the Academe, and Decision Makers

The Press

That the British press appreciated the role of the Concert in the Bulgarian Crises to an even greater degree than did its Habsburg counterpart is evident from the fact that former made 760 direct references to it, in 60 different journals, over the Crises' 688 days. That is, the interested British public could on average encounter a direct discussion of the Concert's role in the Crises slightly more than once a day. Meanwhile, during the period of most acute crisis discussion of the Concert was even more intensive, with papers directly referencing the regime 488 times in 241 days, or on average about twice a day.³⁹

Such depth and breadth of Concert discussion in the British press would, for reasons expounded earlier, be significant even had this press largely or unanimously referenced the regime only to disparage it or deny its existence. And this point bears mentioning as at the outset of the Crises the British press was, like its Habsburg counterpart, ambivalent about the significance or influence of the Concert in European inter-state relations. However, unlike with the Habsburg press, which demonstrated an almost uniform commitment to the regime and attributed Concert disloyalty largely to non-Habsburg actors, the British press was initially at odds with itself over whether British decision makers ought to remain faithful to the Concert or to break with it.

As was conspicuously recognized even in the Habsburg press, two of the principal protagonists in these early Crises Concert debates were the *Daily News* and *The Pall Mall Gazette* (PMG).⁴⁰ Both were by 1885 aligned with the Liberal Party and, while the *Daily News* enjoyed wider readership, the PMG maintained "an influence out of all proportion to its modest circulation," and at no time more so than during the Bulgarian Crises, when the PMG's editor, W.T. Stead (whose Concert loyalty was particularly noted in the Habsburg press), was at the height of his ill-fated notoriety.⁴¹

On 6 November 1886, and in reaction to the gathering of a comprehensive, pan-Concert conference in Istanbul/Constantinople, convened to address the widening and deepening crisis, the *Daily News* fired the debate's opening salvo by editorializing that

It is difficult to look with any satisfaction on the assembling of the Conference. The principle which lies at the basis of it is, in our view, an unsound one. The Great Powers undertake to manage the affairs of all the small and struggling States and populations whose movements give any trouble to the rest of the world... England ought not to go into the Conference at all... No one supposes that the interest of the populations of Bulgaria and East Roumelia will be the objects of the care of the three Emperors [i.e., those of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia] who are managing the whole affair...

[The conference is a regime] which arrogates to itself the right of coercing peoples into political systems which are not of their own making, which are not natural... Public opinion in this country may be said to be almost altogether in favour of allowing the two groups of Bulgarian populations to come together and form one State any moment they [i.e., the Bulgarian populations] think right.. We cannot believe that [then British prime minister] Lord Salisbury would be a party to the brute policy which would force them asunder once again... The Conference in fact, as it has been got up, is only the old Holy Alliance over again. It professes to be the custodian of European peace, as the Holy Alliance professed to be the custodian of religion...

The day of such Conferences ought to be over... England could do nothing practical for the struggling nationalities by going into the Conference, and she may be allowed to consult a little for her own dignity by keeping out of it... At all events let us not give our sanction to the preposterous assertion that the Constantinople Conference represents anything that could possibly be called in a true sense the Concert of Europe. When there is a Concert of Europe it will be a concert of peoples and interests, not of diplomatists representing secret arrangements between Emperors... [the conference] only represents a new form of Holy Alliance which it is the duty of England to discountenance to the best of her power.⁴²

The *PMG* immediately challenged the assumptions, arguments, and policy recommendations thus expounded by the *Daily News*, proclaiming on the same day

What nonsense the *Daily News* is talking this morning about Bulgaria!... This morning it [i.e., the *Daily News*] seems to have lost its head altogether, and gives advice which can only be characterized as the worst and most dangerous that could possibly be volunteered at such a crisis by an English newspaper. The gist of its advice is that England should break up the Concert of Europe on the Bulgarian question and refuse to go into the Conference at Constantinople...

LORD SALISBURY, we trust and believe, will be too shrewd [to boycott the conference]. If the European Concert is broken, it will not be by England – not even although the leading Liberal organ [i.e., the *Daily News*] should demand the adoption of the course [i.e., of acting outside of, and thus dissolving, the Concert] which for nearly ten years it [itself] has been rightly denouncing as one of the worst and most mischievous of mistakes in the East...

We believe that there ought to be a great Bulgaria, united and free, stretching from the Danube to the Aegean, and we have done, and shall continue to do, everything that we can do in order to re-establish the Bulgaria of San Stefano... But although we entirely approve of the effacement of Eastern Roumelia... our sympathies must not blind us to the fact that the only way of safety in the East lies in the principle of the European Concert...

It would be a great improvement to efface the artificial and unnatural distinction between two sections of the same nation [i.e., to unify the Principality and Eastern Rumelia, thus dissolving the division of the Bulgarian nation between these two territories]; but to promote and strengthen, and, if possible, to give executive authority to, the Concert of Europe is one of the most imperative duties of every English Government. The European Concert is the forerunner of the United States of Europe. To denounce it as a new form of Holy Alliance is childish and worse, for it leads to the adoption of a policy placing England in direct opposition to the tendency which contributes most towards the evolution of a European polity which will place peace and progress on a firm basis, and substitute for the brutal and wayward arbitrament of the sword the supreme authority of international law.⁴³

Nor did the *PMG* stop there, reiterating a week later (on 12 November) that “the *Daily News* repeats its pernicious nonsense this morning about the duty of England to break up the European Concert if she cannot at every stage have her own way. Fortunately, there is no chance whatever of Lord Salisbury doing anything of the kind, and such views are equally at variance with those of the Liberal leaders which the *Daily News* affects to represent.”⁴⁴

Unimpressed by the *PMG*'s arguments, on 17 November the *Daily News* not only continued to deny that the Concert had any legitimate role in the Crises, but denounced the regime entirely, declaring that

[Lord Salisbury's] conduct has been marked by a sort of paralysis of will and purpose. He has exhibited himself as the feeblest and most hesitating of modern Foreign Ministers. He lays down sound principles in one breath and contradicts them in another. He is now for the rights of nationalities and now for the suppression of those rights in the interests of the European System [i.e., the Concert of Europe]. The European System is a fine phrase for the oligarchic despotism of the Six Great powers – a despotism narrowed into the ascendancy of the great military Monarchies of Northern and Eastern Europe [i.e., the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires].

What in this state of affairs is the attitude of Lord SALISBURY? He lays down the principles of national emancipation and development for Bulgaria, and obstinately refuses to apply them to Servia and to Greece. The consequence is that Servia is endeavouring and Greece threatens to seize for herself what diplomacy withholds... [Even while] protesting against a return, as he regards Bulgaria, to the *status quo ante* [i.e., of a full restoration of Ottoman rule over Eastern Rumelia], his representative is instructed to assent, we know not with what subterfuges of reserve, to that principle [i.e., of restoring Ottoman rule, at least *de jure*, over Eastern Rumelia] as the basis of the Conference...

Lord SALISBURY in his Guildhall speech described the policy... of her MAJESTY's Government... [as being] in the first instance “that the strength of the Turkish Empire may be maintained undiminished, because we believe it to be a guarantee of the peace of Europe; and in the second [instance], [to accept] any arrangement... [both] to satisfy the populations whom it [i.e., that arrangement] concerns [i.e., the populations of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and the Ottoman Balkans], and to discourage any attempts upon the integrity of the Turkish Empire, which we [i.e., the Salisbury government] consider as an essential portion of the European System...”

Lord SALISBURY's second [instance] involves an irreconcilable contradiction. Any arrangement which may satisfy the populations concerned [i.e. Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, and others living in Ottoman European territories] is absolutely incompatible with the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, for what they demand is emancipation from it. Lord SALISBURY secures himself a purely verbal consistency by arbitrarily limiting his popular sympathies to the Bulgarians, and denying them to the Greeks, the Albanians, and the Serbs and other non-Bulgarian Slavs who are still under the direct rule of the SULTAN.... The integrity of the Turkish Empire must... be maintained at the cost of misery and ruin to the Christian races subject to it, because, we are told, it [i.e., the Ottoman state] is an essential part of the European system. If so, the sooner the European system is got rid of the better.⁴⁵

Contrariwise the *PMG* framed as “petty” the *Daily News*'s allegation that Salisbury was partly responsible for Serbia's invasion of Bulgaria, and likewise declared that “hardly less petty, however, is [the *Daily News*'s] ill-disguised satisfaction at the outbreak of a fratricidal war, because, forsooth, it shows the ‘absurdity’ of the European Concert in general and of LORD SALISBURY'S participation therein in particular... It is something, however, to know that the *Daily News* represents nobody but itself in this ridiculous trifling.”⁴⁶ And, on 19 November, the *PMG* added that

Lord SALISBURY has been prompt to seize the opportunity, and he now poses both in Central Asia and in the Balkans in the cast off clothes with which Mr. GLADSTONE went a-piping in Midlothian six years since. If Liberalism stood for anything in Eastern politics, then it stood for the principle of the European Concert. To-day the chief Liberal organ, the *Daily News*, denounces Lord SALISBURY daily because he does not destroy the Concert, and then leave the Balkan States to light up the flames of a general war without intervention of the Powers.⁴⁷

Finally, on 26 January 1886 the *Daily News*, in what would prove to be its last word in this Concert debate, reacted to its realization that a British fleet would likely not only participate in, but to a degree lead, a naval demonstration against Greece by lamenting that

This... has excited a profound feeling of distrust and discomfort, to use no stronger words, all over the country. Is it possible, men ask themselves, that the British Fleet is to be sent on this mean and ignoble mission? Has the concert of Europe come to this – that we are to use our irresistible power on the sea to do the behests of other Powers?... [Lord Salisbury] has taken on a coercive movement. He has placed the whole weight and influence of this country in the hands of the other Powers. The British Fleet is to go on their errand, to bolster up the existing order of things in South-Eastern Europe, and to defend the Sick Man's [i.e., the Ottoman Empire's] territory...

[Lord Salisbury] has succeeded in turning round upon himself, and in office he has carried out the policy he had contemned in opposition [i.e., the policy of Concert loyalty]... the Turkish Empire is in trouble, and Lord SALISBURY “full charged with England's thunders” launches them to its aid... Even those who think that Greece is ill-advised to take decisive measures at the present moment, and who would have approved the Government if it had warned Greece and then stood aside, would strongly resent active interference on behalf of the Turk. Yet Lord SALISBURY invites the Powers to sanction that interference by England and sends Greece a violent ultimatum...⁴⁸

Unsurprisingly, the *PMG* had an opposite reaction to drawing similar conclusions, arguing on 25 January 1886 that

It is all very well of the *Daily News* to tell the Greeks to ‘go in and win’... but the *Daily News* saying so will not suffice to get it for them. If the European Concert should break down or prove ineffectual, what would happen?... Has the *Daily News*, which is so bitterly opposed to Lord SALISBURY's attempt to preserve peace, counted the cost of war, and is it prepared to see its own alternative carried out to its logical conclusion?... Is the *Daily News* ready, then, to see England fight Austria, or Russia, or both?

We wait with anxiety to see what line [the recently reelected] Mr. GLADSTONE is prepared to take... Mr. GLADSTONE has thus a great responsibility and a great opportunity. He can, if he likes, reconstitute the German alliance, maintain the European Concert, and keep the European peace. For our own part, we yield to no man in sympathy with the Greeks or in faith in their future. But a friend who prophesizes nothing but smooth things is only an enemy in disguise; and we decline to be deluded by specious words into regarding the encouragement of Greece to run to her own destruction.⁴⁹

The Liberal Party's electoral victory, and Gladstone's return to the head of government, a week after this January exchange abruptly ended this debate, with the *Daily News* hastily adopting the *PMG*'s program of Concert loyalty, as just a few articles must serve to demonstrate. One particularly striking illustration of the *Daily News*'s conversion was in its 18 February 1886 edition, published just weeks after its 26 January denunciation of British participation in the action against Greece, in which the paper argued that

If Greece were at this moment to attack Turkey the settlement of Greek [territorial] claims, which have been long standing, is more likely to be postponed than accelerated. It is this this consideration among others which has induced Ministers [i.e., of the new Gladstone government] to follow the example of their

predecessors [i.e., the recently departed Salisbury Government], by joining with the rest of Europe in applying *friendly* pressure to Greece [my emphasis].

Peace will in all probability be by these means secured... [Greeks] ought to be made aware, if they do not know already, that there are two hundred thousand Turkish troops ready to invade Greece at a moment's notice. It cannot be expected that Europe shall disable Turkey from attack... There is just now a genuine concert of Europe... [and Britain] has no selfish object to serve. Her own interests prompt her, as her own inclinations lead her, to be on friendly terms with the Greek nation. But for this reason Lord ROSEBERY [now Britain's Liberal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs], representing the [Gladstone] Cabinet, is determined not to allow the outbreak of a war which could only be disastrous to Greece herself... Greece must trust in Mr. GLADSTONE, and yield.⁵⁰

And just four days later the paper added that

there seems... to be now good reason for supposing that the Concert of Europe will not... be broken... The news from Athens is, we rejoice to say, of a more peaceable character, and there appears now to be little doubt that Greece will yield to the manifestation of superior force... The action of Mr. GLADSTONE's administration is avowedly taken in the interests of Greece herself... All Greece is asked to do is not to defeat the calculations of her allies by disturbing the peace at a peculiarly critical moment in European history. It is surely not a very immoderate request... [the Greeks] cannot complain that Mr. GLADSTONE had deceived them. Before he came into office he advised them in the most emphatic language to hold their hand.⁵¹

And the *Daily News* was to remain faithful to its new dogma of Concert loyalty throughout the remainder of the Crises, as witness a 4 May 1886 article in which the paper noted that

One of the ablest Conservative organs in this country – we mean the *Saturday Review* – has urged that Greece should be left to fight it out with Turkey... We find it difficult to understand how Englishmen and scholars, who ought to be Hellenists and lovers of freedom, should hold such views. But the point on which we desire to insist is that those who advocate for non-intervention in the present circumstances are on the Turkish side, while the best friends of Greece support the action of the Powers [i.e., support the blockade of Greece]. The Government of M. DELYANNIS has behaved throughout [the Crises] as if the exact reverse of this were true...

Mr. GLADSTONE and Lord ROSEBERY have larger questions to consider than the difficulties of the Greek Ministry, or the personal embarrassment of M DEALYANNIS. England... has been leading the European Concert, and the responsibility thereby laid upon her has been solemn... England has all along told [Greece] that she must submit to the decision of the Powers... The diplomatic forms and ceremonies, the solemn plausibilities, [i.e., the formal technicalities] of the world recognize the SULTAN as an absolute Sovereign, and Turkey as an independent Power. An international lawyer must say [i.e., British foreign policy makers must say, at least publicly and formally], with his tongue in his cheek or not, that the QUEEN [i.e., Queen Victoria] is in Cyprus the vassal of the SULTAN, and that the Porte can at any moment order the English out of Egypt.⁵²

The *PMG*, for its part, continued to advocate, as it had done, for British loyalty to the Concert, noting with approval, for example, on 19 February that “Mr. Gladstone would follow Lord Salisbury in saving [the Greeks] from themselves. After last night's announcements... it will be impossible for the Greek representatives here [i.e., in England] or for those who are credited with special knowledge of English affairs at Athens to pretend that there is any reason for doubting England's loyalty to the European Concert.”⁵³ And the *PMG* would maintain its program of Concert loyalty throughout the remainder of the Crises, a program which was on display in a 26 July 1887 article and which declared, as the Crises drew to a close, that

the greatest and most reassuring sign of the growth of the principle which will in the end make an end of [all] war [is]... the Concert of Europe [which] provides at present a rough but effective High Court of the Nations. It is at once a Legislature, a Tribunal, and an Executive. It is as yet imperfect. Its authority is often set at naught. But it is growing. It has made immense progress in the last twenty years, and before the century is out it is quite possible the federation of Europe may be so far accomplished as to render it impossible for any Great Power to draw the sword against the veto of the other Powers. That is the case in the Eastern question to-day. There is no reason why it should not be the case equally in relation to all other questions which disturb the peace of nations.⁵⁴

In the late 1870's two paradigms for a 'Concert' international regime developed in discussions among British foreign policy commentators and decision makers. One was founded and defined by the Berlin Congress and Treaty, notably with the participation, and under the supervision, of Britain's Conservative Party, and especially of its leader, Lord Salisbury. Gladstone had posited the other while leading his Liberal Party to victory in his 1878-1880 Midlothian campaign. A competition between these paradigms had been latent in British debates about its foreign policy during the Egyptian Crisis, thus allowing partisans of different policy programs to each claim loyalty, and allege their opponents' hostility, to a Concert whose precise nature none were willing, or, perhaps, able, to fully articulate. These competing paradigms now came into direct conflict, and the resulting debates drew into sharper focus the distinctions between, indeed irreconcilability of, the two Concert models.

One model found a champion in the *PMG*, and the Concert paradigm articulated and defended therein was the one founded at Berlin. Namely, an international regime predicated on territorial states and whose first principle was a guarantee of the at least formal sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its member states (i.e., of all Berlin Treaty signatory states), especially its Ottoman member state. Likewise, a regime in which conflicts among member states were resolved by means of comprehensive, pan-regime consultation rather than factional agreements or resort to violence. However, the *PMG* was clear that non-Concert member states, i.e., non-Berlin Treaty signatory states, especially the Balkan states conditionally recognized or founded by that Treaty, did not enjoy such guarantees. In fact, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of these states were qualified, enjoyed only at the sufferance of the Concert, while their ruling regimes, indeed sheer existence, were under the Concert's collective and collaborative supervision.

According to this paradigm of Concert, British foreign policy makers had but two choices, either to adhere to the regime, or to withdraw from and violate it, with Britain thereby entering into a condition of international state of nature in its relations with all other states. And while apologists for this Concert model might admit that the latter condition seemed to offer greater liberty to enforce and realize extra-Concert principles or values, they at the same time insisted that this freedom was illusory. In such a condition there were not many and more principles of legitimacy to which a policy maker might appeal, but only one, namely might as right, that is, power, both its balance and preponderance, and resort to violence as the sole bases of resolving disputes among states. Naturally, the *PMG* recommended that British decision makers choose the path of international regime, that is, of Concert loyalty, chiefly by coercing the ruling regimes of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece to adhere to such Crisis solutions as respected, if sometimes only formally, Ottoman state prerogatives.

Meanwhile the other Concert model found a champion in the *Daily News*. The paradigm articulated and defended therein was one predicated on human rights, national rights, and national self-determination. According to this model, in their pursuit and enforcement of these principles the ruling regimes of territorial states were permitted, if need be and no alternatives

seemed available, to resort to violence against, and to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of, other territorial states. And this applied especially to the human rights, national rights, and national self-determination of non-great power states, and especially to the peoples and nations of the Balkans.

Moreover, advocates of this Concert model argued that the principles on which their paradigm was based were in fact not principles of inter-state relations at all but moral values that transcended the principle of international regime itself. Thus, should the practices of international regime prove an insuperable barrier to the realization and enforcement of such values, they would recommend that Britain ought to withdraw from, act outside of, and even seek to dissolve, that regime. This was not, they argued, so as to use their greater might *as* the basis of right, but to employ British might *for* right, as they saw right in one or another conflict or dispute. Naturally, the *Daily News* recommended that British decision makers choose this path of moral virtue over that of loyalty to the Concert. Namely, by coercing the Ottoman regime, if need be resort to arms and if need be unilaterally, to cede such territory to the Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek, and other states as would allow the nations on which these states were based, and for whose benefit they existed, to realize projects of national unification.

Three other dimensions of *PMG* and *Daily News*'s Concert debate during the Bulgarian Crises bear emphasis. First, in its advocacy the *Daily News* was not, as the *PMG* sometimes alleged, being disloyal but more faithful than the *PMG* itself to the principles ostensibly embraced by the Liberal Party's foreign policy program. Second, in the actual event the Concert paradigm that determined British foreign policy during the Crises was not the one articulated by the *Daily News* but the model advocated by the *PMG*. Indeed, upon entering office the Gladstone government itself quietly adopted the latter's paradigm as the basis of its Crises foreign policy making (about which more will be said later), with the *Daily News* itself swiftly following suit. In doing so, the *Daily News* demonstrated just how seriously it took the virtue of loyalty, that is, by placing Liberal Party loyalty even above its loyalty to the liberal principles and values of that Party.

What is more, in doing so the *Daily News* joined the Gladstone government, and the Liberal Party broadly, in also placing loyalty to the Concert above the preferences of their own constituents and even the principle of popular sovereignty. That is, the Conservative Party's professed commitment to a Concert defined by the territorial state, and the Liberal Party's professed commitment to a Concert of national and human rights, respectively, was a matter of public record, as the *Daily News*'s reportage itself affirms. And in the midst of the Crises Britain held an election in which a Liberal Party received a greater preponderance of votes than did its Tory opponent. However, no sooner did the Liberal Party take over government than it adopted the foreign policy program of its adversaries, a policy flip-flop that was met with the public dismay and vociferous condemnation of at least some Liberal constituents. Notably, such indifference to public opinion and detachment of policy making from participatory processes of rule was entirely in keeping with the Concert paradigm the Gladstone government now adopted. After all, while the Midlothian-articulated Concert paradigm was as committed to popular sovereignty as it was to human rights, national rights, and national self-determination, the Concert founded at Berlin subordinated the former principle as much as the latter three to the principles of its regime, notably both in states under the regime's supervision and in the regime's member states themselves.

Third, while the *Daily News*'s conversion to the territorial Concert paradigm was both public and unmistakable, after this conversion the paper argued, as is especially evident in the

language noted above, that it in fact had not changed its position at all, and that it, and the Liberal Party, were, as ever they had been, loyal and committed to the Concert. Such assumptions, arguments, and language demonstrated that sufficient confusion remained in British discussions of foreign policy about the Concert's precise nature as to offer the space for rhetorical acrobatics. That is, no unambiguous consensus had yet formed in such discussions as to what was definitively the 'true' Concert, with decision makers thenceforth being forced to either be for or against 'the' Concert. For the time being, partisans of different foreign policy programs could continue to proclaim their loyalty to a 'Concert' while leaving what this might mean in actual practice vague and undefined.

Meanwhile, during the Crises the Tory-aligned journals were never quite so divided as their Liberal-aligned counterparts in their analyses of, and recommendations for, British foreign policy making, especially as concerned the role of the Concert therein. For the most part, such journals echoed Conservative Party leadership in prioritizing loyalty to a Concert that accorded to the territorial state paradigm even while expressing sympathy for peoples under Ottoman rule. However, the Conservative press was not monolithic during the Crises and, while their differences were mainly over questions of degree rather than fundamental assumptions, goals, or values, some voices in this press diverged and evolved throughout this period, as just a few examples taken from two the most prominent Conservative-leaning journals, namely *The Times* and *The Standard*, must suffice to demonstrate.

At the outset of the Crises *The Times* cleaved closely to the Salisbury government's rapidly evolving policies, at first condemning and opposing the coup in Eastern Rumelia, then, upon learning of Russian hostility to unification, reversing its position and endorsing it. And such Concert ambivalence was on display in a 23 October 1885 article in which *The Times* argued that

It is understood that the objections urged by the British Government to the naked proposal of the *status quo* [i.e., a full and effective restoration of Ottoman rule in Eastern Rumelia] have been responsible for the delay in the setting of the European Concert in motion... But the duty of England is clear. This country may not be able to resist the will of the Continental Powers if they determine to abide by the letter rather than the spirit of the Treaty of Berlin. But we can enter an emphatic protest, at all events, against the injustice and the inexpediency of forcibly separating the Bulgarian provinces after their voluntary union, and of deposing Prince Alexander or reducing him to the necessity of abdication.⁵⁵

Thus, *The Times*, while neither denouncing, or rejecting the legitimacy of, the Concert's role in the Crises nor arguing that Britain ought to withdraw from, refuse to participate in, or act outside of the regime, was willing to countenance disrupting and impeding the Concert to some degree, ostensibly in the name Bulgarian national rights and self-determination. That is, *The Times* never questioned that British representatives ought to enter in, and be a full participant of, the pan-Concert conference in Istanbul/Constantinople, nor that Britain ought to accept the legitimacy of, and abide by, the resolutions thereof, but only advocated that Britain issue protests at that conference, even if this slowed the speed by which that conference arrived at its resolutions. It was at the same time notable that paper recognized that there could be, and indeed was, a distinction between the 'letter' and 'spirit' of the Berlin Treaty and that the Concert conference was determined to at least adhere to the former.

Yet six months later, and after Salisbury had both abandoned efforts to convince the pan-Concert conference in Istanbul/Constantinople to recognize Bulgarian-Rumelian unification and had embraced the formula articulated in the Tophane Agreement, *The Times* similarly evolved its position, as witness a 2 April 1886 article in which the paper argued that

The Powers have their own duty to fulfil. Their primary interest lies in the maintenance of European peace, and peace, as we have said, cannot be secured until the Bulgarian question is finally settled. If, therefore, Prince Alexander's consent to the settlement proposed by the Powers [i.e., to the Tophane Agreement] cannot be obtained, the Powers must endeavour to settle the matter without his consent and leave him to take the consequences.

Their [i.e., the Powers'] international right under the Treaty of Berlin is clear. The Porte is fully entitled under that instrument to nominate the Prince as Governor of Eastern Roumelia for five years, and the assent of the Powers is all that is needed to bring the nomination within the terms of the treaty. The preliminary consent of the Prince himself is not necessary... But he [i.e., Prince Alexander] is probably wise enough to accept accomplished facts, and politic enough to make it appear that in so doing he has only yielded to the *force majeure* of the European concert. A man might fairly expect to be forgiven for doing at such bidding what he would never be forgiven for doing voluntarily.⁵⁶

Notably, *The Times* was clear that the force to which Prince Alexander would in all probability, and in the event ultimately did, submit was neither Britain alone nor a factional *ad hoc* coalition or alliance bloc but the comprehensive Concert regime. Likewise, the Crises solution this force had compelled Alexander to accept was one that both preserved, if only formally, Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty at the expense of Bulgarian national self-determination and which exercised the Concert's collaborative, collective, and effective authority over a non-Berlin Treaty signatory regime. Thus, *The Times*, in a course vaguely reminiscent of the *Daily News*, followed Salisbury on path that led from ambivalence about, to emphatic loyalty to, a Concert regime predicted on the territorial state.

Conversely, *The Standard* was, like the *PMG*, from the outset of the Crises ironclad in its advocacy for British participation in, and adherence to, just such a Concert regime, arguing on 29 October, in reaction to the impending Istanbul/Constantinople conference, that

[Britain] was a party to the Treaty of Berlin, which bears the signature, together with Lord BEACONSFIELD's, of the present PRIME MINISTER (i.e., Lord Salisbury). Lord SALISBURY, therefore, can have experienced no difficulty in accepting it as the base of the Conference that the Powers shall seek for a solution of the difficulties that have arisen [i.e., shall resolve the Crises' according to such a framework] which shall not be incompatible with the Treaty of Berlin. England is always prompt to honour its own signature, and it would be impossible to refuse to accede to a principle so plainly binding on all who took part in the Congress of Berlin...

The third object [of the Berlin Treaty] was to secure what remained of the Ottoman Empire in Europe from attack, no matter from what quarter it proceeded [i.e., no matter what actor might threaten it and no matter what principle they might appeal to while doing so]... the Treaty of Berlin becomes a sagacious and statesman-like Instrument; and, so far, it has answered its purpose. At this moment [the Berlin Treaty] stands between Europe and war. It prevents Austria and Russia from rushing into arms. It enables Turkey to preserve a composed attitude. Finally, it keeps in order those unruly and unreasonable [Balkan] Principalities that are envious and uneasy in proportion to their insignificance... Therefore, the Treaty of Berlin needs no defense and in laying it down as a preliminary that the decisions of the Conference [i.e., the pan-Concert conference in Istanbul/Constantinople] must not be incompatible with the Treaty of Berlin, the Powers are acting with as much dignity as wisdom...

But to say that decisions of the Conference must not be incompatible with that Treaty is not to say that it must be neither altered nor modified in any single particular... England can with a safe conscience enter the Conference as a champion of the Treaty of Berlin; but it must be a Treaty of Berlin properly interpreted... England also has her ideas. They are not selfish ideas; they are not despotic ideas; they are not ideas incompatible with the happiness of the Balkan peninsula and the welfare of Turkey.⁵⁷

Thus, even from the Crises' inception *The Standard* was resolute in its advocacy for a solution framework that both adhered to the Berlin Treaty, and which thus accorded to the model ultimately enshrined in the Tophane Agreement. That is, for a solution that adhered, at least formally, to the principles of the Concert, especially as regarded that regime's Ottoman member state. And it was also notable that *The Standard* was convinced that during the Crises one of the principal elements that stood between Europe's great powers and a general war thereamong was the Berlin Treaty, and, hence, the Concert of Europe.

And *The Standard* was, also like the *PMG*, to maintain its loyalty to a Concert founded and defined by the Berlin Treaty throughout the Crises, a commitment especially on display in a 7 September 1886 article in which the paper declared, in reaction to the Russian orchestrated coup against Prince Alexander, that

According to public law and International engagements, any arrangement for the future [i.e., of the Principality of Bulgaria] must be made on the basis of the Treaty of Berlin. That Treaty gives no separate or exclusive right to any one Power. The settlement [of the new Bulgarian Question] must depend on the joint and consentient act of all the Signatories... [Russian proposals] can acquire validity only when they receive the seal of the Concert of Europe.⁵⁸

The Academe

During the Bulgarian Crises British debates between competing Concert paradigms over which might serve as a basis for Britain's foreign policy making, or whether any Concert model should do so at all, were not limited to journalists and state officials. Rather, the Crises marked a moment of such clarity, intensity, and crystallization in British public discussions of the Concert that some of the Britain's leading scholars on such matters felt it necessary to contribute their expertise to these discussions. And this contribution took the form of direct, and sometimes testy, exchanges between two Oxford professors about the precise nature of the Concert and its role in British foreign policy making, exchanges which played out on the pages of *The Times* throughout the Crises and whose points mirrored the debate between the *PMG* and *Daily News*.

One of these two scholars was Professor Thomas Erskine Holland, then a renown Chichele Professor of Public International Law at Oxford University who had in 1885, and thus immediately before the outbreak of the Crises, happened to publish a book entitled *The European Concert in the Eastern Question*, a book that would throughout the Crises be much cited in, and discussed across, the British press.⁵⁹ Holland's antagonist was Professor Edward Augustus Freeman, a similarly renown Regius Professor of History, also at Oxford, known for his antipathy for the Ottoman Empire and advocacy in favor of Balkan national movements.

This would be the only occasion on which professional academics of the Second Concert era would directly, at length, and in detail express their views in the press about what the Concert was, or ought to be, what principles it stood for, or ought to stand for, and what it did or did not do, or ought to do or not do. Consequently, this discussion will quote their debate at some length and attempt to put the professors' contributions thereto into direct conversation to the greatest extent practicable.

The debate began, in effect, with the publication of Holland's suddenly highly relevant book. In its introduction Holland argued that the Congress and Treaty of Vienna (and ergo the First Concert of Europe) ignored the Ottoman Empire, thereby placing that Empire outside of both the Treaty and the Concert regime it founded. However, Holland contended that the Concert had over time progressively extended its authority over the Ottoman regime, "tentatively since

1826, systematically since 1856 [i.e., since the Treaty of Paris].” This extension of Concert supervision over the Ottoman Empire had resulted in

A remarkable series of treaties, forming together a sort of *corpus iuris publici orientalis*, in which the rights of Turkey, of the new states which have been carved out of it, and of the semi-independent provinces which still remain subject to its suzerainty are declared and defined by the authority of the great powers collectively. On the one hand, the Turkish Empire is placed, as it were, under the tutelage of Europe; while, on the other hand, the claim of any single power to settle the destinies of that empire without the concurrence of the rest has been repeatedly negated. . . . The present work will contain the text in full of those treaties and other diplomatic acts which are the title-deeds of the states who have thus been wholly or partially freed by the European concert from the sovereignty of the Porte.⁶⁰

And in his chapter devoted to the Berlin Treaty Holland explained that “in the preceding chapters we have traced the gradual emancipation, under the supervision of Europe, of isolated out-lying portions of the Ottoman Empire. We now approach a larger subject.”⁶¹ He then argued that the Treaty was not, in his view, an affirmation of Ottoman state prerogatives, which he claimed the Treaty disavowed. Nor did the Treaty found a Concert international regime predicted on the territorial state principle. Rather, the Treaty was in the first place an affirmation of an already existing ‘Concert,’ one that notably excluded the Ottoman regime and whose principal function was to collectively regulate the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and to restrain individual actors from doing so unilaterally. That is, the Berlin Treaty was, according to Holland, an affirmation of the Concert as an instrument for preserving a balance of power among European great powers. Meanwhile, Holland asserted that “the greater questions – of the rise of new nationalities, the redistribution of territory, and the narrowing of Ottoman jurisdiction, have been newly, and in most cases for the first time, provided for by the Treaty of Berlin.”⁶²

However, Holland also expressed arguments and assumptions in his book that were sharply self-contradictory to those expounded above. That is, he argued that the determination of which states would be admitted to the Berlin Congress as full participants therein was made strictly on the basis of those states that had been full participants in the Congresses of Paris and London. That is, all states, but only those states, that had fully participated in the former two Congresses would be full participants in the Berlin Congress. Interestingly, Holland failed to note the fact that the Ottoman Empire had been just such a state.

Meanwhile, Holland maintained that reforming the Treaties these Congresses produced, i.e., the Treaties of Paris (1856) and London (1871), was the principal reason for convening, and was the chief concern of, the Berlin Congress. He then echoed the Berlin Treaty itself by noting that “such portions . . . of the earlier treaties [i.e., of Paris and London] as are not abrogated or modified by the later [i.e., Berlin] Treaty are expressly confirmed by it [i.e., by the Berlin Treaty]; and the unrepealed and permanent provisions of the three Treaties [i.e., of Paris, London, and Berlin], taken together, contain the now binding decision of the great powers as the settlement of Eastern Europe.”⁶³

Curiously, given his assumptions about the principal object of both the Berlin Treaty and Concert of Europe, namely to regulate the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, Holland then argued that, as regarded these “unrepealed and permanent provisions” and their “binding decision,” “the portions of the Treaty of Paris which are still in force [i.e., still in force as of 1885] relate to the admission of the Porte to the European concert (Art 7.) [and] to a resort to mediation before a war between the Porte and any one or more of the other signatories of the [Berlin] Treaty (8).” That is, Holland admitted that, in line with the basic assumptions and arguments of the present discussion, in 1885 the Ottoman Empire was, in point of fact, a full and

member of the Concert, an inter-state reality that had been established at Paris in 1856 and reaffirmed at Berlin in 1878. Moreover, that one of the fundamental principles of the Concert regime, of which the Ottoman Empire was a full member, was recourse to comprehensive, pan-Concert consultation rather than violence as a means of resolving conflicts between Concert member states, especially its Ottoman member state. Which of these two sets of assumptions about the Berlin Treaty, the Concert of Europe, and the Ottoman Empire Holland prioritized in his thinking on British foreign policy making would become clear in his debate with Freeman.⁶⁴

Professor Freeman, meanwhile, first laid out his assumptions and arguments in a 22 October 1885 letter to *The Times* in which he declared that

In the present state of things in South-Eastern Europe we have naturally heard a good deal about the Powers, the Powers of Europe, not uncommonly about Europe [itself] in a kind of personified fashion... Bishop Butler said long ago... that if conscience "had power, as [much as] it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world"... It is assumed [in the press] that [the Powers] have authority, as they have manifest power, and that it is therefore for them absolutely to govern the world.

Some of us may be inclined to ask by what right this is... It may commonly be prudent for a weak nation to obey the orders of a stronger nation, or of several stronger nations, or of several Powers, one of which [i.e., almost certainly, Austria-Hungary] is not a nation... [Yet] as far as one can see, no State, great or small, does in practice hold itself bound by its treaty engagements a day longer than happens to be convenient... [a] treaty is a convenient way for making a momentary settlement... None of the Powers that sign [a] treaty seems to look on [that] treaty as a law, a law to be obeyed till it is repealed by the same authority that enacted it – that is, by the consent of the Powers that signed the treaty. If any of the Powers that signed the Treaty of Berlin wishes to back out of the observance of that treaty it will do so if it thinks it can do so with safety. And the other Powers will take its backing out quietly, unless they think their own interests are affected thereby...

But the hard thing, as some of us think, is that, while the Powers that sign treaties get out of them so easily, the treaties are pressed so very tightly on the necks of those who have not signed them, and who, some of us hold, are in no way bound by them. Very hard words have lately been applied to some of the struggling nations of South-Eastern Europe because they have not held themselves to be bound by the arrangements made for them by other people. They are charged with the high crime of breaking the Treaty of Berlin, a treaty to which they never consented.⁶⁵

Four days later Holland responded to Freeman directly, thus inaugurating their debate in the *The Times*.

My eminent colleague, Mr. Freeman, in his letter which you printed on the 22d, raises an interesting question as to the right of the great Powers to arrogate to themselves a controlling authority in Europe. But he complicates this abstract question with a practical one... and adds what I venture to think a most unfortunate disparagement of the binding force of treaties... Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria are not chargeable with the high crime of breaking the Treaty of Berlin, because such a charge... would point to a breach of contract, while none of these States was a party to the [Berlin] treaty...

The theory of the obligation of treaties is contained in the protocol signed at London on behalf of all the great Powers on the 13th of March, 1871, to the effect that "no Power can liberate itself from engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers, by means of an amicable arrangement." Since this proposition must admittedly be taken subject to the tacit proviso *rebus sic stantibus* [i.e., so long as international conditions have not fundamentally changed since the time of signing], it is no doubt liable to evasion, but as undoubtedly does exercise a restraining influence on international conduct.

The units of international society are not nations, but States. Diplomatic discussions between France and Great Britain... are fortunately carried on without any reference to the constituent elements of the United Kingdom [i.e., fortunately given the problematic place of Irish nationalism in Britain].

Finally... the old plan for the preservation of the peace in Europe was for a State which thought itself threatened by the aggrandizement of its neighbour to go to war to maintain the balance of power. The European concert, which has existed more or less, since the Congress of Vienna, endeavours to obtain a similar result by united action... The presence at a congress of a representative of any State, great or small, the affairs of which are to be a topic of discussion... is, indeed, most desirable, but to insist on anything more would be to make government by congress impossible.⁶⁶

Freeman in turn countered Holland, arguing that

My position... comes to this, that the right claimed by certain of the Powers of Europe to dictate to all the [other and lesser] Powers is one which has no moral strength... Against Mr. Holland's third position [i.e., that only sovereign territorial states existed in, and that nations were invisible to, European international law and relations] there is not a word to say from the point of view of his technical science [i.e., international law]. That science undoubtedly deals, not with nations, but with States. Only I think it is a pity that it is so; that is, that it is a pity States do not better correspond with nations than they do...

Mr. Holland, as he speaks of "government by Congress," looks on the dominion exercised over Europe by the six Powers as a "government." But the consent of the governed, in any shape, is surely wanting... It is by sheer superiority of physical force, and by nothing else, that "Europe" commanded Norway to be united to Sweden, and now commands Southern Bulgaria [i.e., Eastern Rumelia] to be disunited from Northern [i.e., from the Principality]. Mr. Holland looks forward mournfully to the danger of "government by Congress" becoming impossible. Supposing "government by Congress" did become impossible, what then [i.e., what would be so bad about that]?⁶⁷

Adding on 9 January 1886 that

I see that your [i.e., *The Times*'] Correspondent at Vienna talks of the "aspirations" of Greece, and treats those aspirations as "illusions." That is a way of speaking which is perfectly natural at Vienna... Whenever there is a hope of redressing some wrong, or setting free, for instance, some portion of mankind, it is in some quarters thought that such hopes are at once set aside by calling them "aspirations"... of course, despots and those who live in the atmosphere of despots are apt to look on every such "aspiration" of a free people as an "illusion..." Yet right has [sometimes] triumphed over despots and diplomatists...

All that is asked [by Greece] is that "Europe" should fulfil the promise which it has twice made [i.e., according to Freeman, the promises made at the Congress of Berlin and during the Dulcigno/Ulcinj Crisis to annex Epirus to Greece]... The honour of Europe was pledged to the deliverance of a region which takes in Joannina [i.e., of Epirus]. I am quite ready to see some master of diplomacy start up and say that Europe was not pledged to anything of the kind... It is perfectly true that no definite promise legally binding was made; "Europe" at Berlin took care that the clauses tending to bondage should be much more strictly binding than the clauses tending to freedom... But it was a promise of that kind which, in ordinary life, no honest man would think of trying to evade...

Lord Salisbury has at this moment before him as noble an opportunity as ever was set before the leading statesman of a free people... Freedom has a heavy charge against him for his share in the deeds of 1878 [i.e., for his participation in the Berlin Congress].⁶⁸

Predictably, Holland viewed the Crises' Greek dimension differently, arguing that

Thanks to the European Concert, there seems reason to hope that the Greek incident may be considered as closed... Even persons who are too well-informed to continue to believe that the honour of Europe was

pledged by that Treaty [i.e., of Berlin] to transfer Epirus from Turkey to Greece seem to cherish a languishing belief that the 24th Article of the Treaty still contains unexhausted potentialities of Hellenic aggrandizement. I have no hesitation in saying that the operation of Article 24 is already exhausted. A diplomatic text is less alluring reading than a rhetorical disquisition upon the wrongs of an oppressed nationality, but it has the advantage of being at once precise and authoritative.⁶⁹

In response, Freeman argued that

It is always pleasant to dispute with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Holland... [and] I do not think I should have taken up my pen if he had not, as it seems to me... gone a step or two beyond the range of his own craft... [I] still maintain that the "honour of Europe" is pledged to a work which Mr. Holland, from his point of view, naturally calls "transferring Epirus from Turkey to Greece," but which I, from my point of view, call the deliverance of a certain part of enslaved Greece from Turkish oppression...

I must once more protest against the phrase "Europe." By "Europe" Mr. Holland means, not the whole of Europe, but only a part. "Europe" has lately come to be used, in a rather slipshod way,... to mean six particular European Powers [i.e., the Berlin Treaty signatories minus the Ottoman regime], who, I venture to say, have no exclusive right to the name... I venture to say that the "concert," the "mandate," and all the rest of it, are absolutely without moral strength. The authority of the six Powers is an authority of brute force and of nothing else. If they do not fall to thrashing one another, they can thrash all the rest – that is certain... If Mr. Holland had not used the word "honour," his case would have been unassailable...

I have said all along that "Europe," to use the conventional phrase, did not bind itself to the deliverance of Joannina and the neighbouring lands [i.e., of Epirus], in any form of words which, in the case of private men, would have been held in a court of law to be a binding contract... At the time of the Berlin Treaty in 1878 a line taking in Joannina was suggested by the Powers for deliverance, and at the time of the Berlin Conference in 1880 a like line was again suggested. We may be sure that at both times everybody in Joannina and the coasts thereof understood the words of Europe as meaning that Europe was going to do its best to secure the deliverance of their country. They would have said that the particular wording was chosen in order not to wound the susceptibilities of the Turk, or some other of those special objects of diplomatic tenderness which seem so much more precious than justice and freedom...

Mr. Holland and I necessarily speak two different languages. As Professor of Diplomacy and International Law, he is bound to use the language of formulae; as Professor of History I am allowed to use the language of facts. He is bound only to see Powers; I am allowed to see nations. He is bound to use the word "Greece" to mean only that part of Greece which has yet been delivered [i.e., the territorial state termed the 'Kingdom of Greece'], and to use the word "Turkey" to mean those parts of Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria which the Turk still holds in bondage [i.e., the Ottoman Empire's Balkan territories]. I am free to use a nomenclature which better expresses the facts. What I, and those who think with me, seek is right and freedom; we wish to see certain lands which are in bondage set free.⁷⁰

In the end Holland the last word, asserting that

[There is an] interesting communication from Mr. Freeman which I have just read in *The Times* of yesterday. I have to thank my learned friend and colleague for his courteous admission of the perfect accuracy of my statements and the perfect soundness of my inferences, within the range of my own craft. But what is much more important, we now have it under Mr. Freeman's own hand that, according to international law (dyslogistically described as "the technical laws of Mr. Holland's craft"), nothing remains to be done under Article 24 of the Treaty of Berlin... The question really turns upon the words of the Treaty, not upon the meaning which may or may not have been put upon it by "everybody in Joannina and the coast thereof"... in the dealings of nations I know of no distinction between a "legal contract" and an "honorable promise."⁷¹

Several of Holland's and Freeman's points of disagreement in this debate, many of which closely resembled the near-simultaneous debate then playing out between the *Daily News* and

PMG, bear special emphasis. First, Freeman denied outright that international laws, let alone international regimes, existed in practice, and framed both international law and the principle of international regime as being neither desirable nor plausible even in theory. All treaties were, according to Freeman, nothing more than *ad hoc* and temporary understandings, or perhaps truces, between actors who understood themselves as being bound by nothing greater than their interests when they were wicked and by their moral commitment to right and justice when they were virtuous. The actual wordings of treaties were in Freeman's view only intended to accommodate the sensitivities and susceptibilities of various parties thereto so as to expeditiously achieve agreement, wordings that were readily agreed to by all as all understood that none considered themselves in any way actually bound by the content or meaning of those words.

Thus, rather than giving a moment's consideration to treaties, laws, or international regimes, or indeed state self-interest, Freeman argued that foreign policy decision makers had a moral obligation to act in the name of right and justice, so far as they themselves saw right and justice, and to do so with other like-minded actors when possible but to do so alone when necessary. And this responsibility was in Freeman's view all the more compelling on powerful actors when they encountered situations wherein other powerful actors were denying a just and righteous object to, and still more when they were subjugating, weaker actors.

Yet, any comprehensive commitment among international actors to a regime of mutually agreed upon principles was an anathema to Freeman. Thus, he could not accept even the possibility of some framework that would systematize and spell out a consistent and exhaustive set of conditions by which to determine whether, in any and all cases, such an intervention would be just and right or unjust and wicked. Likewise, that would systemize and spell out a uniform process by which, in any and all cases, such an intervention might be carried out righteously and justly. Rather, such determinations about an intervention could only be made on a case-by-case basis, with the decisive factor in each case being the dictates of the intervening actor's conscience. And among the just and righteous causes that Freeman's conscience felt were deserving of British patronage was that of national self-determination, especially the national self-determination of small Balkan national movements.

Conversely, Holland argued that treaties founded a corpus of systematic, authoritative, and, if not permanent, then at least enduring international law that was mutually binding on all their signatories. And these signatories collectively became thereby members of comprehensive international regimes, regimes that were charged with the realization and maintenance of the laws and underlying principles articulated in the treaties that founded them. While, in Holland's view, international regimes were imperfect instruments for realizing and maintaining a treaty's principles, for example by allowing the members of such regimes to sometimes evade these *de facto*, the force these regimes exerted on inter-state relations was still non-trivial in actual practice.

Indeed, Holland argued that in the condition of international regime it was immaterial to inter-state relations or foreign policy making whether any one state-ruling regime viewed as righteous and just, or as wicked and unjust, any actor, act, or condition that fell under that international regime's jurisdiction. Still less consequential were the views of some, and least of all of individual, citizens of even member states on such matters. And this applied no matter how strongly or sincerely the consciences of such individual actors, groups, to citizens were outraged by an act, actor, or condition, or how righteous or wicked these appeared to in fact be. Rather, in the condition of international regime the only authority whose views were material, i.e., the only agent that could legitimately authorize or command an inter-state act, e.g., an intervention by one

or several states against one or several others, was the comprehensive pan-signatory authority of a treaty's signatory states, what Holland referred to as "government by congress."

Yet, even more critical for the present discussion of the Concert of Europe was not the points on which Freeman and Holland disagreed but those on which they shared a consensus. And this especially concerned what they both agreed were the conditions and realities actually extent in European inter-state relations at the time of the Bulgarian Crises. Notably, while Freeman bemoaned and expressed outrage at such conditions and realities even as he recognized them, Holland saw them as being, if not ideal, then less disagreeable than Freeman's alternative of dissolving the existing international regime, abrogating all existing treaties, and liquidating international law as such.

First, Freeman's repeated advocacy for the supremacy of national self-determination in inter-state relations forced Holland to clarify his own position on the place of 'the nation' in inter-state law. While in his book Holland had claimed that the Berlin Treaty had introduced "the rise of new nationalities" into such law, he had also affirmed in it that the Ottoman Empire, a state that was manifestly defined solely by territory (i.e., was in no sense national), was an unambiguous member of the Concert, and thus entitle to all the guarantees that derived therefrom. Now, Holland was explicit that nations did not exist in, and were invisible to, international law and European inter-state relations, even as collective rights-bearing minority communities within states (such as, say, Britain's Irish community). Rather, purely territorial states, such as the Ottoman Empire, were the sole legitimate entities and actors in such law and relations. And Freeman did not challenge but rather affirmed that, regrettably in his view, this was in fact the case in the existing theory and practice of European international law and inter-state relations,

Second, both Holland and Freeman recognized that throughout the Crises foreign policy makers in the Berlin Treaty's signatory states (i.e., the Concert's member states) had enforced, if sometimes only formally, this principle of the territorial state, especially as concerned the Ottoman Empire, against would-be challengers to it. And both agreed that these challenges had during the Crises been predicted in the first place on appeals to national rights and national self-determination. That is, both agreed that, however sympathetic they might have been to such appeals, decision makers in the Treaty signatory states had during the Crises prioritized loyalty to the Treaty and Concert above all other concerns, and subordinated, at least *de jure*, the principles of national rights and national self-determination thereto.

Third, both scholars recognized a unanimous assumption among all these decision makers that Europe's lesser powers, especially those in the Balkans, occupied a subordinate position in a two-tier system of inter-state relations. Moreover, that the lesser powers and states on the lower tier of this system were under the collective and collaborative supervision of the great powers that had comprehensively signed the Berlin Treaty. Fourth, and finally, both scholars acknowledged that these decision makers had rejected conflict resolution by unilateral actors, *ad hoc* coalitions, or alliance blocs, let alone recourse to violence. Rather all had maintained a commitment to the Treaty and Concert's fundamental principle of comprehensive, pan-regime consultation among all Treaty signatory states, and ergo all Concert member states, throughout the Crises.

However, Freeman and Holland were not the only parties to their discussion. Rather, *The Times* itself also weighed in on the debate playing out on its pages. On 24 October 1885, thus during paper's fleeting hostility to the Istanbul/Constantinople conference and advocacy for full

recognition of Bulgarian-Rumelian unification, *The Times* published a review and analysis of Holland's book in which the journal concluded that

Professor Holland shows how largely the principal points of the Eastern question have been concentrated in the Treaty of Berlin... In the Treaty of Berlin was till a month ago to be sought the mind of aggregate Europe on the ultimate fate of Turkey as determined by the rise of new nationalities, the redistribution of territory, and the narrowing of Ottoman jurisdiction. That is the key-note of this important publication...

Its [i.e., the book's] appearance this year seems a stroke of unintentional irony at the European Concert it is designed to illustrate, and at the presumption of attempting to bind nationalities by congresses and protocols. The splitting up of the Greater Bulgaria, which Russia had chosen to create according to its own discretion by the Peace of San Stefano, was the pet achievement of the Treaty of Berlin. The population of the two districts has set the treaty at defiance, and may be said to have so far torn it up. Servia and Greece have been boasting for weeks past that they meditate similar infractions of its [i.e., the Treaty's] provisions. For a time it appeared that their [i.e., Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece's] dreams were about to be realized, and that the Chichele Professor of International Law [i.e., Holland] would, in a second edition, very shortly have to class the Treaty of Berlin with its elders as an instrument of which "the surviving portions relate almost exclusively to subsidiary questions." All the Balkan States proclaim everywhere, and have declared in our columns, that, as two of them [i.e., Bulgaria and Greece] have violated the treaty, it no longer binds any...

We are told that a majority of the great Powers intend to teach the Balkan peoples at all events that the Treaty of Berlin is not to be tampered with by them. It is satisfactory to learn that the English Government will be no party to an inhibition fruitful of future confusion [i.e., will be no party to such an intervention]. The English protest [i.e., against full restoration of Ottoman rule in Eastern Rumelia, issued by British representative at the Istanbul/Constantinople conference], it may be hoped, will not be spoilt by the admixture of any proposal, such as has been rumoured, for a merely personal union of the two territories in question. [The crisis] cannot be solved by... the instalment of PRINCE ALEXANDER as the SULTAN's lieutenant in Eastern Rumelia... The clauses of the Treaty of Berlin on the subject of Eastern Roumelia contemplate its existence as a province of Turkey. With the most honest intentions no Prince of Bulgaria could govern it in that spirit.⁷²

Meanwhile, in a 9 January 1886 article *The Times* proposed a Crises solution predicated on an *ad hoc* Ottoman-Bulgarian coalition against the other Balkan states. Namely, that the Ottoman regime would recognize Bulgarian-Rumelian unification with the understanding that a now-unencumbered Bulgaria would employ its undivided resources to crush (a notably already vanquished and abject) Serbia, while a similarly unencumbered Ottoman Empire would employ its now-undivided resources to crush Greece. Thereafter, *The Times* commented on Freeman's arguments, expounded in the paper's morning edition of that same day, by admitting that

We are quite aware that in recommending this policy to the SULTAN we cannot look for the approval of Mr. FREEMAN... Mr. FREEMAN seems to hold that the claims of enslaved populations to freedom are indefeasible and are to be pressed in season and out of season in sublime disregard of time, circumstances, and the interests of European peace...

But in order to adapt [Mr. Freeman's] language to the depraved comprehension of the "despots and diplomatists" – by which term we are to understand the Powers of Europe and their representatives – Mr. FREEMAN advances and endorses the claim of Greece for compensation, and interprets that word to mean the yearnings of an enslaved people for freedom,... But there is nothing incompatible with [our] sympathy [for Greece] [and] the proposition that Greece is not entitled to imperil the peace of Europe by an ill-timed or premature assertion of her claims, and to this proposition we must, in spite of MR. FREEMAN, declare our emphatic assent...

Mr. FREEMAN, it is true, manages to make it appear that the present claims of Greece are founded on a promise being, as he says, “of that kind which in ordinary life no ordinary man would think of trying to evade.” He refers us to Mr. HOLLAND’s work on the “European Concert in the Eastern Question” for the history of the evasion. But that work – whose very title is a protest and testimony against the independent action of Greece – also contains an account of the efforts made, not without considerable success, by the “despots and diplomatists” to fulfill their promises [i.e., those formally made in treaties and conventions].

The case of Macedonia stands on a different footing. The Treaty of Berlin contains no promise of any kind that Macedonia should be divided, as Mr. FREEMAN proposes, according to national affinities, between Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The difficulty of any such subdivision lies in the well-known fact, of which Mr. FREEMAN takes no account, that various races in Macedonia are inextricably intermingled.⁷³

The Times’s points of consistency and evolution in its commentary on Holland’s arguments and assumptions bear special emphasis. In terms of the former, the paper was consistent throughout such analyses in what it understood to be the principles of the Berlin Treaty, and ergo of the Concert of Europe. As its review of Holland’s book makes clear, the paper presumed that the chief function of the Treaty and Concert were not, as Holland contended in his book, to “wholly or partially free states from the sovereignty of the Porte.” Nor were Treaty and Concert dedicated to managing the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire so as to preserve a balance of power among the great powers.

Rather, both Treaty and Concert were, in *The Times*’s view, predicated in part on “the presumption of attempting to bind nationalities by congresses and protocols.” That is, predicted on a subordination of national rights and national self-determination, especially as regarded Balkan national movements, to state prerogatives articulated in congresses, such as the Berlin Congress, and in protocols, such as those of the Berlin Treaty, especially as regarded an Ottoman Empire that had fully participated both in that Congress and in formulating those protocols. And *The Times* pointed to the division of San Stefano Bulgaria, in the name of Ottoman state prerogatives, as a “pet achievement of the Berlin Treaty” to specially demonstrate that this was indeed a fundamental presumption of that Treaty.

And events proved *The Times*’s conception of the Concert to be correct. Indeed, while “for a time it appeared that the [the Balkan nations’] dreams [of full national unification] were about to be realized,” in the end they were not. Rather the great powers (i.e., the Berlin Treaty signatories) did indeed “teach the Balkan peoples at all events that the Treaty of Berlin [was] not to be tampered with by them.” Moreover, the solution to the Crises ultimately was, in fact, an “admixture” that resulted in the “instalment of PRINCE ALEXANDER as the SULTAN’s lieutenant in Eastern Rumelia” (at least formally), thereby preserving Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity (if only *de jure*).

Thus, the Treaty of Berlin, and ergo the Concert of Europe, did not, as Professor Holland and a bevy of modern scholars contend (namely those of the “Berlin System” school), provide for “the rise of new nationalities.” Rather, the Treaty was an affirmation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of purely territorial states, namely of Treaty signatory and Concert member states, and the supersession of this principle over all others, including those of national rights and national self-determination, in European inter-state relations, a view which Holland himself came to emphasize in his debate with Freeman. Yet, as observed in the discussion of *The Times*’s reportage in relation to that of *The Standard*, the views of *The Times* also evolved throughout the Crises. However, *The Times* evolved not in its conception of the Treaty and Concert themselves but so only in its attitude about them, coming to embrace in its critique of Freeman what it had condemned in its discussion of Holland.

Meanwhile, both *The Times*'s recognition of the condition that would render any partition of Macedonia along national lines problematic if not impossible, namely that its mainly Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian populations were highly intermixed throughout its territory, and the paper's derision of Freeman for his ostensible ignorance of such conditions, bears noting. Indeed, Freeman had been equally at a loss as to how to resolve Serbia's invasion of Bulgaria or Greek ambitions against territory claimed by the latter. Notably, neither *The Times* nor Freeman made any mention of, or showed any concern for, Macedonia's (or indeed the Balkan's) non-Christian ethno-religious polities, such as 'Bosniaks,' Pomaks and Jews, or non-Christian or Christian-minority ethno-linguistic polities, such as Turks and Albanians.⁷⁴

Freeman's, almost certainly willful, blindness to such conditions and incapacity to devise means addressing them is highly illustrative of the shortcomings of his approach to international relations. That is, his conscience was clear when championing what he presumed to be the cause of small Christian nations in their struggle against what he also presumed to be a dogmatically Islamic, and, not coincidentally, sectarian, brutal, tyrannical, and backward, regime (namely, the Ottoman regime). So too was his personal moral compass dependable when navigating such struggles. Yet, Freeman's conscience became clouded and his moral compass unreliable when confronted with disputes between small Christian nations themselves. That is, conflicts that pitted what were in his view equally weak, and thus equally sympathetic, actors against one another and in which an application of Freeman's conception of freedom and justice to one community enjoying his sympathies necessarily entailed, according to his own apparent morality, oppression, injustice, and wickedness for another community that equally enjoyed such sympathies.

Still more confounding for Freeman would have been a conception of the Ottoman Empire as a weak, and therefore sympathetic, actor itself, at least *vis-à-vis* Europe's great powers. Notably, Freeman himself spoke consistently of there being but 'six' great powers, and there can be no conceivable doubt that the Ottoman Empire was excluded from that tabulation. Thus, he himself understood, if only subconsciously and implicitly, that such a conception of the Ottoman Empire was not the stuff of farce or sophistry.

Once international law, let alone international regime, to say nothing of the wicked and nihilistic principle of immediate and material self-interest, had been dispensed with in favor of conscience and morality alone as the basis of international relations, what was Freeman to do when conscience and morality became unreliable? It is perhaps to his fortune that Freeman was to die before the realization of his dreams, namely the abrogation of the Berlin Treaty, the dissolution of the Concert, and thus the liquidation of international law in, and the restoration of an international state of nature among, European inter-state relations, and especially the chief consequences of this, namely the Italo-Ottoman, Balkan, and First World Wars, rendered it impossible to simply ignore such paradoxes any longer.

The Decision Makers

The constraint of space forces this discussion to limit its examination of British foreign policy makers during the Crises to just the two who were most critical to the making of such policy, that is, the two who alternated as the heads of Britain's government, and led the two largest British parties, throughout the Crises, namely Lord Salisbury and William Gladstone. While the foreign policy programs of each charted distinct, dynamically evolving, and twisted

paths, they both also mostly, and ultimately, adhered to a policy program of commitment to the Berlin Treaty, the Concert Europe.

Despite having personally participated in the Berlin Congress and that his personal signature was affixed to the Berlin Treaty, the British press observed that Salisbury was during his first tenure as prime minister (June 1885-January 1886) sometimes ambivalent about, and even occasionally hostile to, both the Treaty and the Concert. Rather than being constrained by a commitment to an international regime, Salisbury sometimes expressed a preference for British ‘splendid isolation’ and the ‘freedom of action’ to pursue, unilaterally if need be, what he and his government saw as Britain’s immediate material interests as they, and they alone, saw fit.⁷⁵

In the Crises such interests were, in the Salisbury government’s view, the speedy liquidation of all Russian influence in the Balkans, and thus the elimination of any Russian threat to (successively): Istanbul, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the eastern Mediterranean (especially to Britain’s new eastern Mediterranean base in Cyprus), the Suez Canal, and thus to British trade routes to India. The Salisbury government concluded that this end could best be achieved by assuming patronage of full Bulgarian-Rumelian unification in the face of Russian opposition to it. Thus, it was hoped, transforming an aggrandized Bulgaria into, if not a British client state, then at least a state that would maintain a baseline hostility toward, and thus be a regional bulwark against, St. Petersburg.⁷⁶

Admittedly, British papers, some with approval (such as the *PMG* and *The Standard*) and some with censure (such as the *Daily News*), largely interpreted some of the Salisbury government’s early Crises actions as conforming to, maintaining Britain’s place in, and accepting the supervision of the Berlin Treaty and the Concert. Namely, that government’s acquiescence to send a British representative to the Istanbul/Constantinople conference, rather than attempting, as some journals advocated, to solve the Crises unilaterally or through bi-lateral negotiations, or to deny the conference’s legitimacy through a boycott of it.

Yet other papers noted that the Salisbury government’s uncompromising insistence on full Bulgarian-Rumelian unification, a position to which it alone cleaved at the conference, rendered the government an opponent of, rather than participant in, the conference and thus an opponent of Concert itself. And this view only seemed confirmed by the general obstinacy of the new – and Salisbury appointed – British ambassador in Istanbul/Constantinople, William Arthur White. Nevertheless, before Salisbury government left office at the end of January 1886 it had both accepted the main points of what would become the Tophane Agreement and begun British involvement in, even leadership of, the pan-Concert naval operation against Greece, and had notably done so through its participation in pan-regime consultations in Istanbul/Constantinople.⁷⁷

Throughout these developments Gladstone and his shadow cabinet had declined to offer any Liberal Party foreign policy program as an alternative to those progressively adopted by the Salisbury government during the Crises. This had led to much speculation in the British, and indeed non-British, press, before, during, and after Britain’s November/December 1885 general election, about whether a Gladstone government might adopt or disavow the ultimately Berlin Treaty- and Concert-loyal policies of the Salisbury government. Indeed, was not Gladstone the author of the “Bulgarian Horrors?” Had he not been a champion of the (Christian) Balkan national movements during the uprisings of the 1870’s? Had he not articulated a Concert of human and national rights during his Midlothian campaign?⁷⁸

Yet on 19 February 1886, within weeks of coming into government (in January), and in an address that was directly quoted in at least 18 different British journals published across the width and breadth of the country, Gladstone announced that

reference has been made to the question of the Concert of Europe, and it is to us [i.e., the Gladstone government] a matter of full satisfaction that the great Powers of Europe have been working together on this occasion [i.e., of the Bulgarian Crises], and in the spirit of that concert we shall undoubtedly continue to act. It is a great satisfaction to us to be able to follow without any deviation, so far as I [i.e., Gladstone himself] am aware, the course that appears to us, according to our present knowledge, to have been marked out by our predecessors in office [i.e., the Salisbury government].⁷⁹

And indeed, Gladstone would remain faithful to this program of Treaty and Concert loyalty throughout his tenure prime minister (February 1886-July 1886). Likewise, as the British press noted, Salisbury would maintain the continuity of a British policy program of commitment to the Treaty and Concert, as adopted by himself and preserved by Gladstone, for the remainder of the Crises after his own return to government in July 1886.⁸⁰

Salisbury's and Gladstone's mutual ambivalence about, and even hostility to, the species of Concert that served as the basis of British foreign policy making during the Crises derived from divergent origins. Salisbury's lay in ambivalence about the principle of international regime itself, and in a preference for the condition of an international state of nature, wherein he would have the 'freedom of action' to pursue what he saw as Britain's immediate material interests. Gladstone's lay not in opposition to the principle of international regime itself, but in a preference for a regime of human and national rights. Yet both came to embrace a species of Concert predicated on the territorial state as the basis of their Crises policy programs. Indeed, as concerns the latter, the *Bristol Mercury* was on the nose when it reported on 11 February 1886 that "Mr. Gladstone is in a special sense the creator of the concert of Europe and it is not likely he would destroy his own handiwork, even though it is being used for a purpose he did not contemplate six years ago."⁸¹ And much of what can be said about Salisbury and Gladstone can also be said about other key decision makers in their respective governments, such as the Conservative Lord Randolph Churchill or the Liberal Lord Rosebery.⁸²

Salisbury and Gladstone's foreign policy program reversals are notable in two further respects. First, they are quite familiar to any observer of modern foreign policy making. In such one often observes politicians out of government decrying a sitting government's acceptance of, and commitment to, constraining sets of international norms. Only to then observe these same politicians, accepting, even embracing, sometimes shyly (as Gladstone did during the Bulgarian Crises), and sometimes openly, the same commitments. That is, one observes that what is most decisive for the program of foreign policy makers, in that policy space that remains easily the least accountable to participatory politics, is not so much party affiliations, purported values, or ostensible ideologies, but whether or not a policy maker is actually responsible for making real decisions that will have material consequences. In opposition one is free, in their pursuit of office, to expound on the ideal, in power one must confront the material limitations of reality.

Secondly, these reversals underscore the degree to which the intensity of Concert debates in the British press and in British academia failed to register in British politics during the Crises. Rather, this quiescence in British politics as regarded its foreign policy program came part and parcel with a consensus of Concert loyalty shared by the Tory and Liberal leadership. Notably, such had not been true of British politics during past Second Concert era crises, nor would it be true of its future ones.

Conclusion

The Demise of the Second Concert

The same assumptions about, and commitments to, the Second Concert that had contributed to the peaceful resolution of the Egyptian and Bulgarian Crises during the 1880's would continue to facilitate pan-great power peace throughout the *fin de siècle*. Indeed, two more major crises would break out among such relations during the following decade, namely the Hamidian Massacres Crisis and the Creten Crisis. In both Crises actors challenged the Concert not by appealing to such material concerns as the balance of power or state self-interest, but to abstract principles such as minority, national, and human rights. Yet in the end both crises were resolved by Concert diplomacy and according to the Concert's principles.

However, the Treaty of Berlin, and the Concert regime it founded, were not immortal. Over the first decade of the 20th century European empires filled in with colonial seizures of land the final blank extra-European spaces on their globes, and reached the limits of their capacities as they confronted insuperable extra-European forces. Consequently, the focus of expansionist elements among Europe's great powers returned to Europe itself. At the same time, European great power relations increasingly bifurcated between two increasingly rigid alliance blocs. Under such conditions, commitments to the Concert among its member states declined. The fatal moment arrived in 1908.

In that year, the administrative and military turmoil surrounding the Young Turk revolution eroded to new lows the Ottoman Empire's capacity to resist opportunistic predation on its territory. Yet the revolution also seemed as though it might democratize, liberalize, and revitalize the Empire, and thus provide both the means and a justification for its reclaiming effective Ottoman authority in territories nominally falling under its sovereignty but ruled *de facto* by external actors. Meanwhile, Bosnia had become the keystone of an ambitious Habsburg reform program, centered on the transformation of the Dual Monarchy into a 'trialist' Austro-Yugoslav-Hungarian state, a program that many of its proponents believed was the best, and perhaps last and only, means of arresting what they saw as the Monarchy's decline and ensuring its survival. Thus, for reasons both reactive and premeditated the Habsburg regime dissolved the incongruity in Bosnia between international formality and geopolitical reality by annexing the territory.¹

This annexation, along with Bulgaria's simultaneous declaration of independence and annexation of Eastern Rumelia, ignited a firestorm of outrage among foreign policy makers across all the Concert's member states, save those in the German Empire. The Habsburg regime, as well as Bulgaria's, refused calls from these Concert members to either rescind their annexations and declarations or to participate in a pan-Concert conference or congress to mediate the resulting Bosnian Crisis (1908-09), a position which German foreign policy makers supported unwaveringly. In the event, the Crisis was resolved by various *Realpolitik* machinations and public and confidential factional negotiations among Concert members, predicated on considerations of power (its balance and its preponderance), self-interested *raison d'état*, and coercion (including naked threats of violence). The upshot was a piecemeal series of bi-lateral and unilateral declarations by all of Europe's great powers that retroactively approved the Dual Monarchy's annexation of Bosnia.²

Yet there could be no doubt that these annexations, declarations, negotiations, and threats transgressed not merely the spirit but the letter of both the Berlin Treaty and of the Concert's

principles. These acts had violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Concert's Ottoman member state and they had resolved a crisis among Concert members not by means of comprehensive and collaborative consultation but on the basis of factional, even secret, negotiations and by open coercion. And there could be just as little doubt that in so acting the ruling regimes of Austria-Hungary and of Germany had instigated, and in allowing for such acts the Concert's other members had ratified, the abrogation of the Berlin Treaty and the dissolution of the Concert.

That European inter-state relations after the Bosnian Crisis were no longer carried out in what until then had been the harmonious tone of the Concert international regime, but in a recognizably new and more discordant key of international state of nature, is a fact widely recognized by scholars. One renowned historian of the period argues, for example, that "the Bosnian Crisis first showed to Europe the shadow of a general war"³ Meanwhile another asserts that "the Bosnian annexation crisis has been seen as a significant landmark on the road to polarization and war, if not actually a 'dress-rehearsal' for 1914."⁴ It is therefore notable that while the most serious challenges to the Concert over the thirty years of its existence were driven by such abstract and novel principles as minority, national, and human rights, the more material and ancient considerations of state self-interest, balance of power, realpolitik, and great power competition were the bases of its ultimate destruction.

Moreover, that the principal agents of the Concert's destruction were Habsburg foreign policy makers is also notable and laden with dramatic irony. Habsburg advocates of annexation assumed that this act, about which they did not inform even their German ally ahead of time, would increase the Monarchy's security and independence. It would do so, it was believed, both by expanding Austria-Hungary's sheer material and territorial resources and by affirming that the Monarchy was no mere German client state but remained a great power in its own right, capable of carrying out an independent foreign policy under its own authority. Yet the annexation achieved the opposite of both these aims. In fact, it destroyed the only means by which the Monarchy could have preserved itself as a great power and independent actor.

The annexation so isolated the Monarchy that it became entirely dependent on Germany for its security, thenceforth exercising foreign policy only by the latter's permission and otherwise following Germany's lead. Meanwhile, it was simply a material fact that the Austro-Hungarian state could no longer vindicate its status as a great power by force of arms alone, a condition that Bosnia's meager resources could do nothing to improve. Thus, the surest defense of the Dual Monarchy's interests, and its ability to engage in foreign policy as a truly independent actor lay in pens and paper rather than with bullets and bombs. That is, such prerogatives were best safeguarded as a member of an international regime that guaranteed its members' sovereignty and territorial integrity and ensured conflict resolution by means of consultation rather than violence. And the Monarchy instigated the destruction of just such a regime. It was thus true, as has often been said, that in the 20th century the Habsburg regime 'committed suicide out of fear of death.'⁵

After the Concert's dissolution European great power relations returned to the condition of an international state of nature, and the consequences were not long in coming. Within six months of the Bosnian Crisis's resolution Italy's Victor Emmanuel III and Russia's Nicholas II signed the Racconigi Bargain, paving the way, just two years later, for Italy to invade and annex territory that was both *de facto* and *de jure* under Ottoman rule, namely Tripolitania (today, Libya) in the Italo-Ottoman War (1911-12). In doing so the Kingdom of Italy committed the first act of overt war by one great power against another since the Russo-Ottoman War more than

three decades before, thus ending what thus proved to be Europe's second longest period of unbroken pan-great power peace since the advent of its state system.⁶

It was notable that Italy's ruling regime undertook such actions without even a perfunctory justifying rationale other than that of sheer right of conquest. Moreover, the crisis generated by this war was resolved not by means of a comprehensive and collaborative pan-great power congress or conference, but by an Italian dictate in bilateral Italo-Ottoman negotiations. Nor did the violence end with the Italy's invasion of Tripolitania. Rather, the following year the first of what would prove to be two Balkan wars broke out, namely the First (1912-13) and Second (1913) Balkan Wars. In fact, there would be war among or revolving around the defunct Second Concert's erstwhile member states every year from 1911 until 1923.⁷

Unlike with the Bosnian and Italo-Ottoman War Crises, Europe's great powers succeeded in organizing a comprehensive conference to address the crisis generated by these Balkan Wars, namely the London Conference (1912-13). Yet, this Conference excluded the Ottoman Empire as a full participant and was remarkable only for its dysfunction and impotence. Unlike its Berlin Congress predecessor, which imposed significant territorial and administrative modifications on both the victors and vanquished of the Russo-Turkish War, thereby radically transforming material conditions on the ground that established by force of arms, the London Conference succeeded in little more than recognizing, and thus legitimizing, such conditions.⁸

Such a resolution to the crisis betrayed just how disinterested the Conference's participants were in expending the political capital necessary to realize the kind of comprehensive resolutions, let alone founding the sort of international regime, as had been achieved at Berlin in 1878. At the same time, the principal byproduct of the Conference, namely the Treaty of London (1913), cohered to no recognizable hierarchy of principles. Indeed, one of the questions that so bedeviled the London Conference was the greatly increased respect that its plenipotentiaries accorded to the principle of national self-determination, and the inability of these plenipotentiaries to reconcile either competing national claims with one another or national rights with the prerogatives of the state.⁹

That the London Conference, and the Conference and Treaty of Bucharest which followed and amended it (1913), had achieved little and would require further pan-great power consultations, even absent the significant changes to the on-the-ground Balkan conditions everyone expected to immediately take place, was a generally recognized fact. However, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914 curtailed any further effort among great power foreign policy makers to organize such a conference or congress. The ensuing July Crisis (1914) thus would not, like the European crises of the 1880's and 90's, play out in the condition of an international regime, that is, within "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge[d] in a given area of international relations [namely that of crisis management]." Rather, they would play out in the condition of an international state of nature. The outcome was as predictable as it was calamitous.¹⁰

True, the great power actors of the European state system were less atomized between 1908 and 1914 than they had been during either of the two previous occasions when that system had existed in an international state of nature, i.e., from the founding of the state system to the First Concert (1648/1713-1815) and during the interregnum between the First and Second Concerts (1853-1878). Rather, between 1908 and 1914 these actors were divided between two more or less rigid collective defense alliance blocs, which, after the Concert's abrogation, were the European state system's sole remaining supra-state institutions preventing that system from

devolving fully into the fluid, anarchic, and perpetual war of all against all so characteristic of the continent's previous states of nature.

Yet, while some commentators were confident that these factional supra-state institutions were in themselves as capable of preventing a general war as any comprehensive, pan-great power international regime, the fact remained that, absent such a regime, the states of each power bloc existed with those of the other in a state of nature. Ergo, the only principles legitimately determining their relations were that of power, either its balance or its preponderance, and might as right. And in August 1914 the critical foreign policy makers of all the defunct Concerts' erstwhile member states concluded that, though the resulting destruction assuredly would be general, this principle of power permitted them, nay required them, to go to general war against one another.

The Second Concert's Legacy

The First World War obliterated fundamental and seemingly immutable realities of the European state system to a degree unrivaled in its history up to that point. Ruling regimes that had for centuries steered the foreign policy making of four European great powers, namely those of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires, all vanished in just half a decade. Two of Europe's great power states, namely the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, were wiped off the map altogether. With the major exception of France Europe of 1914 was a continent of princes, and all great powers but one were ruled by monarchs. By 1923 almost half of Europe's states, and all but two of its great powers, were republics.¹¹

Even the victors were radically transformed. In 1914 Italy had been a liberal, though not especially democratic, constitutional monarchy. By 1923 it was becoming a fascist dictatorship. In 1918 Britain expanded suffrage to near-universal proportions, extending the vote to masses that, having sacrificed so much for their country, could no longer be denied a say in how it was ruled, and in doing so more than doubled, and perhaps even tripled, the rate of enfranchisement from what it had been in 1914. Not coincidentally, by 1924 the Liberal Party ceased to be a major player in British politics, while the Labour Party became one. Not since the rise of modern states had geopolitical conditions in Europe been so much a *tabula rasa* on which foreign policy makers could establish new material conditions and introduce novel principles of inter-state relations. And, in the wake of a cataclysm of unprecedented scale, never had doing so seemed more urgent and necessary.¹²

What emerged out of this moment of caesura was a new international paradigm, articulated at Paris in 1919 and affirmed at Lausanne in 1923, in which the principles of national and minority rights, and national self-determination, were recognized as equal or superior to any other principle or interest in European inter-state relations. Scholars of the Berlin System school thus correctly see in this moment the founding of a "Paris System," one that replaced a system of sovereign territorial states with a system of sovereign national communities. They err only in arguing that this was the result of incremental evolution. Rather, it was a moment of transformation in European inter-state relations that was nothing short of revolutionary.¹³

Yet European peace after 1923 was neither as stable nor as durable as that which had followed 1878. One major reason for this was that, despite valiant efforts by adherents to the League of Nations (1920-46), neither foreign policy makers, nor the scholars and jurors of the rapidly evolving and expanding field of international law, were able to reconcile in practice the principles of national rights and national self-determination with the prerogatives of the

sovereign state. In the end, fanatical zealots of the former simply abolished the latter, as well as the principles of popular sovereignty and minority, liberal, and human rights, and indeed any notion of right itself.¹⁴

Moreover, while the Second Concert had been an international regime without an international organization, the League of Nations was an international organization without an international regime. For most of the League's existence critical great powers in the – now global – state system the League was intended to supervise remained outside of, with many even hostile to, the organization, including: Japan (League member 1920-33), Germany (League member 1926-33), the Soviet Union (League member 1934-39), and the United States (never a member of the League). Meanwhile, many foreign policy makers even in those great powers that were members of the League were at best lukewarm in their commitments to the organization and its principles. By 1945, and in the wake of another, and even more apocalyptic, World War, the League of Nations was as universally discredited as the Concert had been in 1918.

While the League of Nations was not a descendant of the First and Second Concerts, the United Nations is. Like the First and Second Concerts, today's international regime is the byproduct of comprehensive consultation (i.e., of 'Concert diplomacy') among all the victorious great powers of the Second World War, namely the San Francisco Conference (1945). As with the First and Second Concerts, today's international regime was founded by the treaty produced by this Conference, namely the Charter of the United Nations. Like the First and Second Concerts, today's international regime is composed of the signatories, or their successors, of that Charter, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, the French Fourth (now Fifth) Republic, the Republic (now People's Republic) of China, and the Soviet Union (now Russian Federation). Like the First and Second Concerts, today's international regime takes as its first principle that none of its members will violate, at least directly, the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another member, and that crises among members will be resolved by means of comprehensive, pan-regime consultation rather than resort to violence. And, as with the First and Second Concerts, this principle applies absolutely only to full members of today's international regime.¹⁵

Unlike the Second Concert, but like the First (albeit briefly), today's international regime is physically embodied in, and represented by, an international organization, namely the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and to a lesser and more general extent by the United Nations as a whole. The full members of today's international regime are the only permanent members of the UNSC, and as such they are the only UN members who enjoy a guaranteed veto over all UN resolutions. Thus, given that under the principles of today's international regime the only legitimate violations of a state's sovereignty and territorial integrity are those authorized by the UN, only the full members of today's international regime can be certain that the only legitimate violations of their state prerogatives will be those to which they themselves have consented.¹⁶

As with the First and Second Concert, factional *ad hoc* coalitions, such as the Franco-British force dispatched to Egypt in 1882 or the "coalition of the willing" that invaded Iraq in 2003, bilateral alliances, and factional multilateral alliance blocs, such as the Holy Alliance (1815-25), the Triple Alliance (1882-1915), the Warsaw Pact/TFCMA (1955-91), the CSTO (2002-today), and NATO (1949-today), may, according to the principles of today's international regime, exist parallel with, but are subordinate to, and all their constituent members are ultimately integrated by, that regime. The First and Second Concerts existed alongside other international regimes, both universalist, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and factional, such as the German Customs Union (1834-66/1919), some of which were embodied in, and represented by, a permanent international organization, and some of which were not. Such is

also the case with today's international regime, which exists alongside the ICC, the OSCE, the IMF, the WTO, the G-7 and G-20, OPEC, the African Union, ECOWAS, the Arab League, the Organization of American States, Interpol, and the IAEA, to name only a few (as a supra-national state-like confederacy the EU is sufficiently *sui generis* as to be excluded from a list of international regimes and organizations).

As was the case during the First and Second Concert eras, each of these regimes is responsible for overseeing a prescribed set of inter-state activities among its member states, be that defining the laws of war, trade and investment, law enforcement, regulatory standardization and oversight, observation or enforcement of minority and human rights, or whatever else. However, as was the case with the First and Second Concerts, in the sphere of inter-state relations all parallel or overlapping international regimes are today subordinated to the authority of the UN, and especially to that of the UNSC, which enjoy a supreme prerogative to determine the legitimacy of acts in such relations.¹⁷

Yet, most member states of today's international regime are, i.e., two thirds of the UNSC's membership is, not permanent, but temporary and rotating, members, effectively temporarily elevating such states to full membership in today's international regime, a status to which any UN member state can be lifted. This is but one illustration of how today's international regime blurs the distinction between its members and non-members in today's inter-state relations. True, UN member states that do not sit on its Security Council, and ergo are outside the regime, enjoy no veto on UN resolutions, and thus could, at least in principle, at any time be subject to violations of their state prerogatives authorized, and hence legitimized, by today's international regime, and thus are in some sense under that regime's supervision. Yet, as noted earlier, according to the UN's principles the only legitimate violations of *any* UN member state's sovereignty and territorial integrity are those explicitly authorized by the UNSC, with all UN member states otherwise enjoying a guarantee of their state prerogatives.

Meanwhile, in notable contrast to today's international regime, the First and Second Concerts established no mechanism for elevating states under their collective supervision to membership in their regimes, even temporarily. A state was either permanently member of the Concert or it was permanently excluded from it. And states so excluded from the First and Second Concerts never enjoyed guarantees of their sovereignty and territorial integrity so explicit or substantial as those extended to the non-members of today's international regime.

Moreover, and more generally, the degree of integration among today's states is incomparably thicker, that is, is populated with incomparably more, more robust, and more sophisticated international regimes, international organizations, and trans-state non-government organizations, than inter-state relations during the First and Second Concerts ever were. Consequently, for actors interested even to the slightest degree in recognizing and maintaining principles and laws in international relations, and not conducting such relations solely on such material bases as *raison d'etat* and power (both its balance and its preponderance) alone, such thickness inhibits (though does not, of course, prohibit) violations of *all* states' sovereignty and territorial integrity. And it does so to a far greater degree than was the case for actors harboring similar degrees of commitment to such principles during the First and Second Concert eras.

This commitment to state prerogatives *per se*, i.e., irrespective of membership in today's international regime, is one of several subsidiary values that today's international regime, like the First and Second Concerts, admits as legitimate principles in inter-state relations, albeit as principles subordinated to the regime's supreme guarantee of its members' state prerogatives. At the same time, today's international regime, like the First and Second Concerts, also admits the

legitimacy of minority, national, and human rights, and national self-determination, in such relations. The result has been considerable contestation, of the sort quite recognizable to any student of the First and Second Concerts, over what the supreme principle of today's international regime is or ought to be, what if any hierarchy exists or ought to exist among its principles, or whether policy makers ought to remain loyal to, or act outside of, the regime.

Yet for all of today's commentators on, and makers of, foreign policy, whatever their assumptions or preferences, the Second Concert of Europe offers a conceptual framework, a promise, and a warning. It provides a framework for making sense of the bewildering complexities of international relations and for how actors might approach those relations, infamous for their arbitrariness and capriciousness, with some degree of practical and ethical consistency. Its promise is neither that of universal nor of perpetual peace. The Concerts realized neither. Rather, while the sovereign state may be an inescapable reality of our modern world, the Concert suggests a means of escaping from the condition of an international state of nature and thus of building a bulwark against general war, a bulwark that, as the history of the Concerts suggests, is stronger than that which obtains from hegemony or balance of power alone. And it stands as a warning for those who would reject the principle of international regime in favor of pure power politics or other ideals. The peace of the Concert eras was not always harmonious, but it survived until its music stopped. For those who had played in them as well as for those who had been their spectators what followed was discord and devastation.

References

Introduction

¹ Carsten Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory, 1815-1914* (Harlow: Longmans, 1970), 3-4.

² Many of these are taken from Holbraad, others from my own reading of references to the Concert, see, *Ibid.*

Chapter 1

¹ Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955), especially “Part One: Medieval Diplomacy, Fifteenth Century” in general and “I. The Legal Framework” and “Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities” in particular.

² Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, especially “Part Two: The Italian Beginnings of Modern Diplomacy.”

³ Mattingly argue that the intrusion of wider Latin Christendom into Italian inter-city-state relations at the dawn of the 16th century resulted in Italy’s novel system of practically secular and strictly self-interested sovereign states becoming the dominant paradigm of all Western Christian inter-polity relations: Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, especially “Part Three: Sixteenth Century Diplomacy.”

⁴ See Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume I: Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia, 1493-1648*, ed. R. J. W. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and the following endnote.

⁵ Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, Volume 1, especially “Introduction: Narratives of Early Modern German History,” “56: The Peace of Westphalia,” “57: The Impact of the War on German Society,” and “58: The Thirty Years War and the German Polity” in general and page 641 in particular.

⁶ For an interdisciplinary discussion of the Peace of Westphalia that highlights pre- and post-Westphalian continuities and complicates the “myth” of Westphalian “caesura,” while at the same time affirming that the Peace was, if not a cause, then at least a consequence of a period of acute transition from Latin Christendom and imperial universalism to sovereign state atomism, see: Randall Lesaffer, ed., *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially Randall Lesaffer, “Peace treaties from Lodi to Westphalia” and Heinz Duchhardt “Peace Treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era.” Andreas Osiander affirms Westphalia’s effective deconfessionalization of European inter-polity and inter-state relations. However, he goes still further than Lesaffer and Duchhardt and argues that it is in fact an ahistorical myth to speak of an introduction of “sovereignty” at Westphalia. Rather, “the non-legal concept of autonomy was very much at the core of the negotiation. This concept [of

autonomy] accommodates both the limited, distinctly non-sovereign self-determination defended by the estates of the Empire, and the full independence long enjoyed by other European actors,” Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pg. 78, also see: especially (as concerns the deconfessionalization of European inter-state relations) “2.3.1. Christendom,” pg’s. 27-31; meanwhile Stephen D. Krasner is even more emphatic about pre- and post-Westphalian continuities, and especially highlights both the heterogeneity of polities that existed before, at, and after Westphalia and the degree to which state sovereignty has always been “contested.” If Westphalia marked development, Krasner argues, it was a significant weakening of the Latin Christian and imperial regimes, which then created the conditions that would later allow the sovereign state and its system to develop, Stephen D. Krasner, “Chapter Nine: Westphalia and All That,” in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, eds. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

⁷ The quoted phrase and the concept it defines are from Max Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation.”

⁸ For recent works affirming the more traditional and orthodox Peace of Westphalia narrative, especially as concerns both its having marked a turning point in European inter-polity and inter-state relations and its delegitimization of confessional apologia for inter-polity or inter-state acts, see: John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 37-39 & 44; Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), especially “Part Two: The Founding of The Sovereign States System at Westphalia: Five: Westphalia as Origin,” in general and pg.’s 77-84 in particular; Jennifer Mitzen, *Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013); indeed, Stephen Krasner maintains that it is still useful from a conceptual, narrative, and phraseology standpoint, if not perhaps that of strict historical accuracy, to use the terms “Westphalian System” and “State System” more or less interchangeably: Krasner, “Chapter Nine: Westphalia and All That,” in *Ideas and Foreign Policy*; for an affirmation of the traditional and orthodox narrative of the Peace of Utrecht adopted above see: Osiander, *The States System of Europe*, especially “3: The Peace of Utrecht;” Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 40 & 44; Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 84-85; Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, Volume 2, 52 & 129; Mitzen, *Power in Concert*; Alfred H.A. Soons, ed., *The 1713 Peace of Utrecht and Its Enduring Effects* (Boston: Brill, 2019), especially Jaap de Wilde “Chapter 1: Balance of Power: Adversarial Pair of Scales or Associational Arch?,” Isaac Nakhimovsky, “Chapter 2: Envisioning Europe after Utrecht: Voltaire and the Historiography of the Balance of Power,” Randall Lesaffer, “Chapter 3: The Peace of Utrecht, the Balance of Power and the Law of Nations,” and Stella Ghervas “Chapter 8: In the Shadow of Utrecht: Perpetual Peace and International Order, 1713–1815; Beatrice de Graaf, Ido de Haan and Brian Vick, eds., *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), especially Beatrice de Graaf, Ido de Haan and Brian Vick, “Introduction” and Stella Ghervas, “From the Balance of Power to a Balance of Diplomacy? Peace and Security in the Vienna Settlement.” Paul Schroeder also provides a passing affirmation of this narrative: Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics: 1763-1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 3; Of course, the reality of Utrecht was, as with the Peace of Westphalia, far more complicated than this, as demonstrated by

a recent anthology edited by Inken Schmidt-Voges and Ana Crespo Solana. Yet, while its contributors contest and complicate each other's arguments in several respects, they also share a consensus that Utrecht's recognition of a Christian commonwealth was indeed a vestigial dead letter and that its framers embraced the balance of power as a paradigm in the European state system. However, they also largely agree that this was hardly an innovation. Indeed, the consensus opinion of its contributors is that a commitment to such a balance featured prominently in intra-polity calculations and inter-polity negotiations and relations since long before even Westphalia. Moreover, its contributors assert that the conventional Utrecht narrative, namely that it was the apotheosis of state ruling regimes as the sole personalities in European inter-state relations, misses key historical complexities and realities of the period. They contend (and allege as their chief contribution to the historiography) that sub-, supra-, non-, and inter-state personalities, especially diplomats, trans-state elites (in particular great noble families), economic actors, and pundits continued to be or became significant forces in such relations. Indeed, they stress that the balance sought by the framers of Utrecht was not strictly among states alone but among the total of all these forces, of which states themselves were only one element, Inken Schmidt-Voges and Ana Crespo Solana, eds., *New Worlds?: Transformations in the Culture of International Relations Around the Peace of Utrecht* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).

⁹ Prussian King Fredrick II (the Great) famously said of the event, in reference to Russian Empress Catherine II (also Great), "Catherine and I are simple brigands; I just would like to know how the empress calmed down her father confessor! She cried when she took; and the more she cried, the more she took," Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland, Volume 1: The Origins to 1795, Revised Edition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 390.

¹⁰ I am hardly the first to make this observation or to use this term in this context. A.J.P. Taylor framed Europe's pre-1914 inter-state relations in this way as early as 1954: A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), xix. More recently, Richard Tuck has provided a robust argument for viewing such relations through this lens: Richard Tuck, for example, discusses the concept at length, though he uses the term verbatim only once: Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002), 215.

¹¹ Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*.

¹² See, for scholarship largely affirming this interpretation of European-Ottoman relations see, for example, Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, 28-36 & 42-44; Karl-Heinz Ziegler, "The Peace Treaties of the Ottoman Empire with European Christian Powers," in Lesaffer, ed., *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History*; Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), especially "10: The Empire Unravels" and pg.151; Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), especially "5: The Ottomans and their Wider World;" for an anthology that to a degree affirms but significantly complicates this traditional narrative of relations between European Christian states and the Ottoman Empire during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, see: A. Nuri Yurdusev, ed., *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or*

Unconventional? (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); especially see Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, "Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz," in *Ottoman Diplomacy*, ed. Yurdusev; for an argument stressing the degree to which Ottoman-European relations were driven more by pragmatism than devotion to 'holy war,' and which stresses the interconnectedness of these relations see: A. Nuri Yurdusev, "Introduction" and "The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy" in *Ottoman Diplomacy*, ed. Yurdusev; for another argument stressing such pragmatism, and which also asserts that while the Ottoman-European treaties were temporary truces *de jure*, the Ottoman regime often entered into formal and prolonged peace agreements with Christian regimes and acknowledged that its peace treaties with Christian regimes were *de facto* mutually binding and prolonged compacts: Gábor Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest: The Ottoman Empire and Its Wars in Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), especially "Prologue" and "Part III. Sinews of Empire, 10. Lawfare and Diplomacy;" yet nearly all of the authors cited in this endnote stress that the Ottoman Empire was by no means segregated intellectually or culturally from Christian Europe. These authors argue that the sheer persistent existence of both polities as a powerful force with which each had to reckon had profound implications for how theorists imagined the possibilities for, and the fundamental laws of, political life both between the two polities and within their own. Moreover, they demonstrate that Ottoman and Christian European polities remained deeply economically, socially, culturally, and intellectually interconnected, both among their elites and their subalterns, throughout the era. Indeed, the contributors to a recent anthology on Ottoman-Christian relations demonstrate that below the strata of inter-state relations and diplomacy the Ottoman cosmos was always deeply socially, culturally, economically and politically interconnected, or, as they put it, "entangled" with that of the European Christian states: Pascal Firges, ed., *Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2014).

¹³ Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, especially "Chapter 4: Thomas Hobbes."

¹⁴ Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, especially "Chapter 5: Samuel Pufendorf."

¹⁵ Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, 141; Mark Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 35-36.

¹⁶ Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, 223-224.

¹⁷ Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, 221.

¹⁸ For 2 translations of Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace" see: Immanuel Kant, *Project for a Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay by Emanuel Kant* (London: Vernor and Hood, 1796), and, Immanuel Kant "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" in Immanuel Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History* ed. Pauline Kleingeld, trans. David L. Colclasure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

¹⁹ He judged such an enterprise hopelessly utopian and thus useful only as a thought experiment, Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, especially "Chapter 5: Samuel Pufendorf" and "Chapter 7: Rousseau and Kant."

²⁰ For example, Friedrich von Gentz, who served as secretary to the Congress of Vienna, had been one of Kant's students: F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1963).

²¹ First, Kant proposed that all member states of his Peace recognize the existing geopolitical landscape as in effect constituting a 'year one.' That is, he argued that the past provided all states with claims to at least some of the territory of others on various bases of plausible historical legitimacy, be it dynastic right, the recovery of territory lost during previous wars, the reunification or restoration of ancient provinces, and so on. Thus, he asserted that a perpetual peace, or even a merely durable one, would be possible only were all states to agree to a collective amnesia, forgetting the entire history of inter-state relations up to that point and establish as illegitimate for any inter-state act any apologia grounded on any event or condition predating the Peace's founding. Moreover, Kant proposed that no sovereign state existing at the time of the Peace's founding could by any means become subordinate to or fully incorporated into another. This prohibition was absolute and was to be maintained irrespective of, say, the dying out of one state-ruling house and the legitimate dynastic claims of another to the former's throne or even the freely given and uncoerced unanimous consent of both states' ruling regimes and entire populations to such subordination or unification. And, as the Peace Kant pretended to establish was in theory to be perpetual, no territorial alterations whatsoever between its sovereign and separate states would be possible except on a wholly uncoerced and voluntary basis. That is, Kant declared the principle of state territorial integrity was to be sacred and inviolable. Secondly, Kant greatly expanded the earlier Augsburg-ian, Westphalian, and Utrecht-ian principles of de-confessionalization to include all matters of human behavior and belief beyond the strictly religious, proposing that the internal acts, policies, laws, and constitutions of states, no matter the question, be of no just concern to any other state. Third, he was explicit that he imagined no supra-state institution to ensure that his prescribed principles were realized and enforced in practice, let alone the founding of a world state (and in this he departed markedly from Saint-Pierre and Rousseau). That is, Kant's international regime was not to be accompanied by, or physically embodied and represented in, a permanent and formal international organization. Indeed, Kant not only allowed for, but hoped that, tensions, disagreements, and even conflicts among states would continue, as each state expressed its discrete interests and perspectives in its relations with others, and only prohibited an ultimate recourse to war as a legitimate means for resolving these disputes, replacing it instead with a principle of comprehensive, pan-regime consultation. That is, Kant proclaimed that the principle of state sovereignty was likewise to be sacred and inviolable. Indeed, he went so far as to prohibit one state's ruling regime from inciting 'treason' in another, that is, calling another state's citizen's attention to an act or policy undertaken by their own government and inviting them to resist it. Notably, Kant proposed several other sacred and inviolable principles, such as a prohibition against secret treaties, peacetime standing armies, national debts, and the use of assassins and poisoners as well as a demand that each state guarantee asylum to any citizen or subject of another state facing execution upon repatriation (notably this guarantee did not apply to those facing torture or indefinite detention without cause). However, these do not especially concern our discussion. The Peace Kant imagined was therefore hardly an innovation in terms of the principles that lay at its foundation. As we have seen, the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity already dated back perhaps as much as a century and a half to the Peace of Westphalia. What was

novel about Kant's proposal was the proposition that all states enter into something like a social contract, though one that notably established neither a state-like leviathan nor permanent or formal organization of any kind to ensure its enforcement. Rather, the comprehensive, binding, and integrated international regime Kant developed was to be collectively guaranteed by all of its member states solely through the force of the international law established by and based on that regime. Kant's proposed Peace was both innovative and notable for our discussion in one further respect. While he believed his prescriptions might produce a durable peace in a state system composed entirely of absolutist monarchical regimes or one of mixed absolutisms and republics, a *perpetual* peace would only ever be possible, in Kant's view, were the state system composed exclusively of republics. As noted, Kant proposed that his Peace rely on the force of international law alone for its realization and enforcement. And as it was, in Kant's view, only in republics that law alone ruled without the intervention or aid of humans (such as rulers or lawyers), it was only in a state system composed exclusively of republican regimes, whose citizens and rulers were universally habituated to rule of and by law alone, that his prescriptions could be realized without coercion and peace be perpetual. Indeed, Kant was no advocate for the development of a robust international jurisprudence, especially given his disdain for lawyers, and sought to develop a society whose actors would be so habituated as to live according to the rule of law alone, without the intervention of 'mercenary' sophists who in his view obfuscated and perverted law in interest of the highest bidder. That some commentators have therefore seen Kant as a forerunner of the historically dubious so-called 'democratic peace theory,' and there are arguments either way, is beyond the scope of the current discussion. Indeed, for Kant a 'republic' simply meant a regime that ruled according to its own laws, and even a monarchical regime unaccountable to a legislature could be a republic so long as it upheld rule of law in practice, see: Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (1796), 2-31, 44-75 & 93-94; Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (2006), 67-72, 74-85 & 94-109; Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, especially "Chapter 7: Rousseau and Kant" in general and pg.'s 215-225 in particular.

²² There is no automatic correlation between a state's losing, maintaining, or gaining territory and the overall material power of that state. The Kingdom of Prussia-cum-German Empire's rise from a middling to a leading great power is a case in point. That is, the geopolitical rise of the Prussian/German state between 1815 and 1871 was not primarily due to any territorial expansion (its territorial gains between 1864 and 1871 being more a consequence than a cause of its rise). Rather, this rise was chiefly a result of rapid and immense industrialization within its existing territory, especially in its Rhine Province (during the so-called *Gründerzeit*), for some excellent discussions of this period of German history see: Thomas Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, 1800-1866*, trans. Daniel Nolan (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), especially "5. Industrialisation" in "II. Life, Work, Business;" David Blackbourn, *The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), especially "Part Two: The Age of Progress, 1849-80."

²³ Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, especially "Chapter 7: Rousseau and Kant" in general and pg.'s 215-219 in particular.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ For a discussion of the French Republic and Empire's relations with states ruled by *ancien régimes*, see: Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848* (Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1962), especially "4: War;" and George Rudé, *Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815* (London: Collins, 1964), 179-180 & 208-222. However, it should be noted that Rudé also makes clear that such relations were "not and never became a straightforward crusade of the crowned heads of Europe against revolutionary France." Rather, this was just one element in complex, dynamic, and evolving relations. Indeed, Rudé especially notes that there was considerable disunity, indeed internecine hostility and perfidy, within the *ancien régime* camp throughout the period. For more recent works affirming that, while the presumption of a Manichean struggle varied in intensity in European inter-state relations during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars period, it never ceased to be an important element in those relations, see: Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics: 1763-1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), especially "2. War and Revolution, 1787-1792" & "3. The First Coalition, 1792-1797" in general and 53-56, 71-74, 123-124, 134, 152 & 580 in particular; Jonathan Sperber, *Revolutionary Europe, 1780-1850* (New York: Longman, 2000), especially "3. The French Revolution and Europe" & "4. Napoleon's Europe;" Adam Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon & The Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007); David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007), especially "Declaring Peace; Declaring War," "The Last Crusade," & "The Exterminating Angles;" Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy*, especially "Part One: War". This is also the consensus narrative of the contributors to: Beatrice de Graaf, Ido de Haan and Brian Vick *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Friedrich von Gentz, who served as secretary to the Congress of Vienna, had been one of Kant's students: F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1963); for recent works that largely or entirely affirm this narrative of the Congress of Vienna, while providing complicating insights, see: Osiander, *The States System of Europe*, especially "4: The Congress of Vienna;" Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, especially "VIII. An Appraisal;" Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace*; David King, *1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War, and Peace at the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harmony Books, 2008); Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy*, especially "Part Two: Peace." For a concise but informative and generally excellent analysis of Congress of Vienna historiography, and the principal differing perspectives and debates contained therein, see: Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy*, especially "Assessments of the Settlement," pg. 149-157; for a recent anthology whose contributors provide a consensus affirmation of this narrative of the Vienna Congress even as they complicate it in various critical and illuminating respects, see: de Graaf (et al.), *Securing Europe after Napoleon*, especially "Part I: Conceptualisations" and Stella Gervas, "From the Balance of Power to a Balance of Diplomacy?: Peace and Security in the Vienna Settlement;" for a recent cultural history that attempts to challenge this conservative Congress narrative, and instead asserts that the wider cultural milieu in which it took place reveals the degree to which its participants strove toward liberal, religiously tolerant (especially *vis-à-vis* Jews), humanitarian (especially *vis-à-vis* slavery), and even national aspirations, see: Brian E.

Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014).

²⁸ In 1830 Charles X, the last French monarch to be styled “King of France,” fell to a revolutionary uprising that replaced him with Louis-Philippe I. The latter’s lack of dynastic legitimacy, embrace of constitutional rule, revolutionary tricolor flag, informal sobriquet “bourgeois king,” and formal title “King of the French” (i.e., ruler of a national people rather than a territory) all highlighted his regime’s liberal and more participatory means of rule as well as its formal foundation, at least in part, in popular sovereignty. Yet, while founding such a regime violated the principle of legitimist conservatism, the ruling regimes of its other four full member states never seriously considered an intervention to restore the conservative Bourbon regime, but rather upheld the primacy of its state prerogatives and quickly, if begrudgingly, accepted the legitimacy of Louis-Philippe’s regime. Just as notable was the degree to which this outcome diverged from events in Spain seven years earlier, in which Spanish reformers had attempted to force a liberal, constitutional, and participatory system on its king, namely Ferdinand VII. While the Concert split over intervention and non-intervention at the Congress of Verona (1822), which contributed to the abrogation of the Congress/Vienna System itself, a French army, backed by all Concert member states save Britain, ultimately invaded Spain (thus grossly violating both Spanish sovereignty and territorial integrity), violently crushed the reformers, and restored absolutism. The stark difference in outcomes between 1823 in Spain and 1830 in France laid bare the practical implications, *vis-à-vis* state prerogatives, of full membership in, or being under the collective supervision of, the Concert, for a synopsis of these events, see: Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, “I. The July Revolution in France,” 666-670, and “V. Vienna, Verona, and French Intervention in Spain, 1822-1823,” 621-628.

²⁹ Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*; Osiander, *The States System of Europe*, especially “4: The Congress of Vienna;” Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, especially “VIII. An Appraisal;” Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace*; King, *1814*; Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy*, especially “Part Two: Peace;” de Graaf (et al.), *Securing Europe after Napoleon*, especially “Part I: Conceptualisations” and Stella Ghervas, “From the Balance of Power to a Balance of Diplomacy?: Peace and Security in the Vienna Settlement;”

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Augustus Oakes and R.B. Mowat, eds., *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1918), 38.

³² See discussion of the ‘July revolution’ and the Concert’s intervention in Spain in 1823 noted in the endnote above. And, just as in Spain, the Concert would intervene in various territories of the German Confederation to enforce the principle of legitimist conservatism, but, just as in Spain, this was no violation of the Concert as these territories were not members, but subjects, of the regime: Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, “I. The July Revolution in France,” 666-670, and “V. Vienna, Verona, and French Intervention in Spain, 1822-1823,” 621-628.

³³ Especially see: René Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 1968); Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914* (London: Routledge, 2013).

³⁴ Micheal Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company: 2017), especially pg.'s 180-181, 183-184, 187 & 196; these figures are drawn from Clodfelter's casualty calculations for: the Crimean War (pg. 180), 'Franco-Austrian War' (pg. 181), Austro-Prussian War/Third Italian War of Independence (pg.'s 183-184), Franco-Prussian War (pg. 187), and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 (pg.196).

³⁵ For some telling historical episodes and anecdotes, drawn from secondary literature, that hint at a general and systematic recognition of the Concert's dissolution during the period itself, see, for example: Carsten Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory, 1815-1914* (Harlow: Longmans, 1970), 72-79, 95-100, 136-141, 144-148, & 153-161, and, more generally, "2. The Hegelian Antithesis" in "Chapter Two, The Progressive Theory," and "Chapter Two, The Balance of Power Theory;" Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe*, 16 & 225; Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers*, 129; and it is worthwhile to note that both international relations theory realists and historians of the long Concert school often argue that the Concert survived during this period in that the regime was always primarily, even entirely, synonymous with the classical 'balance of power' principle. Yet, if this is historically true, the Concert failed spectacularly at realizing its principal *raison d'être*, and at no time more so than during this period. Indeed, such an argument assumes that German unification, which by all accounts then and now greatly upset and even destroyed the balance of power in the European state system, must have occurred under the Concert's auspices: especially see: Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe*, it should be noted Albrecht-Carrié is not explicit that the Concert was based on a classical balance of power principle, but his arguments are only comprehensible on the assumption that the balance of power was a significant element in the Concert; Richard Langhorne, *The Collapse of the Concert of Europe: International Politics, 1890-1914* (London: Macmillan, 1981); Ikenberry, *After Victory*; Matthias Schulz, "Chapter 2: Did Norms Matter in Nineteenth-Century International Relations?: Progress and Decline in the "Culture of Peace" before World War I" in *An Improbable War: The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914*, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2007); for such an account of German unification in the European state system see, for example: Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; John Lowe, *The Great Powers, Imperialism, and the German Problem: 1865-1925* (London: Routledge, 1994); for a telltale primary source that recognizes a breakdown and dissolution of the Concert itself see Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust who, on the occasion of his failure to build a coalition capable of preventing the Franco-Prussian war, famously declared that "Europe no longer exists." That is, Europe as a comprehensive, integrated entity united by the social contract of an international regime no longer existed: "Ungarn und das Rothbuch," *Neue Freie Presse*, Wien, 25/01/1871.

³⁶ Albrecht-Carrié's book on the Concert is largely a compilation of primary source documents, one of which both formally expresses the comprehensive consensus view of the Paris Congress

and demonstrates that these were indeed the intentions of its participants: Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe*, 192-195.

³⁷ Oakes and Mowat, eds., *The Great European Treaties*, 176.

³⁸ Oakes and Mowat, eds., *The Great European Treaties*, 176. 73-98

³⁹ True, the Congress and Treaty of London (1867) was comprehensive in scope, involving all Vienna Concert members as well as the Kingdom of Italy, not to mention the lesser states of the low countries. However, as the Ottoman Empire had been admitted to the preceding Concert, namely that of Paris, its exclusion from the proceedings of, and agreement at, London in 1867 left this Congress incomplete *vis-à-vis* any associated European Concert international regime. And in any case, any Concert founded by the 1867 London Treaty was also a fleeting institution, as two of its members, namely the Kingdom of Prussia and the Second French Empire, were at war within a mere three years of its founding. See: Oakes and Mowat, eds., *The Great European Treaties*, 256-262.

⁴⁰ Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring, 1982): 357-378; Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics* Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985): 58-79; Robert Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Jun., 1992): 716-724.

⁴¹ Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), especially "Chapter Five: Security Community" in general and pg. 183 in particular.

⁴² Jennifer Mitzen, *Power in Concert*, especially "Chapter One: Public Power and Purpose in Global Governance" in general and pg. 18 in particular.

⁴³ Schulz, "Did Norms Matter;" Matthias Schulz, "1. Cultures of Peace and Security from the Vienna Congress to the Twenty-First Century: Characteristics and Dilemmas" in *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture*, eds. Beatrice de Graaf, Ido de Haan and Brian Vick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

⁴⁴ Eckart Conze, "Historicising a Security Culture: Peace, Security and the Vienna System in History and Politics, 1815 to Present" in *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture*, eds. Beatrice de Graaf, Ido de Haan and Brian Vick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), though it should be noted that Conze's model and periodization represents the consensus adopted by nearly all the contributors to this anthology; for a similar argument see: Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy*. Meanwhile Jervis argues that the Congress period was merely the era during which the Concert's influence was at its height, after which it declined until finally abrogated in the mid-19th century. See, for example: Jervis, "Security Regimes;" "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation;" "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the

Concert;” Mark L. Haas, *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), especially “The Concert of Europe, 1815–48.”

⁴⁵ Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, especially “VIII. An Appraisal.”

⁴⁶ See, for example: Richard B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System,” *World Politics* Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jan, 1976): 159–174; Jervis, “Security Regimes,” From Balance to Concert,” and “A Political Science Perspective;” Paul W. Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?,” *The American Historical Review* Vol. 97, No. 3 (Jun., 1992): 683–706; Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, especially “VIII. An Appraisal;” Osiander, *The States System of Europe*, especially “4.3. The Balance of Power” and “4.4. The Great-Power Principle, in general and pg.’s 181 & 195–196 in particular; Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, especially “Chapter Five: Security Community” in general and pg. 190 in particular; Clark, *Hegemony in International Society*, especially “4. Collective Hegemony;” Mitzen, *Power in Concert*, especially “Public Power and Purpose in Global Governance;” Schulz, “1. Cultures of Peace and Security.”

⁴⁷ This definition, provided by Stephen D. Krasner, has become the standard one for informal ‘institutions’ and ‘regimes’ in international relations theory: Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” *International Organization* Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring, 1982): 186.

⁴⁸ See, for example: Elrod, “The Concert of Europe;” Osiander, *The States System of Europe*, especially “4: The Congress of Vienna;” Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, especially “VIII. An Appraisal;” Ikenberry, *After Victory*, especially “Chapter Four: The Settlement of 1815;” Clark, *Hegemony in International Society*, especially “4. Collective Hegemony: The Concert of Europe 1815–1914.”

⁴⁹ Schulz, “Did Norms Matter,” 46. Also see: Schulz, “1. Cultures of Peace and Security.”

⁵⁰ Osiander, *The States System of Europe*, especially “4: The Congress of Vienna” in general and pg.’s 241 & 226 in particular.

⁵¹ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, especially “Chapter Four: The Settlement of 1815” in general and pg. 83 in particular.

⁵² Clark, *Hegemony in International Society*, especially “4. Collective Hegemony: The Concert of Europe 1815–1914.”

⁵³ See, for example, Elrod, “The Concert of Europe;” Jervis, “Security Regimes,” From Balance to Concert,” and “A Political Science Perspective;” Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, especially “Chapter Five: Security Community” in general and pg.’s 194–201 in particular; Mitzen, *Power in Concert*; Conze, “Historicising a Security Culture.”

⁵⁴ Though there are disagreements, albeit trifling ones, about the Concert among institutionalists themselves. Ikenberry, for example, asserts that Britain was a *primus inter pares* in, and thus the

ultimate guarantor of, the Concert and that a benevolent *Pax Britannica* hegemony was a *sine qua non* precondition for the Concert's continued existence: Ikenberry, *After Victory*, especially "Chapter Four: The Settlement of 1815;" meanwhile Paul Schroeder argues that the Concert was a joint bi-polar hegemony led by the United Kingdom and the Russian Empire, whose collaboration and mutual judicious restraint in the exercise of their power in the name of the Concert was the basis of its existence. According to Schroeder, the Concert thus operated according to a three-tiered hierarchy of non-member and member Concert states, and then within the latter of clients and hegemonies, with the Kingdom of France, Kingdom of Prussia, and the Austrian Empire enjoying Concert membership and great power status under cooperative and benevolent Russian and British tutelage: Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?;" Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, especially "VIII. An Appraisal;" it is unimportant for our discussion whether Concert member states shared power and decision making equally, hierarchically, or whether it was monopolized by a single member. Rather, what concerns us is whether Concert member states understood that the supreme principles of their international regime were the state prerogatives of its member states and recourse to mediation rather than war between them, and both Ikenberry and Schroeder agree that this was the case.

⁵⁵ See, for example: John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49; Korina Kagan, "The Myth of the European Concert: The Realist-Institutionalist Debate and great power Behavior in the Eastern Question, 1821-41," *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (1997): 1–57; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001); Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," *Security Studies* 14, no. 4 (2005): 565–606; Matthew Rendall, "Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe," *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 3 (2006): 523–540; Sheldon Anderson, "Metternich, Bismarck, and the Myth of the 'Long Peace,' 1815-1914," *Peace and Change* 32, no. 3 (2007): 301–328.

⁵⁶ For members of this school see, for example: Enno E. Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy, Volume II: The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Enno E. Kraehe, "A Bipolar Balance of Power," *The American Historical Review* Vol. 97, No. 3 (Jun., 1992): 707-715; Pamela M. Pilbeam, ed., *Themes in Modern European History, 1780-1830* (London: Routledge, 1994); Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace*; Ikenberry, *After Victory*; however Ikenberry is somewhat difficult to situate within the Concert 'school' schema in that he focuses on what he sees as the shortcomings of Congress of Vienna and its failure to produce a formal and permanent international organization to regulate inter-state relations. Yet he also argues that the Congress established a set of informal but generally recognized norms to which all great powers felt obligated and that this informal regime persisted until the outbreak of the First World War; others argue the Congress period was merely the era during which the Concert's influence was at its height, after which it declined until finally abrogated in the mid-19th century. See, for example: Jervis, "Security Regimes;" "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation;" "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert;" Haas, *The Ideological Origins*, especially "The Concert of Europe, 1815-48;" meanwhile still other authors argue that Congress System was a distinct regime from the Concert and that the latter only came into existence when the former dissolved. See, for example: Jarrett,

The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy; this is the consensus periodization in: de Graaf (et al.), *Securing Europe after Napoleon*.

⁵⁷ For members of this school see, for example: Elrod, “The Concert of Europe;” Paul Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972); Jervis, ““Security Regimes;” “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation;” “A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert;” Lowe, *The Great Powers*; Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*; C. J. Bartlett, *Peace, War, and the European Powers, 1814-1914* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), though Bartlett argues that some actors did sometimes speak of concert after the mid-19th century; Sperber, *Revolutionary Europe*; John A. Vasquez, “Conclusion: The Vienna System” in *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848: Episode or Model in Modern History?*, eds. Peter Krüger and Paul Schroeder (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, especially “Chapter One: Stable Peace” and “Chapter Five: Security Community;” Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy*; Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*; Miroslav Šedivý, *Crisis Among the Great Powers: The Concert of Europe and the Eastern Question* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017); de Graaf (et al.), *Securing Europe after Napoleon*.

⁵⁸ For members of this school see, for example: R. B. Mowat, *The Concert of Europe* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1930); Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe*; Carsten Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory, 1815-1914* (Harlow: Longmans, 1970); Langhorne, *The Collapse of the Concert of Europe*; Osieander, *The States System of Europe*, especially “4: The Congress of Vienna,” Osieander is notably unusual in asserting that the Concert persisted until the First World War but was a system ontologically distinct from that of the ‘balance of power;’ Georges-Henri Soutou, “Was There a European Order in the Twentieth Century? From the Concert of Europe to the End of the Cold War,” *Contemporary European History* Vol. 9, No. 3, (Nov., 2000): 329-353; Ikenberry, *After Victory*; Clark, *Hegemony in International Society*; Schulz, “Chapter 2: Did Norms Matter;” Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy*; Margaret MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914* (New York: Random House, 2013); Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013); F Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers*; Maartje M. Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014); de Graaf (et al.), *Securing Europe after Napoleon*.

⁵⁹ Schroeder, for example, argues that, far from representing a restoration of an *ancien régime*, the novel introduction of a Concert international regime institution to the European state system represents a revolution of greater and more enduring significance than anything produced by the French revolution. Moreover, that, far from being reactionary, the Concert was in fact moderate and even progressive, noting in particular the Concert’s suppression of the slave trade and that, while the Concert did not foster democracy, national liberation, or liberal rights, Europeans were in 1815 overwhelmingly uninterested in such prerogatives but desired only peace and stability, which the Concert provided: Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*; Vick takes Schroeder’s progressive argument still further, asserting that when viewed from the social and cultural milieu of its founders, the Concert was enlightened and tolerant (especially *vis-à-vis* Jewish emancipation), humanitarian (especially *vis-à-vis* the slave trade), and even liberal: Vick

Securing Europe after Napoleon; conversely, Zamoyski questions the sheer existence, let alone significance, of any Congress/Vienna system, let alone Concert regime, and highlights both the discord and even violence that broke out between its purported members shortly after its supposed founding. Zamoyski likewise contends that insofar as the Concert's members collaborated at all it was to dominate, or better oppress, the smaller and weaker non-member states and to suppress national aspirations, toleration of religious minorities, democratic movements, and individual rights, all of which resulted in increasing radicalization, fanaticism, and prejudice in European society: Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace*; meanwhile Mazower argues that the Concert regime, whose principal function was in his view to enforce legitimist conservatism, was but one of many forms of imagined international/inter-state or supra-national/supra-state regime during the 19th century. Indeed, he contends that by the later part of the century the Concert had so declined in significance that competing "internationalisms," for example capitalist, free trade cosmopolitan internationalists on the one hand and Marxist, socialist internationalists on the other, were far more focused on each other than on the increasingly irrelevant Concert and its legitimist conservatism. Notably, all of the non-Concert "internationalisms" Mazower explores, with the possible exception of what can best be described as 'jurisprudence' internationalists, did not ground themselves on the sovereign state system or presume their principal actors to be states, but imagined partial or wholesale alternatives to the sovereign state and its system: Mazower, *Governing the World*. And the above is but a brief synopsis of the chief contributions to Concert scholarship from only a few noted historians.

⁶⁰ One of the earliest authors to do so was 1930, R. B. Mowat, a renowned early 20th century anglophone historian of European inter-state relations who devoted an entire book, namely *The Concert of Europe*, to the 1871-1914 period. And Mowat both recognized a distinct earlier Concert, which he dated from the 1815 Congress of Vienna to the 1848-49 revolutions, and a subsequent period, lasting from 1849 to 1871, of continuous chaos and frequent warfare in the European inter-state system. The Concert of Mowat's book is thus clearly a 'Second' Concert. However, his model of Concert diverges in many critical respects from the one expounded by this discussion, such as by admitting extra-European events, relations, and concerns to its jurisdiction and including the development of supranational/supra-state jurisprudence (e.g., the Hague Conventions) under its aegis. Moreover, Mowat argues that the second Concert was founded in 1871 and thus: was based on the Treaty of Frankfurt, predicated on German domination of the continent, and excluded the Ottoman Empire from the regime (and that, ergo, the Russo-Ottoman war was not a violation or abrogation of this 'Frankfurt Concert'): Mowat, *The Concert of Europe*.

⁶¹ Albrecht-Carrié argues that this age was coextensive with the tenure of arch conservative and partisan of absolutist monarchism, Klemens von Metternich, as Chancellor of the Austrian Empire. However, it should be noted that Metternich did not maintain his office until 1851. Rather, in 1848 he was brought down by the revolutions of that year, and in 1851 Austria's restored absolutist regime, under a young Franz Josef, merely denied his request to be restored to something like his old position. Nevertheless, Albrecht-Carrié argues that given the dominance of Metternich's ideals, and of himself personally, in European inter-state relations during his time as chancellor, as well as the clear caesura in such relations that occurred shortly after his downfall (i.e., the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853), his tenure in office is expedient for the

purposes of periodization: Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe*, especially “Introduction” in general and pg.’s 10-14 in particular.

⁶² Albrecht-Carrié does not use this precise language, and in fact stresses that the Empire serves as a basis for defining this period not because it or Napoleon III were somehow representative of, or played an especially decisive role in, this era of the Concert. And it is notable that Albrecht-Carrié devotes much of his discussion of this Concert era to downplaying what he himself recognizes as substantial Concert violations or failures, and excusing Concert disinterest and inaction in cases where he himself recognizes that the principle of international regime demanded interest and action, that is, Albrecht-Carrié implicitly recognizes that the ‘Age of the Second French Empire’ was one of an international state of nature: Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe*, pg.’s 14-17 & 152-153.

⁶³ Much of Albrecht-Carrié’s discussion of this third Concert era is imprecise and the Concert no longer even has a clearly defined membership (for example, he argues that the international regime included all the parties to the Algeiras Conference of 1906, which elevates a host of minor Powers and even the United States to Concert membership). It is also notable that Albrecht-Carrié is unusual among long Concert school scholarship for arguing that the principal challenge to European inter-state relations during this period was not the ‘problem’ of Ottoman decline but the ‘problem’ of Germany’s rise. Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe*, pg.’s 17-21, 197-200, 230 & 330.

⁶⁴ Nor does he attempt to clarify what if any hierarchy may have existed among these ends, an important consideration given that many of these principles and goals were in tension or even mutually incompatible, and thus the Concert could not be all things to all people but rather had to be at least some of these things more than others, and perhaps some of these things *against* others. At times Albrecht-Carrié even challenges the very idea or historical reality of both an international regime predicated on common principles and international law as such: Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe*, 14-21, 152-153, 191-192, 197-200 & 230.

⁶⁵ This theory took as its paramount aim the conservation of existing state borders, the conservation of conservative and dynastically legitimate monarchical regimes, or both: Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe*, pg.’s 15-61 & 119-135.

⁶⁶ This theory assumed that the Concert was nothing more than the classical balance of power principle by another name: Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe*, pg.’s 80-113 & 136-161.

⁶⁷ This theory assumed that the Concert was primarily a means of: first, integrating states within a species of Kantian international regime; second, ensuring adherence to international law and the stipulations of treaties (some of which were founded on guaranteeing its members’ state prerogatives and the principle of mediation and some of which were not); and, third, fulfillment or enforcement of liberal rights and “humanitarian ideas.” Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe*, 62-79 & 162-204.

⁶⁸ Notably, Holbraad argues that each of these three major theories of Concert admitted legitimacy of war, even among Concert member states, on the basis of anti-revolutionary

policing, maintaining the balance of power, or humanitarian causes, respectively: Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe*.

⁶⁹ While Bridge and Bullen adopt a similar periodization as Albrecht-Carrié and Hollbraad, they challenge a narrative of three successive eras within a continuously extant, century-long Concert. Rather, they assert that a first Concert among Europe's five great powers dissolved in 1853 with the outbreak of the Crimean War. What followed, they argue, was an interregnum of anarchic and uncoordinated relations among that Concert's former member states. Order was then reestablished by the Treaty of Frankfurt (1871) and the founding of the German Empire, after which a second Concert international regime, very similar though not identical to the first, came into existence: Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers*.

⁷⁰ First, both agree that the Second Concert did not introduce a novel or greatly expanded formal recognition of ethnic national communities into European inter-state relations, and that such communities would not be so introduced until after First World War. Secondly, both agree that 'Concert diplomacy,' that is, crisis resolution by means of comprehensive consultation among all Concert members, was a fundamental feature of the Concert. Third, both assume that the Second Concert was a 'collective hegemony,' wherein a hierarchy existed between member and non-member states, and wherein the former exercised a collaborative supervision over the latter. They argue this throughout their book, but especially see: "Chapter 1: Introduction: The Character of International Relations, 1814–1914" in general and pg. 's 4 & 173 in particular.

⁷¹ First, Bridge and Bullen contend that the Second Concert's members were little interested in the theory and practice of international regime *vis-à-vis* intra-regime relations, and that, other than a vague and tacit commitment to a *status quo*, the members established no generally agreed upon principles, norms, or strictures to direct relations among or between members themselves. Such intra-Concert relations, they argue, were guided by realpolitik machinations and material interests on the one hand and by perceived balances or imbalances of power among these members on the other. In fact, it was in their view not common commitment to an international regime, but an imbalance of power, namely in the form of a hegemonic *Pax Germanica*, wherein the German Empire served as *primus inter pares* among Concert states, French isolation, and the cunning realpolitik machinations of one man, namely Bismarck, that kept the peace between 1871 and 1914. Meanwhile, they argue that France consistently remained across its many republican, royal, and imperial regimes a revisionist and destabilizing provocateur. Thus, when France could be contained, as in the First Concert, or isolated and subjugated, as in the Second Concert, these regimes functioned, and when it could not these regimes failed. That is, the Second Concert era was not predicated even on a balance of power principle, but on a practical imbalance of power. As concerns Bismarck, Bridge and Bullen argue that while late 19th century European geopolitics provided the preconditions that made a Second Concert possible, the actual existence and influence of the regime was a consequence of Bismarck's management of affairs. That is, much as the First Concert had been coextensive with Metternich, the Second Concert was little more than a Bismarckian alliance system by another name, at least as regarded its intra-regime affairs. Finally, the dates of Bride and Bullen's Second Concert (i.e., 1871-1914) diverge from those of this discussion (i.e., 1878-1908), with Bridge and Bullen claiming 1871 as the foundational moment, and thus the Treaty of Frankfurt as the foundational instrument, of the Second Concert. Such a date and mechanism are notable in two respects. First, it assumes that

the Second Concert came into existence not by means of, nor was based on, ‘Concert diplomacy.’ That is, the Second Concert was not the product of a comprehensive, pan-great power congress or treaty, but rather of bi-lateral negotiations, namely between the Third French Republic and the German Empire, and of a bi-lateral treaty, namely the Treaty of Frankfurt. Meanwhile, Bridge and Bullen argue that the more comprehensive, pan-great power Conference and Treaty of London (1871) and Congress and Treaty of Berlin merely augmented and affirmed the inter-state order established at Frankfurt. Second, such a date assumes that if there was a Second Concert then the Ottoman Empire was not a member of it. That is, this date presumes that the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 was not a case of two Second Concert member states going to war with one another and ergo was neither a violation nor an abrogation of any international regime to which both belonged, as Bridge and Bullen themselves argue the mid-19th century wars among erstwhile Vienna Concert members were. In fact, they are explicit that, irrespective of statements made at congresses or the language written into treaties, all actors understood that both the First and Second Concerts were strictly Christian regimes from which the Ottoman Empire was excluded. Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers*, especially “Chapter 1: Introduction: The Character of International Relations, 1814–1914,” “Chapter 6: The Testing of the New Order, 1871–79,” and, in Chapter 6, especially “General Characteristics of the Period 1871–1914,” “Chapter 7: The Conservative Powers Dominate the States System, 1879-95,” and, in Chapter 7, especially “The First Bismarckian Alliance System, 1879-87” and “The Bulgarian Crises of 1885–87 and the Second Bismarckian Alliance System” generally, and pg.’s 8, 10, 15, 173-178 & 208 in particular.

⁷² For this recent historiography, see: Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002); Pieter M. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016).

⁷³ For the first-generation scholarship see: Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1944); A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* (London: H. Hamilton, 1948); Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950); Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1951); Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960); Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*.

⁷⁴ See previous two endnotes.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ For a discussion of “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” see: Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-27.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*; the language ‘master races over subject peoples’ is Taylor’s: Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy*.

⁷⁸ In one notable case this genealogical succession is supposed to be not merely intellectual. According to the recent literature, Hugh Seton-Watson, among other historians of the mid 1970’s, began the inquiries that would eventually overturn the national assumptions that his father, Robert, had unquestioningly embraced and lay at the foundation of his father’s historical arguments and narratives. Yet it should also be noted that the Seton-Watson family fits only imperfectly into the historiographical lineage found in the recent literature. Robert was more of an actor in than a first-generation historian of the long 19th century and its evolution of nation, nationalism, and national identity. Meanwhile what the recent literature alleges was the second generation’s discovery of the nation as invented, contingent, and ambiguous is supposed to have remained as yet only embryonic in Hough’s work, reaching full maturity only after his death: Robert William Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* (London, Constable & co., ltd., 1911); Robert William Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (London, Constable and company limited, 1917); Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: Methuen, 1977); another figure of continuity whose existence challenges a model of genealogical cleavage is Eric Hobsbawm. The recent literature understands Hobsbawm’s contributions to the second generation’s ‘discoveries’ of the nature of nation, nationalism, and nationhood as having been critical. Yet he was as much a member of the first generation as he was of the second: Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*; Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875* (New York: Scribner, 1975); Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁷⁹ For the second-generation scholarship see: Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*; Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976); Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*; Gary B. Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Editions, 1983); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) note: while the original publication of Hroch’s work (1968) places him chronologically in the 1st generation, that it was not translated into English until 1985 places him intellectually in the second generation of anglophone literature; Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, especially “Waving Flags: Nations and Nationalism;” Ernst Gellner, Gale Stokes, Miroslav Hroch, and Roman Szporluk, “Class and Nation: Competing Explanatory Systems,” *Eastern European Politics and Societies* Vol. 4, No. 1 (Dec., 1989): 98-150; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*.

⁸⁰ Gellner, *Nations*, 55.

⁸¹ Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*.

⁸² While Marxists had for more than a century before Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* understood nations as invented bourgeois constructions and as byproducts of capitalist industrialization, this seems to have come as a revelation to second-generation scholars. Though it should be noted that Marxist historians do not reject primordial, objective, and essential institutions *per se*, but assert that the only real primordial, objective, and essential institution is that of class: Gellner, *Nations*; also see literature cited for the 'second generation of scholarship' and the 'most recent anglophone literature/historiography.'

⁸³ Of course, all communities are imaginary when their geographic scope stretches past the horizons of the village and their membership extends beyond the circle of tangible persons with which one has routine and direct physical contact or communication. Likewise, just as long 19th century development of mass education and mass literacy, as well as modernity in general, made possible the expansion of national communities, so too did it expand the breadth of membership in and depth of identification with many other communities, be they constituted on the basis of class, race, form of occupation, firm of employment, sports team admired (e.g., the "Red Sox Nation"), beloved literature, musician, or television series (e.g., 'Trekkie'), or whatever else. Despite the first-generation literature, which described nation-building national movements as simply the most successful and powerful of the long nineteenth century constructed identities, that nations could also be imaginary seems to have come as an epiphany to the second generation: Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

⁸⁴ See literature cited for the 'second generation of scholarship' and the 'most recent anglophone literature/historiography.'

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ For other scholars of nationalism from this generation who share its conclusions about the national narrative of the long 19th century but do not directly or thoroughly address the historiographical evolution of those conclusions, see: Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups*; Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800-1912*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Dominique Kirchner Reill, *Nationalists who Feared the Nation: Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste, and Venice* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012); İpek Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878-1908* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); John Deak, *Forging a Multinational State: State Making in Imperial Austria from the Enlightenment to the First World War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015).

⁸⁸ One critical member of the recent literature/third generation that falls outside this timeline is István Deák. Deák framed a narrative of national indifference as early as 1990, albeit within the circumscribed community of the officer corps of the peacetime Habsburg imperial army. This is

especially noteworthy as such key members of the recent literature/third generation as Rogers Brubaker, Jeremy King, and Pieter Judson conducted their doctoral research at Columbia University during Deák's tenure there. Moreover, these members completed their research shortly before or after Deák's publication of the narrative that would later serve as the foundation of the recent literature/third generation's broader arguments. It is therefore difficult to avoid the impression that this narrative superstructure is, through Deák's protégés, a legacy of his conclusions: István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁸⁹ See scholarship cited for the 'most recent anglophone literature/historiography.'

⁹⁰ It is important to note that scholars of nationalism during the third-generation period did not universally share the conclusion of a nationally indifferent long 19th century narrative. Some scholars continued to assert, as national scholars and nationalist activists of the 19th century had claimed and lay commentators continue to assert, that nations truly were primordial, objective, and essential; see, for example: Anthony D. Smith, *The Antiquity of Nations* (Malden, MA, USA: Polity, 2004). Meanwhile other writers reasserted the conclusions of the first generation of scholars. Namely, that the nation was an invented and constructed group identity, but that over the course of the long 19th century it nevertheless became a significant, indeed the hegemonic group identity and loyalty of Europe; for the most recent and convincing demonstration of this argument see: John Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations: A History of Eastern Europe* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2020); also see scholarship cited for the 'most recent anglophone literature/historiography.'

⁹¹ It is true that nationalist activists, nationalist politicians, journalists, and most amateur historians between the early 1920's and late 1970's assumed that nations were primordial, objective, and essential. This remains just as true today. However, few serious scholars of nation during the first generation era shared this assumption or argued that nations were *re*-discovered and *re*-awakened. Rather such scholars appreciated that these were merely the assumptions of the actors they described and analyzed. Likewise, the scholars of the first generation understood very well that nationhood has always vied with other loyalties for dominance, that the nation has always held ambiguous and assorted definitions, and that the final products of national movements were never predetermined. And one such a scholar of the first generation is Hans Kohn, especially notable in that Kohn is one of the few scholars that some of the recent literature cites explicitly in its indictments of the first generation. In fact, Kohn-bashing has become something of a pastime for contemporary modern historians broadly. However, their critiques typically oversimplify the sophistication of Kohn's discussion by plucking features of his model out of the intricate and ambiguous context in which he carefully situates it and essentializes Kohn's dichotomy between 'Western' and 'non-Western' nationalism in ways that he himself did not. For example, one may disagree with Kohn's model of Western and non-Western nationalisms, and one may even deny the utility of his model for understanding the historical evolution of nationalism in general and within the spheres of his dichotomy in particular. However, it would be unjust to Kohn to fail to note that he never argued that the national features he claimed were predominate in the West were unknown outside the region nor that the features of nationalism he claimed were stronger in the non-West were alien to the West. Much more significantly, Kohn's national dichotomy was only possible if nations were to some degree a

matter of choice, and Kohn argued both that nations came into existence through movements of deliberate and novel construction rather than of recovery and that in this process of construction nations were shaped by the preexisting loyalties against which they competed. Indeed, for Kohn the precise nature of these preexisting loyalties greatly influenced the division between his Western and non-Western nationalisms, a result that was neither predetermined nor inevitable but deliberately chosen. And another notable scholar of this generation, who analyzed but did not adopt nationalist assumptions, was A.J.P. Taylor, whose assumptions and narratives became the virtually unchallenged orthodoxy of non-Marxist anglophone scholarship on nationalism, nationhood, and national identity throughout this generation. Taylor was as explicit that the nationalist actors he investigated were engaged in novel projects of invention and construction, what he termed “movements,” as he was that the diverse and contingent conditions under which these movements operated gave rise to varied and ambiguous national identities and conceptions of nationhood. Meanwhile, as early as 1960 Elie Kedourie offered the full-throated non-Marxist polemic against nationalist assumptions of the nation that has many decades later become obligatory in the introductory commentary of the recent literature: Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, especially 3-24, 329-334, 455-458, and 572-576; Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, especially: 7 & 28-32, and Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Kedourie, *Nationalism*, especially “Politics in a New Style” and “National self-determination,” especially 71-75.

⁹² Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*.

⁹³ Hans Kohn is the chief theorists of this paradigmatic dichotomy between a ‘Western,’ i.e., civic/liberal, and a ‘non-Western,’ i.e., cultural/ethnic, nation: Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*; also see: Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Bernard Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nation,” *Critical Review* 10, no. 2 (1996); Dan Dungaciu, “East and West and the “Mirror of Nature:” Nationalism in West and East Europe - Essentially Different?” in: *A Decade of Transformation, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences*, Vol. 8: (Vienna, 1999); Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties*, 4-9.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ While in some way’s oversimplifying Kohn’s arguments, Bernard Yack nevertheless provides an especially powerful deconstruction of these paradigms, Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nation.”

⁹⁸ For example, see: Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution* and *The Age of Capital*; Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*; Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*.

⁹⁹ Jennifer Jackson Preece, “Minority Rights in Europe: From Westphalia to Helsinki,” *Review of International Studies* Vol. 23, no. 1 (Jan., 1997): 75-92, especially 79-81; Eric D. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” *The American Historical Review* Vol.

113, no. 5 (Dec., 2008): 1313-1343, especially 1317-1323; Eric D. Weitz, *A World Divided: The Global Struggle for Human Rights in the Age of Nation-States* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019); Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*, especially “The 1878 Berlin Congress: Europe's New Ethno-Nation-States” in general and 238-239 in particular.

¹⁰⁰ See: Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), especially “Humanity before Human Rights.”

¹⁰¹ Any survey of Enlightenment political thought, from Hobbes, to Kant, to Rousseau, and beyond, bears this out. However, for scholarly affirmation of this point, one might note Jonathan Israel. Israel allows that what he terms ‘the radical school’ of Enlightenment thought, which among other ideas embraced the principle of popular sovereignty, was more intellectually consistent than what he frames as its ‘moderate school,’ which among other ideas rejected popular sovereignty. Likewise, he argues that the ‘radical school’ ultimately triumphed over the ‘moderate school’ in becoming the axiom of all modern society. However, Israel also makes clear that during the Enlightenment itself the ‘moderate school’ represented the overwhelming mainstream of Enlightenment thought, while the ‘radical school’ was at its fringe: Jonathan Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

¹⁰² For a discussion of Enlightenment debate about the principles of popular sovereignty and religious toleration, see: Israel, *Enlightenment Contested*; regarding popular sovereignty especially note “Part III: Political Emancipation: Chapter 13: Popular Sovereignty, Resistance, and the ‘Right to Revolution’” & “Part VI: Radical *Philosophes*: Postscript;” religious toleration is addressed throughout Israel’s discussion.

¹⁰³ One passage of Arendt’s analysis is so effective as to deserve being directly quoted at length: “Jews were exhorted to become educated enough not to behave like ordinary Jews, but they were, on the other hand, accepted only because they were Jews, because of their foreign, exotic appeal. In the eighteenth century, this had its source in the new humanism which expressly wanted “new specimens of humanity” (Herder), intercourse with whom would serve as an example of possible intimacy with all types of mankind. To the enlightened Berlin of Mendelssohn's time, the Jews served as living proof that all men are human. For this generation, friendship with Mendelssohn or Markus Herz was an ever-renewed demonstration of the dignity of man... Eager to stress the basic unity of mankind, they wanted to show the origins of the Jewish people as more alien, and hence more exotic, than they actually were, so that the demonstration of humanity as a universal principle might be more effective,” Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 57.

¹⁰⁴ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.

¹⁰⁵ The claim to ontological equivalency between political ideology and national identity on the one hand and ‘religion’ on the other is not a novel observation. Czesław Miłosz made such an analogy *vis-à-vis* Marxist-Leninist-Stalinism as early as 1953, though he was likely not the first to note such equivalency, Czesław Miłosz, *The Captive Mind* (New York: Knopf, 1953); meanwhile Eric Hobsbawm, in the final installment in his survey of modern European history,

was explicit that political ideology broadly, as well as national identity, functioned as modern and ‘secular’ religions: Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994); more recently Yuri Slezkine has provided a thoughtful examination of the uses and missuses of the terms ‘religion’ and ‘secular religion,’ as well as the superficial differences and fundamental similarities of the two concepts, both in theory and in practice: Yuri Slezkine, *The House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), especially: Book 1, Part 1, “3. The Faith.” (pg.’s 73-118).

¹⁰⁶ Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*, especially “Humanity before Human Rights.” However, it is critical to note that Moyn argues that a principle of human rights is both an entirely modern and an entirely *sui generis* phenomenon. That is, he contends that the modern human rights principle is not the apotheosis of an organic and slowly evolving philosophical or ideological tradition whose origins and incremental development stretch back into the distant past. Rather, it resulted from a sudden and unexpected crystallization of a heterodox set of values drawn from various and diverse intellectual and ideological traditions that took place in the West during its moment of neo-liberal caesura in the late 1970’s/early 1980’s. Indeed, Moyn argues that an essential pre-condition for the sudden advent of modern human rights was a Western consensus that many of these traditions, especially such notably communal traditions as socialism, nationalism, national self-determination, and the state, had been discredited, an assumption that did not, he argues, prevent human rights theorists from selectively drawing from them. Moyn is certainly correct that it would be anachronistic to speak about ‘human rights’ *per se* in the context of European intra-, sub-, supra-, and non-state relations thought during the *Belle Époque*-era. Aside from a handful of eccentrics, no one during this period advanced the idea that they, each of their fellow citizens, and every individual human beyond their state’s borders had or ought to have identical rights. Still less that any institution should exist that would apply its principles and values equally to each and every human being on earth, ergo, an institution that would necessarily circumvent and even violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their state, their nation, or both. Indeed, Moyn demonstrates that while it may seem that at first glance that some intra-, sub-, supra-, and non-state actors employed the language of human rights during this period, upon closer inspection we discover that in reality this was only in furtherance of civil (i.e., citizen, state-based), minority, national, or class rights *per se*, but not *human* rights as such. However, even Moyn recognizes that during this period some state actors advocating for coercive, state prerogative-violating acts on the inter-state age did employ apologies that bore resemblance to the language of modern human rights. Though Moyn asserts that it is misleading to read these apologies as a direct antecedent of, and as laying the intellectual foundations for, the later development of modern human rights theory, other commentators have argued that such similarities are more than superficial or coincidental: Moyn, *The Last Utopia*, especially “Humanity before Human Rights,” and Samuel Moyn, *Human Rights and the Uses of History* (London, Verso, 2014), especially “Spectacular Wrongs: On Humanitarian Intervention.”

¹⁰⁷ For arguments that find in the wars, interventions, and crises of the 19th century direct antecedents of and the theoretical foundations for modern human rights and humanitarian intervention see: Gary Jonathan Bass, *Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914: The Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012), and

Michael N. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2013); Alexis Heraclides and Ada DiIalla, *Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century: Setting the Precedent* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015); Fabian Klose, ed., *The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and Practice from the Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Chapter 2

¹ A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), especially “XI: The Great Eastern Crisis;” M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), especially “The Constitutional Moment and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878” in “The Twilight of the Tanzimat and the Hamidian Regime;” Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914: The Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice* (Princeton, N.J : Princeton University Press, 2012), especially “Chapter Six: Nonintervention during the Eastern Crisis (1875-78);” F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914* (London: Routledge, 2013), especially “The Eastern Crisis of 1875-78,” in “6: The Testing of the New Order: 1871-79;” John Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations: A History of Eastern Europe* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2020), especially “8. The 1878 Berlin Congress: Europe’s New Ethno-Nation-States.”

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ For a discussion of the Russian Empire’s ethnic cleansing campaign of Circassians and its consequences for the Balkans in the 1870’s see: Walter Richmond, *The Circassian Genocide* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013). Also see: Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*; Rodogno, *Against Massacre*; Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System*; Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*.

⁷ Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*; Rodogno, *Against Massacre*; Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System*; Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ For a discussion of the Young Ottoman movement and its multifarious views on, among other things, the nation and nationalism in general, and of an Ottoman ‘nation and Ottoman nationalism in particular, see: Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000). Also see: Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*; Rodogno, *Against Massacre*; Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System*; Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*.

¹⁶ Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*; Rodogno, *Against Massacre*; Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System*; Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ See, for example, Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), especially “The Polarization of Europe, 1887-1907;” Bridge Bullen, *The Great Powers*. One exception to this is Carole Fink’s *Defending the Rights of Others*, which extensively consults both the text of the Treaty and Congress’s protocols, and which is discussed at great length in an endnote below: Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹⁹ Jennifer Jackson Preece, “Minority Rights in Europe: From Westphalia to Helsinki,” *Review of International Studies* Vol. 23, no. 1 (Jan., 1997): 75-92, especially 79-81; Eric D. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” *The American Historical Review* Vol. 113, no. 5 (Dec., 2008): 1313-1343, especially 1317-1323; Eric D. Weitz, *A World Divided: The Global Struggle for Human Rights in the Age of Nation-States* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019).

²⁰ Unless otherwise specified, all citations of the text of the Berlin Treaty text are taken from: Augustus Oakes and R.B. Mowat, eds., *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1918). Reference to the protocols of the Berlin Congress are from: House of Commons, *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin: With the Protocols of the Congress* (London: Harrison and Sons, 1878).

²¹ And this applies especially to the Berlin Treaty and the Concert, given that the plenipotentiaries expressed widely varied ontologies and even vocabularies as concerned the politics they addressed at the Congress. As concerns the latter, see, for example, Carole Fink's description of differing views among plenipotentiaries as to whether Jews were, in fact, 'Jews,' or whether they were 'Israelites,' or when and where Jews were 'Jews,' and when and where they were 'Israelites:' Fink's *Defending the Rights of Others*, pg. 26, fn. 111; pg. 27, fn. 112. As concerns confusion over ontology, e.g., were Bulgarians a confessional community bound together by a common membership and faith in their Church? were they a nation bound together by the 'secular confession' of their ethnic identity? were they a (civic) nation bound together solely by common citizenship in a state? were they a race bound together by blood? were they several, all, or none of these? And what, for that matter, were Slavs? were *they* a race or a nation? and what were Bulgarians in relation to Slavs? with plenipotentiaries expressing a wide range of views on such matters, see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, (for Lord Salisbury) 22, 24, 114, 135, 184 & 209; for the French language see: 17, 18, 101, 128, 177, & 203; (for Alexander Gorchakov) 23, 35-36, 90, 207; for French see: 18, 30-31, 83, 201; (for Mehemed Ali Pasha) 182; for French see: 175; (for Pyotr Shuvalov) 25, 48, 49, 137, 172, 198, & 229; for French see: 19, 42, 44, 130, 165, 193, & 220; (for Alexander Karatheodori Pasha) 121, 252; for French (especially instructive in this context) see: 108, 246; (for William Waddington) 117, 195; for French see: 104, 189; (for Benjamin Disraeli) 117, 197, 208; for French see: 104, 192, 201-202; (for Gyula Andrassy) 113; for French see: 101; (for Otto von Bismarck), 68, 79, 90, 138, 185, 254; for French see: 60, 74, 83, 131, 177, 248. Given such confusion in terminology and ontology, the public and consensus meanings, intentions, and indeed wording of the Congress's agreements, and Treaty's articles, were far more significant than the personal and confidential perspectives of any one participant or foreign policy maker, let alone lobbyist, commentator, or other private person.

²² One particularly striking example of this is Carole Fink's *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938*, which, as noted above, is one of the few current works to extensively consult the text of both the Berlin Treaty and the Congress's protocols. The principal concern of Fink's book is, as its title suggests, not so much the Berlin Congress or Treaty themselves, nor inter-state and great power relations as such, but mainly how these related to the evolution of communal minority rights/communal protection guarantees in European international relations, and especially as these concerned European Jews. Meanwhile her chapter devoted to the Berlin Congress and Treaty is principally focused on its Romanian dimension, a completely justified focus given her larger concerns. However, such a focus leads her to conclude that *all* of the Treaty's articles guaranteeing religious liberty were mainly, indeed entirely, motivated by an interest in providing communal protections to Romania's Jews. As concerned the other Treaty articles that guaranteed religious liberty outside of Romania, these were, Fink argues, mere facades and contrivances, largely devoid of any meaning in themselves, that aimed only at securing a communal species of protection for this one (Jewish) population and almost entirely as concerned this one place (i.e., in Romania). Fink bases these conclusions on scant evidence, mainly on the protocols themselves, which, as the following discussion will demonstrate, on their face challenge rather than affirm such conclusions, and a few personal and confidential correspondences between William Waddington, Jules Armand Dufaure, Adolphe Crémieux, and Gerson von Bleichröder (only one of which, namely Waddington, was a plenipotentiary at Berlin, and two of which, namely Crémieux and

Bleichröder, were not themselves foreign policy makers but merely lobbyists). In fact, Fink asserts that the Congress's discussions of religious liberty as concerned all other conceptions of such (e.g., as an individual right), as concerned non-Jews, and as concerned polities other than Romania were simply part of an elaborate, surreptitious, and premediated conspiracy, primarily concocted by French (namely Waddington) and German (namely Bismarck) plenipotentiaries, but carried out with the conscious and deliberate collaboration of all other non-Russian plenipotentiaries, so as to secure special Jewish protections, almost entirely as concerned these in Romania. And she bases this on just two sources, that is, a (misquoted or miscited) reference to secondary literature, namely to Stern's *Gold and Iron* (see pg. 25, fn. 101) and a single source of primary evidence, namely a personal and confidential correspondence from Bleichröder to Crémieux, notably neither of whom were themselves participants in the Congress or foreign policy makers (see pg. 27, fn. 117). Indeed, if anything some of her own cited evidence seems to challenge her own conclusion, and to suggest that what the plenipotentiaries in fact intended was not an exclusively Jewish communal protection guarantee that mainly concern Romania, but a universal, liberal, and uniform guarantee to all individuals, without respect to community, as defined by confession, nation, or whatever else, in all of the polities they discussed, see in particular pg. 29, fn. 129 and pg. 29, fn. 131: Fink's *Defending the Rights of Others*. Meanwhile many of the authors of the Berlin System school rely on a significant misreading of the Berlin Treaty's text in support of similar arguments, though these will be addressed elsewhere below: Preece, "Minority Rights in Europe: From Westphalia to Helsinki; Weitz, "From the Vienna to the Paris System;" Weitz, *A World Divided*."

²³ Oakes and Mowat, *The Great European Treaties*, 37-98.

²⁴ Oakes and Mowat, *The Great European Treaties*, 176-184 & 330-332.

²⁵ See: the Treaty of London (1839): 28 articles in total (the treaty itself having 4, its annex 24); the Treaty of Vienna (1864): 24 articles; the Treaty of Vienna (1866): 24 articles; the Treaty of Zurich (1859): 23 articles; the Treaty of London (1832): 18 articles; the Treaty of Frankfurt (1871): 18 articles (together with its annex, 21 articles); the Treaty of London (1863): 15 articles; the Treaty of Prague (1866): 14 articles; the Preliminaries of Versailles (1871): 10 articles; the Treaty of London (1867): 7 articles; the Treaty of London (1852): 5 articles; the Straights Convention (1856): 3 articles; the Protocol of London (1830): 11 paragraphs: Oakes and Mowat, eds., *The Great European Treaties*, 116-125, 141-152, 184-185, 198-209, 226-239, 251-255, 260-262 & 274-288.

²⁶ Oakes and Mowat, eds., *The Great European Treaties*, 176.

²⁷ Oakes and Mowat, eds., *The Great European Treaties*, 176.

²⁸ In light of the above claim, see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 90, 118-119, 153

²⁹ In light of the above claim, see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 153.

³⁰ In light of the above claim see, for example: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, (for Shuvalov) 64-65 & 78, (for Andrassy) 65, (for Gorchakov) 90, and (for Karatheodori Pasha) 115. The Congress's discussions of Romania and Montenegro were also generally illustrative of such views: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, (for Romania) 136-138 & 151-156, (for Montenegro) 156-157.

³¹ See, for example, *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 11, 12, 14, 35, 226, 270 & 277; especially see 241-242. Gorchakov was especially clear on this point: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 14.

³² The discussion below will frequently demonstrate, in its analysis of other dimensions of the Congress, that this Congress presumed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these polities to be subject to its oversight and that the Congress could subordinate their sovereignty and territorial integrity to such other principles as the Congress saw fit to adopt, especially those of monarchical rule and religious toleration. However, here it will suffice to point to a few epically illustrative episodes surrounding Bismarck, such as when Bismarck, during the Congress's discussion of Bulgaria's ruling regime, that is, of the details of its institutional structure and of its domestic policies and laws, declared that "if the Bulgarian populations, either through ill-will or innate incapacity, cannot make their new institutions work, Europe will in truth be obliged to take counsel." *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 64. Also, when declaring the German Empire's recognition of Serbia and Romania's independence Bismarck was explicit that "the Congress admits the independence of Servia, but *on the condition* that religious liberty shall be recognized within the Principality. [Bismarck] adds that the Drafting Committee, in formulating this decision, must take care to lay down the connection established by the Congress *between the proclamation of Servian independence and the recognition of religious liberty*" [my emphases]. *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 120. Likewise, as concerned the Principality of Romania, Bismarck declared that "the question is whether or not the Powers are agreed to recognize the independence of Roumania... Europe alone has the power to sanction [Romania's] independence. She has to ask herself *under what conditions* she will adopt that important decision, and if she considers *that these conditions* shall be the same as those already established in the case of Servia" [my emphases]. *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 153. Critically no plenipotentiary challenged but rather, implicitly in their silence about, and explicitly in their voting in favor of, such, endorsed these formulations.

³³ Waddington, for example, was just as emphatic that the new polities' existence and 'independence' were preconditioned on the approval and oversight of the Congress, declaring that he recognized "the independence of Servia, but *on the condition* of the following proposition identic with that which the Congress has accepted for Bulgaria" [my emphasis]. And, as regarded the Principality of Romania, that "faithful to the principles which have hitherto inspired them, the French Plenipotentiaries demand that the Congress shall grant the independence of Roumania *on the same conditions* as that of Servia" (my emphasis). *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 119 & 153. Critically no plenipotentiary challenged but rather, implicitly in their silence about, and explicitly in their voting in favor of, such, endorsed these formulations.

³⁴ The German, Austro-Hungarian, French, and Italian plenipotentiaries, for example, took it as a matter of course that they had the authority to determine for these polities, without any

consultation whatever with either their ruling regimes or populations, such key domestic policies as tariffs and commercial regulations. See, for example, *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 79-81 & 120-121. Meanwhile, that the Congress's disavowal of these polities' territorial integrity is best demonstrated by its consensus ultimatum to Romania's ruling regime that it accept what the plenipotentiaries themselves understood to be a gross violation of this principle, namely the ceding of Romania's Bessarabian territory to Russia, as a precondition of the Congress's recognition of Romania's existence and 'independence.' *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 136-138. Also see: 64, 119-120 & 153.

³⁵ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 24.

³⁶ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 48 & 117.

³⁷ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 232 & 253.

³⁸ The Russian plenipotentiaries evolved their successive schemes by the comically transparent means of adopting another plenipotentiary's misreading of their language and then claiming that this clear misreading in fact captured their proposal's true intent (thereby denying that they had modified their proposal at all). However, in a sense, they did indeed remain ever faithful to the principle that underlay all of their schemes, namely the demotion of the Ottoman Empire to a second-tier status in the European state system. *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 239-241, 253-254, & 265-267.

³⁹ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 239-240.

⁴⁰ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 240-241, 253-254, & 265-267

⁴¹ Salisbury, Bismarck, Andrassy, Karatheodori Pasha and the French plenipotentiaries were especially clear that Russian plenipotentiaries' second and third proposals constituted an abrogation of Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity, and possibly that of all the Treaty's signatory states in general, and were equally clear that they rejected these proposals on this basis. *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 253-254 & 265-267.

⁴² *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 239

⁴³ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 241.

⁴⁴ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 265.

⁴⁵ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 240. For the non-Russian plenipotentiaries' implicit and explicit confirmation of the principles expounded in Bismarck's address, see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 240-241, 253-254 & 265-267.

⁴⁶ See, in particular, *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 47-49, 64-69, 76-80, 91-93, 121, 132-133, 184-185, 195-199, 211 & 266.

⁴⁷ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 253.

⁴⁸ Bismarck, Andrassy, and Salisbury were especially clear about this distinction, *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 253-254, & 265-267.

⁴⁹ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 267

⁵⁰ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 48. 77.

⁵¹ Bismarck (in his categorical rejection of the 2nd paragraph and his personal interpretation of the first), Andrassy (in attempting to rescue the first paragraph by making substantive revisions to it), Lord Salisbury, Karatheodori Pasha, and the Italian and French plenipotentiaries were all clear on this point, *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 253-254 & 265-267.

⁵² *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 266.

⁵³ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 232, 239-241, 253-254, & 265-267.

⁵⁴ Weitz, "From the Vienna to the Paris System," especially 1317-1323; Preece, "Minority Rights in Europe," especially 79-8; Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*, especially "The 1878 Berlin Congress: Europe's New Ethno-Nation-States."

⁵⁵ Weitz, "From the Vienna to the Paris System," 1320.

⁵⁶ Though this is obvious from just a cursory knowledge of the framers themselves and the context in which they wrote the Berlin Treaty, it was also then the case that, while some of these Churches had achieved effective independence, none were in 1878 autocephalous. For an introduction to the Orthodox Church in the Balkans, and the sometimes mutually reinforcing, sometimes ambiguous, and sometimes confrontational relationship between state, nation, and Church during this period, see: Lucian N. Leustean, ed., *Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Southeastern Europe* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014).

⁵⁷ As the preamble to the Treaty of Berlin is missing from the text found in *The Great European Treaties*, the English citations from the preamble are from the text found in: "Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East: Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878," *The American Journal of International Law* Vol. 2, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents (Oct. 1908): 401-424; for the quotation cited here, see: 402. Notably, while the German text of the Berlin Treaty uses ambiguous language when referring to the title of the Tsar (i.e., Emperor of all the Russias/Russians), the French language makes clear that this title did, in fact, frame the Tsar as a ruler of "Russias," i.e., of territories, and not of "Russians," i.e., not of a people, peoples, or nation: *Deutsches Kaiserreich, Reichs-Gesetzblatt: 1878* (Berlin: Bureau des Bundeskanzlers, 1878): 307.

⁵⁸ For a discussion of the distinction between a territorial nobility and royalty on the one hand, and a royalty and nobility of a people on the other, and the role each played in both the evolution

of peoples into nations and the development of nation-states, see: Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

⁵⁹ “Treaty between Great Britain, (*et. al.*),” 402. The same language is used in both the German and French texts of the Treaty: Deutsches Kaiserreich, *Reichs-Gesetzblatt*: 307.

⁶⁰ For a discussion of the Young Ottoman movement and its multifarious views on, among other things, the nation and nationalism in general, and of an Ottoman ‘nation’ and Ottoman nationalism in particular, see: Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. Also see: Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*; Rodogno, *Against Massacre*; Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System*; Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*.

⁶¹ I thank Christine Philliou for illuminating me as to Alexander Karatheodori’s background. For a discussion of the Karatheodori family, see: Christine Philliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

⁶² For a more detailed consideration of this confusion in these states, see: Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875* (New York: Scribner, 1975), especially “Building Nations.”

⁶³ For an especially strong example of this argument see: Pieter Judson., *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016).

⁶⁴ Eugen Weber, as noted earlier, argued that peasants living on the territory of the Third French Republic were at the time of the Treaty’s signing only in the early stages of transforming into Frenchmen, and, rather than having adopted a French ethnic national identity or the Parisian-French language, still primarily clung to more ancient and regional orientations and continued to speak mutually unintelligible French ‘dialects’ and non-French languages, see: Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*. On the other hand, shortly before the Treaty’s signing, and on the occasion of the founding of the Kingdom of Italy, Massimo d’Azeglio famously quipped, “we have made Italy. Now we must make Italians.” How far Italy was from d’Azeglio’s goal in 1878 is reflected by the fact that even into the early 20th century many immigrant Venetians, Genovesi, Neapolitans, and Sicilians (among others hailing from the Italian peninsula who could not understand each other’s languages) discovered they were, in fact, ethnic Italians only when American immigration officials told them so upon their arrival to the United States. For an example of the latter claim see: Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, 153-154.

⁶⁵ A.J.P. Taylor., *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* (London: H. Hamilton, 1948), 22.

⁶⁶ For an examination of these events and the considerations behind them, see: Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers*.

⁶⁷ At no point during any of the Berlin Congress’s sessions did any plenipotentiary challenge the Russian view that that majority of Eastern Rumelia’s residents were Bulgarians: *Correspondence*

Relating to the Congress of Berlin: With the Protocols of the Congress; pg. 36 provides an especially effective demonstration of this; for a more nuanced and more recent examination of how those actually residing in Eastern Rumelia self-identified during this period see: Milen V. Petrov, "Everyday Forms of Compliance: Subaltern Commentaries on Ottoman Reform, 1864-1868," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct., 2004): 730-759. Though it should be noted that Petrov's study ultimately affirms that the overwhelming majority of those living in Eastern Rumelia thought of themselves as ethnic Bulgarians.

⁶⁸ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 22-23 & 36.

⁶⁹ Gorchakov was also especially clear on this point, though he was equally clear that his endorsement of a purely territorial conception of the Greek state was merely intended as an act of conciliation toward the Congress and was given against his own inclinations, which were for a recognition that the Balkan states were ethnic nation states. *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 22-25 & 34-38.

⁷⁰ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 24-25, 35-36 & 47

⁷¹ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 22-24

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 156-157 & 182.

⁷⁴ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 24-25, 35-36, 47, 156-157 & 182.

⁷⁵ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 22-25 & 34-38.

⁷⁶ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 35, 49, 95, 196-197, 156-157, & 182.

⁷⁷ For the only two exceptions to this rule at the Congress, see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 93-94, 210, & 225.

⁷⁸ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 93.

⁷⁹ For these exceptions see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 132.

⁸⁰ See, in particular, *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 156-157, 182 229-230

⁸¹ For example, see: René Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 1968), especially: "Topic VII. From the Treaty of Paris to the Treaty of Berlin," and Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers*, especially: "The Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878."

⁸² Though the plenipotentiaries expressed this anxiety throughout the Congress, one can find especially prominent examples at: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 22-25

(which in this context must be read alongside 34-38), 47, 49, 93, 113-115, 120-121, 185-186, 195-198, 208-210, and 212.

⁸³ Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System,” especially 1317-1323; Preece, “Minority Rights in Europe,” especially 79-81; Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*, especially “The 1878 Berlin Congress: Europe’s New Ethno-Nation-States.” Carole Fink also takes special note of these articles: Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others*.

⁸⁴ Preece, “Minority Rights in Europe,” 81. Preece does not reference article 35 directly but rather by means of noting article 34, which, in the context of her argument, could only be an indirect reference to article 35. Weitz engages in similar indirect reference by citing article 43, which for his argument could only be an indirect reference to article 44: Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System:” 1320, n.17.

⁸⁵ Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System,” 1320-1321; Preece, “Minority Rights in Europe,” 81; Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*, 236. Unlike Weitz and Connelly, who cite article 44 to support their claim that the Berlin Treaty introduced novel communal ethnic national rights and minority protections into inter-state law, Preece’s analysis of article 44 is primarily concerned with its “elaborate” guarantees to the citizens of the signatory Powers residing in Romania. However, as she herself notes in the next sentence, this principle of extraterritoriality was by the time of the Treaty’s signing already well established, for example in eastern Asia (especially in China, Siam, and, if only for the moment, Japan). Indeed, in the Ottoman Empire this principle had been in practice for centuries, in the form of the “capitulations.” We may put aside the question of whether extending purported communal minority protections to a specific class of foreigners is or is not “elaborate.” What matters here is whether the Berlin Treaty’s adoption of the principle of extraterritoriality was new. And it was not.

⁸⁶ For the demographics of the various religiously, linguistically, and ethnically defined polities of the Balkans during this period see: Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997); Philliou, *Biography of an Empire.*; Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800-1912*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

⁸⁷ See, for example, Stern, *Gold and Iron*, especially “Chapter 14: Rumania: The Triumph of Expediency.”

⁸⁸ For a German and French version of the text see: Deutsches Kaiserreich, *Reichs-Gesetzblatt*: 307-345.

⁸⁹ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 63.

⁹⁰ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 80.

⁹¹ For the wider debate see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 63, 80, 92-93

⁹² *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 119-120

⁹³ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 120

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid*

⁹⁶ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 153.

⁹⁷ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 153-154. For the Congress's rote and unanimous affirmation of the principle hitherto established as regarded Montenegro see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 157. For the same as regarded the religious liberties 'decaled' by the Ottoman regime in article 62, see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 184 & 185

⁹⁸ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 153.

⁹⁹ For an account of the Romanian regime having adopted this policy toward its Jewish minority population see: Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*, 230-237.

¹⁰⁰ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 255.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, the Liberal Party in the UK, the *Républicains modérés* [Moderate Republicans] in the Third French Republic, the *Nationalliberale Partei* [National Liberal Party] in the German Empire, the liberalizing reforms of Russian of Tsar Alexander II, the *Sinistra Storica* [Historical Left Party] in Italy, and the *Verfassungspartei* [Constitutional Party] in Austria-Hungary. For a thorough analysis of the later see: Jonathan Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1861-1895* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Indeed, though 1878 marked its termination, the Ottoman Tanizmat period can be viewed as an expression of this era of triumphant classical liberalism.

¹⁰² Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1944); Bernard Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation," *Critical Review* 10, no. 2 (1996); Dan Dungaciu, "East and West and the "Mirror of Nature:" Nationalism in West and East Europe - Essentially Different?" in: *A Decade of Transformation, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences*, Vol. 8: (Vienna, 1999); İpek Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878-1908* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 4-9.

¹⁰³ Articles 13 and 39 do not contain the language of article 30's second paragraph, but article 30's first and third paragraphs are exactly reproduced in both of the former.

¹⁰⁴ This article has been noted before to demonstrate that insofar as the Treaty explicitly recognized national communities it was to prohibit rather than affirm special consideration of

them. However, in this context we see that ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks, as a community distinct from all other citizens, are guaranteed special, exceptional, and particular communal protections, advantages, and privileges. That is, while all ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks enjoy the same rights regardless of their particular confession or nationality, as ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks they enjoy special rights *vis-à-vis* non-ecclesiastic, non-pilgrim, and non-monk citizens.

¹⁰⁵ Again, while all monks, regardless of country of origin, shared the same rights as monks of Mount Athos they enjoyed special communal rights that other individuals in the Ottoman Empire did not enjoy.

¹⁰⁶ Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System,” 1320.

¹⁰⁷ For example, article 12 granted protection guarantees to the Muslim community living in the Principality of Bulgaria. While some of article 12’s framers may have assumed that Muslim Turkic speakers in the Principality were simultaneously a religious and national community, such synonymy did not apply, at least automatically, to its Muslim Slavic speakers, the so-called “Pomaks,” of whose existence the article’s framers were certainly aware. See, for example, Carl Sax’s 1877 ethnographic map of the Balkans, which prominently outlined Pomak communities in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, which was one of many maps composed immediately before the Berlin Congress’s convocation and intended specifically for that Congress’s reference, and which is depicted above, i.e., as “Map 10.” A. Ishirkov, Vasil Nikolov Zlatarski, and Dimitŭr Khristov Rizov. *Die Bulgaren in ihren Historischen, Ethnographischen und Politischen Grenzen: Atlas mit 40 Landkarten* (Berlin: K. Hoflithographie, hofbuch- und steindruckerei Wilhelm Greve, 1917)

¹⁰⁸ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 255

¹⁰⁹ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 22-23.

¹¹⁰ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 13.

¹¹¹ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 35.

¹¹² *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 23

¹¹³ Richard Andree, *Geographisches Handbuch zu Andree's Handatlas: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der kommerziellen, statistischen und politischen Verhältnisse* (Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasing, 1882), 800.

¹¹⁴ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 155

¹¹⁵ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 13, 93, 170, 212.

¹¹⁶ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 12, 49, 185.

¹¹⁷ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 49 & 182.

¹¹⁸ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, (for Andrassy) 65, (for Gorchakov), 117.

¹¹⁹ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 46-47, 114, 184.

¹²⁰ For a compelling demonstration of the Enlightenment's celebration of both diversity and toleration, especially as regarded matters of confession and faith, see: Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1951), 57-85.

¹²¹ For a discussion of the interrelationship of the Enlightenment, religious toleration, individual rights, liberalism, national rights, and nationalism see: Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), especially "Humanity before Human Rights" in general and 26-32 in particular. For a more thorough discussion of religious toleration and the Enlightenment, see: Jonathan Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) and Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 57-85.

¹²² Israel, *Enlightenment Contested*. Also see previous chapter.

¹²³ Article 3 declared that: "The Prince of Bulgaria shall be freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers. No member of the Reigning Dynasties of the Great European Powers may be elected Prince of Bulgaria. In case of a vacancy in the princely dignity, the election of the new Prince shall take place under the same conditions and with the same forms." Plainly, the confirmation and assent power, i.e., veto power, of both the Sultan and the signatory Powers curtailed the extent to which the population of Bulgaria was "free" to elect its prince. The prohibition against its electing a prince from a great power dynasty further limited its freedom *vis-à-vis* foreign prince options. This prohibition also implied, and the veto power of both the Sultan and signatory Powers ensured, that regardless of the preferences of those who would be ruled by him, this prince would be a foreign and not a native, that is to say not a national, prince. Meanwhile the article's second paragraph ensured that this would be true not only of Bulgaria's first prince, but for all the Bulgarian princes that followed, at least so long as the Berlin Treaty, and its associated international regime, remained a decisive force over Bulgaria in particular and in European inter-state relations in general.

¹²⁴ In fact, at the Congress the plenipotentiaries directly addressed that idea of Bulgaria going without a monarch and being ruled entirely on the basis of self-government. However, none questioned that such a proposition was tantamount to 'giving Bulgaria up to anarchy' and this suggestion of Bulgaria being without monarch (i.e., of its being a republic) was mainly used as a *reductio ad absurdum* device in a discussion about how the Treaty's signatory states would themselves determine who Bulgaria's monarch would be. *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 64

¹²⁵ In the French text: "*une assemblée de notables de la Bulgarie, convoquée à Tarnovo, élaborera, avant l'élection du Prince, le règlement organique de la Principauté.*" In the German text: "*eine in Tirnovo zusammenzubrufende Versammlung von Notabeln Bulgariens wird vor*

der Wahl des Fürsten das organische Reglement des Fürstenthums ausarbeiten.” Deutsches Kaiserreich, *Reichs-Gesetzblatt*: 315.

¹²⁶ During the Congress’s discussion of what would become Treaty article 4, Shuvalov made clear that while some Notables would be elected by a participatory process involving Bulgarians themselves, other Notables would not be chosen on this basis, with Russian commissioners appointing the latter. Notably, these appointed Notables would not, as in modern legislatures and constituent assemblies, equally represent all the citizens of either the Principality as a whole or of their distinct legislative districts in particular. Rather, as in archaic assemblies, these appointed Notables would represent hierarchically structured corporate entities, entities unaccountable to the Principality’s citizens and entities that excluded most of such citizens from either membership or participation therein, with these entities being two particular institutions, namely Islamic ecclesiastical courts and the secular state juridical bureaucracy (these appointed Notables were drawn from the ‘cadis’ of Bulgaria, with cadis being judges who in the Ottoman Empire performed two functions, first, as in all of Islam, being to administer sharia religious law courts, and with the second, in a function that was unique to the Ottoman Empire, being to administer secular laws decreed by Ottoman sultans). *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 68

¹²⁷ Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty provides some indication of what its framers assumed an ‘organic law’ to be. This article proclaimed that “the Sublime Porte undertakes scrupulously to apply in the Island of Crete the Organic Law of 1868, with such modifications as may be considered equitable.” The modifications to Crete’s Organic Law that resulted from this article, such as the introduction of an assembly more closely resembling a modern legislature, brought this Organic Law into closer accord with modern constitutions. However, the Organic Law established in 1868, which article 23 amended but maintained, was far from a modern constitution in that when compared to the latter it guaranteed far fewer rights to its subjects, was less absolute in its guarantee of those rights, was far less comprehensive in the institutional framework it established, was much more ambiguous in its delegation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, left far more power in the hands of the executive, and established as its assembly a body much more in keeping with that of an ‘assembly of notables’ than a legislature. If the Organic Law imagined by article 4 took as its model the Cretan Organic Law of 1868 noted in article 23 then it could hardly have been assumed to be synonymous with a modern constitution. For a discussion of the Cretan Organic Law of 1868 see: Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton University Press, 1963), especially 46-47, 146-150, & 158-159. For the Congress’s discussion of Crete’s Organic Law, see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 269-270. Moreover, that something like Crete’s Organic Law was what the plenipotentiaries had in mind for Bulgaria is further borne out by the fact that no plenipotentiaries at Berlin questioned the formulation of a Bulgarian Organic Law expounded at San Stefano, which explicitly made reference to the Danubian Principalities’ (i.e., Romania’s) *Regulamentul Organic* [Organic Regulation] as both prototype and model for Bulgaria’s own Organic Law. Notably, this Regulation, which Tsar Nicholas I’s regime had imposed on the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1831, was as much a constitution, in the modern sense of the term, as was the *Magna Carta Libertatum* signed by the English King John in 1215. Sir Edward Hertslet, ed., *The Map of Europe by Treaty: Showing the*

Various Political and Territorial Changes which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814. Vol. 4. (London: Harrison and Sons, 1891), 2680-268 & 2694-2696.

¹²⁸ In the first place, at various times since 1800 ‘assemblies of notables’ had convened, and ‘organic laws’ had been promulgated, in all of the polities whose independence the Treaty now conditionally recognized, namely in Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania (as well as in Greece). In all instances these terms had referred to proto-constitutional orders that had, among other pre- or proto-constitutional features, founded proto-legislative bodies largely or entirely consisting of appointed (rather than elected) members. Meanwhile, by 1878 all of these polities, excepting Montenegro, had replaced, at least formally, their ‘organic laws’ and ‘assemblies of notables’ with modern constitutions and legislatures, a condition underscored by terminology that reflected the distinction. Meanwhile, as recently as 1876 Bulgarians themselves had, as citizens of the Ottoman Empire, been ruled, albeit briefly, by a constitutional regime and represented in a modern legislature, a condition to which article 4 did not ensure their return. At the same time, all the of Treaty’s signatory states themselves, excepting Russia, either maintained or had had recent experience with, both modern constitutions and modern legislatures, and indeed Russia’s ruling regime would demonstrate a keen sensitivity to phraseology *vis-à-vis* both constitution and legislature, and the principles implied by such phraseology, during its 1905 revolution.

¹²⁹ Harboring what would ultimately prove to be a misplaced confidence in the Russophilia of the Bulgarian people, but still uncertain about the identity of its future prince and hence his amenability to accepting Russian tutelage, Russian commissioners at Tirnovo urged the Notables to adopt ever more participatory and even democratic institutions, thus ensuring the political emasculation of that prince. Spurred by this Russian encouragement, the Notables declared themselves to be a constituent assembly, that they were founding not merely an ‘organic law’ but a constitution, and took as their model for the latter the unquestionably modern and liberal democratic constitution of Belgium. This outcome is especially notable in two respects. First, in 1831 Russia was the agent most responsible for imposing on the Danubian Principalities’ their *Regulamentul Organic* (i.e., proto-constitutional organic law), notably not as a conservative alternative to a more progressive and fully developed constitution but as an alternative to having no foundational law whatsoever. And while the *Regulamentul* was far from a fully developed and modern constitution it was nonetheless significant in that it, like Britain’s *Magna Carta*, introduced the practice of enshrining absolute principles of governance in a foundational document. Russian agents also played a critical role in encouraging the Notables at Tirnovo in 1879 to move beyond proto- to fully developed constitutionalism, with the former (i.e., proto-constitutionalism) itself having also been pioneered by Russia in Balkans in 1831 (only Greece’s Constitution of 1822 pre-dated the *Regulamentul* in the region). In doing so, Europe’s most absolutist and anti-constitutional regime became a significant agent of liberal-democratic constitutional evolution in the Balkans over course of the 19th century. True, this was the result of contingent circumstances rather than by deliberate design or principle, but such is the nature of realpolitik. Secondly, while Tirnovo’s Assembly of Notables *cum* constituent assembly produced an undeniably liberal-democratic and modern document well deserving of the title ‘constitution,’ this had not been the plenipotentiaries’ consensus intention at Berlin. Indeed, this was not only beyond what the Russian plenipotentiaries in particular had imagined, but beyond what the Romanov regime as whole had expected, with this ultimate constitutional outcome being a consequence of contingent internal and external Russian developments. Thus, while the

plenipotentiaries' consensus was for a Bulgarian "Assembly of Notables" to draw up an "Organic Law," this was not in itself an indication of their commitment to constitutionalism, participatory governance, self-rule, or the principle of popular sovereignty. In fact, it demonstrates the opposite. For a discussion of the 'Tirnov Constitution' and its framing, including how this process deviated from the original expectations of all the Berlin Treaty's framers (including and especially its Russian ones), see: Ilya Vinkovetsky, "Strategists and Ideologues: Russians and the Making of Bulgaria's Tirnov Constitution, 1878–1879," *The Journal of Modern History* 90, no. 4 (2018): 751–791, especially: 758-767, 770-771, and 787-789. Also see: Keith Hitchins, "From East to West, 1774–1866" in *A Concise History of Romania* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

¹³⁰ Bismarck was especially candid and direct that these were the plenipotentiaries' assumptions during an episode in which he reacted to a declaration by Prince Milan of Serbia regarding Jewish emancipation in his Principality. In his response to this declaration Bismarck was clear that, in his view, it was not Prince Milan or Serbia's ruling regime but the Congress that ultimately held the prerogative to decide what laws were abolished or enacted in Serbia. And Bismarck was equally clear that Prince Milan's regime, Serbia's government, and the Principality's institutions, constitution, and laws existed only at the sufferance of the Congress. *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 180.

¹³¹ While Bosnia's population overwhelmingly shared the same south Slavic language, to the extent that it self-identified nationally it largely did so as belonging to Serb ethno-confessional (i.e., Orthodox Christian), Croat ethno-confessional (i.e., Catholic Christian), or Yugoslav ethno-linguistic nations. Meanwhile the Muslim Slavic speakers of the territory either continued to largely self-identify primarily in confessional terms or as belonging to one of the noted national communities. A secular 'bosniak' ethno-confessional (i.e., Muslim) national identity would not emerge as a mainstream phenomenon in Bosnia until the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990's. Thus, any separation of Bosnia from Ottoman rule that was predicated on ethnic national claims would have entailed either: immediately merging the province, at least administratively, with a south-Slavic-majority territory, such as a Habsburg province (i.e., the Hungarian Crownland of Croatia-Slavonia or the Austrian Crownland of Dalmatia), the Principality of Serbia, or (much less plausibly) the Principality of Montenegro; or granting the territory independence as a sovereign state (most likely as a principality); or partitioning the province and either distributing the resulting territories in some combination among Austria, Hungary, Serbia, and Montenegro (according to presumed national demographics) or establishing several sovereign ethnic national micro-states (also according to presumed national demographics). That article 25 imagined none of these arrangements demonstrates the extent to which its framers ignored or rejected the ethnic national principle. For a discussion of Habsburg-era Bosnia-Herzegovina see: Robert Donia, *Islam Under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1878-1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Robin Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism: The Habsburg 'Civilizing Mission' in Bosnia 1878-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹³² Article 62 was also implicitly grounded in this principle of humanity. That is, it granted all Ottoman citizens both an individual right, as individuals, to religious expression, and guaranteed communal protections to various, enumerated confessional communities. That is, the article established religious toleration as a fundamental principle of the Ottoman regime.

¹³³ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 114

¹³⁴ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 117.

¹³⁵ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 117.

¹³⁶ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 117.

¹³⁷ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 113.

¹³⁸ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 113-114.

¹³⁹ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 114.

¹⁴⁰ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 115.

¹⁴¹ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 117.

¹⁴² *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 117.

¹⁴³ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 116.

¹⁴⁴ No plenipotentiary challenged Beaconsfield's interpretation and thus – *qui tacet consentire videtur* – it became the consensus interpretation of the Congress and its regime, *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 197-198.

¹⁴⁵ For explicit statements to this effect see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 24, 25, 50, 65, 78, 91, 94, 211. For more implicit recognitions of Bulgaria as remaining an Ottoman territory, and thus that any official declaration of independence would violate the Berlin Treaty, see: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin* 78, 88-89 (especially as against 120-121), 91, & 211. It is also telling that while the Congress discussed Eastern Rumelia's northern border with Bulgaria at considerable length, it hardly discussed its southern border with other Ottoman provinces at all. This was a seeming affirmation that Eastern Rumelia remained fully Ottoman, ergo its southern border was essentially a domestic Ottoman administrative question, and thus was largely outside the purview of the Congress: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 230.

¹⁴⁶ While an ethnic national community bearing the name 'Bosniak' is generally understood to be a recent innovation, dating to no earlier than the 1990's, an examination of the protocols of the Berlin Congress reveals that this term was in use at the time of the Treaty's framing. That is, the Treaty's authors were not ignorant of the existence of 'Bosniaks' and could have referred to such if they had wanted to: *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 182.

¹⁴⁷ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 93-94, 210 & 225. As regards Armenia, the plenipotentiaries seemed more interested in giving or denying credit to the Ottoman regime

for the reforms it purported to have made *vis-à-vis* its Armenian territories since the outbreak of war than in addressing the innovative nature of their recognition of an Armenian ethnic national community.

¹⁴⁸ Persia was also permitted to address the Congress on this basis, *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 133-135, 151-153, 224-225.

¹⁴⁹ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 22-25 & 34-38.

¹⁵⁰ *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin*, 80, 93, 184-185.

¹⁵¹ Though here too there were exceptions, such as the Ottoman provinces of Mount Lebanon, Cyprus, the Khedivate of Egypt, among others, that is, territories not mentioned in the Treaty but over which the Ottoman regime did not enjoy complete effective sovereignty.

¹⁵² Eastern Rumelia was this type of territory. The Treaty was clear that Eastern Rumelia assumed none of the trappings of statehood, i.e., it remained a province, and was just as clear that it remained under direct Ottoman administration (article 13). The Treaty declared, moreover, that its local population would neither have any role in selecting its administrators (article 17) nor participate in the institutions of its administration (article 18), and that, insofar as it had any relationship with foreign states, the province was no different than any other integral Ottoman territory, i.e., any such dealings could only be undertaken via the Porte and not directly with the local provincial administration (article 20). The Treaty also readmitted the Ottoman military to the province, allowing it to build fortifications on the frontier as it saw fit (articles 15 and 16), and maintained the Sultan as the owner and operator of the railroads in the province (article 21).

¹⁵³ Again, Eastern Rumelia is a case in point. The Treaty preconditioned the appointment of the province's governor-general on the approval of its international regime, i.e., empowered that regime with a veto over the Ottoman regime's choice of the province's administrator (article 17). The Treaty also declared that its international regime had an equal role with the Ottoman regime in determining the institutional structure and practices of the province's administration (article 18). As concerned the Ottoman military, the Treaty prohibited it from employing irregular and militia units such as "Bashi Bazouks" and restricted the presence of the Ottoman military to the province's border with the Principality of Bulgaria (article 15), delegating intra-provincial security to the local administration (article 16). However, article 18 deserves special note in this discussion, in that it imposed a deadline of three months by which time the international regime's role in determining the form and function of the province's administration, i.e., their intervention in domestic Ottoman affairs relating to this province, would cease. Moreover, it declared that the model for the province's administration would be that of the Ottoman Empire's own provinces (i.e., not modeled on extra-Ottoman polities), and that the provincial administration would be imposed by means of an imperial decree by the Sultan (i.e., neither be imposed by the Treaty's international regime nor established by the local population). All of which both made clear that the province and its administration was under direct Ottoman authority and, consequently, affirmed the principle of Ottoman state sovereignty. Also, while Eastern Rumelia best illustrates this space in the hierarchy, other polities more or less fit into it. For example, article 23 not merely maintained, but mandated an expansion of, Crete's "Organic Law of 1868," which had

granted the province a degree of autonomy. This same article decreed that the Ottoman regime establish “similar laws” throughout “Turkey in Europe” and that the Ottoman regime create “special Commissions in which the native element shall be largely represented” to advise it on those laws. Noting only in passing that the language “native element” carefully avoided any recognition of national communities, what is significant about article 23 is that it violated Ottoman sovereignty from both internal and external directions. While the article made clear that commissions representing the Treaty’s international regime were merely advisory, and that the Ottoman regime remained the agent who would determine the number and form of any laws or institutions it might decree within its territory, it also required the Porte to consult with the Treaty’s international regime before decreeing any such laws or institutions. Thus, the article mandated Ottoman domestic institutions whose existence, and hence legitimacy, derived from sources other than the Ottoman regime itself at the same time as it authorized an external actor (i.e., the Treaty’s international regime) to oversee Ottoman domestic affairs. Nevertheless, whatever provincial administrations might result from this process, even if they were to include local participation, there could be no doubt that they would be under Ottoman authority.

¹⁵⁴ The Principality of Bulgaria is illustrative of this type of territory. The Treaty declared that the Principality was an autonomous and tributary polity, i.e., one whose only relationship to the Sultan was as a tribute-payer but was otherwise not subject to his laws, policies, decrees, etc., and that the Sultan was not the Principality’s ruler but merely its suzerain (articles 1 and 9). In fact, merely terming Bulgaria a “principality” bestowed on it the trappings of a sovereign entity. As we have seen, while the Treaty granted the Principality’s local population a participatory role in determining the form and carrying out the function of its administration, this role was far more circumscribed than it at first appeared and was ultimately not predicated on the principle of popular sovereignty (articles 3, 4, and 6-8) but was under the supervision of the Treaty’s international regime. Meanwhile the Treaty expressly prohibited the Ottoman military from any presence whatsoever in the Principality (article 11) and replaced the Sultan’s regime with that of the Principality as the owner and operator of the railroads in the province (article 10).

¹⁵⁵ While article 3 declared “the Prince of Bulgaria shall be freely elected by the population,” as we have seen the Treaty conditioned the final appointment of that prince on the approval, i.e., veto, of both the Porte and the Treaty’s international regime. However, in respect to each other, the veto powers of both the Ottoman and international regime were equal.

¹⁵⁶ The Treaty prohibited the Principality of Bulgaria from altering any preexisting trade laws, policies, regulations, or tariffs with their relevant outside actors (article 8). This stood in sharp distinction with, for example, the Principality of Serbia (article 37), which the Treaty explicitly imagined as shortly concluding “fresh arrangements” with the relevant outside actors in such matters. Meanwhile Bulgaria remained the only polity on which the Treaty imposed regular payments of tribute to the Ottoman regime (article 9).

¹⁵⁷ The Ottoman provinces of Mount Lebanon (since 1861) and, as noted, Crete (since 1868) were in many ways similar to that of Eastern Rumelia, while the tributary Khedivate of Egypt (more or less since the initial Ottoman conquest of it in the sixteenth century, but especially since Muhammad Ali seized power in 1805 and since the establishment of the Khedivate in 1867) bore resemblance to the tributary Principality of Bulgaria (though, after the British

conquest of Egypt four years later, the Khedivate would more closely resemble Bosnia-Herzegovina). However, it should also be noted that the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, to a lesser extent, Novi Pazar were unprecedented in modern Ottoman history and the Ottoman regime's relationship to its Bosnian province was unique among the Treaty's signatory states. This provides another indication of just how severely the Treaty's authorization for Bosnia's permanent occupation and direct foreign administration violated Ottoman sovereignty.

¹⁵⁸ For example, the United Kingdom would repeatedly and seriously consider Irish home rule, finally enacting it 1914. The Habsburg regime's authority was highly circumscribed in both halves of the dualist state and was in the Austrian half of that state further devolved among provinces and municipalities possessing not inconsiderable degrees of autonomy. Meanwhile the Romanov regime's degree of authority over the Grand Duchy of Finland was not absolute, and in the German Empire highly varied degrees of imperial authority among its constituent provinces was the rule. In fact, that the European Empires (and all the Treaty signatories other than the more national states of France and Italy styled themselves as such) permitted such asymmetry in their sovereignty, even among their European territories, is not surprising. For, while such sovereignty asymmetry across territories, persons, and peoples is an anathema to modern states and their demand for absolute sovereignty and total administrative uniformity, for empires it is conducive to that quintessential aspect of their power, namely '*divide et impera* [divide and rule].' For a discussion of the fundamentally differing administrative models of states and empires, see: Michael Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), especially "Introduction" and "Part 1 State Projects of Legibility and Simplification" (both chapters); Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Chapter 3

¹ Initially this Ottoman preference for light and indirect rule of Egypt was a matter of expediency. Yet as early as the late 16th century, and to an ever greater and accelerating degree over time, it was a matter of capacity. Carl F. Petry, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Volume 1, 640-1517* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), especially Michael Winter, "18: The Ottoman Occupation;" M. W. Daly, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Volume 2, Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), especially Michael Winter, "1: Ottoman Egypt, 1525-1609," Jane Hathaway, "2: Egypt in the Seventeenth Century," and Daniel Crecelius, "3: Egypt in the Eighteenth Century;" Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), especially "5: Possessor of the Kingdoms of the World" and "11: The Perils of Insouciance;" Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, *A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), especially "3 The Ottoman Age, 1516-1805;" M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), especially "1.: The Ottoman Empire at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century."

² Though the distinctions between the two institutions were myriad and significant, both in theory and historical practice, like the Ottoman janissaries, which it pre-dated by centuries, the mamluk corps was composed of ‘slave’ soldiers and ‘slave’ administrative officials. That is, soldiers and officials formally held in bondage by rulers or commanders that enjoyed *de jure* absolute power over individual janissaries’/mamluks’ life and death and who *de facto* acted as these individuals’ patrons and benefactors. Though the mamluks were, like the janissaries, a Turkic speaking institution, they, also like the janissaries, drew their ranks from outside the geographic core of their sultanate and from among non-Turkic speaking peoples, with janissaries hailing mainly from the Ottoman Balkans, especially its frontier, and mamluks mainly from the Caucasus, especially from its Circassian speaking communities. Janissaries and mamluks also shared other features whose legacies would be critical to the events of the 1880’s, namely: both came to staff the bureaucratic elite of their respective sultanates and to exercise substantial practical authority over the same on behalf of their nominal masters; both increasingly gravitated away from military (though this formally remained their principal duty) and toward administrative, fiscal, and commercial activities; and both developed into quasi-hereditary castes. Both also developed into staunchly conservative defenders of, and thus serious obstacles of modernizing reforms to, the traditional social, cultural, political, economic, administrative, and military *status quo* of their respective polities. And for this reason, above all due to their refusal to countenance any military reforms or innovations, during the early 19th century both suffered the same fate. That is, both institutions were liquidated by the rulers of their respective polities, with their leaders and many of their rank-and-file massacred, most notably, for the mamluks, at the ‘Massacre of the Citadel’ (1811) and for the janissaries at the ‘Auspicious Incident’ (1826). Yet such mamluks and janissaries as survived this violent process of dissolution soon reclaimed an influential position in their respective polities’ administrations. *Ibid.*

³ That Selim III would invite Ali and his Albanian bashi-bazouk command to join the Egyptian campaign was neither surprising nor unusual for this period. By the late 18th/early 19th century, after a century of janissary defeats at the hands of one or another European Power, in the face of rising janissary corruption, aversion to combat, and defiance of, insubordination toward, and even outright hostility to the Sultan, and confronted by a widening gap between the prowess of European militaries and that of the janissary corps, the Porte was increasingly looking for alternatives to the janissaries to serve as the core of the Ottoman army. One such alternative were private bashi-bazouk militias of the sort commanded by Muhammad/Mehmed Ali. Another were the *Nizām-ı Cedīd* [New Order] professional army formations, which accorded to European models and which would, given his enthusiastic sponsorship of the program, drive janissaries to depose, and instigate the assassination of, Selim in 1808. Daly, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Volume 2*, especially Khaled Fahmy, “6: The era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, 1805-1848” and Hassan Ibrahim, “8: The Egyptian Empire, 1805–1885;” Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), especially “5 The Ottomans and their Wider World;” Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*, especially “12: The Power of the Provinces,” “13: From the ‘New Order’ to the ‘Re-ordering,’” and “14: A Crisis of Identity;” Marsot, *A History of Egypt*, especially “4: The Beginning of the State System, 1805–1922;” Hanioglu, *A Brief History*, especially “2: Initial Ottoman Responses to the Challenge of Modernity” and “3: The Dawn of the Age of Reform.”

⁴ In the latter capacity Ali undertook a series of mostly successful offensive military campaigns nominally on behalf of his Ottoman suzerain/senior partner, namely that of crushing the Saudi/Wahhabi uprising in Arabia (1811-18), conquering the Sudan (1820-24), and aiding in the effort to suppress the revolution in Greece (1824-28). While all of these campaigns were formally effected in the name of the Sultan, Ali practically integrated such territorial spoils as accrued from them into his own emerging Egyptian imperial state. *Ibid.*

⁵ By the early 1830's Ali felt himself in a strong enough position to directly challenge his Ottoman suzerain-*cum*-senior partner and thus sent an army (under the command of his son Ibrahim) to invade and conquer Ottoman Syria (1831), to then annihilate the Ottoman army sent to evict him therefrom (1832), and to then move within striking distance of Istanbul/Constantinople itself (1833). And Ali and Ibrahim would repeat this same program at the end of the 1830's, crushing another Ottoman army again sent to oust him from Syria (1839), commandeering nearly the entire Ottoman navy (1839), and again assuming a position to occupy the Ottoman capital itself (1840). In fact, by 1840 Ali had so vanquished the Ottoman regime's armies that nothing stood between his forces and the Topkapi Palace, and Ali contemplated not merely declaring Egypt's independence but usurping the Ottoman regime itself, replacing it with his own Alawiyya regime whose rule would then extend to nearly all existing Ottoman territories, though whose core would now primarily situate in Egypt rather than the Balkans, Istanbul/Constantinople, and the Turkish straits. Both possibilities were only prevented by the intervention of the First Concert of Europe, especially France, Britain and Russia. This was a curious turn of events, given that the three latter Powers had, in part to aid the Greek War of Independence, only six years before annihilated the Ottoman-Egyptian navy at Navarino (1827) and intervened militarily against Ottoman-Egyptian forces on Greek territory itself. Meanwhile the Romanov regime had, in part also to support the Greek Revolution, just four years before been at war with the Ottoman Empire (1828-29), during which it had razed Ottoman fortresses, destroyed Ottoman armies, and annexed Ottoman territory. In doing so these Powers had played a significant role in creating the very existential threat faced by the regime that they now collectively sought to rescue. Yet, driven in part by the conservative and statist values of the First Concert of Europe (that the Ottoman Empire was not a member of the regime notwithstanding) and in part by an equal fear of, on the one hand, the regional geopolitical vacuum that would result from Ottoman extinction or, on the other hand, of a 'Turkish' state revolutionized, modernized, and strengthened by new, energetic, and expansionist Alawiyya rulers, these Powers assumed the role of the Ottoman regime's saviors. The result of the Concert's intervention (i.e., the Convention of London, 1840) was that Ali was compelled to surrender back to Ottoman rule all but his Egyptian and Sudanese possessions. In exchange, the Concert simultaneously compelled the Sultan to recognize the Alawiyya regime as hereditary *Wali/Vali*'s of Egypt. The commission the First Concert's members charged the Ottoman regime for the services thus rendered to it under this duress was the imposition of a sweeping and non-reciprocal Ottoman free trade regime, first extended to the British (in the Treaty of Balta Liman in 1838), and, shortly thereafter, effectively to all the member states of the First Concert. This eliminated nearly all internal tolls and drastically reduced all import tariffs throughout the Ottoman Empire, with obvious and inevitable pernicious, and eventually catastrophic, consequences for the Ottoman economy in general, and nascent Ottoman industry in particular. *Ibid.*

⁶ Juan R. I. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Daly, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Volume 2*, especially F. Hunter, "7: Egypt Under the Successors of Muhammad 'Ali" and Hassan Ibrahim, "8: The Egyptian Empire, 1805–1885;" Marsot, *A History of Egypt*, especially "4: The Beginning of the State System, 1805–1922."

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ What follows is not an attempt to provide a detailed and comprehensive account of the domestic Egyptian dimensions of the Crisis, variously referred to at the time and since as a 'mutiny,' 'rebellion,' or 'revolution,' which are beyond the scope of this discussion. Suffice it to say that these particulars and nuances were dizzying complex and fluid, with alliances collaborations forged and unforge, and confrontations escalating and deescalating, between and among the various strata, institutions, and communities of Egypt's heterogenous society as these engaged and disengaged with the uprising. Yet it is worthwhile to note that while some historians have seen in this crisis an expression of proto-nationalism, both Arab Egyptian and pan-Arab, and even embryonic Egyptian socialism, the current historical consensus is that, despite a degree of consistent socio-economic differentiation, with more affluent Egyptian elements tending to support the Khedivate and Europeans while middling and subaltern elements tended to back the insurrectionists, the event is best understood as an act of pan-regional-patriotic and nativist resistance against domination by 'outsiders.' Notably, this is how almost everyone, Egyptian, Ottoman, and European, actually understood the event at the time. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*; Daly, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, especially Donald Reid, "9: The 'Urabi Revolution and the British Conquest, 1879–1882."

¹⁰ Born to a moderately well-off *fellah* family in the rural Nile Delta region, Urabi had been a beneficiary of the more nativist and traditionalist inclinations of Isma'il's uncle and predecessor, Mohamed Sa'id (*Wali/Vali* of Egypt 1854-1863), who had opened the lower levels of Egypt's officer corps to promising Arabic-speaking youths seeking a military career. Yet Urabi, despite an early meteoric rise to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, had languished under Isma'il, who had reasserted the place of Turkic speakers in the army and sidelined or dismissed Arabic-speaking officers, a policy that only hardened with the drastic military cuts consequent from Egyptian bankruptcy and European seizure of Egyptian finances. Further radicalized by his participation in the ill-considered, ineptly conducted, and disastrous Egyptian–Ethiopian War (1874-1876), undertaken in the midst of Egypt's financial crisis, Urabi was finally provoked into public action by the Tewfik regime, which, despite promoting Urabi himself to the rank of colonel, affirmed anti-Arab discriminatory policies in the Egyptian military's officer corps. *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ The Ottoman regime, finding the prospect of publicly backing a popular insurrection, especially one overtly hostile to Europeans to be as distasteful and dangerous to the survival of its rule as violently and openly suppressing fellow Muslims in the undisguised interest of Christian European great powers, opted for a policy of prevarication and equivocation. Neither were the Concert's member states, especially the Freycinet and Gladstone governments, eager to see the Ottoman regime recapture by force of arms actual authority in a territory in which its rule had been effectively supplemented by local and European actors, all the more so given the implications such an outcome might have beyond Egypt itself (e.g., as for French Tunisia, British Cyprus, Austro-Hungarian Bosnia, Russian Batum, etc.). *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.* For the statement on Gladstone's finances, see: Reid, "9: The 'Urabi Revolution and the British Conquest," in Daly, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, pg. 230.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Britain enacted a protectorate only with the Ottoman Empire's declaration of war on it in 1914: *Ibid.*

²⁰ Moreover, Gladstone's government committed itself, with apparent sincerity, to reestablishing substantive and direct Alawiyya, or perhaps even Ottoman, rule over Egypt once one, the other, or both regimes developed the capacity for 'good governance' in Egypt, though neither Gladstone's nor any other British government over the next seven and half decades ever recognized such 'capacity.' *Ibid.*

²¹ For paradigmatic examples of historical accounts that both provide comprehensive analysis of the realpolitik machinations and material calculations of the key actors in the Egyptian Crisis of 1881-82 and which neglect, minimize, or ignore the Concert regime's role therein, see: A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954) and F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System, 1814-1914* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005).

²² This becomes still clearer when one contrasts the Concert's presumed jurisdiction over Ottoman Egypt, and hence the strictures commentators presumed to apply to Concert members regarding any actions undertaken therein, with the strictures, or more properly the lack thereof, presumed to apply to those same members regarding actions undertaken elsewhere in Africa. No common international regime was presumed to exist among Europe's great powers and the indigenous polities, communities, or ruling regimes of the latter, and thus European great powers and African polities, communities, and ruling regimes were presumed to exist in an international state of nature with one another. Thus, elsewhere in Africa Europe's great powers were presumed to be restrained not by any principles of a Concert or by those of any other international regime, but only by the competing claims of one another and, insofar as they were capable of doing so, the material resistance offered by African polities, communities, and ruling

regimes themselves. As Tell El Kebir demonstrated, Egyptians were hardly more capable than any other African polity of vindicating their sovereignty and territorial integrity against European great powers challenges thereto by sheer material strength and force of arms. Thus, the only condition that might compel a European great power/Concert member state to treat, even merely *de jure*, Egypt in any way differently from other African polities was Egypt's status as an Ottoman territory, and that the Ottoman Empire was a Concert member state.

²³ See: <https://anno.onb.ac.at> (note: includes all spellings and declensions, e.g., “*Europäische Konzert*,” “*Europäischen Konzert*,” “*Europäische Concert*,” “*Europäischen Concert*,” etc.). *Vis-à-vis* journals, see (in alphabetical order): *Die Bombe*, *Figaro*, *Grazer Volksblatt*, *Innsbrucker Nachrichten*, *Ischler Wochenblatt*, *Jörgel Briefe*, *Klagenfurter Zeitung*, *Leitmeritzer Zeitung*, *(Linzer) Tages-Post*, *Linzer Volksblatt*, *Mährisches Tagblatt*, *Marburger Zeitung*, *Morgen-Post*, *Neue Freie Presse*, *(Neuigkeits) Welt Blatt*, *Prager Abendblatt*, *Prager Tagblatt*, *Die Presse*, *Salzburger Chronik für Stadt und Land*, *Salzburger Volksblatt: unabh. Tageszeitung f. Stadt u. Land Salzburg*, *Das Vaterland*, *Vorarlberger Volksblatt*, *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Wiener Caricaturen*, *Wiener Zeitung*.

²⁴ “Wien, 6. Mai.,” *Neue Freie Presse: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), May 7, 1882, pg. 1-2, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

²⁵ For the presumption of the Ottoman regime as a ‘vassal’ of Europe, see: “Wien, 6. Mai.,” *Neue Freie Presse: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), May 7, 1882, pg. 1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

²⁶ “Ausland.,” *Neue Freie Presse: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), September 13, 1882, pg. 4., <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

²⁷ Robert J Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1878-1914* (Boulder: East European Quarterly, Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1981); Robin Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

²⁸ “Wien, 20. Februar. (Zur Vorgeschichte der bosnischen Okkupation.)” in “Inland.,” *Neue Freie Presse: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), February 21, 1904, pg.’s 5 & 6.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle*; Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System*; Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*.

³¹ “Die Botschafter-Conferenz.,” *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), June 2, 1882, pg. 2, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

³² “Wien, 2. Juni.,” *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), June 3, 1882, pg. 1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

³³ “Die Vorgänge in Egypten.,” *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), June 29, 1882, pg. 7, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

- ³⁴ “Wien. 11. Juli.,” *Die Presse: Abendblatt* (Vienna), July 11, 1882, pg. 1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ³⁵ “Rußland und der griechisch-türkische Grenzstreit.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), September 19, 1882, pg.’s 1-2, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ³⁶ “Wien, 19. Mai.: (In Sachen der westmächtlichen Flottenexpedition.)” *Prager Abendblatt* (Prague), May 20, 1882, pg. 2, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ³⁷ “Wien, 26. Juli.: (Die neueste Wendung in der Haltung der Pforte und – Die türkische Deputazion. – König Milan.)” *Prager Abendblatt* (Prague), July 27, 1882, pg. 2, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ³⁸ “Ein Gewaltakt Englands.,” (*Linzer*) *Tages-Post* (Linz), July 15, 1882, pg. 1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ³⁹ “Das gewalthätige England.,” (*Linzer*) *Tages-Post* (Linz), August 9, 1882, pg. 1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ⁴⁰ “Zur egyptischen Frage.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), May 24, 1882, pg. 4, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ⁴¹ “Vor der Feuerprobe.,” (*Neuigkeits*) *Welt Blatt* (Vienna), September 16, 1882, pg. 1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ⁴² “Zur Lage in Aegypten.,” *Grazer Volksblatt* (Graz), September 8, 1882, pg.5, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ⁴³ “Wien, 9. Juni.: (Graf Khevenhüller als Zivil-Adlatus des Militärgouverueurs von Bosnien. - Zur egyptischen Frage.)” *Prager Abendblatt* (Prague), June 10, 1882, pg. 2, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ⁴⁴ “Wien, 30. Juni.: (Gemeinsamer Ministerrath. – Zur egvptischen Frage.)” *Prager Abendblatt* (Prague), July 1, 1882, pg. 1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ⁴⁵ “Konstantinopel, 17. November. (Deutschland und die Türkei.)” *Die Presse* (Vienna), November 22, 1882, pg. 3, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ⁴⁶ “Wien, 26. Juni.,” *Neue Freie Presse: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), June 27, 1882, pg. 1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ⁴⁷ “Petersburg, 2. August.,” in “Aus und über Egypten.,” *Das Vaterland* (Vienna), August 3, 1882, pg. 2, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ⁴⁸ Here, “Rom, 15. Mai.,” in “Telegramme des Correspondenz-Bureau.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), May 16, 1882, pg.’s 4-5, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>. Also reported in: “Rom, 15. Mai.:

(Kammersitzung.)” in “Telegramme des Correspondenz-Bureau.,” *Neue Freie Presse: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), May 16, 1882, pg.7; “Rom, 15. Mai.: (Kammersitzung.)” in “Telegramme des Correspondenzbureau,” *Das Vaterland* (Vienna), May 16, 1882, pg. 5; “Rom, 14. Mai.: (Kammer-Sitzung.)” in “Telegramme des Correspondenz-Bureau,” in ‘Die Krise in Egypten.,” *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), May 16, 1882, pg. 7; “Rom, 15. Mai.: (Kammersitzung.)” in “Telegramme des Telegraphen-Correspondenz-Bureau.,” *Wiener Zeitung* (Vienna), May 16, 1882, pg. 9; “Rom, 15. Mai. Kammersitzung.” in “Nachtrag: (Eingelangt um 1½ Uhr nach Mitternacht.),” *Pester Lloyd* (Budapest), May 16, 1882, pg. 3.

⁴⁹ “Wien, 19. Juli.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), July 20, 1882, pg.1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

⁵⁰ “Wien, 13. Juli.,” *Die Presse: Abendblatt* (Vienna), July 13, 1882, pg.1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

⁵¹ The text quoted here is from: “Die egyptische Frage in der französischen Kammer.,” *Neue Freie Presse: Morgenblatt* (Vienna), June 2, 1882, pg. 7, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>. For additional reporting on this debate, see, for example, the 2 June editions of: *Prager Abendblatt*; *Prager Tagblatt*; *Die Presse*; *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*; *Wiener Zeitung*; the 3 June editions of: *Das Vaterland*, *Pester Lloyd*, (*Linzer*) *Tages-Post*; (*Neuigkeits*) *Welt Blatt*; the 4 June editions of *Grazer Volksblatt*; *Klagenfurter Zeitung*.

⁵² “Wien, 13. Juli.,” *Die Presse: Abendblatt* (Vienna), July 13, 1882, pg.1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

⁵³ “Die Deputirten-Kammer über die egyptische Frage.,” *Neue Freie Presse: Abendblatt* (Vienna), July 21, 1882, pg. 2, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

⁵⁴ This total is arrived at by combining the Gale Primary Sources online archive of British Library Newspapers, Gale’s *The Times* Digital Archive, and ProQuest’s Historical Newspapers: The Guardian and The Observer archive. For these archives see: (for British Library Newspapers) <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>; (for *The Times*) <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>; (for ProQuest’s Historical Newspapers) <https://www.proquest.com/hnpguardianobserver>; (note: these results included both the search terms “Concert of Europe” and “European Concert”). *Vis-à-vis* journals, see (in alphabetical order): *Aberdeen Journal*, *Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette*, *Belfast News-Letter*, *Berrows Worcester Journal*, *Birmingham Daily Post*, *Blackburn Standard*, *Bristol Mercury*, *Bucks Herald*, *Cambridge Independent Press*, *Cheltenham Chronicle*, *Cheshire Observer*, *Daily News*, *Derby Daily Telegraph*, *Dundee Courier*, *Edinburgh Evening News*, *Essex Standard*, *Evening Telegraph*, *Exeter and Plymouth Gazette*, *Freeman’s Journal*, *Glasgow Herald*, *Gloucester Citizen*, *Grantham Journal*, *Hampshire/Portsmouth Telegraph*, *Huddersfield Chronicle*, *Hull Packet*, *Jackson’s Oxford Journal*, *Leeds Mercury*, *Leed’s Times*, *Leicester Chronicle*, *Liverpool Mercury*, *Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser*, *Morpeth Herald*, *Newcastle Courant*, *Northern Echo*, *Nottingham Evening Post*, *Nottinghamshire Guardian*, *Reynolds’s Newspaper*, *Sheffield Daily Telegraph*, *Sheffield Independent*, *Southampton Herald*, *Stamford Mercury*, *Star*, *The Ipswich Journal*, *The Manchester Guardian*, *The Morning Post*, *The Pall Mall Gazette*, *The Standard*, *The Times*, *Trewman’s Exeter Flying Post*, *Western Mail*, *Western Times*, *York Herald*.

- ⁵⁵ “Sir Stafford Northcote at Sheffield.,” *The Times* (London), September 3, 1881, pg. 7, <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.
- ⁵⁶ “Conservative Meetings in West Lancashire: Sir R. Cross on the Policy of the Government.,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester), November 21, 1881, pg. 6, <https://www.proquest.com/hnpguardianobserver>.
- ⁵⁷ “Great Conservative Meeting at Woodstock.,” *The Morning Post* (London), January 20, 1882, pg. 2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁵⁸ “Lord Lytton on the Policy of the Government.,” *The Standard* (London), January 20, 1882, pg. 2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁵⁹ “Notices” in “House of Commons, Tuesday, Feb. 7.,” *The Times* (London, England), February 8, pg. 7, <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.
- ⁶⁰ “The Address.–Foreign Affairs.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Morning Post* (London), February 16, pg. 2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁶¹ “London, Thursday, February 16, 1882.,” *Morning Post* (London), February 16, 1882, pg. ’s 4-5, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁶² “The Bombardment of Alexandria.: Ministerial Statements.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Morning Post* (London), <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁶³ “The Vote of Credit.,” in “House of Commons, Tuesday, July 25.,” *The Times* (London), July 26, 1882, pg. 8, <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.
- ⁶⁴ “The Vote of Credit.,” in “Imperial Parliament: House of Commons.,” *The Standard* (London), July 27, 1882, pg. 2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁶⁵ “The Vote of Credit.,” in “Parliament Intelligence: House of Commons, Wednesday, July 26.,” *The Times* (London), July 27, 1882, pg. 7, <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.
- ⁶⁶ “The Future of Egypt.,” in “House of Commons, Yesterday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester), November 14, 1882, pg. 1, <https://www.proquest.com/hnpguardianobserver>.
- ⁶⁷ “Ministers and Egypt: Great Meeting in Piccadilly.” *The Standard* (London), Feb. 18, 1884, pg.2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁶⁸ “The Soudan War.,” in “House of Commons.,” *The Standard* (London), Mar. 26, 1884, pg. 2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁶⁹ “The Vote of Credit.,” in “House of Commons, Tuesday, July 25.,” *The Times* (London), July 26, 1882, pg. 8, <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

- ⁷⁰ “Colonel Stanley in Chelsea.,” *The Times* (London), Apr. 19, 1883, pg. 6, <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.
- ⁷¹ “Lord R. Churchill in Edinburgh.,” *The Times* (London), Dec. 19, 1883, pg. 7., <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.
- ⁷² “The Vote of Censure.,” in “House of Commons, Yesterday.,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester), Feb. 13, 1884, pg.6, <https://www.proquest.com/hnpguardianobserver>.
- ⁷³ “The Soudan War.,” in “House of Commons.,” *The Standard* (London), Mar. 26, 1884, pg. 2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁷⁴ “The Address.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Leeds Mercury* (Leeds), Feb. 8, 1882, pg. 7, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁷⁵ “Egypt. Another Attack by Lord Salisbury.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester), June 24, 1882, pg. 10, <https://www.proquest.com/hnpguardianobserver>.
- ⁷⁶ “The Conference.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *The Daily News* (London), May 7, 1884, pg. 2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁷⁷ “Lord Salisbury at Dumfries.,” *The Times* (London), Oct. 22, 1884, pg. 6, <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.
- ⁷⁸ Imperial Parliament.,” *Leeds Mercury* (Leeds), July 13, 1882, pg. 7, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁷⁹ “The Vote of Credit.,” in “House of Commons, Tuesday, July 25.,” *The Times* (London), July 26, 1882, pg. 8, <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.
- ⁸⁰ “The Vote of Credit.,” in “House of Common, Wednesday, July 26.,” in “Parliamentary Intelligence.,” *The Times* (London), July 27, 1882, pg. 8, <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.
- ⁸¹ “The Vote of Credit.,” in “House of Commons, Wednesday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.” *Leeds Mercury* (Leeds), July 27, 1882, pg. 7, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁸² “Egypt and the Powers.,” in “House of Commons. – Thursday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Morning Post* (London), February 10, 1882, pg. 2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.
- ⁸³ “The Foreign Policy of the Government.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester), February 16, 1882, pg. 6, <https://www.proquest.com/hnpguardianobserver>.

⁸⁴ “Mr. Gladstone’s Deference of the Bombardment of Alexandria.,” in “House of Commons, Yesterday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *The Manchester Guardian* (Manchester), July 13, 1882, pg. 6, <https://www.proquest.com/hnpguardianobserver>.

⁸⁵ “The Vote of Credit.,” in “House of Commons, Tuesday, July 25.,” in “Parliamentary Intelligence.,” *The Times* (London), July 26, 1882, pg. 9, <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁸⁶ “Casualties in the Fleet.,” in “The Bombardment of Alexandria.,” in “House of Commons. – Wednesday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Daily News* (London), July 13, 1882, pg. 2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁸⁷ “The Reforms in Armenia.,” in “House of Commons. – Friday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Morning Post* (London), May 26, 1883, pg. 2, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁸⁸ “London, Friday, June 2, 1882.,” *Morning Post* (London), June 2, 1882, pg. 4, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁸⁹ “London, Friday, June 2.,” *The Standard* (London), June 2, 1882, pg. 4, <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

Chapter 4

¹ For a more thorough description of these events see: A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), especially “Chapter XIV. The Triumph of Diplomacy: The Bulgarian Crisis, 1885-7;” F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914*. 2nd ed. (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2005), especially “The Bulgarian crises of 1885-87 and the Second Bismarckian Alliance System” in “Chapter 7: The Conservative Powers Dominate the States System, 1879-95;” R. J. A. Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2005), pg.’s 93-103.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ For the text of the Agreement see: Sir Edward Hertslet, ed., *The Map of Europe by Treaty: Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814*. Vol. 4. (London: Harrison and Sons, 1891), 3152-3157

⁵ For a more thorough description of these events see: Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914*; Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ For paradigmatic examples of historical accounts that both provide comprehensive analysis of the realpolitik machinations and material calculations of the key actors in the Egyptian Crisis of 1881-82 and which neglect, minimize, or ignore the Concert regime's role therein, see: Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914*; Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*.

¹⁰ See: <https://anno.onb.ac.at> (note: includes all spellings and declensions, e.g., “*Europäisches Konzert*,” “*Europäischen Konzert*,” “*Europäisches Concert*,” “*Europäischen Concert*,” etc.) Vis-à-vis journals, see (in alphabetical order): *Das Vaterland*, *Die Presse*, *Figaro*, *Freie Stimmen*, *Grazer Volksblatt*, *Kikeriki*, (*Linzer*) *Tages-Post*, *Mährisches Tagblatt*, *Morgen-Post*, *Neue Freie Presse*, *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, *Neuigkeits Welt Blatt*, *Prager Abendblatt*, *Prager Tagblatt*, *Salzburger Chronik für Stadt und Land*, *Salzburger Volksblatt*, *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Wiener Zeitung*

¹¹ “Wien, 23. April.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), April 24, 1886, pg. 1, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ “Die Krise in Griechenland.,” *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* (Vienna), May 14, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

¹⁸ “Politische Uebersicht.,” *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), April 21, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

¹⁹ “Wien. 23. April.,” *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), April 24, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Notably, according to the *Neues Wien Tagblatt* reportage thereon, the semi-official Ottoman newspaper *Tarik/Tariq* also expressed the view that during the Crises the Ottoman regime had not capitulated to coercion, exerted either by Russia, any other great power, any faction thereamong, or indeed by the Concert itself. Rather, the Ottoman regime had only acted in accordance with its own sincere commitment to the Concert. “Keine Kaiserzusammenkunft.” *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* (Vienna), September 4, 1887, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

- ²² “Politische Chronik.,” *Das Vaterland* (Vienna), April 27, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ²³ “Politische Uebersicht.,” *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), April 28, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ²⁴ “Das europäische Schiedsgericht.,” *Morgen-Post* (Vienna), April 22, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ²⁵ “Das verstimmte Konzert.,” *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* (Vienna), May 2, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ²⁶ “Wien, 16. September.” *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* (Vienna), September 21, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ²⁷ “Ungarn und das Rothbuch.,” *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna) January 1, 1871, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ²⁸ “Wien, 16. September.,” *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* (Vienna), September 17, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ²⁹ “Wien, 7. October.” *Die Presse* (Vienna), October 8, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ³⁰ “Wien, 7. Juni.” *Die Presse* (Vienna), June 8, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ³¹ “Wien, 30. September.” *Die Presse* (Vienna), October 1, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ³² For further discussion of such concerns, see: A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948); Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016); John Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations: A History of Eastern Europe* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2020).
- ³³ “Wien, 13. November.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), November 14, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>. Also see “Die Erklärung des Grafen Kalnkoy” in the same edition, which affirms the accuracy of the *Die Presse*’s reporting on Kalnkoy’s address.
- ³⁴ “Paris, 29. Mai.” in “Telegramme der “Neuen Freien Presse”.,” *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna) May 30, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ³⁵ “Die Entreune in Peterhof.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), July 21, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.
- ³⁶ “Paris, 20. April” in “Telegramme des Correspondenz-Bureau.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), April 21, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>. Also see: “Paris, 20. April” in “Telegraphische Depeschen.,” *Morgen-Post* (Vienna), April 21, 1886; “Paris, 20. April” in Telegramme des Correspondenzbureau.,” *Das Vaterland* (Vienna), April 21, 1886; “Paris, 20. April” in

“Telegramme des Telegraphen-Corespondenz-Bureau.,” *Wiener Zeitung* (Vienna), April 21, 1886; “Paris, 20. April” in “Telegramme.,” *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* (Vienna), April 21, 1886; “Politische Uebersicht.,” *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), April 21, 1886; “Ausland.,” *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* (Vienna), April 22, 1886; “Frankreich.,” in “Ausland.,” *Grazer Volksblatt* (Graz), April 23, 1886.

³⁷ For just a few rather notable examples of such Habsburg press Crises reportage on Britain, all of which affirms this discussion’s principal claims about the Concert and its significance for European inter-state relations, see: “Wien, 31. October.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), October 31, 1885; “Wien, 9. November.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), November 9, 1885; “England und die Dardanellen-Frage.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), September 15, 1886 (a similar report on this debate between these British papers was also reported in the *Neue Freie Presse* on September 15, 1886); (for an article in the Habsburg press notably expressing the views of W. T. Stead, a prominent British journalist and then-editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette* who was during this crisis at the height of his fame, expounding an anti-isolationist, anti-alliance bloc, but staunchly pro-Concert regime foreign policy) “Ausland.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna) July 1, 1888, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>. And for just a few rather notable examples of the Habsburg press’s recognition of British loyalty to the Concert, see: (Lord Randolph Churchill) “Zur bulgarischen Krise.,” *Neuigkeits Welt Blatt* (Vienna), September 24, 1886 (note: this address by Churchill was also reported in the *Neue Freie Presse*, *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, and *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* on September 23, *Das Vaterland* on September 24, and the *Grazer Volksblatt* on September 25); (Lord Salisbury and William Gladstone) “Wien, 22. Februar.,” *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), February 23, 1886; (Report on article likely, but not certainly, written by Gladstone) “Ausland.,” *Die Presse* (Vienna), October 10, 1889; (Lord Rosebery) “Roseberry über die griechische Frage.,” *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), May 13, 1886;

³⁸ For articles in the Habsburg press especially demonstrative of the assumption or argument that the Berlin Treaty, and thus that the Concert regime, had been bent but were as yet unbroken and that both Treaty and Concert played a significant role in determining the crisis’s events; that the Treaty and Concert served to ensure certain fundamental principles; that chief among these principles were a defense of member state sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially that of its Ottoman member state; that another of these principal principles was crisis resolution through comprehensive, pan-regime consultation rather than unilateral, bilateral, or alliance bloc negotiation or dictate; that the Concert was thus a means of maintaining pan-European peace; that the Concert was founded by the Berlin Treaty; that in this crisis the Concert served to suppress the principle of national self-determination; and that Concert-loyalty by key decision makers likewise suppressed the will both of the ruling regimes and public opinion of those decision makers’ own member states, see: (notably assuming that Prince Alexander of Bulgaria could not speak to the Concert directly but rather that only Sultan Abdul Hamid could address the international regime about Bulgarian matters, given that Bulgaria remained an Ottoman suzerainty, and assuming, moreover and for the same reasons, that in his effort to end his disastrous Serbo-Bulgarian war King Milan of Serbia could not negotiate directly with Alexander but only with the Porte) “Serbien in Poth.,” *Morgen-Post* (Vienna), November 28, 1885; (notably reporting on arguments by decision makers that, while clearly disingenuous, nevertheless unanimously took for granted both that the coup in Plovdiv was a violation of the Treaty and the Concert and that this mattered not only in theoretical but also material terms) “Die

Conferenz.," *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), November 7, 1885; (notably stressing that Bulgaria remained an Ottoman suzerainty, ergo that a Russian invasion of it would have violated not merely Bulgarian but Ottoman territorial integrity, that Austria-Hungary and the other signatory Powers rejected any Russian invasion partially on this basis, and thus demonstrating that technicalities of international law had material influence on inter-state acts) "Wien, 8. April," *Die Presse* (Vienna), April 8, 1886, and this article is notably reprinted verbatim in "Politische Rundschau." *Südsteirische Post* (Marburg), April 10, 1886; "Rußland und Bulgarien.," *Die Presse* (Vienna), April 23, 1886; "Wieder ein Ultimatum.," *Neuigkeits Welt Blatt* (Vienna), April 23, 1886; "Europa gegen Griechenland.," *Neuigkeits Welt Blatt* (Vienna), April 28, 1886; "Wien, 30. April.," *Die Presse* (Vienna), May 1, 1886; "Die kritische Wendung.," *Morgen-Post* (Vienna), May 8, 1886; "Wien, 8. Mai.," in "Ausland.," *Die Presse* (Vienna), May 9, 1886; "Wien, 11. Juni.," *Die Presse* (Vienna), June 12, 1886; "Wien, 7. August.," *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), August 8, 1886; (notably arguing that henceforth Prince Alexander did not confront Russian antipathy directly but only through the instrument of the Concert, a regime of which Russia was but one, though a significant, member state) "Wien, 30. August.," *Die Presse* (Vienna), August 31, 1886; (notably demonstrating Freycinet's continued rejection of revanchism and ongoing commitment to work within the Concert regime and its principles) "Wien. 1 October.," *Die Presse* (Vienna), October 2, 1886; (notably assuming that a Russian invasion of Bulgaria would violate Ottoman territorial integrity, given that Principality remained an Ottoman suzerainty, and that the weight of this consideration, i.e., that of effectively going to war against the Ottoman Empire, played a non-trivial role in dissuading St. Petersburg from undertaking such an action) "Wien, 18. November.," *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna) November 19, 1886; (notably arguing that Austria-Hungary could not unilaterally intervene in the process of electing Prince Ferdinand to the Bulgarian throne, that the Ottoman regime, as sovereign of the Eastern Rumelian Governor-General and suzerain of the Bulgarian Prince, had first right of approval or denial of the candidate, and that only after this approval could Austria-Hungary, acting as but one, unexceptional member of the Concert regime and in accordance with the Berlin Treaty, give its vote one way or the other, that is, notably affirming both Austria-Hungary's and the Concert regime's commitment to the Berlin Treaty and Concert's principles, especially that of preserving member state, particularly Ottoman, sovereignty) "Politische Rundschau.," *Bukowinaer Rundschau* (Czernowitz/Tschernowitz/ŤšernowiŤšernowitz), July 21, 1887, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

³⁹ This total is arrived at by combining the Gale Primary Sources online archive of British Library Newspapers, Gale's *The Times* Digital Archive, and ProQuest's Historical Newspapers: The Guardian and The Observer archive. For these archives see: (for British Library Newspapers) <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>; (for *The Times*) <https://www.gale.com/c/the-times-digital-archive>; (for ProQuest's Historical Newspapers) <https://www.proquest.com/hnpguardianobserver>; (note: these results included both the search terms "Concert of Europe" and "European Concert").

⁴⁰ For Habsburg recognition of the debate between these two papers especially see, for example, "Wien, 9. November.," *Die Presse* (Vienna), November 9, 1885; and, "England und die Dardanellen-Frage.," *Die Presse* (Vienna), September 15, 1886 <https://anno.onb.ac.at>. However, these were not the only articles in the Habsburg press to report on this debate.

⁴¹ For brief synopsis background of these two papers see: “Daily News: About this Publication,” *Gale Primary Sources online archive of British Library Newspapers*, (accessed) November 11, 2022, https://go.gale.com/ps/aboutJournal.do?contentModuleId=BNCN-1&resultClickType=AboutThisPublication&actionString=DO_DISPLAY_ABOUT_PAGE&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&docId=GALE%7C1ZTJ&userGroupName=ucberkeley&inPS=true&rcDocId=GALE%7CBA3203157948&prodId=BNCN&pubDate=118851002; “Pall Mall Gazette: About this Publication,” *Gale Primary Sources online archive of British Library Newspapers*, (accessed) November 11, 2022, https://go.gale.com/ps/aboutJournal.do?contentModuleId=BNCN-1&resultClickType=AboutThisPublication&actionString=DO_DISPLAY_ABOUT_PAGE&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&docId=GALE%7C1ZUH&userGroupName=ucberkeley&inPS=true&rcDocId=GALE%7CB3200392686&prodId=BNCN&pubDate=118851005. For Habsburg press reportage on W.T. Stead, see, for example, “Ausland.” *Die Presse* (Vienna) July 1, 1888, <https://anno.onb.ac.at>.

⁴² “London, Friday, November 6,” *Daily News* (London), November 6, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁴³ “Our First Duty in Bulgaria.,” *Pall Mall Gazette* (London), November 6, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁴⁴ “Occasional Notes.,” *Pall Mall Gazette* (London), November 12, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁴⁵ “London, Tuesday, November 17.,” *Daily News* (London), November 17, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁴⁶ “The Price of Peace,” *Pall Mall Gazette* (London), November 16, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁴⁷ “The Conservative Reaction of 1885,” *Pall Mall Gazette* (London), November 19, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁴⁸ “The Threat to Greece,” *Daily News* (London), January 26, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁴⁹ “Who are the True Friends of Greece,” *Pall Mall Gazette* (London), January 25, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>

⁵⁰ The *Daily News* asserted that both the Berlin Congress and Berlin Treaty had given the Kingdom of Greece an ironclad guarantee to territory in both Thessaly and Epirus. In point of fact, in the 13th protocol of the Berlin Congress the plenipotentiaries had pledge only to mediate between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire as to the latter’s claims on the former’s territory and merely floated the idea of Epirus and Thessaly as a possible basis for those negotiations. Indeed, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries were clear in that same protocol that they had no intention of ceding any territory to the Kingdom of Greece, though, as we have seen the

Ottoman regime ultimately did so by ceding Thessaly to Greece. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Berlin made no explicit reference to either Thessaly or Epirus at all. “The Dilemma of Greece,” in “London, Thursday, February 18,” *Daily News* (London), February 18, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁵¹ “Greece and Bulgaria,” in “London, Monday, February 22,” *Daily News* (London), February 22, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁵² “Greece,” in “Yesterday,” *Daily News* (London), May 4, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁵³ “Occasional Notes,” *Pall Mall Gazette* (London), February 19, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁵⁴ “‘The Owllet of Atheism’ in Politics” *Pall Mall Gazette* (London), July 26, 1887, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁵⁵ “London, Friday, October 23, 1885,” *The Times* (London), October 23, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁵⁶ “London, Friday, April 2, 1886,” *The Times* (London), April 2, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁵⁷ “London, Thursday, October 29.,” *The Standard* (London), October 29, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁵⁸ “London, Tuesday, September 7.,” *The Standard* (London), September 7, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁵⁹ Thomas Erskine Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question: A Collection of Treaties and Other Public Acts* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885). Aside from the articles cited in the following discussion, also see, for example: “The Eastern Question.*,” *Morning Post* (London), October 24, 1885; “‘The European Concert in the Eastern Question.’*,” *Pall Mall Gazette* (London), November 19, 1885; “The Aspirations of Greece.,” *Bristol Mercury* (Bristol), January 11, 1886; “Greece and the Powers,” *Daily News* (London), February 19, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁶⁰ Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question*, 2.

⁶¹ Holland, *The European Concert*, 220.

⁶² Holland, *The European Concert*, 223 in particular and 220-224 in general.

⁶³ Holland, *The European Concert*, 222.

⁶⁴ Holland, *The European Concert*, 222-223 in particular and 220-224 in general.

⁶⁵ Edward A. Freeman, "Great and Small Powers." *The Times* (London), October 22, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁶⁶ T. E. Holland, "Great and Small Powers." *The Times* (London), October 26, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁶⁷ Edward A. Freeman, "Great and Small Powers." *The Times* (London), October 29, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁶⁸ Edward A. Freeman, "The Aspirations of Greece." *The Times* (London), January 9, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁶⁹ T. E. Holland, "Greece and the Treaty of Berlin." *The Times* (London), April 28, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁷⁰ Edward A. Freeman, "The Epirot Frontier." *The Times* (London), April 29, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁷¹ T. E. Holland, "Greece and the Treaty of Berlin." *The Times* (London), May 1, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁷² "London, Saturday, October 24, 1885." *The Times* (London), October 24, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁷³ "London, Saturday, January 9, 1886." *The Times* (London), January 9, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁷⁴ Freeman, "Great and Small Powers," October 22; Edward A. Freeman, "Two Foreign Ministers." *The Times* (London), November 12 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>; Freeman, "The Aspirations of Greece," January 9; Edward A. Freeman, "The Duty of Greece." *The Times* (London), January 29, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁷⁵ See, for example: "Our London Correspondence." *Liverpool Mercury* (Liverpool), September 26, 1885; "Liverpool Mercury." *Liverpool Mercury* (Liverpool), October 2, 1885; "Echoes of the Week: An Independent Expression of Radical Opinion." *Portsmouth Evening News* (Portsmouth), October 12, 1885; "Liverpool Mercury." *Liverpool Mercury* (Liverpool), October 13, 1885; "Mr. Herbert Gladstone, M.P., at Stanningley.: Liberal Achievements.." *Leeds Mercury* (Leeds), October 14, 1885; "Sir Algernon Borthwick at South Kensington," *Morning Post* (London), November 21, 1885; "Summary of News.," *Sheffield Independent* (Sheffield) September 24, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>. For historical analysis of the assumptions and intentions of British foreign policy makers during the Crises see, for example: Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914*.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ See, for example: “From our Correspondent: Constantinople, Tuesday,” in “The Balkan War. Servian Proposal for Peace. Rejection by Bulgaria.” *The Standard* (London), November 26, 1885; “From our Correspondents.: Constantinople, Dec. 1” in “Bulgaria and Servia. Peace Proposals. Rejection by Prince Alexander. Expected Renewal of the War.,” *Daily News* (London), December 3, 1885; “Constantinople, Dec. 6.,” in “Bulgaria and Servia. The Armistice Negotiations. Expected Renewal of the War.” *Daily News* (London), December 7, 1885; “Constantinople, Dec. 5.” In “Servo-Bulgarian War. Renewed Fighting Expected. Recall of Lebib Effendi.” *Morning Post* (London), December 7, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>; “St. Petersburg, Nov. 8.,” in “Latest Intelligence. From. (From our Correspondents). The Eastern Crisis.,” *The Times* (London), November 9, 1885; “Bulgaria and the Conference of Constantinople,” *The Times* (London), December 19, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive> (this article must be read ‘against the grain,’ especially in light of “Die Gesprengte Konferenz.,” *Neuigkeits Welt Blatt* (Wien), December 5, 1885, <https://anno.onb.ac.at/>).

⁷⁸ “From our Correspondent: Vienna, Sunday Night.,” in “Rising in Roumelia., The Government Deposed., Union with Bulgaria., Proclamation of Prince Alexander.,” *The Standard* (London), September 21, 1885; “Election News.,” *Daily News* (London), October 5, 1885., “London, Tuesday, October 13,” *Daily News* (London), October 13, 1885; W. E. Gladstone, “Mr. Gladstone and the Bulgarian Question.,” *Morning Post* (London), October 17, 1885; “From our Correspondent: Berlin, Monday Night.” in “The War in the East. Retreat of Bulgarians. Prince Alexander and the Sultan.” *The Standard* (London), November 17, 1885; “From our Correspondent: Berlin, Wednesday Night” in “Resignation of the Government. Continental Opinion.,” *The Standard* (London), January 28, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>; “St. Petersburg, Nov. 8.,” in “Latest Intelligence. (From our Correspondents). The Eastern Crisis.,” *The Times* (London), November 9, 1885; “(From our Correspondent.) Constantinople, Tuesday.,” in “The Balkan War. Servian Proposal for Peace. Rejection by Bulgaria.,” *The Standard* (London), November 26, 1885; “Constantinople, Dec. 5.,” in “Latest Intelligence. (From our Correspondence.) The Eastern Crisis.,” *The Times* (London), December 7, 1885, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>; “Wien, 22. Februar.” *Neue Freie Presse* (Wien), February 23, 1886, <https://anno.onb.ac.at/>.

⁷⁹ “The State of Greece.,” in “House of Commons. – Thursday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Daily News* (London), February 19, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>. Also see: “The situation in the East.,” in “House of Commons. – Thursday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Aberdeen Journal* (Aberdeen), February 19, 1886; “Aberdeen, Saturday, Feb. 20, 1886.” *Aberdeen Journal* (Aberdeen), February 20, 1886; “The Eastern Question.,” in “House of Commons.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Morning Post* (London), February 19, 1886; “The New Government. Ministerial Statement.,” in “House of Commons – Thursday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Exeter and Plymouth Gazette* (Exeter), February 19, 1886; “Greece and the Eastern Question.,” in “Statement by Mr. Gladstone.,” in “House of Commons – Thursday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Glasgow Herald* (Glasgow); “House of Commons – Thursday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Gloucester Citizen* (Gloucester), February 19, 1886; “Greece and the Powers.,” in “House of Commons, Thursday.,” *Leeds Mercury* (Leeds),

February 19, 1886; “Statement by the Premier. The Government’s Irish Policy.,” in “House of Commons.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Liverpool Mercury* (Liverpool), February 19, 1886; “Greece.,” in “House of Commons. – Yesterday.,” *Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser* (Manchester), February 19, 1886; “Last Night’s Parliament. The Irish Question. Ministerial Statements. Speeches of Mr. Gladstone, Earl Granville, and Lord Salisbury.,” *Nottingham Evening Post* (Nottingham), February 19, 1886; “The European Powers and Greece.,” in “House of Commons. – Thursday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Huddersfield Chronicle* (West Yorkshire), February 19, 1886; “Statement by Mr. Gladstone.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Portsmouth Evening News* (Portsmouth) February 19, 1886; “Summary of the News.,” and “The Eastern Crisis.,” in “House of Commons.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Sheffield Independent* (Sheffield), February 19, 1886; “Affairs in Greece.,” in “House of Commons.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *The Standard* (London), February 19, 1886; “Greece and the Powers.,” in “House of Commons. – Thursday.,” *Western Mail* (Cardiff); “Statement by Mr. Gladstone.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Hampshire/Portsmouth Telegraph* (Leeds), February 19, 1886; “The Greek Question.,” in “Ministerial Statement.,” in “House of Commons., Yesterday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Belfast News-Letter* (Belfast), February 19, 1886; “The Week’s Parliament. Thursday.,” *Nottinghamshire Guardian* (Nottingham), February 26, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁸⁰ See, for example: “Summary of the News.,” *Sheffield Independent* (Sheffield), November 10, 1886; “Thursday, November 11, 1886.,” *Leeds Mercury* (Leeds), November 11, 1886; (notably demonstrating Salisbury’s return to a latent ambivalence about the Concert while at the same time acknowledging that a Concert existed, was based on the principles of the Berlin Treaty, was composed of 7 members, i.e., explicitly including the Ottoman regime, and operated, for better or worse, on the basis of collective, comprehensive consultation, though Salisbury would prefer the principle of majority vote to unanimous consent; also note that Salisbury is not here opposed to a Berlin Treaty based Concert as such, but merely to the idea that international regime’s resolutions must achieve unanimous consent to be realized, a far cry from the idea that it could or should be ignored or abrogated outright) “Bulgaria and European Turkey.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Morning Post* (London) February 24, 1888; “The Bulgarian Question.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Belfast News-Letter* (Belfast), February 24, 1888; “The Bulgarian Question.,” in “House of Lords – Yesterday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Bristol Mercury* (Bristol), February 24, 1888; “Bulgaria.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Leeds Mercury* (Leeds), February 24, 1888; “Bulgaria.,” in “Parliament.,” *Freeman's Journal* (Dublin), February 24, 1888; “Bulgaria.,” in “House of Lords. – Yesterday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser* (Manchester), February 24, 1888; “The Bulgarian Question.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Sheffield Independent* (Sheffield), February 24, 1888; “Bulgarian Affairs.,” in “The Imperial Parliament.,” *York Herald* (York), February 24, 1888; “Imperial Parliament. House of Lords – Yesterday. Recent Events in Eastern Europe. Important Statement by the Prime Minister.,” *Western Times* (Exeter), February 24, 1888; “Thursday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Bristol Mercury* (Bristol), February 25, 1888; (the interpretation of Salisbury’s words here are instructive) “Thursday.,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Leed's Times* (Leeds), February 25, 1888, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers> and “Bulgaria.,” in “Parliamentary Intelligence.,” *The Times* (London), February 24, 1888, <https://www.gale.com/intl/c/the-times-digital-archive>.

⁸¹ “Thursday, February 11, 1886.” *Bristol Mercury* (Bristol), February 11, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

⁸² *Vis-à-vis* Churchill, see: “Liverpool Mercury.” *Liverpool Mercury* (Liverpool), October 13, 1885; “Summary of News.” *Sheffield Independent* (Sheffield), October 13, 1885; “Meeting at Rodley. Lord Randolph Churchill’s Address Criticized.” *Leeds Mercury* (Leeds), October 14, 1885; (notably, Churchill was challenged here in his commitment of Britain to a Treaty- and Concert-loyal policy by a Mr. Labouchere whose explicit rejection of the Concert was, despite his being member of the Liberal Party, grounded in isolationism and strict state self-interest) “The Eastern Question,” in “House of Commons,” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *The Standard* (London), September 23, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>. Note that Churchill’s speech was also directly quoted or referenced in at least 24 other British journals, including (on September 23) the *Aberdeen Journal*, *Bristol Mercury*, *Daily News*, *Dundee Courier*, *Exeter and Plymouth Gazette*, *Gloucester Citizen*, *Leeds Mercury*, *Liverpool Mercury*, *Morning Post*, *Nottingham Evening Post*, *Pall Mall Gazette*, *Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette*, *Western Times*, *York Herald*; (on September 24) the *Glasgow Herald* and *Stamford Mercury*; (on September 25) the *Buck’s Herald*, *Cambridge Independent Press*, *Cheshire Observer*, *Leed’s Times*, *Southampton Herald*; (on September 28) *Bury and Norwich Post*; (on September 30) *North Devon Journal* and (notably presenting Churchill’s words as its own opinion) *Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette*. *Vis-à-vis* Lord Rosebery, see: “Saturday, February 13th, 1886.” *Leeds Mercury* (Leeds), February 13, 1886; “The situation in the East.” in “House of Commons – Thursday.” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Aberdeen Journal* (Aberdeen), February 19, 1886; “Greece.” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Berrows Worcester Journal* (Worcester), February 20, 1886; “Greece and the Powers. Statement by Lord Rosebery.” in “Imperial Parliament.,” *Daily News* (London), May 11, 1886, <https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/british-library-newspapers>.

Conclusion

¹ For a discussion of the Young Turk Revolution, and how it, and its dangers and promises, were seen inside and outside the Ottoman Empire, see: Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), especially “16. The Storm before the Calm;” M. Şükrü Hanioglu, “A Brief History of the late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Nader Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For a discussion of Habsburg imperialist ambitions about the dangers that the Young Turk Revolution posed to them see: A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* (London: H. Hamilton, 1948), especially “Chapter Seventeen: Solution by Violence, 1908-1914;” Robin Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Pieter M. Judson. *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), especially “Chapter Seven: Everyday Empire, Our Empire, 1880-1914.”

² For an account of the Bosnian Crisis see: A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), especially “Defeat of Russia in the Bosnian Crisis” in “Chapter XIX. The Formation of the Tripple Entente, 1905-9” and “Shadow of General War” in “Chapter XX. The Years of Anglo-German Hostility, 1909-12;” F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914* (London: Routledge, 2013), especially “The Near Eastern Crisis and the End of the Austro-Russian Entente” and The Flexibility of the European States System, 1909-11” in “8: Unstable Equilibrium, 1895-1911.”

³ Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, 457.

⁴ Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers*, 294.

⁵ Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, and Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers*.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ For an excellent account of the immediate post-First World War moment see: Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002). Also see: Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994).

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Jennifer Jackson Preece, “Minority Rights in Europe: From Westphalia to Helsinki,” *Review of International Studies* Vol. 23, no. 1 (Jan., 1997): 75-92; MacMillan, *Paris 1919*; Eric D. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” *The American Historical Review* Vol. 113, no. 5 (Dec., 2008): 1313-1343; Eric D. Weitz, *A World Divided: The Global Struggle for Human Rights in the Age of Nation-States* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ These assumptions and arguments about the United Nations mainly derive from those of Samuel Moyn: Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010) and Samuel Moyn, *Human Rights and the Uses of History* (London, Verso, 2014); but they also accord with those expounded by such international relations scholars as: John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint,*

and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) and Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

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