UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE

Toward a Subject of Racism: Case Histories from the Psychoanalytic Clinic, 1930-1970

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Culture and Theory

by

Christopher Eliot Chamberlin

Dissertation Committee:
Professor Jared C. Sexton, Chair
Professor Sora Y. Han
Professor Julia Reinhard-Lupton

2018

DEDICATION

To

Adrián

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thank you to Elizabeth Abel, Celia Brickman, Sora Han, Karen Kim, David Marriott, Julia Reinhard-Lupton, Gabby Schwab, Frank Wilderson, and Judy Tzu-Chun Wu for their rigor, criticism, and unflagging support. Thank you to my graduate student colleagues (past and present) James Bliss, Nick Brady, Lashonda Carter, Patrice Douglass, Letty Garcia, Meredith Lee, Diana Leong, Megan McCabe, Jasmine Montgomery, Linette Park, Judy Rodriguez, Sara-Maria Sorentino, and Jaye Williams for their mettle and intelligence. Thank you to Caroline, Christina, Claudia, Jackie, Juon, Joceyln, Kade, Laura, Savannah, Sean, and Vanessa at the Starbucks on Jamboree and Bristol for the cold brew and bonhomie. Thank you to Louise Hickman for listening and caring. Thank you to Jared Sexton for the transference desire. Thank you to Ralph Chamberlin and Ute Chamberlin for their material and emotional support. And thank you to Adrián Ismael-Plascencia Flores for the rest.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Christopher Eliot Chamberlin

2011	B.A. in German; B.S. in Economics with honors; minor in Political Science, Arizona State University
2015	M.A. in Culture and Theory, University of California, Irvine
2017	Instructor in African American Studies, University of California, Irvine
2017	Mentoring Excellence Certificate, Graduate Division, University of California, Irvine
2012 – 2018	Teaching Assistant in the Departments of African American Studies; Asian American Studies; Gender and Sexuality Studies; Religious Studies, University of California, Irvine
2018	Ph.D. in Culture and Theory; D.E. in Feminism and Critical Theory, University of California, Irvine

FIELDS OF STUDY

Black studies, gender and sexuality studies, psychoanalysis, historiography of slavery, clinical practice and methodology, liberalism, subjectivity, Frantz Fanon, Jacques Lacan

PUBLICATIONS

2018	"Affective Ankylosis and the Body in Fanon and Capécia." *Studies in Gender and Sexuality* 19, no. 2, 120-132.
2018	"Review of the book *Power and Feminist Agency in Capitalism: Toward a New Theory of the Political Subject*, by Claudia Leeb." *Hypatia Reviews Online*, retrieved from http://hypatiareviews.org/reviews/content/350

SELECTED AWARDS AND DISTINCTIONS

2012	Dean's Fellowship, School of Humanities, University of California, Irvine
2016	Dissertation Research Grant, Humanities Commons, University of California, Irvine

2016	Outstanding Graduate Teaching Assistant Award, School of Humanities, University of California, Irvine (nominated)
2017	Graduate Research Fellowship, U.S. Fulbright Student Program to Canada (alternate)
2018	Tom Angell Graduate Student Mentoring Fellowship, Graduate Division, University of California, Irvine
2018	University of California President's Postdoctoral Fellowship, Berkeley

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Toward a Subject of Racism: Case Histories from the Psychoanalytic Clinic, 1930-1970

By

Christopher Eliot Chamberlin

Doctor of Culture and Theory

University of California, Irvine, 2018

Professor Jared C. Sexton, Chair

This dissertation closely reads a set of Civil Rights Era case histories in which analytic practitioners examined the cultural and psychic causes of their patients' antiblack racism. This case archive provides the basis for a theory of the *racial* as a material signifier that is in language but empty of meaning—that causes the subject of racism but does not organize a racial identity. An analysis of the formal contradictions and idiosyncratic symptoms that populate the afterlife of slavery follows. Combining insights from the historiography of slavery, literary and critical theory, and contemporary analytic method and technique, "Toward a Subject of Racism" redefines the relationship between psychoanalysis and black studies.

The first part of this project reconstructs an antiracist tradition of psychoanalysis starting in the interwar (1930s) United States to situate Freudian practice as formative to the conceptualization of antiblack animus, particularly in the work of John Dollard and Helen McLean. Second, this study scans secondary readings of nineteenth-century law, philosophy, and social practice to formalize the conjunction of liberal capital and black slavery as a symbolic impasse that produces and administers what Jacques Lacan calls *jouissance*. Third, the dissertation derives new literary methods from contemporary clinical technique to closely read

how this symbolic impasse structures the gendered sexual attachments to racial blackness as described in five psychoanalytic case histories (1947-1971).

It is argued that the subject as analyzed in clinical practice is the linchpin and absent center of racism, that the contemporary dialectic of racism and antiracism mediates the symbolic impasse in liberalism, and that this impasse is inscribed and transmitted by a revolutionary racial signifier. This signifier obtains its decisive historical agency only after the advent of global abolition. Rather than a particular position, practice, or ideology, this dissertation considers racism to be a process that knots the irreducible registers of (symbolic) political structure, (real) libidinal enjoyment, and the (imaginary) dynamics of racialization. This analysis further considers how the universal negation of racism in the post-Civil Rights Era triggers an affective turn within the objective practices of white supremacy that presents a crisis to critical interpretation.

INTRODUCTION

> No doubt the phenomenon of racism is notoriously difficult to delineate. Depending on how one approaches it, it either appears as a terrifying monolith, or as a chimera that doesn't exist at all.
>
> Farhad Dalal, *Race, Colour and the Processes of Racialization: New Perspectives from Group Analysis, Psychoanalysis and Sociology* (2002, p. 29)

"Toward a Subject of Racism" develops a method of inquiry into the limit of racial power by way of a new genealogy of the antiracist psychoanalytic clinic in the United States. It argues that the subject analyzed by clinical practice is the linchpin and absent center of racism, and that the contemporary dialectic of racism and antiracism mediate an impasse in the logic of liberal capital that is inscribed by an historically revolutionary "racial signifier." This signifier *causes*—but does not *realize*—the subject of racism. Rather than a position, practice, or philosophy, this dissertation theorizes racism as a process that knots the mutually irreducible registers of (symbolic) political structure, (real) libidinal enjoyment, and the (imaginary) dynamics of racialization. As Farhad Dalal and a long tradition of radical analysts have discovered, this phenomenon is notoriously hard to delineate. My wager is that racism is in its nature an obstacle to understanding and that the notoriously difficult language of psychoanalysis can transmit this obstacle without dissipating racism's essential obscurity. For this reason, this project does not apply psychoanalysis to racism or translate racism psychoanalytically but explores how racism is structured psychoanalytically.

These arguments travel on two main rails of inquiry. First, I track the historiography of racial slavery *as* an analytic structure—tracing the paradoxes of racial subjection, the topological incorporation of black agency, the problematic of excess enjoyment, and the political structure of a liberalism constitutively divided by the limits of slavery—to isolate how the racial signifier

obtains its determining historical agency after the global abolition of black slavery. This first part of the dissertation therefore diagrams both the history and structure of racism. Second, I recover five case histories—published between 1947 and 1971—in which practitioners in the American tradition of psychoanalysis outline the clinical phenomenology of a racial symptom. I read within and along the grain of their interpretations to isolate the points of nonsense that structure each patient's racial attachments and to locate the signifier that loops the subject into the social link. This second part of the dissertation therefore explores both the formal pathways and idiosyncratic constructions that bind, displace, and animate the history and structure of racism. The clinic of racism suggests that the institutionalization of antiracism is mirrored by the subjectification of the imagined demands of the Civil Rights Movement, and that their historical combination transforms racism's predominant form of expression from the articulation and stratification of racial positions to the decentralized production of sexual symptoms.

This dissertation enters first and foremost onto the composite field of race, gender, and sexuality studies by shifting a focus from racial representations and practices toward the critically overlooked "racist" subject, thus analyzing racial hierarchy through and from the specificity of the subject of clinical experience. Drawing on clinical techniques, theories, and case literature to pursue this aim, this dissertation develops a new method of inquiry for the critical and literary humanities that involves racism in ontological questions about sex, subjectivity, and libidinal enjoyment. Second, this project complicates the historicist frames and anti-liberal disposition of the post-Civil Rights cultural studies by accounting for the full weight and impact that black freedom movements and anti-racist discourses have had on the historical restructuring of sexuality and racial power. To this end, I introduce an analytic that supplements the prevailing historical epistemologies of knowledge/power—the management of *bodies*—with

an interdisciplinary psychoanalysis that tracks a distinct and singular form of power that governs through the production, administration, and negation of sexual symptoms—the *flesh* of racialization. Third, "Toward a Subject of Racism" takes an entirely new approach to the field of race and psychoanalysis—and the dissident traditions of Freudian and Lacanian discourse more broadly—by historicizing the subject of the unconscious with regard to the structural impasses of racial slavery and the radical character of liberalism. Finally, my archival research into the research and development of the American clinic revises the history of psychoanalysis and psychiatry by analyzing the racial politics that codified the uptake and transnational diffusion of Freudian psychotherapy in the academic and medical fields.

Saussurean Hegemony or Psychoanalysis

To clarify the stakes this project raises in the fields of black studies and literary and critical theory, let me first draw attention to the part of the title that admits to the most interpretations: the subject of racism. This "subject" self-evidently refers to the particular matter of this dissertation (even if only to eventually withdraw its status as given), but "the subject of racism" also echoes a psychoanalytic *bon mot* on another scene, "the subject of the unconscious," or more specifically, the subject as the effect of an unconscious structured as a language. With the corresponding terms properly replaced, racism can be cast as structured *as* the processes of condensation and displacement, metaphor and metonymy, that striate and smooth the signifying system and produce racial meaning. The "as" in each of these expressions is not an adverb that designates an analogy (racism is not *like* the unconscious) but a preposition: racism is materialized in the function, character, and structure of language. This is not a new idea. In the African American literary theory that emerged in the formal engagements with so-

called poststructural theory in the 1980s, this expression is given various concrete forms. In Hortense Spillers' landmark essay toward an anti-Oedipal psychoanalysis, slavery and the black captive are described as bound and produced in the recursive cycle of metaphor and metonymy that procures racialization with its source material and returns to gender its historical contingency (1987). Around the same time, Stuart Hall more explicitly observed that the historical and geographical plasticity of blackness, and the heavy lifting the term does across a range of domains of social life and political discourse, "functions like a language" (1985, p. 108). On later reflection, he conceives the cultural turn in both Marxism and theories of racial domination, in which he situates the site and contribution of his work, as a field that assumes as a rule that

> "*all* practices (including the economic) have to be reconceptualized as 'working *like* a language.' *Not* that everything *is* a language, but that no social practice works 'outside of meaning' and in *that* sense, every social practice is '*within* discourse' – i.e. it depends on meaning for its effectivity. … Race, in that sense, is a discursive system, which has 'real' social, economic, and political conditions of existence and 'real' material and symbolic effects." (2002, pp. 452-3, emphasis in original)

With considerably more circumspection in his entry in the definitive special issue of *Critical Inquiry* edited by Louis Gates, Jr. under the title of "'Race,' Writing, and Difference," Anthony Kwame Appiah wrings his hands over the dawning of a "Saussurian hegemony," referring to the vague injunction to render racialization, along with every other matter of critical consideration, as a text generated and made readable by an interplay of differences that is "purely internal to our endlessly structured *langues*" (1985, p. 35). In the "reality" outside the "text-world" of the academy—the everyday and intimate salience of racialism—Appiah writes that "we take reference for granted too easily," and that in the objective practices of social reproduction, race seems to function not as a language, discourse, or formation of meaning but as a *word* that *just works* (pp. 35-6).

While affirming these varied angles, this dissertation puts pressure on all sides by documenting how and why "language" is *not-all*. Scoping out its limits requires first triggering in earnest the revolt against a Saussurean hegemony that extends its hold over the contemporary analysis of racial power (in guises old and new), and which survives perhaps nowhere more innocently and obviously than in the colloquial and technical opposition between *race* and *racism*. These terms achieve their difference—and their ultimate indistinction—through their closed and mutual reference: race is a racist categorization of human difference, and racism the organization and exercise of power along racial lines (cf. Bonilla-Silva, 2001); or, race comprises the structure of knowledges, practices, and techniques of racial power, and racism the affects, emotions, and fantasies that motivate and justify the existence of race (cf. Goldberg, 1990). Let us say for now that race and racism are less concepts than *words* that *just work* in the critical lexicon. Of course, this particular conceptual dyad is not new. Race and racism were first systematically soldered by the Franz Boas school of American cultural anthropology in the 1920s and 1930s, whose empirical studies disproved that race had any anchoring in biology or natural endowment, promoted the diversity of culture as the only legitimate category of human difference, and popularized *racism* as the term to describe the beliefs, politics, and actions that ignorantly acted as if race were real or natural (cf. Trouillot, 2003). In this case, placing "racism" in the formula where Spillers, Hall, and Appiah have written "race"—making the subject of this study the subject of *racism* structured as a language—is designed not to eclipse one term with the other but to group *both* race and racism on the "same side" of the equation (i.e. language), to abandon their unstable and unrewarding distinction—and to arrogate to the "other side" of race/racism a mechanism that accounts for the incompleteness of language, that makes racialization *irreducible* to the dynamics that produce, exchange, and accumulate signification.

The *subject* of racism remains irreducible to racialization structured as a language—this axiom subtends this project. The subject of racism is an effect of race/racism, but not its realization; caused by the signifying regimes of race but not determined by them; engulfed by symbolic power without mortgaging the heterogeneity and vicissitudes of sexuality to the codifications of power, knowledge, and ritual. In this light, the subject does not stand outside racialization or subvert its processes but is identical to its problematic. If raising the question of the *subject* of racism backgrounds an investigation of its "victim," what Frantz Fanon called its "phobogenic object" (1952/2008, p. 117), this is only to transform the nature of the relation between them. Toni Morrison, unsatisfied with the 1980s' analyses of the objective processes of racialization *without* a subject, announced the urgency of this gearshift in the 1990s. She ventures that "the pattern of thinking about racialism in terms of its consequences on the victim—of always defining it asymmetrically from the perspective of its impact on the object of racist policy and attitudes" (1992, p. 11) has forked (and idled part of the critical potential of) African American studies; and that this predominant inquiry into the "object" of racial power

> should be joined with another, equally important one: the impact of racism on those who perpetuate it. It seems both poignant and striking how avoided and unanalyzed is the effect of racist inflection on the subject… The scholarship that looks into the mind, imagination, and behavior of slaves is valuable. But equally valuable is a serious intellectual effort to see what racial ideology does to the mind, imagination, and behavior of masters. (pp. 11-2)

The essential takeaway of this audit is not just the recommendation to analyze white attitudes, fantasies, and ideologies—the vast content of antiblack culture—nor to shift the site of investigation to the parasitic nature of whiteness' symbolic integrity, although neither project is to be discouraged either. More fundamentally, Morrison calls for research into the structure of the mind of the "slave" and "master" to be put on equal footing: not to indict the perpetrator of the crime or exonerate its victim, but to place the subject and object of racism on the *same side of*

the equation and thereby reconfigure their relation—and precisely in a psychoanalytic manner, if we are to take as non-accidental Morrison's choice to introduce *Playing in the Dark* with a meditation on the 1976 autobiography of a French novelist and former analysand of Bruno Bettelheim, who describes in detail the black sensations and racial imagery that stimulated her hysterical anxiety and triggered her flight into analysis.

Collocating the subject and object on the "same side of the equation" would similarly have to avoid a logic of mutual determination, of attributing to the object of racism the cause of its subject (and vice versa), lest their difference collapse and the subject become resorbed into the objective play of discourse. In the last instance, Morrison allows this resorption to occur when she pursues the possibility that literary blackness explains both the *cause and nature* of literary whiteness (p. 9) and proposes that black bodies in bondage played the immediate point of reference and screen of projection for the nineteenth-century literary imagination (p. 47). If she rightly warns of the absence of the subject of racism in African American studies, Morrison also relies on a linguistic idealism which limits had already been mapped in the critical periphery of the 1980s. We are thus left with two equally incomplete research programs: one conclusively denaturalizes racial blackness through the combinatory of language but lacks a theory of subjectivity and any resemblance to the "reality" of racialism; the other foregrounds the problematic of subjectivity but at the unaffordable price of embalming the black body as an inert and infinite source of metaphor. Let me foreshadow my route of navigation between the Scylla of structural determinism and the Charybdis of linguistic essentialism: this dissertation charts a *formal impasse* in the symbolic logic of liberal capitalism and the disjunctive link it forms to the vicissitudes of sexuality through the historical invention of the *racial signifier*—a revolutionary creation on the border of language but beyond metaphor and metonymy.

From the Case Up

Because this dissertation aims to agitate how the relationship between the subject and structure of racism is conceived, it paints its reddest bullseye on the conceptual wedding between racialization and epistemology—both the cultural and literary analyses that closely read the network of associations to racial otherness (unconscious or otherwise) and the archaeological studies that reconstruct the epistemological conditions of racial discourse, the practices and technologies it underwrites, and the relations of power its networks conduct. Roughly, the former is the object of literary critical approaches to racialism, and the latter the frame of reference for Foucauldian analyses of biopower. As Kalpana Sehsadri shows, the problem with these methods, whether alone or together, is that they both bang their head against the "resilient non-sense" of race (2000, p. 2), its ability to survive repeated invalidation, *as well as* its considerable flexibility, an effectivity that is unfazed by its diverse and mutually contradictory forms of expression. If the genealogical deconstruction and epistemic pluralization of racialism are two of its *objective* features, both have a severely limited value as critical procedures. My argument will be that the incorporation of antiracism into modern governmentality acts as a structural operator that results in the invariant nature of these two features of racialization, and that this incorporation explains why they do not intrinsically exhaust racial power. In an historical conjunction with what I will describe as the "racial signifier," the negation of racism cancels and preserves the symbolic impasse in liberalism. Consequently, this project is both *more* than a critique of the theory of racial formation and *less* than a disposal of Michael Omi's and Howard Winant's mapping of racial epistemologies (1986/2015). The racial signifier—a word that "just works," a representation of the formal failure of representation—operationalizes racialization

and makes it irreducible to itself. Because it locates racism as a process that extends beyond meaning, this humbles the method of interpretation as alone inadequate to rendering its structure and function.

"Toward a Subject of Racism" rotates centrally around questions of method, turning to the history of psychoanalytic practice to invent and enact a new critical procedure that is adequate to analyzing the subject of racism as a limit to interpretation—and to formalizing the historical production of a unique racial signifier that, although in language, contains no meaning or linguistic content. Analyzing race within the Freudian tradition is of course not novel. Few have more explicitly lobbied African American literary and critical theory, and black feminism in particular, to consider psychoanalysis than Hortense Spillers, just as fewer have posted more warning signs about the endeavor. While her writing on the matter is too dispersed to synthesize here, I want to contrast the vector I will take with one specific aspect of Spillers' call for theoretical "confrontation" because it captures a strategy that is less than uncommon within the "psychoanalysis of race" (Lane, 1998). Psychoanalysis, it is said, promises to bear critical fruit and new ethical relations only after we first "invade its heredity premises and insulations" (Spillers, 2003a, p. 376), theoretical propositions whose insularity and inefficacy, argues Spillers, was established by a primal archive of clinical experiences conducted with exclusively-white, European, middle-class patients (p. 86). This tarnished basis results in a maloccluded analytic that Spillers argues can be "opened up" by tying psychoanalysis off from its past *and future* clinical practice and putting in its place the social and cultural economy of "race" as an object of analysis. Now, the great risk entailed in figuring psychoanalysis as an unmarked body of clinical knowledge about race, in painting it as an "elaborate form of ethnography […] a writing of the ethnicity of the White western psyche" (Doane, 1991, p. 211), is precisely of

naturalizing race on the psychic level, of racializing the subject, and of begetting a new ethnopsychiatry. If racial segregation, it is true, has never not stratified psychoanalytic practice and systematically excluded the poor and people of color from the dispensation of analytic care, it is *prima facie* unjustified to leap from this fact to condemning its practice, abandoning the clinical experience, and jettisoning the universal. Psychoanalytic practitioners who have analyzed historically excluded subjects make their point unambiguous:

> There is nothing reported in the literature or in the experience of any clinician known to the authors that suggests that black people *function* differently psychologically from anyone else. Black men's [sic] mental functioning is governed by the same *rules* as that of any other group of men [sic]. Psychological principles understood first in the study of white men [sic] are true no matter what the man's [sic] color. (Grier & Cobbs, 1968, p. 154, emphasis in original)

Psychoanalysis is such a powerful analytic and *effective practice* because it does *not* racialize the subject; racism in turn draws its very strength from hijacking the universal rules of the unconscious. Instead of confronting the premises, postulates, and concepts of psychoanalysis directly with those of another field (or for that matter of developing "race" and "psychoanalysis" together on the basis of their common understandings or repressions), this dissertation releases psychoanalysis' insights into the universal principles and idiosyncratic productions of mental functioning on a new problem—racism and antiracism in their intercourse with slavery and its afterlife, which is to say the principle problems in critical race theory, black studies, and humanistic inquiry in general (see below). These matters have been *gratuitously* or non-necessarily excluded from the analytic and clinical purview. Because psychoanalysis is not in the first instance a univocal set of concepts or (racial) knowledge but a mode of formulating the problems that insert themselves into its practice, a "top-down" approach to psychoanalysis—that keeps its concepts but derelicts its methods, that bulldozes its clinical depths to reorganize its conceptual heights—cannot be recommended and will not be sought. Does ridding the clinic as a

site, method, and orientation not dehistoricize psychoanalysis by abstracting it from its historical practice—past, present, and future? Because I answer this question in the affirmative, this dissertation is constructed "from the case up," one that submits to the analytic method new problems. Racism was, can, and must be a problem for psychoanalysis.

Racism in Three Tenses

Racism tacitly operates in three different tenses or guises in this project, each of which plays a separate if contiguous critical function—strategic, genealogical, and mathematical. These tenses do not name racism's essential traits or constitutive features but account for the different and even conflictual ways that the term "racism" will be used in my writing. Each tense attempts to capture a likeness or facet of the same problematic, *without* presuming racism to be a discrete object with an underlying substance, consistency, or common denominator. Their interrelation creates a tension that situates racism as a crisis for critical thinking.

As already intimated by the forgoing discussion, racism is first recovered, preserved, and operated upon as a *paleonym*. Jacques Derrida justifies the practice of retaining "old names" as a strategic necessity for deconstructing the presumptive meanings that words transfer through their historical and routinized uses. (Keep an eye out for parallels between paleonymy and the tactic of "strategic essentialism" that his interlocutor, Gayatri Spivak, popularized.) Such a use of names, especially of those that remain in wide use, forms an effective "lever of intervention" through which the presuppositions sedimented in its conceptuality can first be isolated, then manipulated (Derrida, 1981, p. 71). "Writing," "matter," or "unconscious" as the issues of the philosophical tradition—or in our case, the "racism" bequeathed equally from the social sciences and the (at times overlapping) black radical tradition (cf. Robinson, 1983/2000)—each straddle a dispersed

system of predicates and binary oppositions that are structured in the last instance by a "reduced predicative trait." The first task of paleonymy is to isolate this repressed trait, which functions as a self-presence of meaning, and to grasp the conceptual organization that it animates; the second task is to reorganize the conceptual apparatus by "extracting," "grafting," and "extending" that trait through a new writing. Now, if racism has been part of the American climate of debate for only a century or so and acquired its mature denotation as an "institutional" factor in the political writings of the 1960s (cf. Hamilton & Ture, 1967/1992), it may have greater social currency and organizational power today than at any other point in its career—perhaps it is not such an "old word" after all. Since the 1980s in fact, racism has progressively fallen out of favor in the critical lexicon relative to "racialization" and allied terms linked to the methods of historical epistemology, but this housecleaning in the academic vocabulary has conspicuously coincided with a mounting *opposition* to racism that has ensconced itself as an organizing principle of late liberal governmentality. To retain and rework racism is therefore to press a lever of intervention into the metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties that abound in both the critical discourses that have (non-negatively) discarded racism and the official language of governmentality that has (non-positively) affirmed it.

For reasons that will be extrapolated in the chapters that follow, it will also be necessary to pump the breaks on the paleonymic procedure at a precise point: after extracting from racism its asemantic conceits, and illuminating the system of predicates it illegitimately organizes, we will restrain from grafting, extending, and deconstructing its "presence" on the premise that "racism" can eventually be abandoned for a more rigorous concept, which is what Derrida promises in his methodology. Racism will instead be reserved as a name for the objective social processes in which racism is itself grafted, extended, and elaborated, resulting in the equivocal,

incommensurable, but effective social meanings it generates. Conversely, I will examine how liberal discourse coins the much older signifier of the "racial"—which is only later reiterated, condensed, and transformed by the invention of "racism"—as a type of historical neologism that cancels and preserves its own impossibility (more on this soon).

Racism also functions as an *epistemological indicator* within the antiracist discourses in which it was formalized: this is the second tense in which it will be qualified in this dissertation. Michel Foucault used this term (only once) to describe a rather different concept: life—specifically in relation to the field of post-eighteenth-century biology. Scientific fields utilize a variety of concepts that serve distinct functions, including those that classify (categorize objects as a specific type), that differentiate (between one object or process and another), and that isolate (one feature of an object or process). Against these scientific concepts, Foucault distinguishes the epistemological indicator as a "peripheral notion" by which a scientific practice "designates itself, differentiates itself in relation to other practices, delimits its domain of objects, and designates what it considers to be the totality of its future tasks" (Chomsky & Foucault, 2006, pp. 5-6). It goes without saying that Foucault held serious reservations about conducting any rigorous inquiry into "life" or its cognates—it simply does not emerge or function as an object of knowledge. An indicator is constitutive of an episteme but scientifically useless; it is a meta-concept that only delineates and congeals a transformation in the practices of knowledge production. Here is the point: "racism" is for early-twentieth-century anti-racist discourses what "life" was for late-eighteenth-century biology—it is scientifically unintelligent, yields no new objects, processes, or knowledge, and designates instead an accumulation of knowledge about racialized systems, practices, institutions, and ideologies *as* knowledge about racial injustice. Racism thus surprisingly represents within antiracist scholarship the field's own *origin*, marking

internally the *limit* of its explanatory capacity. Considering that "life" is *also* the object that Foucault everywhere else investigates as the crux of modern power, a final extension of the homology is warranted: racism has equally and indissociably emerged as a political object through which twentieth- and twenty-first century sovereignty regenerates itself: first as an imagined object of social engineers in the 1930s, then as a negative precondition for liberal governmentality in the Civil Rights and post-Civil Rights dispensation.

Another feature radically distinguishes racism from the life concept-metaphor, and even approximates its opposite, which lies in the manner in which racism materializes exclusively under the sign of universal prohibition. Albert Memmi marveled at this repulsive quality, singular in its universality, as a "strange kind of tragic enigma associated with the problem of racism," only to unironically proclaim—as if its truth were patently obvious—that "even those who have shown themselves to be racist" deny their true identity (2000, p. 3). Indeed, the undecidable contours and qualities of racism, and its correlated status as universally taboo, make its nearest cousin in this dimension neither life nor death but *incest*, the prohibition of which the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss considered as sustaining the total array of a culture's social formations. This redoubles the fitness of a psychoanalytic reading, particularly along the lines of a French psychoanalysis that inflects the Freudian discovery across the structural anthropology of the 1950s and 1960s.

Considering, then, that an epistemological indicator consolidates a field of knowledge as a field of power, racism neither adequately nor inadequately describes a "real" problem—after all, it is only indirectly related to the methods of inquiry, scientific practices, and disciplinary concepts that it groups under its sign. Does this limit every inquiry into racism to the methods of genealogy, etymology, or historiography? Even worse, can an inquiry into racism only ever

distort the appearance of power and act as the mask or alibi through which it extends its capillary grip? This is assuredly not the case, even if no shortage of studies exist that try to relieve racialization of any singularity by classifying it as a species of generic power. To situate (but not reduce) racism in the fields of knowledge that formalize it, and thus rigorously investigate racism as *neither* an immanent nor transcendental signifier, requires observing two additional conditions: 1) no concept is wholly determined by its historical conditions, and on a higher order, 2) no historical field of inquiry is wholly determined by its political structure. The first and simpler point is crisply demonstrated by the philosopher Davide Tarizzo in a gloss on this aspect of Foucault's writing on the life-concept:

> Words [such as "life"] continuously emigrate from one region to another of our epistemological horizon and, in doing so, they carry with them invisible meaning-effects. That is not to say that they carry with them entire theories—*consolidated, consistent, unitary*. Enunciations, even if they belong in different discursive regimes, rather appear to contaminate one another, here and there, to blotch one another, obfuscating our futile, albeit legitimate, dreams of purity. (2017, p. 11, emphasis in original)

Their dirigible nature assures that no concept is not subject to the terms and conditions of signifying slippage, certifying their viability as *both* critical terms *and* ideologemes articulable into law, moral injunction, and public administration. One must also add to Tarizzo's observation the fact that words also and perhaps more potently carry with them opacity-effects, radiating a range of epistemological quarters with a void around which meaning comes to organize itself. More immediately, this limit and ambiguity of the word ratifies the criterion for selecting the case histories gathered in this dissertation, each of which reflects on a psychoanalytic notion of racism—or one of its cognates such as "racial prejudice," "anti-black hatred," and so on. In short, the migratory nature of racism (as an enunciation) assures that its signifying potential both limits and exceeds itself, that its meaning is pliable yet historically delimited—both at that point

at which each psychoanalyst historically works through "racism" and in that moment in which each case history is in turn reworked from the present angle.

To address the second condition for the study of racism—that no research endeavor is a wholly determined reflection of its political conditions of existence—requires introducing the third tense of racism: as *signifier*. By signifier, I refer not to the Saussurean counterpart to the signified (or the "referent" Appiah found unpalatable for rendering racial practice), but to an indivisible unit of language in the logic of signification that Jacques Lacan elaborates in conjunction with the Freudian theory of sexuality, where the signifier *generates*—but by itself does not *carry*—meaning through the associative and combinatory procedures of the unconscious (Lacan, 1981/1993). Opposite both the paleonym's strategic function and the genealogical purposes of the epistemological indicator, the signifier marks a derivative of what I described above as a "political structure," the symbolic impasse in and through which antiracist discourse emerges. First, how does the conception of the signifier as a structural coefficient sanction the critical agency of racism? An epistemological indicator emerges within the material relations, economic forms, and aesthetic milieu of an historical episteme, but this episteme generates knowledge to make up for a fundamental contradiction that cannot be positively represented. I would suggest—and this dissertation will argue—that racism is *also* a marker that flags and compresses the symbolic impasse that forges it. Against Foucault's final reservations, then, the inconsistency within any "political structure" guarantees that no inquiry into racism is *prima facie* compromised.

As a signifier with no inherent meaning, racism must consequently be calculated in relation to the (inconsistent) political structure in which it obtains and performs a discrete historical function. This is the other historical component that is missing in Foucault's account:

scientific inquiry into the object of racism has its *indeterminate cause* in the symbolic impasse that traverses the political structure—this explains *why* the inquiry into racism emerged when it did (without determining its final shape). In a different but highly related context, Saidiya Hartman describes this sort of political structure as a "racial calculus and political arithmetic" that the institutionalization of slavery entrenched and that the deinstitutionalization of slavery did not resolve (Hartman, 2007, p. 6). If she limited captioning the "afterlife of slavery" to its effects—the imperilment and devaluation of black lives—then the other, unnumbered side of the equation—the algebra that organizes these effects but carries *no inherent value*—has remained a seriously overlooked area of research.

The calculus of black or racial reason organizes symbolic institutions but is not reducible to them—Hartman makes it possible to write slavery and its afterlife as a *matheme*, an act and figure of writing Jacques Lacan invented to formalize and de-idealize the structures of the (political) unconscious. A matheme attempts to "to formulate how the real can be formulated as an impasse within proofs of limitation and impossibility" (Burgoyne, 2003, p. 82). In other words, it schematizes how the real is written into the symbolic as an impasse in formalization—how the real is historically actualized in its function, character, and structure. *An impasse in formalization:* this Lacanian definition of the real (1975/1998b) is how the contradiction between racial slavery and liberalism will be considered, and how the relations between sovereignty, slavery, and blackness that comprise its formal components will be interrelated. Any signifier only obtains its place, function, and effectivity within the economy of the relations of such a structure. If "the racial," as an historically specific signifier, is an empty point through which this impasse in formalization is inscribed and transmitted, and if the racial only becomes determinate after the global abolition of slavery in the late nineteenth century, then "racism" achieves a new

autonomy as a signifier in the postwar dispensation under the *negation* of anti-racism, displacing and extending this impasse into new and more volatile forms—this at least will be my contention. Antiracism's new preponderance reduces the symbolic scaffolding around the racial, decentralizes its institutionalization, and—in the continuing failure of a new revolutionary invention—devolves the *realization* of this post-slavery arithmetic to the molecular level, to the affective attachments subjects make to the signifiers, images, and conceptions of racial blackness. As such, the complex copulation between the "the racial" and "racism," as separate but fully interloped signifiers, causes and radically underdetermines the subject of racism.

This polymorphous quality, even with its pandemic level of distribution, coupled with (and perhaps elucidated by) the growing hegemony of antiracism in Europe and the United States, led the French psychoanalyst Octave Mannoni—well into the 1960s—to glimpse the following about racism:

> The problem is not a simple one; racism does not form a clearly defined category in any classification of diseases. From the point of view of pathology, it is, rather, a symptom which has a very different meaning with a paranoiac than it has with a pervert; and, besides, may perfectly well be found in "normal" personalities. *This kind of problem may, and indeed must, be of interest to every psycho-analyst*. (Mannoni, 1966, p. 330, emphasis added)

Racialization simultaneously maintains its "polyvalent mobility" and "dynamic motility" (Stoler, 2002, p. 385)—its historical staying power, synchronic contradictions, and incomplete totality—by being *reduced* and transmitted to the subject on the mathematical level, beyond its symbolic forms, institutional settings, disciplinary techniques, and discrete meanings. Racism may generate institutional effects but is itself (and for that reason) anti-institutional. The case histories that comprise the bulk of this study track the historical transformation of racism from a symbolic system (i.e. Jim Crow) to a series of symptoms—in "paranoiacs," "perverts," "normal personalities," and others besides—that is reproduced in idiosyncratic ways but increasingly

administered or governed through neoliberal anti-racism. My challenge to psychoanalytic theory lies here in forcing a recognition of slavery and its afterlife *as* clinical matters, and of the clinic in turn as a necessary epistemology for analyzing modern racial power.

Chapter Sequence

These three tenses overlap and interact throughout the dissertation chapters, which build out the epistemological, structural, and clinical dimensions of racism. Chapter one first conducts a critical historiography of racism as an epistemological indicator by excavating an anti-racist tradition in the American clinic and psychoanalytic social sciences of the 1930s. While Frankfurt School theorists geared the Freudian and Marxian traditions to diagnosing the rise of fascism and the authoritarian personality in the West, a motley crew of American sociologists, anthropologists, and clinicians enthusiastically adopted and popularized psychoanalysis as a method for understanding the intransigence and exacerbation of antiblack violence—particularly as a mode of intervention for curing race prejudice as a social illness. Against the common sense that medicine and American anti-intellectualism assimilated psychoanalysis and irremediably defanged its critical purchase, I show how psychoanalysis actively helped *engender* the conceptualization of racism, while excavating how the anti-racist sentiments and modernist aspirations of left-liberal interdisciplinary academics fatefully divorced Freudian metapsychology from its clinical concepts and practice. Chapter one gauges the theoretical and political consequences of foreclosing an "epistemology of the clinic" within an early psychoanalysis of race relations, particularly through the anti-racist work of the clinical analyst Helen McLean and the "psychocultural" anthropologist John Dollard. The same function "racism" came to perform in the non-clinical humanities and social sciences discourses in the

1930s and 1940s has now fully entered the main of popular culture and politics: racism functions as a sign for the limit and resistance to the signification of power.

The second chapter situates the theoretical deadlock that the psychoanalytic social sciences reached in the problematic of racism in the early twentieth-century within liberalism as a symbolic impasse in formalization. Through primary and secondary readings of nineteenth-century slavery statutes, Euro-American philosophical treatises, and abolitionist writings, this chapter unearths a longstanding concern over (and repression of) the free (i.e. non-slave) subject's excess enjoyment of property in black chattel and demonstrates how this concern issues from a contradiction between slavery and freedom. By exfoliating the psychoanalytic intuitions of three major scholars of slavery and capitalism—black feminist Saidiya Hartman, Marxist philosopher Domenico Losurdo, and American historian James Oakes—I mathematize how "the racial" operates within the structure of liberalism as a signifier that inscribes the liberal impasse in formalization. I argue that the dialectic of racism and antiracism further displaces and exacerbates this impasse during the "third turn of liberalism," the postwar Civil Rights Era. Historicizing psychoanalysis as a science of the "afterlife of slavery" on the one hand, this chapter redresses the absence of the notion of *jouissance* (i.e. libidinal enjoyment) in the critical study of racial slavery and power on the other, challenging a linguistic essentialism that plagues the latter fields and that naturalizes the black body as an inert signified. Tracking the paradoxes of jouissance in relation to the practices of subjection and the vicissitudes of capital, this chapter advances the counterintuitive claim that racial power operates through the impossibility, prohibition, and renunciation of sovereignty—both structurally and subjectively. I end by making the critical distinction between "the" and "a" racial signifier to show how liberalism produces but does not realize the subject of racism.

To outline a method for reading the case history archive, the third chapter examines the history and theory of the "post-interpretative" turn in Lacanian clinical technique, particularly in the writings of Jacques-Alain Miller. After reviewing the theory of interpretation, and surveying some of the sources of the discontent that hermeneutics arouses in the literary and critical studies, I distinguish the analytic method as one that theorizes (and is structured by) the limits of interpretation. This chapter argues that the transformation of the Freudian method must be read next to the historical adjustment of the limit of interpretation within the objective practices of liberalism, capitalism, and global racial politics, which specifies the structural transition between the "linguistic" interpretation of race in the Jim Crow era to the production of "affective" racial attachments in the post-Civil Rights regime. This chapter introduces a new literary-critical procedure—a "reduction to the absurd"—for isolating (rather than overinterpreting) the symptoms of racism, ascertaining modern racism not as irrational and impossible to analyze but logical: structured nonsense. In parallel, this chapter examines the case history as a literary genre that uniquely meditates on its own method to maintain a rigorous internal tension between the specificity of clinical experience and the historical processes of racialization. Against the academic mortification of psychoanalysis—its reduction to a theory divorced from an historical, ongoing, or "living" practice—I consider the Freudian field as a problem-based scientific practice that demands introducing before it a new case: the problem of racism.

The fourth chapter presents analyses of five psychoanalytic case histories, each of which discusses the etiology, clinical phenomenology, and vicissitudes of a racial symptom. These vignettes include accounts of a young teacher who exclusively sleeps with "ghetto" black men (Gearhart & Schuster, 1971), a five-year-old boy with a suspected phobia of his black female housekeeper (Monsour & Grotjahn, 1967), the dreams and aggressive behavior of four white

men during the 1943 Detroit race riots (Sterba, 1947), the rapid emergence of a "rape hysteria" and "race riot" among "delinquent" girls and boys at state institutions (Fraiberg, 1947), and a militantly anti-racist woman's sudden "racial attack" (Bird, 1957). While analysts' Oedipal interpretations tended to overlook their patients' racial fixations, their analyses also adumbrate the idiosyncratic ways in which the (neo)liberal repression of racism returns as unstable "positive" and "negative" attachments to gendered and sexualized conceptions of racial blackness. I historicize each case, highlight the contradictions immanent to the symptomatology and the analyst's interpretations, and activate the analytic method to isolate the racial symptom as a structuring limit of interpretation. Drawing from the history of psychiatry, African American studies, critical theory, Frantz Fanon, and the Freudian and Lacanian canon—seminal texts, deep cuts, and secondary literature—each case is historicized as a singular theory of racism (presented in this chapter in no particular order). If liberalism's structural impasse obviates a metatheory of racism, this is because the racial signifier ensnares each subject through a composite of real, symbolic, and imaginary pathways. Racism is not hypostatized as a syndrome or sign but graphed through its psychodynamics; the racial symptom is isolated as an idiosyncratic point that mediates the political structure that effects (but does not realize) the contemporary subject of racism.

A conclusion briefly discusses the implications of the case histories in relation to the history and structure of liberalism, particularly for non-clinical psychoanalyses of racism and antiracist theory broadly, and ends by contouring the ethical dilemma of racism.

CHAPTER ONE: Epistemology of the Clinic: Racism and the Interwar Crisis in the American Social Sciences

> The most fruitful orientation at a time like our own, when racism is generally condemned in principle, is a clinical one. It is legitimate to assume, at the beginning of the twenty-first century—as it might not have been at the beginning of the twentieth—that racism is an evil analogous to a deadly disease. But the responsibility of the historian or sociologist who studies racism is not to moralize and condemn but to understand this malignancy so that it can be more effectively treated, just as a medical researcher studying cancer does not moralize about it but searches for knowledge that might point the way to a cure.
>
> George M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Brief History* (2002, p. 158)

"An Unconscious Fascination"

The Jewish-American business magnate Julius Rosenwald incorporated his eponymous philanthropic fund in 1917. A clothier by trade, Rosenwald amassed his fortune as a part-owner of Sears, Roebuck and Company, where he was instrumental in transforming the garment industry by employing a standardized sizing convention first employed to mass produce soldiers' uniforms during the Civil War. Endowed with 200,000 shares of the retail giant's stock, the Julius Rosenwald Fund sponsored the construction of several thousand "Rosenwald schools" for black children in the rural South from 1917 to 1932, part of a coordinated effort with Booker T. Washington and the Tuskegee Institute (McCormick, 1934). The fund's motto reflected the project's grand ambitions: "For the Well-Being of Mankind."

In 1943, the Rosenwald Fund allocated funding for a "study of racial conflicts" at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, a venture arguably equal in ambition to its mission statement. The Institute was founded in 1932 and quickly became the first epicenter for psychoanalytic thought outside the Northeastern seaboard, distinguishing itself from its sister training institutes by applying Freud's methods to social and political issues well beyond the medical purview that would eventually monopolize American psychoanalysis after the 1940s. H.

Scudder Mekeel, a staff anthropologist at the Rosenwald Fund, was assigned to collaborate with Chicago analysts to analyze the data they had collected on racism (MacGregor, 1948). A report on the Institute's progress describes how ongoing psychoanalytic interviews had yielded "valuable material on the genesis of prejudicial feelings in an individual and the role which such irrational attitudes play in the dynamic functioning of the prejudiced person" (1947, Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, p. 34). This Race Prejudice Study was launched in the autumn of 1943, as race riots wracked the United States domestically, and the country entered the second year of a global war for Western democracy. To mark the study's occasion, the Institute invited an up-and-coming African American man of letters, Richard Wright, to present on the topic of black fear and hatred.

Wright's friend and collaborator, the sociologist Horace R. Cayton, Jr., first arranged this lecture for the Institute's clinical staff. Before Cayton rose to fame as the co-author of the landmark 1945 urban study *Black Metropolis*, he was in long-term analysis with one of the Institute's founding clinicians, Helen V. McLean, a principal investigator in the Rosenwald race project (Mendes, 2015, pp. 40-1; McLean, 1944). Cayton was one of 33 "Negro" patients—out of 1,531 patients overall—that the Institute treated between 1942 and 1947, the first five-year period in which it kept track of the racial composition of its client base (Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, 1947, p. 55). Cayton subsequently introduced McLean to Charles S. Johnson, founding director of the Race Relations Institute at Fisk University in Nashville. McLean went on to participate in its inaugural 1944 conference on the psychodynamics of racial conflict, where she spoke on a panel that included Smiley Blanton, a clinical psychiatrist from Tennessee who was briefly analyzed by Freud, and Gordon Allport, author of the landmark postwar text on the psychic roots of prejudice (Gilpin, 1980, p. 301; Allport, 1954). McLean returned to Fisk

numerous times in following years and gained a reputation as a "prominent advocate for the inclusion of psychoanalysis in discussions of American race relations" (Mendes, ibid.). To her confreres in Chicago, she proudly disclosed that she was a direct descendant of the abolitionist martyr John Brown.

In a 1946 missive to the field, McLean opens with a plain observation: "To date very few psychiatrists have made any serious psychodynamic studies of the Negro-white problem" (p. 159). The conclusions she draws on the state of the psychoanalysis of racism would describe not just a temporary phase of a field in its infancy, but one of its abiding traits: "The large literature on the Negro and in part by the Negro has no counterpart in any literature by white men concerning the irrational psychological motivation of their own attitudes toward the Negro" (p. 162). This observation—not on the absence of race in psychoanalytic theory, but the absence of the agent of racism—echoes contemporary observations on this same "taboo subject" (cf. Bergner, 2005). Like feminist and postcolonial scholars since at least the 1970s, and queer and transgender scholars since at least the 1990s, critical theories of race have increasingly recognized psychoanalysis' critical potential and intervened in its development as an analytic protocol. Unlike the scholarship on women, gender, and sexuality, however, no academic or clinical domain of inquiry has made racism—much less the effects of the structure and active legacy of racial slavery on what Toni Morrison called the "mind, imagination, and behavior of masters" (p. 12)—the object of a sustained investigation. No doubt because "there is still little *systematic* writing to date that addresses how this intersection [of race and psychoanalysis] ramifies on theories of mind, methods of therapeutic practice, or clinical institutions" (Sexton, 2016, p. 154, emphasis in original), critical black, race, and ethnic studies not turned to clinical

epistemologies in the same way that (for instance) queer theory has (cf. Penney, 2014; Watson and Giffney, 2017).

To its great merit, the field that Christopher Lane christened the "psychoanalysis of race" (1998) has catalogued the pervasiveness and inherent instability of racial meaning in art, literature, and popular culture. But without the nuance of clinical experience and a *feel* for the subject's perturbable tolerance for contradiction, this field has proceeded as a ground-clearing exercise, *as if* a production of critical knowledge were, if not sufficient to undo the ruse of race and the modes of power it enables and authorizes, then a necessary precursor to this end. This twists Marx's adage about the "philosophers [who] have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; [when] the point, however, is to *change* it" (Marx, 1888/1978, p. 145, emphasis original). Alienated from analytic practice, the psychoanalysis of race poises interpretation as a *means* of change. Practitioners have cautioned against this Enlightenment optimism by bringing attention to how understanding, interpretation, and the production of knowledge often function precisely as barriers to change (cf. Fink 2013a; 2013b), but my point is simpler still: not that it interprets instead of changing the world, but that the psychoanalysis of race lacks a specifically clinical theory of change. To lack a theory of change is to also lack a theory for the impediments to change. The failure to draw this theory out misses what is essential about psychoanalysis as a practice, set of strategies, and policy "of cure, of care and of treatment" (Dunker, 2011, p. xxiv) that does not aim to alter ideological beliefs, adjust sexual fantasies, or raise political awareness, but to change the *sexual being* of the subject.

A psychoanalysis of racialization would need to be clarified through the construction of clinical knowledge about racism's subject—as McLean's work suggests—alongside studies of its social effects. To jump to the latter and begin cataloguing the effects of racial subjection on the

racial identities of its victims passes over the crucial step of elaborating a theoretical relation of the notion of race/racism to the analytic field. Indeed, there has never been a shortage of work on the "Negro" subject that did not use and abuse the language of psychoanalysis, and one has never had to look far to find it. Alexander Thomas and Samuel Sillen famously assembled a lurid collection of these texts in their acerbic *Racism and Psychiatry* (1972), throwing into stark relief how the history of American psychoanalysis is characterized by—even if it is not reducible to—both an avoidance of the topic of racial prejudice and an obsession with the recesses of the "colored" psyche. *The Psychoanalytic Review*, the first journal of psychoanalysis to be published in the United States and first in the world to publish original work in English, contains no less than three articles on black "mental illness" in its inaugural 1913 volume. When Freud and Hanns Sachs established *American Imago* in 1939 as the field's new flagship journal, its first article was a psycho-ethnography of "the dozens" as a psychological adjustment device of the American Negro (Dollard, 1939). There is no place to recount here the assertions made and conclusions reached in these frequently moribund reflections, which so often trade biological and cultural idioms of racial essentialism for a crude psychological essentialism, installing "white" and "black" *psyches* into new reified markers of race.

Insisting on a psychoanalysis of racism within and against this mottled background, McLean holds that "It is not enough to explain such an attitude [racism] by saying it is an historical cultural inheritance" (1946, p. 162). An historical account of the production of racial knowledge, even a sociological study or racial practices, is essential but insufficient for understanding the seemingly anachronistic cause and intransigence of racism. She holds that no scientific endeavor but psychoanalysis can tackle a paradox that racism presents: "why at the moment when the white man was most powerful did he enslave black men and need to boast of

'white superiority'?" "Quite evidently," she continues, "white European man for all his boasts and his weapons did not feel secure" (ibid.). McLean relies on Richard Wright's introductory remarks to Cayton's *Black Metropolis* to trace this insecurity to a convergence between the totalization of the capitalist mode of production and the "hang-overs from a feudal morality," by which Wright refers to a certain philosophical byproduct of Western liberalism, namely, the broad affirmation of natural equality against serfdom and bondage (McLean, 1946, p. 162). On the one hand, the advent of industrial capitalism accelerates a process of denaturalization that decenters patriarchal authority, severs man from the bonds of organic affiliation, and installs a symbolic order governed by the bewildering and overwhelming temporality of the commodity-form. "The advent of machine production altered [man's (sic)] relationship to the earth, to his family, to his fellow men, and even to himself" (Wright, 1945/1993, p. xxii). On the other hand, the contradiction posed by the twin birth of modern democratic principles and racialized slavery means that no subject can naturally, organically, or indivisibly identify as a slavemaster, whether first in practice or eventually in the proxy of whiteness. As the free "could not enslave others with a singleness of heart" (p. xxi), racialization provided an inadequate compensation for the alienation that the capitalist mode of production had unleashed. McLean makes this psychoanalytic subject—economized but unmotivated by economic interests or useful pleasures—the native terrain of her psychoanalytic inquiry into racism. The emergence of this subject she carbon-dates to the collapse of the "methods of gaining satisfaction" that accompanied the destruction of the peculiarly American "feudal system" of black slavery (1946, p. 163).

Hers was neither the first go at reading black literature toward an exploration of the psychic life of racial power, nor the last to employ psychoanalysis to analyze the political,

aesthetic, and historical responses to racialization. The originality of McLean's approach—dispensing with the *racial* psyche to outline a *racist* one—is even deflated by Cayton himself, with whom Wright had once planned to publish a periodical that would "'psychoanalyze' the white reading public" (Mendes, p. 39). Rather, what distinguishes McLean's work is how she figures the clinic in her research itinerary, which she says would have to be part of an interdisciplinary study of racism. "Data and material from which such studies [of racism] could be made are already available" (McLean, 1946, p. 159) writes McLean, citing three sources: sociological and anthropological studies, novels and fictional works in general, and finally "clinical observations on both Negroes and white men" (p. 165). "From clinical observations of white patients," she continues, "the existence of… an unconscious fascination for the Negro [i.e. interracial sexual attraction] has been noted again and again" (ibid.). We are left to speculate about this unconscious fascination, how it was interpreted by analysts at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, and what its clinical staff made of these encounters. Unlike Freud, McLean did not publish case histories on her clinical work. But we do know that her elevation of racism to the level of fundamental object contrasted with the approach taken by the prevailing medical and psychiatric establishment, as well as diverging from the ranks of practicing analysts in the early twentieth century for whom racial prejudice was a non-concern. The exceptions here prove the rule. The English analyst Owen Berkeley-Hill wrote one of the earliest articles on the "color question" and the unconscious symbolic associations to blackness in 1924, and Carl Jung proposed in 1930 that Americans suffer a "Negro complex" based on an unconscious identification with the traits of blackness (p. 196). Neither study derived their conclusions from clinical experience, while the opinion A. A. Brill submitted to the tenth annual report of the NAACP—himself a close confidante of Freud's—damns lynching and suggests that a cultural

form of sexual perversity explains its malignant prevalence, but this proposition is not developed in depth (NAACP, 1920, p. 16). At least in the American tradition, one division quickly becomes apparent: whereas analysts felt authorized to muse about race in culture, and even deride the concept or condemn the violence it organized in practice and principle, it remained a strictly non-clinical matter, irrelevant to analysis.

What does an *epistemology of the clinic* offer that accounts of racism—psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic alike—have so consistently foreclosed? This chapter will suggest that the mutual exclusivity between clinical inquiry and the critical analysis of racism is historically contingent. More strongly, it will argue that an understanding of virtually any aspect of racism must be, not merely incomplete, but damaged in its central substance to the degree that it does not incorporate an epistemology of the clinic.[1] Why? A juxtaposition to its companion term, "culture," specifies what clinical knowledge is, and how it is *already* at work in culture.

Feminist theorist-practitioners Marie-Hélène Brousse and Maire Jaanus describe "culture" and the "clinic" as contiguous and uncoordinated: at variance in what (logical) stage of the production of knowledge they emphasize, and therefore involved in a relation of conjunction *and* disjunction. The emphasis on the link between culture and clinic recollects that Freud invented psychoanalysis with the discovery of the unconscious as a form of *unknowable knowledge* that only manifests obliquely through the formations and deformations of speech that its structure organizes, such as dreams, jokes, and slips of the tongue. In contrast to formal systems of knowledge, the unconscious is a *knowledge that does not know itself*, an unique network of language fragments that relate to each other without cohering into sense or meaning. Psychoanalysis does not try to compete with this knowledge by replacing it with a sensible

[1] I borrow the form of this sentence, the title of this chapter, and hopefully some of the same critical verve, from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's *Epistemology of the Closet* (1990).

interpretation, but makes itself a method, or a set of operations, for isolating this unknown knowledge: for inverting or estranging meaning to reveal where every knowledge formation wanes into a resilient nonsense. Freud, furthermore, modified his theories—and kept reinventing psychoanalysis—with each clinical encounter. The singularity of the psychoanalytic subject insures this endless modification, attributable to the fact that each subject is the effect of a unique and therefore incommunicable assemblage of signifiers. The subject's singularity constitutes an inherent limit to knowledge (i.e. *savoir*) as a relation between statements and groups of statements in a given discursive field (Foucault, 1972/2002), including the knowledge psychoanalysis embodies in its techniques. Rather than confirm the same set of theories, "Freud's case studies are primarily designed to prove that something in the clinical implementation of psychoanalytic theory does not work" (Nobus & Quinn, 2005, p. 35)

As ground-zero for the *limit* of any epistemology, the clinic functions as the laboratory of psychoanalytic theory. Brousse and Jaanus hold that "analytic discourse cannot exist without the experience of the couch. It is its absolute condition, just as experimentation and calculation are the absolute conditions of experimental sciences" (2013, p. viii). Knowledge is encountered in the clinic; instead of being applied there, knowledge comes to grief in clinical settings. This is because psychoanalysis, like the historical changes that affect the cultural, social, political, economic, and scientific fields, is not a static knowledge or discrete theoretical entity; it is "opened up from the symptomatic, unconscious knowledge born from analytic experience and research in [psychoanalysts'] case histories" (p. viii). Psychoanalytic theory can only be a provisional totality because its body of knowledge is inherently detotalized by the experience of its practice. Because Freudian theory is born out of, and deconstructed by, the singularity of the clinical encounter, it relinquishes the modern pretension to the mastery of knowledge. This

tension between the singularity of the subject and the body of psychoanalytic theory is irreducible and definitive of the epistemology of the clinic. This tension, in fact, is the site of clinical practice, which is the way through which unconscious knowledge is put into words and its structural processes transmitted into psychoanalytic theory.

"Culture," unlike this process of *transmission* of the unconscious into theory, figures here as the product of a process of *abstraction* of the unknown knowledge into discursive and material practice. Like jokes, cultural phenomena function like formations of the unconscious. We can therefore be more specific about Brousse's and Jaanus' proposition: the clinic is not just contiguous with culture, but its *inversion*, as the clinic is the site where the knowledge that works in, and animates, culture (but that "does not know itself") is isolated. Based on this topological relation between clinic and culture, the epistemology of the clinic, and social and cultural analysis, cannot be apportioned along the line of difference that distinguishes the individual and the social, for the unconscious "renders this opposition untenable and enables culture and clinic, with their differing emphases, to focus on what is common to them both, the real of the symptom" (p. vii). The *real of the symptom*, I will propose, is that element of racism that McLean finds curiously absent in the psychoanalytic literature, and identified as its "irrational motivation," which can be isolated as a point within culture where its coherence fails, but that cannot be transcribed into knowledge (i.e. mastered). Cultural studies, we might add, are efficient at interpreting and encompassing what has already been abstracted into culture, but tend to miss the singularities that riddle it, the nodes of meaninglessness around which it revolves. The problem is redoubled in the employment of a psychoanalytic cultural criticism—*application* being the operative term—that is detached from an ongoing clinical practice. Any theory

unlinked from such a practice is by definition ahistorical, allergic to the singularities of historical experience.

This chapter explores the history of the foreclosure of a clinical epistemology in the anti-racist clinic in the United States. As such, this chapter is also the prehistory to the reopening of the epistemology of the clinic in the second half of this project. What follows is a story about the (failed) invention of racism.

Engineering Racism out of Modernity

Helen McLean's career speaks to the traction that the "psychoanalysis of race relations" obtained within a budding philanthropic- and academic-industrial complex. At the very least, the meaning of racial prejudice (and its cognates) cannot consequently be taken for granted, just as Freud estranged the meaning of sexuality by transforming its notion, unpacking its metaphysical subtleties and making it unrecognizable to the fields of knowledge from which he inherited it. This prehistory of the intersection of analytic and anti-racist discourses has been overshadowed by the monopoly that the sociology of race relations held on the postwar languages on racism, anti-Semitism, and prejudice, not to mention the critical literature on its political oversights and theoretical shortfalls (Steinberg, 2007). The same can be said for Frankfurt School critical theorists, whose interests in racism and anti-Semitism were actively subordinated to analyses of economy and authority in the 1930s, and whose eventual studies on prejudice in the United States were not initiated until well into the 1940s (Jay, 1973/1996). The historian Jonathan Hagel suggests instead that the emergence of a study of racism, or an investigation of "the place race prejudice played in the white psyche," dates "not to the Civil Rights movement of the late 1950s and 1960s and the racial reaction of the 1970s and 1980s… but rather to the psychologically-

infused (or at least tinctured), leftist and liberal anti-racism of the 1930s and 1940s" (2012, p. 15). This minor adjustment generates major consequences for the theories and histories of both the study of racism and psychoanalysis—they now intersect.

To understand how psychoanalysis came to play a formative part in the theorization of racism requires understanding that medicine was not the only, nor even the principal medium through which psychoanalysis emerged as a cultural and scientific dynamo in the United States (cf. Hale, 1978). That narrative arc—established at least fifty years ago, and omnipresent in the historiography on psychoanalysis today—obscures the starring role Freudian discourse played in articulating racism as a problematic. Historian of medicine John Burnham and adjacent chroniclers of the history of the social and behavioral sciences point to a psychoanalysis that spread to (and within) the United States only secondarily by way of the psychiatric practice that would later evolve into "American ego psychology." It metastasized more virally through an "intellectual and cultural avant-garde" (2012, p. 3) of artists, writers, critics, radicals, and perhaps surprisingly, a vibrant, interdisciplinary, and historically consequential psychoanalytic social science that sprang up in the 1920s and 1930s. The success of the Freudian field within this foster environment (more on this below) generated an exuberant expectation for a grand synthesis of humanistic and scientific fields, of "psychoanalysis as a discipline with one foot in medicine and another in the social sciences" (p. 113). Sociologists, cultural anthropologists, philosophers, psychologists, economists, and political scientists in the interwar period adapted psychoanalysis above all else as a method and practice: not just to interpret the social world as it was, but to design and implement changes on a social level that addressed political problems of a specifically-American provenance (Ross, 1997).

This transformation acted as a fulcrum for a broader revision in critical social theory around a new set of problems, particularly the emotional turmoil driving and disrupting culture. Freudianism channeled social scientists' critical attention "inward" to patterned thoughts and behaviors, and away from the "external" patterns of culture, tradition, and ritual—more or less the exclusive area of inquiry into matters of racial conflict since the beginning of the twentieth century (Hagel, p. 10). If this extended the volte-face from nature as a locus of cultural determinism as posited by social Darwinists at the end of the nineteenth century, the curative component of the analytic method was still alone insufficient to explain its appeal and quick uptake in the social sciences: a confluence of historical processes primed (even if it did not guarantee) the transfusion of psychoanalysis into the United States by overwhelming the explanatory capacities of previous scientific paradigms for analyzing the function, place, and historicity of racial antagonism. That the dire conditions of black life in the United States were exacerbated, not alleviated, by the march of time, the advent of industrialization, and African Americans' great migration to the North was foremost among these vexations. The social and behavioral sciences had a "seemingly limitless capacity for producing knowledge about every aspect of African American life and psychology… [but] they possessed little capacity to generate new understandings or explanations of white racism" (Hagel, 2012, p. 22). While they were competent stockpilers of ethnographic data, these fields strained to situate the sudden ascendancy of racial nationalism in modern Europe: rising racial violence could be described and historicized, but not explained. This included a spike in lynchings in the United States after World War I, new racial restrictions on immigration, the revival of the Klan, and perhaps most emblematically, the contagion of race riots that controverted urbanization's modernist premises with irrefutable evidence that the crisis of the aftermath of slavery had not abated.

The nature of this problem troubled the belief that racial antipathies were a regional issue contained to the peculiar resentments between ex-slaves and ex-masters, so much so that Hagel argues it precipitated a "crisis of American modernity in the 1930s and early 1940s" (p. 8). Yet one wonders if it is perhaps more accurate to localize this crisis in the social sciences themselves, to the extent that they were progressively positioning themselves as both modernism's representatives and engineers, responsible for both knowing and steering the course of race relations. What becomes clear is that this crisis did more than upset a faith in the inevitable course of progress—the social sciences did not assume such a teleology as history's natural course—but problematized the more fundamental understanding of history as composed of "homogeneous empty time," which is what Walter Benjamin conceptualized as the presumptive root of progressive, pessimistic, and nonlinear accounts of history alike (1968/2007). If its method is additive, and conceives of the past, present, and future in a geometric grid governed by the mechanical law of cause and effect, then psychoanalysis offered another reading: one that did not interpret time as an objective flow of events, or cultural development as a series of phases, but positioned history as a structural or unconscious constellation of events. In adopting this approach, the psychoanalytic social sciences would make racism both its split subject and case history. Mari Jo Buhle argues that these "neo-Freudians," a branch of psychoanalysis that developed around the particular political questions that arose in the United States, "made the study of prejudice and bigotry the heart of a major interdisciplinary endeavor" (1998, p. 10). Bewildered by the intensification of antiblack violence despite the long demise of slavery and the liberalization of culture, psychoanalytic social scientists wondered: what if the time of slavery is unconscious? What if racism lay in its subject?

Racial antagonism was both the object of analysis that drove the rapid metastasis of psychoanalysis as a mode of critical inquiry, and the object-cause that will be occluded in the theoretical and political formations that psychoanalysis produced. This is what remains to be demonstrated. Now, as McLean and others have recognized, psychiatric practitioners and social scientists were beat to this punch by black humanists and theorists of race, who were the first to read psychoanalysis to make sense of the dual dilemmas of American and African-American culture (cf. Ahad, 2010). Before it became part of the social scientific avant-garde in the 1930s,

> Freudian insights into the irrational nature of the racial animosity and conflict found their most sympathetic American audience in the 1920s out on the intellectual frontiers of the American race problem, among those who, like E. Franklin Frazier, Walter White, and W.E.B. Du Bois, were best attuned to challenges to the reigning racial orthodoxy. (Hagel, p. 51)

Cultural historian Eli Zaretsky's (2015) conclusion—that the "political Freudianism" of this "African-American radicalism" from the 1920s to the 1960s "aimed less at a theory of racism (though attempts at this were made) than at uncovering the memory of the slave experience and its aftermath" (p. 7)—can therefore be complicated by a host of exceptions, then or now.[2] Yet the institutional and political context through which psychoanalysis was imported to the Americas secured a unique methodological flexibility and diversity that was otherwise absent in adjacent endeavors. Establishing psychoanalysis as a *de jure* social scientific framework required the "interventions and support of national research networks, deep-pocketed philanthropic foundations, federal and state governments, local institutions, as well as national associations and committees" (Gitre, 2010, pp. 241-2). The University of Chicago became the first university in the United States to hire an analyst when in 1930 it appointed the Hungarian émigré (and

[2] For recent psychoanalytic approaches to black literature in contemporary critical, cultural, and literary studies, see: Abel, Christian, and Moglen (1997), Tate (1998), Marriott (2000; 2007), Spillers (2003b), JanMohamed (2005), Crawford (2008), and Tuhkanen (2009).

founding director of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis) Franz Alexander to a professorial position. National research organizations simultaneously forged institutional links and subsidized theoretical cross-pollination through new interdisciplinary research centers like Yale's Institute of Human Relations and, after 1934, the transplanted Institute for Social Research at Columbia University (Gitre, 2010, pp. 254-8). Attached to the funding these institutes provided were requirements that psychoanalytic research have the potential for "real-world" applications, and on a scale commensurate with the scope of the crisis in the American social sciences. The most influential propagator of social-psychoanalytic research, the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC), "encouraged if not required real-world application and results" (p. 255), incentivizing a social rather than clinical interaction in the conduct of research and the deployment of the policy solutions that that research informed. Immanent to this mandate for applied solutions was a "social adaptation" hypothesis that progressively read crime, prejudice, psychoneuroses, and other so-called ailments as cultural artifacts, or symptoms of subjective maladjustments to the onset of modern industrial capitalism. This hypothesis figured Freudian psychotherapeutic techniques as adaptable to the toolkit of the social engineer, who would be able to design public policies capable of ironing out the symptoms of (or resistances to) modernization. If this triangulated the crisis in modernity as simply the birth pangs of its own gestation, it also soldered the theory of racism to a very practical consideration: the need to eliminate it. Racism, anti-racism, and social engineering emerge here as a practical-conceptual trinity.

The Interwar Turn to Affect

Of all the social scientists influenced by Freud, arguably none applied his clinical method with as much cautious enthusiasm as John Dollard, the sociologist and anthropologist who first

systematically employed psychoanalysis to theorize antiblack racism. Dollard followed neither the race relations paradigm of the Chicago school of sociology, nor was he a practicing analyst who conducted therapy with "racially prejudiced" patients (despite himself undergoing a yearlong, SSRC-funded training analysis under Hanns Sachs at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute). Rather, in hybridizing methods from psychotherapy and the social sciences, Dollard became a flag-bearer for an interwar turn to affect in the humanistic social sciences, one that multiplied the "sociological breadth" of the social sciences with the "emotional depth" of a theory of Freudian subjectivity. Not unlike the affective turn of the twenty-first century, the interwar turn sought to account for the seemingly unreasonable passions that motivated reason, as well as the complexity of the forms of relation and causality that bound and disconnected human thought and action. The tumult of racial passions that marked the era motivated a turn to the emotions and grounded the development of an American critical theory that, for the first time, became clearly distinguished from its European progenitors.

The influence of Dollard's work, its theoretical indebtedness to psychoanalysis, and his clinical-ethnographic fieldwork, have been jointly overlooked in the historiography, despite the victory over the sociological imagination that his conclusions quickly won. Dollard undoubtedly played a hand in this success. He and his colleagues wasted no time generalizing his findings about "caste prejudice" into the *magnum opus* of the interwar turn to affect, the "frustration-aggression hypothesis" that underwrote a new unified theory of modern subjectivity (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears, 1939). It held that the *libidinal* (i.e. sexual) frustrations that modern life generated are efficiently relieved through the aggressive thoughts and actions that groups and individuals direct at scapegoats—racial or otherwise. This thesis influenced social scientists, policymakers, and cultural theorists for decades to come. Then-senator and sociologist

Daniel Patrick Moynihan heralded Dollard's Freudian theories in a foreword to the fifth edition of *Caste and Class*, writing that they had, by the postwar period, rightfully become "part of our general understanding of the world" (1937/1988, p. vii).

These theoretical generalizations were germinated in *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, a study Dollard finished in 1937, and that Hagel credits with first transforming "the psychoanalytic understanding of white racial prejudice from the periphery to the center of American racial discourse" (2012, p. 52). Dollard's fieldwork describes racial animosities as the emotionally-driven methods that Southern subjects used to reconcile a conviction in the necessity of the caste system with the "leaven of our democratic mores," the principle of equality foremost among them (1937, pp. 62-3). Its interdisciplinary approach, combining research from anthropology, social psychology, and psychoanalysis, is rendered all the more eclectic by Dollard's mixed methods, which fall somewhere between ethnographic survey and individual analysis. He ultimately assembles nine "life histories," intensive biographical narratives, from interviews with three black women and nine black men of Indianola, Mississippi that comprised the core of his five-month fieldwork. He included additional testimony from upwards of sixty other black and white informants.

Immediately heralded as canonic among Dollard's colleagues, W. E. B. Du Bois (1937) was decidedly more skeptical about *Caste and Class*—not just about what he saw to be Dollard's sparse use of economic data and his lack of a critique of political economy, but also about the imprecision of the "greatly modified psychoanalytic technique" (Dollard, 1937, p. 448) that Dollard outlined two years before in a book-length treatment (1935/1998). Du Bois took issue with how it raised the perspective of a few interview subjects—and the racial structure of the South more broadly—to the level of a "symptom" equivalent to the operation of prejudice in

general. For his part, Dollard described his technique as neither a collection of data through questionnaire, nor the product of "cross-examination of the anthropological or psychiatric type" (Dollard, 1937, p. 20). Replacing the iconic couch-and-armchair arrangement with facing rocking chairs, Dollard recorded in detail his subjects' conversations, bodily actions, dreams, and general behavior, but "did not press for material from the unconscious level," considering it unethical to raise issues that could not, for a lack of time, be resolved without a properly-conducted therapeutic session (1937, p. 25). Dollard's aim was not to have his interview subject stand-in for the castes (or "races") and classes of their extraction, but to develop detailed personality profiles that would be articulated with the general properties of mental life that psychoanalysis enumerated. After all, an intervention at the individual level was never his goal—it was for a speculative *social* program of intervention that Dollard conducted his research.

Dollard's method was the product of the breakdown of traditional disciplinary barriers in American critical inquiry. With a doctorate in sociology from the University of Chicago, extensive tutelage in Freudian theory from psychoanalytic luminaries like Harold Lasswell, Abram Kardiner, and Karen Horney, working relations with a gamut of American exiles of the Frankfurt School, and as the director of the influential "Culture and Personality" school of anthropology at Harvard, Dollard had a glossarial education (Hagel, pp. 54-66). Yet his ambidexterity was not entirely unique, as the heavy investment by philanthropies and academic foundations into Freudian theory had paid off by the late 1930s and 1940s, generating a flourishing "neo-Freudian psychoculturalism" (Gitre, 2011). This was less a school of thought or formal discipline than a "variety of new theoretical models, field methods, and research programs" (Levine, 2001, p. 808). Fueled by the steady emigration of psychoanalysts and critical theorists from Europe, the increasing institutionalization of psychoanalytic training facilities, and

the fuller integration of Freudian theory into the medical and social science programs at elite academies, psychoculturalism was not hegemonic, but it had become the cutting edge (Gifford, 2010).

Psychoanalysis' allure lay in promising a theory of subjectivity that had the rigor of a science; and the allure of science lay in its imagined ability to scaffold the construction of social programs that could accurately address and efficiently ameliorate the antagonisms traversing racial culture. Only by weaving together the social and psychological sciences—on the one hand—and theory and practice—on the other—would native and immigrant, Southerner and Northerner, black and white, be integrated in a modern society, an idyll that the marriage of theory and policy would consummate. Freudian psychoanalysis was the quilting point of this interdisciplinary synthesis, as well as its aspirational ideal, if on a smaller (and for that reason insufficient) scale. Paramount to such a social program would be the ability to generate theoretical instruments to isolate and diagnose racism at its source. The SSRC accordingly adopted the "'the Negro problem' as a central focus" of its research program, while affiliated philanthropies made acculturation or adaptation the principle guiding their academic projects. "For the first time," write Jane Adams and D. Gorton, "the South's 'Negro problem' was a national problem" (2004, p. 340). Psychoanalysis, it was hoped, would produce an answer to racist aggression in the form of a cure.

The integration of psychology, the study of culture, and an as-yet undefined mechanism of social therapy amounted to a national project of white reconstruction. By this term I mean to designate a cultural project that emerges in the wake of the *failure* of black reconstruction, and as a reaction against a political project for realizing black emancipation after abolition (Du Bois, 1935). How, then, was this "social therapy" imagined? Anticipating the ego psychology of the

1950s and 1960s, which intended to cure neurosis by adjusting the patient to "reality," the turn to affect in the 1930s psychoanalytic social sciences developed a "cultural-therapeutic approach to social engineering" (Bryson, 2009, p. 363), with the aim of adjusting white and black personalities to the post-slavery acceleration of industrial capitalism. Psychoculturalism was to midwife the modern subject where its birth was strained, and to pave the way for a modernity cured of the misplaced discontent of alienation or the resentments of repressed racial attachments. To do this, the social sciences borrowed from Freud a topography of the mind and from sociology a cartography of the demos to conceive of a racially-differentiated *social ego*. Not simply the effect or bearer of abstract social forces, the social subject was imagined as paradigmatically neurotic, as wrestling with the rules and limits of social life, and as developing compromise forms of libidinal satisfaction, including racial prejudice in the commercially underdeveloped South and elsewhere, that conflict with the cultural mandates against aggression and the liberal aspiration of racial inequality. The social ego is invented as the specific object for an imagined public policy that would adjust, divert, and reinvest the ego's libidinal (i.e. sexual) attachments to acclimate the black subject to a *freedom without reparations* and to adjust the white subject to a *supremacy without slavery*.

The SSRC's 1934 "Lake George Report," which formalized future plans for the field of personality and culture, listed the "Negro problem" as the primary item on its theoretical agenda, but did not, like Dollard, situate racial prejudice at its fulcrum. It rather expressed new concerns about black political autonomy, marked by several convergent historical developments—black migration to the north, the rising education of African Americans, and an aggressive turn in blacks' attitudes toward whites (Bryson, 2009, p. 378). White reconstruction in this sense entails an extension and nationalization of a Southern reaction against black political agency (and the

redistribution of the means and ends of production). Rather than believing in its inevitability, white reconstruction believes in the *necessity* of modernism while conceding the unnaturalness of capitalism. Only in this way would state interventions informed by scientifically-valid research into racialized populations be justified. While understood on the one hand as a tool to illuminate and eliminate white racism, Freudian psychoanalysis, marked by a profound ambivalence, is thus simultaneously incorporated as a remedy to cure black radicalism—not to construct the (subject of the) unconscious, but to bring it out in the open. In the utopian vision that holds the total program of psychoculturalism together, an aggressive white racism *and* an equally aggressive black discontent would need to be located, addressed, and degraded at the same time.

Does the subject of the unconscious meet the same fate in Dollard's work? Among previous studies of the distribution and reproduction of racial power, his neo-Freudian approach stands out for integrating the "interior" element of the social ego with great care, an introspectiveness that corresponded with the contemporaneous turn in anthropology from the foreign and external "other" to the "otherness within" Western democracies (Manson, 1988). In the life histories Dollard subsequently recorded, the emotional complexity within the racialized subject bordered on the impenetrable and undiagnosable. Dollard finds his informants lacking consistent intentions, riven by irreconcilable depths and contradictions (1937, p. 21). In cases of racial prejudice, they were described as possessed by an "irrational antagonism… vented toward other people" (Dollard, 1938a, p. 15). Dollard laments the unshakability of his own "pro-Negro bias" and "antisouthern sentiment," and is elsewhere aghast at how white Southerners "seem very much like the psychotics one sometimes meets in a mental hospital" (1937, pp. 33-36). Yet instead of finding in the excesses, inconsistencies, and idiosyncrasies of his subjects the

"irrational motivation" of racism (McLean), the "real of its symptom" (Brousse & Jaanus), Dollard flags this inscrutability as a final frontier to be interpreted and *affectively mapped* by the neo-Freudian anthropologist. The social ego harbors here a dark continent previously impenetrable to those quantitative methods that failed to provide convincing explanations for the explosion of racial violence during the interwar years—but that psychoculturalism would conquer. "What the psychoanalytic study seems to provide," writes Dollard, "is the identification of relationships which are not discerned by the census or discoverable in any other way than by intensive individual study" (1938b, p. 725). "The aim of this study," concludes Dollard in *Caste and Class*, "is to grasp and describe the emotional structure which runs parallel to the formal social structure in the community" (1937, p. 16).

Socializing Sexuality

The invention of the social subject was designed to jailbreak the Freudian ego from its individualization, to enable the source of its emotional conflicts to be located historically—in the external transformations of culture and capital. In practice, the first casualty of this division between subject and society is the conceptualization of a neither-individual-nor-social unconscious, of a subject that is in society, but irreducible to the network of social relations it inhabits (Freud, 1915/1957e). The theoretical paradigm that accompanies the invention of this subject, which eliminates any aspect of human subjectivity that is exempt from the effects of social life, must therefore itself be historically dated: the social subject becomes inextricable from a modernist *epistemological enclosure*—generated in both sociology and anthropology, in both the Americas and Europe—that produces, expands, and appropriates "society" as an object of state intervention. The concept of "the social," as Andrew Zimmerman argues, "emerged as a

field of control in an era when mass democracy threatened to upend hierarchies of power and authority" (2015, p. 487). Even if shoring up the unstable distribution of power was the effect rather than the intention of the sociocentric project, it proceeded by way of appropriating the Freudian the unconscious as a last territory for the state's policy scalpel. Motivating the psychocultural program, in other words, is not just the liberation of the subject from some obscure vacuum from historical forces, but a desire to render the subject available, accessible, and responsive to the designs of social engineers intent on intervening in the historical process. Society and its accompanying social ego are produced here as the objects for an outside intervention, useful fictions on a "stage of exteriority"—the epistemological and ontological space that Denise Ferreira da Silva nominates as the domain in which a Western scientific formation ethically preauthorizes the deployment of the "tools" of state reason (2009).

This state-centered paradigm ballooned the social to such a degree that it foreclosed an unconscious for which there quite simply was no longer had any place. And the inflated powers attributed to the social in the sociological and anthropological fields proceeded on the critical pretense of repudiating the *sexual* body as a biological, and hence *racist* conception of the human. As social theorists in the 1930s grew increasingly critical of fascist ideology in the United States and Europe, as well as of the biological pseudoscience that justified their varied projects for racial extermination, the psychocultural field increasingly sought to eradicate the vestiges of biological reason from their own intellectual inheritance (Gitre, 2011). (The "caste" concept Dollard borrows from the field of social anthropology was preferred to the essentialist concept of "race" for the same reason [Warner, 1936].) This anti-biological principle aimed to avoid eugenic as well as social Darwinist reason, while wresting control of scientific authority from clinicians and old-guard social scientists alike—not to mention claiming a moral high-

ground. This abundance of caution (and their strategic considerations) led the neither-natural-nor-cultural concept of the sexual drive to be rejected as a synonym for a biological (and hence extra-social) instinct. Freud himself rejected the equation between sexual drives to instincts, and rather enigmatically suggested that the drive-concept was a "psychical representative" of the "frontier of the mental and somatic" (Freud, 1915/1957d, p. 122), and hence both ineffective for any social program, whether modernist or white supremacist.

Steering between the Scylla of cultural determinism and the Charybdis of biological essentialism, sociocentric theory repeated and reiterated a wariness of psychoanalysis' individualism and channeled that wariness into a tactic to resist the medical fields' monopolization of the discourses of the mind. They scolded practicing Freudians (whether from the medical or non-medical fields) for eliding social factors and artificially truncating the scale of their analyses to the individual and immediate family relations. In addition to the elision of the ego in the study of culture, the other, more consequential target of sociocentric theory was thus the elision of culture in the (clinical) study of the ego. John Dollard was no exception to this opinion. Psychoanalysis' failure to "study the material of an analysis *from the community angle*," he contends, is "not done [by analytic practitioners] because of the necessity of concentrating on the therapeutic problem which has been so continuously to the fore in the history of the use of the analytic method," which has rendered psychoanalysis "[un]able to derive much that is of value to social theory" (1937, p. 21, emphasis added). In conflating drive with instinct, the clinic with the individual, and medicine with racism, psychoculturalism transformed an explicitly non-clinical psychoanalysis into a seemingly readymade anti-racism. Social scientists (along with their contemporaries at the Frankfurt School) consequently tended to subordinate every angle of analysis to the social dimension, and hedged against the clinical method, which appeared to be

the least social (and ipso facto the most "medical" and "racist"). Linguist and anthropologist Edward Sapir, who co-directed the Culture and Personality seminars at Yale with Dollard, held not only that it would be a "social psychology into which the conventional cultural and psychological disciplines must eventually be resolved," but that this future science would have "to bring every fact of personality formation back to its social matrix" (1934, pp. 401-2). Erich Fromm, otherwise unwavering in his critique of the politics of social reformist, asserted that Freud's clinical method tended to rest on a "purely technical-medical model" that supports and reproduces a bourgeois individualism (1935/2000, pp. 152). Not only do these indictments anticipate a conflation between psychoanalysis and the medical gaze that Foucault (1973/2003), Deleuze and Guattari (1972/1983), and others enabled in the anti-clinical bents of their projects, but their liberal commitment to anti-racism intercepts the reception of the fundamental concepts of the (sexual) drive and the unconscious in the American theoretical tradition. My point is precisely this: that an anti-racist sentiment both generated the enthusiasm for psychoanalysis and censored Freud's most consequential (clinical) concepts.

Over the course of his career, Freud himself did not so much make a leap from analyzing individuals to sociological collectives in the way that the psychoanalytic social sciences made the opposite leap from the exteriority to the interiority of cultural life. Freud rather inscribed an internal leap within each entity he analyzed. This internal identity between the outside and inside of mental life—between manifest and latent thoughts, between speech and the structure of the unconscious—meant that "The relations of an individual to his parents and to his brothers and sisters, to the object of his love, and to his physician—in fact all the relations which have hitherto been the chief subject of psycho-analytic research—may claim to be considered as social phenomena" (1921/1955e, p. 68). Freud does not indicate a positive continuity between both

poles but indicates that culture is structured as the unconscious, that sexuality detotalizes the social just as it splits the subject. This reveals the social for a fiction and suggests that libidinal enjoyment, rather than only constituting the unconscious politics of the subject, also undermines every social project. Needless to say, this makes psychoanalysis incompatible with a psychographic research program that makes the economic redistribution of libidinal attachments its lodestar. Between the quintet of case histories that establish the theoretical architecture of psychoanalysis, and the publication of "Totem and taboo"—wherein Freud first ventures beyond the disciplinary purview of psychiatry into historiography and ethnography, in what Michel de Certeau nominated as "the second moment in the psychoanalytic *conquista*" (1986, p. 7)—a sociocentric adjustment is both less than sufficient and more than superfluous.[3] The identity of the individual case with the anthropological study is the dialectical identity of psychoanalysis with itself.

Let me then suggest the following: there is no sociocentric approach to anti-racism that does not emerge without a state solution, as no conception of "society" emerges that does not always already comprise a stage of deployment in which the state authorizes (and reproduces) itself as an agent chartered to identify and destroy racism. Given the social sciences' resistance to Freud's major concepts, *and* the clinic's resistance to the social and libidinal designs of the state, we are faced with an additional and consequential fact: *the psychoanalytic social sciences do not produce any conception of anti-racism that does not negate the unconscious, the drive, and the unknowing knowledge of desire*. Rather than read racism next to the impasses of sexuality, and consider the relation of the subject of racism, Dollard and his colleagues equate racism *to* an

[3] Freud's five case histories are Dora (1905/1953b), Little Hans (1909/1955a), the Rat Man (1909/1955b), Dr. Schreber (1910/1958), and the Wolf Man (1918/1955d). The major anthropological texts include "Totem and taboo" (1913), "Group psychology and the analysis of the ego" (1921/1955e), "Civilization and its discontents" (1930/1961), and "Moses and monotheism" (1939/1964b).

external deformation of sexuality. In an interview in 1975, Dollard goes so far as to affirm that "the regulations surrounding caste… prevents intimate social intercourse and supposedly sexual intercourse" (Ferris & Dollard, 2004, pp. 13). Reflecting on the post-Civil Rights era, he concludes that "We are in my opinion making the most valiant effort in all the world to cope with this problem; we are really fighting it" (p. 14). The consequences of this orientation are profound: if Freudian psychoanalysis is developed from—and sustained by—the practice of listening to the unconscious and the problems that inhere in the sexual relation that anti-racism aims to "cure," then an anti-racism of this stripe will always also be program for the elimination of psychoanalysis.

Racism and Antiracism

At the heart of the psychoanalysis of race relations rests a dialectical oscillation between racism and antiracism. This demands shifting our attention from the analysis of racism as an historical phenomenon and object of investigation, to the invention of the concept of racism as an epistemological impasse arising out of specific historical conditions and theoretical formations. At the same time that Freud wended his way stateside, the modern concept of racism began to gain currency in the broader transatlantic humanities and social sciences.[4] It sprang to life as a formal concept in the 1920s and 1930s through a specific anti-racist discourse, one that was critical of the scientific concept of race and scientific racism's twin propositions: that race is a stable natural classification, and that prejudice is instinctive. What today goes by the name of "scientific racism" is therefore not just a type or variation of racism, but the concept's very

[4] For one of the first formalizations of the term "race prejudice," see Finot (1907/1969). Another early variation, "color prejudice," is first regularly used by J. A. Rogers in his *Sex and Race* triptych, which demonstrates more than a passing familiarity with Freudian discourses on racism, including Dollard's. See: Rogers (1944/1972, esp. 77-85).

prototype. George Fredrickson notes that the salience of this concept of racism "emerges only when the concept of race, or at least some of its applications, begin to be questioned," even if institutions now classified as racist—such as colonialism and segregation—chronologically precede its formalization (2002, p. 156). Franz Boas' 1911 rebuke of the veracity of the idea of race inaugurated this sort of scientific anti-racism within American anthropology. If this position was not novel, Boas brought "scientific sobriety to the issue" by using a method of induction based on the empiric observations of human biology to dispute the biological grounding of race (Bernasconi & Lott, 2000, p. 84). Such polemics against race, and the espousal and affirmation of the essential diversity of human cultures that invariably accompanied it, eventually "provided the humanist and cosmopolitan anti-racism of the post-war period with most of its arguments" (Balibar, 1991/2011a, p. 21), laying the groundwork for the elevation of multicultural/multiracial societies into a principle of liberalism.

Collectively, studies that criticize the scientific baselessness of racist belief understand racism as an intellectual error, and race as "man's most dangerous myth" (Montagu, 1942/2001). But the theoretical researcher who stops here is immediately backed into a corner of their own methodological making, as they are forced to concede that racism, "like any dogma that *cannot be scientifically demonstrated*, must be studied historically" (Benedict, 1942, p. 97, emphasis added). In other words, these critiques of racism have no explanatory currency outside the archaeology of knowledge or historiography of racialization that they outline, enabling an idea to be traced backward in time but foreclosing any consideration of causality. The historian is equally at a loss to explain why racism, as a form of consciousness in error, appears to survive the periodic invalidation and repudiation of the race concept in its various forms. Racism is rendered here a peculiar phenomenon perpetually on the verge of disappearing, but perennially

revivified in guises old and new, to the great dismay of the cultural historian. Unknowable, racism becomes a sign for a crisis in knowledge-power and the limit of the extant social scientific methods. In other words, racism becomes a concept that represents a resistance to conceptualization, a representation of the limit of the representation of power.

Owing to this epistemological impasse, the critical career of the deployment of the racism-concept is marked by the instability of its referents, particularly the inessential content of its historical agents (or "subjects," individual or institutional) and victims (or "objects"). Indeed, historians first imported the concept of racism into political criticism during the 1920s to criticize supremacist ideas held by European nationals against other *European* groups, followed only then by the gradual assimilation of antisemitism to the concept of racism in the 1930s. Ideas, policies, and attitudes that regenerated the subordination of American and diasporic Africans would only begin to receive a classification as racist in the 1960s, largely through the discourses of the Civil Rights Movement. Its formulation in these prewar forms of political criticism was largely identical in definition to the one that emerged in anti-racist anthropology, where racism was understood as a mass hysteria, or the irrational forms of behavior that followed the error of the belief in the (biological) reality of race. But a difference occurs when "white racism" enters the crosshairs of the psychoanalyst (chapter 4). If these case histories prefer the terms "racial hostility," "race hatred," or "racial animus" to describe their patients' symptoms, they also consistently describe racism as an affect that is inseparable from speech, an irrationalism that is not caused by a failure of reason, but that can be isolated through reason's winding pathways into its opposite. The analytic literature suggests a minimal gap between racism and the belief in race, and insinuates that (racist) affect is not autonomous of language, but constitutes an excess *within* reason.

In breaking up a cause-and-effect relation between racism (as affect/effect) and race (as reason/cause) that inheres in the prototypical notion of scientific racism, we can introduce an irreducible difference between the source, object, and aim of racism, immunizing the theorization of racism from three interrelated conflations: 1.) of its *source* with its *objects* (e.g. the notion that its real or imagined targets elicit or stimulate racism), 2.) of its *object* with its *aim* (e.g. the notion that racism is satisfied in a discrete and measurable end), and 3.) of its *aim* with its *source* (e.g. the notion that racism is equal to, or the product, of race, or vice versa).[5] Borrowing the distinction between its source, object, and aim from Freud's outline of the sexual drive (1915/1957d), this schema (a strictly heuristic fiction) simultaneously preserves a distinction between the historical content and structural logic of the object of racism, creating a split in its object: because *any* object can inhabit the structural place of racism, *no* single object fully satisfies it. Racism thereby attains an inexhaustible quality that does not terminate in ends and exhibits an immanent causality that arises out of its constant self-displacement, thereby obviating its political ontology as an instrument subordinated to outside motives—whether ignorance, madness, or the supposed inertia of racial power. The lack of any necessary content at the same time prevents racism from being dehistoricized, as the distinction between the content and position of its object "liberates" racism to incorporate a wide variety of historical actors and contexts. It is for this reason that the psychoanalytic cultural theorist Christina Sharpe, in her analysis of the post-slavery condition, does not reify racism as a *relation* of power. She insists on a paradigm for analyzing antiblack racism that is historical *and* universal: "*all modern subjects* are post-slavery subjects fully constituted by the discursive codes of slavery and post-slavery"

[5] When Dollard violates the third point by defining "race prejudice" as an effect of the instability of caste barriers, racism can logically only be eliminated through one of three scenarios: the perfection of caste in slavery, the elimination of race in genocide, or the end of democracy in autocracy.

(2010, p. 3, emphasis added). If neither she nor the psychoanalytic discourses she marshals describe racism as a structure of domination or a capillary network of governance and coercion, this is because racism is unlike any modern form of power: *there is no racist relation*. With the cleavage in the object of racism, the subject of racism now emerges as something other than a racialized subject or an agent of rational or irrational intention—but as a subject of an historical and structural impasse created in the wake of slavery's exhaustion. Inexhaustible, racism is not only irreducible to its objects but *identical to its subject*.

The critical potential unleashed by linking racism to the structure of the drive, superseding both idealistic and relational conceptualizations of racism, should not be underestimated. Any future inquiry would have to analyze racism as more than the sum of policies, institutions, ideologies, practices, and cultural representations that generate the "objects" of racism and reproduce the material conditions of racial inequality. To do otherwise—to limit the critique of racism exclusively to a critique of racial inequality, injustice, and their symbolic lineaments—dehistoricizes *value* as an historically and politically constituted measure, which usually appears silently under the heading of the "human." The pitfalls of jumping ahead and presuming the human (or some other abstract index) as a measure of value—as a yardstick for calculating the inequalities of racism—can be outlined in the following manner: to discern racial (material and/or symbolic) inequality presumes the installation of a measure of value first equal to itself; for this measure to be representable, it must be exercised in, against, and among a field of discrete and quantifiable objects; to exercise this measure and quantify racism in the inequalities *among* these objects, each object must be integrated as a self-same unit; finally, to unify the cleavage in each object is to conflate the object and aim of racism (error #2 above) and foreclose the immeasurable inexhaustibility of its subject. If the "idea of equivalence inheres

within capitalist relations of production" and the machinery of commodification (2016, p. 3), as the psychoanalytic cultural critic Todd McGowan says it does, then we get a better idea about why this critique of racism springs forth so readily today. But the termination of slavery and the ongoing struggle for racial justice magnifies this problematic complicity between antiracist critique and power. This can be outlined in the following manner: a limited project for racial equality aims at equalizing the black ex-commodity and the white citizen-subject; measuring the distance and inequality between these two positions rests on a measure grounded in the prior *equalization* between the use-value and exchange-value of blackness as a commodity (i.e. blackness as a metaphysical quantity equal to itself); this fetishes the ex-slave *as* an object-commodity and fixes the subject of racism opposite it as a master, thereby making each an object unequal to each other but identical in-and-for-themselves. The logic of the drive poses a challenge to this limitation of the imagination by holding that the subject of racism is inexhaustible because it is already *not equivalent to itself*. Having mapped here these two routes by which the conceptualization of racism, based on a critique of inequality, wanders into fetishist reason, we can make another, more consequential conclusion: namely, that the foreclosure of the subject of racism is here revealed to be strictly equivalent to the foreclosure of a form of *black freedom* that exhausts and exceeds the above framework of equality and the capitalist relations of production that underwrite it.

Yet the theoretical windfall imminent in an inversion from an unequal object to a subject (and freedom) unequal to itself was held in escrow at the precise historical moment that Freud's discovery would enable both to come under new scrutiny. Social theorists quite simply failed to match the invention of the concept of racism, and the focus on the "racist white psyche," with a theory of the unconscious, the drive, and sexuality—and thus retained a theory of the subject as

an object of repressed knowledge, reason, or emotion. Whereas this interwar turn to affect debuts the human subject as a more complex unit of analysis, Freud disputed the notion that affects or emotions (as opposed to ideas and thoughts) were repressed. In his metapsychological writings, he argues that "the attribute of unconsciousness [is] completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings and affects are concerned" (1915/1957e, p. 177). The unconscious is structured by the representational laws of condensation and displacement, not as a reservoir of extra-linguistic emotions. Likewise, the difference Freud drew between the source, object, and aim of sexuality—the anatomy of the drive—are also reversed in the psychocultural field. Without an antonym for either a natural (instinctive) or cultural (emotional) conception of racism that is exhausted in a definite goal (and can be prevented through a social re-engineering of libidinal satisfactions), any theory of racism will find itself flummoxed by the same paradox that caught the intellectual historian George Fredrickson's attention while tracking the historical discourses of racism, as condensed in the epigraph that begins this chapter. In his historical survey of the term, racism appears without exception under the mark of rejection: it is universally opposed by all those who recognize, theorize, and criticize it. Throughout the entire history of (the concept of) racism, there is *no one who is not* an anti-racist—either because one protests that racism is a damaging, illiberal, anti-social dogma (as its accusers do), or because one disputes the legitimacy of the prior invalidation of race, culture, difference, or one of its stand-ins—and is therefore not in "error" at all (as those accused do). *Like incest, racism is universally repressed*. It is this very likeness between the (split) object of incestuous jouissance and the (split) object of libidinal racism that pushes Fredrickson to appeal to a clinical method to determine the structure and process of racism.[6]

[6] If the standard health model of medicine and its opposition of disease and cure is precisely what the Freudian clinic obsolesces (see conclusion), Fredrickson's comparison of racism to a disease borders on the anachronistic.

Whither the Black Analysand?

The invention of racism, the discovery of its odious and objectionable character, and the spontaneous consensus that met the need to get rid of it, overdetermined the methods used to make sense of it. The practical end of prescribing anti-racist policy doubles back on every interwar theory of racism as an invisible, extra-theoretical force, disguising the epistemological deadlock racism condenses in the garb of a moral failure—and more perniciously, a state of emergency. It was here that the "social ego" was invented by the psychoanalytic social sciences as something like a racist bundle of sexual interests gone astray; and it was also there that a modern state apparatus was already presumed ready and willing to engineer an alternative satisfaction of sexual needs to derail this anti-social (i.e. anti-modern) gratification in racism. From this vantage, the invention of racism invests liberal biopower with a rejuvenated scientific authority to manage the backward South—or what today would be an illiberal, unruly, and "deplorable" whiteness. Black reconstruction's project of improving the material conditions of the freedman—*reparations*—is thereby supplanted by a liberal-therapeutic program of treating the emotional health of whites—*redemption*. Racism, we said, is unlike any modern form of power. Anti-racism, on the other hand, appears in the interwar period as a burgeoning *dispositif*, as therapeutic governmentality at its most modern. It should come as no surprise, then, that a Freudian clinical method of "analysis terminable or interminable" (Freud, 1937/1964c) would not be considered strategically viable for addressing a problem in urgent need of termination, and on a public scale. Gordon Allport's candid admission on the prospect of employing psychoanalysis to address and abate prejudice is instructive on this point: "even if this [psychoanalytic] method proves to be the most effective of all methods—and because of its

depth and interrelatedness with all portions of the personality, *it should be*—the proportion of the population reached will always be small" (1954, p. 496, emphasis added).

If the psychocultural social sciences traded the subject of racism for the redeemable (white) citizen as an object for an invigorated liberal biopower, whither the black subject? More to the point, whither the black analysand? Their absent presence is a common fixture in the imaginations of the neurotics that Dollard interviewed and those patients that psychoanalysts like McLean saw in their Chicago offices, but the black subject somehow falls outside the *clinical* imaginary and the consideration of racial prejudice in which they only play the "object" in non-black fantasy, aggression, and sexual fascination. To reckon with this matter in a speculative vein, let me recite Sharpe's previous proposition about the post-slavery subject, but now in full: "while all modern subjects are post-slavery subjects fully constituted by the discursive codes of slavery and post-slavery, post-slavery subjectivity is largely *borne by and readable on* the (New World) black subject" (2010, p. 3, emphasis original). If this conveyance and legibility is due to how the New World black subject repeats and represents the "violence of history" (Sharpe, p. 121), then Sharpe designates in her New World black subject something other than a racialized subject, political identity, or social ego. This subject insists on the order of the *historical real*, as a paradox for knowledge, a limit for interpretation, and an impasse for policy.

John Dollard encountered the paradoxical nature of the New World black subject as intolerable—so much so, in fact, that his entire research program was momentarily put in jeopardy. In the preamble to *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, Dollard explains that his original intention was to *only* gather the life histories of the African American inhabitants at his research site, and to construct an anthropological and psychological understanding of caste prejudice exclusively through the "life histories" of black subjects. But he gave up a few days

after he arrived. “The lives of white and Negro people are so dynamically fixed in one system that neither can be understood without the other. The insight put an end to the plan of collecting Negro life histories in a social void” (1937, p. 1). Given the definition Freud offered in “Group Psychology”—that the subject of psychoanalysis *is* its relations, but that those relations also *create a void in the social*—we can venture that the New World black represents in an exceedingly privileged way the ruination of diagnosis, cure, and nosography, to the insurmountable resistance to the mastery of knowledge. Blackness represents the epistemology of the clinic.

CHAPTER TWO: Liberalism Without Sovereignty: Enjoyment as a Factor of Racial Subjection

> Democratic power is faced with the paradox of desire, with the fact that it has a desire not to desire (absolute power)—therefore it limits itself.
>
> Renata Salecl, *The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Ideology After the Fall* (1994, p. 96)

An Impasse in Formalization

What does situating liberalism as a structure of mind—the "self-consciousness of a class of owners of slaves or servants that was being formed as the capitalist system began to emerge and establish itself"—enable beyond mundane observations of the self-serving ignorance of power (Losurdo, 2011, p. 309)? This is the definition that Domenico Losurdo proposes after laying out the historical permutations of a "contradictory link" that traverses the liberal tradition of thought. This twist tie between emancipation and dis-emancipation is the unique symptom of the reemergence of slavery in the modern world. By his account, liberalism administers this symptom through a dialectical logic that consists, on the one hand, of a denunciation of *political* slavery (the revolt against Old World monarchical power), and on the other, of the affirmation of *black* slavery (the celebration of the enjoyment of chattel property). Because the affirmation and denunciation of slavery are isomorphic, the opposition between slavery and freedom is fully internalized: in the simplest and sufficient terms, liberalism *is* the irreconcilability of political bondage and black slavery. We are by all means on the right track to think of liberalism as a structure of mind, and particularly one that is plagued by the "paradox of desire" that the psychoanalyst Renata Salecl describes in the epigraph above—a desire not to desire slavery.

New warnings about the ascendancy of fascism in the West, prognostications of a crisis of legitimacy in multicultural democracy, and the emergence of white nationalist politics at the

populous margins of culture have made reviving Losurdo's question—What is liberalism?—doubly urgent. Adequately posing this question, however, calls for first suspending the stance that fixes liberalism (and its stepchild, neoliberalism) as the foil by which political critique, in anti-racist and feminist scholarship in particular, gets its bearings and identity. This is a maneuver perhaps nowhere more self-consciously executed than by Amanda Anderson (2016), who mines the aesthetic responses to liberalism (primarily in the twentieth century and postwar era) to rediscover a political heritage—concepts, principles, aspirations, objectives—that is, among its most systematic thinkers, soberly aware of liberalism's own bleak prospects, of the obstacles that impede the realization of its designs for political community, and of the historical challenges presented by "the intractability of liberal vices, the limits of rational argument, the exacting demands of freedom amid value pluralism, the tragedy of history, and the corruptibility of procedure" (p. 2).

If for Anderson liberalism has a tradition of tarrying with the inoperative nature of human community that is worth recovering today against political movements that would foreclose this spirit of "existential realism" (p. 17)—from the right or the left—then the feminist philosopher Denise Ferreira da Silva numbers among its most vigorous contemporary contributors (2007). Through a deep excavation of the founding statements of modern thought—from European philosophy of the early seventeenth century to today's race and ethnic studies—she tracks how racial knowledge repeatedly crowns modern consciousness as the self-determined agent of reason. Da Silva joins Anderson in her wariness of "exclusion" as an adequate descriptor for liberalism's thought and activity, tracing instead how liberalism's immanent critique of exclusion divulges race as a signifier of moral being. Liberalism thereby merges racial subjection *and* racial otherness and reduces them to signs of the incompleteness of its own political project,

while reauthorizing its own ethical mandate by obviating racial inequality and the routine murder of people of color as crises of legitimacy. By da Silva's reckoning, the essential moment in the movement of the "spirit of liberalism"—from slavery to multiculturalism—is the *incorporation* of the subaltern, which enables the modern subject to countenance the conditions of racial subjection without discarding its transcendental mantle.

The essential revision that both of these projects make is to analyze liberalism as a radical and internally conflictual discourse, but neither executes their analysis with a theory of the subject—neither, in other words, is psychoanalytic. Anderson and da Silva, among a number of recent works on liberalism that follow in their Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian footsteps (Brown, 2015; Povinelli, 2016; Mills, 2017), generate new insights into its philosophical, literary, aesthetic, natural, and legal archive but generally bypass sexuality and subjectivity as a problematic. As a consequence, the nature of sexuality or "libidinal enjoyment"—what English translations of Jacques Lacan preserve in the French as *jouissance* to distinguish it from the psychological notion of "pleasure"—does not enter as a variable in the calculations of what liberalism *is*. Psychoanalysis—and perhaps psychoanalysis alone—offers a theory of the subject based on a clinical practice that examines the historical experience of the symbolic unconscious, and that traces the topological relation between language, sexuality, and history. From the outset, then, we can hold that the Freudian field traces the operation of power beyond a set of ideological propositions (the boundaries of which are always problematically defined) and examines it instead as a structure that historicizes the subject's access to jouissance. This tradition of inquiry is uniquely capable of accounting for the diverse mixture of political ideologies that liberalism encompasses by making its object the nature of the impossibility of consolidating liberalism as a consistent ideological whole. Precisely here does a theory of the

subject make its mark: if extant approaches analyze the subject as both an effect of a discourse structure and the realization of a certain historical reason, then for psychoanalysis, the structure of discourse is itself based on the split, speaking, and "excessive subject" encountered in clinical practice as the internal opacity of historical reason (Rothenberg, 2010).

In the following, I intend to magnify these literary and historical critiques of liberalism—in Anderson's case, by preserving her careful consideration of liberalism's immanent critical negativity, while insisting that the institution of racial slavery is a part of the history of liberalism that is more complex and deeply-rooted than a shortcoming of its ideals; and in da Silva's case, by endorsing her foregrounding of racial subjection in liberalism's *longue durée* while holding that the subject of the unconscious *subverts* (without necessarily threatening) the self-determined subject of racialist philosophy. I will develop this inquiry through a kind of philosophical ethnography that reconstructs the immanent dynamics and formal logic of liberalism from the absent cause of its subject, and in turn, from the moderated relation of that subject to the object of jouissance. In the last instance, to do justice to the nature of racial subjection and the resilience of resistance requires reading the structure of liberalism not primarily as an (imaginary) ideology or (symbolic) practice, but as a (real) impasse in formalization. To this end I will conduct a combinatory reading of three historical texts of racial liberalism—the aforementioned work of the Marxist philosopher Domenico Losurdo, that of the historian of Southern slavery James Oakes, and of the black feminist theorist Saidiya Hartman—whose inquiries into the contradictions of liberalism, the problematic nature of sovereignty liberalism entails, and the role of enjoyment in racial subjection, respectively, help to reground a structural psychoanalysis of modern power. In each case, I will focus on how jouissance simultaneously disorganizes liberalism and factors into the reproduction of racial subjection. By *structural*

psychoanalysis, I am specifically drawing attention to developments in Lacanian thought in the late-1960s that combined his return to Freud with a "return to Marx." This new critical outlay developed a systematic critique of liberalism based on "an analysis of the modes by which the libidinal [i.e. jouissance] is inserted into collective actions, modes that may differ markedly from those that are at work in the clinic of the singular subject" (Holland, 2015, p. 11). By drawing out symbolic correspondences between non-Lacanian theories of racial liberalism, on the one hand, and Lacan's non-racial theory of liberalism and subjectivity, on the other, this chapter seeks to accomplish two things. First, it reconceptualizes liberal power as a symptom of black slavery and develops a new set of references for thinking the post-slavery subject of racism. Second, this chapter outlines "the/a racial signifier" as a split concept needed to read the relation of the subject of racism to the structure of liberalism, in preparation for the analyzing the postwar case history archive.

"The Uselessness of Slavery Among Ourselves"

Let us grant that liberalism has no coherent ideology—not because the philosophies that claim (or are assigned to) its heritage are so heterogeneous, but because liberalism realizes its negative essence in the conflict on and over the limits of slavery, which is only ever riddled with provisional consensuses. If this makes liberalism "a hyper-inflated, multi-faceted, body of thought—a deep reservoir of ideological contradictions" (2016, p. 71), as the political theorist Duncan Bell suggests, this cannot be attributed to some invariable need for its proponents to scramble justifications (or critiques) of the existence of slavery from within a political culture that makes individual freedom its conceptual touchstone—no. For one, the eventual racialization of Africans as a class fit for perpetual slavery historically proceeded as an *unthinking* invention,

requiring no coherent argument or doctrinal justification to initiate its practice, nor any unified ideological schema to maintain and defend it (Campbell and Oakes, 1993). Slavery is not anachronistic to liberalism because liberalism *assumes* slavery in the first and last instance. As we will see, liberalism consequently has before itself the much more ambiguous task of determining slavery's limits: of discriminating between the (black) slavery that aggrandizes the spirit of liberalism and the (political) slavery that corrodes it. Slavery is in every sense given; liberalism revolves around deciding on the nature of its extension.

Let us furthermore grant that every social structure based on such a negative essence is riven by an historical process that mediates its constitutional paradox. This process consists of the very elaboration of this division between political bondage and black slavery, of a diachronic (i.e. historical) displacement of its synchronic inconsistency. This immanent dynamics or structure-in-movement is mapped as a dialectical logic, which invokes slavery in two ways: first, it "demand[s], in the face of interference by monarchical power, peaceful enjoyment of [liberal property-owners] own possessions and servants," including human chattel (Losurdo, 2011, p. 301). Against an absolute power of some sort—the monarchy, church, aristocracy, or patriarchal sovereignty as such—liberalism demands the right to "self-government and peaceful enjoyment of its property (including that in slaves and servants), under the sign of the rule of law" (p. 309). Rather than a total freedom from coercion, this demand insists on a legal regime that installs minimal but necessary limits on freedom of others—enough to reproduce the capacity of the slaveowning community to enjoy its property (this form of governance be explored in greater detail in the next section). If this demand for regulation is the first moment of the liberal dialectic, the second turns around and constructs the very moral fiber of the liberal identity, the rhetorical treasury of its political demands, and the economic legitimacy to accumulate goods

and persons, by demanding a defense against a "pre-liberal" power that teeters on the perpetual verge of *enslaving* the slaveowning class. "In reconstructing the history of liberalism," Losurdo suggests "it is better to start with the slogan advanced by the rebel American colonists: 'We won't be their Negroes!'" (p. 301).

In this absurd slogan lies the linchpin that mediates and operationalizes liberalism's contradictory link: an identification *with* the black slave, its state of abjection, and the correlated "cause of the slave"—emancipation (Sinha, 2016). This identification with the black slave is no mere rhetorical flourish or feint but sets the contradiction of liberalism in motion: what at first appears as an untenable contradiction—the demand to enjoy slavery in the name of freedom—only "further strengthen[s] the proud self-consciousness of the community of the free" (Losurdo, p. 248). The enjoyment of slavery is the talisman that testifies both to the emancipation of the slave/owner, and to their moral distance from a tyranny from which the liberal project separates itself. That this identification subsidizes the multiplication of systematic forms of racial and economic subjection *and* a political culture "ever more intolerant of the abuses of power, the intrusions, the interference and the constraints of political power or religious authority" infuses this mode of power with its strange tenacity (p. 38). This structure of identification incorporates "the motifs and aspirations of the oppressed," a strategy of power previously attributed as the invention of a much more recent multiculturalism (Žižek, 1997, p. 30), while confirming the radical nature of liberalism that, as Anderson and da Silva contend, lies in its intolerance of exclusion. More to the point, this identification is exemplary of what Slavoj Žižek describes as the preponderant *form* of modern ideology, fetishistic disavowal: masters knew very well that they were not black, yet nevertheless, they identified and organized as slaves. Indeed, it is the incorporation of the aspirations of blackness—the spirit of fugitivity—that internalizes the

opposition between a *universal* class of free subjects and a *particular* class of excluded persons. In this process, blackness undergoes a peculiar doubling. On the one hand, the condition of the slave marks the particular identity that is abstracted and universalized into a locus of identification (and through which political tyranny is distinguished and constructed as an imminent threat); on the other, the collective enjoyment of black property consecrates the emancipation of the community of the (already) free. The detour through this object of equal enjoyment, which is created through the short-circuit between the particularity of blackness *and itself*, consummates liberalism in blackness as a *universal particularity*. It was in this context that John Adams cried that "the most abject sort of slaves" of the British crown were slaveholding American revolutionaries (as cited in Bailyn, 1967/2017, p. 233).

Enjoyment is everywhere at stake in this identification with the black slave and the object of equal enjoyment it yields. Enjoyment is not a term that Losurdo applies as a descriptor, but a conceptual touchstone in the liberal canon itself. Liberal thought, in other words, borrows (in advance) from the formal language of psychoanalysis, while psychoanalysis in turn derives (and modifies) a portion of its concepts from the liberal political culture within which it develops. The various psychoanalytic themes that describe the structure and movement of liberal thought—identification, demand, enjoyment—are unavoidable, raised out of necessity rather than selected for transcription. "Repression" is not one of these immanent concepts, and it is used by Losurdo to describe how liberalism maintains the grounding distinction *within* slavery. Whereas the political slavery that liberalism repudiates is censured in its founding documents, the black slavery it attempts to secure as a natural entitlement is repressed by an array of rhetorical mechanisms: "euphemism," "circumlocution," "linguistic interdiction," and so on. "The slavery referred to [in the liberal archive] is the one of which the absolute monarch is guilty. The other

slavery which shackles blacks," concludes Losurdo, "is passed over in silence" (Losurod, 2011, p. 9). The identification with blackness enables these repressions; or more precisely, identification is a form of zero-level repression, one that first represses nothing but the very indistinction between black and political slavery as such. Considering, then, that "the institution of slavery received its juridical and even constitutional consecration, albeit with recourse to the euphemisms and circumlocutions we are familiar with, in the state born out of the revolt of colonists determined not to be treated like 'niggers'" (p. 25), the liberal enterprise is "founded," "born," or "consecrated" by this repressive black identification. As such, the identification with blackness does not repress an actually-existing difference between black slavery and political slavery but generates their distinction on the first order. The authorization of black slavery is consequently rendered impossible, as it is only the product of the repression of its indistinction from political slavery; in contrast, political slavery is at the same time perpetually foreclosed.

Incorporated as both enjoyed object and enjoying subject, blackness creases liberalism at the center and relocates its antagonism: liberalism does not experience slavery as a contradiction to liberty and universal right, but wrestles with the *practical* consideration of "how to delimit the community of the free effectively" (Losurdo, 2011, p. 55). The limit of slavery that marks the structural origin of liberalism is thereby transposed into a boundary that is determined through the calculus of moral law. Moreover, this boundary becomes demarcated in the moral language of utilitarian reason, a principle that is already condensed in a maxim canonized in Montesquieu's 1748 *The Spirit of the Laws*. Montesquieu does not denounce slavery as such but cautions against the "uselessness of slavery among ourselves," with the plural possessive referring to the metropolitan Europe that he represented (as cited in Losurdo, p. 48). If Jacques Lacan will later declare that "jouissance is what serves no purpose" (1975/1998b, p. 3), as the

internal obstacle to utilitarian reason, an homology can be drawn between libidinal enjoyment and an excessive (political) slavery that Montesquieu's liberalism repudiates as useless. These are juxtaposed to the reasonable practice of slavery that a second of Montesquieu's dictates confirms: "Reason wants the power of the master not to extend beyond things that are of service to him; slavery must be for utility and not for voluptuousness" (as cited in Losurdo, p. 47). Slavery is unjust where it is useless; and slavery is useless when it satisfies the "voluptuousness" of sexual predilections that are not subordinated to the good of public utility. In prohibiting slavery (whether in metropolitan Europe or, in the colonies, among non-Africans), liberalism fulfills the principle function that the Lacanian notion of "discourse" performs: to both prohibit and defray enjoyment in social collectives (Verhaege, 2007).

The principle of the inadmissibility of slavery installs negation—a universal prohibition—as a lever in the structure and displacement of liberalism to mitigate the volatile effects that the identification with blackness unleashes. Every "social link" pivots on such a universal prohibition (Lacan, 1975/1998b, p. 17), albeit in this case, this negation is not equivalent to the interdiction of incest that launches the "traffic in women" and the formation of kinship, as feminist and structural anthropology of the twentieth-century has posited (Lévi-Strauss 1969; Rubin, 1975). This negation rather decrees, in a redundant motion, the abolition of slavery among the free (as with the redundant ban on incest that blocks sexual relations between kin whose symbolic identities cohere only as an effect of this prohibition). If liberalism makes the modest gesture toward abolishing or warding off slavery among "ourselves" so often, it is to stall liberalism from realizing itself *as* an undifferentiated or "generic" slavery. "The legitimation of 'slavery among ourselves,'" were it to be endorsed and the zone of abolition disbanded, "would involve the dispersion of the pathos of liberty that played a key role in the liberal demand

for self-government by civil society" (Losurdo, pp. 48-9). Without this limitation, black slavery loses its distinction from the political slavery that liberalism rejects, and against which it symbolizes its demands for freedom. Limiting *and* affirming the cause of the slave, liberal thought maintains an historically variable yet structurally indispensable gap between the black subject that it is "useless" (and prohibited) to enslave and the black object that it is "useful" (and necessary) to enjoy. Liberalism is a form of slavery that refuses to be absolute.

This symbolic formation aims to manage the problematic that jouissance presents in and to social collectives. "*The structure* [i.e. discourse] *in its totality is a protective one*," writes the analysts Paul Verhaeghe, to the extent that a discourse as Lacan defines it provides a framework and a set of symbolic stances in which the subject can articulate a safe distance from "the bliss of all-embracing jouissance in which we [i.e. subjects] would disappear" (Verhaeghe, 2001, p. 24, emphasis original). Liberalism is an historical structure to the extent that it universally prohibits political slavery and thereby provides a set of symbolic stances in which the free subject can articulate its safe distance from an "all-embracing slavery"—the immersion into which would disperse the "pathos of liberty" and evaporate the subject. Managing this volatile possibility requires liberalism to progressively dissolve an internal excess—a "voluptuousness" it both produces and transgresses—into a useful form of enjoyment, transforming it into an infrangible public good. Is not liberalism, in this sense, an apparatus that "embraces everything, even what thinks of itself as revolutionary," while at the same time, a movement which also "accomplishes its own revolution in the other sense of doing a complete circle" (Lacan, 1991/2007, p. 87)?

Liberalism's Three Impotent Masters (and One Surplus Object)

The prohibition of a useless sexuality discloses an obscure and senseless intention that possesses the rational Enlightenment subject—an attraction that liberalism abhors as useless but recognizes as a rudiment of subjectivity. At the same time, this prohibition is implemented *as if* a "full" and boundless enjoyment, a "total uselessness," is a possible achievement of social collectives. As Losurdo has shown, the weight of liberal rhetoric is thrown most passionately behind defending a cordoned space where the community of the free are able to exercise their liberty in the unrestricted, "full" use of black slaves. Yet the form of governance erected to realize this order is nowhere *more* meddlesome than in the laws, informal procedures, and regulatory codes that governed the "free" practices of slavery. These regulations, furthermore, aim not at determining the rights, obligations, and behaviors of slaves, but at dictating specific limits on the *slavemasters'* consumer conduct. "Modern or liberal liberty has been described and celebrated as the undisturbed enjoyment of private property," notes Losurdo wryly, "But slave owners were in fact subject to a whole series of public obligations" (2011, p. 97). That an elaborate structure of disciplinary mechanisms was necessary to make slavery possible indicates that slavery, understood in essence as the unrestricted enjoyment of black chattel-property, was *impossible*.

In addition to being that which is useless and serves no instrumental function, Lacan simultaneously defines jouissance as a "logical obstacle" that is derivative of the "real" and that, "in the symbolic, declares itself to be impossible" (1991/2007, p. 123). This allows the equivalence between slavery and jouissance that Montesquieu's dicta elaborated to be extended in an additional dimension—to its impossibility, its structural, formal, or real impasse. For Lacan, jouissance is a disturbance of the body that is immanent to language and arises out of the inability of any signifier to designate, for any subject, its lost, primordial, or "full" enjoyment.

This lack-of-enjoyment is experienced as "castration," but in contrast to Freud's definition of castration as a threat issued by a temporal authority (i.e. father), Lacan establishes castration as a "structural operator," an irreducibility of language, that alienates every speaking-being. "Castration as the statement of a prohibition"—or the deprivation instituted by the authority of a particular social order—"*can in any case only be founded at a second moment*" (p. 125, emphasis added). The historical renunciation of full enjoyment—or, as we can put it, the relinquishment of the "essence" of slavery—therefore proceeds *as if* its temporal attainment were possible. This renunciation is codified in a logically "second moment," creating thereby what Lacan calls a "vast social connivance" between necessity and contingency, between language and politics (p. 78). By prohibiting jouissance, it is symbolized; by symbolizing it, a discourse makes jouissance accessible as a lost and enervated quantity. Let me suggest that the renunciation of the impossible is the primary lever of liberal subjectivation. Its political and affective efficacy lies in an impotent but conniving sovereignty that prohibits the essence of black slavery that it itself is structurally incapable of securing.

Putting aside any remaining doubts, the historian James Oakes holds without equivocation that, the southern United States was the New World slave society most powerfully shaped by liberalism (1990/1998, p. 62). By shifting now from the theoretical aporia of liberalism (Losurdo) to its practical contradictions (Oakes), we will seek to isolate the complex nature of sovereignty in relation to jouissance under slavery, which hinges on a collusion between the (structural) impossibility and (political) renunciation of racial enjoyment. Through an overview of court cases, slave codes, and personal correspondences among plantation owners, Oakes examines the practical impossibility of realizing black slavery in liberal capitalism. He does this principally by drawing out the paradox of a system that increasingly issues regulations

and restrictions on the activity of the "free" the more that the law affirms the political legitimacy of black captivity. Most salient is the paradox arising between the mutually necessary but incompatible entities of the liberal state and the slaveowning class. The state must, at minimum, delimit the community of the free by restricting who can be enslaved (and limiting who can be freed), while the essence of slavery consists of the unrestricted power of a master to do what he wishes with his (or her) slaves. The slave, in turn, is by definition subtracted from the universal dispensation of rights, and therefore cannot have their claims to legal personhood recognized by the state in its arbitration of the relations between the free and non-free. An ambiguity consequently shrouds the relation of the slave who owes total subordination to a "sovereign" owner-subject who themselves owe allegiance to the state on which they rely to formally and informally secure slavery's material reproduction.

The state is further tasked with adjudicating a proliferating series of rules and codes of conduct that determine the "minimum standards of humane treatment" by which slaveowners were required to abide—both to grease the gears of everyday subjection, and to reduce premature death (asset loss), insubordination, and open revolt among slaves (Oakes, 1990/1998, p. 157). The political bloc that sought to represent the slave power, in legislating these regulations, implicitly betrayed the (impossible) essence of slavery. While the "discipline imposed on masters by the law of slavery was, at least in part, *self-discipline*" (p. 158) because of their authorship of its legislation, the ambiguity of the liberal state that both secures and undermines slavery—as well as the superconductivity of the liberal discourse that both embraces and denounces slavery—continually threatened to engulf the slavemasters' ambiguous sovereignty. Indeed, the rules of engagement that codified the everyday practices between masters and slaves were themselves the product of a conflict between the free and the unfree, acting as informally

contractual parties. Slavemasters routinely limited the cruelty of their conduct and curbed the extent of their demands for work—these were precisely concessions granted to slaves who demanded improved conditions of treatment and systematically resisted the violations of their bodies, lives, and families. The conceit of the slaveholders' "self-restrictions" masked black political agency and reified historical "patterns of accommodation" (pp. 146-7). Where and when slaves' resistance sought to extract new concessions, and when those resistances jumped the boundaries of informal arrangement to solicit legal arbitration, the sovereignty of the slavemaster plunged into a renewed ambiguity. Liberalism renders the "jurisprudence of slavery intrinsically subversive" because it "was all but impossible for a liberal political culture to place limits on the masters' power without implicitly granting rights to slaves" (p. 159). To grant slaves rights, in turn, interferes with the master's right to enjoy his possessions free from intervention. The legal apparatus responsible for organizing the enjoyment of the slaveholding class therefore has the paradoxical effect of extinguishing the "essence of slavery" whenever and wherever it works to secure its reproduction.

The historian Moses Finley concluded that the southern United States and the Caribbean were the only two modern "slave societies" (1980). Yet practically, a liberal slave society cannot exist. Rights to liberty and property that codified the "emancipation" of the citizen from the state never included the direct right to black slavery, as the law only ever "declares those rules [i.e. rights] irrelevant to the slaves themselves" (pp. 56-7). Because "no society can be built on a body of law whose purpose is to negate society itself," slavery cannot ground a social collective: slavery is both the obstacle to the realization of liberalism and its condition of possibility. Paradoxically, the legal apparatus designed to ensure what Saidiya Hartman, in the next section,

will call the "full enjoyment of the slave as thing" involves installing a limit to "full enjoyment" (1997, p. 86).

Of the bevy of legal mechanisms that disciplined and punished the conduct of delinquent slaveholders, one in particular stands out as suggesting the functional continuity between an "inhumane" slavery and the surplus enjoyment that discourse universally prohibits. Slaveowners who mistreated their slaves, who enjoyed their property "beyond the law," faced having their slaves expropriated by the state and resold to another, more humane master (Oakes, 1990/1998, p. 158). The mitigation of libidinal *envy*—the affect designating a sexual aggression against an other's excessive enjoyment, the prohibition of which Freud hypothesized formed the basis for the *esprit de corps* of modern social collectives (1921/1955e, p. 120)—dictates the grammar of this particular regulation. In enforcing this practice of expropriating and redistributing maltreated slaves, the state exhibits what Lacan furthermore calls the very "essence of law—to divide up, distribute, or reattribute everything that counts as jouissance" (1975/1998b, p. 3). A surplus enjoyment—in this case, the *inhumanized slave*—disappears precisely where it has been parceled up, positioning liberal discourse at the intersection of a universal prohibition *and* collective redistribution of a "useless" jouissance.

If we can now indicate that *state power* structurally infringed on the *slaveholding power* out of a mutual necessity (even if slaveowners imaginarily recouped their agency by claiming authorship over the "humane" restrictions imposed on their exercise of liberty), there lurks behind them a third and *headless* master who is inextricable from racial liberalism: *capitalist power*. For Oakes, "what made slavery *southern* was precisely its intersection with the world beyond the South" (1990/1998, p. 42, emphasis original). In contrast to ancient slavery, "New World slavery was itself the servant of the driving force of capitalism" (p. 52). Oakes continues:

"the slave's subordination to the master was total, yet the *masters had masters of their own*"—the abyssal drive of capital—"and they loom in the slaveholders' letters and diaries, ominously but invisibly, like the bondsmen whose personalities are rarely mentioned but whose presence is always felt" (p. 54, emphasis in original). Slavery would be inoperable without capitalism, yet property-holders are simultaneously subject to the demands of a logic of accumulation over which they exercise no control: "the slaveholders needed capitalism far more than capitalism needed the slaveholders. Modern slave societies had come into existence to serve capitalism; they could not survive without capitalism; they went to their graves at the behest of capitalism" (p. 56). Capital, like slavery, *does not* ground a society and undoes the social collective while progressively isolating subjects in narcissistic relations with objects of libidinal enjoyment (i.e. commodities) to the *exclusion* of social attachments (Declercq, 2006). At the same time, as Oakes has also shown, the objects of this political economy—the black slaves themselves—resist the market's rationalizing processes (as embodied in the slavemaster as its impotent emissary), and thus obstruct in turn the realization of capitalism.

Liberal discourse produces these three impotent "masters": the slaveowner, the state, and the drive of capital—and between them, the surplus object of the slave. The peculiarity of this object lies in its absolute capacity to decapitate mastery without thereby accumulating or holding sovereign power: it is a surplus-object that the slaveowner cannot abuse with impunity, that the state cannot invest with rights without subverting slavery, and that capital cannot subordinate to the rationality of exploitation. Rather than appoint one of these masters as liberalism's "base" that reigns sovereign over its derivative superstructures, we can suppose that liberal power sustains racial subjection precisely out of this *knot of unsovereignties*.

Usufruct

The preceding considerations have brought a certain history of liberalism to light that still appears as a structure or history without a subject. In other words, Losurdo and Oakes diagram how liberalism reproduces itself as the negation and preservation of slavery, and how its mode of governance generates a set of laws, practices, and a moral framework that impedes the realization of liberal discourse from the inside. What this outline would still suggest is that jouissance—as an unreasonable voluptuousness, excessive uselessness, or procedural impossibility—is efficiently dissipated by the "vast social connivance" that liberalism employs (both in theory and practice) to quarantine slavery's structuring excess. In this mode of presentation, liberalism risks becoming dehistoricized as airtight and inevitable, and misappraised as providing laws that procure "symbolic stances" that do not pose for the subject any "crisis of investiture"—this crisis is what Eric Santner identifies as an insurmountable product of the *signifying stress* or sexual drive that disorders every attempt by the subject to conform to or embody a social position (Santner, 2011). As Joan Copjec also points out, the subject of the unconscious is for this reason an *effect* but never the *realization* of an historical discourse (1994/2015). The identity and difference between the unsovereign nature of liberalism and the "sovereign incalculability" (ibid., p. 208) of the sexual subject that subverts it remains to be elaborated. Since liberalism does not dictate an essential or invariant form of political community, but produces an historically-specific form of access to enjoyment, this subject remains one of its *underdetermined* effects—an effect, that is, of the inability of the discourse structure to *either* provide a full satisfaction (i.e. total enjoyment of slavery, free from all outside interference) *or* eliminate jouissance entirely through the inscription of enjoyment into a self-contained symbolic framework (Lacan, 1991/2007, pp. 18-20). It is the latter which now

demands our attention: How does the subject manage the racialized sexuality "beyond the pleasure principle" that liberalism cannot metabolize?

It is to this question that Saidiya Hartman turns in her analysis of the imaginary schemas and quotidian practices of enjoyment that soldered the reproduction of racial subjection in the nineteenth-century United States. Her innovation is to foreground the *abolitionist* as the paradigm of slavery and make the subject of the unconscious the basis of an analysis of liberal discourse. In opening *Scenes of Subjection* (1997) with a close reading of an 1822 correspondence between the abolitionist John Rankin and his brother—in which Rankin relays the lurid details of a slave coffle he witnessed passing through the Kentucky countryside—Hartman teases out the pivotal but precarious nature of the abolitionist's "empathic identification" with the black slave. That empathy, Hartman argues, involves a projection of Rankin's own body in the place of the slave's to experience "firsthand" the horrors of the institution and consequently to present the horror of that pain as a testament to slavery's ethical bankruptcy. Rather than laud this maneuver as a risk to racial reason, Hartman issues a cautionary evaluation: if, for the abolitionist, "pain [is] the conduit of identification," the representation of pain obliterates the "otherness" of the slave. Through the intersubjective substitution that replaces his feelings for those of the figural slave, empathy *masks* the very suffering he designs to condemn (pp. 17-23).

If the "repressive effects of empathy" camouflage, for the abolitionist, the unbearable horror of slavery (in the process of denouncing it), then the happiness and contentment that slave owners routinely imputed to their chattel property similarly served to dissimulate the quotidian nature of violence (in the process of defending it). Through this imaginary double masking—of the horrors of pain and violence—the projective and identificatory strategies of the abolitionist

and pro-slavery subjects find a point of convergence: for each, enjoyment disavows. These two approaches to empathic identification, moreover, created the "qualities of affect distinctive to the economy of slavery"—joy, desire, pleasure, terror, and the many passions that the black body excited as a "locus of excess enjoyment" (p. 21). For Hartman, this last factor, the excess enjoyment of the black body, holds a privileged yet paradoxical status within the affective economy of captivity. For the abolitionist, the projective identification with the slave dissimulates the unrepresentable horror of slavery in an imaginary substitution of bodies that is itself experienced as pleasurable. For the slaveowner, the projection *of* enjoyment onto the slave shields his conscience from the knowledge of violence. Hartman hereby shifts the burden of proof for the existence of racial subjection away from exclusively economic, philosophical, aesthetic, or legal apparatuses: "From the vantage point of the everyday relations of slavery, enjoyment, broadly speaking, defined the parameters of racial relations" (p. 23)—then and now.

As a fundamental concept in psychoanalytic theory and practice, *jouissance* also departs from economic, philosophical, aesthetic, and legal definitions of enjoyment. But to what extent do Losurdo, Oakes, and Hartman verify or diverge from the notion of enjoyment as defined by the analytic experience? For Losurdo, enjoyment is how the philosophical imagination of the liberal tradition renders access to the good, which is realized (if only in theory) in the exercise of the principle of abstract right: "every individual's equal enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty [was] guaranteed by law" (2011, pp. 105-6). Undisturbed enjoyment was not only a component part of the liberal conception of freedom, but the unjustified limitation of enjoyment was a component part of the liberal conception of slavery. For Oakes, on the other hand, rights were not just the means, but themselves the ends of enjoyment that all free persons (if only in theory) "enjoyed" equal access to, and to which slaves were constitutively exempted. In liberal ideology,

"freedom—the enjoyment of rights—was only possible in society," and that society was not one in which slaves existed as legitimate personalities (1990/1998, p. 63). For both Losurdo and Oakes, the analysis of enjoyment is limited to its function as a legal, philosophical, and thus ideological notion; it plays no independent part in a theory of language or as a dimension of historical subjectivity. What Losurdo and Oakes indicate instead is how liberal discourse distributes and eliminates excess enjoyment as the alternating means and ends of a utilitarian moral economy.

Hartman parts with this treatment of enjoyment as a philosophical idiom by focusing instead on the objective function jouissance performs in the unconscious of everyday practice. She anchors her definition in the nomenclature of political economy: enjoyment accrues in the economy of interest, possession, and property entangled in the everyday practices of racial subjection. She outlines her definition by drawing on *Black's Law Dictionary* and the *Oxford English Dictionary*, where "enjoy" has a verbal function: to have, to use with satisfaction, to benefit from, to profit from, to occupy, to have sexual intercourse with, to exercise a right, and to take delight in the captive body in which a legal, political, and/or existential title is held. This legal definition, enmeshed in the language of contract, means, and ends, leads enjoyment to be described as that which is "attributed to the slave in order to deny, displace, and minimize the violence of slavery" (1997, p. 25). Enjoyment's final and determining verb-form is therefore "*to disavow*," to suspend an inconvenient reality and to gain from an alternative one.[7] Whereas the pro-slavery ideologue projects pleasure onto the captive body in order to enjoy the fruits of slavery, the anti-slavery agitator would disavow slavery by enjoying the very process of

[7] Hartman specifically cites Deleuze's definition of disavowal: "an operation that consists in neither negating nor even destroying, but rather in radically contesting the validity of that which is; it suspends belief in and neutralizes the given in such a way that a new horizon opens up beyond the given and in place of it" (as cited in Hartman, 1997, p. 213n63; see also Deleuze, 1967/1991).

"entering into" and identifying with the captive body's pain. For Hartman, then, enjoyment is conceptually consolidated as the *use* of a thing, the gain-in-pleasure derivative of such a use, or simply the opposite of a lack-of-enjoyment. If this utilitarian gloss is insufficient for rendering the complexity of the (abolitionist) subjectivity involved in this scene, it is because Hartman defines enjoyment as the opposite of pain, trauma, and the absence of enjoyment. In other words, this notion of enjoyment is never excessive—it can be handled, used, possessed, exchanged, and spent to maximize the subject's sovereign good.

In contrast, Lacan takes advantage of the equivocations of the language of law to describe jouissance apropos the civil law feature of "usufruct," which he contends enables the difference between "utility" and the psychoanalytic understanding of jouissance to be illustrated. Usufruct "means that you can enjoy (*jouir de*) your means, *but must not waste them*" (1975/1998b, p. 3, emphasis added); it is "the right of enjoying a thing, *the property of which is vested in another*, and to draw from the same all the profit, utility, and advantage which it may produce, provided it be without altering the substance of the thing" (*Black's Law Dictionary*). Usufruct designates a form of enjoyment that *excludes* ownership, that is in fact dispossessive, and precludes the qualities of mastery, full disposal, and exchangeability. The feminist psychoanalytic theorist Jane Gallop intellects that this turns the logic of political economy on its head: jouissance as a type of usufruct approximates a "useless use-value" in excess of any exchange-value, and thus stands apart from the logic of commodification (1982, pp. 49-50). Jouissance comprises a "thing" subtracted from exchange and acts as a common inheritance that a discourse universally *prohibits* from being exhausted, spent, or "used (up)." Usufruct exhibits "the reservation implied by the field of the right-to-jouissance. Right (*droit*) is not duty. Nothing forces anyone to enjoy (*jouir*) except the superego. The superego is the imperative of jouissance—enjoy!" (Lacan, p.

1975/1998b, p. 3). The difference between the right to enjoy property (in slaves or other commodities) and this obscure *duty* to enjoy is the discovery that Lacan calls the "turning point investigated by analytic discourse" (ibid.). The critical point for our own inquiry becomes: what structural agency issues the excessive imperative to enjoy blackness?

Magnifying the problematic nature of jouissance, Hartman turns to Marx's writings on the commodity-form to argue that the abolitionist's empathic identification is immanently solicited by the enjoyable properties inherent in the fungibility of the captive body and the economic forms of racial subjection: "the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery" (Hartman, 1997, p. 21). If enjoyment and economic practice are inextricable, as Hartman argues, exchange and accumulation do not exhaust its processes either. Fungibility (i.e. exchangeability) remains an essential feature of possession and property, but it is *inimical* to the "useless use-value" of jouissance, which can be neither exchanged nor stockpiled. The commodification of the black body, in other words, *defends* against jouissance, making exchange a feature of the economization of libidinal enjoyment, of the conversion of that corrosiveness surplus jouissance that undermines the social link into a social value-form—"cut up" and distributed into an imaginary economy of pain and pleasure. The proper analogue to the jouissance of racial subjection resides not, then in the commodity form directly, but rather in the (sexual-libidinal) body. In the Marxian analysis, the commodification of labor in the capitalist mode of accumulation always stops short of using up the *libidinal (real) body*, of consuming the worker's "flesh and bones" which are figured as the "useless appendix" of useful labor power (Bianchi, 2012). Capital prevents itself from consuming and commodifying the useless residues of the laboring body to subordinate the excess

of jouissance into the process of excess production. Capitalism is a form of cannibalism that refuses to be absolute.

Back once more to Hartman, who holds that the abolitionist's pleasurable and disavowing identification with the slave confirms the strategic value of the "investment in and obsession with 'black enjoyment'… [as] part of a larger effort to dissimulate the extreme violence of the institution and disavow the pain of captivity" (1997, p. 23). Yet if "extreme violence" and the "pain of captivity" are the problems that empathy resolves, this begs the question: What anthropological postulate endows the subject with a natural aversion to violence (to the other)? What psychology understands the subject as a rational and economizing, pleasure-seeking and pain-averse creature? And what explains the obscure imperative that compels the abolitionist—at the scene of subjection—to efface and replace the reality of a violence that is itself already unrepresentable? "Such cruelty," wrote John Rankin himself, "[already] far exceeds the powers of description" (1833, p. 37). Nevertheless Rankin finds himself compelled to describe and represent this cruelty in endless detail.

Analytic experience suspends these anthropological postulates and theorizes a subject within *and* beyond representation. When Hartman—and those analyzing the paradoxes of racial liberalism in the widest sense—describes "enjoyment" as a factor of racial subjection, it is in fact the negation of libidinal enjoyment—the pleasure (and pain) that *limits* jouissance—that is described, and its constitutive excess that remains conceptually unaccounted for. If Hartman is right that "enjoyment defined the *relation* of the dominant race to the enslaved" (1997, p. 23), then a psychoanalysis of racial slavery begins with the proposition that jouissance makes the representation of any (sexual) relation impossible. Relations of racial power are precluded by the jouissance that liberalism produces, but that it also incompletely economizes, and thus fails to

fully bind. This is the problematic that black slavery's universal abolition in the late nineteenth century exacerbates, issuing the vicissitudes of (un)sovereignty that condition the crisis of investiture of the subject of racism in post-slavery society.

From "the" Racial Signifier…

With the aid of retrospection, liberalism can be fictionalized into a sequence of three radical turns. Each restructures the discourse by displacing its central contradiction and sublating its ontological crisis to a subsequent plane. "Almost a century after its first turn [i.e. the condemnation of slavery among the free], the liberal world underwent a second: now condemnation of hereditary slavery *as such* was dictated as a constitutive element in its identity" (Losurdo, 2011, p. 322, emphasis added). This late-nineteenth-century progression extends the constitutional immunity to slavery from the "free" to the "unfree." Strictly within the governing logic of liberal discourse, this paradoxical object—the "unfree" incorporated into the zone of abolition that its exclusion consolidates—assumes the status of *the racial*. The burden of racial blackness consists then of not only symbolizing or "naturalizing the major incident of slavery" (Hartman, 1997, p. 191), but of inscribing its foreclosure. As such, the racial does "not directly produce new significations but…instead mark[s] the presence, within language, of an essential impasse in and resistance to signification" (Pluth, 2007c, p. 106). The features of this inscriptive mark will be outlined in what follows.

Now, the third and contemporary revolution of liberalism is only consummated during the Civil Rights Movement and against the backdrop of the Cold War. For the first time, the "principle of racial equality became a constitutive element in liberal identity" (Losurdo, 2011, p. 322). Between the second paradigm and this third course, liberalism expands from a renunciation

of the uselessness of slavery as such, to the *universal prohibition of the uselessness of racism*. "Racism," as a signifier incorporated in this governing logic, functions expressly as an antonym of racial equality.[8] In short order, then, racism or racial inequality (these terms being algebraically interchangeable) would lie both outside the bounds of liberal discourse and within its ambit as a generative obstacle for Euro-American hegemony (cf. Melamed, 2011).

What makes this third reconsolidation revolutionary in both name and substance—beyond the remarkable force of the popular revolts that exhausted the preceding post-slavery paradigm—is that it aims to nullify and preserve the racial at once. Rather than exterminate the paradoxical placeholder that marks the final expiry of slavery, the anti-racism *dispositif* targets the racial to drain it of its historicity, to (de)aestheticize blackness into a mute and insignificant icon. Within the new governing terms of liberal discourse, then, racial equality (i.e. the eradication of racism) acts as a synonym for the dilution of the racial into a *difference devoid of intrinsic meaning*. These words belong to the French psychanalyst and critic of colonialism, Octave Mannoni, from his critique of the postwar normalization of anti-racism, which he charges with saddling racism with a new "white man's burden" of representing the limits of (political) representation:

> It is as though the meeting between black and white, far from being an encounter between two 'undifferentiated men,' were a distillation of the difference between them—a difference devoid of any intrinsic meaning—which becomes the symbol, at once obvious and absurd, of what goes wrong in human relations, and also, so far as we ourselves are concerned, of what goes wrong in the white world. (1966, p. 333)

To eliminate the senseless dimension to racism is in these terms strictly impossible. Racism functions as an irreducible otherness that obstructs liberal discourse from within, that frustrates

[8] Article 2, Section 2 of the United Nations Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, adopted on 27 November 1978 as an expansion of the anti-racist principles outlined in the Preamble to the original 1945 UNESCO charter, reads in part: "Racism includes racist ideologies, prejudiced attitudes, discriminatory behaviour, structural arrangements and institutionalized practices resulting in racial inequality." For the full text see Lerner (1980).

the sexual (i.e. "human") relation, that localizes jouissance as the excess of the post-Civil Rights era—and that condenses the impossibility against which liberalism leverages the ban that reconstitutes its discourse. If the intellectual, political, and social movements of the 1950s and 1960s forced racism to be reckoned with as a pathogen of (and threat to) Western democracy, its symbolic correspondence with jouissance consolidated the discursive status of racism as incipient of a crisis of legitimacy. If anti-racism voids the distillate symbol of the racial of its political significance, ontological inconsistency, or structural antagonism, racism emerges primarily as a problem in the field of sovereignty, which Santner grasps as the logic through which "early modern and modern societies have attempted to organize, manage, and administer" the excessive quality of the libidinal (2011, p. xx). It will be the task of the rest of this chapter to advance a theory of the subject that can show how the liberal logic of sovereignty is both driven and impeded by the alloying of "racism" and jouissance.

Two studies from the fields of critical sociology and literary criticism, respectively, provide critical handrails for accounting for the repetition of the racial amidst the third turn of liberalism. To draw a tighter circle around the contemporary problematic of enjoyment, the following analysis will infer the *racial signifier* as a necessary concept for understanding the form and function of racism in the Civil Rights and post-Civil Rights clinic. I will argue that the racial signifier marks a difference that is *objectively devoid of meaning*, and that anti-racism's injunction to drain the racial of political significance is both superfluous and the real point of connivance between the political and the field of language. This signifier divests sovereignty without possessing it, impedes power without sharing in it, and realizes autonomy without constituting it. In turn, the racial signifier acts as an empty point through which the liberal

impasse in formalization is inscribed and transmitted to the subject of racism—causing (without determining) subjectivity.

The strange agency of this racial signifier—perhaps more "absurd" and less "obvious" than what Mannoni called the symbol "of what goes wrong in human relations"—forms a complex between language, jouissance, and the sexual body. The racial signifier in this way situates the libidinal as a factor of racial subjection, which the philosophical ethnography at the beginning of this chapter indicated as being infrastructural to the flywheel that revolves the liberal structure. This concept takes stock of the historical variability *and* uncanny intransigence of racism, which is irreducible to an ideology and the critique thereof (Oakes and Campbell have already indicated the contingency and retroactivity of racialization to racial slavery). Even if this racial signifier does not define racism with primary reference to the multiple "American attitudes toward the Negro" (Jordan, 1968/2012), its existence is all the same a necessary precondition for the promulgation of such racial knowledge and sentiment, in whatever form.

In their coauthored opus, the anthropologist and historian duo Karen E. Fields and Barbara J. Fields introduce *racecraft* as a legend for mapping the "mental terrain" that reproduces the everyday salience of race. Racecraft attempts to explain the race-concept's political and ideological resilience despite having its metaphysical moorings regularly cut in the domains of scientific discourse and critical commentary for at least a century. Rather than focus on the ideological content of racial thought (theological, economic, biological, cultural, or otherwise), racecraft names a mental process and "social alchemy" (2012, p. 261)—unthinking but not unreasonable—that inverts the polarity between racism (as cause) and race (as effect). In language that recalls the temporality of the unconscious as well as the logic of commodity fetishism, the Fields describe how a belief in the concept of race is thoroughly practical: both in

the sense of arising out of individuals' collective participation in the practices of racism, and in the sense of being a useful belief for codifying and making sense out of those relations of power. Racist practice encompasses both the micropolitics of public and private subjection that assume race as a premeditated fact, *and* the normative habits of social reproduction that conjure and regenerate a range of race-concepts *as needed*, and *as if* they existed. Racial concepts are not, however, exhausted by the function they play as a rationale or motivation for racist action: they are objectively unmoored and relatively independent from the practices that gestate their appearance. Emerging as part of the "descriptive vocabulary of day-to-day existence through which people make rough sense of the social reality that they live and create" (p. 134), these race-concepts are abstract valence signifiers capable of bonding into any number of personal or collective, lay or scientific, marginal or popular formations of racial sense. Whereas prejudice is usually thought to consist of a subjective distortion of the objective absence of race, the Fields employ racecraft to describe race as the product of a "real" or objective dialectic between racist action and imagination: a dynamic process of imagination "realized" in social practice, and of social practice "re-realized" in the racial imagination. Racecraft "acquires perfectly adequate moving parts when a person acts upon the reality of the imagined thing; the real action creates evidence of the imagined thing" (p. 22). Race not only grounds racism after the fact; in the daily practice of ideology, race obtains the objective appearance of causing racism, even standing in for racism itself. We see here that the *form* of race is an unknowing knowledge and process of reason at work in the quotidian workings of social reproduction before it becomes a *content* for thought—race is a knowledge that speaks by itself.[9]

[9] "Knowledge…is something spoken, something that is said. Well then, knowledge that speaks all by itself—that's the unconscious" (Lacan, 1991/2007, p. 70).

Racecraft explains the historical mechanism that reproduces race-concepts, but it does not situate the subject effected by this form of knowledge—whence the "real action" that the Fields presume as the catalyst of racism and the subject of racecraft? What causes the dialectic between imagination and practice? When racial inequality is understood as a "perfectly adequate" self-powered structure, comprised of mechanical actions looped in an imaginary and symbolic circuit that mutually cause each other, subjectivity is untenably demoted to the status of cog. Not only does historical change itself lose any conceptual provision, but racism cannot rightfully claim the title of first-mover in a perpetual motion machine. This immediately raises questions about the structural cause of the profusion of multiple and conflicting racial ideologies. Why indeed does *one* concept of race not suffice, and why indeed do its multiplying and conflicting idioms not short-circuit race's signifying salience? What animates the dialectic that knots racist action and imagination *and* unsettles their sedimentation in a covalent bond? The mass production of racial idioms that the Fields canvass—spanning the ad hoc to the most formally developed, from slavery to the present—correctly shows race to be a *necessary* conceptual product of racial capital, but it also indicates that racial capital does not produce any *specific* doctrine of race—if at all. We can therefore conclude that no *particular* or *essential* set of positive, negative, or neutral associations qualify the conceptuality of race and/or racial difference.

This profusion of conflicting racial idioms is strictly equivalent to the non-identity of the race-concept with itself. Toni Morrison distills this fact in surveying the "Africanist presence" within the literary canon as it emerged in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth-century United States. She traces the metaphorical plasticity and expansive denotative and connotative properties that racial blackness (and the production of racial meaning more broadly) plays within this canon and examines how an African American otherness—whether explicit or shrouded in

silence and evasion—serves as a metaphoric switch for expressing a wide range of themes and "narrative gearshifts." The dynamism of the literary canon relies on blackness' signifying viscosity. It leans on "Images of blackness [that] can be evil *and* protective, rebellious *and* forgiving, fearful *and* desirable—all of the self-contradictory features of the self" (1993, p. 59, emphasis original). Blackness serves as a referent or point of reflection that grounds the American canon as a coherent and identifiable entity; that canon, once cohered as such, then lends signifying stability to a battery of tropes including freedom, slavery, economy, progress, god, nationhood, authority, and absolute power. Uninterested in classifying writings from Edgar Allen Poe, Ralph Waldo Emerson, or Ernest Hemingway as "racist," Morrison searches instead for how the "the racial" "ignites and informs the literary imagination" (p. 8) and amasses a national (which is to say New World, and ultimately global) treasury of signifying material. Like Barbara and Karen Fields, Morrison tethers this racial metaphor back to its source material in the contemporaneous practice of racial slavery, finding in the ubiquitous existence of bonded black bodies the cause and condition of the modern literary imagination: there is no writing, she contends, that is not racial

> in a country in which there was a resident population, already black, upon which the imagination could play; through which historical, moral, metaphysical, and social fears, problems, and dichotomies could be articulated. The slave population, it could be and was assumed, offered itself up as surrogate selves for meditation on problems of human freedom, its lure and elusiveness… in terms other than the abstractions of human potential and the rights of man. (pp. 37-8)

The Africanist presence is, by Morrison's reading, a *necessary and unavoidable* force in American literature, even (or especially) in the absence of explicitly racial themes or characters.

Morrison outlines this "Africanist presence" not just to make a point about the thoroughly multiracial character of modern writing, but to attribute to the "presence of an African population," as mediated by the literary and the textual lattice of an early imagined community,

"potent and ego-reinforcing" capacities—a fulcrum for defining, displacing, and reforming the ego (p. 45). Now, Morrison graphs the literary laws that govern race as an unconscious knowledge, but in a fashion similar to the deadlock that the Fields encounter, Morrison does not account for what brings blackness, as a signified and as a "presence," into existence. Whence the procedure that produces a population "already black," constituted, ready, and available (these are Morrison's words) for the literary imagination to condense and displace? This relation between the slave (as a signified) and blackness (as a signifier) is the centerpiece of Morrison's notion of surrogacy, just as Morrison's notion of surrogacy grounds Hartman's analysis of racial practice and fungibility (above), particularly when Hartman explains how the black body in pain provides a vessel for John Rankin's literary flights of imagination. In both cases, the black body is endowed with preternatural powers to signify anything for the (sovereign) eye of its beholder. Reflecting this same error, for the Fields, race is a "language of consciousness" that emerges from the interpretation of daily practices that functions as an innate fount of knowledge, as a sense ready for the making. All three—Morrison, Hartman, and the Fields—attribute to the imagination a vital capacity for inventing and repeating racial sense.

Nevertheless, we must note that race's inter- and intra-conceptual inconsistencies—the non-identity among racial ideologies and the division within the race concept itself—are coaxial. What limits this double discovery is the failure to raise a logical prerequisite to the level of theoretical concern. Namely, in the overlap between the Fields' and Morrison's inquiries, we can derive a basic and necessary postulate: If race grounds a number of externally contradictory knowledge formations (Fields), and if race is also polyvalent to the point of internal contradiction (Morrison), then race has *less* than no inherent meaning—the racial first signifies *nothing*. Further, if race does not settle on any specific historical meaning but performs only

signifying difference *as such*, the meaningless nature of this repetition of the racial—the fact that it *does not cease to exist*—is isomorphic with the racial signifier that signifies nothing.

This profusion points to a source ex-centric to speech and beyond the realm of communication: the racial is the product of the Other. Now the Other—the total structure of the signifying system that Freud described as the unconscious, which is "external" and thus inherently invasive of subjectivity—has an essential relation to the racial through a process that is distinct from the accounts given in the respective theories of literary imagination and racecraft. Toni Morrison and Barbara and Karen Fields hold that race is always replete with one signification or another: either as a *sign* that obtains its meaning in an object (i.e. the black body), or as a *trace* that is abstracted from its referent in the ordinary course of social reproduction (i.e. racist practice). Yet more precisely, that signifying element which is repeated but does not communicate a message or refer to a meaning is not a sign—it is a signifier. Unlike a symbol, a signifier does not represent an object, thing, or area of meaning, but refers to another signifier (as another absence of meaning). Elevating the (nonrepresentational) signifier-to-signifier relation to this level of primacy is foreign to Saussurean linguistics, which holds that the production of meaning takes place when symbols are paired with pre-constituted objects in reality. To presume this pre-constituted (racial) object is precisely to naturalize race, even if the language of linguistics is non-biological. It is for this reason that the racial signifier must be read as itself productive of the signified (i.e. meaning). Further, because each signifier is alone meaningless, the signified is not the product of any single signifier in a one-to-one relation but is developed through and within the totality of the signifying system—the Other. "The signifier does not designate what is not there, it engenders it," observes Lacan—and "what is not there at the origin is the subject itself" (1966-7, p. 7). The (racial) signifier therefore engenders the

subject; it does not determine or fully represent this subject of racism but, in signifying nothing, causes it to emerge as a *missing origin*.

…To "a" Racial Signifier

What distinguishes the racial signifier from any other part of the signifying system? Let me note right away that this conceptualization of the racial signifier is designed to be modest: it strives to explain less, not more; to reduce interpretation, not fashion a critical skeleton key. Necessity is the mother of theoretical modesty. This notion is designed to match the minimal (but no less essential) function that the racial signifier performs in the "real" of the liberal structure. And that racial signifier has a very limited task: to mark an irreducible difference within liberalism that objectifies its constitutive impasse in formalization.

A number of conclusions follow. First, the repetition of the racial signifier is not an epiphenomenon of the social reproduction and material practices of racial capitalism; rather, the racial signifier is caught in a cycle of repetition because the liberal impasse in formalization presents an obstacle to signification. Because the racial signifier can by definition never convey or signify this real impasse, it represents and embalms a crisis of (political) representation. Second, because the racial signifier both preserves and displaces the impossibility of liberalism—which today operates under the anti-racism *dispositif*—the existence of the racial signifier is overdetermined by the totality of the signifying system (i.e. Other) of which it is a part. Inversely, and for that reason, the coherence of prejudice, racialization, or the subject are underdetermined by the racial signifier that causes them. Third, the racial signifier has the dual character of being both autonomous from liberalism and subordinate to it. On the one hand, it sovereignly causes the subject of racism, decapitating its pretensions to a transcendental agency;

on the other hand, the racial signifier is entirely subordinated to the totality of the signifying chain that it is pressed into service to represent. Fourth, owing to its adversarial relationship to representation, the signifier can never be fully integrated, articulated, or signified by the subject of racism that it causes (i.e. the subject that the signifier represents for all other signifiers). Each subject therefore has, by way of its "origin" in the racial signifier, a necessary relation to the impossibility of the coherence of liberalism. Because that relation is not a form of determination, the subject is prevented from securing its self-representation. Because the racial signifier imparts a deficiency of sense, the subject is constituted in and as a surplus of meaning.

Fifth and finally, the impasse in formalization that defines liberalism is strictly identical to the intangibility that jouissance presents to and for the subject. How? Like the real, bodily jouissance is intractable to signification. "Because enjoyment [i.e. jouissance] is quite real," according to Lacan, "in the system of the subject, it is nowhere symbolized, nor can it be symbolized" (1968-9, p. 326). The minimal condition of a discourse is the formal articulation of jouissance from a radical resistance to signification into an impasse in formalization, a translation of the intangible into a symbolic system that produces the racial signifier as a remainder, as a monument to its inherent incompleteness. Lacan gives this definition of the real as a deadlock in symbolic logic:

> This is where the real distinguishes itself. The real can only be inscribed on the basis of an impasse of formalization. That is why I thought I could provide a model of it using mathematical formalization, inasmuch as it is the most advanced elaboration we have by which to produce signifierness. The mathematical formalization of signifierness runs counter to meaning – I almost said "*à contre-sens*" [i.e. "counter meaning," "against the tide," or "contradiction"]. (Lacan, 1975/1998b, p. 93)

The subject articulated in and by liberalism's impasse in formalization is caused by this racial signifier—but because it lacks a formal, prescribed, or readymade symbolic template for inscribing the racial in its experience of the libidinal body, the subject is left to scrounge for

idiosyncratic methods, fantasies, and symptoms to mediate this excess jouissance and assign it a place and meaning through a particular articulation of language. A discourse structure, to repeat, does not just attempt to formalize and defend against jouissance—it also causes it. Finally, the racial signifier functions as an empty link between subject and structure, a minimal displacement between the two that transfers the paradoxical foundation of liberalism without imparting any meaning, identity, or position; that causes the subject of racism but provides it no organizational calculus. Contrary to Foucault's nominalization of sexuality as a relay for power, the racial signifier is the *empty* transfer point for the power-effects of liberalism—the most intractable element in power relations, endowed with no instrumentality, and incapable of serving as a point of support for any strategy or formation of politics.[10]

This irreducibility of subject to structure brings me to a final and essential point. Strictly speaking, "the" racial signifier does not exist. This is not only because it does not convey any meaning by itself, but because it is a heuristic construction that attempts to account for and preserve nothing more than the tension between the impasse in formalization that necessarily produces the racial signifier, and the singular nature of the subject of racism that it causes (but does not organize). To describe "the" racial signifier in any specific context is to attribute to it a substance and assign it a specificity that the racial signifier by definition does not contain. When describing its particular effects, "the" racial signifier (as cause) disappears, and what can be called "a" racial signifier is retroactively grounded as a signifying element or signified-effect in

[10] I am paraphrasing the definition of sexuality that Foucault gives in the *History of Sexuality, Volume 1*:

> Sexuality must not be described as a stubborn drive, by nature alien and of necessity disobedient to a power which exhausts itself trying to subdue it and often fails to control it entirely. It appears rather as an especially dense transfer point for relations of power: between men and women, young people and old people, parents and offspring, teachers and students, priests and laity, an administration and a population. Sexuality is not the most intractable element in power relations, but rather one of those endowed with the greatest instrumentality: useful for the greatest number of maneuvers and capable of serving as a point of support, as a linchpin, for the most varied strategies. (1976/1990, p. 130)

the subject of racism. In the subject, “the” racial signifier disappears into these effects. “A” racial signifier as elaborated in and by each subject is therefore as singular as its article insists. Each of the case histories that follow in the second half of this dissertation pivots on an articulation of “a” racial signifier.

CHAPTER THREE: Reductio ad Absurdum: Post-Interpretation and the Inclining Insignificance of Racial Blackness

> …the original discovery of Freud is that of a *method*. An unprecedented method, it is linked to something equally unprecedented, the foundation of the psychoanalytic *situation*. For where in the world, before psychoanalysis or beyond it, was one permitted and invited to say everything, up to and including the most secret thoughts of carnage, racism or rape?
>
> Jean Laplanche, "Psychoanalysis as Anti-Hermeneutics" (1996, pp. 9-10, emphasis in original)

Split Concept

In the previous chapter, I introduced the concept of "the/a racial signifier" to preserve a tension between the subject of racism and the structure of liberalism, between the history of racialization and the determination of racial sense, between the singular nature of the invention of black slavery and the universal impasse it creates—each element being threatened by extinction where their mutual displacement is not epistemologically safeguarded. To lift the suspension on any of these dialectical tensions, in other words, would authenticate blackness as an unpremeditated metaphor, and along with it, disenfranchise any possible method for mediating the historical variability and tenacious intractability of racialization. As such, the/a racial signifier will also have a positive function: to account simultaneously for the epidemiological (i.e. ubiquitous) and serial (i.e. repetitive) axes of racism, to preserve the specificity of clinical experience and implicate the subject of racism as an effect, but not realization, of racial liberalism as an impasse in formalization—an impasse that is displaced but not resolved by the subject of racism. After the redundant debunking of biological theories of race across the twentieth century (and its equally redundant return in new biological nomenclatures in the twenty-first [Roberts, 2011]), we learned in the last chapter that racial blackness, within and outside the fora of critical inquiry, enjoys a twilight career as a "signified," buoyed by a linguistic essentialism that renaturalizes

race in the body of language—the Other. The racial is not found in nature but it appears to be immune to denaturalization. Structural psychoanalysis was administered as a panacea to these aporia, with the critical history of racial liberalism serving in turn to bring new specificity to the nature of subjectivity and enjoyment under post-slavery and anti-racist conditions.

As a heuristic device, the/a racial signifier, through a sort of ruptural unity marked by its bar (/), combines the necessary relation between the signifying system (i.e. Other) and the libidinal body (i.e. jouissance). To bring these features into opposition, or to treat one in isolation from the other, would result in either a hermetic structuralism or a naïve individualism. Both options are unhistorical. Here I want to return to a couple peculiar features that we began to note in the last chapter. First, the racial signifier causes the subject of racism and smites it with an irreducible contradiction but imparts no necessary meaning and provides the subject no particular coordinates with which to organize its identity, desire, or politics. Second, I contended that "the" racial signifier does not exist, but minimally fulfills the function of invoicing the historical mode of production and logical necessity of the racial after the "third turn" of liberalism—wherein the declaration of the uselessness of racism determines liberalism's new "window of discourse." I also suggested that only "a" racial signifier exists, and strictly as an effect that is not determined or determinable in advance. In this way, the bar (/) in this ungainly phrase specifically combines and separates the definite ("the") and indefinite ("a") articles, designating the general individual of a species and a singular and nonspecific "one," respectively. This results in a split concept that neatly mirrors the scission it describes, that both provides conceptual meaning and withholds it. Such a notion is designed, as I mentioned in the last chapter, to function as a limit to interpretation. Why? Not only is liberalism itself split—revolving around a resistance to signification that doubles as the cause of its inexhaustible dissemination of meanings—but the

real that its formal structure transcribes designates the inherent limits to interpretation. These limits are therefore the cause of interpretation, as it is the inability to name or signify the real of jouissance—quite simply, the fact that "a" and "the" racial cannot coincide to name the being or "inner essence" of racial liberalism—that sets the signifier in motion in the signifying system.

In this chapter I will expand on the consequences that this discovery has on the analysis of racism, what type of methods this discovery enables and disables, and how I will consequently approach my reading of the clinical literature in the following chapter. My main focus will be on the method of interpretation, a procedure at once so broadly defined and ubiquitous in humanistic inquiry that it enjoys a nearly uncontested existence—even standing in for literary method itself (cf. Eco, 1992; Best & Marcus, 2009). Having foresworn the ontological questions science pursues in its own (but not privileged) way, the cultural and literary studies rely on the protocols of interpretation to analyze the shape and gaps in the latticework of power, but in doing so, also epistemologically kettle their object. The primacy of interpretation limits the localization of power to what can be interpreted. When encountering the less-than-senseless, it has only two options: keep a safe distance or, even worse, represent and thus obscure the insensible. On the contrary, the concept of "the/a racial signifier"—with one part signifying the resistance to signification, the other signaling a meaning displaced to a future moment, to be developed in "a" particular case—is inherently incompatible with this method. Yet because the racial signifier has the peculiar property of inciting desire and causing interpretation (more on this below), it can only be exfoliated by working backward from within the field of interpretation—knowledge, rhetoric, ideology, and the course of treatment recorded by the clinical literature of psychoanalysis. This calls for a democratization of method, a chastening of interpretation, and its revitalization through the recognition of interpretation's limits. There at its immanent threshold

is where "a" racial signifier cannot be interpreted and must be *isolated*. The following strives to outline a supplementary method of inquiry from within the margins of interpretation, which will elucidate how racism's historical center of gravity shifted from a symbolic identity to a real symptom. In a double inversion of the "declining significance of race" proclaimed by the Harvard sociologist William Julius Wilson (1978/2012), the activation of this method across the case archive tracks the vertiginously *inclining insignificance* of racial blackness.

Psychoanalysis is a method above all else. Whatever body of knowledge it has accumulated, and concepts it has appropriated or invented over its lifespan—and there are many—they are linked and disjoined through a method and its aim, even as that method itself has undergone serious revisions in response to the historical exigencies that are encountered in its theory and practice, clinical and otherwise. This history will be glossed below. Much more, this method is not hermeneutical, at least not principally so; as the provocative title of Jean Laplanche's text in the epigraph suggests, the Freudian method is perhaps even directly opposed to interpretation, standing on its own as a practice of anti-interpretation—a surprising claim that directly targets a literary criticism and theory that not only identifies as a latter-day torchbearer of psychoanalysis, but promises to expand (or depending on who you ask, liberate) its insights "beyond" the clinic to the analysis of culture and politics, even if it owes the resilience of its own method of close reading to the form, style, and technique of Freud's case analyses (Brooks & Woloch, 2000). A quick word then about my approach: I will be conceiving of psychoanalysis as neither a framework of interpretation *nor* a "discursive practice" consisting of a set of immanent rules and concepts that determine true and false statements (Foucault, 1972/2002). Conversely, it is closer to a "disciplinary matrix" in the sense Thomas Kuhn describes the form of tacit, practical, or problem-based knowledge distributed in scientific communities and generated in the

concurrence of symbolic formulae and a set of concrete examples—axioms and cases, or, mathemes and subjects (Kuhn, 1962/2012). Because what a group of practitioners have in common is a training and knowledge (including in methods) that are "embedded in shared exemplars" (p. 191), I ultimately do not aim to *intervene* into psychoanalytic theory directly, but to execute a far simpler and more consequential act: to contribute new cases. In preparation for this act, this chapter will outline a new method that recent psychoanalytic practice has yielded, one that is not exhausted by the protocols of interpretation.

Interpretation Terminable and Interminable

What is interpretation? In the simplest terms, interpretation transposes signifying elements according to a cipher or "interpretive master code" (Jameson, 1981/2002, p. x). Interpretation first comprehends a text, speech, or image as a datum, then replaces that manifest knowledge with another meaning. Interpretation has a spatial form and works in an opening-and-closing motion: it establishes the narrative coherence of an object, introduces gaps or depths into it, then fills them in with a new comprehension. To open up the definition of "cipher" is to come face-to-face with this closed system: it alternately denotes the code, the decoding key, and the act of encoding. Shoshana Felman famously problematized the elevation of psychoanalysis as a knowledge—a body of cipher keys—above the prostrate literature that it would accede to interpret, which renders the latter an inert object that could only ever attest to the timeless truth of psychoanalysis (Felman, 1977). In advocating for a relation of mutual implication between literature and psychoanalysis, Felman prevents domiciling mastery in one camp or the other, but throws into relief another essential character of hermeneutics, namely its productivity: interpretation associates elements to each other to create a meaning-effect that did not exist

beforehand. Like metaphor, then, interpretation creates sense through a comparative and substitutive relationship between signifying elements. Interpretation is productive of signification, and continuously begets more of it for further interpretation. This inherent incompleteness led Lacan to posit that, for all intents and purposes, "desire is interpretation itself" (1973/1998a, p. 176). Alone or as a predominant method, interpretation aims at understanding (however provisional), at the crystallization of meaning, at the equilibration between the text and the reader's demands on it, even if its initial move is to interrogate the unity of spontaneous comprehension. Hermeneutics in this precise sense is most firmly rooted in the imaginary, the realm of mutual understanding and reciprocity, which is structured, like the ego, according to a logic of synthesis, wholeness, and conclusion (Fink, 2010).

Central to literary interpretation is the cipher, the rule that governs the transposition of elements, which finds in the epistemological frame or framework its most commonly developed form (cf. Butler, 2009). A framework fuses tacit or unstated knowledge into a symbol removed from the play of interpretation, which is then used to translate the text, event, or experience under its purview into a datum with a meaningful relation to that symbol. The chief function of a framework is to strip the anecdotal character of the singular and reproduce it as a particular or typical instance. Despite claiming only regional proficiency over a specific genre of text, a framework exercises a sovereign right to render the objects in its fiefdom transparent—a provincial universalism, but a universalism no less. Interpretation is for this reason opposed to what I described in the first chapter as the epistemology of the clinic, which does not symbolically translate the speech of the subject but develops in each case one theory—new and provisional. Frameworks employ their "symbol" specifically as a master signifier, dispensing with the (clinical) subject altogether: a framework represents all objects under its jurisdiction as

signifieds with a natural affiliation to the master symbol. A framework is pre-psychoanalytic to the extent that it relies on a linguistic understanding of meaning production, on an essential relation between meaning, sound-images, and objects "out there."

For Laplanche, the analytical method is distinct from interpretation because it is interested in dissociating signifying material—prizing sense apart—without a "pre-established codes for [performing] a re-translation" (1996, p. 8). Analytic interpretation is in this sense only about half of literary interpretation because it demotes association (i.e. meaning) to a contingent and spontaneous byproduct of its method; in turn, literary interpretation is in this view less than the sum of its two parts, as its dissociative maneuver is shown to be subordinated to the end of reassociation. Laplanche (above) suggests that the analytic method, which proceeds through the medium of free association, is also the only one that permits racism to be *spoken*. The originary hermeneuticist, says Laplanche, is not the analyst or critic, but the subject; the psychoanalytic "situation" is the treatment of a subject (not a preconstituted object) that is always already in the throes of translating the enigmatic messages of its cultural milieu, the obscure questions posed by the social "other." The analysand's originary translation—and here we would be talking about racism as an interpretation, even a neurotic theory—represses this enigma (which itself holds no latent meaning), requiring psychoanalysis to pursue a different activity than that of deciphering, or of creating a "cipher of ciphers" for understanding the typical liberal or racist subject. For Laplanche, the proper analytic method "de-translates" the signifying product of the subject's codifications and decomposes what its personal symbol has synthesized. Defined this way, Laplanche preserves a key feature of literary interpretation, namely its limitless productivity: the signifying material of free association that is subject to analytic dissociation begets new associations that must be de-translated to infinity. Such a method without ends, of an analysis

(not terminable but) interminable, does not disturb literary interpretation's geostationary orbit above synthesis, meaning, and signification, while sidelining the cure as an orienting device of the analytic method. In a word, Laplanche makes the analytic method another name for (philosophical) deconstruction.

Unsurprisingly, interpretation has had its fair share of past and recent discontents, even if few picket for its total demise. With the intent of poaching some of their insights, I want to focus briefly on how these diverse detractors might find common cause as responses to a specific historical and political conjuncture—one that Laplanche's reading does not procure. One does well to start such an overview with the titular entry in Susan Sontag's *Against Interpretation and Other Essays*, which first judges interpretation to be a textual approach with an historically variable value, at times subversive and at other times stale and conservative. She contends that its role in *this* age of signifying or intellectual overproduction—she was writing in 1966—is hegemonic and thus reactionary, handmaiden to a dictatorship of understanding that impoverishes experience and assaults immediacy. Sontag saw interpretation as a procedure that reductively judged art (literature and film especially) by its content, reduced content to an apparent meaning, and slated appearances for replacement by hidden understandings, subtexts, and truths. As an alternative, Sontag advocates for replacing hermeneutics by a variety of critical procedures—formal analysis and surface descriptions among them—that "cut back content so that we can see the thing at all" (1966/2001, p. 14).

In Anthony Farley's later but adjacent legal analysis, interpretation is inseparable from modern racial law, and functions as an expression of its desire. Interpretation is here not simply a stance or activity assumed by the observer or critic, but an objective process of the legal apparatus, which relies on interpretation to activate the underdetermination of its rules and bind

its principles in each legal case. Importantly, for Farley, interpretation is motivated by a desire for hierarchy that is repressed and remastered in the liberal elevation of equal rights to a legal and philosophical principle. "Rights cannot be equal because only those who are oppressed are said to require equal rights" (2003, p. 689). The end of equal rights inscribes inequality in the law *before* the act of interpretation, thus warping the resolution of legal indeterminacy in each case toward the perfection of hierarchy, while showing that legal hermeneutics emerges exactly by subtracting equal rights from interpretation. Farley only hints at the "imagination" as a possible method of non-juridical interpretation, or an interpretation without ends.

More recently, Rita Felski has targeted the dominance that one particular genre of interpretation—a critical variation—is said to have taken in Anglo-American literary studies in the "past few decades." Felski works to revitalize and reimagine interpretation, to recall different grammars of translation that do not presume depth, foundation, and hidden abodes—these dispositions being the hallmarks of "skeptical," "suspicious," or "seditious" forms of interpretation. Contra Sontag, Felski's discontent with critical interpretation springs from a concern for its waning productivity, its diminishing returns—a worry that critique, as Bruno Latour influentially put it, has "run out of steam" (Latour, 2004). Felski accounts for this impoverishment of critical interpretation on a transformation in the broader cultural sensibility, particularly the fragmentation of cultural narratives, the increasing incoherence of ideology, the proliferation of disbelief and detachment, and a general hegemony of cynicism (2016, pp. 45-6). Her solution, what she calls a "postcritical reading," refuses the comprehension that literary interpretation prematurely assigns the text it submits to deconstruction and endorses instead a constructivist approach oriented toward the unexpected, one that proceeds by "attaching, collating, negotiating, assembling—of forging links between things that were previously

unconnected" to bring "new things to light" without generating "endless rumination" (p. 173-4). To a large extent, Felski has hereby reinvented the Freudian task of free association. Dissociation is for her the spontaneous byproduct of a process of active association or meaning-creation—productive, yes, but without critical excess.

When Laplanche challenges the view that psychoanalysis is but a rigorous hermeneutics and proposes that it has always been deconstructive, he wanders into a crowded field of critical theorists and literary critics—both hostile and friendly to the Freudian tradition—that do not approach psychoanalysis as an historical formation, a living theory and practice. Here we need to recall that its constant internal reworking "has as much or more to do with the practical need to address impasses encountered in the consulting room as it does with theoretical difficulties" (Voruz & Wolf, 2007, p. vii). Psychoanalysis may be understood as an anti-framework for this very matter of fact. History enters psychoanalysis through the clinic. *Its method is applied in the clinic and revised by the epistemology of the unconscious*. Keeping and endorsing all the historical observations that the above critics of interpretation have highlighted—the overproduction of meaning/knowledge, the fetishization of equal rights, the ascendancy of cynical reason and ideological incoherence—I want to turn now to consider one particular recent innovation in the Lacanian clinical field because it enables the limits of interpretation that the split concept of "the/a racial signifier" throws into relief to be productively engaged. In other words, while interpretation has been conclusively liberated by its critics from its *external* encumbrances, what I want to suggest is that the constitutive limit of interpretation has not yet been addressed. The split concept of "the/a racial signifier" requires dealing with this impasse. Please note, if it has not been made clear already, that the "limit" of interpretation does not refer to the intangible or ineffable, to the polysemous or simply the irrational and confused, but to the

linguistic and material limit in the signifier—tangible but not meaningful, logical even if not reasonable. In short, I would like to propose that a method on the boundary between the humanities and medicine, a form of interpretive writing between science and literature (Long-Innes, 1990)—clinical psychoanalysis—has explored this material limit in a lucrative way that can benefit literary theory, critical analysis in the humanities, and black studies alike.

The Purified Symptom

"The age of interpretation is behind us." In this dramatic proclamation to the analysts of the *École de la cause freudienne* in 1996, Jacques-Alain Miller severs a tie to interpretation that today's literary studies only dare to fray (2007, p. 3). This contrast is to be accounted for not simply as a calligraphic decision, but as a real difference in methodology. Why is interpretation behind the analyst, or, why is the analyst now in front of interpretation? A first answer is that interpretation is the dominion and activity of the unconscious, that is, of the discourse of the Other. As we have already indicated, interpretation functions as a form of substitution that is not unlike the dynamic of metaphor and metonymy, the primary processes of the unconscious structured as a signifying system. The signifying system itself interprets the enigmas, repressions, and impasses that riddle it, but also begs to be interpreted itself: as with desire, interpretation begets interpretation. The analysand may be said to interpret second, and the analyst—should the analysand decide to seek analysis—would only be a distant second runner-up to the scene of interpretation. What force drives this interpretation immanent to the unconscious? "The signifier as such, that is, as cipher (*chiffre*), as separated from the effects of signification, calls for interpretation as such. The signifier on its own is always an enigma and this is why it craves interpretation" (p. 7). That which propels the cycle of interpretation is the

isolated and detached signifier that, on its own, uninvolved in the movement of metaphor and/or metonymy, contains and produces no meaning.[11] The cause of the field of interpretation is therefore opaque to its own deciphering activity. Not for nothing, Miller calls this hypothetically isolated signifier a *cipher* (*chiffre*: also "digit" or "figure"), a means and beginning of interpretation, making the isolated signifier functionally equivalent to the master symbol of the theoretical and/or historical framework. Bringing this conclusion a step further, the cipher-like racial signifier also solicits and elicits interpretation before it is encountered by the critical hermeneuticist; race exists here as an already existing framework, culturally elaborated around and by a crux that defies the dialectic of sense and nonsense, a crux that "purely performs" (Pluth, 2007a). All of this puts interpretation on the same footing as delusion; interpretation in the mode and manner of the unconscious—the assignation of cultural meanings, the attachment of political significations, historicization through the linkage of additional signifiers—represses the racial signifier that is already animating and obscured by the intercourse of "black reason" (Mbembe 2017) and the critical reflection thereon.

"A practice that targets the *sinthome* in the subject," offers Miller as an alternative, "does not interpret like the unconscious" (2007, p. 6). Such a renovated practice would forge a third path beyond interpretation—which repeats the repression of the (racial) signifier—and noninterventionist silence. Miller takes his inspiration here from Lacan's revision of psychoanalytic theory, who held that the symptom was *unlike* the dream to which Freud originally likened it. Freud cast the dream as a formation of the unconscious addressed as a decipherable message to the dreamer and described "fixations" in contrast as primal symptoms that frustratingly evaded every attempt to be put into words. Against this division between bodily

[11] Lacan would later call the signifier hypothetically isolated from the signifying system the "letter," which, because it was rooted in and through the drive and linguistically unelaborated, could not be interpreted.

and linguistic symptoms, Lacan generalized the condition of the primal class, holding that every symptom (now rewritten as *sinthome*) is a formation of *enjoyment* that, unlike the dream, is not addressed to the Other and cannot be interpreted, but is bound to the signifying apparatus nonetheless (Lacan, 2004/2014, p. 125). Lacan thereby conceived of a "purified symptom…one stripped of its symbolic components," an articulation of libidinized signifiers that tie the body and language together, in which could be figured "the drive in its pure form" (Verhaeghe & Declercq, 2002, p. 66). In addition to being indecipherable, this symptom is universal—there is no subject that is not symptomatic—while buttressing a pattern of enjoyment absolutely particular to each subject, even if each symptom is composed of signifying elements received, as Hortense Spillers styles it with reference to the social subject of race, from "language as an aspect of the public trust" (2003a, p. 396). Like the racial signifier, then, "the" symptom does not exist—each subject only ever suffers from *a* symptom, its particular way of "getting off" on the unconscious.

The method adequate to such a concept calls for neither a removal of the symptom nor an interpretation of it—the *sinthome* disposes itself to neither—but for a *reduction* of its symbolic elaboration to its meaningless core, a boiling down of signification to the libidinal residue, the isolation or separation of the senseless signifier from the symptom through a subtraction of sense. This is not done with the intent to remove the symptom, but to separate or sever it from its symbolic tissue—fantasy, dreams, and everything else that comes up in the free association in clinic and culture—and lay it bare, in the flesh of the senselessness of its animation. "This is why the post-interpretative practice," concludes Miller, "takes its bearings on the *cut*" (2007, p. 8, emphasis added)—the isolation of the cipher from the field of signifiers—instead of taking part in an elaboration, unpackaging, or deconstruction of meaning. It "consists in withholding S_2

[knowledge], in not bringing it in—so as to circumscribe S_1 [the cipher]" that symbolizes (and represses) enjoyment, with the ultimate intent of "bring[ing] the subject back to his [sic] truly elementary signifiers" (p. 7). The goal of dehydrating meaning over the course of analysis is to enable the subject to make a decision on how to orient themselves to their elementary signifiers, their opaque and irreducible perplexity. We might understand an inquiry that is attuned to sounding for racism as a method of *reductio ad absurdum*, but in reverse: this method would work back from symbolic contradictions to its consequences in the absurd "elementary signifiers" that possess the subject.

In a Fanonian spirit, the Lacanian analysis must be "slightly stretched" to address "the/a racial signifier" that the previous chapter both historicized and assigned its structural function (Fanon, 1961/2004, p. 5). Lacanian analysis does not offer an account of an historical signifier as I am presenting the racial here, much less one that fulfills the function of *historically* inscribing the real as an impasse in formalization. While recent work in critical theory has begun to parse how, in the introduction of the concept of the discourse structure, Lacan "pushed for the historicization of jouissance" by consulting Marx on the formal nature of capital and the production of surplus enjoyment (Feldner and Vighi, 2015, p. 110), the paradox of multiracial democracy that copulates with the structure of capital is critically avoided. The signifier through which that impasse is inscribed—that, to repeat, "mark[s] the presence, within language, of an essential impasse in and resistance to signification" (Pluth, 2007c, p. 106)—is *pari passu* missing as well. This affects what subject psychoanalysis' theory, method, and practice can suppose. Now, the revolutionary racial signifier that invents liberalism is an historically new enigma for signification. But liberalism has also simultaneously formalized, symbolized, and interpreted this new signifier into a ubiquitous and diverse array of representational schemas or "racial

formations," even if those formations are contingent, inconsistent, unstable, and constantly working at cross-purposes with each other (Omi and Winant, 1986/2015). Again, it is for this reason that the racial signifier is objectively overdetermined but also, and for that very fact, subjectively underdetermined.

Every political project based on the racialization of social structures—through laws, institutions, narratives, myths, media, and the everyday senses of race—and every apparatus that organizes power racially through an articulation of racial projects, traffics in racial signifiers. Yet as representational schema, racial formations contain two additional logical functions that must be identified as such: a cipher (i.e. S_1 or "phallic signifier") that is removed from the field of interpretation and that invests each racial formation with sense and the capacity to reproduce itself as meaningful, as well as "purified symptoms," the residue that this cipher can never fully transcribe. The difference between these two instances—of the racial as general cipher, of the racial as singular enjoyment—is one way to split the difference between "the racial signifier" and "a racial signifier." The racial, in other words, encompasses the registers of the real (contradiction), the symbolic (cipher), and the imaginary (knowledge)[12]—*and* (increasingly) excites a new creation on the side of the subject that idiosyncratically knots these registers together through a formation of bodily enjoyment (*sinthome*). We will return to explain the historical predominance of the latter soon, but depending on the particular circumstance, the racial signifying material can be either a part of the illness or the cure, a provisional solution to the impasse of liberalism or a local reproduction of its inconsistencies. It is ultimately not our business to designate which symptom counts as "actually existing racism" in need of swift

[12] "Any power in a human society, however brutal, arbitrary or violent it may be, encompasses these three registers that define human reality, in variable doses and through various manifestations: the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary" (Koren, 2017).

removal or censure, as we are interested in both desubstantializing racism (as a sociological descriptor) as well as inquiring into the objective operation of "racism" *as a new signifier*. How does the hegemony of anti-racist institutions, narratives, and policy introduce "racism" itself as a signifier that moderates, manages, and administers racial power? The method of *reductio ad absurdum* is not enervated but vitalized by this dilation of the analytic purview.

Racism (Partly) Turns to Affect

If "analytic practice is ever-more post-interpretative," how did this come about (Miller, 2007, p. 8)? It is true that a transnational network of analysts and theorists has grown increasingly aware of the shift in therapeutic technique that the later Freud made in response to a growing reckoning with the limits of interpretation, which is nowhere more apparent than in his last papers on clinical technique, "Constructions in Analysis" (1964a) and "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1964b). But Miller also gives a parallel historical reason, and a surprising one, when he suggests that the rapid ascent of psychoanalysis has played a hand in the neoliberal condition that threatens to push a method of interpretation resistant to modification into an early and ignominious retirement. What Lacanian clinical practice has to contend with today, in a way that was still nascent if already remarkable during the long Lacanian midcentury, is "the consequences of the sensational success" of Freudian practice: first in its takeover of psychiatry, then through its (mis)translation into a governing cultural fiction, and finally in its passage into the structure of discourse itself (Miller, 2005, p. 11). Freudianism midwifed "the liberation of jouissance" from the inhibitions installed by the previous, so-called late-Victorian form of civilization, established a new orientation to the enjoyed symptom, and faces now the consequences of a pyrrhic victory (ibid.). Miller points out as evidence of this shift the growing

frequency of patients described by their psychoanalysts as "disoriented" and "disinhibited," to which we can add the parallel clinical phenomenon of a host of new symptoms—from addiction to ordinary psychosis—that all center on the suffering of an *excess* enjoyment, rather than its deficiency (Svolos, 2017).

Viewed askance, the libidinal arrangement of the "bygone civilization" that Freudianism helped retire overlaps in its tenure and specifics with the third turn of liberalism: the complex of prohibitions and regulations of sexuality in "explicitly racist regimes"—Jim Crow, Apartheid, and its precursors and global affiliates—that elaborated the racial signifier into a publicly-ordained symbolic order, particularly by instituting "race relations" on the basis of a baroque system of spatial segregations, sexual proscriptions, and an open commitment to maintaining racial hierarchy (Fredrickson, 2002). In the segregationist regime in the American North and South (after and before the Civil War), this consisted of an unprecedented "inscription of race as a network of signs" (Abel, 2011, p. 4), a collective if vastly uneven interpretation of race instituted into policy and practice. If in the post-Reconstruction days of Freud's investigations, (racialized) sexual norms and prohibitions created symbolic pathways that acted as collective guardrails to jouissance, psychoanalysis was "subversive" to the extent that it sought to reignite the desire of the subject to interpret and relate to the symptoms that the discourse of their implication veiled. The aim of analysis was to bring the castrative dimension of the symbolic back into play, to dissolve the imago of the Oedipal father as a semblance, and to derail the subject from their libidinal compulsions, inhibitions, and resistances in order to reintroduce desire as a dialectical movement against cultural proscription and symbolic ankylosis.

In contrast, in the current "postmodern," "post-Oedipal," or "post-Civil Rights" period, capital makes jouissance its global lodestar, subject to a process of commodification and

consumerist morality. This dispensation interpellates a self and enjoins that self to constantly acquire, evaluate, and moderate their enjoyment. Here analysis is "subversive" to the extent that it brings the castrative dimension of enjoyment (instead of desire) into play. This twin elevation of enjoyment and knowledge—emphasized throughout the contemporary psychoanalytic literature, which I will not rehearse here[13]—coincides with the public deconstruction of racial meaning, the removal of racial segregation as a compass for social policy, the fumigation of racial animus from law and industry, and perhaps most consequentially, the dissociation between racism and a symbolic identity that this previous alignment sutured. Instead of abolishing hierarchy, the whiteness with which supremacy was once alloyed is increasingly subject to a symbolic erasure.

Ciara Cremin helpfully extrapolates this cultural logic into a fuller triad of late capitalist injunctions that, in addition to the push to enjoy and the demand to conduct instrumental and rational activity, entails a left-liberal moral charge—a compulsive and hegemonic directive to be aware and react, even act-out, to crises in equality and justice with a recognition of (and inevitable identification with) the image of the other (2011). With racism homogenized as the cardinal antonym to these new universal values of equality and justice, this demand renovates racial capital *in lieu of* replacing a disaggregating segregationist regime with a new signifying invention—in a word, it subjectifies (i.e. internalizes) the imagined demands of the Civil Rights Movement. Call this a shift from the linguistic turn to the affective turn *within* white supremacy and the practices of racism, but only if we understand the decline of the social construction of race (and the diffusion of the "affective attachments" to it) to augur and coincide with the increasing autonomy of the racial signifier. In that case we can recycle a serendipitous phrase

[13] See Vighi (2010) and McGowan (2012), for instance.

and christen this moment "the epoch of the body" (Shepherdson, 1999), but only, again, if we rigorously oppose the body in equal parts to the body of representation, imaginary embodiment, and the corporeal (i.e. natural) organism. Symptoms—enfleshed, libidinized, or enjoyed signifiers—are consequently not on the order of "disorders" as the DSM likes to enumerate them, because there is no order, standard, or normative context in which the symptom can be measured as a deviation. Racial symptoms eclipse (without extinguishing) the symbolic coordination of enjoyment, identity, and racial hierarchy that pre-anti-racist societies—what Farley would designate as regimes in which "equal rights" are not yet elevated to the status of governing principle—once tolerated and managed as a space for mediating its contradictions.

Case History as a Genre

The case histories in the following chapter were published between 1947 and 1971. Falling in what Nathan Hale Jr. called the "golden age of psychoanalysis" in medical practice and popular culture (1995, p. 276), and what C. Vann Woodward called—*in medias res*—the Second Reconstruction (1957; cf. Marable, 1984/2007), these analytic inquiries emerge as part of the transformation of psychoanalysis, capital, and the global struggle against racism on both political and academic fronts. What will first strike the reader of these documents is their brevity in comparison to Freud's five classical case histories on Dora (1905/1953b), Little Hans (1909/1955a), the Rat Man (1909/1955b), Dr. Schreber (1910/1958), and the Wolf Man (1918/1955d). The prolixity of Freud's readings can be partially chalked up to their placement within an earlier phase of the development of the analytic method: Freud's interpretation executes a series of dialectical reversals and provisional closures; it upends the narrative form of patient biography and instantiates, in its nonlinear progression, the inexhaustible process of the

unconscious as a signifying system (Loewenstein, 1992). By familiarizing the analytic community and lay public with the form and practice of analytic interpretation, they also served an important propaedeutic (and propagative) function. In increasingly butting-up against the limits of this method, what he first articulated as the unplumbable navel of the dream (1900/1953a, p. 111), Freud stopped publishing case histories and turned toward issuing evermore speculative works to represent the limits of interpretation (limits that he first encountered in his ongoing clinical practice). In contrast, the postwar American case histories gathered in this text rarely exceed ten pages. If Stephen Marcus was right to anoint Freud's case histories as a new form of literature occupied primarily with the analyst's own interpretation and analysis (Marcus, 1974/1993, p. 76), then we must consider this reduction in length in the postwar archive in tandem with an historical change in the analytic method itself, one that responds to the changing dynamics of the clinical encounter. This will be an ongoing question both here and over the course of the next chapter, but I want to provisionally offer that the relative brevity of these case presentations is linked to a decline in interpretation primarily experienced on the side of the *analysand* and the growing prevalence, in turn, of the libidinal symptom.

But what can case histories, as a genre, tell us about how racism functions that any other kind of cultural text from the Civil Rights and post-Civil Rights era cannot, and what disposes this literature in particular to the method of *reductio ad absurdum* we have just outlined—if anything? One must start with the most obvious difference between it and, say, a novel or poem, which is that the postwar case history is written for a community of analytic thinkers, both professional (in medical psychiatry, social work, private practice, or academia) and lay. The case history minimally aims to transmit psychoanalytic knowledge (Mackie, 2014). As such, the

(imagined) analytic community is concerned with racism as a phenomenon of clinical practice, and the case history is designed to measure both the efficacy *and* insufficiencies of psychoanalytic theory in relation to its idiosyncratic emergences. Racism therefore necessarily enters clinical phenomenology with enough of an identity to present itself as an object of analytic disclosure, but with sufficient conceptual elasticity to achieve a qualitative reconstruction over the course of the analysis. All the same, the following analysts—in contrast to the early efforts of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis (chapter 1)—do not develop racism as a research question pursuant to the methodology and philosophy of modern science: that is, in the three-act model of hypothesis, experimentation, and results. Rather, racism itself barges into the analytic situation; the analyst (and the analysand) encounter racism as a *surprise event* of the free association. Racism enters clinical practice; it is part and parcel of clinical experience; like all signifying matters put before it, racism is foreign and irreducibly other to psychoanalytic inquiry. If nothing else, the following case histories demonstrate that *racism speaks (to) psychoanalysis*.

John Forrester places the case as a genre more broadly within a group of historical fields that reason through "shared examples." In dispatching theory to a secondary role, case reasoning does not require its practitioners to employ or agree on a unified theoretical apparatus, codes, or shared body of knowledge, as it draws instead on a shared set of exemplary instances. To "think in cases" is to operate within a *paradigm* that is not necessarily subtended by a metalanguage; case reasoning furthermore does not proceed via deduction or induction, experimentation or statistical calculation, taxonomy or prototype, but via a practice of knowledge customized for and by the treatment of each "problem." Psychoanalysis is hereby repatriated to a group of fields, consolidated in the late nineteenth century, that practice and study by case, including medicine, business, and particularly the Anglo-American common law tradition and its attendant legal

practice. What sets psychoanalysis apart from these professional associations is the irreducible contamination of the analytic case by the experience, transferences, and counter-transferences—that is, the desire—between the "subject" (the analysand) and the author (the analyst). In this way,

> Psychoanalytic writing is not just writing about psychoanalysis; it is writing subject to the same laws and processes as the psychoanalytic situation itself. In this way psychoanalysis can never free itself of the forces it attempts to describe. As a result, from one point of view, all psychoanalytic writing is exemplary of a failure. Psychoanalytic writing fails to transmit psychoanalytic knowledge because it is always simultaneously a symptom. (Forrester, 2017, pp. 65-6)

The case history demonstrates the allergenic nature of the subject—the effect(s) of the unconscious—to the realization of an epistemology. Clearly, these Civil Rights Era case histories cannot recover an historical individual or instance of racism from the debris of misinterpretation, and for two reasons: first, as a symptom of the failure of psychoanalysis, the desire *between* analyst and analysand choreographs the case history, irremediably blurring the boundary between individuals from the outset; second, if isolation is (or must be) the psychoanalytic method of "reasoning" in cases, our task is not (only) to reinterpret but to lay bare how each case history *overinterprets its cause*. This overinterpretation, again, is driven or caused by the elementary signifier that "craves" interpretation in order to know nothing about itself. Derived from a fundamental psychoanalytic insight—that every utterance always conveys both less *and* more than intended—the *reductio ad absurdum* that prunes interpretation must be accompanied by a speculative reconstruction that figures the symptom of racism not only as a resistance to signification, but as an excess embodied in signifying nonsense. Dany Nobus and Malcolm Quinn helpfully describe this logic driving the Freudian method as *abductive*, the creation of a "retroactive explanatory paradigm strictly within the boundaries of the specific object of research under consideration" (2005, p. 30). If there is for this reason no such thing as a "typical" or

"closed" case of racism, there is also, as the very definition of *genre* suggests, and that its aim of transmitting knowledge likewise indicates, no absolute particularly to each case either. Rather, case reasoning creates "complex networks of similarity and dissimilarity relations, often nested in heterogeneous hierarchies, with no guarantee of self-consistency or the non-contradictory character of these overlapping categories" (Forrester, 2017, p. 51). Five case histories yield five possibly inconsonant theories of racism; or put succinctly, each case is *a-typical*—that is, sui generis, a "type of its own," an exception to all others.[14]

Between Symptom and Fetish

If the case history is already a symptom of psychoanalysis, a method of symptomatic reading that exclusively searches for signs of repression within the analytic text is an insufficient tactic for titrating "a" racial signifier. To adopt this symptomatic approach would require presuming psychoanalysis as a watertight proposition and racism as an underlying substance obscured by the false appearances that analytic theory creates. Such a reading would be akin to putting each case on trial, or to making an example out of the a-typical. As opposed to a symptomatic reading, I will follow Russell Sbriglia's succinct definition of *fetishistic reading*, which would "concern itself less with what a text *fails* to or refuses to say than how what it *does* say is disruptive, troubling, or non-sensical enough," and that furthermore gives "texts (and their authors) their due while nonetheless holding them accountable—perhaps more so than ever—for the ideological masks that (they know very well) they have chosen to don (all the same)" (2017,

[14] This way of thinking the case befits the nature of the archive. Each case history is the only foray made onto the topic of racism in the careers of their authors; in the venue they were published, each case is the only psychoanalytic text to brook the question of racial prejudice; and no school of analysts with a unified theoretical schedule or aim, or any evidence of communication among them, emerged in the American tradition of psychoanalysis. The "psychoanalysis of race relations" that Helen McLean hoped to realize in the 1940s would never exist.

pp. 117-8, emphasis in original). This method of engaging in a level manner with the complexity of the clinical writing accords with the historical timeframe in which the case histories were written, in which the exercise of power progressively operates fetishistically, out in the open; where racial coercion and inequity is camouflaged in the fatigues of its own revelation (Marriott, 2010; Zupančič, 2016). Indeed, the reader of these case histories will be struck by how the analysands frequently interpret their own activity and behavior as "racist," and with neither pride nor resignation. Invariably, many of the analysands are (or at least begin treatment as) ardent race liberals who identify with progressive values and the general concerns of the Civil Rights Movement, who are opposed to racial prejudice in both ideology and practical activity—a set of practical beliefs that does not unravel their racial symptoms, but indeed quite the opposite, comes to be the very form through which they are sustained.

It is precisely the hegemony of anti-racism—its structure and history—that makes these racial symptoms possible, a dispositif that the pressure for racial justice *caused* but that a conservation in culture and academy *realized* into a volatile social link. Adolph Reed Jr., referring to the hegemonic scope of the negative sanction that racism now attracts at both the center and fringes of liberal society, contends that, "just as race has been and continues to be unthinkable without racism, today it is also *unthinkable without antiracism*" (2013, p. 50, emphasis added). Race is unthinkable without antiracism—racism is both the public name for the antithesis of liberalism and the signifier that, in the opprobrium and negation it magnetizes, preserves the contradiction inherent in racial equality, that makes "race" (unconsciously) thinkable. Antiracism, let us be clear, is not just a diluted interpretation of racial justice nor a liberal sentiment epiphenomenal to the structure of racial oppression but a dialectical pole through which the racial is now systematically instantiated. From a Lacanian grounding that

echoes this assessment, Kalpana Sehsadri holds that modern civil society "must prohibit what it terms 'racism' in order to prevent the annihilation not so much of the 'inferior' races but of the system of race itself" (2000, p. 9). Such a feature not only calls for a fetishistic reading, but points to the historical reorganization of racial power through a supplementary modality—and it is at this point that we must again slightly stretch the prevailing Lacanian judgment. For Seshadri, "Whiteness" is (and since modern colonialism and racial slavery, appears to have always been) a master signifier that creates and organizes a system of human differences, one that "promises access to an absolute wholeness to its subjects—white, black, yellow or brown" (p. 5). Grounding the spectrum of racial identities, whiteness accessorizes dominance by mapping the racial as a complex of differential and governable relations. The regime of "racial looking," the visible cues of race, shore up this assemblage, which together respond to the lack-of-being opened by the real of sexual difference. This analysis may begin a description of one aspect of one historically specific regime of racial power (i.e. racial apartheid), but it does not tarry with racism in its contemporary form, in which whiteness is censored, denounced, and deposed as a cipher for being—in which the fantasy of whiteness is *socially traversed* and the master signifier of race *culturally fallen* from its place as the signifying grounding-wire of racialization. Multiracialism does not primarily produce an array of ontological lures or imaginary identities but operates in the real of liberal logic *as* the negation (and preservation) of racism (cf. Lentin & Titley, 2011, p. 75).

If the racial is reproduced now through a dialectic of racism and antiracism, then this new combinatory *undermines* the securitization of identities in the system of racialization. Antiracism breaks the line of determination between whiteness and supremacy in law and policy but does not instantiate a new order of human (racial) differences. Civil Rights reforms removed explicit

legal barriers to racial equality but did not rearticulate or reconstruct the social order (Steinberg, 1995). Because the antiracism that supersedes the end of *de jure* racism is unaccompanied by any collective political practice—but subsumed by the new injunctions to enjoy, know, and recognize the (racial) other—it is symbolically deconstructive, grounding neither an identity nor a social compact. The defining character of contemporary liberalism lies in the widening crisis in the symbolic investiture of racial being. Foreclosed from the institutional terrain, unsequenced by a collective reorganization of the objective practices of social hierarchy, *the articulation of the racial increasingly takes place on the decentralized level of each subject*. On this plateau, the underdetermination of the racial results in idiosyncratic creative strategies for tying the real, symbolic, and imaginary of racialization together—disorganizing the (political) meaning of racial blackness through the inclining variety of its idiosyncratic instantiations. Seshadri's otherwise incisive reading therefore does not historicize racism between the turbine and cowling of contemporary racial capital, nor map its dialectical roots in the logical contradiction of racial slavery. Even more simply, clinical experience disproves the hypothesis that whiteness functions as a master signifier.[15] Each subject in the following case histories is socially and politically white, but the reports on their treatment give no indication that the racial acts as an imaginary lure of psychic wholeness, nor are the "jouissance crises" that drive the patients into analysis in any generalizable way the result of an inability to clearly distinguish the frontiers of an imagined (racial) self (Fink, 1997, pp. 8-10).

Because "the" racial signifier emerges in the formalization of the real in the symbolic—as the impasse in multiracialism qua antiracism—the hypothetical isolation of "a" racial signifier

[15] By my count, Seshadri dehistoricizes racism in three interlinked ways: 1) by not accounting for how the "real" is historically inscribed in the symbolic as an impasse in formalization, 2) by assuming race to be a matter of difference or differential relations that it has only recently become through the cultural logic of multiculturalism, and 3) by excising the late capitalist injunctions to enjoy, know, and recognize the other (i.e. antiracism).

in each subject lays bare the historical structure (i.e. the Other) within the subject. In other words, "a" racial signifier attests to the foreign internality of history to the subject, and the externality of the subject of racism to itself. To reduce the articulation of racialization to "a" racial signifier in each case history is therefore not equal to finding "the" same racial signifier within each subject but localizes the mutual operation of both poles—between the *sinthome* and liberalism's symbolic impasse—through the unbridgeable gap between them, to the lack of meaning that grounds racialization. To give it an axiom, let us say that "a" racial signifier represents the subject of racism to "the" racial signifier—a provisional formula that does not assume the definite and general "racial" to operate as a master signifier. Let us then make the goal of the following case analyses that of conceptualizing these two poles in their structural incompatibility without collapsing their interoperative proximity—to make their magnetic polarity or "racial tension" vibrate. In this procedure we take guidance from Alain Badiou: "[W]hat a truth rests upon is not consistency, but inconsistency. It is not a question of formulating correct judgments, but rather of producing the murmur of the indiscernible" (2005, pp. 33-4).

CHAPTER FOUR: Five Theories of Racism: From White Supremacy to Racial Symptom (and Back Again)

"Black is Beautiful" (1971)

Daniel B. Schuster (1919 - 1996) graduated from the University of Wisconsin medical program in 1943 before joining the faculty of the department of psychiatry at the University of Rochester School of Medicine and Psychiatry. As a clinical professor, he conducted long-term supervision of patients at the university's Adult Outpatient Clinic, which had been "established for those in the community and surrounding counties who cannot afford private care" (Schuster & Freeman, 1970, p. 516). Patients are first evaluated through a two-week screening interview; once admitted for treatment, they are assigned to a team consisting of a senior resident and supervisor. Approximately one quarter of the patients at the Clinic are self-referred. Trained and professionally affiliated as a psychiatrist, Schuster did not undergo a psychoanalytic training analysis himself, having instead conducted a residency in psychiatry and neurology in the Wisconsin state hospital system before accepting his position in New York. He published several articles in major American psychoanalytic and psychiatric journals, co-authored a book on integrating psychoanalytic approaches into short-term clinical service provision, and wrote several pieces on the training of psychotherapists. This is the only writing Schuster published on the topic of race.

Lutrelle P. Gearhart earned a Master's in Social Work from the University of Michigan in 1963. She is presumably the psychiatric social worker to which the present analysand was first referred.

It is the late 1960s. The patient is a 25-year old elementary school teacher. She arrives at the Adult Outpatient Clinic at the University of Rochester reporting a rapidly decomposing life situation. She has alienated her friends and her career is on the brink of ruin. She is deep in debt and creditors are threatening legal action. Her so-called promiscuous sex life brews in the eye of this storm. Daniel Schuster, the supervising psychiatrist, learns that a specific axiom governs her sexual conduct, one that the patient frequently repeats: "black is beautiful." She uses this slogan, newly popularized in the 1960s by the black pride movement, as a criterion for selecting her sexual partners, all of whom are black men. She expresses a preference for soul musicians and those connected to the "ghetto subculture," and is especially affectionate of their black children.

In contrast, the patient insists that white men are impotent eunuchs, unable to please women, and that only black men embody true, virile masculinity. Only they are "real men," her codeword for sexually aggressive males. She abstains from sexual relations with white partners entirely while seeking out black men to provoke the censure of what Schuster describes as the "white establishment." What she sees as their begrudging tolerance of her behavior she enters as evidence of whites' pathetic unmanliness. Over the course of the two-and-a-half years in which she adheres to the "black is beautiful" conjunction, the patient engineers a series of progressively violent encounters with her paramours, which eventually result in physical confrontation. While humiliated, angry, and frustrated at the frequency with which her relationships crash and burn, Schuster reports that she derives great "narcissistic gratification" from her debasement and basks in her status as a "white sex symbol" (Gearhart & Schuster, 1971, p. 480). We begin with this stroke of irony: a case in which the "black is beautiful" mantra inflates the self-worth of a white woman.

What place does the patient's sexual conviction occupy in her libidinal economy? To approach this question requires first asking a different one: What triggered the analysand to enter therapy? Bruce Fink observes that the factor that motivates an analysand to seek analysis is generally a "crisis in jouissance," a breakdown in the ways in which a person has been deriving libidinal satisfaction—whether this is due to a waning *or* intensification of their symptoms (Fink, 1997, pp. 8-10). In this case, the construction of her racial symptom, "black is beautiful," did not trigger the flight into therapy: "At the time the patient initiated professional help for herself, an overidentification with her father was operating, for her anxiety coincided with his stress resulting from a progressively declining career" (Gearhart & Schuster, p. 480). Having held her father in such high regard, the patient experienced his termination like the fall of an idol,

particularly because his firing revealed that he had earned a reputation as a reckless spender of corporate accounts. Confirmation that her "crisis" is tied to his professional status is found in the event that triggers her latter "flight into health," or the sudden recovery ("re-covering" or repression) that follows a restoration of the symptom. Six months after his dishonorable discharge, "her father finally obtained a job, [and] the patient put aside mature questioning and reappraisal and reverted to her previous stereotyped conception of him" (ibid.).

The nature of her flight into illness orients the authors' interpretation of the etiology of the patient's symptom, which is said to center on the feelings of ambivalence she holds toward her parents. She has long been estranged from her severe and prudish mother, who consistently admonishes her choice of sexual partners and rebukes her "for behaving like a slut" (p. 481). In contrast, the patient's father was once a musician who, as family lore would have it, had a "wild sex life as a bachelor," but settled down after marriage (p. 482). But this deflation of sexual virility also elevates his stature in a different register, as her mother repeatedly warned the patient as a girl that "good men like your father" were not interested in girls who "messed around" (laterally, men who expressed sexual interest in the patient were described as being "no good") (p. 482). If his status as "good" hinges on mortgaging his sexual potency for a professional one, then the revelation that he had for years been wasteful with company money—professionally impotent—led the patient to a crisis of identity. "This humiliation seemed an influential factor in impelling her to seek professional help" (p. 483). In light of this history, the authors suppose "black is beautiful" served a defensive function that was attached to, inextricable from, and functional to the elevation of her father to the status of "good." The maintenance of the one sustains the other.

A distance consequently comes into view between the construction of the "sexual theory" that black is beautiful and the patient's flight into illness. But did black become beautiful at the exact moment that her father became good? No, and the patient describes her racial predilection as beginning after a precisely datable event. After accepting a job at a summer music camp while she was in college, the patient seduced an older, married white man with a pregnant wife, but the patient immediately felt "revulsion and contempt" for his infidelity and thenceforth rejected all white men, concluding instead that "black is beautiful" (p. 481). Schuster suggests that the patient is revolted by having seduced an insufficiently-differentiated substitute for the "incestuous object"—her father—and that her attraction to virile black men functions to preserve this verboten gratification in the disguise of symbolic (racial) difference. The bulk of the analysts' argument about white and black symbolism draws on three of Freud's articles on the splitting of "affectionate" and "sensual" sexual currents, but their dates of publication, between 1910 and 1912, antedate Freud's revisionary discovery of the drive and, before that, his metapsychological papers on the unconscious, narcissism, and repression.[16] Within the theoretical constraints this bibliography sets, the subject is limited to being understood as a closed economy that seeks a system homeostasis between the affectionate currents of childhood and the sensual currents of erotic love, which are split by the later prohibition of incest. If under normal conditions, the libido is said to be able to successfully recombine the childhood model of affection in a sensual object choice in such a way that circumvents the incest barrier, a common "pathological" strategy is to segregate love and sexual objects by overestimating the former and debasing the latter. The authors consequently see the fall of the father to a "degraded object" to

[16] The authors cite three articles by Freud (1910/1957b; 1911/1957a; 1912/1957c).

short-circuit the (unconscious) racial segregation of libidinal interests that had previously served as an "elaborate disguise of her persistent incestuous interest in her father" (p. 484).

The authors' conceptualization of the function of beauty, which they do not link to the Freudian oeuvre, nevertheless swerves the analysis back within a zone of analytic theory that they had avoided. Beauty works, in their estimation, as "an elaborate mechanism involving reaction-formation and sublimation to convert something unpleasant, abhorrent, and distressing into something tolerable—indeed highly desirable" (p. 483). Still, this concept must address why black is indeed beautiful if its racial debasement is needed to first attract the patient's sensual currents away from the beatified father. The other riddle requiring solving, of course, is how the cultural equation between black and "that which is dirty (impure), debased, sinister, evil, and magic" (ibid.), which the black power slogan itself was designed to counteract, finds itself already "counteracted" by a patient who incorporates an imago of black sexuality into a destructive sexual symptom. Schuster and Gearhart conclude that she extols this virtue because she *identifies* with her sexual partner/aggressor, as black comes to represent "her base sexual feelings, her evil, masculine strivings which are transformed and elevated to something beautiful" (p. 483). By "identifying with this object of great beauty" she is not only able to maintain her incestuous gratification but "accomplishes [the] restitution of her self-esteem" (p. 484). The previous split between "good" and "debased" external objects is linked to this internal splitting of the drive, which diverts sensual destructiveness outward and an affectionate current inward.

In demarcating the function of "black is beautiful," Schuster and Gearhart intend to consider "the role of irrational mental forces in racial prejudice" (p. 479). Yet this "irrationality" remains fairly economical, limited as it is to describing the intra-psychic displacement between

familial and social objects, as well as the contradictions the patient tolerates in beholding "debased objects" as beautiful. Even then, these contradictions are resolved by the implication of a sovereign, "ego-syntonic" aim—whether that of "esteem" or the unity of affection and sensuality typical of the "normal attitude in love" (Freud, 1912/1957c, p. 180)—that abridges the heterogeneity of the clinical material. The limitations of this cipher of interpretation leave its traces at several turns, most acutely in the circular claim that "color difference" serves "as a means of expressing the tabooed incest object *as well as* the incest barrier" (Gearhart & Schuster, 1971, p. 482, emphasis added). For the patient, the authors will add, "the black man becomes both a love object (who is not a parent) and a hated parent (for whom she has no love)" (p. 483). Under such a hypothesis of bifunctional harmony—modeled on the dualism of some of Freud's early theories that opposed the "purity" of love with the "baseness" of sex, that set the excess of the sexual instinct over and against the constraints of social life, that erased the inherent ambiguity of the drive—the author's final interpretation is revealed to be arbitrary. How? If the patient's sexual relations with black men camouflage the fulfilment of incest, as the analysts claim, the opposite contention is equally viable: that "slumming it" with black men is only the means to reinforcing the affection for her father, to maintaining the disguise of her sensual lust for him in the oversized garb of platonic veneration. Both explanations could be simultaneously true. The authors' sole consideration of the first explanation is only grounded in a vulgar historicism that assigns causality to the wish for incest (with the father) because of its supposed anteriority in the patient's life history. Because the father is fixed as a primordial sexual object, interracial relationships can only ever be a diversion from "same-race" relationships. Once this vulgar historicism is discarded, the analysis can return to the letter of the case, raising a question

on the order of logic: what distinguishes the "good" (father) and the "beautiful" (blackness) that results in their differential relations to "incest" (jouissance)?

Jacques Lacan incorporates the notions of the *good* and the *beautiful* into a schema of concentric envelopes around an unbearable surplus. Each serves as a barrier to incest, creating the constitutive distance between the subject and an excess of desire. The outermost layer of this schema of envelopes is the regime of utility and efficient use, described by Lacan as a "restraint constituted by the concatenation and circuit of goods" which is "linked by a whole tradition to pleasure" (1986/1992, p. 216). The pleasure obtained in "clean" and pleasurable uses, a value that the business profession of the patient's father emblematizes but that also refers to the marketplace of goods and consumerism more broadly, is conditional on a prudence and self-control that is sustained by the reciprocal power each individual is granted to limit others' disposal of "the good of all." This is a right that forms "a very solid link from which will emerge the other as such" (p. 229). Here are the rudiments of the right *and* limits to property. In the community distributed under any one of the signs of the "good of the all"—happiness, the commons, the satisfaction of needs, or some other object of a sovereign politics—the defense of one's goods from others also entails a relinquishing of desire and a renunciation of enjoyment: "forbidding oneself from enjoying" the good or squandering its value in a "*jouissance* use" (pp. 229-230).

Beyond the good, in the envelope closest to the field of jouissance, is the experience of beauty, "the true barrier that holds the subject back in front of the unspeakable field of radical desire that is the field of absolute destruction, of *destruction beyond putrefaction*" (pp. 216-7, emphasis added). Beauty "both reveals and hides that within it which constitutes a threat, denouement, unfolding, or decomposition" (p. 298). The beauty experienced here has for that

reason “nothing to do with what is called ideal beauty” based on “the famous human form,” and is thus non-identical to the cultural iconography that constitutes the conventional sphere of aesthetics (p. 297). Beauty in this denotation is not pretty and simply attractive (visage), it is repulsive and unendurable (lack); not symbolic or imaginary beauty, but a real beauty in its unbearable splendor (cf. Freeland, 2013). According to Lacan, this real beauty incarnates the “death instinct” with a “blindness effect” that wards off a destructive jouissance through a mixture of attraction and disgust—“clean” *and* “dirty” pleasure—that, in juxtaposition to the function of the good, reignites the dialectic of desire (Lacan, 1986/1992, p. 281). Lacan, in fact, will conclude that beauty emerges precisely there where the cordon sanitaire of the good is transgressed, acting as a final bearer of a limit to desire. Having now put the beautiful and the good on the same axis, the present case can be represented askew.

Like any rigorous theory, “black is beautiful” exists in a dialectical relationship to a practice, one that “was ultimately put to a martyr’s test” when the patient, driven by her curiosity about soul music, took a summer job as a bartender at a seedy black watering hole (Gearhart & Schuster, 1971, p. 480). Contrary to the conclusion that the racial other serves as both the barrier and object for the patient’s incestuous gratification, these events reveal a delamination between the source and aim of her sexual drive, putting the very “objectivity” of incest in question. Practically, the analysand’s dialectic of desire ricochets between attraction and disgust, which a masochistic self-punishment ultimately delimits:

> Her entry into the black ghetto subculture assaulted her sensibilities when she learned that pimps, prostitution, gambling, marihuana, and hard narcotics were real parts of the “dirty world.” So great, however, were [sic] her narcissistic gratification at becoming the “white sex symbol” and her proclivity for trouble, that the patient could not extricate herself. Propelled by masochistic needs, the patient maneuvered the blacks into throwing her out. (p. 480)

"Ghetto culture" incarnates the beauty of black soul in its vitality *and* putrefaction, but the object of jouissance, that "destruction *beyond* putrefaction," is precisely distanced and delayed by her failure to ingratiate herself into black social life and by the masochistic pain the analysand engineers. Lacan likens the production of pain to "a panicky return to the dialectic of goods" insofar as pain, like pleasure and the good, is a symbolic resource nurtured, distributed, and regulated in an imagined community (Lacan, 1986/1992, p. 239). Rather than efficiently combining the debased and the beautiful in the black sexual object, the patient derives a masochistic enjoyment from her repeated failure to complete the sublimation from the one to the other, her failure to effectively realize blackness as simultaneously good and enjoyable.

As she approaches the limit of the beautiful, the analysand resorts to an extreme measure to maintain her desire, while her theory progressively undergoes a systematic contortion—or more accurately, a refinement. She is plunged at one point into a "jealous panic" after perceiving the interest of her latest black paramour to be on the wane. She stages a showdown as a form of crisis intervention into her flagging symptom formation.

> During the fracas, she shouted obscenities of incest, race, and color as he taunted her with the threat of following her south to rape her in front of her grandmother. He knocked her to the floor and hit her in the face and body, yet later the patient could speak with masochistic pride that she had been beaten up "by a black." (Gearhart & Schuster, 1971, p. 480)

The analysand is fired from job as a barmaid and becomes a persona non grata in the ghetto's social circles. And yet:

> Her feelings of shame, frustration, and rage were mobilized by the thought that she was "not good enough for dirty niggers." The outcome of this experience for the patient has been a *refinement* of black as synonymous with "a real man," and "dirty nigger" as her epithet for an exploiter of women. Although the patient was temporarily stunned by physical pain and humiliation, she reentered the black community to foray for a "real man." (ibid., emphasis added)

"Black is beautiful" contains now two distinct but related theories: one that black men are "real"— strong, sexually potent, dirty but desirable—and one that "dirty niggers" enjoy, squander, and destroy "the good of the all" and are corrosive to value as such. Blackness contains on the one hand an identity of oppositions between life and death, and on the other hand a destruction beyond this dialectic, in excess of decomposition. With this annotation, we can turn now to the conclusion Gearhart and Schuster reach on the role or function of racial prejudice in the patient's pscyhopathology, which they interestingly define in the inverse—the analysand's "espousal of 'black is beautiful,'" and her identification with black hypersexuality, "does not result in contempt and prejudice against one of a different color" but "appears to be an *opposite state of prejudice*" (pp. 483-4, emphasis added).

Prejudice is said to lie in an opposite state owing to the manner in which the patient's sexual philosophy transgresses a moral injunction imposed by her maternal grandparents, who "epitomized traditional southern aristocratic culture, reminiscent of pre-Civil War plantation life, and a social system segregated by color and separated by classes" (p. 481). Their granddaughter subverted this culture early in her youth by "associating with 'poor white trash,'" particularly a "dirty sharecropper" (p. 481). Sleeping with black men extends the transgression of the edict against associating with "bad men," which was passed down first from the patient's grandmother, then from her own mother. A barrier to a rather different iteration of "incest" is thus erected in an expansion of the analysand's theory: black is beautiful *is anti-racism*—relations with black men flout the suffocating restrictions and incestuous endogamy demanded by the matrilineal superego and embraces the liberalization of sexual relations. Of course, the celebration of black aesthetics as an antidote to racist culture and public degradation first emerged in black countercultural movements. But this discourse seems to have also contributed

to flipping the historical equivalence between *incest* and *amalgamation* on its head. If Christina Sharpe reads the antebellum (and subsequently Jim Crow) equation between incest and amalgamation as a "phantasmatically powerful conjunction," as a single prohibition equally leveled in an "equation in which *too different* is the same as *too similar*," and if this furthermore marked "one nodal point around which subjectivity in the New World was reorganized and around which it cohered" (Sharpe, 2010, p. 28, emphasis in original), then the patient's anti-racist stance personifies a break with this historical alignment. Her pursuit of desire across the color line enabled her to escape the "tight family constellation" and strict limits on fraternizing across race and class differences imposed by the "southern system," which had left the analysand socially isolated from her peer group (Gearhart & Schuster, p. 481).[17] This is an equation in which *too similar* is the same as *too racist*. Interracial sex acts as a prophylactic against matrilineal racism; the injunction to enjoy and the injunction against racism replace the injunction against racial segregation. Together, they allow the patient to effectively enjoy anti-racism.

Instead of thinking of this as a liberation of sexuality, of the 1960s as the final death knell of a Victorian system of sexual proscriptions, or of the deconstruction of antimiscegenation laws as an (even ambivalent) lifting of repression, the patient's pursuit of interracial sex illustrates the historical relocation of prohibition and its *multiplication* on the level of the subject. Whereas the grandparents bar interracial and inter-class contact in accordance with an exclusionary regime of racial capital, the patient begins here to *prohibit everything except* for one very particular mode of maximized enjoyment spelled out under the "black is beautiful" axiom. Unsurprisingly, her

[17] Notably, during the adult sexual activity documented in this case history, the patient establishes an esprit de corps with her white male contemporaries, relationships that the authors describe as being "characteristic of siblings," and who she exploits not for sex, but for "practical utilitarian needs" (p. 479).

decision to sleep with "white trash" earlier in her life was met with harsh disapproval by her entire family—everyone, that is, except her father, who was absent that summer on business. Schuster recalls that the patient insisted that she felt that if her father were present, he would have "understood" her subversive sexual choice "and protected her against their [her mother's and grandmother's] unfair attack" (p. 481). We will return to this feeling about her father in a moment.

"Black is beautiful" therefore seems to be inextricable from a broader historical reorganization of sexuality, law, utility, and sovereignty. Speaking at the beginning of the 1960s, Lacan described the "movement that the world we live in is caught up in [as] wanting to establish the universal spread of the service of good as far as conceivably possible" (Lacan, 1986/1992, p. 303). He further observes that the good "cannot reign over all without an excess emerging," that "to promote the good of all as the law without limits, the sovereign law… goes beyond or crosses the limit" (p. 259). What limit? The imperial extension of utilitarianism enters a double bind at that moment when it stops opposing the good to jouissance and begins to "reign over" enjoyment itself. The function the good formerly had—to exclude jouissance—now includes jouissance into the sovereign aim, erasing the limit that the beautiful would have safeguarded in luring desire away from its decomposition.

The analysand encounters the predicament of facing an increasing restriction on restrictiveness in the unconcerned response she receives from the "white Establishment," which commands productive enjoyment, jouissance without loss, or pleasure without undue excess—that is, a jouissance only relieved of its unbearable quality. Her employer only threatens to fire the analysand as her exhibitionism begins to affect her work as a teacher, but her behavior otherwise just generates "disbelief and indignation" and "evokes a permissive paternal attitude in

older white men" (Gearhart & Schuster, 1971, p. 480). This tolerance for her surplus gratification, the lack of any effective prohibition, subtracts the unbearable from the beautiful to (re)fashion another good. Jacques-Alain Miller, following up on Lacan's comments, flags the phase of capital that was becoming contemporary at the end of the 1960s as similarly defined by a systematic *permissiveness*, where "the cause of difficulty [in the analysand] is the prohibition on prohibiting" (Miller, 2006, p. 12). The injunction to enjoy does not open a new realm of pleasure but makes enjoyment increasingly dissatisfying by unburdening it of its liminal quality. By elevating "black" from its Southern station (as "bad," which is but the "good" in its "opposite state") to the beautiful, and making this the *only* pathway for her desire, the analysand engineers a personal series of restrictive covenants, and constructs out of blackness an intimate source of unbearable enjoyment. This serves to reintroduce *negativity* into her sexual economy.

Within and against the injunction to enjoy without negativity, the patient racks up debts and losses, financial and social, that threatened to derail her career and ruin her life situation at the beginning of the treatment. Yet the patient did not just reach an arbitrary breaking point when she entered analysis. The efficiency of "black is beautiful" hinges on the function her father plays to guarantee its creditworthiness. Rather than the castrating, punishing, prohibiting figure the father strikes in an Oedipal schema, he is here characterized by his permissiveness, his license, his mild and provident hand. He serves as a point of symbolic consistency that approves the validity of debt. In the function of an "Other supposed to know," he sustains the collective fiction that all debts and transgressions will eventually be reconciled. Conviction in his power maintains faith in the significance of debt by providing a type of deposit insurance on all symbolic credits extended, and a limitation of liability for all symbolic debts assumed. This belief requires the father to take an abstract and idealized form, safe from association with any

flaws that would tarnish his sterling image. Like the patient's father, the perfect guarantor is an absent one. Thus, when he was eventually revealed as a reckless spender, as excessive with money as she herself was in the domain of sex, the patient's externalized point of accountability evaporated, and the debts to society she racked up in the pursuit of pleasure suddenly lose the discrete proportions that his imaginary yardstick maintained.

Recall that the analysand entered analysis as "creditors were threatening her with legal action… [and] her father was unable… to pay off her debts" (p. 479). As suddenly present *and* unemployed, the patient's father loses the (semblance of the) power to permit, evaluate, and pardon the negative surplus the patient had accumulated. He was in this sense an exceptional part of the same "White establishment" for which the patient otherwise held so much contempt. The evaporation of his power threatens not to "free" the subject from debt and discipline, but to retroactively convert the transgressive nature of her racial enjoyments, the negativity of her destructive sexual tastes, or her "debt to society," into activities forgiven and forgotten, satisfactions without cost, an itinerary lacking lack. Was this lack of lack not the specter of anxiety that triggered her flight into therapy? And was her father's subsequent re-idolization not the event that restored her negative surplus?

I think we can witness here a transition between—or rather a combination of—two grammars of racial power: one based on the restrictive maternal law, and the other on a new, permissive paternal law. The former maternal law pursues a patriarchal order comprised of rigid segregations, the purification of racial difference, and a monumentalization of utility based on the "good of all," where whiteness and sovereignty are soldered and indistinct. The latter paternal law expands the "good of all" to the "good of enjoyment." For this new permissive schema, racial restrictions are anathema to the pursuit of enjoyment. Rather than the

consummation of incest—an attempt to recover a lost, full enjoyment—the patient's sexual pursuits, her constantly disappointed mission to seduce a black man who can fully satisfy her, *actively engineers her own castration*—a castration spectacularized both in the debt she accumulates and the physical and emotional injuries she goads her black partners into inflicting. She, in a new reversal, overidentifies with the black pride slogan of "black is beautiful," designing her own castration *as if* black men are not castrated. In this way does she pursue her sexual itinerary *as if* the imaginary wholeness of "real" black men, as obtainable objects of enjoyment, were always imminent, just one seduction away.

“The Living Proof of Oppression” (1967)

Martin Grotjahn (1904 – 1990) was a prolific psychoanalyst—he published over 400 texts over the course of 60 years of professional life—and co-founded the Southern California Institute for Psychoanalysis (it merged with the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society and Institute in 2005 to form the current New Center for Psychoanalysis). Born in Berlin and trained at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, Grotjahn fled Nazism for Kansas in 1936, where he worked at the Menninger Clinic in Topeka (Schlachet & Grotjahn, 1980; Hale, 2001). He practiced at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis under Franz Alexander before moving to Los Angeles to serve as a training analyst. Soon thereafter, Grotjahn began a private practice in Beverly Hills and concluded his career as a clinical professor of psychiatry at the University of Southern California. Grotjahn is known for pioneering work on family and group therapy, while his most-recognized text is likely a book on the psychoanalysis of humor (Grotjahn, 1957/1966). Elizabeth Danto affiliates Grotjahn to a leftist tradition of psychoanalysis with ties back to the early years of the Berlin Policlinic (Danto, 2005). At the time the present piece was published, Grotjahn was conducting clinical work at USC and was at the peak of his scholarly output. This article was published in Gandhi Marg, the journal of the Gandhi Peace Foundation, which was founded in India in the 1950s with the mission to promote truth and justice through nonviolence.

Karem J. Monsour had a private practice in Pasadena, California, and served as the director of counseling services at the Claremont Colleges from 1967 to 1980.

One is immediately struck by the resemblances between this case and that of Little Hans nearly sixty years prior. Both, as the title of Freud’s 1909 article indicates, are an “analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy” (Freud, 1909/1955a). In the former as in the latter, a worried father reports his son’s troublesome behaviors and beliefs to the analyst, while the presence and absence of the mother accompanies the emergence of a supposedly phobic symptom. It remains to be seen if the similarities end at these superficial appearances. Billy is the subject of the present case, the youngest of four siblings. He is described as experiencing a “symptomatic attack of incipient anti-Negro prejudice” directed at Mary, “a Negro cleaning woman” working for the family who is delegated guardian duties during periods in which the parents are absent (Monsour & Grotjahn, 1967, p. 341). Billy had always expressed a maternal affection for Mary, which made his pronouncement—“Black people are all bad. They hurt you”—come as such a

"surprise" to his family. Asked by a playmate if Mary, too, is "bad," Billy (overheard by his father) clarifies: "Mary isn't black: she's reddish-brown and she's good, because she cleans" (p. 342). These comments comprise part of what the authors described as a "single symptomatic outburst which gradually receded as his ego integrity became re-established following his parents' return" (p. 343).

The analysts conclude that Billy is suffering from a phobia that issues from a powerful Oedipal conflict, one that is triggered by the routine absence of his mother. The feelings of abandonment that followed her departures led Billy's affection for Mary, a maternal substitute, to suddenly intensify. But to stave off a consummation of his "incestuous" impulses with this substitute, a consummation that he desperately feared, Billy renders Mary undesirable by associating to her various antiblack qualities and negative generalizations that are readily available in the cultural milieu. Prejudice is subsequently defined by the authors as "primarily the shunning of a symbolically feared object" (pp. 344-5). Phobia is the "mechanism" of racial prejudice because it *resolves* an Oedipal impasse, constituting a "first phase" of prejudice that the authors correlate to the institution of segregation. By placing a substitute for maternal love behind the color line, the prohibition of incest is firmly attached to the social institutions of race, fashioned into a taboo that—as Freud wrote—does "not differ in [its] psychological nature from Kant's 'categorical imperative', which operates in a compulsive fashion and rejects any conscious motives" (1913/1955c, p. xiv). The "second phase" of prejudice—not a necessary component of prejudice but indeed a product of the *failure* of the racial resolution of the Oedipus complex—consists of additional "aggressive components" from an "overt hatred" that is triggered when the boundaries of segregation that have been libidinized by the phobic structure are perceived to be in danger of being transgressed (pp. 348-349).

Despite their heavy accent on the Oedipal dynamic, the authors forgo mentioning any synonymy between Billy and Little Hans, the boy Freud had affectionately called "little Oedipus" (Freud, 1909/1955a, p. 97). Instead, Grotjahn and Monsour refer to Freud's second great paternal myth, that of the primal father. They contend that the social institutions (totem) and sexual prohibitions (taboo) that install order and mitigate aggressive impulses in the wake of the ancient "murder" of the primal father generate a "social super-ego structure," a moral law, that materializes in modern Western democracies *as* racial prejudice. Excerpts of Brian Bird's psychoanalysis of prejudice (1957) supports the subsequent hypothesis that racialization and the erection of antimiscegenation laws has a stabilizing "social function" correlative to the "ego adaptive function" it plays for Billy—as a method of coping with maternal loss (lack) and mitigating the realization of incest (excess)—as well as to the various myths and religious beliefs that organize primitive societies. Racial prejudice replaces religion as the categorical imperative of the agnostic age. In this case, because it conflicts with racial prejudice, the modern notion of *racial equality* is found guilty of inducing the "social friction" that manifests in the unrest in the contemporary (1960s) United States (Monsour & Grotjahn, 1967, p. 348). A democracy without racial taboos thus countervails the racialization of "ancient" proscriptions, threatening to plunge society into a pre-social chaos. "In this light," finish the authors, "one might conceive of racial prejudice as an indication of the on-going socio-cultural struggle for internationalization of behavior control leading to conscience development" (pp. 348-9). If the color line maintains social order, the institutionalization of racial prejudice renders civilization as a *socialized phobia*, and Billy in turn as a normal case of neurosis.

A major difference between Little Billy and Freud's Little Hans lies in how Billy's phobia has already been "socialized": the place that Mary occupies as the tabooed subject in

Billy's case correlates to "the part" that vexes Little Hans in his own symptomatology—his penis. Although Hans' mother had chided her son for his onanism, the trauma his phobia indexes lies not in a fear of losing his penis ("castration anxiety"), but in encountering sexuality, via his eroticized "*widdler*," in its radical heterogeneity to the body, as primally "detached" (Pluth, 2007b). By Freud's reckoning, sexuality itself is the so-called tabooed object, while the *horse* that triggers the outbreak of anxiety is Little Hans' phobic object—a distinction between source and object not made in the account given of Billy's prejudice, but which makes phobia in any case irreducible to its object. For Freud, the horse that Hans perceives to "bite" and "fall down" is an *equivalent* of his father. As such, the repressed desire Hans harbors for his father's death ("fall") coincides with the reprisals ("bites") he fears carrying out his wish would entail (Freud, 1909/1955a, p. 126). In rereading the case, Lacan treats the horse not as an equivalent or facsimile of the father, but as an executor of the paternal *function*. "Horse" is a contingent signifier and strictly meaningless—as a pure substitution for the trauma of sexuality, it represents nothing (Zafiropoulos, 2010, p. 181). Rather, the phobic object *castrates*, engendering lack and the dialectic of the signifier inherent to symbolic structure as such, enabling thereafter the subject's production of an "individual myth" (Lacan, 1979) that *inscribes* the enigma of sexuality into the enigma of language. To inscribe sexuality means putting it into words but this does not *resolve* sexuality. A possible definition of the subject becomes tangible: the subject spans the gap in the repetition of the impasse of sexuality into the impasse of language. In a relevant discussion, Ed Pluth describes how children like Hans and Billy initially make an "imitative use of signifiers detached from questions of meaning, expression, and intent," a use that consists of "simply taking up the enigma of signifiers as such" to cipher the terror of an Other sexuality—neither the child's nor an other's (2007b, p. 76). For signifiers to lack meaning—like the

"fort/da" game that Freud's grandson played using a spool of thread—does not mean that their constructions lack a logic, only that their formal articulation is wholly unconscious. Language "uses" the child (as with the adult) as much as the other way around, providing a privileged demonstration of the signifier's constitutionally alien nature and its basically "stupid" character.

Can Billy's "individual myth" be considered a phobia, as Grotjahn and Monsour contend, or is it rather an imitative use of signifiers (of the Other) as Pluth illustrates?[18] Making little ado about their content, the authors catalog in this case history a series of elementary intellectualizations and conversational exchanges that Billy had made by the age of five, which the authors ascribe as relevant to the construction of his racial phobia. One of these intellectualizations codifies sexual difference: "Louie [the family dog] is a boy. Dogs are boys and cats are girls" (Monsour & Grotjahn, 1967, p. 341). (Upon "confessing" this theory, Billy waxes embarrassed before he "tried to confuse the issue by reversing and re-reversing this statement.") During a subsequent phase of juvenile sexual advances, Billy also gave "numerous oblique indications that he knew the 'facts of life,'" but "he steadfastly refused to ask directly about babies and how they were made. He seemed to be trying 'not to know' about such matters" (p. 342). Billy extended this line of inquiry on the heels of a stay at Mary's house, where he had been deposited when his parents were away. "I know how to tell where people live. People with white faces live together in one place and people with brown and black faces live in a different place." On another occasion Mary had just been picked up at her house, and Billy concluded: "I've got a white face and Mary, your face is black. It's sort of reddish-brown. Lots of people here [in Mary's neighborhood] have reddish-brown faces." "You look very pretty Mary" (ibid.).

[18] What Lacan calls an "individual myth" is homologous to what Freud elsewhere calls a "sexual theory," which is an early attempt by children to formulate knowledge *as* an ignorance of sexuality (cf. Leader, 2003).

Two weeks after this exchange, Billy and his father discussed church, as Billy had recently attended one with Mary. His father asked him if he enjoyed this experience.

> *Billy*: No. It was too much noise around there.
> *Father*: Were all kinds of people with all kinds of faces there?
> *Billy*: No. Only brownish-black faces.
> *Father*: (Asks why.)
> *Billy*: Because the church is where all the brownish-black people live around there.
> *Father*: (Asks if Billy thought they were nice people.)
> *Billy*: No. They're bad.
> *Father*: (Asks why.)
> *Billy*: (No answer.) (p. 343, formatting mine).

This topic arose as Billy was accompanying his father to Sunday school to pick up his sister. As the all-white congregants began to exit, Billy's father asks him if he thought "the people in this church were funny people like people at the brownish-black people's church."

> *Billy*: Yes. I'm going to get brownish-black and so are you when we get older.
> *Father*: (Asks if he was going to really get brownish-black.)
> *Billy*: No. I'll tell you something. The people with white faces are new and people with brownish-black faces are old.
> *Father*: (Asks if children who played near Mary's house were new.)
> *Billy*: No, they're old. (ibid.)

At nine years old, Billy demonstrates what the authors call "ambivalent residues" from his so-called prejudice three-and-a-half years before. During a car ride, Billy and his father pass a library just as a young black boy was leaving with several books in-hand.

> *Father*: Do you think there should be libraries only for Negro children and ones only for white children?
> *Billy*: No. They (i.e. Negroes) aren't any different from any other types of people. Just their skin is more colourful.
> (Silence.)
> *Billy*: Why don't Negroes get to vote as much as white people?
> *Father*: I think they should, don't you?
> *Billy*: Yes, they're the same as any other types.
> *Billy*: Besides someday I'm going to be a Negro anyway because they have more rights! Someday the Negro people are going to be the only ones who get to vote and they aren't going to let the white people vote then. (ibid.)

Grotjahn and Monsour both separate Billy's sexual theories from his "prejudice-tinged remarks" and discard their relevance, leaving their linked occupation with the "facts of life"—the origin of children in an enigmatic and traumatic sexual act—unelaborated. We can begin by noting that Billy's bestial coding of sexual difference rudimentarily inscribes this sexuality as the impossibility of the sexual relation. Whether boys or girls are cast as cats or dogs, a symbolic division on the order of species attests to a real impasse: the sexual non-rapport. Billy's first prejudiced remarks about black people also divide a "good" Mary from "bad" black people, which attempts to inscribe the Mary's otherness *as such* into a series of mutual exclusions that are ordered geographically (by neighborhood), temporally (by age), and politically (by the "quantity" of rights).

It may be tempting to assign these symbolic oppositions the status of paradigm, but that can only generalize one component of racial reason while leaving its structure unaccounted for. Describing Billy's anti-Negro prejudice as "incipient," as the authors do, correctly locates it in the future perfect, as Billy is currently doing nothing more than multiplying the points at which the impasse of sexuality is being inscribed into purely symbolic oppositions that have *no personal meaning*, including the "prejudiced" oppositions of black/white, reddish-brown/brownish-black, and good/bad. Billy's affection for Mary can also be specified as a *demand for love*, as it is her incapacity to satisfy this demand that causes Billy to multiply these symbolic oppositions in the first place—oppositions that are constitutive of desire in the signifying order insofar as they do not localize an object of desire.

Preempting the counterpoint that Billy's selection of Mary as a phobic object might simply be contingent, the analysts parry that "it was precisely the observable differentness of Mary, that is her colour, which permitted labelling Billy's behaviour as a form of prejudice"

(Monsour & Grotjahn, 1967, p. 345). More than just an important figure, Mary's race is thereby considered to be the cause of Billy's prejudiced behavior. But this problematically projects a meaning from the "outside" position of the analyst onto a signified ("colour"), instead of constructing the cause of Billy's philosophizing in a split in the signifier—that is, in the subject as we have begun to define it.[19] The ultimate lack of an understanding about racial difference is why Billy, when asked by his father in the first dialogue about the cause (or "signified") for his racial discrimination between good and bad, *does not have an answer*. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, oppositional binaries can only become "rigid" once they are triangulated by a meaningless third term. As we will see, Billy's indeterminacy and doubt lead to a series of contradictions and reversals of statements that indicate that there is precisely no such firmly grounded relation between opposing signifiers (yet).

Perhaps the most striking common denominator among all of the intellectualizations and conversations relayed by his father is the doubt in which Billy's categorizations are laced, readable as an effect of his "trying not to know" about the "facts of life." For instance, the "imperious tone of voice" in which he describes his theory on cats and dogs immediately gives way to a chagrined equivocation, while his decree separating the "good" Mary from "bad" blacks was "categorical and carried an impression that he was denying a feeling of uncertainty which he hoped to put aside by this determined statement" (p. 342). But this categorical uncertainty attests to the *absence* of phobia, as doubt is precisely the sign of an assimilation into the lack that riddles the symbolic; on the contrary, the anxiety with which phobia contends signals the certainty of a traumatic jouissance that is not elaborated into, or mediated by, signifiers. The

[19] Here we should add that the self-evidence that Mary's "colour" is supposed to have provided Billy is belied by his otherwise anti-empiricist observations, such as the connection between "old" black children and "new" white adults that ignore the "self-evidence" of size and height.

anxiety Little Hans experienced, his fear of being bitten and devoured, led the phobic object of "horse" to stand in for the absent paternal metaphor, localizing the unbound desire of the mother. But we notice instead how a "no" begins nearly all of Billy's responses: having been acquired to whatever extent *by* the function of negation does not require the response of the construction of the "signifying crystal" of a phobia to mediate the Real of sex (Lacan, 1970/2006a, p. 432). This greatly complicates Grotjahn's and Monsour's analysis: if all phobias involve a mythic "racial" construction, as they contend, it seems now that not all racializations of totem and taboo are necessarily phobic. Where then is racial prejudice located?

Four years after its publication, one analyst responded to the present case. It is the only other treatment it received.

> *Herbert A. Robinson, M.D., is formerly a psychiatrist and Chief Deputy Director of the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health. He was in "spoken and written" communication with Karem Monsour during the writing of this indirect response.*

In a short commentary that briefly returns to Billy's case presentation, Herbert Robinson disputes the utility or use value Monsour and Grotjahn grant racial prejudice—that racial phobia economically defends against incest. Robinson argues instead that racial prejudice accrues only a volatile and unstable "pseudo-therapeutic benefit." The pivotal additions to the analysis are the insights that Robinson derives from his experience as a black psychiatrist treating paranoid white patients, which, to put it bluntly, demonstrates how the "social super-ego" hypothesis does not pass the clinical smell test. This hypothesis "appears most vulnerable to challenge by the black psychiatrists" whose working-class white patients regularly achieved a "rapid reconstitution" of their egos through an idealizing identification with their black psychiatrists (Robinson, 1971, p. 233). This observation of a transference phenomenon doubles as a criticism of American

psychoanalysts—among whom we can include Grotjahn and Monsour and the nihilist "cure" they propose (more on this below)—who equate an identification with the analyst with the aim and successful termination of the analysis. Robinson will grant that racial prejudice, like incest, exhibits a wide-ranging attraction, but contends that its "adaptive mechanism" is paradoxically destabilizing.

Robinson describes the "reconstitution" (or "health") of his white patients following their identification with him as a "pseudo-recovery" (or "pseudo-health") (p. 233). This ambivalent achievement

> has been attributed to the paranoid patient's identification with the "oppressed." In his concreteness, he makes no allowance for different life experiences among black people. Black is black and the white paranoid patient projects his feelings of oppression onto all blacks, equating it with the oppression he imagines himself to be undergoing. (p. 232)

The crux of this pseudo-recovery pivots on an empathetic identification with black oppression that these twentieth-century John Rankins make, rather than the type of active denigration Billy is projected (by his thumb-twiddling father and therapists) to be making. If this is less than "healthy," it is not in the least because this ideal "cure" is "based upon denial and unrealistic identification," or the suppletion of a delusion.[20] To wit:

> It replaces the overt paranoid symptomatology with an underlying fixed delusional system grounded on the belief that the therapist's blackness has confirmed the patient's paranoid theories. With the "living proof of oppression" in front of him, the patient need no longer be preoccupied with fears of oppression; instead, he feels able to endure "injustices" as calmly as does his "oppressed" therapist. (p. 233)

[20] Specifically, the white paranoid "uses denial of accomplishment to reduce the status of the black therapist to that of peer, or at least comrade-in-arms against the oppressor" (pp. 232-3). This imaginary equalization of character has the effect of disavowing the racism that the "oppressed" black psychiatrist has to survive to "accomplish" his position. Laterally, Robinson also implies that this imaginary equality and the empathic understanding of black suffering has the additional function of repressing the white subject's own "fears of oppression," which are the delusions of persecution that personify the painful incursions of jouissance definitive of the paranoid structure.

The patient's reconstitution is an "ego destructive" cure because it expands the paranoid structure, objectifying it as an external reality of race relations. By providing delusions of persecution proof in the image, ideal, and metaphor of the black analyst, paranoid speculation is inscribed as a paranoid fact. The "living proof of oppression" or *castration in the flesh* provides a reference point for the patient that transposes the impasse of sexuality into the impasse of an intractable (symbolic) "race problem."

An additional line of commentary in Robinson's critique of the case history is inextricable from this clinical counterexample. Before Mary's "colour" attains any meaning or binary articulation, which is where Monsour and Grotjahn locate the emergence of the "second phase" of racial prejudice, Robinson writes that Billy will have "'learned' racial prejudice, although *without demonstrating behavioral pathology*, prior to the oedipal phase," before the "secondary or acting out phase" (p. 233, emphasis added). Such a pre-symptomatic "learning" can be understood as a "learning" *in* the Other, a prior articulation that precedes the subject, which produces the signifiers that are always already available for Billy to use "stupidly" or meaninglessly. Racial prejudice would consequently have no particular symptomatology; in exceeding the Oedipal phase of a particular family constellation or biographical experience, it exists first and foremost as a signifying system attached to symbolically organized social practices:

> His parents and Mary had "taught" racial prejudice to Billy by the roles they played: those of the white (superior) employer and the black (inferior) servant. By the time he was five the demeaning connotation of maidservant had become synonymous with black woman many times over in Billy's thinking. (pp. 233-4)

Described here is a process that is the obverse of the identification that Robinson described his paranoid white patient making. If a patient with a paranoid structure objectifies a bodily invasion of jouissance by inscribing (but not resolving) it racially (cf. Vanheule, 2011), then Billy is

subjectified by racialization, sinking his initial anchor points in the Other through his imitative use of racial signifiers. Billy does not so much acquire racial prejudice at a particular stage (anal, oral, Oedipal, etc.) as much as he becomes alienated *into* the symbolic *through* the material practices of racial prejudice.

We might say that the pre-symptomatic Billy and the post-paranoid white patient both evade racism as an otherness intrinsic to the practices of racial hierarchy. Billy converts the insatiable demand for maternal love that he directs at Mary through the "imitative use" of racial signifiers, triggering the dialectic of oppositions that introduces doubt (i.e. lack) into the signifying system to which he is subjectified. But Robinson's patients face a stalled dialectic of the signifier, which has been petrified in their persecutory delusions. The white patients of the Los Angeles psychiatric clinic perform a last-ditch identification *with* the object of prejudice that has the effect of inscribing by racial proxy the castration (i.e. lack) that had gone missing (or had never been established). The partial identification with blackness sustains the paranoid delusion of imminent persecution by way of the "living proof" that this persecution has *already* occurred in the black personage.

The clinical solution to a "lacking lack" that an identification with the black analyst provides in the 1970s has its functional correspondent in the place Ann duCille describes the black woman as occupying in the overlapping developments of multiculturalism, commodity culture, and cultural theory in the 1990s. The black woman is converted in these fields into a highly-renewable and highly-renewing "other Otherness [or] hyperstatic alterity" (duCille, 1997, p. 22). Further, the African American woman circulates as a "principal signifier" in the fields of feminist literary studies and psychoanalysis, functioning as an "infinitely deconstructable 'othered' matter" (p. 21) that rescues postmodern theorizing—which dispatches with notions of

truth (i.e. external reference) and the limit of difference (i.e. negativity)—from a self-circuiting stall, relodging an *un*-deconstructable rock of difference that renews the terms of debate and recharges the productivity of commentary. If, per duCille, the impasse of postmodernism is inscribed in the black woman as an infinitely deconstructable object, Robinson's patients inscribe the invasive bodily *jouissance* expressed by their paranoid fantasies as an infinitely deconstructable *racism*. First establishing the interchangeability of an unbearable experience and the experience of racism—the "white paranoid patient projects his feelings of oppression onto all blacks"—he then shores up his delusional schema through the "external" renunciation of racism—"the patient need no longer be preoccupied with fears of oppression" (Robinson, p. 233).

Back to the original case: if his parents do not openly discuss with Billy the enigmatic origin of babies, they also fail to mention the place Mary inhabits as the maidservant in their domestic economy. Billy's doubt is both a sign of his non-phobic neurosis *and* directed at the unsatisfying explanation he is (not) given about the superabundant source of "uncanny pleasure" (Sharpe, 2010, p. 160) that Mary's presence generates—and this against his liberal father's intimation of the "good" of equal rights, begging evermore the unasked question of division as an effect of an intrinsic otherness, one that that "inequality" implies and inscribes. Reading the enigma of this division into Billy's signifying plays, that is, as exercises of his sexual curiosity, one can reuse one of the authors' descriptions, and transpose their terms: Billy "had given numerous oblique indications that he knew about the 'facts of [racism],' though he steadfastly refused to ask directly about [Mary] and how [enjoyment] was made. He seemed to be trying 'not to know' about such matters."

Grotjahn and Monsour conclude their analysis with the contention that prejudice, or at least one part of it, cannot be eradicated, an inference that issues from the consistency their social adaptation hypothesis demands. "Racial *discrimination* can be changed perhaps… But racial *prejudice*, which is at the root of most forms of discrimination, will not be easily changed. Nor is it likely to disappear when its sources spring from the most profound anxieties in human nature" (Monsour & Grotjahn, 1967, p. 349, emphasis added). Recall that racial "phobia" is a social good insofar as it is realized as a segregationist system that distances the object of incest; this consequently defines the good as the satisfaction of detoured or mediated sexual needs, which are themselves opposed to (and defenses against) the "horror of incest" (p. 347). In the same category as "incest" are the values of justice, equal opportunity, and the "democratic processes and increasing equalization of the social classes through industrial and educational processes," all of which are antithetical to racism (p. 348). Democracy (as anti-racism) and "civilization" (as racial taboos) are in the last instance mutually incompatible, with postwar liberalism defined as a form of anti-racism that violates the ontological limits of civilization. Splitting racial prejudice into a primary "phobia" (segregation) and the sexual aggression of the "secondary or acting out phase," Grotjahn and Monsour warn that the former component must be preserved—not just to reinstall a limit on the latter that liberalism was beginning to dismantle in the 1960s, but to spare the black population from social violence. "Pathological prejudice [i.e. 'phobia'] is a condition imposed on the personality by the ego in order to deny aggression access to motility" (p. 349). To drive the point home, the authors refer to the "universal" horror that is supposed to accompany a question that would have been freshly reinjected into the public discourse: "Would you want your daughter to marry a Negro?" (*Loving v. Virginia*, like this article, was issued in 1967.)

Three scenarios march in this parade of horrors: incest, intermarriage, and Civil Rights Era liberalism. What common structural complex links these three scenarios—or "delusions" as Robinson might call them? The horror each scenario elicits betrays an aversion to "sexual instincts" run amok, which the authors strive to *resolve* in lieu of *repeating* the impasse of sexuality in the (impasse of the) symbolic, as Billy does. In generalizing a so-called phobia to the level of paradigm, Grotjahn and Monsour thus commit to the "delusion" of a pure (incestuous) drive without vicissitudes, or what is the same thing, to a total binding of the "vicissitudes" of the instinct (*Trieb*) (Freud, 1915/1957d). Their clinical and political solutions therefore aim to engineer a drive without symptoms or a symptom without excess. Such a "pseudo-recovery" of excess denies that sexuality cannot be eradicated, that jouissance ("aggression") is inherent to the structure of its articulation ("liberalism") with which it is (not just antithetic but) identical.

Add to this parade of horrors a fourth one: that of their own nihilistic cure. Grotjahn and Monsour, like the paranoid white patients in the Los Angeles psychiatric clinic, find "*hope…with the oppressed* whose strength in their suffering may deliver us from our racial sins" (Monsour & Grotjahn, p. 349, emphasis in original). We cannot help but wonder if Robinson had this very sentiment in mind when he described his own patients' delusional identifications with blackness. Contrary to this more-than-cruel optimism, Robinson exercises a psychoanalytic pessimism on the status and fate of racism, as well as—and this is a crucial difference—the notion of a non-imaginary act, expressed in a double negative: "Racial prejudice remains an adverse social phenomenon without true psychological benefit. It is ego destructive, and its dynamics *do not preclude eradication of its overt manifestations*" (Robinson, 1971, p. 234, emphasis added). Edited slightly, we could say: the jouissance of racism is an adverse social phenomenon beyond

the pleasure principle; it is a drive, and its dynamics do not preclude being displacing *through* its symbolic vicissitudes.

"Fear of Dethronization" (1947)

> *Richard Sterba (1898-1989) founded the Detroit Psychoanalytic Society in 1940 and practiced in the city for the rest of his life. Following accusations that he analyzed and trained non-physicians outside the auspices of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Sterba was stripped of his accreditation as a training analyst (Anna Freud convinced him not to sue for the sake of psychoanalysis' professional reputation) (Hyman & Swan, 1994, p. 256). Sterba had an otherwise esteemed background: he was a member of the inner circle of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute in the 1920s, where Wilhelm Reich, whose lectures he attended, is to have "had the greatest influence on [his] development as a psychoanalytic therapist" (Sterba, 1982, p. 34). Sterba refused a permanent position at the Berlin Institute for Psychoanalysis to protest the anti-Jewish policies Nazis imposed at the school, leaving for the U.S. in 1938. One of his first major manuscripts, a dictionary of psychoanalysis, was published in German in 1932—it contained Freud's blessing in the preface—while "The Fate of the Ego in Analytic Therapy" (1934) is considered a classic of what would come to be called ego psychology. It argues for making the patient's identification with the analyst the aim of analytic treatment while encouraging the analyst to form "an alliance with the ego against the powerful forces of instinct and repression" (p. 120). Across seven decades, Sterba wrote prolifically on art, technique, metapsychology, culture, literature, music (sometimes with his wife Edith, a child psychoanalyst and musicologist), historical figures, and his own case histories.*

Few clinical studies of prejudice have reached the level of influence Richard Sterba's analysis has achieved, its pride of place no doubt in part secured by Frantz Fanon's remark in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952/2008)—with which we will return a bit later—that claimed that he and Sterba had separately "arrived to the same conclusion," namely that in "relation to the Negro, everything takes place on a genital level," and that "the white man behaves toward the Negro as an elder brother reacts to the birth of a younger" (p. 121). The interlocutory shelf life of Sterba's article amongst practicing psychiatrists and psychoanalytic theorists in the United States is independently remarkable (cf. Butts, 1971; Kovel, 1984; Gordon, 1993; Marriott, 1998; Hamer, 2006). Nearly all are to varying degrees persuaded by Sterba's conclusion that white participants in the Detroit race riots unconsciously identified with each other as brothers rehearsing the phylogenic murder of the father, with the black man as the substitute target of their fratricidal passions. You will notice that these two theses—that blacks play the role of older siblings and

the role of the father—appear to be strictly perpendicular, even at loggerheads with each other. Sterba in fact combines two different libidinal schemas. One assumes a centralized discourse of power organized around the father, while the other operates according to a horizontal discourse of power organized in a fraternal dispensation, "after the patriarchy" (MacCannell, 1991). Both patricidal and fratricidal impulses comprise a spectral mixture of group-forming and group-destructive tendencies. Mention of this difference in the literature that cites the article is, at best, made in passing.

The clinical material from which Sterba draws was produced one month after the riots, and he presents four dream fragments from four different patients (his own and possibly others') who had been in analysis before and during the summer of 1943. He splits the dreams into two categories to illustrate "two different forms of hatred and aggression" that originate and organize the generally "negative attitude toward Negroes" (Sterba, 1947, p. 412). The first, a "constant and general antagonism" against blacks, is not analogous to the hostility characteristic of the jealous reaction children have upon the arrival of a new sibling, but *is* that current expressed and distorted by racial difference: "Negroes signify younger siblings" (p. 413). Sterba finds sexual difference a non-factor in this hatred, which is "directed equally against both sexes. Male as well as female Negroes are to be kept out of the family" (p. 415). Sterba also leaves two distinct primary processes—metaphor and metonymy—undistinguished, the consequences of which we will explore. "The primitive mechanism of *displacement, i.e., the substitution* of another object for that originally tied up with the infantile emotional desire, enables the repressed tendencies even in the adult person to find some outlet" (p. 412, emphasis added).

The second "unconscious motive" for racial prejudice is gendered: it "manifests itself in the Negro race riot and is directed against male Negroes only" (p. 416). In Sterba's variation of

the Oedipus myth, black men represent fathers whom the child despises for hogging the cherished interest of the mother. Yet this mother is not "white," but the "Negro mammy" of a Southern complex, whose love the child seeks, and which the "black father" frustrates as a "big rival" (p. 419). Anti-black hate therefore proceeds from black love, with the former condensing on the black "phallus." Sterba therefore misrepresents this second motive when he emphasizes the exclusively "male" direction of aggression, when its libidinal wellspring is, by his own reckoning, quite clearly "maternal," and a black maternity at that. Still, this explanation homogenizes for Sterba a series of historical occurrences, from Southern lynch mobs and animal phobias, to the 1943 Detroit riots and every manner of group hunting: all equally rehearse "collective father murder." Their difference is not one of type but degree, as the phallus removed from black men in the Southern lynching ritual is superseded by a scenario in the North (i.e. Detroit) in which it is *already* "detached from the victim," as found in the form of the automobile torched by whites during the riot, which "stands for the penis in numerous dreams and jokes" (p. 420).

Distinguishing original from substitute figures amongst these metaphorical instances of collective father murder would be foolhardy, lest one attempt to establish that every rioter was raised in the South by a black caretaker. This black Oedipus complex is unconscious, not a lived experience. Not only can a structure of racial prejudice thus be constructed, but so can the universal laws that govern the difference between the two "unconscious motives" be formally elaborated—the one "gendered," and the other "ungendered."

Lacan's return to the Oedipus complex dislodges castration's place from the effect of a prohibiting agent and embeds the loss of jouissance as a function in language—the nodule of the real, symbolic, and imaginary. It thereby unifies the castration complex, the Oedipus complex,

and the myth of the primal father that seem incompatible in Freudian metapsychology, no less in Sterba's use thereof. Metaphor, a substitution between signifiers, generates what Lacan calls an "effect of sense." It acts as a barrier to jouissance that can be embodied by any contingent signifier, depending on the clinical circumstance. Figures of the prohibiting law, such as the father, god, or the state, are for that reason conceptually downgraded to the level of semblant (Miller, 2011). Two consequences of the Lacanian reappraisal of castration are crucial for present purposes. First, the signifier "murders" the father, insofar as the symbolic substitutes his "living" person with a relativized metaphorical function, usurping his presence and depriving him of any natural identity. Second, the "Names-of-the-Father," in the plural, form a swarm of signifiers that share no essential traits—masculine, paternal, etc.—but have only their operation in common, which is metaphoric in an elementary sense: they replace and repress jouissance with a signifier (any signifier will do). Woman for instance, as a signifier (and not a natural person "in reality"), can be one Name-of-the-Father. "Negro mammy" may play the same part, to the extent that she enables a "significantization of jouissance" (Miller, 1989, p. 46) that blockades, symbolizes, and gives meaning to enjoyment.

Reflecting on his early theories, Freud suggested that "what is essential in dreams is the process of the dream-work," not its specific content (Freud, 1933/1964a, p. 8). To place the etiological context of each subject in abeyance, and leverage instead a theory of the signifier that throws the dream-work into relief, is to pave a royal road to racism as a structural activity governed by the laws of language. Sterba described the second class of dreams, with which we will start, as indicative of the "second unconscious motive" for anti-Negro race hatred, those that express the aggression of "collective father murder." The following was produced by a "non-analytic patient" who expressed support for anti-black violence during the Detroit riots.

> He dreamed at the time of the race riots that a Negro was trying to climb into the window of his bedroom on the second floor, while he was lying in bed. The patient grabbed his favorite shot gun, which was lying beside him, and shot at the Negro. He shot his head off, the body fell down outside, and the head rolled onto the floor of the room, where it began to cry: "What did you do to me? I can't go home without my body." (Sterba, 1947, p. 421)

Sterba finds the decapitation to have an "obvious" castration theme. But this dream stages not only a story on how a primal father in sole possession of jouissance is deprived of his monopoly, but also on how this dispelled jouissance returns in a perverse way—a return that Sterba does not give the analytic value it is due. Not only is the black body in the dream symbolized through the action sequence that banishes it outside the domestic premises, but the organ castrated by the shot gun rolls back toward the dreamer and speaks to him from the dead. This is an anxiety-dream, its unpleasurable quality does not make it unsatisfying. Sterba is told that the analysand "knew" that the "home" mentioned by the decapitated head referred to the patient's mother, suggesting "home," "mother," and "dead black body" form a series of metaphors—insides and outsides, oppositions and identities. On the other hand, the undead black head, a voice-without-body, falls out and away from the series and collapses this law of distance, but is not for that reason opposed to the paternal function. It is its underside, its productive dimension, creating a terrifying *surplus of jouissance*.

Consider in the same vein another patient, "a very liberal man, who was deeply shocked by the Detroit events and sincerely opposed to the persecution of the Negroes." His dream consisted of a single fragment: "He is hunting and shooting down a few white birds" (p. 421). The patient repented to Sterba afterward that he recognized that "white had to be replaced by *black*," believing the dream to have inverted its racial coding to disguise the guilty pleasure he derived from imagining his participation in the riots. The dream would thus "correctly" read: "He is hunting and shooting down a few *black* birds." Sterba enters this as evidence in favor of

his interpretation that the birds condense in one figure the father, black men, and the phallus (birds, like automobiles, are in Sterba's estimation a "ubiquitous penis symbol"), and that the analysand's mild and provident ego had in this coolheaded interpretation checked and balanced his patricidal knee-jerk.

But Sterba takes for granted that the "he" who is "hunting and shooting" in this dream is the first person ("I") replaced by a neutral third, assuming that the patient's liberal conscience switched their places, just as it switched the birds' color during their oneiric repackaging. But we are inclined to take censorship seriously as a function that is strengthened, not weakened, in waking life, and make the patient's interpretation (and his analyst's affirmation thereof) the crux of the matter. Suppose then that the birds were at first, in fact, *correctly* colored, but that the "he" of the dream originally referred to *Negro*, not "I." This would yield a new, strictly analytic construction: "*The Negro* is hunting and shooting down a few white birds." The interpretation Sterba makes sustains an ignorance about this new unconscious phase of phantasy. We are now dealing not only with one substitution, but a chain of unequal substitutions, and a general sliding among them. It is not just the shameful "truth" of a racist act of patricide that a benign dream of bird hunting distorts, but the interpretation *of* distortion that generates a substitution on another scene, one moreover spoken aloud: "white *had to be* replaced by *black*." Here the penitent admission of racism made by the analysand obscures a more enigmatic, dynamic structure, while betraying an urgency of unknown origins. Amongst the various substitutions at play, no generative principle identifies either the original construction or the force that animates the sliding between them. The only constant among the constructions is the production of a loss within the signifying field. By culling the flock of a few birds, a phallic part is isolated and

discarded that throws the interpretations into a somersaulting but organized exchange of terms, enabling a shuffling and redistribution of racial representations.

We can add some precision to Sterba's thoughts on some critical counts, as castration in these cases underwrites or codifies desire, rather than being its goal. And a substitute *for* a masculine father does not organize each dream, as much as metaphor itself disposes of a "real," ungendered father (whose remains are a decapitated head, dead or fallen birds) that creates in its wake gender-effects. Let us then pivot to the other class of dreams, where black figures appear as "unwelcome intruders." Jim Crow being the historical reference, Sterba writes that its purest expression is the desire to "draw the color line," to "drive out" blacks and maintain their subordination. Again, this reaction signifies the "fear of dethronization which the older child experiences with regard to his growing rival" (Sterba, 1947, p. 415), a response that turns the libidinal schema of the riot upside down—the riot stages the mass castration of an *excessive* figure of enjoyment, while segregation defends against the impending *loss* of paternal care. A patient produced the following dream during a time when his hostility toward his younger brother was particularly acute.

> The patient is in his parents' house. A group of Negroes are attacking the house, and are ready to set it on fire. This danger is all of a sudden removed by a magical procedure: the Negroes are all transformed into small balls of protoplasm which are contained in a bottle, so that they can easily be disposed of by emptying the bottle into the sink. (p. 413)

Sterba figures that blacks are "re-converted into ovula [sic] in the womb" to be "emptied," an interpretation the analysand agrees is correct (pp. 413-4). But like the driver of the substitutions in the dream of the flock of birds, this passes over the etiology of the danger that triggers this emergency evacuation. Sterba prefaces his interpretation by adding that the "social group of white people… represents an enlarged family" (p. 413), implying that the "parent's house" and

"womb" are part of a series: nested realms in which a white patriarch holds authority, and which the patient presumably wishes to secure from black ruin.

A theory of the Name-of-the-Father becomes useful here precisely because it is *not* a theory of fathers, authority, or family, but of the proper name as a logical function. This logic takes as its starting point the modern *decline* of patriarchal power (thus anticipating the Foucauldian critique of the repressive hypothesis), while accounting for the inexhaustibility and perverse returns of "his" repressed enjoyment. Jacques-Alain Miller describes proper names as signifiers that refer without signifying. Having no set of properties, traits, or meanings, "the proper name means nothing," has "no other signification besides its utterance, which precisely defines the proper name as a rigid designator" (2011). What the Name-of-the-Father designates is the innermost being of the subject. But exactly when identification appropriates this being—as, for instance, through the proper names "I" or "Richard Sterba"—does it have a mortifying effect, as the metaphor stamps the subject with the mark of symbolic death, as already dead. The proper name is always the improper name for being, the name that misnames jouissance necessarily.

"Protoplasm": this is the pure signifier that the analysand's dream supplies, ingeniously devoid of all imaginary traits, as if designed to avoid the lack of correlation between being and appearance that language creates.[21] Yet "protoplasm" by itself is blatantly insufficient for sustaining a sense of identity, and nothing about the dream suggests that race attains the status of a thematic that provides the dreamer with an imaginary identity. Rather, its magical procedure consists exactly of repressing, containing, and disposing of the innermost being of the subject, its living substance—a "flammable" jouissance—that blackness bears through a signifying

[21] The Oxford English Dictionary has this denotation: "The complex translucent, colourless, colloidal material comprising the living part of a cell"; "A primordial substance."

association. The draining process trades the disposal of its caustic vitality for the *death of the subject*. Protoplasm metaphorizes blackness, preventing an imminent conflagration of jouissance, but also providing it a symbolic form. Depositing the protoplasm in the bottle—an exemplary symbolic vessel, a signifier (and creator) of *nothingness*, of no signified in particular—delineates a structural void, an emptiness carved out of the real that any object of desire can subsequently come to occupy once its colorless content is decanted. This schema provides no necessary racial ego-identity, and insufficiently explains Jim Crow's racial dualism, even if the latter is a signifying battery that funds the dream.

Further diagramming the difference between metonymy and metaphor can help situate the petroleum-like quality that jouissance seems to obtain here. Lacan notoriously tweaked the work of the linguist Roman Jakobson to redescribe the Freudian primary processes of displacement as metonymy and condensation as metaphor. But metaphor, "concerning identification and symbolism," operates on a different level than metonymy, which "is initial and structuring in the notion of causality" (Lacan, 1981/1993, p. 220). Metonymy describes the coordination of signifiers, the formal articulation that characterizes language, through which a signified (object a), an "enjoyed sense" without the sense of meaning, is displaced or transposed, sliding from signifier to signifier. It is on this level that Lacan situates the subject as represented by one signifier to another signifier. Metaphor strikes this metonymic hotbed by condensing, superimposing, or repressing one manifest signifier with a latent one; as such, metaphor "is situated at the precise point at which meaning is produced in nonmeaning" (Lacan, 1970/2006a, p. 423).

Metonymy is as foreign to meaning and identity as metaphor is to jouissance, yet neither process functions without the other. A Name-of-the-Father—a metaphor distinct from all

others—ties both levels together by interdicting the real, substituting it with *nothing*: a pure substitution that creates a gap in knowledge, and produces, *ex nihilo*, the surplus object a that escapes, repels, and undoes the production of meaning. The metonymic circulation of jouissance positions it as a retroactive object-cause of desire, a function Sterba has undoubtedly failed to entertain. In this light, the third dream's serial condensation repeats in reverse the paternal metaphor's procedure, "bottling" jouissance into the symbolic order and producing the object a. Racism inscribes here a subject-without-identity: the protoplasm represents the dreaming subject to blackness.

Sterba's suggestion that white society and white family are interchangeable furthermore reminds us of the transference between family, nation, and civilization that his contemporary Fanon says white Europeans experience as a birthright. When Fanon adds, in the same chapter in which he draws comparisons between his discoveries and Sterba's, that "Militarization and the centralization of authority in a country automatically entail a resurgence of the authority of the father" (1952/2008, p. 109), one is reminded that the American war effort was also reaching its zenith in the summer of 1943. However, the "resurgence of the father" in the wartime state of emergency does not restore power to some previous autocratic form. Economic coordination may be technically centralized in a wartime crisis, and legal prohibitions may multiply and expand, but a perversion in the function of the Name-of-the-Father is equally consequential, and vital for understanding the historical relation between nationalism and racism, a link that manifests in the clinic.

In the 1940s, militarization and mass mobilization demanded a graduated sacrifice of Jim Crow's racial boundaries, and the modes of enjoyment those barriers organize—from the assembly line to the urban space. An estimated 50,000 African Americans (and 250,000 to

300,000 mostly Southern whites) moved to Detroit between 1940 and the eve of the riots, and A. Philip Randolph's "March on Washington Movement" had recently pressured President Roosevelt to sign Executive Order 8802 in 1941, which banned racial discrimination at defense plants receiving federal funding (White & Marshall, 1943). Nationalism demands a sacrifice of all particular forms of enjoyment, and the centralization of libido under one particular signifier to the exclusion of others: "Nation." In place of racial segregation, nationalism incarnates an *unsegregated hierarchy* subordinated to the national good, even if that good is effectively or implicitly white-serving. Nationalism attempts to mobilize, inscribe, and redistribute all enjoyment; yet the more it universalizes Nation, the more its capacity to name the "innermost being" of each subject evaporates. Nationalism suffocates the metonymic subject by distending the social tie, forcing a universalizing group identification that crowds out the singularity of enjoyment.

Does some element of the anti-black racism that structured Detroit in June 1943 not emerge in indirect contradiction to nationalism? Does the black political demand for economic equality and desegregation not provide nationalism a form of appearance that it does not have in "nature"? And does racism, *at the same time*, not provide the subject nationalism suffocates a representation in the absence of any natural semblance? At the very least, the relation between racism—of the structuring variety we have delineated so far—and nationalism—of the sort that attempts to positivize a form of anti-racist universality that assaults the racialized organization of enjoyment—is not prefixed in an identity or opposition but becomes "a question of historical articulation" (Balibar, 1991/2011b, p. 50). Unlike the ur-father, who, in Freud's anthropological tale in "Totem and taboo" (that Sterba liberally cites), achieved a paleographic détente by equally forcing all members of the primal horde into abstinence, reserving all enjoyment for

himself and creating a simmering resentment that only *later* erupts in his delayed deposal, the 1940s' centralization of nationalist discourse-power is immediately met with an outbreak of resistances to desegregation, defenses against an assault on subjects' "innermost being"—resistances found in the symptoms, inhibitions, and anxieties of Detroit's dreams.

I just suggested that racism as articulated in the three previous dreams is irreconcilable with nationalism, but this does not exhaust the field racism encompasses. We will venture to make a split in Sterba's dream taxonomy along a different axis (and with a different distribution) than between patricidal and fratricidal motivations. Just as Lacan mathematized and unified Freud's myths about the father, desire, and authority, we can reconvene these dreams under a theory of language to render racism in its structural laws. The first class—the dreams of the beseeching and decapitated head, the hunted flock of birds, and the magical protoplasm—*is structured like metaphor*, performing a substitution that consummates a signifying void, produces a surplus enjoyment, and engenders meaning-effects. Like the fraternal collusion in the patricide myth or the bond between parent and child in the nursery scene, metaphor produces an association-effect, organized around a repression of signifiers that, in the mutual reference their substitution creates, congeals meaning out of nonmeaning. A second class—anticipating now the fourth dream—*is structured like metonymy,* displacing enjoyment from one signifier across a plurality of others. Like the dissolution of the primal father's harem regime or the sibling rivalry that ends in a mythic fratricide, metonymy produces a dissociation-effect, dissolving meaning-links and decentralizing enjoyment from its accumulation under a single organizing signifier.

Let us analyze how the last dream is structured like metonymy. Sterba describes his patient as a "violent Negro hater" who, at the time the riots broke out, was under pressure by his family to sign affidavits on behalf of European relatives seeking refuge in the US, relatives who

were admired by his family more than he himself was appreciated, and leading the patient to fear being subject to a "dethronization" by a new sibling (synonymous to the one Sterba says galvanized the dream of the magical protoplasm).

> A big boat approaches New York harbor. The patient is on a small raft nearby. Some Negroes jump from the porthole of the boat into the water. The patient drives his raft toward them and crushes the Negroes between his raft and the side of the big boat. (Sterba, 1947, p. 414)

Sterba rounds out a veritable cast of characters: the boat, he says, plays the part of the mother, the raft carries the patient, and the Negroes are the patient's younger siblings. Again, the analyst says this script replicates the nursery's dynamics of envy and offers hostility to younger siblings as a version of the desire for racial segregation. Whether these blacks are captives or passengers in the dream is vague, but after they jump, they are immediately wasted, squandered, crushed, used-up by the patient toward no end, and he makes no attempt to recover or return their bodies. The ship's mission would fail by default, which is to deliver its cargo to a fourth, unremarked dramatis personae, and the only one with a proper name: "New York harbor" (incidentally the primary staging port for US operations in the Atlantic arena during WWII). Disorganizing the vertical integration between the rigid designator, the shipping container, and the racial beings whose possession it monopolizes are the minimal and sufficient formal coordinates given by the dream. This schema, too, does not explain a desire *for* segregation—the dream-work would more simply *oppose desegregation* as a desiccation of enjoyment.

Revolting against the altruistic duty to receive his kin, the last patient insists that his "innermost being," his jouissance, is not named by the (American, familial, moral) universal good, and his dream metonymically displaces the patriotic and familial functionalism that forecloses the subject. By crushing the black figures to reopen a lack-of-being, the conditions are set for re-killing the primal anti-racist father, for re-pluralizing the Name.

We recall that Sterba had distinguished an infrastructural "constant antagonism against Negroes" from "its *exacerbation* into the form of the group-psychological phenomenon of the Negro race riots," the fatal *effects* of which are borne out on the bodies of black men (p. 411, emphasis added). Beyond distinguishing it from other "types" of racism, power, or violence, Sterba points here to the internal complexity of anti-black racism, its lack of identity with itself. In his estimation, the first motive's tendency to segregation has the *universal-ungendered* structure of a sibling rivalry, whereas the aggression of the second derives from the *singular-gendered* structure of ambivalent feelings each subject has about their own father. If the libidinal investiture of segregation is somehow exacerbated in the riots, what connects the universal structure of the former to the singular structure of the latter? It seems the answer is the "external" institution of black sexual difference. The parental figure whose care, love, or attention the arrival of a new black sibling jeopardizes is indeed not distinguished as a mother or father in the infrastructural phase, nor is the black sibling-figure that animates the process gendered male or female. The patricidal structure of the riots, on the other hand, are linked to the emergence of a libidinal enjoyment that is racialized *and* gendered, produced *and* repressed, "signifierized" *and* lost. This complicates the linear temporality of "exacerbation," the spatial distinction between infrastructure (i.e. Jim Crow) and event (i.e. the riots), and finally the distinction Sterba himself tries to establish between fratricidal and patricidal forms of racism.

In other words, we are not looking at a topography or evolutionary tree of racial affects, from segregation to open hostility, but the *dialectical structure* of racism structured as the unconscious. Indeed, nothing in the dreams themselves suggest any progression of racism from a latent investment in segregation to its manifest emergence in the riots. While the 1943 riots that left 25 black and seven white Detroiters dead (and 700 more injured) is spectacular, can it be

qualitatively distinguished on this basis when 17 black lynchings occurred between 1940 and 1943 in Detroit alone (Sitkoff, 2010, p. 45)? It is not the childhood dream content, sociological scale, or phenomenology that differentiates racism, but the mode in which the metaphoric and metonymic processes of racism affect a group-formation organized by the Name-of-the-Father. Segregation's sibling antagonism entails the "family" as an imaginary totality *affirmed* by the subject against a would-be black intrusion. On the other hand, the perpendicular collective father murder replicated in the riots entails the "nation" as an imagined community, but in this case, one *negated* by a passionate attachment to the "Negro mammy" object of libidinal enjoyment. When Sterba therefore initiates his study astonished at how his clinical material "fitted so well into the hypothesis that psychoanalysis, or rather Freud, had developed with regard to the origin of human groups" (p. 411), we underline that Freud's theories on the origin of human groups are, dialectically, also already theories about their breakdown, their degeneration, their segregation—that is, about the origin of the *dissolution* of social bonds.

Racism, compositional and decompositional. These dream-works demonstrate that neither grammar exhausts its productivity, but realize how productive racial signifiers—as opposed to the racial meanings or representations that traditionally concern cultural studies—are in the domain of psychoanalytic subjectivity, in their propensity to metaphorically bind *or* metonymically unbind the social link. Let us now return to Fanon's claims on how his findings are corroborated by Sterba's conclusions about the group-forming power of anti-black racism.

Fanon finished *Black Skins, White Masks* in 1951 while interning at the experimental Saint-Alban psychiatric hospital in southern France (he eventually practiced psychiatry from 1953 until resigning from the clinic at Blida-Joinville in 1956). It was while treating white French patients and North African immigrants that he incubated his theory of the relation

between racism and nationalism on a nesting model: the "family is an institution that prefigures a broader institution: the social or the national group" (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 115). Understanding colonialism as an alliance of imaginary groups, and racism as a defense of sovereignty's scaled integration, can perhaps be partly linked to the "institutional psychotherapy" in which Fanon was trained (and which structured his later sociotherapeutic practices and political writings) by the radical psychiatrist François Tosquelles, a method that "sought the reintegration of the patient into society through the creation of a model community within the hospital's walls" (Keller, 2007, p. 827). It may likewise be attributable to the methods of American ego psychology of which Sterba was a fellow traveler, a practice that pursued a cure by arranging the patient's identification with the analyst, encouraging the analyst to form "an alliance with the ego against the powerful forces of instinct and repression" (Sterba, 1934, p. 120). Sterba's influential article describing this method was widely available by the time Fanon began his earliest psychoanalytic writings.

Further, Fanon's quasi-clinical vignettes diagnose an eclectic mix of literary subjects, passing acquaintances, hospital patients, apocryphal stories, and first- and third-hand experiences. Where Fanon waxes reflexive, where he formalizes racism and nationalism into theoretical propositions, his examples tend to reinforce a model of race hatred as an imaginary stagnation, petrification, or reification of whiteness and blackness. Yet another discourse shadows his explicit propositions, belying the exclusively group-formative effects of racism, and revealing the symptoms of a structured anarchy. Unlike Sterba's fratricidal-patricidal dualism, Fanon's narrative presentation of the symptoms of racism—the way he orders his case examples in his writing—matches the split between racism structured like a metaphor and racism structured like a metonym.

Fanon suggests that racism, *on the one hand*, and in parallel to the first three dreams our essay analyzed, functions as a form of "self-castration" conducted through the "Negro [who] is taken as a terrifying penis" (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 136). This is the case of a masochism alloyed out of a series of (metaphoric) substitutions—"There is first of all a sadistic aggression toward the black man, followed by a guilt complex because of the sanction against such behavior by the democratic culture of the country in question"—that accommodates the subject of racism to that "democratic culture" by way of the liberal universality of anti-racism (pp. 136-7).

Racism, *on the other hand*, and in parallel to the last dream, simultaneously exists in the form of "sexual perversions" (described exclusively in women and "passive homosexuals"), which Fanon draws, in a chain of anecdotes he (metonymically) elaborates, from his clinical and non-clinical experiences. Here are women in "involuntary gestures of flight" from black men (p. 121), divorcées with "abnormal sex lives" (p. 122), a young woman with a "tactile delirium" spurred by racial contact (p. 124), a prostitute who pursues sex with black men to realize "the destruction, the dissolution, of her being on a sexual level" (p. 131), that are by their very measure "anti-social," destabilizing, disintegrating, and often the grounds for their psychiatric institutionalization, their social repression.

The first casualty of this finding should hopefully be any strictly oppositional notion of anti-racism, any strictly repressive notion of opposition, and any allopathic notion of the cure as a repression of symptoms. We need look no further than state governments' current removal of Confederate monuments as an example of how a health and wellness approach does not disturb the *inclining significance of race*, but substitutes for it an anti-racist symptom amenable to the censorium of "democratic culture." This is arguably where Sterba lands when hoping for a new

"totemic" order to rise out of the ashes of the Detroit riots to sublate—but then encyst—anti-black aggression (1947, pp. 426-7).

But the second casualty of this finding should be the obverse formulation of racism as an illness, as a known nosological and ontological quantity. Now, against the Vichy Regime's organization of the mental asylums and psychiatric hospitals into de facto concentration camps during World War II, Tosquelle's (and to a large extent Fanon's) institutional psychotherapy treated the psychiatric institution itself as subject to the illness of social segregation, located a source of patients' mental illness in the segregation of medical institutions (racially, as in Blida-Joinville, by gender, and from the community, as in Vichy France), and proposed both a fraternity between doctors and patients, and a reintegration of the institution and its patients into society as parts of a multilateral cure. Institutional psychotherapy, explains Camille Robcis, "was designed to fight against stagnation and to promote a horizontal (as opposed to a vertical) vision of society" (2016, p. 220). If the fascist form of racial power has become iconic, Sterba's dreams and Fanon's case histories of subjects deconstructed by "their own" racism, in rupture with the social discourse, tell a different story of racism: not as exclusively ancillary to segregation, stagnation, and corporatism, but as a process of language. They isolate blackness as a racial signifier, ascertain racism as a vulturine power adept at scavenging on the singularity of jouissance—a power quite happy to metastasize, cure itself, in vertical *and* lateral dispensations—and measure the simultaneously *inclining insignificance of race*.

"Kill the Dirty Nigger Bastard!" (1947)

> *A child psychoanalyst, social worker, and cultural critic who conducted her training analysis with Richard Sterba at the Detroit Psychoanalytic Institute, Selma H. Fraiberg (1918-1981) is known for her research into infant mental health, her work with blind children, and the clinical casework she conducted throughout her career at numerous social welfare agencies (Shapiro, 2009). As Professor of Child Psychoanalysis and the Director of the National Institute of Mental Health-funded Child Development Project at the University of Michigan in the 1960s and 1970s, Fraiberg advanced the theoretical contributions of Anna Freud, especially her conceptualization of an "identification with the aggressor," and conducted in Michigan the research into "early childhood" that would earn her greatest renown (Fraiberg 1959/1996; 1977). "Ghosts in the Nursery" (1975) synthesized these theoretical developments and still enjoys a wide readership in contemporary child psychiatry graduate curricula. This celebrated career has its prehistory in the enclosed case analysis, first presented at the 1946 Annual Meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association. At the time, Fraiberg was affiliated with the Consultation Bureau of Detroit, a family case work agency founded in 1932 to provide psychiatric services in the wake of the social upheavals of the Great Depression (it was likely the agency at which Fraiberg received field work training for her social work degree from Wayne State University). By 1943, the Bureau was incorporated into a consortium called the "Detroit Group Project," which conducted psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic clinical work with groups of so-called troubled, delinquent, and otherwise poor, displaced, or homeless youths (Redl, 1943).*

Two separate cases are included in this extraordinary write-up, which Selma Fraiberg published from her work as a psychoanalytic social worker in 1940s Detroit. The first case tracks the prognosis of a "rape fantasy" among six 16-to-19-year-old girls living in a residence for "delinquent" girls; the second studies the etiology and course of development of a "race riot" that broke out among two cabin groups—each comprised of eight boys, aged 11 to 13—in a summer camp for, again, "delinquent" boys. Each case, although describing completely separate incidents, informs the other as a study in the production and structure of identification of what Fraiberg calls "group symptoms." Despite the manifest absence of racial themes in the first case, the structure of feminine desire that it has in common with the boys' group symptom informs the analysis of the manifest themes of racial violence. Fraiberg guides her analysis along the following questions: How does an individual fantasy come to be adopted by a group? What is the

relation between each individual's psychoneuroses and the group symptom in which they are orbited? By virtue of the clinical circumstances, Fraiberg claims a methodological advantage. While group phenomena are "generally inaccessible to scientific investigation" because "the sick group does not come for consultation," groups of children, particularly those already under supervision *as* socially "ill" (i.e. delinquent or anti-social), provide the social worker with a particularly fecund research environment (Fraiberg, 1947, p. 248). The material in the instant cases is derived from "narrative group records, case histories on each child, [and] group and individual interviews."

A further methodological consideration can begin to sketch out in advance the nature of the relation of the individual to the group. Fraiberg concludes in this study that the group symptom allows a variety of personal symptoms be "brought into play" around it, both "in its service and under its protective guise" (p. 281). The process of hysterical identification—Fraiberg endorses Otto Fenichel's work on this process in contrast to Freud's, a difference to which we will return—is said to pivot on an unconscious "etiological factor" held in common by both the individual and the group, making the "group fantasy identical with the fantasy of the initiator" (p. 289). Once *scale*, the intuitive fiction borrowed from cartography and the geographical sciences, is settled as nondeterminative in the analysis, an automatic contrast between the group, the member, and the "initiator"—the latter a "role" Fraiberg reveals as primary in both cases—is not empirically valid nor possible to assume with any clarity or precision.[22] By identifying the individual *with* the group, and the center *with* its periphery, the following fractal logic holds: for the initiator, who is also a member of the group she or he causes, the personal symptom *is* the group symptom that brings further personal symptoms into

[22] On the history and limitations of the concept of scale in geography and spatial theory, see Marston, Jones, III, & Woodward (2005).

play around it, and so on. Instead of forming a diagnostic profile based on some combination of symptoms, this assemblage is delocalized by the subject, leaving its cause and structure to be elaborated in the historicity of the relations between its elements. In the following analysis, the role occupied by the member, like the group itself, "personifies" the elements of this assemblage, just as the stages of its development, the "evolution of [the] group fantasy" as Fraiberg puts it (p. 278), allegorizes the historicity of the cause of the symptom(s).

In addition to asking about its structure, Fraiberg more obliquely raises questions about the temporality of the group symptom, focusing in particular on how, when, and why each fantasy suddenly emerges and just as rapidly enters into remission. Such are the parameters of the first case: Harriett, an 18-year-old living in a residence with five other young women under the supervision of a "housemother," suddenly and without warning experiences being under the imminent threat of a sexual assault by the so-called Sugar Bowl street corner gang.[23] The entire group of girls is beset by fear, internal fighting, and accusations of betrayal. It "appeared that the life and safety of every member of the household was somehow threatened" (p. 278). The delirium lasts two weeks, then suddenly dissipates when the group therapist holds a collective meeting. The chronology and sources of the rumors are delicately laid out during the meeting, much in the same way Fraiberg relates them to her own reader. Still, after all interviews have been completed, "no girl present was able to account for her participation in this bizarre fantasy" (p. 279). The individual analyses with Harriett conducted in the run-up to that meeting were judged as "sterile," so that the group symptom appears to dissolve at the exact moment that all the individuals are brought together as a group. The girls and therapeutic staff are mystified. The

[23] The "street corner gangs" of the 1940s do not have the same cultural reputation nor fulfill the same social function as the contemporary "gang." William Foote Whyte's seminal urban ethnography (1955/2012) gives a better indication of the sociological and colloquial meaning that Fraiberg draws upon.

situation is queer, as is "Harriett, the 'queer one' in the house, the isolate"; queer because she is "dreamy and detached, communicated no dreams and fantasies" and because she regularly "engaged in homosexual acts with some of the transient girls" (p. 279). The theory that group hysteria is grounded in mutual identification, love, or hate must be discarded, as the girls "identified with [Harriett] on the basis of her symptom only, and this must be because the 'threat' of rape reactivated a basic conflict in each of them" (p. 280).

The events that precede and follow the delirium shed light on the nature of this "basic conflict." A "defense against heterosexuality" at first appears to be the drama's animating cause. Weeks before the episode, Harriett had in fact dated Nick, a boy from the Sugar Bowl gang, but broke off her contact with him after he posed an ultimatum: he would stop seeing her if she did not "intercourse with him" (p. 279). His ultimatum restaged a previous impasse in her desire. After the hysteria settled, she confided to a counselor that her mother abandoned her family for a lover in Chicago when Harriett was eight. In Chicago, her mother became pregnant and died during a failed, self-administered abortion. Harriett's aunt subsequently prohibited her from having any boyfriends, while at the same time damning her to a fate seemingly already foretold: "You'll see, you will turn out just like your mother" (p. 280). Heterosexual sex thus condenses for Harriett both a caution and fate, prophesy and prohibition: she cannot have what her mother had but will be what her mother was—dead. Before this identification with the dead mother metastasized into a group fantasy, Harriett also reported dreams in which Nick (after breaking up with Harriett post-ultimatum) took her back and brought her gifts, while the housemother at the same time observed her "knitting a baby blanket for the child she hoped one day to have" (p. 279). In these scenarios, Harriett imagines gifts and a child without the "intercourse" prerequisite to their realization in the terms of Nick's ultimatum. After the group delirium breaks, we also

read that Harriett enters into "an intense homosexual affair" with Margery, who had previously appointed herself as Harriett's bodyguard against the Sugar Bowl boys. If Harriett, as Fraiberg argues, "attempts to resolve the heterosexual conflict through intensification of the homosexual tie to the group," it is because homosexuality now serves to realize "intercourse" but isolate it from its imagined and excessive effect: a fatal abortion (p. 280). Harriett's impasse in desire is split and staggered onto two layered fantasies: "children-without-sex" in the heterosexual scenario and "sex-without-children" in the homosexual one.

"The pattern of *the wish* and *defense* against the wish" for sex that Fraiberg hypothesizes as the basic conflict that the prospect of rape reactivated—and that makes the group symptom so immanently contagious—falls short as an explanation, as the desire of the dead mother is more than an "unmaidenly wish" (pp. 280-1, emphasis in original).[24] Why? Recall that the primal scene of Harriett's childhood splits the desire of the mother into two formulas: the possession of a child-without-sexual-relation and the experience of an enjoyment-without-loss. By inscribing the death that was both prohibited and fated by her aunt within a *dialectic between two impossibilities*, its contradictions are mutually cancelled (as preserved). But with a vengeance, this excess returns in the group symptom *as* rape. The specter of rape is a fear of bodily violation but doubles in this case as a phallus, a cipher that resolves (always unsuccessfully) the impossible—jouissance, the impasse in (maternal) desire—by codifying it in imaginary meaning. Ellie Ragland aptly defines the phallus as the "key signifier by which both sexes interpret their sexuality as lacking (or not) in reference to the mother's unconscious desire regarding her own sexual difference" (Ragland, 2004, p. 10).[25] A function that can be occupied by any object, the

[24] Belying its general applicability is also the fact that Margery herself had a "scandalous" affair with a member of the Sugar Bowl gang before—and without—the hysteria surrounding Harriett's case.
[25] As a psychic operator organizing sexuality and sexual difference, the phallus clearly has no necessary and no direct relation to masculinity or male anatomy.

phallus is "destined to designate meaning effects as a whole" (Lacan, 1970/2006c, p. 579). By the phallus Lacan thus designates the signifier whose function is to stand in for—and thus veil—the evaporation of the signifiable into the function of the signifier (p. 581). It conditions but *does not signify* (i.e. determine, describe, delineate) sexual difference by inscribing the lack inherent in its own inconsistency, enabling sexual identity to be "interpreted" as "a castration to be repressed, denied, repudiated, or foreclosed," depending on the object raised (*aufgehoben*) into its place (Ragland, 2004, p. 6).

Harriett's aunt is first to interpret the mother's sexual desire: she concludes from her sister's fate that woman simply does not exist as desiring, or a woman's desire is always fatal. In the phallic identification organizing Harriett's sexual identity—that is, through the phallus of *rape*—maternal desire is not impossible but fully realizable, albeit barred by tragic historical contingencies. Woman *could* exist, *could* have a child without loss, *could* have sex without division, *could* enjoy without lacking—if only the voracious sexual desires of men did not always intervene to deprive her of her being. Harriett thus interprets castration (not-having) as a violation (not-being) and interprets the heterogeneity of her enjoyment in exclusively masculine (or masking) terms: as the violent genital enjoyment of *other men*.[26] It is the operation of the phallic function as seen here that will guide the analysis of the race riot.

Harriett and the boy identified as Billy in the second case scenario are kindred, although the latter is queer in quite another way as a highly cathected pariah "hated and despised by the group" (Fraiberg, 1947, p. 287). Yet as before, it is not on the basis of a shared hatred that the so-

[26] Another way of mapping this progression is as a series of unconscious choices. Harriett's mother submits to her desire, and wagers her life, which follows an assimilation of castration (negation of being). Harriett's aunt prohibits the desire of the woman—a desire that precisely abandons the identity of wife/mother—and condemns Harriett to a death sentence (negation of enjoyment). Harriett, in a way refusing a choice, finally splits the difference: between enjoying her possessions, and being possessed by other men's enjoyment (negation of desire).

called race riot forms, but on the basis of an identification with a common etiological factor, which in this case is said not to be the fear of rape (violation), but the fear of castration (dispossession). Billy is classified by the social workers as "prepsychotic," one of three such cases in Cabin 3, a group comprised of the outcasts and misfits of the camp. These three so-called prepsychotics are "unable to form attachments even among themselves," and are "erratic, told wild stories, and kept the rest of the group [i.e. Cabin 3] at a high emotional pitch" (p. 282). Camp coordinators organized a boxing match on the fourth night of the summer program, pitting Art, also a member of Cabin 3, against Cabin 4's George, "a pleasant, genial Negro boy of 13 who towered above Art by a foot" (ibid.). George won handily, and Cabin 3 took the loss in stride until Billy began to spread the rumor that George had been wearing brass knuckles during the fight. Not only that, but Cabin 4 was supposedly planning to raid Cabin 3 as well. Within twenty-four hours, both factions had incredibly mobilized for all-out war, each having begun to stockpile knives for a final showdown. Cabin 3 produced a spontaneous propaganda to accompany this arms race, consisting of a sundry grab-bag of allegations. "Niggers started the race riots in Detroit… Two blocks from where I live they killed a white lady who was going to have a baby… The niggers started the whole riot. A nigger tried to get a girl away from a sailor… My father says all niggers is killers" (p. 283). One boy, Mike, was the organic intellectual. He posited the theory (a refinement of Billy's) that "all niggers carry knives a foot long," and provided the group's rallying cry, another redundancy: "kill the dirty nigger bastard [i.e. George]" (p. 287). The 1943 Detroit riots had concluded two weeks before this impending brawl.

The counselors' separate interventions into each cabin group did not disarm the situation. After one met with Cabin 3 to discuss the source of their animus, "the group turned on her and

called her a nigger-lover and dirty whore" (p. 283). After the attempts by various camp coordinators to quell hostilities failed, a joint meeting of both groups was arranged by the camp consultant in charge, a mutual "father figure." Suddenly the hostilities ceased. No one is able to explain their militant devotion in the aftermath. As with the rape hysteria before, the events on the margins of this daylong frenzy help shed light on its structural dynamics. For the two preceding nights, another of Cabin 3's "prepsychotic" boys, Peter, had titillated his bunkmates with tales of how he had seduced their female cabin counselor—the very same "nigger-lover and dirty whore" above—and suggested that she peeked into their windows to watch them undress. The fantasy of her gaze and seduction had quickly become epidemic in the runup to the inter-cabin boxing match.

Billy was eventually identified by both camps as the troublemaker, having played the role of double agent to warn Cabin 4 of a fictitious assault against them. After the hostilities ceased, Billy was expelled by his peers and eventually joined another cabin before adopting a quiet housekeeping role, busily tidying their quarters. Just two hours after Billy began this encore performance, he was excommunicated for unknown reasons and joined another group, where for the next two days he again "acted the part of the fussy housewife who swept the cabin, put things in order, and did menial tasks," this time for one of the camp's black kitchen boys (p. 284). "In those two days it was apparent that Billy was near a break," and his return to family members in Detroit was arranged.

Fraiberg concludes that Billy's domesticated behavior and the cause of the riot are structured by the same fear of castration—a fear that is at least partly explicable through Billy's life history, which can be summarized as a thirteen-year record of repeated abandonment, physical violence, sexual suppression, and self-harm that led to his court-ordered placement in

the summer camp.[27] The fear of castration that governed the boys' race riot, to the extent that it interprets a form of unbearable or unmeasurable loss, is furthermore continuous with the motive energizing the girls' rape fantasy, but Billy's and Harriett's alternative solutions to this impasse accounts for the qualitative difference between the group symptoms. In brief: Harriett enacts a shift in *sexual orientation* to resolve the heterosexual conflict, while Billy enacts a shift in *sexual identity* to resolve the vicissitudes of castration.

As with Harriett, Billy's symptom is determined by a maternal identification. Fraiberg arrives at this conclusion through records she obtained of interviews conducted with Billy when he was six years old, which reveal a number of murderous fantasies involving his father and sexual fantasies involving his mother. Billy saw his then-case worker as a seductress, and masturbated in front of her during analysis, before waxing guilty and whimpering that "It would be better to be a girl"—the analysis quickly concludes (p. 285). Billy's adoption of a "passive feminine attitude and identification with the mother" (ibid.) in this scenario *obviates* an interpretation of what Ragland (above) described as the "mother's unconscious desire regarding her own sexual difference." The position of "girl" is neither one of lack nor plentitude, as it cannot be threatened by or experience castration—she has *already* lost her little penis, the (imaginary) phallus, and has nothing left to lose nor anything left to wager. Because the refusal of castration cordons off sexual difference and renounces desire, this is not a hysterical identification with the *desire* of the mother, but a primordial identification with the *being* of a non- or pre-gendered mother (i.e. Other). Fraiberg does not distinguish between these two types

[27] Billy was abandoned at birth and raised in the hospital until he was readopted at three years old. He was at the same time circumcised to "cure" him of masturbation. He continued to masturbate regularly, often until his penis bled. At four he was caught by his mother, who broke his harm in anger. At six he was referred to a social agency, with symptoms including erratic urination, defecation, stammering, and stealing. At seven he castrated his dog. At thirteen he was placed in the camp by the decree of a juvenile court.

of identification. Yet the metapsychological paper from which she draws her theory of identification makes a distinction of this very sort. Otto Fenichel rigorously distinguishes the *partial identification of hysteria*, which "takes place on a common instinctual demand [or "common etiological factor"] and retains the libidinal cathexis of the object," from the total or *primary identification of narcissism*, which "leads to a withdrawal of the libido into the ego, in the course of which the latter assumes the characteristics of the object" (Fenichel, 1926/1987, p. 105). Of course, the narcissistic identification that totally withdraws all libido into the ego would appear at first to be antithetical to a group symptom, which may have led Fraiberg to discount it up front in her analysis of the race riot. But with Billy this seems not to be the case. Instead of interpreting castration from or by way of the phallus, Billy narcissistically becomes the "object"—he incorporates the phallus, assumes its characteristics, suspends its circulation.

How does Billy's total introversion or "domestication" of libido manage to ensnare the symptoms of the rest of the cabin group? The race riot, we might venture, stalls Billy's incorporation of the phallus, suspending an impending psychosis for the "prepsychotics" who participate in the action. In this sense do the boys' race hysteria bear an equivalence to the girls' rape hysteria: both furnish a phallus. We witness this production in the racist propaganda that Cabin 3 issued, which forms one pole of a dialectic with the titillating rumor of seduction—that is, the scopophilia of the female camp counselor—that precedes it. Forming a fractal loop, one prominent theme in this racial imaginary constructs a race riot as imminent or already in progress (i.e. "niggers started the whole riot"). By equating blackness to the object-cause of violence and violation, these statements reattach the transgressive desire that the camp counselor incarnated to an oblique referent, away from the vulnerable scene of the boys' undressing. That racialized object-cause is then linked to every possible excess and failure of sexuality, generating a second

prominent theme in the boys' racial imaginary, which has no consistency beyond the repetition of the word "nigger." As we will see, this signifier transforms the necessity of castration into a contingency that renders its effects conditional. If "rape" is the phallus in the girls' fantasy, then "nigger" is the phallus in the race riot.

Previous clinical work in the colonial setting has reported on a cultural and unconscious identity of this order—"whoever says *rape* says *Negro*," concluded Frantz Fanon in the 1950s (1952/2008, p. 127, emphasis in original). Randall Kennedy's more recent genealogy of the word "nigger"—what he calls the "epithet that generates epithets"—also suggests that the polysemy, dispersion, and conflictual status of this "paradigmatic slur" privileges it as a cipher of modern racial power (2002). In the race riot in question, "nigger" functions as a sort of hermeneutic drainpipe around which the group symptom is organized as a furious desire *not* to know—about what? Mike's rallying final cry, "kill the dirty nigger bastard," dresses this epithet in a compound so pleonastic and overdetermined that it can only refer to the *sense of sense as such*—to "meaning effects as a whole," as Lacan would put it. As a call to action—"kill!"—this enunciation furthermore eclipses desire with a demand to destroy the instance that ensures the ambivalence of meaning, interpretation, and sexual difference. "Kill the phallus," in other words, finishes interpretation off so as to remain unconscious to the desire—of the mother, camp counselor, Other, and so on—that the "race riot"—in its dialectical relation with the seduction trauma—provides a phallic pylon.[28]

The link and collapse of this dialectic between "black phallus" and "feminine desire" occurs when the camp counselor is suddenly accused of being a "nigger-lover," neutralizing her

[28] Psychoanalyst Donald Moss writes about three of his clinical encounters with this racial epithet, as used by his analysands (2009). One of his conclusions, that racial epithets and hate speech functions as an "answer that precedes the question," resonates with my findings in the present case, despite our different theoretical bases.

desire in the imagined satisfaction in its immediate object. Fraiberg nominates this oscillating and unstable dialectic as the sexual logic of racism (p. 283). Yet the boys' attempt to foreclose interpretation by preempting it is only the obverse of a *scientific* drive not to know about the desire of the Other: that is, a *full* interpretation of desire. This is the camp counselors' consistent tactic, who in both cases zealously adhere to critical reason's capacity to unearth, signify, rationalize, and ultimately deconstruct a symptom that the analysis shows creates meaning, but that is itself nonsignifying. A look at how the interpretations that transformed each group symptom into a state of bewilderment and mutual ignorance can now help us reconstruct two different subjects of racism—each of which webs the so-called "delinquents," social workers, and analyst alike.

First, the girls' rape fantasy defaults after the group is assembled and the source of its "misunderstanding" is interpreted. Yet the threat of rape is alone insufficient to bind women *as* a group because it only nullifies each girl in the register of a loss measured as the ill-gotten gain of men. The trauma of sex and its irreducible difference, in other words, is codified as a violence of the one (and only) male sex. The rape-phallus does, however, organize men into groups, as seen by how Harriett inverts the failure of her sexual relation to Nick—in the singular—into the imminent threat of an attack by the entire street gang—as a mass. Only after the rumor of the girls' impending attack by the Sugar Bowl gang summons their arch-rivals, the Mack Street gang, is sexual difference engendered or symbolized as a "dubious chivalry" (Fraiberg, 1947, p. 279), a curious heterosexuality without sexuality. (Ragland, too, regards the dual role of the phallus as both marker *and* mask of sexual difference [2004, p. 5].) The mass psychology of men therefore also entails "external" relations between groups—whether friendly or rivalrous—that turn on a mutual surveillance and policing of an excess enjoyment (i.e. rape) procured outside

the bounds of the sexual contract. The gangs' vigilance is shared by the therapists, who debunk the bathwater of the sexual threat—but also refute the baby of sexuality as such—by mapping the sources of rumor and the circulation of gossip, disputing the external specter of male enjoyment in light of the "reality" of the internal failure of the group's cognitions. This precisely eclipses the question of the cause of this failure of the group's cognition, the subject: the very gap between phallic jouissance and the obscurity of a maternal desire. Confusion ensues amongst the participants because an explanation is implemented to "cure"—in the sense of hardening, preserving, and arresting—interpretation. The analysis thus ends when the therapists replace the phallic jouissance of "rape" (the mastery of women's bodies) with the phallic jouissance of knowledge (the mastery of bodies of thought).

Second, the race riot dissolves after the warring cabin groups are merged into a higher unity under the ego ideal of the camp consultant. The counselors downplay the instigating factor of the cabin groups' rivalrous tension to a hoax of Billy's engineering, truncating the surfeit-of-sense in the epithetic pleonasm to the lack-of-sense of a common misunderstanding. But to simply hail Billy's unconscious knack for chicanery does not address the specific content of the wild accusations Cabin 3 produced, nor does it explain the prostrate behavior that followed Billy's forced departure from the group. As with the specter of rape, the therapists debunk the racial threat by interpreting an uninterpretable phallus—"nigger"—as simply the delusion produced in a moment of collective confusion. To repeat, it is this phallus itself that *interprets* sexuality and sexual difference. It does not contain any meaning *or* confusion beyond its meaning-effects.[29] In the present case, the nigger-phallus ciphers the desire of the Other as a "nigger-loving" desire. If the camp counselors mistake this desire for a belief, confuse this belief

[29] What the phallus hides is not any deducible content or meaning, but the very fact that it veils *nothing*. It hides its transparency "behind" the appearance of depth. The phallus veils that there is something that cannot be unveiled.

as the baleful substance of racism, and denounce racism based on its similarity to the general effects of sexuality (i.e. antagonism, aggression, disunity), then the camp counselors have interpreted sexuality *as* racism. Given the foregoing discussion of the function of the phallus, we should consider racism instead as an *interpretation of sexuality*. In this schema, "nigger" is the cipher of interpretation that constitutes something like the *non-racist core of racism* in the boys' race riot. Renouncing the radical desire of racism, as the hegemonic form of anti-racism does, not only preserves the phallus that designates the symbolic coordinates of that desire in the unconscious, but inevitably repudiates sexuality itself—and with it the analytic method that can elucidate its effects.

Can this be why Cabin 3's riot participants at first respond to the nominal target of their vitriol with such a hedged form of contrition after their race riot was dissolved? "We didn't mean that, George"; "Honest to God we didn't mean *you!*" (Fraiberg, 1947, p. 284). While their victim is acknowledged in shame as a mistaken target, the group's animus still idles in an anticipation of the real object. George, "a beaten, deadened expression on his face," on receiving their sentiments, "said nothing" (p. 283-4). We can suppose Billy ultimately bears in his body the cathexis negated and decanted as a consequence of the hermeneutic cure administered to the group, having become (i.e. identified as) this "real object" in its stead. Unlike the conclusion to the rape fantasy that disperses an interpretation of desire without demanding that the girls confederate under the ego ideal of a higher unity, the race riot ends in a form of group cohesion or fascism that forecloses sexual difference. Harriett delusively masculinizes jouissance, while Billy delusively feminizes jouissance. The phallus blocked but preserved by the analysts returns as the object Billy incorporates to block but satisfy the insatiable desire of the Other. "Girlishly"

embodying the passive, ungendered object for the black kitchen boys, he makes a total narcissistic identification as the “nigger-lover.”

"A Powerful Feeling for the Equality of Men" (1957)

> *In 1952, Brian Bird (d. 1992) became a founding training analyst at the psychoanalytic training program at the Department of Psychiatry at the School of Medicine of Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio (Clemens, 2013). After being previously affiliated with the analytic institutes at Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia, the program was accredited by the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1960 as the Cleveland Psychoanalytic Institute, and subsequently became independent of the University in 1967. After reorganizing, Bird would initially serve as its chief executive. After serving in this capacity, he supervised the Institute's training analyses and saw patients regularly up until his death. His most widely-cited text is a 1972 metapsychological treatise on the transference, considered a classic in American psychoanalysis and still included in the curricula of various training programs today. Bird was a member of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP), which periodically published on contemporary social issues, including filing position statements against the persecution of homosexuals and against school segregation in the 1950s. The present article has been sporadically cited in psychoanalytic studies of prejudice over the last sixty years. Its conclusions about antiblack prejudice have been integrated into lateral psychoanalyses of racial prejudices "in general" (cf. Grier, 1967; Traub-Werner, 1984) and more recently, into psychoanalyses of homophobia (Moss, 1992).*

Brian Bird analyzed the blooming of a nineteen-year-old woman from a militant champion of racial equality, adamant that "race does not exist," to a sulfuric hater of black men—and back again. Details will follow in a moment but let us first sketch out how Bird understands two tandem defense mechanisms at work in the psychopathology of a prejudiced group, conclusions that he draws from the enclosed clinical analysis. One defense process operates through the incorporation of projected material, the other through the projection of incorporated material. In the first phase, a psychological group incorporates the resentment it projects a "superior" entity *will have had* were the group's envy of and aggression toward this ideal to materialize. In a second phase, that same group projects onto the target of its prejudice the very trait of aggressive envy it *would have* incorporated *had* it not inhibited their expression and expenditure in the first phase. Finally, rather than direct criticism toward itself, the prejudiced group fully appropriates the predicted resentment it had incorporated from the "superior" entity onto the target of its

prejudice. Projection and incorporation clearly function here as analytic fictions, used by Bird to render graphic the respective and coincident temporalities of anticipated certainty and retroaction (cf. Lacan, 1970/2006b). But we will begin prospecting the case history from the valuable metaphor he repeatedly uses to conceive of their interface.

> Use of prejudice in this way is like financing with outside capital. The one race, sensing its insecure position, borrows indignation from a "higher" race, then loans its own guilt to a suitable "lower" race or forces it upon that race. As a result, the oppressed race is attacked, for something it has not done, by a race which really has nothing against it, using hatred it does not own. (Bird, 1957, p. 502)

To extend the simile, and therefore transform the relation between finance capital and racism into a homology (structural identity), prejudice would always be essentially unrealized, as it draws on an enigmatic reserve of "outside indignation" to reproduce itself by constantly reinvesting and conserving the surplus it makes toward a future gain, indefinitely postponed. After all, the webbing of incorporation and projection employed is a purely speculative procedure, at once an amortization and a trade in futures. In aligning the temporalities of psychoanalysis, racism, and capital, it would be fair to say Bird himself postpones realizing the ramifications his intuition is pointing to.[30]

Does the clinical material justify the metaphor, much less our own homology? We begin by noting that the analysand in question did not seek analysis for her "acute attack of racial prejudice," which occurred *in medias res*. The young hysteric sought analysis because she had suffered a string of failures in her professional, educational, and social life and was subject to a number of phobias (Bird describes them as strong inhibitions and "ego restrictions") and overwhelming anxiety attacks (p. 494). On top of her liberal, atheist, post-racial, and anti-racist convictions, she had also developed an inferiority complex consisting of a deep embarrassment

[30] On economy as a trope for both psyche and capital, see Kornbluh (2014).

about her Jewish father and his "filthy" riches, as well as her own Semitic looks. Bird notes that her criticism of these familial and bodily traits gave her no small delight. "She described herself as looking very Jewish and perhaps even Negro" (p. 499). In contrast, her mother and older sister are held in the highest esteem, constituting the "superior" entity in her "racial symptom" (p. 490).

More than a year into the analysis, the patient developed an "attack" of racial prejudice. Two successive events triggered this conniption, as reported to Bird in analysis on the days that they occurred. First, a black parking attendant joked with the patient "in a coarse, flippant manner" that she interpreted to be pregnant with sexual intention. She became furious and drove off. Although she is described by Bird as possessing a "well-developed sense of social consciousness and a powerful feeling for the equality of men," the analysand was "filled with indignation that a colored man should dare to treat her as an equal" (p. 494). The second event occurred a day or so later, when a black man smiled while stopped at a traffic light and said something that the patient could not make out, but that she also presumed to be a catcall. Without divulging details, Bird says similar incidents occurred in rapid succession over the next two weeks, before they stopped altogether after the analytic interpretation. He establishes that these encounters all point to a fear and hatred of the desire of inferior black men to rise above their social station by bedding white women. This conclusion was immediately effective: Bird "had scarcely begun [this interpretation] when the patient herself picked up the theme, carried it on, and rounded it out" (p. 497).

How was this initial interpretation "rounded out"? Both analyst and analysand quickly reach the consensus that the prejudice emerged as a final line of defense against "positive

transference feelings," that is, the analysand's desire for the analyst. The twofold incorporation/projection template is deployed by Bird here for the first time. He explains:

> Racial hatred, as a defense, operated in this way: the patient identified herself with her imagined concept of me and at the same time projected her dangerous impulses onto the persons of Negro men. As a result of this double displacement, a Negro man making advances to her represented her impulse to make advances to me. And her resentment of the supposed advances by the Negro represented the imagined resentment I would display if she gave in to her own impulses. (p. 497)

In Bird's topography, the analysand loans her sexual "id" impulses to black men and inherits a critical "superego" agency from the white analyst. By imputing her own "positive transference feelings" to the black parking attendant and motorist, and then venting her fury toward them *as* she speculates her analyst would respond to her if she had directed them toward him, she is able to maintain the (now yearlong) analytic relationship. Crucially, black men must exhibit no exceptional traits or qualitative difference in the racism structure; as Bird constantly repeats, it is necessary and sufficient that the object of prejudice represent *universal* human traits—drive, envy, striving—in which the idiosyncratic symptoms of each prejudiced subject can be actualized on a *contingent* basis befitting their particular psychobiography (p. 507). Racial prejudice is therefore useful for alleviating sexual aggression outside the "safe space" of psychotherapy because it sublimates id impulses repressed in civil society into relatively harmless "words and feelings." This at least is Bird's suggestion, and he concludes the case accordingly: "Although thoroughly objectionable in its effect, [prejudice] is not without a positive measure of value for the individual and in a broad way for society as a whole" (p. 512).

Bird repeatedly notices that this prejudice is manifesting in a "militant" anti-racist but never speculates why, presumably content to highlight the ironic value of the case, or worse, to assume as unproblematic the normalization of an anti-racist liberalism and/or the liberalization of an anti-racist psychoanalysis. Whatever the case may be, Bird thereby discounts wholesale the

analytic value of the *socially sanctioned symptom* with which the analysand enters analysis, as her critical consciousness and investments in social justice are never related to the process of the incorporation of the "imagined resentment" described in the racial symptom's double displacement. Bird thereby indigenizes racism as a resistance to a transference phenomenon, and equates the transference—and ipso facto the end of analysis—with the extirpation of racism. Testimony to that effect is found in the relief the analysand finds in confessing her sin: "She explained their disappearance [of the "shamefully disturbing" fantasies about Bird] by saying she was so worried about this new hatred of Negroes that she no longer had time to think about [him]!" (p. 497). The anti-racist is satisfied to know that her racial reactions, if they were racist at all, were superficial forms of resistance to the analysis, making their interpretation no longer relevant. Right under Bird's nose, the analysand redoubles the complex, incorporating in the form of a confession the "imagined resentment" her presumably liberal analyst would have displayed had she expressed something more shameful and disturbing than sexual fantasies about him—that is, a racism in the form of sexual fantasies about "inferior" black men.[31]

Submitting the analysand's useful, socially-approved, even fashionable symptom to the same level of analysis as the shameful, socially-disapproved, even unfashionable symptom is not only analytically necessary, but estranges the status and theory of racism from itself. Bird had contended that the analysand already held a prejudice in which her father and she herself are the targets of her vitriol, as part of a defense against an envy she felt toward her idealized mother and sister. If for Bird this is not yet racial prejudice *proper*, it is not because the themes or manifest content of racial inferiority are absent—after all, the patient clearly derides her

[31] Strictly speaking, sexual fantasies about black men are not automatically "racist"; only sexual fantasies about black men that are interpreted and understood as racist (e.g. where black men are "inferior") become, for the anti-racist, shameful and disturbing because they transgress an anti-racist morality.

Jewish/Negro visage and her father's Semitic acquisitiveness—but because the projection-incorporation structure, the process that Bird identifies as the form of racial prejudice, is incomplete.[32] In a process that exhibits the constitutionally impersonal nature of sexuality, the analysand partially projects envy and ambition "onto her own personality" and consequently "diverts" a quotient of self-criticism toward herself (p. 499). Yet a taxonomic difference between this partly "internalized" criticism and a fully "externalized" racial attack cannot hold, because under this criterion, a pure or proper racial prejudice *does not exist*. As if to reach this conclusion, Bird already made the counterpoint, noting that only purely hypothetical "people without a sense of inferiority and of rivalry cannot be prejudiced" (p. 506). Transitively, only a purely hypothetical person free of all sexual enjoyment, with an ego entirely sealed off from a fully projected id and fully extroverted superego, can be "properly" or purely racially prejudiced. We thus reach this new conclusion: because racial prejudice proper does not exist, there is *no prejudice that is not partially racial*. (The costless use-value Bird attributed to "pathological prejudice" therefore also does not exist: no prejudice is categorically useful, or more precisely, only a hypothetically pure prejudice is purely useful.) Every prejudice contains a "self-criticism not fully developed" (p. 511), an inhibition in "development" that generates a sexual excess in the form, in this instance, of the analysand's critical masochism, what Freud might call that vicissitude of the drive that consists of its "turning round upon the subject's own self" (Freud, 1915/1957d, p. 126).

Bird conflates the "actually existing" prejudice of the instant case for a limit case that cannot exist in lived experience. He consequently cannot make heads or tails of the analysand's

[32] Bird draws guidance from texts in psychoanalysis and social psychology that have analyzed anti-Semitism, particularly Nathan W. Ackerman's and Marie Jahoda's seminal postwar analysis (1948). Bird borrows from the latter his analysis of projection, conscience, guilt, and the social functionality of prejudice, while departing from their findings in response to the clinical circumstances of antiblack prejudice.

peculiar "delight in attacking herself," in "proving she was no good," which quite glaringly serves no (ego) defensive function against envy, desire, shame, or externalized aggression (Bird, 1957, p. 498). Once plugged into Bird's revised "financial" metaphor for illustrating the *failure* to realize pure racial prejudice, we can shed new light on the patient's critical masochism *and* her anti-racist convictions in their structural relation to racism. This reappraisal is necessary for reasons relating both to the case history and to the history of the case. Bird supposes (with Freud) that civilization abhors envy and antisocial aggression, but this does not sufficiently historicize the American postwar "condition of reality for statements," the enunciative possibilities and impossibilities ordered by the "group of rules that characterize discursive practice" (Foucault, 1972/2002, pp. 143-4). As a discourse, politics, sentiment, and mode of *external* repression, anti-racism conditions the "socially approved" symptoms that Bird had laid to the side, and its analysis as an "historical a priori" (à la Foucault) links their production to an historical unconscious. What the analysis of anti-racism also addresses is the specific difference of anti-*black* prejudice, which we know can only exist under the coinciding condition of a *black universality*. How do we know this? To repeat Bird's point, it is not a disavowal or intolerance of racial difference that distinguishes racism, but the requirement that the object-slot of prejudice reflect universal traits of "human striving."

With these variables we can propose the following new construction: the anti-racist analysand first projects racism onto *society*, then incorporates the criticism she projects she *would* receive from a *morally superior black group* if her "own" racism were to become manifest. With a righteousness that carries its own surplus enjoyment, she then redirects that criticism onto society. Anti-racism in effect inverts the topographic polarity of racism, with the analysand attributing abhorrent "id" impulses (racism) to society and incorporating a critical

"superego" faculty (anti-racism) from "militant" black men.[33] Since the redirection of incorporated criticism onto society is, as established above, a necessarily incomplete process, a leftover resentment is internalized as a castigation of the analysand's own racial inferiority, as her *black* features become the partial target of prejudice—"attacked for something it has not done, by a [black] race which really has nothing against it, using hatred it does not own" (to recycle Bird's intricate model). The difference between Bird's concept of a socially-disapproved racism and this new conception of a socially-approved anti-racism—the latter entailing a universal equality of man as its measure, ideal, and formal logic—is that the anti-racist criticizes herself and others in "blackface," incorporating *both* a speculated black criticism and the black position as the general equivalent for all *objects of prejudice*. These compulsory, incorporative, and aggressive aspects of anti-racism were in fact a feature of melancholia that Freud was deeply familiar with:

> If one listens patiently to a melancholic's many and various self-accusations, one cannot in the end avoid the impression that often the most violent of them are hardly at all applicable to the patient himself, but that with insignificant modifications they do fit someone else, someone whom the patient loves or has loved *or should love*… So we find the key to the clinical picture: we perceive that the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient's own ego. (Freud, 1915/1957f, p. 248, emphasis added)

Under the regime of anti-racism, where you "should love" your black neighbor (as you love yourself), the colorblind demand on the one level that "race does not exist" obtains its truth-value on another that insists that everyone is, in fact, black. A brief, second clinical vignette seems to suggest as much. Another of Bird's analysands is said to be apathetic about racial politics but nevertheless becomes unusually angry at a friend after he had made derisive remarks about

[33] The hypervisibility of black men in the Civil Rights Movement during the television age, and especially the visibly-armed Black Power Movement, made the image and symbol of black masculinity especially disposed to cathexis in the speculated incorporation and unconscious projection typical of anti-racism.

blacks and Jews. The source of the analysand's anger was determined to lie in his identification with the universal target of prejudice, and in the following way: the patient was aware of the envy his friend felt toward him, and recognized himself both in the criticism the friend directed at blacks and Jews, and as the envious (racialized) object of his friend's rhetorical abuse (Bird, 1957, pp. 504-5).

How, then, to view the so-called acute racial attack of the present case? Does it replay a family dynamic, defend against the transference, or transgress anti-racism as a superficial sentiment? None of the above. The analysand's anti-racism, her "prejudice against prejudice," automatically generates a fear and hatred of black men. Why? As the superego "borrowed" from black men comes to figure a post-racial and multicultural order that was only emergent in the 1950s, the superego gradually loses its phenomenological and functional distinction from the cruel "id" that it set out to discipline. During her racial attack, the analysand bypasses society entirely, so to speak, returning the criticism incorporated *from* the law back *onto* the law that now transgresses itself: morally superior black men are in this scenario "above"—exempt from—the society of universal racial equality they had nominally shaped. To use the contemporary parlance, this logic of *reverse racism* is the determining (and unconscious) contradiction of this case, which still operates within the temporal ambit of anticipated certainty and retrovision, but is located now entirely within the law, rather than in an external opposition between (racist) envy and a regulatory conscience. If Bird relied on the latter through a sort of repression hypothesis that set the id of sexual aggression against the superego of a regulatory cultural conscience, we witness here how the superego *itself projects the id* (i.e. excess jouissance).[34] Here again, in linking the topographies of "partial" racial prejudice and the

[34] For an overview of the history and development of the structural relations between the ego, superego, and id in Freudian and Lacanian theory, see chapter 4 of Shepherdson (2000).

"prejudice against prejudice," the ego, rather than falling from the equation, must be situated as a necessary go-between within the structure and process of racism, as a space in which the law displaces its contradiction as (or in the form of) an intrapsychic antinomy that is partially realized in the imaginary "delight in attacking her [black] self."

Once anti-racism is raised to the level of historical a priori, the patient's racial symptom appears as a totalization of anti-racism or a total renunciation of racism—not in the ego or society but within the topology of the law itself. In the acute racial attack, the superego is superimposed onto, replaces, and consumes the ego; the analysand is given over to an anti-racism without reserve, and her racial self-castigation, now nearly subtracted of the "self" to which it had previously diverted a large part of its censure, perceives any jouissance amongst its legal custodians (black men) as a traumatic encounter with the immanent perversity of a self-transgressed anti-racist regime. Now this is the exact place to exercise some hermeneutic restraint: whatever conjunction of fantasy elements entered into the event in question—the fear and hatred the analysand suddenly felt toward black men who she suspects "would get out of control, would not confine their desires to girls of their own race but would try to elevate themselves by having sexual relations with white girls" (p. 495)—it develops within the irreducible contradiction of the liberal discourse in the throes of an historical transformation.

Luckily, our reframing has the benefit of introducing some theoretical consistency among a number of incisive comments Bird makes about racism. Foremost among these is that the projection of sexual impulses onto a "scapegoat" alone does not constitute prejudice; rather, "prejudice always implies a criticism of others for harboring those [projected] feelings" (p. 503). In other words, prejudice more specifically involves the *interpretation* of projected envy, aggression, and enjoyment—even if Bird himself does not sufficiently outline these

interpretations' conditions of enunciation. But no negative belief, philosophy, or imagination necessarily accompanies prejudice either, as in the hypothetical case Bird cites of an individual with a "harsh" superego for whom even "weak" feelings of envy would cause "*not a widespread belief in racial inferiority*, but rather a violent reaction to the slightest show in other races of any attempt to improve their lot" (p. 504, emphasis added). Stigma or negative representations *may* attend or shore up the process of incorporation and projection, but not necessarily, and they alone do not ground it. Bird, at last, pleas for rigor in the form of a narrow, even circumspect definition of prejudice, one he admits is counterintuitive given the overloaded significance the term bears, but one that would also be necessary to finally distinguish it, as a critical concept, from the superego injunction that impels the anti-racist symptom.

Further distinguishing between prejudicial belief and the structural dynamics of racism, Bird asks us to consider an acutely envious person who could hypothetically weather a high degree of self-criticism and would be able to exercise ambition without projecting or racializing their striving. Bird speculates that such a person could be "ruthless and cruel to those under him: he may abuse them mercilessly, using their racial and social status for his own selfish advancement—*yet it is possible that he will not be prejudiced against them*" (p. 511, emphasis added). Utilizing a racial hierarchy, profiting off of the racial distribution of value, or submitting the subaltern to antisocial conduct—regardless of how cruel and reprehensible—does not meet the strict criteria for prejudice under the structural formula that Bird condenses in the (rather ungainly) neologism "incorprojection."

We can now apply this slim definition to the opening question: Is the financial model an effective homology for racism? In yet another restatement of this formula, Bird declares that "the cause in any case of prejudice should be looked for not only in the relationship existing between

the subject and the object of prejudice, but mainly… in an unsuspected rivalrous relationship to a third party—a more fortunate or desired third party" (p. 494). This "third party" is the same one from which the subject of prejudice draws its "outside capital," its venture indignation, with the mission, like a vanishing middleman, to deliver it to the object of prejudice, posthaste. In seamlessly merging incorporation and projection in this process, Bird is aware that both functions are obsolesced by their conceptual anastomosis, which creates an "entirely new mechanism" that "possesses a special quality best described as the power to pass a *conflict* right on through the ego; or to pass an object [outside capital], or at least a *relationship to* an object [outside capital], right on through" (p. 504, emphasis added). The transmission of a *relation* to "outside capital" sheds the substance-like quality that the metaphor at first appears to bestow this partial-object. Situated in the clarity of Lacanian theory, we could say that the object of prejudice is the *impossible relation* between the Other ("third party") and the subject of prejudice. Impossible—as the "rivalrous" relation with the desired party, the desire *for* the Other, would be *lost* in the first instance, a loss that the "entirely new mechanism" of anti-racism is specifically designed to curtail.[35] Anti-racism, as a particular negation of this impossibility (and not prejudice as such, as Bird proposes), intervenes, mediates, and exploits the loss of a relation to the Other that never existed.

Because it presumes (and does not account for) the same "primitively accumulated" reservoir of capital that upholds the political economy metaphor, the function of the "outside capital" must be reconnected in a Marxist manner to a critical account of its historical mode of production. This makes the homology of financialization to racism all the more necessary, lest the latter degrade into an ahistorical sociology of race relations. Thus far, we have revised the

[35] "A loss [of the Other] threatens to occur on account of feelings of envy, guilt resulting from that envy, and fear of punishment from reality or from the superego because of that envy" (Bird, 1957, p. 504).

racial symptom as a product of the contradiction of an anti-racism that continuously reinvests and re-dissipates racism, that converts an "outside" surplus value into "constant" and "variable" anti-racism, and that generates as its structural surplus a mode of jouissance in the form of the racial symptom—whether as the "acute racial attack" or as the racialized self-flagellation. We are thus equipped to advance the case history's titular promise and speculate about the etiology of a prejudice that has never existed, except as a purely hypothetical racism without/outside anti-racism.

Across Bird's exposition, the Other (i.e. the "outside capital" of signifiers) makes its appearance in three contiguous entities, each of which conceptually excludes the subject: 1) a fully realized anti-racism, 2) racial prejudice "proper," and 3) an "enjoyment-free" ego. In each case, incorprojection would have to be a frictionless process that passes a relation to the Other through the ego and onto the object of prejudice without remainder, thus creating a fictional "other-Other relation." Anti-racism intervenes here to mediate the impossible loss of a relation between the subject to the Other (i.e. the catastrophic loss of the relation to the signifying system). If anti-racism stops the relation from "passing right on through" the subject, then the racial symptom—the remainder of this process—creates an experience of *loss*, in this case by administering various blows to the ego that are engendered by the circumvented relation to (and alienation in) the Other. Do the racial symptoms or libidinal fixations that anti-racism engenders not appear in the present case in three guises that are iconic of contemporary liberalism?—First as a militantly sacrificial anti-racism, then as a guilty and racialized self-criticism, and finally, as the secular confession the analysand makes to her analyst in the "cure" to the racial symptom.

CONCLUSION

> "It is as if every attempt to discern the elusive core of racism, to approach its shadowy secret, drives it further from view. Indeed, racism does its most essential work in the shadow of the very attempt to explain it."

Jared Sexton, *Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiculturalism* (2008, p. 27)

Treatment Without Solution

Racism increasingly appears to function—in idioms both public and private, civil and state, conservative and progressive, fringe and mainstream, national and global, academic and lay—as a total social fact. As an alternative conception to the static image of society as a sum of parts, positions, and functions, the total social fact describes a dynamically extending network of social linkages relating persons, objects, and institutions *as* a society (Mauss, 1954/2002). In the United States in particular, racism has grown increasingly compositional: it travels through political speech and discourses on power, forming a network of relations—oppositional and affiliative—that assemble economic, legal, civil, and cultural institutions together *as* and *into* an anti-racist society, one that churns in a perpetual state of becoming. No doubt the Civil Rights movements and allied revolutionary projects of the last century have had their political demands (both violently and surreptitiously) annexed to the territory of articulation that racism and anti-racism now bounds as a social totality. To conceive racism as a total social fact is thus a non-descriptive, non-substantive, and non-functionalist maneuver. This justifies borrowing the definition of the anthropological concept of *mana* for our own purposes: racism "is a word that appeared in order to understand 'the relationships that it helps construct,' and does not have its origin in an 'order of realities different' therefrom" (Kasuga, 2010, p. 103). Racism not only has no elusive core—as Jared Sexton writes above—but it does its most essential work in feigning

that it does work in the shadow of a different order of realities. For this reason, I have argued that racism is both unlike any modern form of power (in contrast to the anti-racism that negates and defrays it) (chapter 1) and a vacant relay point for the *relation to* the liberal impasse in sovereignty—that transfers it from its inconsistent structure to its split subject (chapter 2). What I am trying to convey—and what I think the case history archive demonstrates—is the manner in which racism is not in any simple or necessary way ancillary to power. The radical premises of liberalism, which engender its fundamental opposition to racism, testifies to this undecidable nature.

Now, as a broker of a totality of social connections, racism has just as importantly proven itself to be a strangely non-communicative signifier. It is a word that elicits a total consensus—those who do not repudiate racism are socially excommunicated—and produces a meaning or definition over which there is an inordinately constant, perpetual, and recrudescent dissensus. In the lack of any meaningfully common functions, features, or characteristics among the racial symptoms explored as "racist" in the preceding case histories (chapter 4), this polysemous feature of racism becomes acutely apparent. Each vignette illustrates the historical production of a unique racial signifier that—whether to the analysand's gain or loss—structures a mode of enjoyment, or a practice of "being," that emerges as a fact and result of the *necessary inexistence of any social resolution to the contradictory existence of the racial signifier*. In addition to mediating social connections, racism can thus also construct the incommunicability of the unconscious, induce the destitution of subjectivity, or veil the silences of the sexual drive. A discourse without communication; an external unconscious; a symptom outside nosography; the convergence of totem and taboo: this is the bread and butter of psychoanalytic theory and privileged matters for a method geared toward thinking the limits of interpretation (chapter 3).

Perhaps most arrestingly, the preceding cases indicate how the ungovernable nature of the subject—its sovereign singularity—provides no prophylactic for a modality of racialization that does not proceed unilaterally through the dispersion of knowledge, fantasy, or practice but is simultaneously totalized *and* detotalized across the imaginary, symbolic, and real of unconscious experience—and is tied together in the ribbon of a symptom. In this light, it becomes clear that the analytic method must *treat* (attend to) a problem, the subject of racism, for which there is no analytic *treatment* (solution).

Witnessing the simultaneously syncretizing *and* disaggregating effects of racism was one observation that motivated this project and determined its methodology. It was accompanied by another one: that the rhetoric and sentiment organizing a great many expressions of anti-racism—academic, activist, and legislative alike—unwittingly copies a therapeutic technique that was developed in the North American psychoanalytic tradition around the midcentury. More than one author of the preceding case analyses can be counted among its adherents and proponents. Alliance is the strategy and aim of this technique. For the "ego psychology" that Lacan skewered throughout most of his career, the forming of an alliance between the analyst and an autonomous portion of the ego *against* the unconscious that resists the cure is the "precondition for psycho-analytic work" (Loewenstein, 1954, p. 188). Similarly, the anti-racist structure of feeling that this study turns up—in the political orientation of the left-liberal social sciences of the 1930s as with the transferential relations between analysts and analysands in the postwar years—seems to govern the formation of a grand coalition against racism as "the unconscious part of the patient's ego which comprises the defenses" (ibid.). If the conception of a "racist society" significantly withers the open assemblage Marcel Mauss envisioned as the dynamic structure of the social, this is partly attributable to a research approach and political

disposition that makes imagining the destruction of racism a "precondition for critical work." By association, racism comes to be pigeonholed in a substantialist and functionalist manner as, for instance, a defense or resistance to the "conflictless sphere" of the unconscious. Alliance as a strategy thus constructs racism as an illness, conceives of illness as a resistance to the cure, and conceives of anti-racism as a mode of administering a remedy. In this dissertation, I have attempted to relativize this blinkering dimension to the imagination as a precondition for analysis, and to enact instead a form of reading and writing to the letter—that is, to the/a (racial) signifier. Bracketing the imagination not only avoids the "medical model" that classifies racism as a disease but enables isolating the racial symptom in the preceding case history analyses as a site of an identity between illness and cure: the racial symptom as both the cause and inscription of a turmoil that is at once psychic and historical.

Upon encountering the racial symptom, it is no longer possible to argue that the potency and allure of ego psychology, of the politics of racial identity, and of the processes of racialization—alone or in combination—come from how they foreclose the subject of desire (Viego, 2007). In other words, the clinic of racism pulls the rug out from under the proposition that racism necessarily assaults the subject, and ipso facto, that "the subject, radically unknowable, radically incalculable, is the only guarantee we have against racism" (Copjec 1994/2015, p. 209). Joan Copjec's powerful statement on the incompatibility between racism and the subject of psychoanalysis has been a springboard for much work on this theme, but fixes racism out the gate as a (Foucauldian) form of knowledge-power, and figures psychoanalysis in contrast as a spontaneous antiracism, and to the very extent that psychoanalysis positions itself as a theoretical and practical safety net for the subject of the unconscious. Paradoxically, the a priori distinction between the subject and racialization makes racism external to the (clinical)

subject and instantly irrelevant to the analytic method. Jacques-Alain Miller mimes this approach when he blames racism on the foreclosure of the subject of desire by the marriage of capital and modern science. Desperate, the subject is said to get off on a hatred directed at the imagined jouissance of the Other racialized as a subject supposed to enjoy (1988; 2017). Slavoj Žižek's extensive commentary on racism in the last decades owes a lot to Miller's formulation, which is all to say that racism almost exclusively serves as a point of illustration for (particularly Lacanian) psychoanalytic concepts, acting as a handy counterexample to define what is improper to the Freudian field. Such a "use" of racism abuses psychoanalysis; it resists racism to the extent that it reduces it to the imaginary and recuses psychoanalysis from its eminent domain. Against this opposition between the subject and racism, the case histories reveal that both the subject *and* racism resist racialization—that the subject is the only guarantee we have *for and against* racism.

This dissertation arrives at this equivocal point by leaning on lateral insights from recent clinically-driven psychoanalytic work in the humanities and social sciences. One such development has occurred in transgender studies, where a cadre of scholars have recently begun to robustly dispute the conflation of transsexuality and psychosis that has been predominant in a certain psychoanalytic (particularly Lacanian) doxa. They argue that trans embodiment, as a sinthome splicing the real, symbolic, and imaginary in a unique tie, can emerge as an identification in any type of psychic structure—perverse, neurotic, or psychotic (Gherovici, 2011). Shanna Carlson even floats the possibility that the transgender subject is in this sense "the human subject as such, the unconsciously bisexual subject for whom sexual difference is only ever an incomplete, unsatisfactory solution to the failure of the sexual relation" (2010, p. 65). Trans embodiment may therefore be a strategy to open the question of sexual difference or foreclose the subject, but the trans subject as a set of (transgressive or pathological) traits does

not exist. Clinical work with trans-identified subjects has been the basis for this intervention, nuancing both Lacanian theory and queer and feminist studies of gender and identity.

In another recent development, scholars have begun to rigorously elaborate Marx with Lacan, to inscribe each in the other in a way that refuses the temptation that critical theory has long indulged to illusorily fill their complementary lacks (Feldner & Vighi, 2015; Tomšič, 2015). Outlining the ways in which Lacan read Marx to anticipate the logic of capital in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly the ways in which consumer or communicative capitalism ramps up the mass production of objects of surplus enjoyment, these studies discover that, while capitalism is structured *as* the unconscious, there is no unconscious of capitalism, no quintessentially capitalist subject or privileged postmodern psychic structure. "Clinically speaking," writes the analyst Stijn Vanheule, "capitalist discourse can both corrupt and/or protect the subject" (Vanheule, 2016, p. 10). Vanheule is well aware that his "line of reasoning implies that the capitalist discourse should not be disqualified *per se*. Lacan's discussion of the capitalist discourse, by contrast, is inherently critical" (p. 13). Depending on their psychic structure, a subject may embody the capitalist structure as a gambit to open the question of sexual difference or foreclose it. But the proletariat or revolutionary subject as a set of (radical or conservative) traits does not exist.

This dissertation also discards any particular identification, desire, or enjoyment as quintessentially racist, and reconsiders the ruling in favor of the subversive qualities of the subject of sex with regard to racism. By defining racism as an allergic reaction to the inassimilable real of sex, one loses track of the capacity the subject has to construct, institute, and safeguard otherness through racism. Take the case of the ex-Southern schoolteacher and devotee to "real black men" (case 1), the five-year-old Billy and his attachment to his family's

black housekeeper (case 2), the self-castrating dreams structured against the sacrificial drive of militarization (case 3), and the militant and masochistic antiracist (case 5) as instances in which the dialectic of racism creates uncertainty, ameliorates anxiety, and tempers the desire of the subject.

En route, this project hails theorists in the critical race and ethnic studies, and scholars on gender and sexuality where they intersect, to reevaluate the pervading functionalism that places racism at the disposal of a power-pleasure principle and critiques it exclusively as an instrument of (ego) sovereignty, hierarchy, and domination. When, for instance, Frank Wilderson III's rigorous reappreciation of the afterlife of slavery also appraises racism as a mechanism for "psychic integration" (2011)—making antiblackness identical to the aim and cure of ego psychology—racism's innate potential to elsewhere collapse the ego into the symptom and disintegrate the subject is left unaccounted for. The clinic cautions against this hasty conclusion in those instances where the racial symptom conducts the breaching of the body by jouissance—instances that include the prepsychotics in Robinson's Los Angeles clinic (case 2), the decompositional dream of the New York Harbor (and Fanon's clinic of the antiblack "perversions") (case 3), and the twin cases of the rape hysteria (around Harriett) and race riot (around Billy) (case 4). Racism either integrates or disintegrates the ego. It may do both or neither.

As with the (trans) subject of sexual difference or the (laboring) subject of capitalism, the subject of racism may be "healthy" or "pathological"; may be psychotic, perverse, or neurotic; may configure racism as a volatile solution to the real of jouissance or a symptomatic hinge on which her desire is sustained; but the subject of racism as a discrete set of (good or evil) practices, fantasies, and beliefs does not exist. Like Plato's *pharmakon*, racism can be a remedy,

it can be a poison, and it is wholly indeterminate. Like the capitalist discourse, the liberal discourse should not be disqualified *per se*. This is the ethical dilemma of racism.

REFERENCES

Abel, E. (2010). *Signs of the Times: The Visual Politics of Jim Crow*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Abel, E., Christian, B., & Moglen, H. (Eds.). (1997). *Female Subjects in Black and White: Race, Psychoanalysis, Feminism*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Ackerman, N. W., & Jahoda, M. (1948). The dynamic basis of anti-Semitic attitudes. *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, *17*(2), 240-260.

Adams, J., & Gorton, D. (2004). Southern trauma: Revisiting caste and class in the Mississippi delta. *American Anthropologist*, *106*(2), 334-345.

Ahad, B. S. (2010). *Freud Upside Down: African American Literature and Psychoanalytic Culture*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Allport, G. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Anderson, A. (2016). *Bleak Liberalism*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Appiah, A. (1985). The uncompleted argument: Du Bois and the illusion of race. *Critical Inquiry*, *12*(1), 21-37.

Badiou, A. (2005). *Handbook of Inaesthetics*. (A. Toscano, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bailyn, B. (2017). *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1967)

Balibar, E. (2011a). Is there a 'neo-racism'? In E. Balibar & I. Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (pp. 17-28). London, UK: Verso. (Original work published 1991)

Balibar, E. (2011b). Racism and nationalism. In E. Balibar & I. Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (pp. 37-67). London, UK: Verso. (Original work published 1991)

Bell, D. (2016). *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Benedict, R. (1942). *Race and Racism*. London, UK: Routledge.

Benjamin, W. (2007). Theses on the philosophy of history. In H. Arendt (Ed.), *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections*. (pp. 253-264) (H. Zohn, Trans.). New York, NY: Schocken Books. (Original work published 1968)

Bergner, G. (2005). *Taboo Subjects: Race, Sex, and Psychoanalysis*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Berkeley-Hill, A. O. (1924). The 'color question' from a psychoanalytic standpoint. *The Psychoanalytic Review*, 11, 246-253.

Bernasconi, R., & Lott, T. L. (Eds.). (2000). *The Idea of Race*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.

Best, S., & Marcus, S. (2009). Surface readings: An introduction. *Representations*, *108*(1), 1-21.

Bianchi, P. (2012). From representation to class struggle: A response to Samo Tomšič. *S: Journal of the Jan van Eyck Circle for Lacanian Ideology Critique, 5*, 114-126.

Bird, B. (1957). A consideration of the etiology of prejudice. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, *5*(3), 490-513;

Bird, B. (1972). Notes on transference: Universal phenomenon and hardest part of analysis. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, *20*(2), 267-301.

Bonilla-Silva, E. (2001). *White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Brooks, P., & Woloch, A. (Eds.). (2000). *Whose Freud? The Place of Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Brousse, M.-H., & Jaanus, M. (Eds.). (2013). *We're All Mad Here*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Brown, W. (2015). *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution*. New York, NY: Zone Books.
Bryson, D. (2009). Personality and Culture, the Social Science Research Council, and liberal social engineering: The Advisory Committee on Personality and Culture, 1930–1934. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 45*(4), 355-386.
Buhle, M. J. (1998). *Feminism and its Discontents: A Century of Struggle with Psychoanalysis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Burgoyne, B. (2003). From the letter to the matheme: Lacan's scientific methods. In J.-M. Rabaté (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Lacan* (pp. 69-85). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Burnham, J. (Ed.). (2012). *After Freud Left: A Century of Psychoanalysis in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Butler, J. (2009). *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* New York, NY: Verso.
Butts, H. F. (1971). Psychoanalysis and unconscious racism. *Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy*, *3*(2), 67-81.
Campbell, J. & Oakes, J. (1993). The invention of race: Rereading White Over Black [Review of the book *White Over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550-1812* by W. D. Jordan]. *Reviews in American History*, *21*(1), 172-183.
Carlson, S. T. (2010). Transgender subjectivity and the logic of sexual difference. *differences*, *21*(2), 46-72.
de Certeau, M. (1986). *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*. (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis (1947). *Report of the Five Year Period, 1942–1947*. Chicago, IL.
Chomsky, N., & Foucault, M. (2006). *The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature*. New York, NY: The New Press.
Clemens, N. A. (2013). *History of Psychoanalysis in Cleveland*. Retrieved from https://psychoanalysiscleveland.org/about-us/history-of-psychoanalysis-in-cleveland/
Copjec, J. (2015). *Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists*. London, UK: Verso. (Original work published 1994)
Crawford, M. N. (2008). *Dilution Anxiety and the Black Phallus*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
Cremin, C. (2011). *Capitalism's New Clothes: Enterprise, Ethics and Enjoyment in Times of Crisis*. London, UK: Pluto Press.
da Silva, D. F. (2007). *Toward a Global Idea of Race*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
da Silva, D. F. (2009). No-bodies: law, raciality and violence. *Griffith Law Review*, *18*(2), 212-236.
Dalal, F. (2002). *Race, Colour and the Process of Racialization: New Perspectives from Group Analysis, Psychoanalysis and Sociology*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Danto, E. A. (2005). *Freud's Free Clinics: Psychoanalysis and Social Justice, 1918-1938*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Declercq, F. (2006). Lacan on the capitalist discourse: Its consequence for libidinal enjoyment and social bonds. *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society*, *11*, 74-83.
Deleuze, G., & von Sacher-Masoch, L. (1991). *Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty & Venus in Furs*. New York, NY: Zone Books. (Original work published 1967)
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1983). *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1972)
Dennis, B. (2009). Personality and culture, the social science research council, and liberal social engineering: The advisory committee on personality and culture, 1930-1934. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, *45*(4), 355-386.
Derrida, J. (1981). *Positions*. (A. Bass, Trans.). Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Doane, M. A. (1991). *Femme Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Dollard, J. (1937). *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Dollard, J. (1938a). Hostility and fear in social life. *Social Forces*, *17*(1), 15-26.
Dollard, J. (1938b). The life history in community studies. *American Sociological Review*, *3*(1), 724.
Dollard, J. (1939). The dozens: dialectics of insult. *American Imago*, *1*(1), 3-25.
Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, O. H., & Sears, R. R. (1939). *Frustration and Aggression*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dollard, J. & Ferris, W. R. (2004). John Dollard: Caste and class revisited. *Southern Cultures*, *10*(2), 7-18.
Du Bois, W. E. B. (1998). *Black Reconstruction in America: 1860-1880*. New York, NY: Free Press. (Original work published 1935)
Du Bois, W. E. B. (1937). Southern trauma: review of "Caste and Class in a Southern Town" by John Dollard. *North Georgia Review*, *2*, 9-10.
duCille, Ann (1997). The occult of true black womanhood: Critical demeanor and black feminist studies. In E. Abel, B. Christian, & H. Moglen (Eds.), *Female Subjects in Black and White: Race, Psychoanalysis, Feminism* (pp. 21-56). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Dunker, C. (2011). *The Constitution of the Psychoanalytic Clinic: A History of its Structure and Power*. London, UK: Karnac.
Eco, U. (1992). *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*. S. Collini (Ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Fanon, F. (2004). *The Wretched of the Earth*. (R. Philcox, Trans.). New York, NY: Grove Press. (Original work published 1961)
Fanon, F. (2008). *Black Skin, White Masks*. (C. L. Markmann, Trans.). London, UK: Pluto Press. (Original work published 1952)
Farley, A. P. (2003). The dream of interpretation. *University of Miami Law Review*, *57*, 695-725.
Feldner, H., & Vighi, F. (2015). *Critical Theory and the Crisis of Contemporary Capitalism*. New York, NY: Bloomsbury.
Felman, S. (1977). To open the question. *Yale French Studies*, *55*/*56*, 5-10.
Felski, R. (2016). *The Limits of Critique*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Fenichel, O. (1987). Identification. In Fenichel, H., & Rapaport, D. (Eds.), *The Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel, First Series* (pp. 97-112). New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1926)

Fields, B. J., & Fields, K. (2012). *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*. London, UK: Verso.
Fink, B. (1997). *A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Analysis: Theory and Technique*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fink, B. (2010). Against understanding: Why understanding should not be viewed as an essential aim of psychoanalytic treatment. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, *58*(2), 259-285.
Fink, B. (2013a). *Against Understanding: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key* (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Routledge.
Fink, B. (2013b). *Against Understanding: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key* (Vol. 2). New York, NY: Routledge.
Finley, M. I. (1980). *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers.
Finot, J. (1969). *Race Prejudice*. (F. Wade-Evans, Trans.). Miami, FL: Mnemosyne Pub. Co. (Original work published 1907)
Forrester, J. (2017). *Thinking in Cases*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
Foucault, M. (1990). *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*. (R. Hurley, Trans.). New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1976)
Foucault, M. (2002). *Archaeology of Knowledge*. (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans.). New York, NY: Routledge. (Original work published 1972)
Foucault, M. (2003). *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*. (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans.). New York, NY: Pantheon Books. (Original work published 1973)
Fraiberg, S. H. (1947). Studies in group symptom formation. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, *17*(2), 278-289.
Fraiberg, S. H. (1996). *The Magic Years: Understanding and Handling the Problems of Early Childhood*. New York, NY: Fireside. (Original work published 1959)
Fraiberg, S., & Fraiberg, L. (1977). *Insights from the Blind: Comparative Studies of Blind and Sighted Infants*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Fraiberg, S., Adelson, E., & Shapiro, V. (1975). Ghosts in the nursery: A psychoanalytic approach to the problems of impaired infant-mother relationships. *Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry*, *14*(3), 387-421.
Fredrickson, G. M. (2002). *Racism: A Short History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Freeland, C. (2013). *Antigone, in her Unbearable Splendor: New Essays on Jacques Lacan's* The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Freud, S. (1953a). The interpretation of dreams. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vols. 4-5, pp. 1-628). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1900)
Freud, S. (1953b). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 7, pp. 1-122). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1905)
Freud, S. (1955a). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 10, pp. 1-150). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1909)

Freud, S. (1955b). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 10, pp. 151-318). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1909)

Freud, S. (1955c) Totem and taboo: Some points of agreement between the mental lives of savages and neurotics. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 13, pp. vii-162). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1913)

Freud, S. (1955d). From the history of an infantile neurosis. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 17, pp. 1-124). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1918)

Freud, S. (1955e). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 18, pp. 65-144). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1921)

Freud, S. (1957a). The antithetical meaning of primal words. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 11, pp. 153-162). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1911)

Freud, S. (1957b). A special type of choice of object made by men. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 11, pp. 163-176). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1910)

Freud, S. (1957c). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 11, pp. 177-190). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1912)

Freud, S. (1957d). Instincts and their vicissitudes. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 14, pp. 109-140). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1915)

Freud, S. (1957e). The unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 14, pp. 159-215). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1915)

Freud, S. (1957f). Mourning and melancholia. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 14, pp. 237-258). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1915)

Freud, S. (1958). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 12, pp. 1-82). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1910)

Freud, S. (1961). Civilization and its discontents. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 21, pp. 57-146). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1930)

Freud, S. (1964a). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 22, pp. 1-267). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1933)

Freud, S. (1964b). Moses and monotheism. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 23, pp. 1-138). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1939)

Freud, S. (1964c). Analysis terminable and interminable. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 23, pp. 209-254). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1937)
Freud, S. (1964d). Constructions in analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 23, pp. 255-269). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1937)
Fromm, E. (2000). The social determinants of psychoanalytic therapy. *International Forum of Psychoanalysis*, 9(3-4), 149-165. (Original work published 1935)
Gallop, J. (1982). *The Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Gearhart, L. P., & Schuster, D. B. (1971). Black is beautiful. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, *24*(5), 479-484.
Giffney, N., & Watson, E. (2017). *Clinical Encounters in Sexuality: Psychoanalytic Practice and Queer Theory*. punctum books.
Gifford, S. (2010). The psychoanalytic movement in the United States, 1906-1991. In Wallace, E. R. & Gach, J. (Eds.), *History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology* (pp. 629-656). New York, NY: Springer Science.
Gilpin, P. J. (1980). Charles S. Johnson and the Race Relations Institutes at Fisk University. *Phylon*, *41*(3), 300-311.
Gitre, E. J. K. (2010). Importing Freud: First-wave psychoanalysis, interwar social sciences, and the interdisciplinary foundations of an American social theory. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, *46*(3), 239-262.
Gitre, E. J. K. (2011). The great escape: World war II, neo-Freudianism, and the origins of U.S. psychocultural analysis. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, *47*(1), 18-43.
Goldberg, D. T. (1990). The social formations of racist discourse. In D. T. Goldberg (Ed.), *Anatomy of Racism*. (pp. 295-318). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Gordon, P. (1993). Souls in armour: Thoughts on psychoanalysis and racism. *British Journal of Psychotherapy*, *10*(1), 62-76.
Grier, W. H. (1967). When the therapist is a Negro: Some effects on the treatment process. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, *123*(12), 1587-1592.
Grier, W. H., & Cobbs, P. M. (1968). *Black Rage*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Grotjahn, M. (1966). *Beyond Laughter: Humor and the Subconscious*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. (Original work published 1957)
Hagel, J. (2012). In search of the 'racist white psyche': racism and the psychology of prejudice in American social thought, 1930-1960 (doctoral dissertation).
Hale, N. G., Jr. (1978). From Berggasse XIX to Central Park West: The Americanization of psychoanalysis, 1919-1940. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, *14*(4), 299-315.
Hale, N. G., Jr. (1995). *The Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in the United States: Freud and the Americans, 1917-1985*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hale, N. G., Jr. (2001). New heads for Freud's hydra: Psychoanalysis in Los Angeles. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, *37*(2), 111-122.
Hall, S. (1985). Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post-structuralist debates. *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, *2*(2), 91-114.

Hall, S. (2002). "Reflections on 'Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance' (S. Hall)." In Essed, P., & Goldberg, D. T. (Eds.), *Race Critical Theories: Text and Context* (pp. 449-454). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Hamer, F. M. (2006). Racism as a transference state: Episodes of racial hostility in the psychoanalytic context. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, *75*(1), 197-214.
Hamilton, C. V., & Ture, K. (1992). *Black Power: Politics of Liberation in America*. New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1967)
Hartman, S. (1997). *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hartman, S. (2007). *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route*. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Holland, J. (2015). Introduction to Jacques Lacan's 'On a Reform in its Hole'. *S: Journal of the Jan van Eyck Circle for Lacanian Ideology Critique, 8*, 6-13.
Hyman, M., & Swan, G. (1994) The Michigan Society for Psychoanalytic Psychology: A brief history. In R. C. Lane & M. Meisels (Eds.), *A History of the Division of Psychoanalysis of the American Psychological Association* (pp. 256-260). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Jameson, F. (2002). *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. New York, NY: Routledge. (Original work published 1981)
JanMohamed, A. R. (2005). *The Death-Bound-Subject: Richard Wright's Archaeology of Death*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Jay, M. (1996). *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Original work published 1973)
Jordan, W. D. (2012). *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1968)
Jung, C. (1930). Your Negroid and Indian behavior. *Forum*, *83*(4), 193-199.
Kasuga, N. (2010). Total social fact: structuring, partially connecting, and reassembling. *Revue du MAUSS*, *36*(2), 101-110.
Keller, R. C. (2007). Clinician and revolutionary: Frantz Fanon, biography, and the history of colonial medicine. *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, *81*(4), 823-851.
Kennedy, R. (2002). *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.
Koren, D. (2017). On an apocalyptic tone adopted today in psychoanalysis. *European Journal of Psychoanalysis*, retrieved from http://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/on-an-apocalyptic-tone-adopted-today-in-psychoanalysis/
Kornbluh, A. (2014). *Realizing Capital: Financial and Psychic Economies in Victorian Form*. New York, NY: Fordham University Press.
Kovel, J. (1984). *White Racism: A Psychohistory*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Kuhn, T. (2012). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1962)
Lacan, J. (1966-7). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XIV: The Logic of Phantasy*. (C. Gallagher, Trans.). Retrieved from http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/translations/seminars/

Lacan, J. (1968-9). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVI: From an Other to the other*. (C. Gallagher, Trans.). Retrieved from http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/translations/seminars/
Lacan, J. (1979). The neurotic's individual myth. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, *48*(3), 405-425.
Lacan, J. (1992). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960*. (D. Porter, Trans.). New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1986)
Lacan, J. (1993). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book III: The Psychoses*. (R. Grigg, Trans.). New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1981)
Lacan, J. (1998a). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. (A. Sheridan, Trans.). New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1973)
Lacan, J. (1998b). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Sexuality*. (B. Fink, Trans.). New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1975)
Lacan, J. (2006a). The instance of the letter in the unconscious, or reason since Freud. In *Écrits* (pp. 412-441). (B. Fink, Trans.) New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1970)
Lacan, J. (2006b). Logical time and the assertion of anticipated certainty. In *Écrits* (pp. 161-175). (B. Fink, Trans.) New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1970)
Lacan, J. (2006c). The signification of the phallus. In *Écrits* (pp. 575-584). (B. Fink, Trans.) New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1970)
Lacan, J. (2007). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*. (R. Grigg, Trans.). New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1991)
Lacan, J. (2014). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book X: Anxiety*. (A. R. Price, Trans.). Malden, MA: Polity Press. (Original work published 2004)
Lane, C. (Ed.). (1998). *The Psychoanalysis of Race*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Laplanche, J. (1996). Psychoanalysis as anti-hermeneutics. (L. Thurston, Trans.). *Radical Philosophy*, *79*, 7-12.
Latour, B. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern. *Critical Inquiry*, *30*(2), 225-248.
Leader, D. (2003). Lacan's myths. In J.-M. Rabaté (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Lacan* (pp. 35-49). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Lentin, A., & Titley, G. (2011). *The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal Age*. London, UK: Zed Books.
Lerner, N. (1980). *The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*. Boston, MA: Brill.
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1969). *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*. (R. Needham, Trans.). Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Levine, R. A. (2001). Culture and personality studies, 1918-1960: myth and history. *Journal of Personality*, *69*(6), 803-818.
Loewenstein, E. A. (1992). The Freudian case history: A detective story or a dialectical progression? Reflections on psychoanalytic narratives from a Lacanian perspective. *Psychoanalytic Psychology*, *9*(1), 49-59.

Loewenstein, R. M. (1954). Some remarks on defences, autonomous ego and psycho-analytic technique. *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, *35*, 188-192.
Long-Innes, C. (1990). Between literature and science: Freud and the demon of interpretation. *Journal of Literary Studies*, *6*(1-2), 13-35.
Losurdo, D. (2011). *Liberalism: A Counter-History*. (G. Elliott, Trans.). London, UK: Verso.
MacCannell, J. F. (1991) *The Regime of the Brother: After the Patriarchy*. New York, NY: Routledge.
MacGregor, G. (1948). H. Scudder Mekeel, 1902–1947. *American Anthropologist*, *50*(1), 95-100.
Mackie, B. (2014). The status of the case history in psychoanalysis. *Analysis*, *19*, 149-158.
Mannoni, O. (1966). Decolonisation of Myself. *Race*, *7*(4), 327-335.
Manson, W. C. (1988). *The Psychodynamics of Culture: Abram Kardiner and Neo-Freudian Anthropology*. New York, NY: Greenwood Press.
Marable, M. (2007). *Race, Reform and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction and Beyond in Black America, 1945-2006* (3rd ed.). Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi. (Original work published 1984)
Marcus, S. (1993). Freud and Dora: Story, history, case history. In Berman, E. (Ed.), *Essential Papers on Literature and Psychoanalysis* (pp. 36-80). New York, NY: New York University Press. (Original work published 1974)
Marriott, D. (1998). Bonding over phobia. In C. Lane (Ed.), *Psychoanalysis of Race* (pp. 417-430). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Marriott, D. (2000). *On Black Men*. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.
Marriott, D. (2007). *Haunted Life: Visual Culture and Black Modernity*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Marriott, D. (2010). On racial fetishism. *Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences*, *18*(2), 215-248.
Marston, S. A., Jones, J. P., & Woodward, K. (2005). Human geography without scale. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *30*(4), 416-432.
Marx, K. (1978). Theses on Feuerbach. In R. C. Tucker (Ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (2nd ed.) (pp. 143-145). New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1888)
Mauss, M. (2002). *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. New York, NY: Routledge. (Original work published 1954)
Mbembe, A. (2017). *Critique of Black Reason*. (L. Dubois, Trans.). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
McCormick, J. S. (1934). The Julius Rosenwald Fund. *The Journal of Negro Education, 3*(4), 605-626.
McGowan, T. (2010). *The End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
McGowan, T. (2016). *Capitalism and Desire: The Psychic Cost of Free Markets*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
McLean, H. V. (1944). Racial prejudice. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, *14*(4), 706-713.
McLean, H. V. (1946). Psychodynamic factors in racial relations. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *244*(1), 159-166.
Melamed, J. (2011). *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Memmi, A. (2000). *Racism*. (S. Martinot, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Mendes, G. N. (2015). *Under the Strain of Color: Harlem's Lafargue Clinic and the Promise of an Antiracist Psychiatry*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Miller, J.-A. (1988). Extimité. *Prose Studies*, *11*(3), 121-131.
Miller, J.-A. (1989). To interpret the cause: From Freud to Lacan. *Newsletter of the Freudian Field*, *3*(1-2), 30-50.
Miller, J.-A. (2005). A fantasy. *Lacanian Praxis: International Quarterly of Applied Psychoanalysis*, *1*, 5-16.
Miller, J.-A. (2006). On shame. In Clemens, J., & Grigg, R. (Eds.), *Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Reflections on Seminar XVII* (pp. 11-28). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Miller, J.-A. (2007). Interpretation in reverse. In Voruz, V., & Wolf, B. (Eds.), *The Later Lacan: An Introduction* (pp. 3-9). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Miller, J.-A. (2011). The non-existent seminar. *Symptom*, *12*, retrieved from http://www.lacan.com/symptom12/the-non.html.
Miller, J.-A. (2017). Extimate enemies. *The Lacanian Review (Hurly Burly)*, *3*(Spring), 30-42.
Mills, C. W. (2017). *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Monsour, K., & Grotjahn, M. (1967). Racial prejudice and the incest taboo. *Ghandi Marg*, *11*(4), 340-350.
Montagu, A. (2001). *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. (Original work published 1942)
Morrison, T. (1991). *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
Moss, D. B. (1992). Introductory thoughts: Hating in the first person plural: The example of homophobia. *American Imago*, *49*(3), 277-291.
Moss, D. B. (2009). On three strands of meaning associated with the word nigger when used during the course of a psychoanalytic treatment. *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, *78*(3), 819-842.
Moynihan, D. P. (1988). Preface. In: J. Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (vii-xii) (5th ed.). Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. (Original work published 1937)
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). (1920). *Tenth Annual Report of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People for the Year 1919*. New York, NY.
Nobus, D., & Quinn, M. (2005). *Knowing Nothing, Staying Stupid: Elements for a Psychoanalytic Epistemology*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Oakes, J. (1998). *Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old South*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. (Original work published 1990)
Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1986/2015). *Racial Formation in the United States*. (3rd Ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.
Penney, J. (2014). *After Queer Theory: The Limits of Sexual Politics*. London, UK: Pluto Press.
Pluth, E. (2007a). Against spontaneity: The act and overcensorship in Badiou, Lacan, and Žižek. *International Journal of Žižek Studies*, *1*(2), 1-28.
Pluth, E. (2007b). On sexual difference and sexuality "as such": Lacan and the case of Little Hans. *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, *12*(2), 69-79.

Pluth, E. (2007c). *Signifiers and Acts: Freedom in Lacan's Theory of the Subject*. New York, NY: SUNY Press.
Povinelli, E. A. (2016). *Geontologies: A Requiem to Late Liberalism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Ragland, E. (2004). *The Logic of Sexuation: From Aristotle to Lacan*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Rankin, J. (1833). *Letters on American Slavery, Addressed to Mr. Thomas Rankin, Merchant at Middlebrook, Augusta Co., VA*. Boston, MA: Garrison & Knapp.
Redl, F. (1943). Diagnostic group work. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, *14*(1), 53-67.
Reed, A., Jr. (2013). Marx, race, and neoliberalism. *New Labor Forum*, *22*(1), 49-57.
Robcis, C. (2016). François Tosquelles and the psychiatric revolution in postwar France. *Constellations*, *23*(2), 212-222.
Roberts, D. (2011). *Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business Re-create Race in the Twenty-first Century*. New York, NY: The New Press.
Robinson, C. J. (2000). *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. (Original work published 1983)
Robinson, H. A. (1971). Pseudo-therapeutic benefits from an adverse social phenomenon (racial prejudice). *American Journal of Psychiatry*, *128*(2), 232-324.
Rogers, J. A. (1972). *Sex and Race: Why Black and White Mix in Spite of Opposition* (Vol. 3). St. Petersburg, FL: Helga M. Rogers. (Original work published 1944)
Ross, D. (1997). A historian's view of American social science. In R. G. Walters (Ed.), *Scientific Authority and Twentieth-Century America* (pp. 32-49). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).
Rothenberg, M. A. (2010). *The Excessive Subject: A New Theory of Social Change*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
Rubin, G. (1975). The traffic in women: Notes on the "political economy" of sex. In R. R. Reiter (Ed.), *Toward an Anthropology of Women* (pp. 157-210). New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
Salecl, R. (1994). *The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Ideology after the Fall of Socialism*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Santner, E. L. (2011). *The Royal Remains: The People's Two Bodies and the Endgames of Sovereignty*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Sapir, E. (1934). The emergence of the concept of personality in a study of cultures. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, *5*(3), 408-415.
Sbriglia, R. (2017). The symptoms of ideology critique; or, how we learned to enjoy the symptom and ignore the fetish. In R. Sbriglia (Ed.), *Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Literature but Were Afraid to Ask Žižek* (pp. 107-136). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Schlachet, P., & Grotjahn, M. (1980). An interview with Martin Grotjahn. *Group*, *4*(1), 72-76.
Schuster, D. B., & Freeman, E. N. (1970). Supervision of the resident's initial interview. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, *23*(6), 516-523.
Sedgwick, E. K. (1990). *Epistemology of the Closet*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Seshadri-Crooks, K. (2000). *Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian Analysis of Race*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Sexton, J. (2008). *Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Sexton, J. (2016). *Skin Acts: Race, Psychoanalysis, and the Black Male Performer* by Michelle Ann Stephens (review). *philoSOPHIA*, *6*(1), 151-155.
Shapiro, V. (2009). Reflections on the work of Professor Selma Fraiberg: A pioneer in the field of social work and infant mental health. *Clinical Social Work Journal*, *37*(1), 45-55.
Sharpe, C. (2010). *Monstrous Intimacies: Making Post-Slavery Subjects*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Shepherdson, C. (1999). The epoch of the body: Need and demand in Kojève and Lacan. In G. Weiss, & H. F. Haber (Eds.), *Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections of Nature and Culture* (pp. 183-211). New York, NY: Routledge.
Shepherdson, C. (2000). *Vital Signs: Nature, Culture, Psychoanalysis*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Sinha, M. (2016). *The Cause of the Slave: A History of Abolition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Sitkoff, H. (2010) The Detroit race riot of 1943. In Sitkoff, H., *Toward Freedom Land: The Long Struggle for Racial Equality in America* (pp. 43-64). Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
Sontag, S. (2001). Against interpretation. In *Against Interpretation: And Other Essays* (pp. 3-14). New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (Original work published 1966)
Spillers, H. J. (1987). Mama's baby, papa's maybe: An American grammar book. *diacritics*, *17*(2), 65-81.
Spillers, H. J. (2003a). "All the Things You Could Be by Now, If Sigmund Freud's Wife was Your Mother": Psychoanalysis and race. In *Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture* (pp. 376-427). Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Spillers, H. J. (2003b). *Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Steinberg, S. (1995). *Turning Back: The Retreat from Racial Justice in American Thought and Policy*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Steinberg, S. (2007). *Race Relations: A Critique*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Sterba, R. (1934). The fate of the ego in analytic therapy. *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, *15*, 117-126.
Sterba, R. (1947). Some psychological factors in Negro race hatred and in anti-Negro riots. *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, 1, 411-427.
Sterba, R. (1982). *Reminiscences of a Viennese Psychoanalyst*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
Stoler, L. A. (2002). Racial histories and their regimes of truth. In P. Essed, & D. T. Goldberg (Eds.), *Race Critical Theories: Text and Context* (pp. 369-391). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Svolos, T. (2017). *Twenty-First Century Psychoanalysis*. London, UK: Karnac Books.
Tarizzo, D. (2017). *Life: A Modern Invention*. (M. W. Epstein, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Tate, C. (1998). *Psychoanalysis and Black Novels: Desire and the Protocols of Race*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Thomas, A., & Sillen, S. (1972). *Racism and Psychiatry*. New York, NY: Brunner/Mazel.
Tomšič, S. (2015). *The Capitalist Unconscious: Marx with Lacan*. London, UK: Verso.
Traub-Werner, D. (1984). Towards a theory of prejudice. *International Review of Psychoanalysis*, *11*(4), 407-412.

Trouillot, M.-R. (2003). Adieu, culture: A new duty arises. In *Global Transformations: Anthropology and the Modern World* (pp. 97-116). New York, NY: Palgrave.
Tuhkanen, M. (2009). *The American Optic: Psychoanalysis, Critical Race Theory, and Richard Wright*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
usufruct. (n.d.). In *Black's Law Dictionary online* (2nd ed.). Retrieved from https://thelawdictionary.org/usufruct/.
Vanheule, S. (2011). *The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective*. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Vanheule, S. (2016). Capitalist discourse, subjectivity, and Lacanian psychoanalysis. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *7*, 1-14.
Verhaeghe, P. (2001). *Beyond Gender: From Subject to Drive*. New York, NY: Other Press.
Verhaeghe, P. (2006). Enjoyment and impossibility: Lacan's revision of the Oedipus Complex. In J. Clemens & R. Grigg (Eds.), *Reflections on Seminar XVII: Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis* (pp. 29-49). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Verhaeghe, P., & Declercq, F. (2002). Lacan's analytical goal: "Le Sinthome" or the feminine way. In L. Thurston (Ed.), *Re-inventing the Symptom: Essays on the Final Lacan* (pp. 59-83). New York, NY: Other Press.
Viego, A. (2007). *Dead Subjects: Toward a Politics of Loss in Latino Studies*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Vighi, F. (2010). *On Žižek's Dialectics: Surplus, Subtraction, Sublimation*. New York, NY: Continuum.
Voruz, V., & Wolf, B. (Eds.) (2007). *The Later Lacan: An Introduction*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Warner, W. L. (1936). American caste and class. *American Journal of Sociology*, *42*(2), 234-237
White, W., & Marshall, T. (1943). *What Caused the Detroit Riot?* New York, NY: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
Whyte, W. F. (2012). *Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1955)
Wilderson, F. B., III (2011). The vengeance of vertigo: Aphasia and abjection in the political trials of black insurgents. *InTensions Journal*, *5*, 1-41.
Wilson, W. J. (2012). *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*. (3rd Ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1978)
Woodward, C. V. (1957). The political legacy of Reconstruction. *The Journal of Negro Education*, *26*(3), 231-240.
Wright, R. (1993). Introduction. In: H. R. Cayton Jr. & S. C. Drake, *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (pp. xvii-xxxiv) (4th ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1945)
Zafiropoulos, M. (2010). *Lacan and Lévi-Strauss or the Return to Freud (1951-1957)*. (J. Holland, Trans.). London, UK: Karnac.
Zaretsky, E. (2015). *Political Freud: A History*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Zimmerman, A. (2015). Culture, psyche and state power. *Modern Intellectual History*, *12*(2), 485-496.
Žižek, S. (1997). Multiculturalism, or, the cultural logic of multinational capitalism. *New Left Review, 225*, 28-51.
Zupančič, A. (2016). "You'd have to be stupid not to see that". *Parallax*, *22*(4), 413-425.