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Four Years Later: National Identity Politics & Historical Implications in South Sudan

A Thesis submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts
in African Studies

by
Sigin Ojulu

2016

ABSTRACT OF THESIS

Four Years Later: National Identity Politics & Historical Implications in South Sudan

by

Sigin Ojulu

Master of Arts in African Studies

University of California, Los Angeles, 2016

Professor Daniel N. Posner, Chair

This paper looks to understand the current salience of national identity in South Sudan. It is based off of a study conducted between June and July of 2015 among a sample of 75 respondents in Juba, South Sudan. The paper focuses on the analysis of our outcomes and uses a historical lens to identify particular events and projects that may have contributed to differences of sentiments across demographics. It is found that although there are significant patterns of variation in identification among demographics, the concept of national identity remains strong. Due to significant limitations, the findings in this study should be considered preliminary. However, they should help to re-inform and update parochial discourses of ethnic attachment in South Sudan, and should add to larger discourses of national-identity and the nation state in many sub-Saharan African countries.

Key Words: South Sudan, Sudan, identity politics, nationalism,
race, ethnicity.

The thesis of Sigin Ojulu is approved.

Jemima Pierre

William Rogers Brubaker

Daniel N. Posner, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2016

I dedicate the completion of this thesis to my family,
whose love is the greatest motivation.

I would like to also acknowledge Dr. Joseph Asunka, William & Lauri Keitel, Thomas Johnson, Molly Ganley, Thomas Getman, Kit Martin, Noah Keitel and Matthew Grove, whose patience, generosity and support have meant the world.

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I INTRODUCTION

Only four years after the independence of the Republic of South Sudan, and the rhetoric of nationalism can still be potently seen in the very material production of goods and services. When you walk through the capital city of Juba, nationalism is almost unconsciously incited; this can be seen from the mass production of tissue boxes that are inscribed with “People’s Choice Facial Tissue”¹ to the telecommunication monopolies of Zain and MTN² who deliberately use slogans like “One nation, Network Coverage” or “We are 1 Voice”³ specifically in their operations in the newest nation-state. Four years later in the marketplaces of Juba, you are able to frequently see a Caritas⁴ stamp on the carts of vegetable merchants saying, “I love my country, I buy South Sudanese products” in Arabic and English.⁵ The thriving hotel businesses and banking institutions also use nationalistic rhetoric for advertisements alluding to a homeland on their plastered billboards, sloganing “We welcome a great bank we can call our own”.⁶ Even products like the Premium White Bull Lager function on the “Proudly South Sudanese” rhetoric with their slogan “The Fresh Crisp Taste of Home”.⁷ The idea of nationhood and a collective national identity seem to pervasively permeate civil society and are increasingly being used as tools of business within the structures of emerging industries, international development agencies and certainly within state infrastructure itself.

¹ Appendix, 1; “People’s choice” is also a slogan that references the 2011 Referendum that brought independence to the southern region.

² Both Zain and MTN are external companies from Kuwait and South Africa respectively.

³ Appendix, 2

⁴ Caritas is an international, religious organization based in El Obeid Sudan but still has operations in South Sudan in 2016.

⁵ Appendix, 3

⁶ Appendix, 4

⁷ Appendix, 5

It would seem then, as central as nationalism appears to be situated into the daily lives of citizens, that national identity might be a strong personal ascription for most people living in this region. However, as we have seen in the four years after its split from the Republic of the Sudan, ethnic conflict, continuously failed peace talks between politically ethnicized factions and rival communities remain. The introduction of the nation-state claimed to bring an end to a religious and racially charged conflict. It claimed to unite a highly heterogeneous population encompassing a purported 60+ ethnic groups and over 80+ linguistic groups. However, this new nation is visibly fraught with stark cleavages and diversity that the nation-state sought to unite - providing a paradox.

It must be noted that the literature surrounding these questions of nationalism, the nation-state and (political) identity formations is vast and has been thoroughly analyzed (Anderson 1991; Billig 1995; Branchadell 2012; Brubaker 1996; Eriksen 1993; Easterly 2006). The idea of the nation is perhaps best captured in Benedict Anderson's seminal work, *Imagined Communities* in which he evokes the idea of nations and communities as imagined and as explanations for the feelings of kinship among citizens who may never meet. Anderson's argument elaborates on Ernest Gellner's (1983) work on the development of nationalism in which economic development necessitates a form of cultural homogeneity. For Anderson, print capitalism is the driver of the sense of shared belonging in a community whose boundaries are not coterminous with that of the linguistic (and thus national) community. Such generated among other things the standardization of languages, giving power and value to culture.

Relevant to the republic of South Sudan's current linguistic dilemma⁸, issues of linguistic identifications have furthermore been central questions of national identity. Pioneer scholars like Rogers Brubaker have done extensive theoretical work on multi-variable societies, which complicate categorizations and formations within the discourse of national-identity (Brubaker 2012, 2014; Lofgren 1992; Blommaert 2012; Geertz 1973). Others seminal works note the power of discursive representations in cultural production which establishes meaning of symbols, and of which states look to exploit and perpetuate (Bourdieu 1991). Extensive postcolonial work has also been done on the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic conflict (Wimmer 1997; Posner 2005; Jenkins 1991; Olzak 1992; Moynihan 1975; Cornell & Hartmann 2007; Fenton 2010). Additional works have highlighted the effects of historical processes of colonialism, slavery and war, which have facilitated the exacerbation of conflict and questions of identity (Wimmer 2013).

Given the breadth of work done on such topics relating to national identity, I find it important to make clear the relevancy of South Sudan and the contribution of this study. Certainly in the context of postcolonial African states, there are many examples that situate issues of national identity; we can point to specific examples that closely resemble the political situation of South Sudan in the cases of Eritrea (Hoyle 2001; Gilkes 2009; Chelati 2009), frequently South Africa (Klotz 2013; Stinson 2009; Orman 2008) or even Nigeria during the Biafra war (Palmberg 1999). It is also important to highlight significant texts like Jemima Pierre's *Predicament of Blackness*, an analysis on race in Ghana as well as Chouki El Hamel's

⁸ The official language of the Republic of South Sudan is English, although the majority of the population speaks Juba Arabic and their respective ethnic languages. Due to the influx of businesses from the horn of Africa (primarily from Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya), Swahili and Amharic are also frequently used in sectors of industry (transport, hospitality, marketplaces, etc.). It is furthermore important to keep in mind that only 27% (World Bank 2015) of the population is literate, posing significant issues regarding the matriculation of representational language at the state level.

Black Morocco which explores slavery, race and Islam; each of which focus on race in Africa – a topic significantly neglected in the literature. However, these interventions and different analytical approaches seem to be outliers, nonconforming to the normative lenses of conceptions of race, ethnicity and nationalism. The literature then is in need of more examples that allow for the expansion of different analytical approaches to these conceptions – particularly in Africa.

South Sudan and the former Sudan then offers site to some of the world's largest fundamental global conflicts. Many such conflicts have manifested at the junctures of stark racialization, religion and the nation state (as the most recent postcolonial example). This locale also happens to be where these junctures repeatedly rupture normative, neoliberal understandings of such topics. Within this particular political geography, I would argue that normative understandings of nationality, group behavior and identity politics can be challenged, reconfigured, and in many cases offer to the literature additional dimensions for framing many of these well studied topics. While this particular study has its own limitations, the primary data collection and findings may help in formulating more comprehensive analyses of such issues, particularly with respect to South Sudan, and certainly in extension to greater Africanist discourses.

The intention of this study is to then gauge the current salience of national identity in South Sudan, four years after independence. A fundamental assumption in this study, and in much of the literature mentioned above is that identity is always contextual, multivariable and shifting. A lens of contextual variation is imperative to South Sudan as the shift in political scale and composition has implications for individual and larger nationalist identifications. My assumption is that the introduction of the nation-state in the south was built around the rhetoric

of uniting a people with a similar history and greater cultural⁹ similarities than their counterparts in the northern region. Given that such was achieved by a 2011 referendum in which the vast majority of southern people seemed to see themselves as part of a separate (and unified) entity, questions around the persistence of identity cleavages might arise. At a structural level, political entities are also very visibly ethnicized, which acts as counter to the unification and propagation of a single national identity. On the local level, ethnic conflict fueled by visceral sentiments of difference continue to plague this region. Such fractionalization might then point to a higher degree of attachments to personal identities (ethnic affiliations, religion, sex, etc.) as opposed to a greater national identity. All of this leaves to question the legitimacy of the nation, nation-state and the strength of national identity. The purpose of this paper then is not to reconcile how political processes may have engendered divisive behaviors of people among themselves. Nor is it looking to analyze political group dynamics. Rather, it looks to identify pivotal historical processes and deliberate projects that may have shaped attachments to a national identity four years after independence.

My hypothesis is that people are less attached to the idea of a South Sudanese national identity and that they place more value towards personal identities (ethnicity, sex, religion, etc.). The assumption with this claim is rooted in the belief that identities of the latter have always been salient to southern Sudanese people. The introduction of the nation-state, coupled with historical politics of inequality, has only then intensified such sentiments - even among propagations of a unified national identity.

⁹ The term “cultural” or “culture” in this paper is used in the normative understanding, which essentializes groups of people through an isomorphic view.

This paper looks to answer the following questions: Do people in contemporary South Sudan attach value to national identity? Does this salience vary across different people? If so, how strong is it and are there other, stronger, more salient identities? Furthermore, to the extent that national identity (and other salient identities) differs across groups, why? What are the historical processes that contribute to these differences? The paper will begin by using a historical analysis to try to understand efforts that the former regimes of the Sudan (Turko-Egyptian, Anglo-Egyptian and Khartoum) as well as the SPLM/A have enacted in facilitating ideas of national identity. I will then use the outcomes of my results to discuss why patterns from respondents might be present in context to the historical analysis. And eventually, the validity of my proposed hypothesis will be tested against the outcomes of the ethnographic data.

Notwithstanding the relevance of the topic of national identity in the current political climate in South Sudan at the moment, perhaps one of the most important contributions of this study is simply the currency of the data. Due to the infancy of the newest nation-state, there is relatively little survey data on this country. Even larger data generators like the Afrobarometer, which looks specifically to produce public attitude surveys in Africa, have yet to produce survey data in South Sudan. Statistic generators like the World Bank and UNESCO also have limited data due to many factors ranging from the lack of institutional infrastructures in the country to the current government's pace of regulation and transparency of basic information of the population. This speaks to the importance of the ethnographic work that I have done, in the collection certainly, but also in the organization of such data. While a large segment of the data collected is not used in this study, what is presented can be used as an analytical tool for expanding more detailed projects for those interested in such topics. In addition to the practical

production of ethnographic material, understandings of South Sudanese national identity at this point in time may also help us in a broader sense to understand alternative forms of governance among highly heterogeneous populations. Such alternative forms outside of the nation-state, particularly in the case of African countries, might ideally be more appropriate to the historical trajectories, values and makeup of current populations in these younger nation-states. Consequently, this study raises the question of the viability of the nation-state. Furthermore, it may help us in better understanding the trajectory of populations like South Sudan, which may become (in a relatively negative projection) present day Somalia or (in a relatively positive projection) a Nigeria or Kenya.

II BACKGROUND & HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 A Deep History: Politics of Inequality

An important discussion that must be referenced to this study is the tension between nationalist projects (in which rhetoric of “nation-talk” is used to project a nation onto a people) and the results or reality of such projections. Generally, in postcolonial discourse such presentations of unity and *nationness* are fairly empty; the realities of nations show huge divisions in a variety of dimensions. Therefore, there are clear discrepancies between rhetoric and that of actual identifications, in which representations do not include its own reality. Furthermore, there lies a chronic gap in many postcolonial states between the state’s attempts to, on a discursive level, place specific emphasis of policy on the existence of a unified nation in spite of the realities of divisions. This picture redirects us immediately back to the streets of Juba, where these discrepancies are colorfully displayed.

It is important then to give a brief historical outline of the general political history of the Sudan in order to understand the current debate of national identity in South Sudan. The historical overview will focus on the various forms of political - and by extension economic - inequality that the southern region encountered during all former administrations in this territory. This spans from the Turko-Egyptian control to the semi-autonomous administration in the south. We will then move into the specific historical analysis of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and their direct efforts at fostering a sense of national identity. This discussion will demonstrate one strong aspect of political mobilization that may have had significant influence over the identification of the southern people of the Sudan. Certainly, it is advantageous to cover a wider variety of movements that may have more broadly shaped national identity in this region. It would also make sense to expand the narrative of the use of radio and media propaganda to more concretely understand its influence. For the purposes of this paper, I will only focus on one aspect of mobilization.

Although the former Sudan had been occupied by the Turko-Egyptian regime beginning in 1821, the southern region of the Sudan was not formally under any governmental administration until 1871.¹⁰ Between the initial occupations of the Turko-Egyptian regime until the establishment of a semi-autonomous Jubaian administration in 2005,¹¹ major developments in trade (Arab and European traders between 1840s-50s), modern navigation (the opening of the White Nile in 1841) and the capital impact of slavery in the regions of Egypt and northern Sudan were monumental in the development (or underdevelopment) of each respective society.¹² This left the southern region not just economically neglected, but in stark, unequal underdevelopment.

¹⁰ Anders Breidlid et al., *A Concise History of South Sudan*, (Kampala, Uganda: Fountain, 2014)

¹¹ In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between the Sudanese government and the SPLM, as a set of arrangements to end the Second Sudanese Civil War.

¹² Breidlid et al., 115

Much of this can be attributed to the devastating impact of the slave trade, raiding and the increasing inequality of innovation in the Northern region. These initial developments established an institutional infrastructure of difference between the north and the south. The implication then is that this created certain identifications respective to populations living in both locales.

In continuation of such political and economic inequality, the subsequent Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Sudan in 1889, under a Condominium hybrid rule furthermore paid little attention to the southern region. Only in 1920 was it that the British implemented a “Closed District Ordinance” of the south, which closed off northern traders from this area.¹³ This policy further alienated the north from the south while British southern policy began to play a larger part in differentiating the two poles. Throughout the next 30 years, various Sudanese polities like the Graduate’s Congress¹⁴ were established in some of the first manifestations of sentiments of self-rule and southern integration outside of British colonialism. Perhaps one of the only significant efforts of recognition of southerners was during the first Sudanese Civil War; the Juba Conference of 1947 intended to decide the fate of the southern region and attempted to elicit southern reactions to Sudanese succession from Egypt. The Juba conference follow-up efforts to include southern voices in the decision of succession were minimal (but clear) during the 1953 political agreements: southerners were excluded and did not participate in new agreements. By this time, however, the British government (at the unified ideals of Sudanese and Egyptian polities) was forced to abandon their separatist policies with the southern region and began to revise its interaction with the south. Up to this point still, the south had been politically neglected

¹³ Breidlid et al., 151

¹⁴ The Sudanese Graduate’s Congress was a nationalist group of Sudanese intellectuals who convened in 1942 to demand self-determination of the co-dominium government.

outside of colonial strategic politics, which by extension had negative economic repercussions. In April 1953 however, the British assisted in the creation of the first southern political party in time for the first Sudanese parliamentary elections.¹⁵ This again, was an entirely politically defensive move in order to foster southern support for the British. By maintaining control of the south, the British had a strategic advantage in the region. Although political activity for autonomy in the south was minimal, the manifestations of these historical (and political) projects from all subsequent regimes had engendered a sense of difference to the north among the people in the south. This difference can be seen to begin circa 1958 at the formation of a militarized Anya Nya movement.¹⁶

The stark political and economic inequality that was facilitated by virtually all former administrations of the Sudan had devastating economic repercussions for the south. These institutional programs of isolation and inequality have direct influence on southern sentiments of difference from the north and by virtue of being a collective other in the eyes of the political state, a sentiment of perceived unity among southerners.

2.2 SPLM/A: Radio & Media Efforts for Southern National Identity

We move now through a brief history of the media climate in the former Sudan and then focus on the SPLM/A's specific response to institutional inequality through radio and other media tools. The presentation of this case is twofold; the first is to provide a concrete, historical project that attempted to foster sentiments of a greater national identity. The imperative in showcasing these particular efforts aims to provide a micro-level extrapolation of the larger

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ The Anya Nya movement was a southern guerrilla movement, which began in the bush against the Sudanese Armed Forces. This movement rose due to General Ibrahim Abboud's violent political repression of southern demands. Many members of the Anya Nya movement also helped and participated in the formation of the SPLM.

dynamic at the level of the nation-state. In this example, we see the manifestations of a multi-ethnic political group attempting to create an idea of the southern people. At the same that the SPLM/A is espousing rhetoric of “nation-talk”, the organization itself is having fundamentally divisive visions of a South Sudanese national identity. In line with my own projections, this context of a hyper politicized and increasingly ethnicized climate complicates the legitimacy of the southern region’s *nationness* (or essentialist reasoning for the formation of a nation). The climate of ethnic fractionalization should also elicit questions regarding the basis to which people in this population should have ever had significant sentiments of national identity.

It is important to mention that much of the literature on media in this region is focused on objectivity, accountability of journalists and mediums for peace building. There is much less focus on the actual mechanisms enacted by groups like the SPLM/A and to what extent it had an influence. The focus on objectivity among media scholars is not surprising, yet the relatively small historical literature regarding radio practices of the SPLM/A should be noted. This is of importance as radio has historically been and continues to be a primary form of information dissemination. It also acts as a primary platform for political dialogue, which engages anyone with access to a radio in present day South Sudan. Such then would presumably have an impact in the structuring of a national identity.

The initial foundations of contemporary mass media in Sudan are dated back to 1903. It was this year that introduced the country’s first newspaper, Al-Sudan¹⁷, although the paper was not owned or operated by Sudanese individuals, rather Egyptian businessmen. Within the next half-century, daily newspapers, print media, radio corporations and news agencies sprouted up primarily in areas around Khartoum and Omdurman. The SPLM/A, in response to northern

¹⁷ Jesper Højberg, International Media Support Report, 2007, 21

centralization of media, created their own radio station, *Radio SPLA*. Radio SPLA operated from secret transmitters within the southern region as well as from facilities in Ethiopia.¹⁸ Most mediums of communication were transmitted in both Arabic and English¹⁹ but also had regional communications in which various ethnic languages were used in the south and larger, international languages like French, were used in the north. After Neimiri's rule during the transnational government, which succeeded him in 1985, the media and free press in the Sudan burgeoned.²⁰ The subsequent 1989 coup led by Omar al-Bashir²¹ and his party marked what could be known as the beginning of heavy repression of free speech in which all media outlets became state-controlled. Bashir's party also banned all political parties outside of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Before Bashir's 1989 coup, 22 daily papers were published in Khartoum and the country had 55 daily or weekly newspapers and magazines.²² Under Bashir's Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS), more than 1,000 journalists in the country were dismissed. Only a handful of papers and periodicals were permitted publishing, yet only by the release of the military or government agencies, or edited by official censors.²³

Mass media during military regimes, and certainly in contemporary usage, have operated as vehicles of political dissemination throughout the country for various polities. Bashier's regime of repression of this industry certainly heightened the political salience of media during

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ The Arabic transmitted through radios in the south was Juba Arabic and in the north, Khartoum Arabic. Both are regional dialects.

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Omar al-Bashir is the current president of the Republic of South Sudan. The International Criminal Court indicted Bashir in 2008 for war crimes and in his primary role during various genocides in the former Sudan.

²² Helen Metz, *Sudan: A Country Study*, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1992), 221

²³ Ibid

the years following the 1989 coup. However, it was the 1935 launch of *Al-Nil*²⁴ that marked the beginning of secretarian divisions in print media. This led to the widespread construction of party newspapers.²⁵ Before such, many of Sudan's political parties published in a variety of periodicals. Press, radio and television also flourished in political plurality. In the south, the relationship to information dissemination can be considered reactionary. The reaction is directly correlated to the high inequality of development in the region, which seems to have incited the desire for a southern voice. An important element to this discussion is the high fractionalization and increasingly ethnicized politics of the SPLM/A and its leaders, which have led to accusations of propaganda and legitimate concerns of accountability. There is extensive that analyzes the developments of the SPLM/A and the divisions among its leaders (Deng 178; Harris, Kirk, Henriques 102-05; Salih, Douglas, De Waal, Ajawin 310; Schomeru, Allen 25-38). The SPLM/A has been frequently accused by various media outlets for their use of mass media as primarily propagandist tools; a potent example of this is the frequent elevation of military leaders as liberators figures, heroes of independence and in some cases the elevation of certain ethnic groups within the movement. Even outside the SPLM/A, media print in the south would glorify ethnic groups (seemingly only) on the victories and romanticized heroism of communities of people. This was done by the wide circulation of oral storytelling and retelling's through village messengers who had bicycles or other forms of mobility. Scholar Jok Madut Jok recalls, "In the early days of the war, it was very common to read about how "the Neur are great fighters", that "the Dinka of Kiir Mayardit (a Dinka) can never defeat them", or how they will "teach the

²⁴ The former Sudan's first daily newspaper.

²⁵ International Media Support Report (2007)

cowards of Bahr el Ghazal a bitter lesson”.²⁶ The elevation of military personnel via newsprint and radio were excessively fabricated and based primarily on heroism. The propagation of military officers had social advantages, as entrance qualifications into public office were almost be default guaranteed for the “generals of liberation”. This has further fueled the corruption of the state, as well as adding distrust and confusion among the people.

It is important to belabor the point regarding John Garang’s generally accepted notion as the “Father of the (new) Nation” to the southern peoples. The intention of doing this is to further isolate the influence of radio propagation in creating symbols for the south, even if the reality of such symbols did not reflect what the people seemed to desire; Garang’s symbol as the father of a new nation were in contestation of his political goals for the south. This contradiction of Garang’s title is ironic considering his primary political goal was to keep the south united within the larger Sudan rather than separating into a new nation. This internal conflict continues to complicate the general rhetoric of a united southern people even before 2011. To understand the late John Garang’s fight for liberation and the figure himself is to understand the power of the SPLA’s media influence in the southern region. It should be mentioned that both Garang SPLM/A and the rebel movement, SPLM/A-IO²⁷ were plighted with issues of human rights violations.

Throughout the second Civil War, radio was really the only medium of communication in the south. As mentioned before, the south’s general marginalization from greater Sudanese society meant that the southern peoples did not benefit from the mass communications markets that were sprouting up. The SPLM/A did have external from Ethiopia and other actors, who

²⁶ Jok Madut Jok, *The Role of Media in War and Peace in South Sudan*, (Juba: Sudd Institute, 2015), 7

²⁷ The Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement – In Opposition, led by Riek Machar.

provided external provisions of radios and secret transmission locations in the south. Therefore, the southern region became almost an area of communicative ‘blackout’. This particular concept of blackout in the south and the elevation of people like Garang may speak to the powerful influence of radio during the war. To push the importance of what seems to be dualistic visions of the nation, the late John Garang’s vision of a “New Sudan” posited that the southern peoples should be incorporated into the larger national framework of the Sudan, where as opposing factions within the SPLM/A and of the SPLM-IO wanted a totally autonomous nation-state that reflected a deliberate difference between the peoples of the North and the South. Given that the 2011 referendum resulted in 98.83% of the voters voting in favor of independence,²⁸ we could conclude that the population’s vision was very clearly in opposition to that of Garang. A point of addition in explaining the current power struggles of governing elites in South Sudan should be noted: When John Garang pushed for the “New Sudan” deal circa 1983, it was in line with understanding the deep impoverishment and underdevelopment of the Southern region in regards to infrastructure, civil society, education, health and general administrative capabilities. Three years after the signing of the CPA, the literacy rate of the Southern Sudan was at a staggering 27%²⁹ and little progress had been made by 2015. By staying attached to the north with representation, the southern half of the *New Sudan* could catch up economically and in lines of social and political stability with the rest of the nation. It should be perceived that there was an understanding on behalf of Garang, that the abrupt autonomy of a nation-state would be highly problematic. Whether or not the perceptions of the ordinary citizens reflected this skepticism and to the extent that people were aware of the intentions of the “father of the nation”, such

²⁸ BBC News, "South Sudan Backs Independence Results", (BBC News, 2011), Web. 23 May 2016.

²⁹ UNICEF South Sudan. "Basic Education and Gender Equality." (UNICEF, 2008), Web. 23 May 2016.

revelation of Garang's vision of national identity may have interesting implications. Regardless, Garang's persona as the "Father of the Nation" is an extension of "nation talk", in which the idea and propagation of the nation and its symbols do not match the reality of unification and unified ideas for the south.

The uneven media environment allowed the SPLM/A to monopolize radio as a tool of influence in the south. Although competing leadership of the SPLM/A had split visions of the nation (Garang's "New Sudan" versus Machar's³⁰ secessionist south), there is no doubt that radio became a vehicle that engendered certain nationalist sentiments among the people. Whether this meant perpetuating an oppositional nationalist discourse from the north or the nursing and perpetuating of intra-southern divisions, the inequality of the media environment elicited reactionary campaigns from both camps. This in turn has shaped southern sentiments and the idea of a national identity. This is therefore not to say that the propagation of either sides was a function of the media environment per se, rather that radio communication became an influential and widely accessible medium for nationalist discourse and for the formation of southern identities.

This historical discussion on the larger institutional inequality should act as a contextual backdrop, which should elicit certain assumptions on how the people of the south reacted to policies of national isolation. Given the result of an autonomous nation-state, such is presumed to have engendered a shared regional connection even among the great diversity within the population itself. In addition, the unequal media climate created a reactionary response from the SPLM/A, who in turn used the tools they had to perpetuate particular (and political)

³⁰ Riek Machar is the former First Vice President of South Sudan. He is widely considered as a historically oppositional political figure to John Garang's SPLM/A as well as the current administration of Salva Kiir Mayardit. Although under the April 2016 Transitional Government for National Unity (TGNU), the rival political parties are under an agreement of power sharing, there is skepticism regarding the reconciliation of both sides.

identifications onto the southern peoples. The discussion on the SPLM/A's efforts of nationalization through radio should help us to understand that there were deliberate attempts to foster particular identities by a multi-ethnic, political entity. Both historical components can be said to have had a strong influence on how current people might identify today.

2.3 Groups of Exposure & Variability of Identification

As a point of notation, it may be obvious that policies and efforts to provoke national identity, which is mentioned above, might be understood in a few different ways. On the first hand, the historical analysis may lead to homogenous expectations concerning everyone who was subject to that history (i.e. all people who were subject to regime policies at the time) so as to elicit a universalist expectation about national sentiments. This view point is valid in the sense that although the Southern region of the Sudan and its people were treated as a separate entity apart from the larger political administration, virtually all regimes during its history created separatist policies that affected everyone in the south evenly. This is meaning to say that although the result of policy may have had various effects on subgroups of the populations in this region (women, children, those on the bottom of hierarchies, etc.), as a political entity, the south was treated evenly. In this way, the people of the Southern region could be seen as one entity, in spite of the immense diversity and cleavages that had always characterized it.

To understand a universalist approach that leads to expectations of similar feelings among all respondents in the forthcoming data, we can identify a few overarching factors that have shaped the south as a whole. These factors pertaining to the south include: total political marginalization, an uneven distribution of communication services due to overall economic

underdevelopment, as well as the perceived differences between a Muslim north and a Christian south. All such factors might have led to feelings of solidarity between groups in the south.

Another way to understand the historical analysis is to expect a more heterogeneous outcome of national sentiments, due to the variety of actors in the South and the level or access to such exposure of regimes of nationalism. For example, the SPLA/M's use of radios, newspapers and other modes of fostering a national identity may not have been accessible to many people. Perhaps, then, those with more frequent interaction with such tools were more susceptible to feeling more nationalistic and alternatively, those with less access may feel less nationalistic. This viewpoint is also valid as aside from general issues of accessibility to modes of nationalistic dissemination, the SPLA/M and groups in the southern region had their own internal differences, which created differential treatments of subgroups.

To understand differentiated levels of sentiments that might be expected among respondents, a few factors can be identified. One factor pertaining to the south includes the material accessibility of media tools, which attempted to elicit certain sentiments of identification. Another factor could be different levels of access to education within the former Sudan as well as within the southern region. Differentiated policies for men and women may have also resulted in gendered results. The limitations of this study did not allow me to test differences in radio exposure among my sample so the analysis below will focus on (institutional and social) structural policies that may have led to variable sentiments.

Given the two overall trajectories, which may explain the contemporary identifications of Southern Sudanese, the question then becomes the following; which historical trajectory dominates current sentiments of national identity in the south? Is it the common treatment (which might have generated a universalist expectation of identities) or the intra-Southern divisions

(which might have generated differentiated identity formations)? In line with my hypothesis, I would argue that differentiated identities are more salient than a universalist national identity in 2015. This is meaning to say that even around the rhetoric of “nation-talk”, people in fact attach more value to identities like ethnicity, sex or religion, in favor of a unified national identity.

III DATA PRESENTATION

3.1 Methodology

To document the degree of salience of nationality among other identities, I administered surveys among various respondents in Juba, South Sudan. The study was conducted between June and July of 2015. The participants included students (high school and university), civil service workers, residents of particular regions of Juba (Juba Town, Gudele, etc.), ethnic or “tribal”³¹ councils, public businesses, service industries like the national passport and citizenship offices and research institutions. Due to limitations that will be discussed in subsequent sections, it was not feasible to generate a random sample of respondents. Restructuring the research design to respond to significant patterns among the sample and therefore better empirically test groups and outcomes would have been advantageous. However, such a wide array of respondents was able to give the study a more nuanced understanding of issues of national identity respective of my sample of diverse backgrounds and demographics.

The first of the two survey instruments was a quantitative questionnaire that attempted to categorize salient identities and significant patterns of sentiments. This questionnaire included

³¹ I am aware of the problematic terminology of the terms “tribe” or “tribal”, particularly in the case of Africa. This term is used throughout the paper in the way that respondents referred to themselves or to groups they are affiliated with. The research design accounted for the colloquial usage of the term for the purposes of clarity. From this point on and if respondent’s terminology or wording in the questionnaire or research design is not being referenced, the term “tribe” will be substituted with “ethnic” group.

three components:³² 1) a demographic bank, 2) an identity bank and 3) a “strength of sentiments” section. The first component of the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate demographic data including their age, sex, educational background, state and county of origin, tribal affiliation. This was done in order to identify trends and patterns that might arise among groups, given the variability of the sample. The second component included an “identity bank” in which participants were asked to rank 8 given identities (Sex, Tribe, County, State, Religion, Age, Nationality and Race) from their most important identity (1) to their least important identity (8). This component of the questionnaire aimed to show the salience of any of the given identities and the distribution among the sample. These categories were chosen given the normative discourse around national identity in South Sudan, which prioritizes conflicts over many of these identities.

In the third component of the questionnaire, “strength of sentiments”, respondents were asked to rank certain sentiments like loyalty, pride and unity on a scale from 1-5; 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest. Questions in this section included: “How loyal do you feel to South Sudan?” (Or to your tribe, or to a religious identity) and “How much unity do you feel that there is in Juba?” (Or your boma, payam or South Sudan, etc.).³³ The aim in this section was to gauge the strength of such sentiments in direct context to the relevance of nationality and the nation-state, and in conversation with personal identifications within Jubaian society. This paper will only focus on questions regarding loyalty towards the nation-state and of self-identity prescriptions. The questionnaire was administered to all respondents equaling a total sample of 75.

³² For a full text of the questionnaire, see Appendix 6

³³ The local government in south Sudan is structured on three levels including the “County” (highest level), followed by “Payam” and (lowest level) “Boma”.

A few notes to point out regarding how the demographics were organized and for what reasons; Respondents were given the option of “sex/gender”. The distinction between “sex” and “gender” is noted, but in the research design it was decided to provide both terms to be used interchangeably, and consequently to mean ‘to be male or female’ in a normative understanding. Education was categorized into three groupings: “None-Primary”, indicating the range between those with no education to those whose highest level of education was primary school; “Secondary” indicating those whose highest level of education was a high school diploma; and “Post Graduate” indicating those whose highest level of education was a bachelor’s or above. The age categorizations were arbitrary and assumed that those 25 years and younger could be considered different than those between the ages of 26-35 and those over the age of 36. Given that ethnic tension is a large portion of national and nation-state discourse in South Sudan, it was appropriate to analyze responses by “tribe”. Due to poor tribal distribution in the sample, the groups had to be coded into “Dinka” and “Others”, the latter group encompassing all other ethnic groups in South Sudan (or of those who participated in the study).³⁴ Further reasoning is that the Dinka are the largest ethnic group in South Sudan. The original intention in this research design was to test differences of sentiments among the Dinka and the Neur (the second largest ethnic group in South Sudan), given the current and historical political climate in which respective ethnic groups have been at the forefront of conflict, vying to be symbols of the national makeup.

The second survey was an oral interview of all respondents who completed the questionnaire. As a reminder, this sample included civil service workers, university students, research institute personnel and individuals in various marketplaces. Interviews were conducted

³⁴ According to a 2011 CIA World Factbook report, the Dinka community is estimated to encompass around 35% of the population, the Neur around 15% and the remaining 58+ ethnic groups encompassing 50% of the population. It should be noted that official statistics vary significantly regarding the ethnic distribution in South Sudan.

in both group and individual formats in locations of comfort for the interviewed. These interviews were conducted with the goal of achieving a more nuanced understanding of issues of national identity and relationships to the nation-state. It was also an important opportunity to gain historical data for our study that possibly had not been documented for particular ethnic groups or of the region in general.

In addition to the quantitative and qualitative survey assessments, I also conducted archival research at the National Historical Archive of South Sudan in Juba. The contents of this archive are documents from previous governments of the Southern region of the former Sudan (or Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the subsequent Khartoum government). The documents in this archive contain telegrams, administrative personnel information and previous government's attempts at regulating the Southern half of the territory. This includes communication between central government officials and the provincial areas in coordinating educational standards, language standardization and kept tabs on handling the various chiefdoms throughout South Sudan and how to effectively deal with issues that arose in these locales. The archive was an incredible resource as it is effectively one of the only locations where (some of the only documentations of) the history of the Southern people of Sudan is being maintained.

All surveys administered were given in English. Certainly, it would have been advantageous to provide multiple translations of the questionnaires as well as provisions for translators for all respondents, but this simply was not feasible in the time allotted. The greatest implication regarding responses may be that there may be an educational or socioeconomic skew, in which English speakers were at an advantage to answer questions more accurately.

In spite of the sample size and other research restrictions which will be further mentioned in the conclusion, we were able to find a few interesting patterns in our research. Some findings were statistically significant and others were not, but among each demographic, we were able to see disparities that may resonate with current national discourses in South Sudan, as well as within context to historical processes that may have developed some of the sample's responses.

3.2 Part I: Identity Bank

We will begin with our findings in Part I of the questionnaire. As a reminder, each respondent was given a choice among 8 identities to rank from the highest salience (1) to the lowest salience (8). Figure 3.1 shows that the three identities that were ranked 1st among the largest percentage of respondents were religion (13%), nationality (13%) and tribe (13%). If we also include second choice identities, as I do in Figure 3.2, we see that there is a greater difference in distribution: 45% of respondents indicated religion and nationality as their two most important identities. Tribe was ranked first or second by 25% of respondents. State and race were chosen as the top or top two identities by less than 12% of the respondents. All other categories did not have a significant percentage of distribution or are not imperative to explore within this study.

FIGURE 3.1
Distribution of First Choice Identity





FIGURE 3.2
Distribution of Among Top Two Identities



Interesting patterns in the data emerge when we break down the distributions by the respondents' demographic characteristics. Figure 3.3 shows such patterns. For example, there is a gender divide among many demographic categories concerning salience of top identities.

FIGURE 3.3
Most Important Identity by Demographic Characteristics

Demographics		Top Identities					Sample Total
		Tribe %	Religion %	Nationality %	Race %	Sex %	
Sex/ Gender	Female	15	20	12	4	28	75
	Male	12	10	40	4	14	
Age	<25	19	21	14	0	28	73
	26-35	8	6	48	6	6	
	>36	8	15	31	8	31	
Education	None-Primary	26	16	26	5	21	73
	Secondary	4	19	26	4	19	
	Post Graduate	12	8	38	4	17	
Tribe	Dinka	4	29	35	4	13	62
	Other	19	16	20	3	21	

**Age, state and county as categories of identity have been excluded due to low levels of distribution among the sample and minimal significance to the study.*

Gender is most salient among the youngest and oldest people: almost 30% of respondents in the < 25 age group and just over 30% of respondents in the > 36 age group ranked sex as the most important identity. When looking at the salience of sex through gender, we see that 28% of women ranked sex as their most important identity, whereas only 14% of men ranked this category as most important. Furthermore, women identify more with tribe (15%) and

religion (20%), in addition to sex (28%), whereas 40% of men are almost 4 times more interested in national identity in comparison to 12% of women's ascriptions to nationality.

There is also a divide among age groups regarding the importance attached to national identity. The salience of nationality is most impressive for those in the middle ages of 26-35, of whom 48% ranked nationality as their top identity. Furthermore, older people (ages > 36) are identifying with nationality by almost 20 percentage points more than younger people (< 25). Younger people also seem to identify more with tribe (by a margin of 11 percentage points) and religion (by a margin of 6 percentage points).

The differences in the salience of various social identities also vary across educational demographics. We see that more educated people identify more with nationality (67%) and that less educated people (those with no education or just primary schooling) identify with tribe (26%) and to some extent religion (16%). We also see that in this demographic category nationality is the most salient identity for people of all levels of education. Additionally, sex is the second (or tied-for-second) most salient identity for people of all levels of education.

When looking at the ranking of nationality through tribal affiliation, there seems to be less attachment of national identity to groups belonging to the "Other" tribe category. The "Other" tribes seem to find more salience in tribal identity, by a significant margin, whereas Dinka people identify more with religion.

A reoccurring pattern that we see with this sample, and in this specific demographic category is that again, race, county and state have low ranks. Such identities were consistently ranked close to an average of 5% for all categories of total respondents. For this reason, we will not focus heavily on the categories of county and state. Although the category of race was also

ranked low in terms of salience for most respondents, such stark difference of sentiments seem to have greater implication considering the racial history of the Sudan. We will therefore look further into this relationship in the following sections. I do want to make an important note, given that we will not cover these two categories sufficiently in the following sections. The analysis of “state” salience in this study refers to the 10 originally constructed states of the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. The identity bank showed that only 3% of respondents indicated “state” as their most salient identity. Among women, only 8% identified state as their most important identity over men’s 0%. The low salience of one’s state in this study must be seen as temporal for the following reason; In October of 2015, president Salva Kiir Mayardit dissolved the original 10 states and divided the regions into 28 states and furthermore, 86 counties. This move has been seen as unconstitutional (most vehemently by the SPLM-IO, Riek Machar), but has since been legitimated by the parliament in December of 2015. In reference to the data, regional state salience is exceptionally low. However, because of recent political events, which many have accused as perpetuating ethnic tension by allocating political power on ethnic lines, a significant difference regarding sentiments of salience to state identifications may be expected. The dissolution of the former larger states has also divided smaller ethnic groups and re-territorialized boundaries to align largely Dinka settlements appropriately within territorial boundaries, leaving many other ethnic groups geographically and politically fractionalized. This has fueled ethnic tension and can be assumed to shift identity salience. Such political moves may have significant impact on the identity and significance of current state sentiments.³⁵

³⁵ I want to make certain to not forgo the obvious discursive ambiguity of the term “state”. In South Sudan, colloquial reference to the “state” refers to the partially self-governing federal state under the central government in Juba. The term “state” however may have been taken as the “nation-state”. In order to reconcile this possible confusion, the demographics section of the questionnaire was clarified to each participant before taking the survey.

3.3 Part II: Strength of Sentiments

Part II of the questionnaire evaluates the strength of certain sentiments. Similar to Part I (the identity bank) of the questionnaire, which asked participants to rank 8 identities from 1-8 to gauge the most salient personal identities for respondents, Part II ranked such questions from 1-5; the value “1” accounts for a weak sentiment towards the question and the value “5” accounts for a strong sentiment towards the question. For example, respondents ranking “1” in response to the question “How important is your nationality to your identity?” are indicating that nationality is not an important part of their identity. Respondents indicating a value of “5” for the same question are placing high importance on their nationality as a component of their identity. For the analysis, values 1-5 have been categorized into three tiers: “Very Strong/Strong” (values 4-5), “Medium” (value 3) and “Very Weak/Weak” (values 1-2).

Each of these questions were asked in order to 1) gauge the strength of sentiments like “loyalty” and salience of certain factors to identity and 2) act as a supplemental tool of contrast for how ranked identities in the identity bank interact with perceived strengths of greater national feelings (outside of their own strictly personal identifications). These questions also attempt to gauge the perception of strength (and/or legitimacy) or weakness of the state and the idea of the “nation”. I have chosen three questions to analyze: How loyal do you feel to your tribe, how loyal do you feel to South Sudan, and how important is your nationality to your identity? The questions were chosen out of the total 14 questions asked in part II of the questionnaire due to clarity in the research design and some qualitative or quantitative significance in the data. The three questions were analyzed by the following demographic groups: sex/gender, age, education and tribe. These demographic categories were chosen due to a significance of difference in

responses for one or more questions among each respective demographics. The language demographic was also analyzed but did not produce any significant differences or patterns for this sample.

When asking, “How loyal do you feel to your tribe?” in Figure 3.4, loyalty to tribe seems to be strong across respondents in all demographic categories. When analyzing for sex, however, women’s sentiments towards loyalty to tribe are significantly higher than men’s with almost a 15 percentage point margin between the top two values. This does not necessarily mean that men do not feel significantly loyal to their tribes as over 50% of men have ranked loyalty within the highest tier of importance, but the sentiment of loyalty to one’s tribe seems significantly gendered. An interesting observation corresponding to this question is the low marginal difference at 4 percentage points between those who are Dinka, and all other ethnic groups. Given the size of the Dinka group in South Sudan as well as the theoretical interest that we might presume for large ethnic coalitions to maintain political power, this finding is significant to the ethno-political discourse in this region.

FIGURE 3.4

Q1. Loyalty to Tribe

Demographics		Very Strong/Strong %	Medium %	Very Weak/Weak %	Sample
SEX	Female	76	16	8	25
	Male	63	23	14	49
	Total	68	20	12	74
EDUCATION	None-Primary	74	11	16	19
	Secondary	77	12	11	27
	Post Graduate (BA+)	83	4	13	24
	Total	78	9	13	70
AGE	< 25	73	21	6	33
	26-35	60	16	24	25
	>36	66	21	13	15
	Total	66	21	13	73
TRIBE	Dinka	64	18	18	28
	Other	68	21	10	47
	Total	67	20	13	75

Figure 3.5 represents the following question asked in the second portion of the questionnaire: “How loyal do you feel to South Sudan?” In response to this question, the majority of all respondents felt strong loyalty to South Sudan, at over 70% for each demographic. However, we see a 22 percentage point divide between those in the ages of 26-35 and those at 25 years or younger. We see here that people within the median age group are almost unanimously nationalistic, while the very youngest and eldest of our tiers – while still significantly loyal to South Sudan – may leave questions as to the strength of loyalty sentiments to South Sudan. A difference to notice is also the 12 percentage difference between Dinka respondents and other ethnic groups regarding loyalty to the South Sudan.

FIGURE 3.5

Q3. Loyalty to South Sudan

Demographics		Very Strong/Strong %	Medium %	Very Weak/Weak %	Sample
SEX	Female	76	8	16	23
	Male	79	9	12	49
	Total	78	7	14	72
EDUCATION	None-Primary	78	10	12	18
	Secondary	77	12	11	27
	Post Graduate (BA+)	83	4	13	24
	Total	79	9	12	69
AGE	< 25	70	12	18	33
	26-35	92	4	4	25
	>36	74	13	13	15
	Total	78	10	12	73
TRIBE	Dinka	86	10	4	28
	Other	74	9	17	47
	Total	79	9	12	75

Our last question in Figure 3.6 asked the following: What is the importance of your nationality to your identity? With this question, we were hoping to isolate the importance of nationality and compare and contrast to respondent’s rank of identities in the identity bank. In all demographic categories, over 80% of all respondents ranked the importance of nationality to their identity within the highest two values. Among our education demographics, there is an 11 percentage point margin between respondents in the lowest educational bracket and those who have received at least a secondary diploma. The high importance that respondents have placed on nationality to their identity is in line with the responses for the identity bank, in which “nationality” was ranked among the top two highest identities for all respondents.

FIGURE 3.6

Q4. Importance of Nationality to Identity

Demographics		Very Strong/Strong %	Medium %	Very Weak/Weak %	Sample
SEX	Female	88	4	8	25
	Male	83	7	10	48
	Total	85	6	9	69
EDUCATION	None-Primary	78	10	12	18
	Secondary	89	3	8	27
	Post Graduate (BA+)	83	5	12	24
	Total	83	9	11	69
AGE	< 25	85	9	6	33
	26-35	83	5	12	24
	>36	87	0	13	15
	Total	85	5	10	72
TRIBE	Dinka	81	8	11	27
	Other	88	4	8	47
	Total	85	6	9	74

A few further significant differences in demographic distribution should be noted, although our focus is on the three aforementioned questions: How loyal are you to your tribe, how loyal are you to South Sudan, and How important is your nationality to your identity? The interest in presenting these findings is to illuminate patterns that supplement our historical findings. Question 6 in the questionnaire asked respondents about their importance of their gender to their identity. Our findings show that 80% of women also ranked gender as important to their identity, whereas only 66% of men ranked their gender as important to their identity.

Sexual identity is therefore gendered with a significant margin between the sexes, but 72% of the total respondents also noted sex as important to their identity, giving significance to gender ascriptions to personal identities. Question 7 asked, “How important is your tribe to your identity?” and was aimed in helping to give legitimacy or challenge pervasive perceptions of ethnic conflict within the nation. Older respondents to this question placed significant importance on their tribe to their identity, while younger people found tribal identity less significant. This is an interesting finding considering young people’s sentiments for loyalty to tribe is high and that in the identity bank, tribe was a salient identity for mostly younger (and less educated) respondents. Overall 69% of total respondents ranked importance of tribe to identity. In our education demographics, we find that those with at least a high school degree place higher importance of tribe to their identity, and that all other groups do not seem to find significant importance of tribe to identity. Again, this statistic is odd considering the high ranking of individual identifications of tribe among the identity bank, as well as sentiments towards loyalty to tribe. Tribal importance to one’s identity doesn’t seem to be gendered, but interestingly, there seems to be a significance of difference between men themselves (21% ranking importance of tribe at the lowest value and 53% ranking importance of tribe at the highest value). This may have to do with the occupational, economic or political status of tribal identity is used primarily as tool of garnering political clout. Question 13 asked, “How much unity do you feel there is in Juba?” Overall, the greatest percentages of the distribution in each demographic (besides sex) fall in the lowest two values indicating that sentiments of unity in Juba are generally low. In terms of sex, women appear to be split in terms of perceptions of unity in Juba (39% in the bottom two values and 39% in top two values). Men have more clear perceptions of unity in

Juba, 68% of whom ranked unity to be in the bottom two values. Question number 14 looks at the larger national scope of unity by asking, “how much unity do you feel there is in South Sudan?” The greater majority of all respondents ranked unity in South Sudan among the lowest two values in all demographic categories, indicating that perceptions of unity in South Sudan are generally low.

Overall, the most significant and interesting demographic findings seem to be among gender responses, and to a lesser extent among age and education. Linguistic groupings did not produce any meaningful patterns, but the issue of language variability within the republic remains a large contention. Our outcomes for both portions of the questionnaire show differences in response patterns across people of different genders, ages, educational levels and tribal backgrounds. Such findings might elicit questions regarding why women in this sample attach greater loyalty to their tribe than men or why educated people might be more loyal to South Sudan. I will discuss the findings of these outcomes in the next section. To do this, I will use archival documentation and responses from the interviews to qualify these variations.

IV RESULTS

4.1 Discussion

There are several interesting patterns in the foregoing analyses that are warrant exploration. In “Part I: Identity Bank”, we have found that the most significant identities to our sample are religion, nationality and tribe. We see that respondents in the middle ranges of age attach greater importance to their national identity. There are also clear divisions of identity ascriptions among gender, in which we see women placing higher value on identities like sex or

religion than men. Men on the other hand seem to place higher value on things like nationality. In “Part II: Strength of Sentiments”, sentiments of loyalty to the nation or the importance of nationality are highly salient among all demographics, even if there are smaller demographic differences.

A few correlations between both sections also arise. When looking at the strength of sentiments like loyalty to the nation or salience of identities (which were also highly ranked in the identity bank) we see that there is overall salience of tribe and nationality shared among all demographics. The most meaningful patterns in each section seem also to arise out of differences in gender. Given that differences in gender for both sections are reoccurring points of contention, this is a useful departure point. Another consistent pattern was the low salience of racial identifications in both sections and among all demographics. Given further the importance of racial ascriptions in the former Sudan and if one subscribes to the assumption that the succession of the south was due to a racial and cultural othering of southerners, it is important to discuss why now the levels of racial identifications are so low.

With these results, in addition to information from the qualitative interviews conducted, we will attempt to link our patterns to the historical analysis of inequality and to explain why salient differences in gender as well salience in religion, nationality and tribe seem to resonate most significantly.

4.2 Religion, Nationality & Tribe

The salience of religion, nationality and tribe among our respondents can hardly come as a surprise given the deep historical and structural political implications that come with the separation of the south from the north. Much of the salience of these particular identities can be

assumed to be due to a history of religious oppression and violence that marginalized groups in the south on the basis of these very identities. Religious salience may be said to arise due to the violent assertion of governmental regimes, which aimed to impose an Islamic religious identity on a population of mostly Christian or Animist believers. The salience of nationality runs in tandem with both religious and tribal salience, given that the common denominator for each salient identity poses the question of who was assumed to belong the nation of the former Sudan. The particular salience of tribe may have more complication given that the south has always had ethnic diversity and in many cases, ethnic conflict, even before colonial contact. It should be noted that the pre-colonial regions of the Sudan politically functioned under kingdoms – most notably the Kingdoms of Nubia or Kush, Egypt and other actors in the region like the Abyssinians or Ottomans. While a centralized authority existed in this political climate, the hierarchies of power should be distinguished. Whereas contemporary state power in the Republic of South Sudan is centralized, the state has very little capability of provisions for the majority of its population. Furthermore, diversity among the population has led to ethnic exclusion in political and social realms of life. Within pre-colonial structures, which also encompassed ethnic diversity, power hierarchies that favored monarchial systems were inclusive of various ethnic communities. Because the subjects of these kingdoms were subject to an authority that monopolized all power and redistributed the kingdom's (vast) wealth back to its population, there remained little room for significant politicization of fractionalized ethnic groups at this time.

I might propose then, that although many communities engaged in common practices such as cattle raiding or crop theft in the pre-colonial era the hierarchies of power within

kingdoms were not fractionalized into ethnic (southern territory) groupings, rather among vast kingdoms of Nubians, Kushites, etc. who encompassed diverse tribal groups.³⁶ It could then be argued that the upward shift of political scope at the foundation of the former Sudan prescribed the unrealistic homogenization of southern communities. Subsequently, the downward shift in political scope in 2011 has now reified past grievances and justified ethnic differences in a hyper politicized climate. Tribal salience seems to have risen during the process of hyper politicization of southern ethnic groups. Such has given salience to tribal identities in the absence of a state structure that might provide for the diverse population and offset past grievances. Given the haphazard homogenization of a politicized southern region among all former regimes, in conjunction with what we have perceived to be long existing southern differences, salience of ethnic identity at the introduction of the nation-state comes as little surprise.

Many of these descriptions have assumptions that I would like to qualify at this time. An appropriate framework to discuss such developments of salience in these identities can be analyzed through Andreas Wimmer's discussion of nationalism, state formation and ethnic exclusion. In his book *Waves of War*, Wimmer provides a framework, which analyses political transformations and configurations that provide either nations or specific ethnic cleavages with legitimacy. His model focuses on shifts from empire to nationalists, to the nation-state and eventually leading to ethnic conflict. Wimmer's research shows that nationalist sentiments are large motivators of war and that once a nation-state is formed, the likelihood of conflict is actually higher – something that we have seen in the developments of South Sudanese nationalism. Part of this likelihood in his model, is due to the reinforced legitimacy of nationalist

³⁶ The importance of political scope and its effects on identity change and salience will be discussed in section 4.4 Racial Implications.

principles, which are then institutionalized by the creation of the state. One of his main arguments is that the nation-state and the “nation” (state elites and the population) must have a contract that is “built on consent and the mutually favorable exchange of resources”³⁷. In his model, for states with weak centralization of power in addition to a weak civil society, the result is uncertainty, which eventually leads to the (realistic) illegitimacy of the state and stronger ascriptions to smaller identities. Furthermore, he adds that this trajectory “leads to competition among the elites for military support” and because “the latter likewise compete in their demand for the state resources, actors end up negotiating separate alliance blocks based on ethnic commonality”³⁸. This analysis paints a clear picture of why we might then not be surprised at the salience particularly of tribe, but in the salience also of nationality. Religious salience in the case of the former Sudan is coterminous with national identity, as again, it is a fundamental reason for the separation of the southern region. Our understanding of this model also helps us in some sense to understand the importance of rhetoric of “nation-talk” and the reality of cleavages that are more than often exasperated at the creation of a nation-state.

4.3 Sex & Gender Implications

The division between men and women concerning sentiments of national identity are very clearly impacted by historical administrative projects. What we see is that women seem to identify tribe, religion and state more importantly than men by percentage points of (8, 4 and 12 respectively). Nationality is most important to men by almost 30 percentage points among respondents indicating this identity as their top identity. In the top 2 categories of salience,

³⁷ Andreas Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2013), 17

³⁸ Wimmer, 71

nationality is 34% greater for males than women. Additionally, about 30% of women have tribe among their top two identities, which is relatively low importance. The margins of salience are relatively significant overall and highlight a gender difference concerning the top identities of salience (particularly nationality and religion). In order to illustrate a few assumptions regarding the gender divide in responses, it is helpful to highlight a few sections from primary documents found in the national archives. These examples demonstrate the patriarchal hegemony in early educational policy, state construction and the subsequent constructions of future national identities.

The first example comes from a meeting in Bhar El Ghazal between members of the Sudanese Ministry of Education, the provincial council of Bhar El Ghazal, local government advisory boards, and relevant chiefs in the region. In this particular occasion, the council members and visiting representatives were assessing the future construction of the educational system in the Sudan (with particular attention to the southern region) and in light of the transition of control from Anglo-Egyptian government to the recently autonomous Khartoum government. Provided below are a few passages from the official Sudanese government correspondence (recorded by a meeting note-taker) regarding the language of instruction in the new broader educational system, and of instruction in the southern region in general. It is useful to quote these sections at length for better context:

The nature and priorities of the Bhar El Ghazal Educational program in the coming years.³⁹

“Education” was merely a name and we must think what boys were educated for. Within a period of years the need for government officials would be filled, and what would the boys do then? If they drifted off we should lose the benefit of them. Was there any way by which we could keep them?

Teaching of Arabic In Schools⁴⁰

³⁹ Appendix, 7 (File No. EP/1-C-2: Sudan Government: Bhar El Ghazal Province Council), 6

“Chairman - We must decide whether we are to teach Arabic in the lowest class of the village school or whether it must be delayed until the primary or the intermediate school is reached. Ought we to drop the teaching of English? Can boys be expected to learn both?”

Mr. H.G. Ramshaw, Inspector of Education, who attended the discussion, explained that the Ministry of Education is now making a plan to cover the next six years. Certain proposals have been made on which the advice of Province Councils is asked. The first proposal is that village schools should be developed along their present lines, until each school has three classes. The boys who attend these village schools can go on to higher schools. In this respect the South is different from the North. The other three stages in education will be the same in the South as in the North.... There is the big question of teaching Arabic. Nearly all boys who go to school in the North already know Arabic. Therefore, all the work in the Elementary School in the North is in Arabic. In the Intermediate School teaching is also in Arabic but at the same time the boys begin to learn English.

The Ministry’s plan for the South is that teaching in the village school shall continue to be in the vernacular. The teaching of Arabic will begin in the Elementary School....When a boy enters an Intermediates School he will not know English. He will begin to learn it there. He must learn enough English at the Intermediate School to enable him to do all his work in English at the Secondary School.

We have now got to decide whether it is good for all our boys to learn the Arabic language, to speak it and to write it. WE must also try to make up our minds whether our boys can learn two languages in the same length of time in which Northern boys have to learn only one language.

Another following passage⁴¹ discussing socialization policy in the classroom:

The headmasters were advised to make a programme to show the daily activities of the boys for the whole week. This program...helps the masters to keep good control of the boys, specially in boarding house schools, and makes the boy feel that he is tied to a routine which is well chosen to meet his demands and that he is always checked.

Religious Teaching in Schools⁴²

It is the Headmaster’s responsibility to see that Religion, like all other subjects is properly taught to the boys. He must make sure that everybody in the school is instructed in the religion decided by the parent or guardian in the consent form. The consent form should be filled in in respect of every pupil.

Discipline in School⁴³

Discipline is one of the most important things that a pupil should learn at School. It is something for the boy to gain from his daily life at school, inside the class-room, in the boarding house or in the playground. The pupils are young creatures that response to everything they see, hear or feel. It is for the headmaster and the staff first of all to see that they are good examples to the boys to take after them. You do not for example expect small children to keep neat and tidy if they see filthy clumsy masters in front of them. All masters are expected to set a good example to the boys.

Another way of achieving high standard of discipline is by setting out a clear applicable programme for the daily life and activities of the boys. This does not work out satisfactorily unless the boys are well trained to adhere to it.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 2

⁴¹ Appendix, 8 (File No. TSD/15.B.1-TSD/17.A.1: General Rulings, Education), 2

⁴² Ibid, 4

⁴³ Ibid, 6

A third important thing is making houses with prefects and house masters. The house masters should be responsible for all the boys in their houses and deal with all their difficulties and troubles.

Conduct of Teachers⁴⁴

Teachers should set a good example for their boys. It is the village school teachers who lays the foundation of good character and behavior. It is not only lessons that boys learn from their teachers, but also manners and all other qualities.

In these passages, there is an apparent prioritization for male students and in many cases, the noun “boys” is used interchangeably with general “pupils” or “students”. We also see boys being socialized in the classroom; the federal government required things like hygiene, proper discipline and grooming during matriculation. Headmasters, then, in all cases, were directly responsible to the Province Education Officer, who in turn was responsible to the government of Sudan in executing state demands. Given the variability of political agendas among participants in state and national regulatory meetings (Ministry representatives from Khartoum, Chiefs, local councils, etc.) in addition to linguistic, ethnic and “racial” differences, there is already a highly politicized negotiation of the type of socialization that should be occurring. The classroom then becomes an environment of state creation with a deliberate linguistic and social agenda in how (specifically) boys should behave, what languages they should speak and how religion should be facilitated through the educational institution – thus fostering a sense of national identity. Gender inequality in this sense is apparent in contemporary southern Sudan given that 40% of males in 2009 were literate, in contrast to only 16% literacy among females.⁴⁵

Certainly, girls and women were not entirely left out of the discussion. The initial schools built after the independence of Sudan were segregated by gender, but girls learned socialization as well. These reports are general governmental educational plans and there is little mention of

⁴⁴ Ibid, 6/103

⁴⁵ Ibid

girls (in general but) specifically on matters of socialization and higher matriculation in the educational system. We can infer that girls were then 1) second to the discussion in talks of educational implementation and that 2) may have already been assumed to be socialized at home (which might lead to more localized identities and less participation in nation or state making).

Shown below are some passages revealing the discourse around girl's education, socialization and future preparations (if any) for their participation as citizens of the upcoming new nation:

The Nature and Priorities of the Bahr El Ghazal Educational Programme in the Coming Years⁴⁶

Some people thought that technical and professional education was more urgent than the turning out of pen-pushers...Others had been heard to say that until the mother is educated the son will not succeed and that girl's education should actually take precedence. It was on this problem of precedence that he sought counsel. The program would be decided by the Minister and the Director, but it was in our power to make our desires known.

Girls' Elementary Schooling⁴⁷

...The Ministry will therefore follow a gradual plan in taking over girls' schools and I think that there is a scope for fruitful co-operation between the Ministry and the Missions for the advancement of girl's education. I also hope that you would co-operate to the utmost with the education authorities in overcoming the staffing difficulties in girls' schools...

Needle Work⁴⁸

In village schools where a woman teacher is teaching the girls should be given needle work as a subject. The teacher should give her requirements to the Inspector who will submit to the Province Education Officer for approval for local purchase.

Even when the discussion of girls taking precedence had been proposed, this notion soon after necessitates "counsel", whereas the matriculation and grooming of boys seems natural and does not seem to be contested even once in any of the archival documents found. In each mention of girl's education, there is much less concern with specific steps for girls outside of primary school and more of a general statement of the provision of education for girls.

⁴⁶ Appendix, 7 (File No. EP/1-C-2: Sudan Government: Bhar El Ghazal Province Council), 6

⁴⁷ Appendix, 8 (File No. TSD/15.B.1-TSD/17.A.1: General Rulings, Education), 3/10

⁴⁸ Ibid, 6/103

Furthermore, the instructor (or “woman teacher” versus a male “headmaster”) provides socialization in the form of needlework for girls. Such tools of socialization can be inferred to socialize girls into gendered, local participants with certain skills and identities in occupying within the nation.

The importance of education and institutional socialization has been thoroughly covered in the literature, and a frequent site of notation for nation building and educational institutions in particular, a site where students learn how to be citizens. The examples above provide a small sample of rhetoric of state building, socialization and should highlight the separation of gender, which may account for the differences of sentiments among our demographics.

4.4 Racial Implications

We turn to the discussion of our findings regarding race, for which our surveyed sample ranked of exceptionally low salience. If we are to subscribe to the theory that the separation of the south and the formation of an autonomous state was done so out of racial difference, in addition to what we might separate to call religious or other “cultural” differences, then the low salience of this category has some implications. This is particularly poignant, if we further assume that the southern Sudanese - over 98% of such people who voted in favor of separation in the 2010 referendum⁴⁹ - saw themselves as racially different, and therefore placing high value on their racial otherness. So then, on one hand, it might be argued that racial identifications must remain strong, as a part of the idea of a greater national identity, prefaced on the difference from northerners. And finally, we might then assume that due to the low salience of race among our

⁴⁹ BBC, 2011

sample, ascriptions to national identity (due to a shared history of racial violence) might be higher. It is important to discuss these developments.

Donald Horowitz's essay on ethnic identity (1976) provides a good framework in processes of political shifts, particularly in a postcolonial context. Horowitz discussion shows that in the course of an independent struggle, a (downward) shift in scale of political units also decreases the salient foci of certain identities. Therefore, when you are part of a larger unit, it might make sense that broader identifications of nation, or race in this case may be more salient, but once independence is achieved- even with constant projection of nationalistic messages – the real divisions and the real identifications are now at a lower level. These processes of (downward) shifts of parameters should show that identifications and the salience of identities change in different contexts. And in the case of South Sudan, this framework is appropriate for substantiating the reason as to why we might expect such differences of salience around the same identities.

Returning to our results then, we see that over 93% of all respondents listed race as not among their top two most salient identities. These statistics are at severe odds with the referendum but could be for a number of reasons. As previously touched upon, the initial reason of current low salience of race points to the prior significance of race, in which southern populations were so starkly racialized as part of all government regimes. Because the separation of the state in itself had its own underlying assumptions of a different, racialized population (that in opposition of a racialized Muslim state identity), at the achievement of a new state where the majority of occupants do not identify as culturally “Arab”, the category of race may now seem irrelevant. As was found through the various interviews conducted, it is important also to

highlight that the concept of race in South Sudanese context is much different from Western (particularly American) understandings, although there may be reference of characteristics of race taken from American racial understandings that are understood by the general public. Scholar Jok Madut Jok notes that “although the Sudanese are continually engaged in construction and reconstruction of their racial identity, these classificatory systems seem well understood by the Sudanese, but far less obvious to outsiders.⁵⁰ He continues to say “the Sudanese have an elaborate vocabulary of racial identification that classifies people into racial groups on the basis of physical characteristics...”.⁵¹ The concept of race in particular has an inverse effect from that of the United States. For example, South Sudanese racial identity is dependent on self-ascriptions, rather than what is externally imposed on an individual. This differs from ethnic ascriptions. In South Sudan, “...where race cannot be attributed to physical characteristics, an individual or a group can choose their racial identity...race is an act of will”.⁵² Sudanese bases of race categorizations, although at times utilizing notions of Western categorization, are not based on phenotypes alone and much more fluid: “They are...pegged to a host of practices such as religion, economic activities, material conditions, the naming of people and other cultural practices” including geographic distance between groups, the natural environment in which groups live and language are all considered “part of the racial schema.”⁵³

This might then raise questions of how southern people may have identified racially in context to the former state. As this is out of our control of analysis, we can only assume that the separation of the southern region into an autonomous nation signals a belief of perceived racial difference. Theoretically speaking, national identity would then be attached to a racial identity - a

⁵⁰ Jok Madut Jok. *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence*, (Oxford: Oneworld Press, 2007), 6

⁵¹ Ibid

⁵² Ibid, 4

⁵³ Ibid

clear identity of salience given the high percentage of referendum voters towards separation. Given the absence of a starkly (northern) racialized other in the larger political unit that encompassed these racialized divides, the achievement of the nation state has seemed to decrease the salience of race for South Sudanese and has thus shifted identity salience to smaller identities.

V CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

What I have done in this study is attempt to demonstrate the current sentiments of national identity from a sample of South Sudanese people. I have used a historical lens and a few theoretical frameworks in the literature to contextualize our findings. What we have found is that people in this sample do indeed attach value to their national identity. While among all demographics, this attachment is generally strong and clear, there are clear differences regarding the identification of identities like religion, tribe and nationality. In contrast to men, women seem to attach greater value to identities like tribe, religion and sex. Men on the other hand identify significantly more with national identity. Furthermore, nationality seems to be an identity of salience to more educated, middle-aged respondents who happen to be Dinka.

The reasoning behind these differences is rooted in a historical accumulation of political and economic inequality. This history is one of state political marginalization, which facilitates the further disenfranchisement of already marginalized subgroups. This history of inequality is one that also prioritizes boys and men in the building of the nation-state, while leaving girls and women out of the broader conceptualization of citizenry. Specific projects like the SPLM/A's use of radio and other media to propagate the idea of a national identity, in the midst of its own

political fractionalization and larger nation state marginalization, also play into the important historical implications of why certain subgroups might attach stronger salience to certain identities over others. Although there were clear political differences among leaders of the SPLM/A in their efforts to prescribe particular identities on southern people, the pervasive use of “nation-talk” in conjunction with a common history seems to have homogenized people’s perception of their own identities. This is in line with our findings, which indicate that across all demographics, national identity seems to be of strong salience. Garang’s propagation of a *New Sudan* focused on establishing economic equality and in order to do this, the southern people would need to see themselves as a part of the larger state structure of the former Sudan. His idea of national identity would have then perpetuated the acceptance of variance of identities within the greater Sudan, towards the means of economic restoration of southern governing bodies. In opposition, Machar’s SPLM/A-IO was clear about establishing a clear difference between people in north and those in the south. This vision of (southern) Sudanese national identity looked to define southern Sudanese identity as the antithesis of northern Sudanese identity, and by virtue of doing so, in many ways homogenizing the south. Machar’s break away from Garang’s SPLM/A signaled further ethnicized perpetuations of a national identity; in Machar’s media campaigns, it was the Dinka who were now the oppressors. Therefore, the establishment of a more unified (southern) national identity inclusive of all ethnicities meant the diffusion of such a monopoly. The use of the radio for both camps certainly garnered ethnic alliances in the absence of a strong central government and thus intensified attachments to politicized tribal identities as well as an autonomous national identity from the north.

Furthermore, the state in its failure to uphold its contract with the population is complicit in the fractionalization and emergence of highly politicized factions that might theoretically have greater incentive in identifying with ethnic groups over larger national identity. However, groups like the Dinka attach higher value to concepts like national identity over other ethnic groups. This does not mean that ethnicity is not an important identity, rather than national identity remains a salient ascription for this group. In addition, in the absence of formerly stark racial divides that were supported by administrative regimes, the introduction of the nation-state has enabled people to attach less value to identities like race, in favor of a national identity, which is seemingly inclusive of a now racially unified (albeit nuanced and socially categorized) state.

The historical implications that have led to a feeling of national identity are clear, even among clear demographic differences among our respondents on the salience of certain identities; national identity among all respondents in our sample remains high. The quantitative and qualitative portions of the questionnaire support these outcomes while the interviews provided a more nuanced understanding of the historical implications. While these outcomes might be surprising given current developments in the republic, which is perceived to be failing as a state and fraught still with ethnic cleavage, the idea of a single national identity seems to hold strong.

5.2 Limitations

While the fieldwork and data acquisition provided for interesting information, I want to be clear about the limitations in conducting this project. The first gaping limitation was time. The project was conducted in a time frame of less than one month between June and July, in addition to occurring during the rainy season. This restricted my mobility to administering my surveys

only to residents of Juba. With more time, it would have been beneficial to procure a larger and more regionally diverse sample that was reflective of South Sudan as a greater whole. It is unclear how my findings may have differed with this addition, but I suspect that national identity might have lower salience, as many rural areas (which encompass 83% of the population) are developing at very low rates.⁵⁴ Given that the country is nearing its fifth year, this may possibly lead to the disillusionment of the state and that of a greater national identity. It may have further been preferable to regionalize areas in Juba like Gudele, the largest housing district, in which ethnic groups tend to segregate living communities by ethnic groups. This small-scale study may have been easier to test and compare empirically.

What I have done is collected a sample of 75 participants and attempted to extrapolate such outcomes to make larger inferences of the total republic of South Sudan. While my contribution again has produced some interesting findings, I would have liked to spend more time on the research design as well as have a larger sample to draw clear conclusions from. I would have liked to pay more attention to tissues of demographic differences and how this may have been facilitated by historical regimes.

A significant setback in measuring the significance of my own data was the inability to produce a control group in the research design. In allowing for more time, I would have liked to measure the strength of salience in certain identities prior to the referendum in order to better analyze my outcomes. It should also be clear about the inferences that I would really like to be able to make that I am not in the position to make with the data that I have. Tribal or religious affiliations for example were difficult to critically penetrate due to the sensitive nature of each topic. This may have been alleviated by having more time to construct a research design to

⁵⁴ National Bureau of Statistics – South Sudan (2010)

circumvent the sensitivity of the final questions that I posed as well as having previous survey data to reference from. I must also mention that South Sudan even in 2015 is still very much a patriarchal society and my own position as a young, female researcher at times did not afford me the access to probe even general demographic questions along the lines of tribe or religion.

Given the mass repatriation of refugees and southern Sudanese nationals back to South Sudan after 2011, it would have been interesting to use the South Sudanese diaspora as a control group and match sentiments of national identity among groups returning - those relatively untouched by political projects like the SPLM/As radio use - and those directly exposed to such projects. This design may have given me a clearer handle on the effects of political projects and their real influence on the national identity among the diverse residents of South Sudan, four years later.

5.3 Recommendations for Further Study

A significant element in the project that my research design encompassed but I was unable to tackle was the topic of language. I was able to collect and organize linguistic data and analyze how linguistic plurality plays into the state construction of a national identity, but eventually this was not included into this discussion. In principle, further research might pay attention to how the implementation of English as an official language is transforming the identity of the nation and furthermore what kinds of implications come with this type of policy construction in a society with some of the highest illiteracy rates in the world.

In addition, it is now clear that not only is the South Sudan in a state of emergency, but it is on its way to becoming a failed state. An interesting future analysis for scholars in the field might be to try not in understanding why state structures tend to do poorly in Africa, rather to


analyze if the paradigms of what we consider the naturalized “nation-state” was ever appropriate, particularly for this context in the southern region of Sudan. The question of the applicability of Westernized notions of the state can be extrapolated into the larger Africanist discourse in what ways the failure of many states in Africa can be overcome. This then has larger implications for the study of national-identity, which is normatively premised within the confines of the nation-state. Certainly, South Sudan is not a unique case of issues of national identity. Perhaps by taking an antithetical political and historical approach in considering the idea of national identity (and in context to Africa’s historical legacy), we can begin to expand our ideas of governance, political groupings and the idea of national identity in general.

APPENDIX

1. People's Choice Facial Tissue, Juba, South Sudan. Personal photograph by author. 2015.



2. Zain, “One Nation, Network Coverage”, Zain, “We are 1 Voice” and MTN “1 Network”, Juba, South Sudan. Personal photograph by author, 2015.





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3. I Buy South-Sudanese Products, Juba, South Sudan. Personal photograph by author. 2015.



4. Co-Operative Bank of South Sudan, Juba, South Sudan. Personal photograph by author. 2015.



5. White Bull Brew, Juba, South Sudan. Personal photograph by author. 2015.



6. Quantitative Questionnaire Part I/II

i. Demographic Bank

1

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

University of California - Los Angeles
International Institute for African Studies

[DEMOGRAPHIC BANK]

(*Please use as much space as needed to answer each question)

A. Age

a. _____

B. Sex/Gender (Circle one)

Male or Female

C. Tribe/Clan _____

D. Nationality: _____

E. In which country do you hold citizenship? _____

F. Last degree completed? (For example, B.A., Law Degree, Post Graduate, etc.)

f. _____

G. What state and county do you come from?

g. State _____

g. County _____

H. Which **ONE** language do you speak the most frequently? _____

I. If you speak other languages, which ones and during which occasions?

(i.e. English/Official, Nuer/Home, etc.)

Language _____ Occasion _____

Language _____ Occasion _____

Language _____ Occasion _____

Language _____ Occasion _____

Language _____ Occasion _____

Language _____ Occasion _____

ii. Identity Bank

2

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

University of California – Los Angeles
International Institute for African Studies

(*Please use as much space as needed to answer each question)

[IDENTITY BANK]

J. Please numerically rank the following identities in terms of your most important identity to your least important identity. ("1" being the most important identity and "8" being the least important identity). Each number can only be used once!

___ Gender	(Example) _2_ Gender
___ Tribe/Clan	_4_ Tribe/Clan
___ County	_1_ County
___ State	_8_ State
___ Religion	_3_ Religion
___ Age	_7_ Age
___ Nationality	_5_ Nationality
___ Race	_6_ Race

iii. Strength of Sentiments, p. 3

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

**University of California – Los Angeles
International Institute for African Studies**

(*Please use as much space as needed to answer each question)

[STRENGTH OF SENTIMENTS]

1. On a scale of 1-5, how loyal do you feel to your tribe? (Circle One)
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High
2. On a scale of 1-5, how loyal do you feel to your county? (Circle One)
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High
3. On a scale of 1-5, how loyal do you feel to South Sudan? (Circle One)
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High
4. On a scale of 1-5, how important is your nationality to your identity?
(Circle One)
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High
5. On a scale of 1-5, how important is your county to your identity? (Circle One)
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High
6. On a scale of 1-5, how important is your gender to your identity?
(Circle One)
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High
7. On a scale of 1-5, how important is your tribe to your identity? (Circle One)
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High

iv. Strength of Sentiments, p. 4

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

**University of California – Los Angeles
International Institute for African Studies**

(*Please use as much space as needed to answer each question)

[STRENGTH OF SENTIMENTS]

8. On a scale of 1-5, how important is your state to your identity? (Circle One)

Low 1 2 3 4 5 High

9. On a scale of 1-5, how important is your identity to social life in South Sudan? (Circle One)

Low 1 2 3 4 5 High

10. On a scale of 1-5, how important is your identity to political life in South Sudan? (Circle One)

Low 1 2 3 4 5 High

11. Is your identity more important to social life or political life? (Circle One)

Social Importance 3 2 Equal Importance 1 2 Political Importance 3

12. On a scale of 1-5, how much unity do you feel that there is in your state? (Circle One)

Low 1 2 3 4 5 High


13. On a scale of 1-5, how much unity do you feel that there is in Juba? (Circle One)

Low 1 2 3 4 5 High

14. On a scale of 1-5, how much unity do you feel that there is South Sudan? (Circle One)

Low 1 2 3 4 5 High

7. File No. EP/1-C-2: Sudan Government: Bhar El Ghazal Province Council, Cover



Chief Mamnyel Dut proposed that shops and houses near and on the main roads should be searched for araki.

Father E. Toniolo considered that car owners, whether private, the Government, or the Mission, often make drivers drive for too long hours. This causes them to give way to the temptations of drink. mitted

Mekki Eff. Mohamed Ahmed stressed again the need for a certificate of good character before granting a driving licence to an applicant. He personally knew of a drunken driver elsewhere in the Sudan, who had his licence suspended. This man later became a reformed character, and obtained a certificate of good conduct. He was issued with a driving licence and has committed no further offence.

The Chairman, summing up the discussion, said that the following steps could be taken.

1. An inspection of all cars in Wau could be made by the Garage Overseer once in every three months, if the Mechanical Transport Department would approve.
2. Owners could be warned to inspect their drivers and cars frequently, and might be held responsible if they failed.
3. Unexpected inspections by the Police on the roads of the Province could be arranged.
4. Applicants for driving licences could be required to produce to the licencing authority certificates of good character signed by two witnesses of good reputation.
5. Magistrates could be instructed to suspend the driving licence of any drivers convicted of driving when under the influence of drink or drugs. suggested


3. The nature and priorities of the Bahr El Ghazal educational programme in the coming years.

The Chairman explained that while everybody clamoured for education, there were three things necessary to it, the money, the building and the teachers. The money we hoped was there, but building could not be done in a day and teachers were short, particularly Dinka teachers. Therefore a complete programme would take time and we had to discuss now where education was most needed and what form of it.

"Education" was merely a name and we must think what boys were educated for. Within a period of years the need for Government officials would be filled, and what would the boys do then? If they drifted off we should lose the benefit of them. Was there any way by which we could keep them?

Some people thought that technical and professional education was more urgent than the turning out of pen-pushers. We were in grievous need for even ordinary artizans, with 30 imported Northern ostas now working in Wau. Others had been heard to say that until the mother is educated the son will not succeed and that girls education should actually take precedence. It was on this problem of precedence that he sought counsel. The programme would be decided by the Minister and the Director, but it was in our power to make our desires known.

8. File No. TSD/15.B.1-TSD/17.A.1: General Rulings, Education, pg. 2



... 2 ...

They were all advised to keep friendly relations with other people specially those whom we need their help. For example a Headmaster needs the help of the D.C. in the repairs of his School, the transport of teachers and pupils, selection of new boys, etc., etc. All this needs good understanding of the two and tactful approach from the Headmaster. Headmasters should be very decent in their letters and their requests should be reasonable. A good Headmaster is one who knows how to deal with others and make them interested in his school.

2. Time Table and Daily Programme.

The meeting then came to discuss the time table and the periods allotted to each subject. There was obvious difference between all schools in the number of periods allotted to each subject. After long tedious discussion all Headmasters were responding to the time table agreed upon in the P.E.O's Conference to come into force when shifting to the Northern Programme.

In the meantime the amended time table for Southern Schools was clearly given to be adopted by all Schools teaching on the Southern Pattern.

The two time tables agreed upon are as follows:-
Time table Programme

Schools run on Southern Pattern

Subject	Cl. I	Cl. II	Cl. III	Cl. IV
Arithmetic	6	6	6	6
Arabic	2	2	8	8
English	2	4	10	10
Vernacular	10	10	-	-
Religion	5	5	5	5
Hygiene	1	1	1	1
Arts & Crafts	4	4	4	4
Geography	-	-	3	4

Time Table Programme

Schools shifting to Northern Pattern:


Subject	Cl. I	Cl. II	Cl. III	Cl. IV
Arabic	10	10	10	10
Arithmetic	8	8	6	7
Religion	5	5	5	5
History	-	-	2	1
Geography	-	-	3	4
Science	-	-	4	3
Arts & Crafts	4	4	4	4
Hygiene	-	1	1	1
Phy. Education	3	3	3	3

It is recommended that 3 periods should be devoted to Agricultural Activities per week per Class.

Daily Programme.

The Headmasters were advised to make a Programme to show the daily activities of the boys for the whole week. This programme should be laid in a way that every master knows what he is exactly doing any time during the week, and every pupil as well. This helps the masters to keep good control of the boys, specially in boarding house Schools, and makes the boy feel that he is tied to a routine which is well chosen to meet his demands and that he is always checked.

Contd...../3....



... 4 ...

69

- 1) a) The Stores Form should be prepared from six copies. The sixth copy should be detached and retained by the Headmaster. The remaining copies from one to five to be sent direct to Director of Education (Supplies Officer.)
b) Only the proper address, signature of official demanding and Station should be written in their proper places in the Stores Form. The rest should be left blank.
c) When the Form is received by the Supplies Officer it will be checked then passed to Director of Stores and Equipment for issue and despatch. These items marked "OUT OF STOCK" will then be re-indentured and issue will be effected as soon as the Stock is replenished.

2) Date of annual demand submission.
No fixed date is laid down for the submission of annual demand. Heads of Schools must decide that for themselves taking into consideration that at least five months should be allowed before the materials are required for use.

- 3) The Stores Form should be sent under a covering letter showing the following information :-
 - a) Name of School,
 - b) Number of Classes with number of pupils in each class.
 - c) The new Classes anticipated (if any).
 - d) The Official address of the Consignee.

4) An inventory List should be forwarded annually with the annual demands.

5) Non-consumable Stores :- as a guide to the distinction between consumable and non-consumable Stores, you may assure that all items except text-books are non-consumable. As the non-consumable Stores are not of a recurrent nature, Stores are only issuable in one of the two circumstances :-

- a) When the school has not yet completed four years and the Stores are therefore needed for additional entry.
- b) When required in replacement of boarded articles in which event proper condemnation certificate should be rendered.

6) Preparation of the Condemnation Certificate

The condemnation Certificate should be prepared from two copies. Articles of each section separately - and be signed by three members. The articles so condemned should be kept in a safe place and should not be disposed with without the prior approval of the Director of Stores and Equipment.

All Headmasters were strongly advised to keep proper Store Ledgers in their Schools. These ledgers should be kept up-to-date and entries of all Stores received and issued should be made at once. It is preferable to keep two separate ledgers for consumables and non-consumables. The Headmaster or his assistant should be in-charge of the Store.

5. Religious Teaching in Schools:

It is the Headmaster's responsibility to see that Religion, like all other subjects is properly taught to the boys. He must make sure that everybody in the School is instructed in the religion decided by the parent or guardian in the consent Form. The Consent Form should be filled in in respect of every pupil. The right time for this is one month

Contd. /5

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d) Annual Reports on Teachers:

Annual Confidential Reports are very important in respect of all teaching Staff in all Elementary Schools. These reports are essential for granting the annual increase of pay. They are equally important to help in selecting masters for courses and further training. These reports should be written on the proper Form if available or on ordinary paper under the headings of the proper Form. These Forms can be obtained from the P.E.O.'s Office on request if needed. For easy reference we give below the proper headings :-

Name (in full)		
Appointment		
Scale	Pay	School
Nationality		per Annum
Particulars		
Educational Qualifications		

Competence :-

- A- Classes and subjects he teaches
- b- Standard achieved in each subject he takes,
- c- Reliability and industry,
- D- Contribution to School life and Discipline (e.g. Any outstanding qualities, whether he is developing any improvements on previous Shortcomings etc.)

7) Discipline in School:

Discipline is one of the most important things that a pupil should learn at School. It is not a subject to be taught inside the class-room nor could it be found on the pages of books. It is something for the boy to gain from his daily life at School, inside the Class-room, in the boarding house or in the play ground. The pupils are young creatures that response to everything they see, hear or feel. It is for the Headmaster and the staff first of all to see that they are good examples to the boys to take after them. You do not for example expect small children to keep neat and tidy if they see filthy clumsy masters in front of them. All masters are expected to set a good example to the boys.

Another way of achieving high Standard of discipline is by setting out a clear applicable programme for the daily life and activities of the boys. This does not work out satisfactorily unless the boys are well trained to adhere to it.


A third important thing is making Houses with prefects and House masters. The House masters should be responsible for all the boys in their houses and deal with all their difficulties and troubles.

For other ways please see minutes of Headmasters' Conference September, 1957 page 8 under (2) Boarding - Schools.

8) Correspondence:

All Headmasters are directly responsible to the Province Education Officer.

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17. Cleanliness of Village Schools Boys :-
Village Schools Boys are provided with soap (one piece) and should be encouraged to be clean in body and in dress. The new issue of cloth for the Uniforms will be from Nzara Damouria which is white in colour and needs more attention to keep clean. Special stress should be made on cleanliness. A new design has been made for the uniforms and samples will be sent to all Inspectors. It is much simpler, more beautiful and with no buttons at all.

18. Arabic and English Sign Boards :-
It has been decided to make sign boards bearing the name of each Village School and be posted at the beginning of the road leading to the School. They should be 2 ft x 1 ft and should bear ONLY the name of the School in Arabic and English one on top of the other. It was recommended that the Councils prepare the boards and posts, and when they are ready, Gumaa Zakaria of the Publications Bureau will be sent to all Councils to make the writing.

19. Needle Work :-
In Village Schools where a woman teacher is teaching the girls should be given needle work as a subject. The teacher should give her requirements to the Inspector who will submit to the Province Education Officer for approval for local purchase.

20. Preparation of A Handbook :-
Village Schools Inspectors were asked to make Handbooks on Schools in their areas. This is meant to help in preparing a Handbook on Education in the three Southern Provinces. The Village Schools Inspector Handbook should include :-
Introduction - Historical Facts - Population - Tribes - Number of Schools in all levels and a map showing the village schools, the Elementary Schools, Dispensaries, Distance in miles and situation of Schools on the main road. They may contain something about the Missions Works and the take over of Schools in 1957.

21. Inspection Book and Visitors Book :-
Inspection is one of the main duties of Village Schools Inspectors and Supervisors. It should be made regularly and properly. When Village Schools Inspectors and Supervisors visit any School, They must go through every thing to make sure that all teachers are doing their work properly. It is very important to write down all remarks and comments or any suggestions. For this purpose a separate inspection book should be kept by the Head Teacher for use by members of the Ministry of Education only. Another book should be kept for other visitors.

22. Preparation Books :-
Village Schools Inspectors and Supervisors should have special interest in the teacher's preparation books. They must see that they are up to date and that the teachers are teaching the proper syllabus. Boys' note books should also be inspected to see the amount of work done and the general standard of boys.

23. Conduct of Teachers :-
No teacher should leave his station unless he takes permission from the Village Schools Inspector or Supervisors. Supervisors can give permission for one day if satisfied with the reasons for absence. Inspectors can give up to three days. For more than three days approval should be obtained from the P.E.O.'s Office. Teachers should set a good example for their boys. It is the Village School teachers who lays the foundation of good character and behavior. It is not only lessons that boys learn from their teachers, but also manners and all other qualities.

At the end of the meetings the A/Director of Education, S.P. gave a valuable farewell talk and wished the Inspectors Good luck and a good new year for their Schools.

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Appendix, 8 (File No. TSD/15.B.1-TSD/17.A.1: General Rulings, Education), 3/10

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With regard to Girls' Elementary Schools it is the Government's intention to be ultimately in charge of them. I fully realise the difficulties which attend girls education in the Southern Provinces particularly the staffing problem. The Ministry will therefore follow a gradual plan in taking over girls' schools and I think that there is ample scope for fruitful co-operation between the Ministry and the Missions for the advancement of girls education. I also hope that you would co-operate to the utmost with the education authorities in overcoming the staffing difficulties in girls' schools. In the circumstances, the date of the taking over, shall be fixed and declared later. ✓

The six Mission Vernacular Teacher Training Centres also come under the proposed plan for the taking over of schools by Government though the future of each of these centres is being studied independently. It seems that the majority of these centres have become redundant and they should therefore be put to other Educational uses. ✓ I am sure that your Education Secretaries with the Juba Education Office would agree on a satisfactory plan for making the best use of these centres provided that the delivery should be completed within this year. ✓

My Ministry's policy is to allow the three Mission intermediate schools to continue until such a time as it would be practicable for the Government to take them over. I hope that this would be possible within the coming one or two years. ✓

The three Technical Schools at Torit, Lainya and Wau have been the subject of thorough and careful consideration. Steps have been taken only recently to re-organise the programme of work at Torit and Wau schools in order to bring them in line with Northern Technical Intermediate Schools. The position of Lainya School has been the subject of discussion with a view to converting it to some sort of artizan school. In view of these facts I feel that it would be wiser to allow the Missions to continue running these schools as they are being run now for the coming one or two years when the staff of the Khartoum Technical Institute will find time to visit and examine the said schools and report as to the best means of taking them over. Until this step is taken, this remains another field in which the Government and Missions could co-operate for the good of the people.

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