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Odell, Graham

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From the Ashes Shall Rise: Determinants of State Reconstitution in Republican China and
Sengoku Japan

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by

Graham French Odell

Dissertation Committee:
Professor Emerita Dorothy J. Solinger, Chair
Chancellor's Professor Charles C. Ragin
Associate Professor Robert M. Uriu

2017

DEDICATION

To

Karina and my family

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Graham French Odell

2005   B.A. in History, Virginia Commonwealth University

2008   M.A. in East Asian Studies, University of Virginia

2011-2016   Teaching Assistant, University of California, Irvine

2017   Ph.D. in Political Science, University of California, Irvine

FIELD OF STUDY

Comparative Politics

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

From the Ashes Shall Rise: Determinants of State Reconstitution in Republican China and Sengoku Japan

By

Graham French Odell

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Irvine, 2017

Professor Emerita Dorothy J. Solinger, Chair

This dissertation addresses the question of why some collapsed states have been reconstituted whereas others have not. Many states today have collapsed, so answering this question has not only scholarly but also practical implications. Very little theorization has been done on this issue, so this study's primary purpose is to develop a new theoretical framework of state reconstitution, especially of the internally-driven variety, which may be more efficacious than externally-directed state reconstruction.

This study employs two cases of successful state reconstitution – Republican China (1912-1949) and Sengoku Japan (1477-1615) – to analytically-inductively derive a new theoretical framework. These cases are distinct across a number of potentially explanatory factors, thus making them ideal for a most-different same outcome (MDSO) research design, which is most appropriate for a study that seeks to formulate a novel theoretical explanation for a phenomenon.

Through the investigation of these cases as well as gleaning insights from the existing

state formation literature, this dissertation develops a theory of successful state reconstitution

by emphasizing the causal impacts of ideology, political symbolism and the distribution of social

power. The penultimate chapter tests this framework on three cases not used to develop it and

finds that the framework is highly successful in explaining cases very different from those

employed to develop it in the first place, suggesting a substantial degree of generalizability.

Introduction

The phoenix dies, and then is born again

   - *Inferno*, Canto XXIV, by Dante Alighieri[1]

Nor shall this peace sleep with her: but as when

The bird of wonder dies, the maiden phoenix,

Her ashes new create another heir,

As great in admiration as herself;

So shall she leave her blessedness to one,

When heaven shall call her from this cloud of darkness,

Who from the sacred ashes of her honour

Shall star-like rise, as great in fame as she was,

And so stand fix'd

   - Cranmer, *Henry VIII*, Act V, Scene V, by William Shakespeare[2]

As a leader of the English Reformation, Thomas Cranmer was a staunch supporter of state

sovereignty. He believed in the principle of Royal Supremacy, which asserted monarchical

authority over the Church in the English realm. In other words, Cranmer was one of the early

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[1] Longfellow 1904: 141

[2] Shakespeare: 72

proponents of establishing territorial sovereignty – that is, the state – in the person of the

monarch. Moreover, as the above quotation dramatizes, Cranmer considered English royal

authority to persist after Henry VIII's and Elizabeth I's reigns. Even with the death of the

sovereign, Elizabeth's glory would endure throughout her heir's rule. Put another way, the state

would outlast any individual mortal coil; sovereignty would be preserved. In Cranmer's usage by

way of Shakespeare, the phoenix represents the transcendence and persistence of state

authority without regard to the passing of individual rulers.

But such sovereign stability is often not observed in the trajectories of human polities.

Instead, the metaphorical phoenix can manifest itself in an alternative way, as when territorial

sovereignty is reborn from circumstances of its prior collapse. The course of state authority can

be a jagged and unstable one. Indeed, cases of state collapse and reconstitution have occurred

throughout history: the cyclic rise and fall of the Ancient Egyptian Kingdoms; the denouement

and rebirth of the Chinese empire in the tenth century CE; the devastation and renascence of

the Valois French state in the fifteenth; and the implosion and reconstruction of the Ugandan

polity in the twentieth. Yet many collapsed states remain so, as can be seen in the fates of the

Roman Empire, Poland-Lithuania in early modern Europe and Somalia today. In these cases,

state authority persists not in its transcendence but in its absence. Why do some states collapse

and then reemerge whereas others remain riven and disarrayed? How can territorial, sovereign

authority be reconstituted? How can the phoenix once again stand strong and complete?

State formation and state collapse are subjects that have received considerable

attention from scholars. State formation, especially of the European variety, has been a central

concern of scholarly work for decades. The study of state collapse has also seen sustained

attention over the past twenty years or so, ever since the end of the Cold War led to a drastic

increase in the number of collapsed states, especially in Africa and the Middle East.

Comparatively little work, however, has been done on state reconstitution, defined as the

formation of a new state following state collapse. Many states collapse, but comparatively few

attempts at reconstruction are successful. Since 1975, seventeen states have undergone the

collapse of central authority, with just four of these also being clear instances of state

reconstitution.[3] Failure to reconstruct the state, however, is not due to a lack of effort, as the

case histories of collapsed states indicate. Many internal and external actors have sought to

rebuild central authority in these societies.

Why, then, are some attempts at state reconstitution successful, whereas others are not?

Addressing this question is crucial for societies that are currently experiencing state collapse or

have already seen their state institutions crumble. Typically, collapsed states are beset by

endemic civil conflict, poor economic performance and generalized human insecurity (Zartman

1995). Developing insights into how these societies can rebuild their state apparatuses is thus

not just a scholarly enterprise but also a moral imperative.

A number of scholars have examined this issue (e.g., Zartman 1995; Rotberg 2003; Kieh

2007; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Krasner 2004; Lake and Fariss 2014).

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[3] I used data from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) *Consolidated Problem Set* version 2015 to arrive at these figures. The list of collapsed states since 1975 includes: Somalia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Uganda, Ethiopia, Chad, Libya, Central African Republic, Lebanon, Burundi, Mali and Yugoslavia. States that were reconstituted include: Liberia (since 2003), Uganda, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone (since 2002). Warring factions in Burundi accepted an internationally-brokered power-sharing agreement in 2005, but violence broke out again in 2015 and continues intermittently. It is unclear, then, whether state reconstitution has been consolidated in Burundi. Chad, Ivory Coast and Lebanon are also borderline cases and so are not considered clear cases of state reconstitution either.

Their work, when considering theoretical reasons for why states are reconstituted, has in common a general focus on the role of the international community in assisting state reconstruction. Aside from Jeremy M. Weinstein's study (2005), however, it appears that no attempt has been made to develop a systematic theory of how states can be reconstituted through primarily domestic actor-led efforts, that is, *endogenous* state reconstitution. Yet given the poor track record of external state-building interventions (Lake and Fariss 2014), it is surprising that endogenous state reconstitution has received such little attention. After all, if foreign actors are almost always unable to successfully reconstruct durable central authority, understanding how *domestic* actors have sometimes been able to do so could give scholars and policymakers an appreciation of how this state-building process can actually be achieved.

In this study, I seek to establish which factors are causally connected to successful endogenous state reconstitution primarily by investigating the historical cases of Republican China (1912-1949) and Sengoku Japan (1477-1615). As well-established instances of durable state reconstitution, they are prime candidates for formulating and assessing a theoretical framework designed to explain how successful state reconstitution occurs. The remainder of this Introduction is organized as follows: I, first, discuss the methodological rationale for my comparative research design; second, review the state formation literature with a specific focus on its insights into the role of social forces, ideational factors and warfare; third, highlight the basic contours of my main argument concerning endogenous state reconstitution; and, finally, preview the contents of this dissertation.

Methodology

How best to achieve an understanding of endogenous state reconstitution is intrinsically a methodological issue. Since little theorization has been done on endogenous state reconstitution specifically, a structured, focused comparison of a few cases can be especially fruitful for advancing research on this topic. A rich methodological tradition recognizes the special value of small-N analysis for developing new hypotheses and theoretical propositions (e.g., Lijphart 1971; Collier and Mahoney 1996; George and Bennett 2005).

Furthermore, for outcomes about which scholars have limited theoretical understanding, a no-variance design (that is, one in which all cases share the same outcome) can be indispensable for formulating novel explanations (Collier and Mahoney 1996). In addition, the 'contrast space' (that is, the range of *non*-outcomes) is quite nebulous for state reconstitution. A collapsed state can remain in institutional flux, transition to a stable collection of successor states, be swallowed up by an external polity or transform into some other kind of non-state structural configuration. Therefore, it is unclear which "negative" outcome would be most appropriate to pair with a "positive" one.

Successful state reconstitution, however, is a conceptually clear condition: it results in the reemergence of the state. Thus, given these methodological arguments, I structure this study primarily around the analysis of two cases of successful state reconstitution. In the final empirical chapter, I test my theoretical framework (which has been partially derived from these two principal cases) on three additional instances of successful state reconstitution. In other words, I employ a no-variance research design throughout the study.

A methodological consequence of this comparative strategy is that this study focuses on formulating a theoretical framework constructed of necessary, rather than sufficient, conditions.[4] When developing hypotheses about sufficiency, analysts should utilize a research design that has a range of outcomes (e.g., democracy versus authoritarianism, patrimonialism versus bureaucracy) so that factors that are present in one set of cases but not in another can be identified. These conditions can then be hypothesized to sufficiently (jointly or singly) explain the differences in outcomes observed in the cases (Slater and Ziblatt 2013).

However, a no-variance design is best suited for formulating and testing necessary condition hypotheses since the purportedly necessary factor (or set of factors) would be observed across all instances of the outcome (Dion 1998). Were it not present in all positive cases, then it cannot be considered necessary. Since a necessary condition does not guarantee the occurrence of the outcome, analyzing non-positive cases is of limited utility.[5] Given my interest in analyzing *successful* cases of state reconstitution, I construct and test a framework of necessary conditions.

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[4] Necessity implies that a cause must be present for an outcome to occur, but its presence does not *guarantee* the occurrence of the outcome. Sufficiency, conversely, indicates that the presence of the cause *is* enough for the outcome to arise, but there may be other causes that are also sufficient for the outcome. We can also think of sets of causes as being jointly necessary or jointly sufficient for an outcome. That is, they function as "macro", "aggregate" or "conjunctural" causes. For example, three factors by themselves may not be necessary for the outcome, but at least two of them must be present in order for the outcome to be possible. Alternatively, three factors may individually not be sufficient but the presence of all of them is enough for the outcome to occur (cf. Mahoney et al. 2009).

[5] Gary Goertz (2003: 73) points out that every necessary condition hypothesis can be converted to a sufficient one, and vice versa, simply by making both the cause and outcome negative. So if X is necessary for Y, then the *absence* of X is sufficient for the *absence* of Y. Since my main interest is in understanding how successful state reconstitution occurs, I do not employ this methodological strategy here. However, future work will analyze cases where the contrapositive of one or more of the conditions I claim are necessary is present and determine if the expectation that the outcome should be absent is supported.

This focus on necessary conditions also accords with the comparative-historical analysis (CHA) approach I take. CHA is "defined by a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison" (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). Systematization involves searching for and formulating theoretical propositions that can help explain multiple cases within a delimited analytical scope. Contextualization, on the other hand, requires that the analyst respect the unique qualities and circumstances of each case.

In this study, I employ the former through the presentation of a theoretical framework comprised of conditions I argue are necessary for successful state reconstitution, regardless of the peculiarities of the cases. The need for contextualization, though, is supported by my lack of claims concerning sufficiency. Rather than assert that a particular conjunctural combination of systematic conditions is sufficient for successful state reconstitution, I argue that commonly necessary conditions interact with case-based, context-specific factors to produce this outcome in each case. In other words, I combine the systematic with the idiographic. By doing so, I espouse an analytic approach that seeks to uncover general propositions about state reconstitution while taking into account the unavoidable diversity of the social world.

An additional core principle of CHA is analytic induction, whereby the analyst explicitly draws on already established theoretical knowledge to systematically analyze cases. During the course of conducting research, the analyst can develop supplemental hypotheses based on new empirical findings or theoretical insights and even modify or reject original propositions.[6] The

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[6] How I employed this iterative process of theorization over the course of this study is outlined in the next chapter.

final product should be a theoretical framework that explains the cases at hand and also makes some cautious generalizations about the wider population, but does not provide fully-developed theoretical models that can be applied anywhere (Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997: 67). I develop such a theoretical framework by leaving explanatory room for case-specific factors and formulating a set of necessary conditions for the delimited population of endogenously reconstituted states rather than for constructed states in general.

Ideally, because of the invariance across outcomes, a necessary-condition research design will employ cases that are heterogeneous in terms of the values taken by plausible explanatory factors. In other words, a most different-same outcome (MDSO) comparative strategy is most appropriate for this kind of approach. Sengoku Japan and Republican China are good candidates for comparison because of their considerable differences. Sengoku was a pre-modern period in Japanese history when external political influence and geopolitical pressures were at a relative minimum. Nationalist ideologies justifying unified nation-states were not present in Japanese culture or in the wider international imaginary. Japanese society during this time was feudal in many respects and had a tradition of comparatively weak central rule. Furthermore, the final state that was reconstructed at the end of this period, the Tokugawa Shogunate, was heavily federal in nature, with a considerable amount of political delegation to lower level units.

Republican China, however, was situated in a modern international context when European colonial power was at its height and considerable geopolitical pressures impinged on the stability of Chinese governmental and social relations. Nationalist ideologies were very much prevalent, both in China and throughout world society. Furthermore, Chinese society,

although highly agrarian and pre-modern like Sengoku Japan, was organized along considerably different lines: a gentry class rather than a feudal nobility ruled local Chinese society and the previous Qing Dynasty had been significantly more centralized than the Muromachi Shogunate had been prior to the Sengoku era. The reconstituted state that emerged at the end of this era, the People's Republic of China, was a highly centralized state with limited local autonomy, though this has increased in recent decades.

Despite these differences, both cases resulted in successful state reconstitution. Thus, we can account for these differences when formulating propositions as to why the two cases exhibited the same outcome. In both cases, moreover, there were no concerted internationally-led efforts at state-building. Though state builders in Republican China received material resources and technical and organizational knowhow from external sources, their campaigns for unification were indigenously led. Thus, these two cases are ideal for examining endogenous state reconstitution.

A final methodological note concerns the sources of evidence I use, which are exclusively secondary historical accounts of the actors, events and contexts of the cases under investigation. Both positivists and interpretivists have challenged the epistemological validity of this kind of research (e.g., Goldthorpe 1991; White 1978). However, Joseph M. Bryant (2000) provides a systematic set of protocols for utilizing historiographical sources for social-scientific research that addresses the epistemological challenges inherent in such an approach. The first such protocol involves critically adjudicating the accuracy of a historical narrative, by assessing its empirical depth and scope, analytical coherence, and comparative consistency with other accounts (Bryant 2000: 495). To assess accuracy, the evidence presented for a given analytical

point ideally should be substantial and diverse, while the overall narrative should be backed up by such well-supported analytical points. Additionally, the historian's inferences should be logically supported by the evidence and the scholar's argument should be internally consistent. Furthermore, the historian's analytical assertions and presented evidence should be consistent with those of other historians' accounts. If there is considerable debate concerning how to interpret a particular event, process or actor, then analysts relying on secondary historiography should be cautious in their conclusions. In general, the analyst who relies on secondary sources must critically assess the comparative validity of diverse accounts of the same historical period or issue.

The second protocol that Bryant stipulates is the adoption of a critical-rationalist mode of epistemological scrutiny called *source criticism*. Historians typically engage with a multitude of primary sources, cross-examining multiple accounts of the same event from different perspectives. However, historical primary sources are often selectively created and revealed by the powerful or the self-interested who were involved in the past events under scrutiny. As a result, historians should treat primary sources with skeptical attention to who created them and why. Disagreement may arise amongst historians over the intentions of the powerful or self-interested who were involved in the production of these primary sources and so the analyst using historical accounts should review debates between historians and area specialists over issues regarding the reliability of source material and how those sources are used in creating narratives (Bryant 2000: 507-509).

Bryant's third protocol is the implementation of a mode of epistemological assessment he labels *sociology of knowledge*. Here the analyst should situate narratives in schools of

scholarship that have their own paradigm commitments, which can be methodological,

theoretical, ideological, or sociological (e.g., partisan). Certain schools can also have a bias

towards investigating particular research domains. Moreover, schools of nationalist history

often portray the past in a favorable yet inaccurate light (Marx 2003). The task of the analyst is

to look at events from multiple scholarly perspectives, considering the framing and evaluative

effects of paradigm commitments (Bryant 2000: 510). In sum, reading as many historical

narratives of a given event, process, context or actor as possible and critically and

comparatively evaluating them are crucial when utilizing secondary sources for data collection

and analysis.

By following Bryant's recommended protocols, my belief is that I have avoided the

epistemological pitfalls underscored by other scholars. I will leave the reader to decide if the

evidence presented in the subsequent empirical chapters in fact supports this contention of

mine.

Insights from the Study of State Formation

As I fully elaborate in the next chapter, state reconstitution is a subtype of state formation.

Therefore, a good starting point for developing an explanatory framework addressing state

reconstitution is to assess the general theoretical insights of state-formation scholars. In

general, research on the historical development of the state suggests that the two key

imperatives of state builders and rulers are resource access and social control. Resource access

includes both the extraction of resources and the fostering of the overall pool of them in

society, such as through economic development (North 1990; Tilly 1992; Ertman 1997; Hui 2005). Social control involves securing the pacification and/or cooperation of subordinate groups so that state interests can be realized (Anderson 1975; Hui 2005; Slater 2010). By not meeting these requirements, state actors (both builders and rulers) endanger their ability to establish and maintain territorial sovereignty.

For a state builder, these imperatives are especially difficult to fulfill because an emerging state has yet to fully foster legitimacy in the eyes of key social actors, and institutions undergirding state power have yet to be consolidated. In a collapsed state, the pervasive institutional flux accentuates these challenges. Thus, state-builders operating within such an environment are likely to rely heavily on the few durable and reliable structural resources and opportunities that are available. For example, powerful or potentially powerful social forces can be useful allies for state builders. Additionally, existing standards of legitimacy can be employed to burnish the image of these political actors, while well-developed mobilization techniques and organizational systems can be taken advantage of to construct durable coalitions.

On the one hand, relying on existing configurations and arrangements eases the task of state builders by allowing them to avoid having to construct *de novo* mechanisms of resource access and social control. But on the other hand, preexisting arrangements can place limits on the effectiveness of state builders' attempts to achieve these objectives, since social forces can have distributional demands of their own, extant standards of legitimacy may preclude certain courses of action and coalitional technologies may restrict the state builder's despotic power. Of course, all these potential issues can also increase state builders' infrastructural power by

enhancing their ability to enact their decisions throughout society. [7] In other words, the imperatives of effective state power force state builders not only to seek out favorable opportunities but also to contend with undesirable challenges.

Rather than review all scholarly accounts of historical and contemporary state formation, I discuss the key theoretical findings of this literature that are most relevant to the comparison between Sengoku Japan and Republican China. Any necessary-condition framework that purports to explain these two cases must center on factors that are shared by both. Because of their dissimilar external contexts, economic systems and military technologies, empirical patterns that scholars have established that pertain to these types of factors are not discussed. Instead, I evaluate the general roles of social forces, ideas and warfare in state formation, three broad dimensions of social life that did have common significant impacts in these cases. The first two have been shown to have independent effects on the development of state power, while the impact of warfare is generally contingent on specific factors encompassed by the first two dimensions. As I argue in this study, successful state reconstitution depends on political actors taking advantage of favorable structural conditions provided by specific manifestations of these general dimensions.

The first dimension, social forces, encompasses groups and classes with collective social power. Many, if not most, scholars of state formation emphasize the role of particular social forces in their causal accounts, at least as one of multiple significant factors (e.g., Tilly 1992;

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[7] Michael Mann (1984) defines despotic power as "the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups" (188), which I consider to include coalitions under the leadership of a state builder. He defines infrastructural power as "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm" (189).

Spruyt 1996; Wheeler 2011; Anderson 1975). These collective actors are frequently

characterized as allying with, or opposing, state builders and rulers. Social forces' preferences,

relative economic power, and organizational strength to a large extent dictate whether they

support state-building projects, how they grant support, and whether state builders seek their

support in the first place. In the context of Europe, both the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy

have been identified as key allies (and, in the case of the latter, sometimes opponents) of state

builders (Spruyt 1996; Tilly 1992; Anderson 1975; Wheeler 2011). Even in Dynastic China, where

the imperial regime largely created the scholar-gentry class, this elite class had its own interests

to which state rulers had to pay heed (Wong 1997). Unifiers can choose to accommodate,

suppress or ignore these social groups and classes and their preferences. Depending on the

context, certain social forces can provide state actors with needed resources and capabilities

for social control, while others could act as obstacles to these imperatives. Moreover, state

actors can *create* new social groups and classes that form a major part of their coalitions. In

other words, the role of social forces is a dimension that is intrinsically involved in the

generation, preservation and exercise of state power, though it is part of the job of the state

builder to determine which forces he will use and how.

Crucially, the agency of social forces distinguishes this dimension from the other two.

That is, social forces, as collective *actors*, not only play a part in the strategies of political actors,

but also can alter the structural environment within which these actors operate and can

respond in kind to their actions. Of special relevance to state building is the fact that the

mobilization and creation of social forces can work against state actors since the rival coalitions

of other powerful actors can act as grave obstacles to their efforts. Not just rival individual

actors, but also collective ones, can consciously challenge and resist state power. In other words, individuals that comprise social forces have their own collective intentionality and can thus work with or against or stay neutral from state actors and their political projects.

The second dimension is that of *ideas*, which includes ideologies, religious beliefs, philosophies and symbols that can shape the political beliefs, attitudes and goals of all actors. In the context of state formation, religious or cosmological ideologies have been shown to have a powerful impact on the disciplining of state administrations and the creation of elite strata (Gorski 2003; Miller 2000). Ideological frameworks and hoary political symbols have influenced the political strategies of powerful actors, such as Vladimir Lenin in Tsarist Russia and the Holy Roman Emperor in Medieval Europe, affecting which social groups are perceived as (potential) allies and which political goals are sought (Skocpol 1979; Spruyt 1996). Additionally, the use of symbolic ritual and claims of exclusive access to the spiritual realm have served to enhance the legitimacy of state rulers (Geertz 1980; Schwartz 2006). Despite these common effects, the specific ideas that serve disciplining, goal-orienting and legitimating purposes vary according to the particular context. Nonetheless, when state actors have access to ideologies and symbols, they are able to take advantage of them to impose discipline on their coalitions and other social forces. Successful state builders use such ideas to legitimate their aims to society, thereby enhancing the efficacy of their efforts to establish and maintain social control and resource access.

Yet the utilization of ideologies, beliefs and symbols often has limits dictated by the internal logics of these ideas and the mental associations ascribed to them by individuals in the wider society. Similarly, state actors can *create* new ideologies, symbols and other ideational

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resources, but the normative limits of such innovation are determined by the logics of appropriateness espoused by key social actors. In other words, the ideational realm is at once replete with opportunities, but may also be laden with restrictions for political action.

The final dimension is that of warfare. Both its preparation and implementation have played a central role in the study of state formation (e.g., Tilly 1985, 1992; Centeno 2002; Ertman 1997; Thies 2004; Spruyt 1996). Indeed, arguably Charles Tilly's most famous contribution to the state formation literature is his maxim: "War made the state and the state made war" (Tilly 1975: 42). Scholars favoring the bellicist paradigm argue that in order for state actors to expand their social and territorial control they must enhance their extractive capacities. Such efforts at increasing resource extraction, though, often incite resistance from social forces in society (especially elites) that must in turn be repressed by state actors. This cycle of extraction and repression can lead to an increase in the administrative, coercive and financial capacities of state structures (Taylor and Botea 2008: 29). War, in other words, is closely correlated with the growth of state power.

But researchers have also shown that the causal role of warfare in state formation is often indeterminate or multivalent. For instance, warfare is just as likely to have disintegrative effects on state capacity as constructive ones (Porter 1994). Additionally, the consequences of warfare for particular emergent or consolidated states depend on other factors, including the degree of ethnic homogeneity, intensity of warfare and nature of the international system (Taylor and Botea 2008, Centeno 2002, Herbst 2000). Moreover, much of the literature on state formation has shown that war is not necessarily an independent factor, but rather usually plays an intermediary or interactive role (e.g., Spruyt 1996; Hui 2005; Ertman 1997). War and the

preparation for war generally encourage centralization efforts, but do not guarantee their

success. While warfare can selectively eliminate inefficient arrangements, it cannot *by itself*

generate new ones. Other causal factors dictate whether new institutions and coalitions can be

formed, and which ones are most likely to emerge. Any account of successful state formation,

including the reconstitution of the state, must address the role of warfare. But the precise role

this dimension plays is generally determined by other, analytically prior or interactive,

conditions.

A New Theory of Endogenous State Reconstitution

By drawing on the above three dimensions, I develop in this study a theoretical framework that

purports to explain how successful state reconstitution occurs. Social forces, ideas and the

(intermediary and competitive-selective) role of warfare interact to form a package of

necessary conditions and associated causal mechanisms, I will show. As the next chapter

elucidates in greater detail, this framework is oriented around the strategic actions of a specific

kind of state builder – the unifier. This type of political actor constructs and leads a campaign

with the express purpose of reconstituting – or said differently, reunifying – the state.

This reunification campaign's success, though, depends on the unifier's capacity to take

advantage of favorable structural conditions derived from the nature of social forces and ideas

in society. If the unifier employs strategies that effectively draw on the opportunities and

resources these structural forces provide, his reunification coalition can survive and flourish in

the arena of warfare. Indeed, as the case studies presented in the coming chapters illustrate,

superior war-making performance is essential for the successful reconstitution of the state by a unifier and his coalition. However, the long-run state-building capacity necessary for a victorious military campaign depends on the prior implementation of strategies that exploit particular, preexisting structural characteristics of social forces and ideas. I outline these strategies and structural characteristics below.

Drawing on the general dimensions of the roles of social forces, ideas and warfare, I argue that three strategic conditions are necessary for successful state reconstitution, each of which is in turn dependent on the existence of an analytically-prior structural condition. In other words, I hold that three pairs of structural-strategic conditions are essential for a unifier to successfully lead her coalition through the crucible of war and, ultimately, to the end-goal of a reconstituted state. The first causal pair consists of a) *the availability and/or development of an ideological framework* and b) *the implementation of the strategy of cohering core supporters*. I argue an ideological framework should be specialized in the sense that its chief function is to foster a coherent and effective yet delimited set of core supporters. This ideology need not have legitimacy in the eyes of individuals outside the unifier's core coalition. In order to be useful for a reunification campaign, an ideological framework should be capable of justifying the unifier's aims of reconstituting the state by her specifically. As a result, the unifier can legitimize her calls for a new territorially-based political hierarchy (that is, a state) and provide a long-term goal to which her supporters can be dedicated. Ideology can thus present a desired result that goes beyond short-term interests, enhancing the loyalty, cohesion and efficacy of the members of the unifier's coalition. The unifier can also harness an ideological framework to impose discipline within her followers' ranks. In other words, ideology can be employed to

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cohere core supporters, thereby transforming them into a reunification coalition. A durable, unified and effective coalition is necessary for success in winning battles, enduring defeat and engaging in the arduous work of building new state structures. These aspects of state reconstitution demand a steady, dedicated coalition, which, I argue, a unifier can foster through the utilization of an ideological framework in the course of cohering core supporters.

The second causal pair comprises a) *the availability of one or more nationally-legitimated symbols* and b) *the implementation of the strategy of incorporating independent social forces*. A nationally-legitimated symbol is one that is widely recognized by social forces and legitimizes political centralization. In contrast to an ideological framework, this kind of symbol appeals to a wide array of social groups and classes and is broadly recognized as such. That is, it should be encompassing. A unifier that makes rhetorical appeals to this kind of symbol can incorporate social forces independent of his core coalition, thereby fostering their active support or at least acquiescence. By doing so, the unifier can reduce the level of recalcitrance, resistance and even outright hostility to his aims and means while attempting to reconstitute the state under his authority. Though warfare cannot be avoided, the unifier can employ incorporation to diminish the intensity and frequency of coercive engagements. As a result, his campaign faces substantially more favorable circumstances than if he did not implement a strategy of incorporation.

The final causal pair consists of a) *the availability of one or more areas with a high degree of geopolitical space* and b) *the implementation of the strategy of disempowering local elites*. Geopolitical space is defined as the strength and density of social groups in a given area, with a high degree of this structural factor indicating a location with few and weak social groups.

The significance of this structural condition pertains to the potential interests and actions of local elites, who typically control the bulk of local socioeconomic resources in situations of state collapse. In order to acquire and mobilize resources for her campaign, a unifier must first gain access to them. Local elites generally do not want to part with the resources they control. Thus, a unifier must disempower those elites, either by eliminating them or co-opting them on terms favorable to her. However, local elites often have connections with social groups and, consequently, can appeal to them for assistance in resisting the unifier's resource extraction efforts. In areas with low degrees of geopolitical space, many such social groups are present and so local elites have greater potential connections that they can take advantage of to thwart efforts to disempower them. Thus, in general, I argue that unifiers must have access to areas with high degrees of geopolitical space so they may disempower local elites and gain access to needed resources, without which the unifier's campaign would be crippled. Without sufficient resources, a unifier's coalition is incapable of effectively engaging in the military campaigns central to the process of state reconstitution.

These three causal pairs are presented as analytically distinct, but as the case studies show, individual structures and strategies regularly interact with each other. This empirical complexification does not diminish the core explanatory power of these causal pairs. But it point to the special opportunities and challenges unifiers must confront as they conduct their campaigns to reconstitute the state. Moreover, case-specific factors intersect with these systematic conditions, further complicating the social realities unifiers face. This theoretical framework is designed to be open to such contextual complexity, but without sacrificing its

potential generalizability. The three test cases in Chapter Four underscore the overall

portability of the principles at the core of this framework.

Outline of the Study

The remaining chapters present a theoretical framework of state reconstitution, a comparative-

historical analysis of Republican China and Sengoku Japan and, using the components of my

framework, independent tests of my theory in the form of three additional preliminary case

studies. Chapter One establishes this study's conceptual and theoretical background and then

lays out in full my causal framework. Chapter Two discusses the three key *structural* conditions

as manifest in Republican China and Sengoku Japan. Chapter Three investigates the specific

implementations of the three *strategic* conditions by unifiers in these two cases. Chapter Four

presents independent tests of my argument through the analysis of state reconstitution in late

twentieth-century Ethiopia and Uganda and tenth-century China. In the Conclusion, I

recapitulate my overall argument, formulate potential theoretical modifications to it and

consider general lessons for state reconstitution in light of the findings of this study.

Chapter One: A New Theory of State Reconstitution

In this chapter, I present a theoretical framework comprised of causal conditions that I

hypothesize are necessary for state reconstitution, or the reconstruction of a state following

state collapse. These necessary conditions, however, are not jointly sufficient for state

reconstitution. Instead, contingent, case-specific factors – which could be either actor choices,

context-specific structural changes, or both – must combine with these necessary conditions to

generate the outcomes in the two cases of this phenomenon that this dissertation will analyze,

that is, Republican China and Sengoku Japan. Thus, I employ this theoretical framework to

uncover necessary, potentially generalizable causal conditions that can substantially explain

successful state reconstitution while explicitly recognizing the uniqueness of each case. My

empirical focus is on the role of unifiers, i.e., political entrepreneurs who actively seek to

reconstruct a collapsed state, and their associated reunification campaigns. Consequently, the

core of the framework centers on the influences upon, and choices of, these agents of change.

My argument focuses on the roles of ideology, symbols and geopolitical space in

explaining successful state reconstitution through the purposive efforts of unifiers. I will

specifically argue that a) ideology plays a crucial role in creating and maintaining a cohesive and

durable reunification coalition, b) the manipulation of key symbols can align and preserve the

support of societal actors to the unifier's cause of state reconstitution, and c) geopolitical space

provides vital room for the unifier to develop and propagate new institutions and

configurations that can serve as the foundation for a reconstituted state. These three broad

factors, ideology, symbols and geopolitical space, influence unifiers' actions by structuring the

sociopolitical contexts they operate in and presenting strategies unifiers can choose to use to propel and guide their reunification campaigns.

This theoretical framework has two components. First, I present a conceptual framework that clarifies the nature of state reconstitution and its relationship to political agency. Second, I propose an explanatory framework composed of six specific causal conditions, derived from the general factors of ideology, symbols and geopolitical space. These conditions are jointly necessary for successful state reconstitution, and fall into two sets. The first set includes three necessary *structural* conditions that provide the crucial space and/or resources for effective state reconstituting by unifiers. The second set consists of three necessary *strategic* conditions that constitute the actions intentionally taken by unifiers and their core supporters to realize the successful inception, extension, and consolidation of their reunification campaigns and, ultimately, reconstituted states.

These two sets of conditions form the bedrock that I argue is necessary for successful state reconstitution. They have been formulated and identified through analytic induction (see Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997) using data and insights from my two primary cases, Sengoku Japan and Republican China, and the scholarly literature on party formation, state formation, ideology and civil war. Specifically, an initial investigation of Sengoku Japan, combined with a general review of the state formation literature, led to the formulation of my initial set of theoretical expectations. These included the methodological importance of focusing on coalitions, a general belief that widely-recognized symbols can diminish conflict between unifiers and their rivals and the claim that regionally-powerful elites can inhibit institutional innovation. A preliminary examination of Republican China confirmed some of

these expectations but also demanded modification of others, such as the claim concerning regional elites, which proved to be underdeveloped. Additional review of the literature on ideology and civil war provided the final theoretical input for the development of my framework. In brief, a systematic dialogue between the two main cases and my theoretical expectations culminated in the framework presented in this chapter. Closer consideration of the cases beyond the broad outlines of the historical processes involved provides a partially independent check on the explanatory power of this framework. Still, this theoretical framework must be applied to other distinct cases of both successful and unsuccessful state reconstitution attempts to properly test its validity. Chapter Four begins this process by briefly looking at three such cases. These independent assessments indicate that the theoretical framework presented here is largely effective in explaining successful state reconstitution. I discuss the framework's robustness and limitations in light of these additional case studies in Chapter Four.

The order of this chapter is as follows. First, I briefly define my general objects of study - the state and state reconstitution. Second, I lay out the general concepts of the political entrepreneur and duality of structure, which is how Anthony Giddens' conceives of the interplay between structure and agency (Giddens 1984). Third, I discuss how the concepts of the political entrepreneur and the duality of structure 1) define the unifier and her role, and 2) constitute the reunification campaign and its ideal life cycle. Fourth, I discuss how the use of ideology can harness normative power and encourage collective action in service of reunification campaigns. Fifth, I review the analytic use of geopolitical space in the state formation and civil war literature and work out the concept's relevance to the actions of

unifiers. Finally, I present my explanatory framework of specific causal conditions jointly necessary for successful state reconstitution.

General Objects of Study

The State

In this section I present my conceptualization of the state. Scholars have provided many definitions of this central social-scientific term. The most common conceptual dividing line is between organizational and institutional definitions (Vu 2010). An organizational approach treats the state as a collective actor, frequently in terms of its autonomy from forces in society (e.g., Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1992). An institutional approach, though, considers the state to be a coherent set of institutions that structure the actions of individual actors (e.g., Gorski 2003; Ikegami 1995). For the purposes of my research, I follow this latter approach because I am concerned with the creation of the state. Thus, the state as an organizational actor does not yet exist for almost the entirety of the historical trajectories I examine. Instead, I seek to understand how the foundations of such an actor can be created, that is, how political agents create the state as an institutional arrangement, or, a set of institutions sharing a common structuring logic.

According to Hendrik Spruyt (1996), the state's fundamental logic has the features of sovereignty and territoriality. The state is sovereign in that it has a final locus of authority (a final decision-making structure), and territorial in that the state's sovereign authority is confined within demarcated borders and recognizes no superior political center (Spruyt 1996:

153). Michael Mann (1993) also offers a (largely) institutional definition of the state that dovetails considerably with Spruyt's. The state is a) "a differentiated set of institutions and personnel", b) "embodying centrality" (i.e., "political relations radiate to and from a center"), c) covering a territorially defined region, d) over which it exercises to some degree "authoritative, binding rule making", and e) "backed up by some organized force" (Mann 1993: 55). But, Mann's definition is not entirely institutional. The first component ("a differentiated set of institutions and personnel") treats the state as an organization because of its consideration of personnel as conceptually part of the state, rather than as a group of individuals operating within the state's institutional confines. While I do not challenge this viewpoint, because my research goal is to determine how the state *as an institutional arrangement* comes to be reconstituted, I discard this portion of Mann's definition. Additionally, by including the function of organized force in buttressing state power, Mann includes a causal statement in a definition, which should be avoided (cf. Motyl 1992). And, again, I seek a definition that is purely institutional. The theoretical power of Mann's definition is its functional agnosticism, in that Mann explicitly recognizes the multiplicity of functions the state has historically taken on (Mann 1993: 55). No one function is unique or necessary to the state.

Stripped of its functional and organizational traits, Mann's state can be defined as an institutional arrangement embodying centrality; territoriality; and authoritative, binding rule making. Since the latter implies monopolistic rule making (has authority or *jurisdiction)* over a certain function or functional area, I label this component as "functional monopoly" for short. Mann's and Spruyt's definitions of territoriality are largely identical. The only difference is that Spruyt includes some notion of sovereignty in his, which should be excluded for conceptual

clarity. Spruyt's "final locus of authority" and Mann's "functional monopoly" are also largely

analogous and complementary where they do not conceptually overlap. Spruyt does not have

a direct analog for Mann's notion of centrality, however, though it is implied in his conception

of sovereignty (and is made explicit in his historical argument). Centrality is a valuable addition,

however, because it paints a picture of the state as not simply a top-down structure that

exercises authority over a given functional area. In a state-society, social groups look to the

state not just for authoritative decisions but also for an arena within which to compete and

cooperate politically. As Mann argues, this function of the state as an arena is the source of its

autonomy. Most societies have required that at least some rules be set monopolistically, and

this necessity belongs to the state. The functional necessity of the state for certain groups in

society, then, generates the functional monopoly and the final locus of authority upon which

the autonomous power of the state (as an *organization*) rests (Mann 1984: 120).

In sum, the definition of the state I will use comprises the following three components: a)

centrality, b) functional monopoly, and c) territoriality. Although the first component has an

intrinsic causal connection with the second, because both are necessary for understanding the

fundamental institutional elements (the institutional *skeleton*) of the state, I include them both.

State Formation and State Reconstitution

State reconstitution is most properly considered a subtype of state formation. Like state

formation more generally, state reconstitution involves *the creation and development of*

institutions that constitute and bolster the fundamental political qualities of centrality,

functional monopoly, and territoriality. Accordingly, state-builders seek to centralize their

political authority over some or all aspects of social life and to do so over a clearly defined

geographic area. These agents pursue this goal whether the process occurring is state

formation or state reconstitution. Additionally, both general state formation and state

reconstitution are concerned not just with the creation of state forms and institutions, but also

with their *consolidation*. After all, enduring developments in levels of state strength or types of

state forms are more analytically and substantively interesting than ephemeral achievements

by state-builders. Thus, I argue that state reconstitution (like state formation in general)

requires not just the creation of a state, but its durable maintenance. A rough

operationalization of consolidation would be when the newly-recreated state form persists

after the initial state ruler, or ruling group, passes from the political scene.

Despite these fundamental commonalities, state reconstitution is different from general

state formation in three substantively important ways. First, state formation covers all

processes of political centralization and territorial ordering. These include the emergence of

diverse state forms (e.g., Tilly 1992), the accumulation, dissipation, or stagnation of state

strength (e.g., Tilly 1975, Centeno 2003), and the development of distinct administrative

infrastructures utilized by state rulers (Ertman 1997). State reconstitution, however, is

specifically concerned with *the creation of the institutional arrangement known as the state*

following a period of state collapse. The development of administrative infrastructure and

accumulation of state strength can be elements of a mechanism that *leads to* the recreation of

a state, but such processes are not the primary objects of analysis. Additionally, though the

type of state that is recreated can vary (e.g., national state, city-state, or empire; federal or

unitary), this potential variation is secondary to the goal of explaining how the state's

institutional skeleton of centrality, functional monopoly, and territoriality can be reconstituted.

The second important difference is that the institutional and political legacies of the

previous state very often impact how state collapse occurs, what social conditions are present

during the period of state reconstitution, and whether or not successful state reconstitution is

achieved. As Thomas Ertman has noted about post-Roman Europe, regional elites took over

Roman institutions and used them to establish autonomous political power. The successor

polities of Europe were unable to overcome these autonomous power structures and recreate

the Western Empire in the immediate centuries following the fall of Rome (Ertman 1997). Anna

Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong make an analogous argument when looking at state

formation and regime change in post-Communist countries. They argue that societies that

inherited well-institutionalized central state apparatuses from the Communist era maintained

such institutionalization past the point of regime change. Societies that did not have a well-

institutionalized central Communist state became either fractious or personalistic in the 1990s

(Grzymala-Busse and Luong 2002). In other words, rulers had to rely on the available

institutional resources at hand when consolidating their authority following the collapse of the

old regime. Though not directly concerned with state reconstitution *per se*, these two works do

point to the causal impact the structure of previous political entities can have on the

development of future ones, including states. In analyses of state formation, recent political

events (e.g., instances of state collapse) may or may not play a central role in the causal

account. When examining state reconstitution, however, the nature of the previous state

structures and the manner in which they collapsed must be taken into account in any causal analysis of the conditions and processes that lead to a reconstituted state.

Third, state reconstitution unfolds on a shorter time scale. Although many states and groups claim their origins in political entities long past (e.g., Holy Roman Emperors or Carolingian kings claiming descent from the Roman Empire, ISIS drawing inspiration from the Islamic Caliphate today), I wish to restrict the conceptual scope of state reconstitution to periods immediately following the collapse of a state. Thus, if a stable political arrangement emerges post-collapse that is not a state that at least mostly conforms to the borders of the previous state, then successful state reconstitution did not occur.[8] An alternative arrangement could be a form of heavily decentralized rule (e.g., feudalism, clan-based system), a multi-state system, or conquest by an external state. The processes of state reconstitution are likely to be shorter in duration than those associated with *long duree* state formation, the topic studied by most state formation scholars (e.g., Tilly 1992; Spruyt 1996; Ertman 1997; Wong 2000). Moreover, the pace at which institutions that centralize and territorially order political power are created and developed will be faster than can be found in other instances of state formation.

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[8] A political arrangement is 'stable', if the fundamental logic of organization remains unchanged for more than one generation. For instance, if a multi-state system emerges after state collapse and the majority of the composite states in that system endure after the deaths of their original creators, the system would be stable. 'Border conformity' of a reconstituted state means that no more than a few peripheral regions of the preceding state are unincorporated by the new state. For example, the inability for the People's Republic of China to incorporate Taiwan into its structure following 1949 does not mean the PRC is not a reconstituted state, since Taiwan was a peripheral region under the Qing Dynasty. If, on the other hand, the Beijing capital region was unincorporated, this would challenge the classification of the PRC as a reconstituted state.

Thus, the attributes that define, first, general state formation and, second, state reconstitution are as follows. State formation can be defined as: the creation and development of institutions that constitute and bolster the fundamental political qualities of centrality, functional monopoly, and territoriality. This political process can vary in duration and tempo. State reconstitution involves the same process but has the following analytical restrictions: 1) shorter duration and faster tempo, 2) direct impact of the institutional and political legacies of the past state and its demise, and 3) leads directly to the recreation of a stable state.

A couple more conceptual clarifications are necessary. First, as already stated, state reconstitution is conceptualized as a *process*, rather than an outcome or condition. Thus, when a reconstituted state has emerged, state reconstitution is over. Such an outcome is termed *successful* state reconstitution. Second, if state reconstitution refers to the overall process of the reemergence of a state, then concrete actions purposively performed by actors in society to move this process forward fall under the umbrella term of state *building*. For instance, the creation of a tax bureaucracy to administer central claims over resource extraction would be an instance of state building contributing to the overall, more abstract, process of state reconstitution.

Endogenous State Reconstitution and General State Reconstitution

Having established the relationship between state formation and state reconstitution, I now turn to how *endogenous* state reconstitution conceptually relates to *general* state reconstitution. Endogenous state reconstitution is a subtype of general state reconstitution,

and thus shares all the same attributes, including the ones the latter shares with state

formation. However, there is one key difference between endogenous and general state

reconstitution.

Whereas general state reconstitution can involve the active leadership and intervention

of external forces in the process of rebuilding the state (such as neo-trusteeship; see Krasner

2004; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Lake and Fariss 2014), endogenous state reconstitution only

involves *internal* actors (individual or collective) leading state-building efforts. This does not

mean, though, that external forces must be wholly absent for state reconstitution to be

considered endogenous. Geopolitical competition, passive or unsystematic introduction of

foreign ideas and practices, and external aid (e.g., economic, military) are all conceptually

permissible. What matters is whether the process of state reconstitution is led, propelled, and

contended over by internal actors. Where it is, endogenous state reconstitution is present. A

chief corollary of this conceptual requirement is that the actions of internal actors emerge front

and center in the analysis of endogenous state reconstitution. This consequence will be fully

fleshed out in section three of this chapter which introduces the new concepts of the unifier

and the reunification campaign.

Table One summarizes the conceptual map I have laid out in this subsection. Following

Giovanni Sartori's guidelines (1970), state formation is the most expansive concept and thus

has the fewest attributes. As one moves down the ladder of abstraction, the range of possible

cases narrows but the concepts become more precise. The far left column lists the three

concepts formulated in this subsection, while the columns to the right indicate the features

that constitute each concept.

Table One: a Conceptual Map of State Formation						
Concept	Attributes					
	Political Centralization	Territorial Ordering	Compressed Temporality	Direct Legacy Influence	Direct Successor State	No Externally-Led State-Building
State Formation	Y	Y				
State Reconstitution	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Endogenous State Reconstitution	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Conceptual Priors: Political Entrepreneurs and the Duality of Structure

The concepts of the political entrepreneur and the duality of structure provide a generalized,

abstract underpinning for my conceptual framework. The unifier is a subtype of political

entrepreneur and so a clear conceptualization of the former requires discussion of the latter

type of actor. Unifiers also act within historically-specific social contexts that shape their mental

worlds and constrain and channel their behavior. Unifiers, in turn, seek to alter their social

contexts. This interplay between structure and agency specific to state reconstitution clearly

exemplifies the duality of structure as conceived by Anthony Giddens. Consequently, sustained

discussion of the political entrepreneur and the duality of structure must come first in order to

make sense of the central analytical concepts this dissertation draws upon – that is, the unifier

and the reunification campaign. In other words, the political entrepreneur and the duality of

structure are this theoretical framework's conceptual priors.

P*olitical entrepreneurs* are actors whom Adam Sheingate (2003) defines as "individuals

whose creative acts have transformative effects on politics, policies, or institutions" (185). He

also states that their acts occur either through the creative recombination of existing

institutional resources (i.e., institutional bricolage) or through the creative destruction of existing equilibria or arrangements. Either way, successful political entrepreneurship redefines the institutional boundaries of authority (Sheingate 2003: 189-190). Indeed, altering authoritative jurisdictions is the chief motivation for political entrepreneurs.

I follow the historical institutionalist tradition by conceptualizing institutions as distributional instruments, in the sense that they provide certain groups with greater access than others to, and allow these groups to accrue greater benefits than others from, decision-making structures. These consequences stem from the asymmetries of power implicated in the development and maintenance of institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). Institutional power asymmetries are first created by political actors, but once these asymmetries become durable they can sustain or enhance the power of political actors (Mahoney 2000: 521). This conceptualization of institutions reinforces Sheingate's view that political entrepreneurs are particularly concerned with the rights of access to, and control over, sources of authority (jurisdictions) over resources. In addition, focusing on political entrepreneurs' alteration of their institutional environments implies that these actors pursue their goals within a specific structural context, which they consciously seek to change in some way. As discussed below, this implication clearly relates to the duality of structure.

What specific activities do political entrepreneurs engage in and under what circumstances are they more likely to do so? For one, they can alter the terms of political debate by framing issues, defining problems, and influencing agendas. They can also invent new policies, organizations, and forms of collective action. Finally, they can ensure that their innovations in policies and institutions are lasting (Sheingate 2003: 188). As to timing, political

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entrepreneurs are most successful in transforming politics when institutional uncertainty and complexity are prevalent. For example, crises can provide entrepreneurs with opportunities to innovate policies or institutions that they had previously been unable to. Additionally, situations where entrepreneurs occupy multiple positions across different organizations and coalitions can provide opportunities for entrepreneurs to make wider claims of legitimacy and thus expand their bases of support. A complex social environment of multifarious institutions, individuals, and events can also provide the entrepreneur with the necessary resources for institutional bricolage (Sheingate 2003: 189-194). In short, political entrepreneurs take advantage of ambiguity and complexity to achieve institutional change through a variety of means.

State collapse provides a context particularly suitable for political entrepreneurs. A collapsed state is likely to display the persistence of certain institutional *elements* from the previous state as well as the emergence of new ones. Collapsed states, by definition, entail the disintegration of an overarching authority, and so political relationships and coalitions are likely to be in flux. Thus, both uncertainty and complexity are pronounced in such a situation. As a consequence, there is space for political entrepreneurs to play a very significant role in state reconstitution. *Domestic* political entrepreneurs, moreover, are more likely than foreign ones to be heavily embedded in a given society, and so are especially able to play a crucial role in the formation of coalitions and the development of institutions that can undergird and propel *endogenous* state reconstitution. Exogenous state reconstitution is likely to involve both domestic and foreign political entrepreneurs.

Political entrepreneurs, as conscious agents of change, must operate in a structural

context that inevitably shapes and constrains their identities, goals, and actions. Giddens' work

on the *duality of structure* provides a good framework to explore this interplay between agency

and structure in the context of state reconstitution, making it the second of this theoretical

framework's two conceptual priors. The duality of structure is "...the essential recursiveness of

social life, constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of

reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent

and social practices, and 'exists' in the generating moments of this constitution" (Giddens 1979:

5). Structure at once influences the actions of agents and is influenced by those actions. Thus,

political legacies from the previous state can continue to shape and constrain the beliefs and

behavior of actors operating within a fragmented society. Private groups may preserve the

coercive capacity they previously acquired under the public authority of the since-collapsed

state. In turn, these coercive resources can be used by these groups to create new institutional

arrangements that structure social ties within the groups' spheres of influence. Alternatively,

sources of legitimacy may persist despite the disintegration of state power and continue to

serve as opportunities for political entrepreneurs to justify the creation of their desired

jurisdictional innovations. The duality of structure constitutes the processes that political

entrepreneurs intrinsically engage with and propel.

Human beings are agents and, as Giddens (1987) argues, all human beings have power,

in the sense that they have the transformative capacity "to intervene in a given set of events so

as in some way to alter them" (7). Through not only the use of material and natural resources

but also the ability to control human activities, human actors can alter the nature and dynamics

of the social systems within which they find themselves. Powerful, "superordinate" actors seek

to control the activities of less powerful subordinates. So, being often men with military

followings, unifiers are relatively more powerful than other members of society, such as

peasants, landlords or merchants. Unifiers often take advantage of this power differential to

impose their will on segments of society, typically in the form of constructing quasi-state

institutions. However, in what Giddens calls the "dialectic of control", in order for

superordinates' strategies of control to have an effect, they must secure the compliance of

subordinates. Superordinates' demand for compliance means that they are dependent on

establishing relationships with subordinates. Since subordinates, as human beings, also have

power, this dependency provides the space for subordinate actors to pursue their own counter-

strategies and create their own autonomous spheres of activity (Giddens 1987: 11). Peasants,

landlords and merchants can resist the state-building efforts of unifiers, creating their own

alternative social networks that grant them the organizational capacity to counter, at least

partially, the hegemonic goals of these aspirational state builders. Furthermore, subordinates

can resist in passive and surreptitious ways so as to retain a portion of socioeconomic resources

in the face of superordinate political power (Scott 1990). The possibility of these counter-

strategies means that unifiers must take seriously the interests and capacities of those they

wish to dominate. In other words, the powerful, in the process of effecting control over the

powerless, are always themselves dependent on the actions of the subordinate. Those actions

of the powerless may or may not be what the powerful desire.

We can observe a dialectic between actors and institutions as well. If we take the

historical institutionalist perspective that institutions have distributional consequences for the

power held by various social groups (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938), then certain (superordinate) groups will benefit more from a certain institutional pattern than other (subordinate) ones. Groups can seek to create institutional patterns with these potential distributional consequences in mind. Intending to create an institutional arrangement under their aegis, unifiers expect distributional patterns favorable to themselves to emerge by virtue of their efforts. Moreover, institutions help maintain forms of rule, which are "stable relations of autonomy and dependence in social systems and are sustained by the routine practices that those in superordinate positions employ to influence the activities of others" (Giddens 1987: 9). Since superordinates and the institutions that sustain these actors' preferred forms of rule are linked, the counter-strategies that subordinates direct at their superiors can also be directed at these institutions. Thus, the institutional arrangements that emerge from unifiers' state-building efforts are sites of both rule and contestation. Ultimately, when the state is reconstituted it functions both as an apparatus the unifier can deploy according to his or her interests and as an arena within which subordinates and superordinates can engage with each other. In other words, the duality of structure is fundamentally implicated in the emergence of the functional monopoly and centrality of the state. In sum, through the duality of structure, agency and the structuring nature of rules and resources are entwined in a dialectic that shapes the overall social system. The intentions and actions of both superordinates and subordinates constitute agency, and both types of agents are dialectically involved in the nature of social structures.

The two dialectics between 1) the powerful and the subordinate and 2) the actor (in this case the political entrepreneur) and the structure of the social system intersect at the point at

which political entrepreneurs sit. As agents, they seek to create or modify forms of rule, thus

bringing themselves into contact with the subordinate counter-strategies that attempts at

control elicit. Moreover, political entrepreneurs are actors who actively seek to alter the

institutional structure of their environment. State collapse gives rise to an environment

especially ripe for the transformative change these actors are capable of enacting. Existing and

latent coalition possibilities can provide political resources for entrepreneurs but also constrain

their options. Similarly, existing institutions may shape and constrain the goals of these agents

but can also provide the building blocks for the creation of new or altered jurisdictions. Thus,

political entrepreneurs can serve as the concrete focal points of an analysis that examines the

role of heightened agency in shaping structure in times of uncertainty.

Core Concepts Defined: Unifier and Reunification Campaign

In this section, I begin by formally defining the concept of unifier and linking it with the

immediately preceding discussion. I then conceptualize the reunification campaign. To reiterate,

these two concepts serve as the empirical focal points of this dissertation.

I argue that the analysis of state reconstitution should principally target a special kind of

political entrepreneur – the unifier. This individual leads, transforms, and utilizes a reunification

campaign in order to achieve a reconstituted state. Fundamentally, the unifier is shaped by

social structures but also seeks to transform them. His entrepreneurial actions, and the

processes comprising his reunification campaign, are explicit and dramatic manifestations of

the duality of structure. Moreover, what I am terming "unifiers" presupposes the presence of a

collapsed state, since one cannot seek to reconstitute a state if a previous one has not already collapsed. Furthermore, individuals who act as unifiers cease to play such a role once the state is reconstituted; they are now the rulers of the newly-recreated state. Unifiers, in other words, can only be present subsequent to the collapse of a state and prior to the new state's reconstitution.

Unifiers are political entrepreneurs who consciously seek to create a particular kind of macro-scale form of rule – the state. The entrepreneur does so via the creation of monopoly control over an institutional jurisdiction in order to implement his or her desired policies. Thus, as political entrepreneurs, unifiers seek to create the largest jurisdiction within a state-society. As noted above, conditions of state collapse are characterized by heightened levels of political uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity, creating an environment ideal for political entrepreneurs and thus unifier to do their work. Unifiers strive to harness these conditions in pursuit of their state-building goals.

Unifiers, like political entrepreneurs in general, operate within the duality of structure. Recall that unifiers by definition seek to reconstitute the state, which necessarily possesses territorial sovereignty. The dialectic of control is critically present in the creation of territorial sovereignty (a form of hierarchy), for that creation by definition entails the formation of subordinates. As noted above, the dialectic of control includes resistance to superordinate efforts at creating and maintaining control; therefore, the unifier must be conscious of the potential resistance and opposition his efforts could elicit. Because the efficacy of the forms of rule that unifiers seek to create depend on the compliance of existing or would-be subordinates, a focus on the actions and strategies of unifiers requires an analysis of groups and classes in

society that could constitute the subordinate hierarchical layers of emergent state structures, but that could also constitute potential opponents.

Furthermore, the creation of sovereign, territorial order out of state collapse is a drastic structural change. Political entrepreneurs in general need not have such an ambitious goal. In fact, all manner of political entrepreneurs can operate within a collapsed state. Some may seek to build state-like structural elements but without any interest in fully reconstituting the state. Others may pursue the creation of alternatives to the state form. But, in my usage of the term, it is only unifiers who strive to reconstitute sovereign, territorial order. This level of ambition sets them apart from other political entrepreneurs.

Unifiers are also distinct from other *state-builders* since the former *purposively* seek to build a state. State-builders, as a general category, may or may not be aware of this larger conceptual, political goal – in fact, Charles Tilly (1992) argues that European state-builders generally did *not* see themselves as constructing the territorially-sovereign political units we call states. Moreover, not all state-builders operate in a context of state collapse. That said, unifiers need not be the sole state-builders operating in a collapsed state-society. Given the necessary resources and conditions, any state-builder can create the institutional and political building blocks necessary, in a given context, for a state to reemerge. But only unifiers intentionally utilize these pieces to build a new state.

For the unifier, building a new state requires a reunification campaign, which I define as *a purposive, relatively sustained state-building attempt at reconstituting a collapsed state by a unifier who has a substantial base of support*. Here, base of support refers to the political and economic resources that the unifier can reliably draw on during the course of the campaign.

The reunification campaign is the unifier's explicit, concrete attempt at creating a new state with roughly the same boundaries as the previous one. The boundaries of the new state and of the old one need not be exactly identical, but they should at least encompass all the core areas and most of the frontier regions controlled by the previous state. In other words, reconstitution involves the reemergence of a clearly identifiable geographic version of, not distinct successor to, the pre-collapse state. A successor state would only encompass a *part* of the previous state's geographic extent; therefore, it cannot be considered a *reconstituted* state.

The reunification campaign is deeply implicated in the duality of structure, as this large-scale, state-building affair depends for its success on structural factors that could facilitate or inhibit centralizing strategies, while, at the same time, the reunification campaign serves as the vehicle through which the unifier shapes new jurisdictional boundaries, establishes new forms of control, and otherwise alters the structural environment. The unifier as political entrepreneur seeks to create new sociopolitical arrangements that can 1) facilitate the creation of a new state and 2) serve as the foundation of that (future) state. The structural environment of the unifier provides building blocks, but may in addition pose obstacles for such an effort, and the unifier exercises his agency within this environment with the explicit purpose to alter it. The structural remnants of the previous state can be either building blocks or obstacles. Since the state is a fundamentally political entity (cf. Mann 1984), its reconstruction requires the creation of new political relationships. The unifier seeks to be the superordinate in these relationships, and so strives to establish forms of control to achieve this position. Although the unifier seeks to more or less reestablish the geographic boundaries of the previous state, he performs this task from within a collapsed state, meaning those boundaries no longer exist.

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Thus, the unifier must construct anew the territorial jurisdiction of the state. Moreover, the unifier seeks to be in control of this jurisdiction upon its reconstruction. As the head of a reunification campaign (the political entrepreneur *par excellence*), the unifier is then the individual embodiment of the duality of structure. He draws on, and is shaped by, the structural environment while seeking to fundamentally alter that environment through the direct consequences of his actions.

The reunification campaign, while by definition a purposive effort, also acts as a gravitational center for a collection of institutional and configurational structures. State reconstitution involves the development of state-supporting and state-constituting structures. Additionally, as the unifier gets closer to fully reconstituting the state, the stronger and more powerful these structures will be. Since the unifier wishes for the emergence of a state controlled by *him*, he will seek to keep these structures within his orbit. Thus, the purposive effort (the reunification campaign) and the collection of structures (the emerging state) are intrinsically linked. Furthermore, this collection of structures is concretely manifested in the form of specific behavioral patterns. That is, the strategies and policies the unifier implements have observable consequences in the realm of (physical and mental) human activity. Therefore, the dynamic relationship between agency and structure can be explicitly observed through the investigation of the reunification campaign and its effects.

The reunification campaign is also accompanied and partially constituted by the unifier's coalition of core supporters as well as social groups independent of, but allied with, this coalition. These groups of individuals are made to perform the actions needed to expand and sustain the campaign. Although the unifier is the leader and primary proponent of the

reunification campaign, these supportive groups are necessary for its success. Without a

coalition, the campaign has no basis in society – it is only a mental goal of the unifier. The

coalition gives the campaign concrete social power. Without allied independent groups, the

coalition's success will be limited since the construction of a state requires a society-wide

acquiescence to authority. Of course, some social groups can be coerced into accepting the

authority of the unifier's new state; but coercion by itself can only go so far. In the early stages

of the campaign, the unifier and his coalition will have limited coercive resources, but will

nonetheless need to acquire the support of additional social forces in order to pursue the goals

of the campaign. Later on, presumably with increased coercion at his disposal, the unifier can

afford to be more forceful than before towards rivals and unallied groups. But this increased

coercive power will likely inspire a reaction in the form of an effort at the accumulation of the

same kind of power from opposed forces or at least of a level of power sufficient to undermine

the unifier's efforts. Seeking support from, rather than outright eradication or subjugation of,

independent groups, then, should play a central role in state reconstitution. The coalition of

core supporters and allied independent social groups form the observable bases of support for

the unifier's reunification campaign. Thus, they need to be systematically analyzed in the

investigation of the causes and processes of state reconstitution.

      I propose that unifiers and their reunification campaigns develop coalitions, attract

independent groups, and generally shape the dynamic process of state reconstitution in three

ideal-typical, analytically distinct stages: inception, extension and consolidation. Inception of

the reunification campaign involves the creation of new institutions and symbolic

configurations. Extension of the campaign comprises the spread of these institutions and

configurations across and into society. Consolidation sees the campaign and its constituent institutions and configurations transformed into the foundation of a durable reconstituted state. Analytically, these stages are in a clear temporal order, with inception first, extension second, and consolidation third. But in actual reunification campaigns, these stages can, and probably will, overlap with each other and emerge at different times depending on the geographic and political context, and any one of them may regress to an earlier one. Still, generally speaking, the spread of institutions and configurations first requires their creation. Similarly, the transformation of disparate structures into a reconstituted state initially requires the presence of those structures across and through society. For the sake of parsimony and comprehensibility, the empirical analysis presented in the next two chapters will present these three stages as if they neatly followed each other temporally, except where the causal narrative necessitates analytical complexification (e.g., moments of repulsed extension that directly lead to new forms of inception, or failed consolidation that directly requires renewed extension).

To recap, the reunification campaign, should it be successful, is a process that replaces a collapsed state with a reconstituted one. This process requires the invention and society-wide implementation of new institutional and configurational arrangements and the reconstruction of a state upon those arrangements. The unifier, as political entrepreneur, is at the center of this process. Given the structural context handed to her, the unifier pursues her goal of reconstituting the state, recombining forms of control and creating new ones. Ultimately, and with the intervention and use of certain favorable factors, she can achieve her goal. Two such factors are ideology and symbols, which are discussed in the next section.

Ideology, Symbols and Reunification Campaigns

So far, I have primarily been concerned with the state-building agency of unifiers. But these visionary individuals cannot achieve their goals unaided. As stated above, they need supporters to assist in creating, sustaining and extending new institutions and configurations and establishing alliances with other social groups. Unifiers also need supporters to gain access to socioeconomic resources and then maintain control of and utilize those resources for the goals of the reunification campaign. But finding and retaining these supporters requires building and preserving a cohesive and durable coalition. Supporters can come and go for a variety of reasons, but the unifier needs them to remain loyal and dedicated for the reunification campaign to generate and retain its propellant force and ultimately find success. Thus, coalition building is crucial for the success of any reunification campaign, and I argue ideology plays a crucial role in constructing and maintaining reunification coalitions. Attracting independent social groups to one's cause is also vital for a unifier. Though unifiers can offer instrumental gains to acquire support external to their coalitions, this strategy can be expensive. Using normative power, and in particular widely-held symbols, can help legitimize one's goals in the minds of members of society. In this section, I discuss the existing literature on ideology and its role in other macro-phenomena and then explain its potential impact on state reconstitution, in particular its value in creating strong and durable reunification coalitions. I also discuss the power of symbols in fostering the support of independent social groups.

Karl Mannheim was one of the first social scientists to take the role of ideology in social phenomena seriously. Instead of merely treating ideology as a form of false consciousness

foisted upon subordinated classes to justify the dominance of the ruling class and thus as something that the social analyst should seek to puncture and sweep away, Mannheim argues we should consider ideologies to be sociologically important systems of belief (Mannheim 1936). Indeed, unlike classical Marxist theorists who stress the essentially undifferentiated and economically determined nature of ideology, Mannheim claims that ideological systems of belief can have diverse manifestations and independent causal effects on social structures. In other words, individuals can adhere to a particular ideology regardless of their social or economic position. Consequently, ideologies should be analyzed with the same degree of rigor and energy as material and coercive structures are.

Michael Freeden concurs, arguing that "[t]he nature of society and its structures, supposedly *reflected* in ideologies, are themselves partly the *product* of those ideologies, operating as ways of organizing social reality" (Freeden 1996: 4). Ideology can have a causal impact on society by, for instance, providing people with mental blueprints which they can use to reconfigure social institutions. Furthermore, unlike Marxists who assert that a particular historical era's dominant means of production dictates the content and purpose of ideology, Freeden claims that ideologies establish specific conceptual patterns from a potentially limitless set of possibilities. In theory, a given ideology can be comprised of any particular set of principles. Clearly, such indeterminacy could not exist if ideology were simply an epiphenomenal consequence of specific material conditions. Ideology should then be taken seriously as a potentially important causal factor when it comes to analyzing social phenomena.

This causal power of ideology arises from its capacity to order human thought and orient human action. As Freeden states, ideologies are "systems of political thinking...through

which individuals and groups construct an understanding of the political world they...inhabit,

and then act on that understanding" (Freeden 1996: 3). This ordering helps individuals make

sense of an otherwise confounding sea of social facts. Ideology can provide people with

explanations of social behavior or assertions of which individuals or positions enjoy legitimate

power. Ideology not only makes reality coherent, it also provides individuals with purpose. In

particular, some ideologies (which Mannheim calls utopian mentalities) seek to transform the

existing social order (Mannheim 1936: 185). These ideologies can give individuals an imagined

future to desire and work to realize. They can grant people long-term goals to set themselves to

help achieve. With purpose comes clarity, again illustrating the power of ideology to bring

perceived order to the indeterminate social world. Such transformative ideologies are still

context-dependent, and so are associated with existing legitimated symbols and norms, either

drawing on or, conversely, directly challenging them. Either way, transformative ideologies, or

"utopian mentalities", direct human thought and action within historically-situated social

contexts, establishing the concepts, preferences, and codes of conduct that individuals use to

alter their social worlds.

Transformative ideology has been shown to be particularly salient in contexts of social

instability. For example, Stephen E. Hanson reveals the vital role ideology has played in the

formation of durable party organizations in fledgling democracies (Hanson 2010). He argues

that in highly uncertain social environments ideology is a necessary condition for building

national party organizations (Hanson 2010: 62). Specifically, party leaders can espouse a

particular ideology in order to galvanize the support of like-minded party members, generating

a cohesive and dedicated partisan organization that can do the hard, long-term work of building

a winning electoral coalition. Individuals living through highly uncertain times generally desire stable and secure social arrangements, but, as Hanson cautions, people's demand for these arrangements does not automatically lead to their supply. There may be no convincing organizations or leaders upon which people could bestow their support. Ideological party leaders are likely to be convincing by virtue of their visions of the polity's future. Additionally, national party organizations are not the only institutional forms that can emerge in such environments to address individuals' need for order. As Hanson states, "'party substitutes' ranging from local electoral machines to slates sponsored by powerful businesses can interfere with the process of institutionalizing representative national party systems" (Hanson 2010: 66). Individual ideologues must purposively create national parties as alternatives to these other institutional options.

Ideology vitally assists in creating *strong and durable* party organizations. The issue is that all members and constituents of a party benefit from its success, regardless of whether they put in the effort to build and sustain the organization. In other words, 'free-riding' is a persistent concern. As Max Weber argues, "*purely* material interests and calculations of advantages as the basis of solidarity…result, in this as in other connexions, in a relatively unstable situation" (Weber 1978: 213). Once a politician wins a seat in an election, for instance, he or she may decide to defect to another party that offers favorable short-term benefits for the politician. Yet, affectual and ideological elements typically supplement instrumental motivations. Therefore, if party leaders visibly commit themselves to clear and consistent ideological principles, they enhance their credibility when claiming to advance the interests of prospective new converts. Such committed party leaders enable supporters to elongate their

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time horizons and forgo their short-term interests in favor of the interests of the "ideological collective" (Hanson 2010: 53). Though defection may bring greater benefits now, the possibility of realizing the much more preferable vision of the polity espoused by the ideological leader keeps the individual politician loyal to the party. Strong partisan loyalties also permit party leaders to centrally direct coalitions of ambitious politicians and their multitudinous local electoral campaigns (Hanson 2010: 67). Reference to the party's ideological goals can keep rank-and-file members in line and focused on ensuring the long-run success of the organization. Thus, ideology explains why national party organizations can both emerge in the first place and be durable and effective subsequently.

There are considerable parallels between the highly uncertain social environment of a fledgling democracy and that of a collapsed state. In both, a plethora of alternative institutional arrangements may be present, and the emergence of either national party organizations or reunification campaigns is not guaranteed, even with widespread social demand for such phenomena. In both situations the high degree of uncertainty makes it difficult for individuals to trust, and cooperate with, their peers, thus causing individuals to discount long-term gains. Consequently, free-riding is as much a concern in collapsed states as it is in fledgling democracies. Leaders in both contexts must therefore commit themselves to clear and consistent ideological principles in order to build strong and durable coalitions. Furthermore, just like leaders of national party organizations, unifiers need to use ideology to bolster subordinate loyalty in order to coordinate and direct their large-scale reunification campaigns. Thus, in many ways, Hanson's theoretical framework can easily be applied to the context of state collapse and reconstitution.

However, there are unique aspects to collapsed states that require modifications to Hanson's argument. First, the nature of competition is different. In democracies at least, parties compete to control the levers of government, and failure to do so does not necessarily pose an existential threat to party members. But in the case of state collapse, competing unifiers *do* necessarily face the possibility of failure that is fatal. One unifier's claim cannot be reconciled with another's. Unifiers could renounce their claims to the state, thus removing themselves as a prime threat to their rivals, but then they would no longer be unifiers. Political parties can and do persist in pursuing their goals even in the face of (electoral) defeat.

Second, Hanson's programmatic political parties are primarily concerned with pursuing party principles – in particular, those concerned with defining the criteria for membership in a polity (Hanson 2010: 46-47). Reunification campaigns, though, are geared towards both reestablishing clear territoriality (i.e., *spatial* membership) *and* centrality and functional monopoly, traits that are hierarchical in nature, not only membership-oriented. Hanson does point out the coordinating effect that ideology can have in party organizations, which by their geographically-extended nature must be hierarchical to be effective. But the *aims* of these parties are not necessarily hierarchic. The goals of a reunification campaign *are* necessarily so, since such a campaign seeks the reconstitution of the state – a fundamentally hierarchical structure. Moreover, the unifier seeks to helm this hierarchy. Thus, in the eyes of their supporters, ideology must also justify the hierarchy and monopoly unifiers seek to construct and control. Ideology also must be able to help the unifier solve the problem of subordinates pursuing counter strategies and seeking autonomous spheres of action. In other words,

ideology must help unifiers *discipline* their core supporters, ensuring they remain loyal to the unifier and perform their duties efficaciously.

Third, unlike durable party emergence, state reconstitution involves the transformation of the most fundamental structures of political order, not just the construction of a component part of an existing (however tenuous) order. An important consequence of this last difference is that the members of the reunification campaign's coalition are a subset of the members of the (future) state that the coalition seeks to construct. Not every individual in a collapsed-state society will join the reunification campaign, but everyone will be living under the new, reconstituted state. So, the unifier must secure (at a minimum) the loyalty and (ideally) the active support of social groups not part of the campaign itself. As Hanson points out, ideologies typically create deep divisions between supporters and non-supporters (Hanson 2010: 41). For the unifier, some divisions are acceptable. But in order to generate sufficient support for the creation of a new state, the unifier must be able to preempt or bridge at least some divisions between himself and his coalition and other social groups – especially politically relevant groups (i.e., those with sufficient social power to challenge or stymie the actions of unifiers). That is, the unifier must formulate a basis of authority for his rule.

The unifier can establish this basis of authority by linking her aims with prominent symbols in a cultural community, that is, among a group of people who recognize systematic relations among symbols (Sewell 1999: 50). As William H. Sewell, Jr. emphasizes, members of a cultural community "need not agree in their moral or emotional evaluations of given symbols" (Sewell 1999: 50). Nonetheless, there may exist in such a community a symbol, or set of symbols, that has shared evaluations among a large majority of politically relevant groups. In

particular, these groups' evaluations can lead to certain symbolic resources having legitimizing

authority, specifically with regard to individuals' claims to political rule. If such shared symbolic

evaluations exist, the unifier can embed these resources within her ideology to grant her

actions legitimacy to others not directly involved in the reunification coalition. In other words,

employing widely-recognized symbols can assist unifiers in *legitimizing* their actions in the

minds of the members of independent politically relevant groups.

Ideology can also be used to discipline core supporters by forging uniformity in their

beliefs and enhancing the unifier's capacity as a totalizing moral agent (Gorski 2003; Thornton

2007). The unifier performs these ideological functions not just through adhering to clear and

consistent principles, but also by manipulating symbolic resources, allocating esteem and

prestige, and administering ritual, all of which are core features of normative power (Lunenberg

2012; Etzioni 1975). As Philip S. Gorski argues, the Protestant Reformation (an ideological

development) led to the adoption of a new infrastructure of governance that was used to

control behavior and shape subjectivity. The early modern state in some European countries,

then, came to claim "clear priority…over the legitimate means of socialization within a given

territory" (Gorski 2003: xvi). Patricia M. Thornton, in her study of the modern Chinese state,

makes similarly normative claims about state formation. The political center continually sought

to cast itself as the moral center of China in order to monopolize legitimacy, seeking to morally

regulate and socially control the population (Thornton 2007: 3-4). In a similar vein to European

and Chinese state-makers, the unifier can use ideology to control the behavior of her core

supporters and shape their notions of moral identity, in particular notions that cast the unifier's

power as legitimate. In other words, the unifier can use ideology to *socialize and regulate* her supporters to assist her campaign's aims.

So, in addition to solving the 'free rider' problem by elongating time horizons, ideology also 1) disciplines unifiers' core supporters and 2) legitimizes their aims. Consequently, the investigation of state reconstitution requires that Hanson's definition of ideology be amended to refer to "any clear and consistent definition of the criteria for membership in a desired political order" to also include *criteria for hierarchical and monopolistic authority* in that order (Hanson 2010: 46-47). I also follow Hanson's emphasis on the ideal-typic nature of this definition since no ideologue will ever hold absolutely clear and absolutely consistent ideological beliefs. Nonetheless, to the extent that a unifier's belief system approximates this definition of ideology, and the unifier vigorously utilizes this belief system to legitimize his actions to his core supporters and also instill discipline in them, then ideology should play a crucial role in successful state reconstitution. Furthermore, the unifier will have to employ widely-recognized symbols of authority to justify his claims to hegemonic power to independent social groups.

These causal impacts of ideology and symbols will be combined with geopolitical considerations (discussed next) in the causal framework I present in the final section of this chapter.

Geopolitical Space and Reunification Campaigns

In this section, I briefly review current conceptions of territorially-uneven infrastructural power and then show how these conceptions can be applicable to state reconstitution. In particular, I argue that social groups can also have infrastructural power, and regions or localities within which social groups are few and weak provide ideal locations for the emergence of reunification campaigns.

Recent research on the state and civil wars has shown how the state and insurgent forces frequently have a geographically uneven reach over their claimed territories. Some regions or localities may be under greater control than others. As Hillel Soifer points out, "the capabilities of the state vary subnationally: the state is not homogeneously powerful throughout the national territory; its reach is uneven over territory and over societal actors" (Soifer 2008: 242). Jeffrey Herbst also emphasizes the geographically uneven levels of state infrastructural power present in African states, with areas further away from the political center more independent from state power than those closer in (Herbst 2000). During civil wars (periods that frequently characterize times of state collapse), sovereignty becomes territorially irregular. It is a) segmented when more than one group enjoys full sovereignty over distinct parts of the state's territory and b) fragmented when two or more groups claim limited sovereignty over the same area(s) (Kalyvas 2006: 88-89). Both state regimes and insurgent challengers must contend with a fundamentally altered pattern of sovereignty introduced by irregular territorially-based warfare. Whether one is talking about civil war or more peaceful

contexts, the state and its challengers must frequently cope with a lack of uniformity in the infrastructural power they enjoy.

In cases of state collapse, where there is no state that can rule or be challenged, infrastructural power and its territorially uneven character are still analytically important. Following state collapse, social forces are the most powerful macro-phenomena in society. Thus, one should expect them to play a very prominent role in any social processes or events that occur. Like political actors generally, social groups can assist, impede or catalyze specific processes and events. Unlike isolated individuals, those who are members of social groups potentially have access to the relationships and resources available courtesy of the social group's collective power. Although many states are socially homogenous (e.g., according to ethnicity or religion), social groups are often also geographically distributed, with some more powerful in certain regions or localities than others, a distribution that is akin to Kalyvas' segmented sovereignty. Geographic areas can also have different densities of social groups, with some areas hosting a plethora of forces and others only a few or even none. This latter type of distribution is analogous to fragmented sovereignty in civil war. The significant yet geographically uneven power of social groups means that the geographic location of a given political actor should have a major causal impact, with some areas having potentially fewer and/or weaker collective actors than others.

I call the geographically distributed strength and number of social groups in a particular area its *degree of geopolitical space*. That is, the degree of geopolitical space considers both how many social groups there are, and their respective social power; in other words, it is a two-dimensional concept. Specifically, the greater the strength of present social groups, the lower

the degree of geopolitical space. Equally important, the greater the *number* of existing social

groups in an area, the lower the degree of geopolitical space. Of course, these two dimensions

of geopolitical space can vary independently of each other, so one area, for instance, could

have a few weak social groups and another could have many such feeble groups. Certain areas,

such as those that are most economically advanced, should see an especially high density and

strength of social groups since these areas, with their high levels of available resources, are very

attractive to instrumentally-rational individuals. Other areas, though, such as those that are

topographically isolated or far from political-economic centers, should see few and weak social

groups due to the relative dearth of utilitarian opportunities. The presence of only a few weak

social groups means that local individual actors have limited opportunities and resources to

draw on when trying to defend or expand their prerogatives. In general, local elites will seek to

resist challenges to their local power. Should a force with collective power seek to disempower

them, local elites will seek out allied social groups for assistance. If such groups do not exist or

do not have sufficient power to lend aid, then the local elites will be at the mercy of whichever

collective force is challenging them.

It is critical that unifiers, and their coalitions, disempower local elites. When unifiers are

weak they are at the mercy of stronger social forces. In order to increase their strength, unifiers

ideally will gain direct access to socioeconomic resources, including taxes, troops, and materials

of war. Local elites have power over local society and thus are the lowest level obstacles to

gaining this direct access. While local elites can become inclined to join a reunification

campaign for ideational or material reasons, I argue this is less likely when the campaign has yet

to see any substantial success, that is, during its inception. But a reunification campaign's

inception phase is just when direct access to resources at the local level is most crucial. Local

elites, seeing a nascent reunification campaign as unlikely to provide any time-bound benefits,

will refuse to join, becoming obstacles to the unifier's efforts. The unifier must then

disempower these local elites, but the success of such a strategy crucially depends on whether

the local elites can acquire external support from allied social groups. Where they cannot, the

modest collective power of the unifier's coalition is likely to be sufficient to overcome local elite

resistance.

Progressive accumulation of directly-accessed material resources provides two chief

benefits to reunification campaigns. First, the increased material resources grant the campaign

objectively greater economic and military strength, which can be used to challenge rival unifiers

and resistant social groups. Second, these resources provide the unifier and his campaign

greater social *prominence*, which helps the unifier appear as a convincing claimant of national

reunification. Individuals in wider society are more likely to take seriously a unifier whose grand

claims of reconstituting the state are backed by a substantial amount of material resources.

Even if many people believe the unifier's claims to be legitimate, if they do not believe the

unifier has a plausible chance of military success, they are unlikely to provide her with vocal

support or acquiescence. Thus, early material success, dependent on direct access to resources,

can provide the initial basis for ideological support. And to reiterate, direct access relies on

effective disempowerment of local elites isolated from allied social groups. A high degree of

geopolitical space establishes this isolation by presenting a context within which local elites

have little to no avenues for summoning collective support to counterbalance the unifier's

disempowering actions.

Causal Framework

My causal framework seeks to explicitly incorporate Giddens' elucidation of the duality of structure by combining structural conditions with strategic ones, defined as the conscious exercise of particular political strategies. Thus, the social embeddedness of the unifier and her role as an agentic political entrepreneur are given equal weight. The unifier's chosen political strategies are temporally and analytically proximate to the outcome in that these strategies are direct necessary causes of successful state reconstitution. This proximity makes them logically more important than antecedent structural conditions (Mahoney et al. 2009). However, because I want to maintain the centrality of the duality of structure within my argument, I treat these structural conditions as equally analytically important as the strategic conditions and not as aspects of a background context. The perspectives on ideology, symbols and geopolitical space I laid out above serve as theoretical starting points for the specific hypotheses I present below. In the remainder of this section I first provide a broad outline of the framework's six conditions and their relationships to each other and then discuss in more detail the hypothesized causal impact of these factors on the outcome of interest, successful state reconstitution.

The framework is composed of two sets of conditions: one of necessary structural conditions and one of necessary strategic ones. An *ideological framework, nationally-legitimated symbol(s) and geopolitical space* comprise the first set, while *cohering core supporters, incorporating independent social groups* and *disempowering local elites* constitute the second. Each structural condition is causally connected with, and analytically prior to, one

strategic condition. Thus, an *ideological framework* is linked with *cohering core supporters;*

nationally-legitimated symbol(s) is associated with *incorporating independent social groups;*

and geopolitical space is paired with *disempowering local elites*. Table Two summarizes these

relationships.

Table Two: Summary of Theoretical Framework			
Type of Condition	**Causal Pair**		
	Coalitional	**Symbolic**	**Spatial**
Structural	Ideological framework	Nationally-legitimated symbol(s)	Geopolitical space
Strategic	Cohere core supporters	Incorporate social groups	Disempower local elites

The full causal force of the structural conditions cannot be realized without the

implementation of political strategies that take advantage of the opportunities and resources

these conditions provide. Furthermore, the exercise of each political strategy, or realization of

each strategic condition, becomes possible only with the presence of its associated structural

condition. Consequently, each condition is not fully analytically distinct from every other.

Instead, the paired, linked nature of the conditions means that, ontologically speaking, each is

partially merged with one other condition. In order to highlight both the structural and strategic

natures of reunification campaigns, though, I separate the two sets of conditions

methodologically, as is seen in how the next two chapters are organized, with Chapter Two

principally concerned with the three structural conditions and Chapter Three focusing on the

three strategies.

I proceed to elaborate the six necessary conditions, three of them structural and three

strategic. A summation and discussion of these factors concludes this chapter.

Necessary Structural Conditions

To reiterate, the three necessary structural conditions, meant here as socially conditioning macro-phenomena, are the presence of an *ideological framework, nationally-legitimated symbol(s)*, and a high degree of *geopolitical space*. The first structural condition is the *availability and/or development of an ideological framework* that 1) can be used to justify centralized political rule by the unifier, 2) delineates a sociopolitical hierarchy considered appropriate by potential or actual core supporters, and 3) provides a long-term, sociopolitical goal to which these core supporters can become dedicated. This framework need not be appealing or justified to the majority of politically relevant social forces, and so has a different function than a nationally-legitimated symbol. Rather, being more sophisticated than a symbol, an ideological framework can, crucially, be used by the unifier to *cohere* his core supporters, that is, transform them into a united, orderly and consistent whole. However, effective cohering requires the prior existence of an ideology that has the three aforementioned characteristics (justification of the unifier's rule, delineation of hierarchy, and provision of a long-term goal). Because this ideological framework focuses on cohering a core set of supporters, one can say that its normative character is *specialized*, unlike that of nationally-legitimated symbols which have a much broader audience.

An ideological framework provides the unifier with the requisite normative resources to socialize and regulate her core supporters, thus establishing a disciplinary relationship with them. An ideological framework that justifies the unifier's claim to hierarchical and monopolistic authority and dedicates his core supporters to his cause can be used to cohere core supporters. Such a framework need not be created by the unifier herself. Regardless of its

origins, the framework must be in place prior to attempts at cohering one's core supporters.

Otherwise, utilizing a nebulous and changing ideological framework in the midst of cohering

application will lead to an *unclear and inconsistent* ideology, at least as perceived by the

unifier's core supporters. Clarity and consistency, as Hanson (2010) points out, are prerequisites

for the effective use of ideology.

Two additional points on the role of this type of ideological framework should be noted.

First, the political rule that this framework justifies does not need to be entirely exclusive to the

individual unifier. The unifier can share authority with other close associates and advisors. But

the framework must be able to justify rule in which the unifier enjoys preeminent authority.

Second, potential or actual core supporters can consider a sociopolitical hierarchy to be

appropriate because of ideological beliefs constituted by the ideological framework itself, by

the ideational context surrounding the framework, or by some combination of the two

mechanisms. The case-specific context determines the precise requisites a framework must

have in order to be compelling to core supporters.

The second structural condition is the *availability of (a) nationally-legitimated symbol(s).*

I follow William H. Sewell, Jr.'s definition of a symbol as a determinate but culturally-contested

concept that acquires its meaning and power from its relationships with other symbols (Sewell

1999). A nationally-legitimated symbol is one that is a) widely recognized by politically relevant

social forces and b) legitimizes political centralization in the minds of these forces. In other

words, this type of symbol is normatively *encompassing* since its legitimate nature is shared by

wide swathes of society, rather than specialized as an ideological framework would be. I focus

on politically relevant social forces since these are the groups that have levels of social power

adequate to make them valuable allies for a unifier's grand goals and also make them

potentially dangerous foes should they choose to resist the unifier's campaign. Unifiers can

take advantage of these symbols to *incorporate* independent groups, that is, make them

supportive or at least acquiescent to the unifier's reunification campaign. I am concerned only

with symbols that legitimize political centralization because that is what reunification

campaigns are primarily concerned with. Such symbols may or may not have a religious,

historical, nationalist, socioeconomic or other kind of component. While such aspects may be

important for the specific society investigated, a generalizable theory of state reconstitution

requires focusing on what is fundamentally necessary for the emergence of a reconstituted

state, across case-specific contexts. Without a symbol that legitimizes political centralization, I

expect unifiers will find convincing powerful social groups to support, or acquiesce to, their

reunification campaigns impossible.

The researcher can expect there to be multiple unifiers and reunification campaigns in a

collapsed state-society, since the possibility of reconstituting a state with oneself in command is

likely to be appealing to many self-interested individuals. Thus, one can also expect multiple

ambitious actors to utilize nationally-legitimated symbols to justify their actions and goals.

Since reconstituting a state by definition requires creating exclusive authority over a

monopolistic entity, only one actor can enjoy such authority. Therefore, rival unifiers will

unavoidably be at odds with each other, as in Hanson's model of political parties (Hanson 2010),

unless they drop their claims to reunification. So, in an environment with multiple unifiers,

nationally-legitimated symbols will be intensely fought over, with rival claims to legitimacy

loudly proclaimed to as many politically relevant social forces as possible. If there is no such

symbol, though, then claims of legitimacy will not be taken seriously and unifiers'

proclamations will not only be loud but also unconvincing.

The final necessary structural condition, the *availability of one or more areas with a high*

degree of geopolitical space, ideal-typically signifies areas that have few and/or weak social

forces that could support local elites' resistance to attempts to take away their prerogatives. I

anticipate geopolitical space to be greater the further away an area is from a capital (or other

major metropolitan) region and the less accessible the topography. One of the crucial

consequences that geopolitical space permits is the *disempowerment* of local elites (described

below), which can provide direct access to resources. It bears mentioning that, as a unifier

succeeds in disempowering local elites and strengthening his coalition in a particular area, the

geopolitical space of that area declines, since the unifier's coalition, a kind of social force,

becomes progressively more powerful.

Local elites and social forces can be distinguished as follows. Local elites are individuals

who are socially powerful within a locale. To the extent that unifiers seek to disempower local

elites, these individuals can be considered rivals, though only at the local level. Local elites may

or may not be part of a larger social force. If they are, then that means they can ally with other

members of the same social force to resist the unifier's disempowerment attempts. Social

forces, though, include groups or networks that are extra-locally powerful and thus can alter,

defend, or attack large-scale (e.g., regional or national) social arrangements and movements.

Membership in a social force provides local elites with resources and coordination

opportunities that they can use to defend their prerogatives. Therefore, the more isolated local

elites are from social forces, the easier the unifier's task of disempowering these individuals.

A secondary consequence of geopolitical space is that few or weak social groups means that there are relatively few potential rivals of the unifier's campaign. Rivals can act as veto players that can block or slow down the actions of unifiers and their core supporters. Another secondary consequence is that the number of social forces (rivals or not) that would need to be included in a coalition capable of establishing and holding political power within a locale is also at a minimum. The fewer allies needed for a unifier to have local security and predominance the fewer resources the unifier must collect and expend. Whatever resources the unifier commands can instead be spent on developing and expanding new institutional and symbolic configurations.

Necessary Strategic Conditions

The three necessary strategic conditions, defined as conscious exercises of specific political strategies, are *cohering core supporters, incorporating independent social forces*, and *disempowering local elites*. As stated above, these strategies are intimately linked with the three structural conditions already detailed.

The first necessary political strategy is the use of a specialized ideological framework (as described above) to *cohere* the unifier's core supporters (or core coalition), ensuring that they have enduring loyalty to the unifier and her cause and will effectively carry out her orders. Cohering reduces the amount of material and coercive resources needed to keep the core coalition in line and operating effectively, and focuses the unifier's core supporters on the long-term goal of state reconstitution. In other words, this strategy utilizes normative power to provide value-rational direction and commitments (Hanson 2010). Moreover, cohering involves

instilling discipline in the core coalition, thereby enhancing its efficaciousness in implementing

the unifier's state-building policies. Thus, the unifier needs to expend fewer resources

monitoring her subordinates. Discipline also renders core supporters less likely to work at cross-

purposes to the unifier and to provide individuals outside the coalition *quid pro quo* benefits

the provision of which siphons off resources dear to the campaign.

Cohering one's core supporters is a crucial strategy throughout the phases of the

reunification campaign, though it is most important in the inception and consolidation phases.

Of all three phases, the inception phase has the greatest uncertainty, since, without even a

secure base of support, the unifier's campaign is almost entirely aspirational. But to establish

any kind of foothold requires a durable core of supporters, and ideology must be used to

convince the unifier's (potential) supporters to move past time-bound interests and have faith

in a future ideal polity. Furthermore, since the unifier has very limited coercive and utilitarian

incentives to attract and retain supporters because it is only the beginning of the campaign, he

must use primarily normative power to build and retain his coalition. In this phase, discipline is

used to ensure the coalition remains united and precious, scarce resources are not lost. In the

extension phase, the unifier has much greater material resources at his disposal thanks to the

emergence of a secure base of support. Still, the long-term survival of the coalition requires the

maintenance of a loyal core of supporters, one that is primarily concerned with the realization

of the unifier's ideological goal – a reconstituted state. Cohering is thus still required, though

not to the same degree as before since now the campaign has substantial coercive and material

resources and the unifier's primary concern is the spread and adoption of the newly-developed

institutions and configurations that buttress his power. Rather, incorporation is of greater

concern than cohering. In fact, an excessive focus on coherence (and especially discipline) may cause the unifier's ideological message to become too restrictive and hierarchical for independent social groups to accept. Not having come to accept the moral authority of the unifier, these social groups instead must hear a message of national unity. In the consolidation phase, discipline again becomes preeminent, since by this point the unifier has incorporated most if not all politically-relevant groups. Now, cohering is required to ensure a durable core of loyal administrators that can ensure the long-term survival of the new state through the renewed elongation of their time horizons. Furthermore, by the consolidation phase one can expect the unifier's material power to be preponderant, so independent social groups that have yet to acquiesce can be subjugated through coercion rather than needing to be convinced by an ideological message that may become too diluted to serve its elongating and disciplinary function. In brief, cohering one's core supporters is vital throughout the reunification campaign's lifespan.

The second strategy is the use of encompassing, nationally-legitimated symbols to *incorporate* social forces external to the campaign, making them allies, or at least passive supporters, of the reunification campaign. The successful use of this strategy leads to a reduction in the number of social forces that resist the unifier's campaign and an increased availability of socioeconomic resources that would otherwise need to be taken by force (coercive power) or through costly material inducements (utilitarian power). This strategy can also make extension of a unifier's political control easier than it would otherwise be, as incorporated social forces come to accept the authority of the unifier and her core supporters.

As stated above, the effective incorporation of social forces first requires a substantial

base of support, which implementation of the first political strategy provides. Therefore, I

expect this second of the political strategies to be most successfully implemented in the

extension phase of the reunification campaign. As success on the battlefield and in building up

a base of support increases, the concomitant increase in prominence of a unifier and his

campaign should make independent social forces more amenable to unifiers' attempts to

incorporate them through the use of nationally-legitimated symbols. Unifiers can, of course,

attempt to implement this strategy during any phase of the campaign. But, I argue, this strategy

will be most efficacious following the inception phase. Additionally, during the consolidation

phase, emphasizing the incorporation of independent groups may be less desirable since it

could weaken the discipline of the unifier's coalition if large numbers of undisciplined new

members join simply out of a desire to be part of a legitimate social movement, and, potentially,

dilute the acceptance of hierarchy and moral regulation crucial for reunification campaigns (see

below). Instead, incorporation of social forces will have the greatest utility during the extension

phase, as the unifier seeks to rapidly spread his newly developed institutions and configurations

across the social landscape. Using normative power to foster acceptance of the unifier's

authority is materially cheaper than using coercive or utilitarian means. Any material or

coercive resources under the unifier's control instead can be used to defeat and subjugate

social forces and rivals that cannot be incorporated, likely due to a variety of reasons. With

finite material resources and in a situation of considerable social instability, the unifier must use

symbolic resources to diminish the costs of expansion and engender a durable sense of his

legitimacy in the minds of politically-relevant groups. Without such cost reduction and

significant legitimation, I argue the unifier will find his task impossible.

The third and last political strategy is the *disempowerment of local elites*, which involves

undercutting their authority and/or co-opting them. This strategy is paired with the structural

condition of geopolitical space. This strategy is vital for unifiers since it helps them a) acquire

direct access to socioeconomic resources (crucial for reunification campaigns), and, less

crucially, b) utilize the local elites' geographically-situated knowledge and expertise for effective

administration before a state apparatus is erected.[9] The second consequence is less crucial than

the first because, in the absence of local expertise, the unifier can rely on his core supporters to

carry out his orders, though this will likely result in more inefficient local policy outcomes than

if local elites' expertise were exploited.

Gaining direct access to resources, as discussed in the previous section, is necessary for

a successful reunification campaign primarily because of the associated effects during the

inception phase. When a unifier's coalition is small and does not yet have a secure base of

support, easy and direct access to local resources is crucial. The unifier cannot yet rely on

independent social groups whose members, ideally, will eventually support the campaign on

the basis of the unifier's effective use of nationally-legitimated symbols. While still a minor

player, the unifier's claims to reconstituting the state will be indistinguishable from the chorus

of other power-thirsty voices claiming the same position. Additionally, the lack of a material

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[9] Of course, other factors play a role in ensuring obtainment of these benefits, including the nature of the local economy and the relative recalcitrance of local elites in assisting the unifier's emerging administration. Disempowering local elites, though, is necessary since it grants unfettered access to whatever socioeconomic resources are available and severely limits the local elites' options for self-aggrandizement.

base of support means that the unifier's aspirational goals will be unconvincing in the face of endemic warfare. Direct access to resources, though, provides the unifier with the means to create a base of support, thus providing her and her campaign with substantial social *prominence*. This prominence can interact with the use of nationally-legitimated symbols to create a convincing claim of legitimate aims to reconstitute the state and so incorporate independent social groups. From a material perspective, a base of support provides a secure launching pad from which the unifier can initiate her reunification campaign in earnest. This political strategy of disempowering local elites, then, will be most useful during the inception phase of the campaign, though its implementation will have positive effects throughout the three phases since ongoing direct access to resources is crucial for sustained state-building (Hui 2005).

Table Three summarizes the relative salience of the three political strategies across the three analytical phases of state reconstitution. The ordinal scoring of the strategies' relative salience is derived from the preceding discussion. By salience I mean the minimally necessary level of success that should be achieved for a given strategy by a unifier during a given phase (phase-strategy, for short) for successful state reconstitution to be achieved. In most cases, a unifier going above and beyond the minimally necessary level of success for a given phase-strategy should pose no problems for the overall campaign even though there may be diminishing returns as greater levels of success provide limited additional benefits. However, as claimed in the discussion above, there are two exceptions. First, in the extension phase, excessive focus on cohering can negatively impact the efficacy of an incorporation strategy. Second, in the consolidation phase, too much emphasis on incorporation can undermine

coalitional coherence. What is most important for the overall success of a reunification

campaign, though, is that the necessary levels of success are realized for each phase-strategy.

Table Three: Salience of Political Strategies, by Phase of Reconstitution				
Strategy	Inception Phase	Extension Phase	Consolidation Phase	Overall Salience Scores
Cohere Core Supporters	High (3)	Medium (2)	High (3)	8
Incorporate Social Groups	Low (1)	High (3)	Medium (2)	6
Disempower Local Elites	High (3)	Medium (2)	Medium (2)	7

The three strategies are not equally important, however. If one codes the three ordinal

levels according to the following schema (Low = 1, Medium = 2, High = 3), additive overall

salience scores for the three political strategies can be established. These overall salience

scores are somewhat analogous to the notion of relevance of necessary conditions proposed by

Gary Goertz (2006), who says that the closer to sufficiency a necessary condition gets the more

important it is. Because the cases I analyze are all positive on the outcome of interest

(successful state reconstitution), one cannot say to what degree each condition approximates

sufficiency. However, one can *a priori* assess the relative importance a unifier should attach to

each condition, given the framework's theoretical expectations. If salience is a measure of the

needed level of successful implementation of a given phase-strategy, then one can say that a

phase-strategy with low salience is less important than one with higher salience since its

implementation does not need to be as successful for the requisite consequences for successful

state reconstitution to be met. One can assume that a unifier, as an individual highly attuned to

the demands of state building, is likely to give great thought to which strategies to pursue at which times. Therefore, if a unifier considers a particular strategy to be especially crucial for a given phase, this is likely evidence of the internal validity of the framework. So, if process tracing evidence suggests that a unifier emphasized a particular strategy over the others in a given phase, then this finding can be compared to the expectations presented in Table Three as an additional check on the framework's validity. This check is supplementary to the main methods used to assess the framework's explanatory power, which include examinations of the strategies implemented by the unifiers and the concrete consequences of these strategies.

Table Three reveals that cohering core supporters is overall the most important political strategy of this theoretical framework. This makes sense since, as I argued above, discipline is vital throughout state reconstitution. Disempowering local elites as the second most important strategy is also an intuitive finding since it is important for state-building generally, but has heightened importance when a unifier's accumulated coercive and utilitarian power is low. Finally, the incorporation of independent social groups as the least important of the three strategies can be explained by the fact that a reunification campaign's most important set of allies is its core of supporters. Unifiers want allied social groups primarily to not be obstacles and provide easy access to needed resources. But the core supporters of the unifier are directly tasked to carry out his orders, thus making him directly dependent on their loyalty. Nevertheless, all three political strategies have high importance. A minimally important strategy would have an overall salience score of three, while a maximally important one would have a score of nine. Two of the three strategies are closer to the maximum than the minimum while

the other is at the midpoint. None of them are considered more irrelevant than not, supporting

their inclusion in this theoretical framework.

Chapters Two and Three apply this theoretical framework to my two main cases of

Republican China and Sengoku Japan. Chapter Four briefly tests the framework on three

additional cases of successful state reconstitution that I did not use when developing the theory

presented in this chapter.

Chapter Two: Necessary Structural Conditions and State Reconstitution

In this chapter I present each of the three necessary structural conditions for Republican China and Sengoku Japan as proposed in my theoretical framework. I first discuss the concept of structure and how it relates to the operation of the three conditions emphasized here. Next, I briefly review each of the three structural conditions delineated in the previous chapter and discuss how they manifest the key aspects of structure generally. I then discuss how the three conditions are manifest in each of the two cases. Each of these last two sections begins with a brief historical overview of the case and then commences discussing the structural conditions in the following order: the availability and/or development of a specialized *ideological framework*; the availability of (a) *nationally-legitimated symbol(s)*; and the availability of one more areas with a high degree of *geopolitical space*.

A structure, such as an ideology, the distribution of organizational power among economic classes, or the institutional framework of a political regime, can shape, constrain, motivate, or bind the actions of an individual. Even when examining collectivities (such as reunification coalitions), the ontological basis should be the individual. As Max Weber argues, structures (including collective groups) are "*solely* the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents of subjectively understandable action" (Weber 1978: 13, italics in original). In other words, only individuals are true agents, though their thought and behavior may be coordinated and

determined by structures encompassing collections of individuals. Moreover, as Giddens argues, structure is best understood as being internal to individuals, existing "as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices" (Giddens 1984: 25). Structure, though, does exist 'beyond' the individual in that it is naturalized. That is, patterns of social thought and behavior become reified by individuals into supposedly enduring facts or properties of social systems (Giddens 1984: 25-26). Giddens further demonstrates that structure can have a multifaceted impact on individuals, signifying meaning, allocating resources, establishing power asymmetries and defining which actions and claims are legitimate (Giddens 1984: 31-33). Structure can thus be empowering, providing resources and motivation for individuals, and restrictive, dictating the limits of one's actions, such as through coercion employed by the powerful or by defining which actions are legitimate. Structure can also be constitutive, such as through bestowing upon individuals their identities and thus beliefs, preferences and motivations. As elaborated in the previous chapter, structure can be transformed by individuals, constituting the duality of structure. However, in this chapter I focus on the power structure has over individuals, rather than the other way round, though I also emphasize the ontologically individual basis of structure. Therefore, where possible, I highlight the individual impact of the discussed structures on the unifiers since these are the individuals my framework considers the most methodologically important.

The three necessary conditions discussed in this chapter have the properties expected of any set of structures. Ideology, for instance, can motivate the actions of an individual by defining which social relationships and institutions are legitimate, but it can also restrict the options that individual has once he or she commits to a particular one. The power of social

groups can constrain the viable options an individual has when deciding how to transform his or her social world. Some social groups, by virtue of the collective resources they have access to, may be able to successfully resist such attempts at alteration, effectively precluding certain choices from being selected by an individual. A structural condition is simply a structure with causal effects relevant to a particular theoretical framework. In the framework employed here, three structural conditions are presented as necessary for successful state reconstitution. In other words, the structures represented by these conditions must be present in the stated form prior to commencement of concerted state reconstitution efforts by unifiers.

So, the structure of a specialized ideological framework that 1) can justify centralized political rule, 2) delineates a sociopolitical hierarchy considered appropriate by potential or actual core supporters, and 3) provides a long-term, sociopolitical goal to which these core supporters can dedicate themselves must be present as a precondition for a unifier to successfully implement the strategy of cohering core supporters, as discussed in the previous chapter. Such an ideological framework can be utilized to shape the identities, preferences and actions of core supporters. The use of such a framework, though, does place subsequent constraints on the unifier. In order to remain ideologically consistent, the unifier cannot shift to supporting another ideology that is different on fundamental principles. Otherwise, the efficacy of the unifier's cohering strategy would be substantially diminished.

The availability of a nationally-legitimated symbol similarly both constrains the actions of the unifier and provides opportunities for her. Effectively referencing such a symbol publicly or incorporating it into her espoused ideological framework can be used to incorporate independent social groups. However, the specific nature of the symbol may forbid the unifier

from reaching out to certain groups that discourses related to the symbol have deemed to be enemies of the politically-relevant segments of society. Allying with these 'enemy' groups could thus prove to be fatal for the unifier's campaign, which, as argued in the last chapter, needs the support of politically-relevant social groups.

Lastly, the availability of geopolitical space also provides opportunities and constraints. Most obviously, an area with few social groups means that the unifier must contend with few potential rivals or social obstacles, thus permitting him to disempower local elites and gain direct access to socioeconomic resources. However, if we assume that the socio-spatial terrain of a given society is not uniformly high in its degree of geopolitical space, then that means the unifier would have to initiate her campaign in certain specific areas. The potential geographic locus of the reunification campaign's initial base area is thus delimited. Like the other two necessary structural conditions, then, geopolitical space reflects the multivalent nature of structure, presenting the unifier with both favorable resources to exploit and constraints with which to contend.

What follows are extended discussions of how these three necessary structural conditions are manifest in the two main cases of this study – Republican China and Sengoku Japan. The case studies are organized by condition, though I reference one of the other two conditions where appropriate given the specific contours of the case.

Structural Conditions of Republican China

Before analyzing how the three necessary structural conditions were present in Republican

China, I present a brief history of the case. The previous state, ruled by the Qing imperial

dynasty, was overthrown following the 1911 Revolution. By the mid-1910s, the central regime

had ceased to control the great majority of the country and was successively replaced by the

governments of one warlord after another, the majority of whom had been generals or other

prominent military men under the Qing and now ruled over autonomous regional power bases.

Chinese society was politically unstable and fragmented, with multifarious individuals seeking

to aggrandize themselves but also to reestablish national unity. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the

Nationalist Party, or Guomindang (GMD), launched a reunification campaign in 1926, with the

collaboration of the Chinese Communist party (CCP). He was partially successful, managing to

establish firm control over much of eastern and central China under Nationalist Party rule.

However, he was never able to construct a reconstituted state. In the meantime, following the

Nationalist purge of Communist forces in 1927, the eradication of the Jiangxi Soviet and the

consequent Long March of 1934, the CCP began constructing a secure base area in an isolated

region of Northwest China. During the Long March, which involved Communist forces trekking

thousands of miles to evade GMD forces, Mao Zedong emerged as the paramount leader of the

Party and over the next decade and a half was able to construct a durable coalition that was

ultimately able to defeat Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD in battle. The Chinese state was

reconstituted by the Communists in 1949 with the founding of the People's Republic of China

(PRC). By the mid-1950s, if not earlier, the CCP under Mao had unquestionable authority over the country and rules to this day.

Structural Condition I: Availability and/or Development of a Specialized Ideological Framework

To reiterate, I argue that the availability of a specialized ideological framework is necessary for the unifier to successfully implement the strategy of cohering his core supporters. Such a framework provides essential normative resources the unifier can employ to attract supporters and ensure they have enduring loyalty to him and his cause and will effectively carry out his orders. Without a specialized ideological framework that provides a long-term normative goal and can justify a sociopolitical hierarchy headed by him, the unifier will be unable to effectively justify his political goals and present himself as ideologically clear and consistent. As a result, prospective or current core supporters will find little in his political program to dedicate themselves to over the long-run and will have poor organizational and normative discipline. I argue such a situation is insurmountable for unifiers. Conversely, if such a framework *does* exist, the unifier has the option of acquiring dedicated and disciplined core supporters, thus constructing a viable reunification coalition. This subsection analyzes the ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism, which Mao Zedong and the CCP utilized to create and maintain a dedicated and disciplined coalition of core supporters.

Marxism-Leninism as a coherent ideological framework did not crystallize in China until 1920, when precursor organizations to the CCP (such as intellectual study and informal political groups) were founded and began disseminating Marxist and Leninist texts within the Chinese

intellectual sphere (Dirlik 1989: 205-206). However, through the mid to late 1910s, Chinese

intellectuals had been developing an ideological climate that would be favorable for radical

frameworks like Marxism-Leninism. Interest in wide-ranging political reform stretched back to

the 1898 Hundred Days' Reform movement, which sought to reinvigorate the Qing state.

Marxism-Leninism was established as a coherent, specialized ideological framework in China by

the First United Front in 1923, when the CCP and GMD joined forces to reunify the state. This

year marked the beginning of the CCP's active efforts to realize the social-revolutionary goals it

was dedicated to. Therefore, the Marxist-Leninist ideological framework emerged as a clear

structural presence over the years between 1898 and 1923. I restrict my analysis of the

development of Marxism-Leninism as a structural condition to these years.

Marxism-Leninism, as presented to the Chinese intellectual sphere, almost without

exception meets the criteria for the kind of ideological framework considered structurally

necessary for successful state reconstitution, as explained below. First, though, I briefly review

the history of the introduction of Marxism-Leninism into the Chinese intellectual sphere,

including the ideological precursors that favored and conditioned its adoption by intellectuals

and the organizational manner in which it was disseminated. Presenting this history helps

clarify the dividing line between the structures that Mao Zedong had to face when emerging as

a unifier and the structural changes he and his advisors effectuated. Furthermore, this historical

background to Marxism-Leninism in China illustrates the intellectual and social connections

Marxism-Leninism had with Chinese nationalism (this case's manifestation of the second

necessary structural condition) and identifies the social groups that were most associated with

Marxism-Leninism. By providing this background, I clarify the social context in which Mao

Zedong and the Communists were embedded in this period and thus highlight the structural opportunities and obstacles they faced as they sought to reunify the state. Though the three necessary structural conditions are what my framework emphasizes, these other structures are inextricably tied to these conditions and ultimately also played central roles in the Communist reunification process, as the next chapter shows.

The Chinese Intellectual Sphere before Marxism-Leninism

As Arif Dirlik (1989) points out, it was not until 1920 and 1921 that Marxism-Leninism started to be clearly understood by intellectuals in China. Some of the most fundamental Marxist-Leninist texts were not fully translated in China until the early 1920s. These developments were in large part sparked by the arrival of the Comintern representative Voitinsky in March of 1921. But the intellectual climate in China had been favorable for the reception of Marxism-Leninism prior to the Russian's arrival. In this subsection I will discuss the chief contours of the intellectual climate in China in the years leading up to 1920. This discussion is important for my analysis because it will 1) show how Marxism-Leninism appealed to the principal ideological class of China, intellectuals and students, and 2) elucidate the political motivations of this class, which is key for understanding Mao's strategies during his reunification campaign. These motivations were principally concerned with addressing what the intellectuals considered China's crippling social backwardness, made evident by the country's recent history of decaying sovereignty and defeat at the hands of foreign powers.

Despite not emerging as a coherent framework until the 1920s, Marxism-Leninism's core features accorded well with a couple of crucial ideological currents that had been

developing since the 1890s, when the first wide-ranging reform movement in late Qing China occurred. The first key ideological current was the concern of the era's intellectuals for social progress, a concern central to the 1890s reform movement. For instance, Kang Youwei, a major intellectual leader of the movement, promoted his Doctrine of the Three Ages which viewed history as moving from disorder to a One World utopia, with society progressing as history advances. Kang also argued that all individuals are equal and deserve autonomy. In his utopia, society would be organized through democratic means and Confucian traditions would be rejected (Fairbank 1987: 205; Liu 1968: 145; Zarrow 2005: 61). A number of intellectuals involved in the 1890s reform movement advocated for the reform of the imperial examination system, one of the most fundamental institutions in China at the time, and even for the creation of a deliberative assembly, which would have been quite at odds with the state's autocratic tradition (Liu 1968: 143). The 1898 reform proposal, written by Kang and his allies, called for reform of Chinese law, greater state involvement in the economy, and abolition of the foot-binding tradition, among other recommendations (Liu 1968: 162). Sweeping reforms of political and social institutions were commonly demanded in the 1890s.

This intellectual interest in reform was to continue for the next two decades (Zarrow 2005: 60). After the Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1901, an anti-imperialist uprising that resulted in the foreign occupation of the capital, the Qing court agreed to a number of reforms that had been advocated by Kang and his associates. Concomitantly, among the literati, the humiliation of the foreign response to the Boxer uprising led to not only growing concern for educational and other reforms but also a rising political awareness that included sympathy for Sun Yat-sen's republican ambitions (Liu 1968: 168). In other words, the restoration of China's strength and

sovereignty required fundamental changes in the structures of Chinese society. This belief in

the necessity of far-reaching political and social reforms was a major impetus behind the 1911

Revolution that overthrew the Qing Dynasty. The events of the late 1910s, including Japan's 21

Demands and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, only intensified Chinese intellectuals' fears of

continued foreign domination and internal weakness. Consequently, an urgent desire for

reform and a belief in social progress were sustained and even reinvigorated. As explained

below, Marxism-Leninism called for social revolution. This core focus of the ideology on the

progress of society, both analytically and aspirationally, accorded with the Chinese intellectual

sphere's decades-long legacy of pushing for social progress.

The second crucial ideological current that had been developing in the Chinese

intellectual sphere since the 1890s was Social Darwinism. As early as the 1890s, Kang Youwei

accepted this ideology's emphasis on the struggle between nations for survival (Fairbank 1987:

205). In the years before the 1911 Revolution, both constitutional-monarchists and republicans

agreed with this ideology. They saw its confirmation in the international context of stronger

states dominating weaker ones. Moreover, Social Darwinism provided a rationale for planned

social change and supported thinking in terms of groups (Zarrow 2005: 60-61). Crucially, the

Marxist emphasis on class struggle and the Leninist notion of vanguard-directed revolution

corresponded, respectively, with the Social Darwinist perspectives on group conflict and social

progress. We again see Marxism-Leninism's appropriateness for the intellectual climate of early

1900s China. Furthermore, Social Darwinism was closely related with nationalism and thinking

of society in terms of the nation-state. After all, intellectuals would most typically invoke the

ideology when discussing international relations. As we will see in the next section, the Chinese

nation-state served as a nationally-legitimated symbol. The common intellectual connection with Social Darwinism helped foster a close association between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism in Republican China.

The decay and collapse of the Qing dynasty spurred ideological adoption of more than just Social Darwinism and nationalism. In the late 1910s, intellectuals were engaged with a wide array of ideological frameworks, with anarchism having the greatest appeal. In fact, the Russian October Revolution, which culminated in the installation of a Bolshevik government, was largely interpreted by Chinese intellectuals through an anarchist lens (Dirlik 1989: 28-29). Other prominent traditions or frameworks included liberalism, Confucian revivalism, and Sun Yat-sen's nationalist ideology. All of these ideologies or ideological traditions advocated for some kind of sociocultural reform or transformation. Even Confucian revivalism was not a reactionary or necessarily conservative ideology. Instead it emphasized societal renewal inspired by China's "rich and diverse traditions" (Cheek 2015: 99). Intellectuals were searching for a solution to the social backwardness that they perceived was preventing the reintegration and reinvigoration of China. An ideological framework that could provide the ideational resources for this effort would be favorably received. Marxism-Leninism would serve as such a framework.

Gaining the support of intellectuals was essential for any aspiring unifier. During this era the central government collapsed, as did the authority of the previously-respected bureaucracy. At the same time, the influence of the gentry class – China's traditional elite – atrophied (Selden 1971). As a result, intellectuals were left as the principal normative agents in Republican China and so played a leading role in determining the direction the country should take (Selden 1971; Cheek 2015). If a unifier sought to employ an ideological framework for the

purposes of reunification, she would have to engage with the intellectuals' debates and ideas and strive to win their support, not least by confirming the intellectuals' concerns about social progress and China's survival. Otherwise, the unifier would forego the support of individuals who could provide ideological guidance and even potential loyalty to the unifier's cause. Without such support, the unifier would have a much more difficult time utilizing an ideological framework clearly and consistently. And considering their adherence to long-run goals like rejuvenating Chinese society, the unifier would also not have access to a pool of quite possibly the most dedicated and disciplined potential core supporters in Chinese society. In other words, the intellectual class and its attendant ideological sphere together constituted a structure that provided both key opportunities and major constraints for unifiers.

Many intellectuals would find Marxism-Leninism appealing, but not until the early 1920s. Though some intellectuals were familiar with parts of Marxism's basic structure, it had no full-throated advocates prior to 1920. Intellectuals involved in the crucial reform periods of 1905-1907 and 1913-1914 did not take Marxism seriously (Dirlik (1989: 95-96). Most authors of May Fourth era publications on Marxism were not future Communists, with the significant exception of Li Dazhao, who helped establish the Society for the Study of Marxist Theory at Beijing University, a key precursor organization to the CCP (Dirlik 1989: 104-105; 202). Moreover, these publications used Marxist theory primarily to analyze Chinese history and society, not as a blueprint for political or social action. Indeed, Li Dazhao in the late 1910s was against class struggle, rather arguing for cultural revolution. Dirlik states that Li's views were indicative of Chinese socialists in 1919 (Dirlik 1989: 120). Marxism-Leninism was thus not a significant ideological framework at this time.

Though Marxism-Leninism was not a well understood ideological framework prior to the

early 1920s, the late Qing and early Republican intellectual sphere had structural characteristics

that were amenable to intellectual interest in and acceptance of Marxism-Leninism. And since

the intellectual class was central to ideological development in this era, Marxism-Leninism

could quite effectively serve as a unifier's specialized framework. Its adoption by nascent

Communists in the early 1920s would prove a boon for Mao's reunification campaign in large

part because of the ideology's appeal to China's intellectual class.

Development and Dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in China

Marxism-Leninism's emergence as a coherent, specialized, unifier-supporting ideology in the

early 1920s was principally externally-driven and intrinsic to the creation of the CCP. The Soviet

Comintern played a crucial role in not only the formation of the Party but also the transmission

of Soviet ideology to China. In fact, the construction of a Communist organizational apparatus

in China was inextricably linked with the translation and introduction of the Marxist-Leninist

ideological framework. Explicating this linkage is important for clarifying the particular nature of

the interplay between structure and strategy that I wish to emphasize. Specifically, my

analytical focus is on how structural conditions impact the strategies of *unifiers*, not all political

actors involved in the overall state reconstitution process. Thus, I treat the ideational and

institutional environment that Mao Zedong and his immediate advisers encountered at the

outset of their unification efforts as structure, even if the creation of that structure itself

involved the exercise of the agency of other political actors, including the founders and

disseminators of Communism in China.

Mao was *not* one of the original founders of the CCP. He thus encountered Marxist-Leninism ideology as a structural condition. Mao's later choices altered and manipulated this ideology, decisions I will analyze in detail in the next chapter. Still, as I will show, events of the 1910s and early 1920s laid the foundation for the emergence of Marxism-Leninism in China as a coherent, established ideological framework. Underscoring the efforts of earlier individuals clarifies what Mao and his advisers were *not* responsible for, which helps create the analytical dividing line between structure and agency central to the theoretical framework I laid out in the previous chapter.

In the remainder of this subsection, I first discuss the two key organizational precursors to the CCP and then assess the early propaganda efforts of the Chinese Communists. Finally, I describe the early dissemination of Marxism-Leninism across China's intellectual landscape.

The formation of Chinese Communist organization began in Beijing when Gregory Voitinsky, Comintern representative, worked with the intellectual Li Dazhao to set up the Society for the Study of Marxist Theory in March of 1920 (Dirlik 1989: 202). The purpose of this Society was primarily to read Marxist works and provide opportunities for Li's students to converse with Voitinsky. Reflecting the ideological predilections of Chinese intellectuals at this time, anarchists outnumbered other kinds of intellectuals, such as socialists and liberals. But the Society did not dedicate itself to the creation of a political organization; it remained a study group, even after the founding of the CCP the following year. Indeed, even after its transition to an open organization from an underground one, the Society restricted its main tasks to the study of Marxism, the translation of Marxist texts, and the organization of public forums to discuss Marxism and socialism (Dirlik 1989: 202). The Society's work, though, was centrally

involved in the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideas within Chinese intellectual society. After November 1921, when the Society shed its underground status, membership ballooned to over 200. Additionally, about forty Marxist volumes were published by 1922 (Dirlik 1989: 202). So even though the political impact of the Society for the Study of Marxist Theory was limited, its role in incubating Marxist-Leninist ideology in China was significant for such a small yet dedicated group.

Unlike the Society, the "Shanghai nucleus" did play a direct role in the formation of a Chinese Communist political organization. Probably founded in August 1920 with assistance from the Comintern envoy Voitinsky, this informal group of intellectuals was centered on Chen Duxiu and his disciples (Dirlik 1989: 201). Their organizational connections eventually spread as far as France, as members took advantage of their personal networks, especially those of Chen. Having just ten members by early fall, the Shanghai nucleus' immediate tasks were recruitment, organization, propaganda and launching Communist nuclei in other cities (Dirlik 1989: 204). The Manifesto of the Communist Party of China was penned in November 1920 with Chen Duxiu's oversight. He left Shanghai shortly thereafter, but his absence did not undermine the efficacy of the nucleus, since by this point the organization and propaganda apparatuses were well-established (Dirlik 1989: 207). The nucleus thus managed to set up an embryonic organizational structure, at least partially independent of direct personal relationships, which became the precursor and foundation for the CCP, formally announced in July 1921.

Even before the CCP's official inauguration, the Shanghai nucleus was heavily involved in propaganda, disseminating Marxist-Leninist ideology to receptive audiences. Both intellectuals and laborers were targeted. *The Communist*, which began publication in November 1920, was

the first journal exclusively dedicated to Communist propaganda. It published Lenin's

theoretical works for the first time in China and was intended as a means for the Communists

to articulate their ideology to China's intellectual audience. *New Youth* became the nucleus'

chief propaganda arm, publishing over 100 Marxist-related pieces by spring 1921. A separate

publication, *The World of Labor*, was the first Communist publication dedicated to reaching out

to laborers (Dirlik 1989: 205). It was intended to educate laborers on their material conditions

and their need for organization, and to promote the special virtue of the working class. The

nucleus itself had its own printing press as well, using it to publish translations of key Marxist

works, such as Kautsky's *Class Struggle* and Marx's *Communist Manifesto* (Dirlik 1989: 206). We

see that even before Mao became one of its central figures, the CCP was reaching out to

intellectuals and the proletariat. It was thus not only seeking the support of China's key

ideological class but also clearly and consistently adhering to and propagating its espoused

ideology. Certainly, these early Communist moves laid the foundation for Mao's own suite of

reunification strategies. The next chapter identifies to what extent Mao intensified, changed or

added to these strategies, thereby clarifying the degree of agency he had in the process of state

reconstitution.

As the above discussion shows, Voitinsky's mission to establish a Marxism-Leninist

organization in China was a success. Chinese intellectuals had a vague understanding of

Marxism prior to Voitinsky's mission, but, as the November 1920 Manifesto makes clear,

Marxism-Leninism as a coherent ideology did not arrive without Russian help. Once it did,

though, it was quickly married to a developing organizational apparatus that had the

articulation and dissemination of Marxist-Leninist thought and institutions at its functional core.

Communist nuclei soon formed in other cities in China. The Shanghai nucleus managed

the spread of Communist cells which emulated its ideology and organization. The first was

established in Wuhan, up the Yangzi River, in September 1920, only a month after the founding

of the Shanghai nucleus. The second was set up in Beijing, recruiting students who were already

affiliated with the Society for the Study of Marxist Theory that had been created earlier in the

year by Voitinsky and Li Dazhao. By the summer of 1921, six total Communist cells existed in

major cities in southern, central and northern China (Pantsov 2012: 100).

Mao Zedong was actively involved in this process. From October to December 1920, he

led the formation of a Communist cell in Hunan. In August of that year, Mao founded the

Russian Research Society dedicated to the study of the Russian Revolution. During these later

months of 1920, he published articles in the provincial capital of Changsha's newspapers

praising the Russian Revolution and Lenin (Dirlik 1989: 209-210). By early January of the next

year, a meeting of 18 individuals in Changsha, called by Mao and another Communist leader,

culminated in most of the attendees espousing Bolshevism (Pantsov 2012: 99). A communist

organization was officially created in Hunan under Mao's leadership. Mao's agency is reflected

in his initiative to create a CCP branch in his home province of Hunan. As early as 1920, then,

Mao is acquiring leadership and organizational experience.

Almost a year after the founding of the Shanghai nucleus, Chen Duxiu called for a

conference of delegates from all the Communist cells in China. Held from July 23 to July 31 in

Shanghai, the convention laid the ground for the official foundation of the Chinese Communist

Party. Chen Duxiu was selected as secretary of its Central Bureau (later renamed the Central

Executive Committee), which comprised two additional members, neither of whom was Mao

(Pantsov 2012: 106). Though he played a significant role at the local level, leading the nascent

Communist movement in Changsha, Mao was still a minor player in the national structure. It

was at this conference that the First Program of the CCP and the First Decision as to the Objects

of the CCP were adopted, discussed below.

By this point, Marxism-Leninism was a coherent ideological framework that had a firm, if

small, presence in the Chinese intellectual imaginary. It had a clear organizational presence in

the Chinese Communist Party which, by 1921, was developing a sophisticated structure of

authority. Additionally, by this point the CCP had several outlets that were actively involved in

disseminating Marxist-Leninist propaganda. As explicated next, this framework could fit the

ideological needs of an aspiring unifier. As we shall see in the next chapter, Mao Zedong would

become this aspiring unifier and would in fact utilize Marxism-Leninism to create a disciplined,

dedicated, and durable reunification coalition.

The Marxist-Leninist Ideological Framework

In this subsection, I analyze the core ideological features of Marxism-Leninism in early 1920s

China. Recall that my theoretical framework expects that for an ideological framework to be

crucial for undergirding successful state reconstitution, it must have the three following

features. First, the framework must be capable of being used to justify centralized political rule

by the unifier. Second, it must delineate a sociopolitical hierarchy considered appropriate by

potential or actual core supporters. Third, it must provide a long-term, sociopolitical goal to

which these core supporters can become dedicated. An ideological framework with these three

features can be used by a unifier to 1) discipline her core supporters, ensuring their loyalty and

efficacy; 2) legitimize the unifier's interests in creating a hierarchy she controls; and 3) elongate

supporters' time horizons to avoid free-riding. Such an ideological framework is *specialized*

since it is not required to have the capacity to generate support from a wide array of social

forces, but instead is focused on appealing to the mental worlds of a narrow group of core

supporters. As I will now show, Marxism-Leninism, as it was manifest in early 1920s China, was

an instance of this type of specialized ideological framework.

The official documents of the CCP and its immediate precursors (study groups and

informal political circles) at the time of its founding in 1920 and 1921 are authoritative sources

for uncovering the ideological features of Marxism-Leninism in early Republican China.

Specifically, looking at the CCP Manifesto (promulgated in November 1920), The First Program

of the CCP (July-August 1921), and The First Decisions as to the Objects of the CCP (also July-

August 1921) provides the means to understand how Marxism-Leninism was presented to

Chinese intellectuals at the founding of the Party. These documents also set down what the

Party organization's official ideology was to be. Thus, individuals who were or would become

Party members would encounter the specialized ideological framework delineated in these

documents. Members like Mao Zedong would primarily come to adopt this framework, since

they were at the core of the rapidly burgeoning organizational structure of the CCP at this time.

The CCP Manifesto declares the Party to have three ideals. First, the economic ideal is

the socialization of the means of production, which was expected to eliminate the basis of

exploitation in society. Second, the Party's political ideal is the abolition of political power and

the military and legal systems that then upheld the elite's power. Finally, the social ideal refers

to the elimination of all classes except the proletariat (Dirlik 1989: 207-208). These ideals

represent the Communist society the Party would strive to achieve, that is, the clear goal for which members could forgo their short term interests.

The Manifesto also discusses the means by which Communism was to be achieved. Class struggle was to be the principal means of overthrowing capitalism and the capitalist-allied state. Only through violence could this overthrow occur. Class struggle was to proceed in two phases. First, the Party must propagandize among the workers, peasants, and sailors, and unite them into a single social class. Then, the transfer of power to the party of the working class would occur, brought about in the end by a general strike (Dirlik 1989: 208). Only the dictatorship of the proletariat – the exclusive exercise of power by the working class – could lead the way to the revolutionary goal of communism, not just in China, but in every country. Members of the proletariat with "the highest class consciousness and revolutionary spirit" would be responsible for devising methods to eradicate capitalism and construct communism (Saich and Yang 1996: 13). We thus see the clear delineation of a long-term political goal (the realization of the three ideals) that specifies a particular sociopolitical hierarchy (dictatorship of the proletariat), essential components of a specialized ideological framework. Moreover, the Manifesto lays out a clear road map of achieving revolution, certainly a useful heuristic for potential or actual members of the CCP.

The First Program of the CCP largely affirms these principles, but with crucial additions. First, the role the military will play in the revolution is explicitly mentioned. The revolutionary army of the proletariat was to be used to overthrow capitalism and reconstruct the nation from the working class. Second, the CCP committed itself to unite with the Third International (or Comintern), the Soviet run organization dedicated to sponsoring anti-imperialist nationalist

movements around the world. Third, the Central Executive Committee is established. Its

functions include supervision and management of the finances, publications and policies of all

local soviets (communist organizations). Finally, the First Program declares that except for

existing soldiers, policemen, and civil service employees, members cannot, in general, be

government officials or MPs (Saich and Yang 1996: 16-17). Limiting the occupational options of

members in this way diminishes the likelihood that they will be corrupted by association with

the non-Communist forces that controlled government bodies in China at the time. Beyond

delineating rules of party discipline (an ideal feature of a specialized ideological framework), the

First Program has other ideological features also crucial for successfully cohering core

supporters. By proclaiming the revolutionary importance of the proletariat army, the First

Program not only reemphasizes the class-based sociopolitical hierarchy specified in the 1920

Manifesto but also predicates the revolution on coercive force. Therefore, the realization of the

three ideals requires a military campaign; a reunification campaign could potentially meet this

requirement. Additionally, the Central Executive Committee that the First Program establishes

can serve as the institutional basis for assertions of authority by individuals. The Central

Executive Committee is also imbued with normative power since the First Program is concerned

with how to achieve the revolutionary goals of the CCP. An individual that can successfully take

control of such a body can thus acquire hierarchically-based authority. A unifier that does so

can employ the CCP's organizational structure and normative power to create and maintain a

reunification coalition.

The First Decision as to the Objects of the CCP provides a list of what the Party

considered its most pressing tasks at the outset of its organizational life. The Party decided that

labor organization, propaganda, the establishment of labor supplementary schools and the creation of an institution for studying working class mobilization were to be the objectives of its organizational energies (Saich and Yang 1996: 18-19). The Party was to use the supplementary schools to organize unions and foster class consciousness in workers. At its founding, the CCP's leaders decided to commence immediately in following their ideological principles of raising working class consciousness and fostering working class unity, which were necessary first steps towards achieving their ideals of the socialization of the means of production and the hegemony of the proletariat. Early on, then, the Communist leadership presented itself in an ideologically clear and consistent manner.

Thus, Marxism-Leninism, as delineated in these founding CCP documents, satisfies the three criteria of a specialized, unifier-supporting ideological framework. First, the three ideals proclaimed in the Manifesto provide long-run goals to which supporters can be dedicated. These ideals entail the transformation of society's core structures, providing a social objective beyond narrow self-interest. Thus, true believers will forgo free-riding, dedicating themselves to this transformative ideology at the expense of their short-term concerns and desires, so long, of course, as their leaders dedicate themselves similarly. Second, Marxism-Leninism establishes a clear ideal social hierarchy, with the proletariat at the top and other classes delegitimized or even eliminated. A classless society implies the absence of all but one class – the working class. While the Party works towards this utopian world, it and its members are expected to privilege the proletariat above other classes. Moreover, as these documents make clear, the Party is expected to play a leading role – as the vanguard, in Leninist terms. A unifier who harnesses

Marxist-Leninist ideology can then justify his authority by helming this vanguard that itself leads

the proletariat, the most superior class in society.

Third, as the First Program of the CCP makes clear, a centralized political organ, the

Central Executive Committee (CEC), was to be in charge of the Communist movement, including

its propaganda aspect (Saich and Yang 1996: 18). To the extent that a unifier adheres to the

ideals of the Party, he can use the CEC to justify his political rule. However, given the fact that

the CEC is comprised of multiple members, a unifier who joins it will likely have to contend with

at least some degree of intra-leadership competition and bargaining. After the promulgation of

the Party's First Program, the position of CEC Chairmanship was introduced, the occupant of

which was generally considered to be the preeminent leader. As this leader, a unifier can use

the CCP's ideological framework to establish and maintain a reunification coalition.

All three key aspects of the CCP's version of Marxism-Leninism provide the ideological

resources for cohering core supporters. The emphasis on a long-run ideal, the declaration of

the proletariat's dominant moral position, and the clear explication of the role of the Party in

propaganda, mobilization, and leadership permit a unifier to construct an organizational and

ideological apparatus with which to create a loyal and conscientious core coalition. The unifier's

adherence to the Party's long-run goal and elevation of the proletariat fosters supporter loyalty

by providing clear and consistent ideological leadership. In response, core supporters take the

unifier's claims to authority to be ideologically proper and forego their short-term interests in

service of pursuing the CCP's three ideals. Without clear and consistent leadership, core CCP

supporters not only would have a hard time understanding what they were sacrificing their

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interests for but also could not trust their leaders to follow through on their stated goals. Core

supporters would thus sacrifice their loyalty, instead.

Additionally, the Party's control over propaganda can be used by a unifier to inculcate

clear expectations of and guidelines for supporter behavior, such as concerning the manner in

which supporters engage and mobilize workers and allied members of society. Propaganda can

also help maintain supporters' beliefs in the legitimacy of the unifier. Furthermore, so long as

the unifier commits to the CCP's ideology, Party control of mobilization and leadership helps

create an institutional and relational structure that binds core supporters to the unifier and her

goals, both ideological and self-aggrandizing. In sum, Marxism-Leninism can function as the

cohering framework unifiers require for constructing and maintaining durable and effective

reunification coalitions.

Structural Condition II: Availability of a Nationally-Legitimated Symbol

To review, I argue that the availability of a nationally-legitimated symbol is necessary for the

unifier to successfully implement the strategy of incorporating independent social groups. Such

groups are independent when they are not embedded in or an intrinsic part of the unifier's

reunification coalition. A symbol is nationally-legitimated when it is recognized by a wide array

of politically relevant social forces and justifies political centralization. In other words, this type

of symbol is normatively *encompassing* since its legitimate nature is shared by wide swathes of

society. Moreover, this symbol justifies the creation of a state. Incorporation involves the

unifier employing such a symbol to enhance the legitimacy of his reunification campaign in the

minds of key collections of individuals in society. By incorporating independent social groups,

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the unifier makes them acquiesce to or even actively support his campaign. A nationally-legitimated symbol is a structural condition since it can, on the one hand, constrain the political ambitions of a political entrepreneur by delegitimizing actions undermining what the symbol represents, and, on the other, assist such ambitions by providing avenues through which an entrepreneur can justify his or her actions to others.

The strategy of incorporation vastly enhances the unifier's capacity to access and utilize socioeconomic resources and construct a new political hierarchy. Without access to a nationally-legitimated symbol, I argue the unifier would be unable to surmount societal resistance to his project and reunify the state under his authority. Self-interest would drive these independent social groups to resist the unifier's efforts to take away prerogatives they enjoy that would be incompatible with the internal sovereignty of a reconstituted state. Moreover, the unifier would have an insuperably difficult time gaining access to a level of resources necessary for successful state reconstitution. In other words, the availability of a nationally-legitimated symbol is essential for the success of a reunification campaign.

In Republican China, the ideal of the unified Chinese nation-state served as a nationally-legitimated symbol. By the 1920s, Marxism-Leninism was not the only ideational phenomenon rapidly becoming part of the Chinese imaginary. Nationalism was also a burgeoning aspect of the country's social and intellectual fabric, its emergence spurred by China's fraught relationship with foreign powers and by the introduction of Western political ideas. Unlike Marxism-Leninism, nationalism was much more widely espoused in China, especially in the urban areas. The Chinese form of nationalism was similar to others, especially of the anti-imperialist kind, in its overriding concern with sovereignty, the political legitimacy of "the

people" (however defined), and hostility towards foreign interlopers and aggressors. In this section I first highlight key aspects of the development of Chinese nationalism over the last years of the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th. These aspects indicate how the ideal of a unified Chinese nation-state could be harnessed by a unifier espousing Marxism-Leninism and how certain groups came to be considered enemies of the nation through the development of Chinese nationalism. This historical review also covers who the politically-relevant social forces of China at this time were and who was considered to be included in the concept of the nation, both crucial for understanding which groups a unifier would have to appeal to in the course of utilizing the nationally-legitimated symbol of the Chinese nation-state. Next, I delineate the fundamental contours of 1920s Chinese nationalism and the ideal of creating a unified Chinese nation-state. This nationalist objective meets the criteria of a unifier-supporting nationally-legitimated symbol.

Development of the Ideal of the Unified Chinese Nation-State

The roots of Chinese nationalism can be found in notions of political community dating from the 1890s, if not earlier. As Peter Zarrow (2005) argues, the majority of Chinese governed under the Qing Dynasty probably had a notion of centrality. Specifically, this centrality stemmed from the rituals, relationships and religious symbols that drew on Confucian tradition and were supported by the Qing state (Zarrow 2005: 58-59). The heavenly bureaucracy of popular religion was mirrored in the state bureaucracy, with the emperor an earthly parallel of celestial imperial authority. Moreover, the state explicitly emphasized the Confucian notion of filial piety and its analogue in the loyalty of the subject to the emperor. The state viewed provinces,

prefectures and villages as building blocks of empire. The gentry, examination system, uniform writing system and marketing networks also furthered social integration (Zarrow 2005: 58). There was a sense of political unity and integration, personally embodied in the person of the emperor. A nationally-legitimated symbol thus existed even prior to the emergence of Chinese nationalism and would in fact serve as the basis for the ideal of the unified nation-state.

But this imperial notion of political community had its limits. At most, political loyalty was to the emperor or dynasty, not a nation. The state itself was not seen as an independent symbol. Instead, the persons of the emperor and his official servants, conducting their business in private, represented the state. Furthermore, local ties, such as to native place associations, were often a more salient source of loyalty than the emperor (Zarrow 2005: 59). Any notion of a national people, constituting an imagined community, was not yet present before the end of the 19th century.

Meanwhile, China's fraught relationship with the West was reaching its nadir. In 1839, the British launched the Opium War that resulted in the imposition of the first of the Unequal Treaties, diplomatic arrangements that undermined Qing sovereignty. A number of subsequent wars with Western powers and Japan culminated in 1900 with the occupation of the capital of Beijing by foreign armies. To make matters worse, China in the last half of the 19th century had to cope with a number of destructive internal rebellions that called into question the Qing dynasty's capacity to maintain order and preserve its power. Intellectuals and other groups in society increasingly questioned the ability of the Qing to defend China's territory and interests. In other words, the emergence of Chinese nationalism was closely linked to China's progressively deleterious situation in the last half of the 19th century.

Ideas of overarching community began to change in the 1890s. Kang Youwei, one of the chief proponents of the 1898 reform movement, began to think in terms of a national community originating in the teachings of Confucius (Zarrow 2005: 57). Liang Qichao, the other leader of the reform movement, was at the center of an emerging intellectual community that was distressed by the shame of China's humiliation at the hands of the Europeans and Japanese. This community had an interest in Japanese-style state-centered patriotism, drawing on traditional sources of authority for creating a modern nation (Cheek 2015: 53). Japan had successfully resisted European pressure and renegotiated its own Unequal Treaties. Consequently, Chinese intellectuals saw in Japan a favorable model upon which to base political and ideological reform. This model encompassed the fostering of a sense of national community and strong loyalty to the state, key ingredients for a nationally-legitimated symbol.

Nationalism developed further in the first two decades of the 20th century. In the years preceding the collapse of the Qing in 1911, both constitutional-monarchists and republicans considered the Chinese nation to be distinct from the Qing dynasty. Furthermore, these two groups committed themselves to strengthening China, believing that a strong state and leadership were required for this task (Zarrow 2005: 60). The New Culture Movement of the mid-1910s took this concern for strengthening to a more fundamental level than the purely political, arguing for a cultural and social transformation of China. Social utopian in nature, the proponents of this movement pushed for individuals to become better citizens, believing that social reorganization could strengthen democracy (Dirlik 1989: 198). New Culture intellectuals emphasized the social unity of the Chinese people, but also the rejuvenation of Chinese culture (Dirlik 1989: 96; Fitzgerald 1996: 138). The people, they argued, needed to become engaged

citizens because this was how a strong state would emerge. Liang Qichao, a major intellectual leader in the 1910s as well, argued that national culture provided the capacity for state sovereignty (Fitzgerald 1996: 108). The people, those who comprised the Chinese nation, would be the foundation of a unified Chinese nation-state.

We see a close association between the foundations of Chinese nationalism and the ideological objective of social progress, itself one of the bases of Marxism-Leninism's appeal to China's intellectuals. Social rejuvenation was to make the Chinese nation strong enough to reestablish national sovereignty. Marxism-Leninism was advocated for such rejuvenation, since the creation of a communist society required first the defeat of imperialism. Only the reassertion of Chinese sovereignty could ensure that the imperialists were expelled, severing their relationships with their class allies in Chinese society. In large part inspired by the Social Darwinist ideology widely shared by Chinese intellectuals, the Communists' Manichean view of international relations accorded well with the dominant nationalist discourses circulating through China's intellectual sphere. Only a rejuvenated, strong nation, therefore, could ensure not only the reunification of the Chinese nation-state but also the realization of a Communist utopian society.

Sun Yat-sen, the founder and early leader of the Nationalist Party (or Guomindang [GMD]), was another major contributor to nationalist thought in the early twentieth century. His "Three Principles of the People" were explicitly nationalistic, as evident in the in the principle of "nation" or "race". His other two principles of "democracy" and "people's livelihood" referred to a participatory and wealthy nation. As the first political figure to present a systematic blueprint for the future of the nascent Chinese nation, Sun ultimately became a

national hero in the eyes of many (Strand 2011: 30). His Principles came to hold a major place in Chinese nationalist thought. Even Yuan Shikai, the first President of the new Republic founded in 1912 and the last national leader to attempt to crown himself emperor, had to occasionally pay lip service to the Chinese "public" (Strand 2011: 92). The national citizen, rather than the imperial subject, was becoming the accepted conceptualization of a member of the national political community. In Sunism, then, we see the further development of the ideal of the unified Chinese nation-state. The people comprise the political community and are to be rejuvenated and strengthened through the introduction of democracy and the enhancement of the livelihood of the people. Chinese nationalism thus moved beyond primarily emphasizing patriotic loyalty to the state, a notion borrowed from Japan. Sun Yat-sen, a member of the Chinese intellectual sphere, introduced a paternalistic and participatory dimension to Chinese nationalism, with the people conceived as active citizens rather than passive subjects. Since he was considered the father of the Chinese nation, any manipulation of this symbol by a unifier would have to treat Sun positively. Furthermore, his core ideas – the Three Principles – would have to be espoused by a unifier if she wants to successfully incorporate independent social groups. Given Sun's reputation, we should expect such groups to subscribe to his beliefs. As we will see in the next chapter, Mao and the CCP did, in fact, incorporate Sunism into their rhetoric and official ideology.

By 1919, the politically-relevant social forces of China (e.g., the students, educators, rural magnates, city merchants, labor unionists, and even militarists) were frustrated by recent events that starkly confirmed China's lack of sovereignty. The Japanese seizure of territory in Shandong Province in North China in 1914, Japan's imposition of its 21 Demands, and the

Versailles Peace Conference decision permitting Japanese acquisition of former German possessions offended the nationalistic sentiments of these social forces. The Versailles decision was especially potent, triggering the May Fourth protests that swept the country in 1919, which led to merchant boycotts of Japanese goods, labor union strikes in foreign-dominated treaty ports, and an increasingly active and organized student movement (Fairbank 1987: 182; Lary 2006). By 1920, a firm belief in the necessity of a unified Chinese nation-state had taken hold across the country.

Chinese nationalism in this period was, unsurprisingly, indelibly anti-imperialist. The Unequal Treaties, treaty ports, freedom of travel for missionaries, and military actions by foreign troops contributed to a sense of national humiliation by the hands of foreign powers. Consequently, Chinese individuals who aided foreigners were viewed as traitors, often referred to as "running dogs of imperialism" (Fitzgerald 1996: 126). The compradors, or Chinese agents of foreign organizations, were especially singled out as enemies of the nation. Chinese nationalists also considered the warlords, with their autonomous military spheres, as principal foes who prevented the Chinese nation-state from becoming unified (Lary 2006: 64). Nationalist thought thus created hard boundaries between the constructed Chinese nation and select enemy groups. Foreign powers, compradors, warlords and other traitors of the nation could not be tolerated. A unifier seeking to incorporate independent social groups would have to avoid maintaining relationships with these enemy groups to at least seem credible when asserting to represent the Chinese nation. Moreover, the efficacy of an incorporation strategy would be substantially enhanced if the unifier spoke out against or even acted with hostility towards these groups.

The above discussion indicates that the ideal of the unified Chinese nation-state was thus not simply a symbol that justified political centralization and was seen as legitimate by politically-relevant social forces in China. First, the notion of the people as citizens was a core component of this symbol. Unifiers pursuing an incorporation strategy would have to address how to include the citizenry in participatory processes of state-making and governance. Second, Sun Yat-sen and his core ideas were central to notions of national legitimacy. His Three Principles would have to be espoused by a unifier hoping to garner widespread legitimacy. Third, not all individuals who resided within the former Qing borders were to be considered part of the Chinese nation. Unifiers would not be able to incorporate these enemy groups without their own legitimacy suffering in the eyes of China's politically-relevant social forces.

The specific structural nature of Republican China's nationally-legitimated symbol thus provides both opportunities and constraints for unifiers. On the one hand, the ideational developments of early Chinese nationalists such as Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen constructed a coherent political symbol that was adopted by most of Chinese urban society, where many, if not most, of the country's principal politically-relevant social forces resided. Unifiers could thus use this symbol to incorporate independent social groups. But on the other hand, the presence of the restrictions delineated above meant that there were limits and requirements to the incorporation strategy a unifier might formulate. What follows is a systematic definition of Republican China's nationally-legitimated symbol that includes these opportunities and constraints.

The Nationally-Legitimated Symbol of the Unified Chinese Nation-State

Nationalism in 1920s China was a political-intellectual movement that demanded the creation

of a sovereign nation-state that had the strength to protect its autonomy from outside forces.

Specifically, the foreign powers of Europe and Japan had to be expelled, along with their

imperialist structures, such as the Unequal Treaties that had undermined Chinese sovereignty

since the 1840s. Furthermore, the creation of a sovereign nation-state required the overthrow

of the warlords who by the 1920s had divided up most of China into their own autonomous

territories (Fitzgerald 1996: 103). A united, powerful state was widely viewed by members of

society to be necessary for a strong, independent Chinese nation. Following the second collapse

in just five years of the Chinese state in 1916, intellectuals, students, government officials, the

business class in the coastal cities, and urban classes in general called for a reconstituted state

(Lary 2006). In other words, the symbol of a unified Chinese nation-state was an ideal most

politically-relevant social forces in China found legitimate and desirable. Additionally, the

Chinese people, however defined, formed the nation that was to serve as the legitimate basis

of a unified state (Fitzgerald 1996; Cheek 2015). As spelled out by Sun Yat-sen, the people were

to be included in some kind of participatory framework that would link the citizenry with the

state. Furthermore, Sunism was at the core of this ideal of the nation-state. His Three Principles

formed an intrinsic part of Chinese national identity. Finally, Chinese nationalism identified key

groups – foreign powers, compradors and warlords – as enemies of the Chinese nation and thus

excluded from the political community. A nationally-legitimated symbol was thus available to

be employed by unifiers operating Republican China for the purposes of incorporation.

Structural Condition III: Availability of One or More Areas with a High Degree of Geopolitical Space

To reiterate, a high degree of geopolitical space signifies an area that has few and/or weak social forces that could support local elites' resistance to attempts to take away their prerogatives. Geopolitical space, as so conceived, permits an actor to disempower local elites which, in turn, can allow for direct access to resources. As I show below, there were areas in early twentieth century China that had substantially high degrees of geopolitical space. These areas, typically far from commercial capitals and characterized by rugged terrain, would be where my framework predicts that aspiring unifiers would have the greatest success in establishing secure initial bases of support. Places with these characteristics had lower density and strength of social groups that could help local elites resist unifiers' state-building efforts. Thus, these areas could be ideal launching pads for reunification campaigns like Mao Zedong's. In the remainder of this section, I discuss the general patterns of geopolitical space in early Republican china.

The nature of the economy and the distribution of the population at the end of the Imperial era provide good proxies for assessing which areas of China would have geopolitical space in the 1920s and 1930s. Though the Chinese economy did grow substantially between the 1890s and 1930s (Rawski 1989), it seems unlikely that this growth would have fundamentally altered the general structure of regional economies. The core-periphery model that G. William Skinner (1977) devised should still have effective descriptive power when identifying the parts of China that were more commercialized than others. Skinner notes that market towns and commercial cities in the 1890s were central nodes in the flow of goods and

services, money and credit, and economic opportunity. Consequently, these towns and cities were also the logical sites for public institutions such as communal temples, schools, and secret-society lodges (Skinner 1977: 276). The large number of social groups that would be associated with all these institutions, along with the many merchant groups that would crowd such commercially-advanced areas, suggests that these market towns and commercial cities would have low degrees of geopolitical space.

The major metropolises of China at this time were Beijing in North China, Xian in the Northwest, Chongqing along the Upper Yangzi River, Wuhan in the Middle Yangzi, Shanghai at the mouth of the Yangzi, Fuzhou on the Southeast Coast, and Guangzhou in the South (Skinner 1977: 283). These metropolises formed the major cores of China's regional economies and had much greater economic and infrastructural investment than the peripheries. These features suggest a greater concentration of social groups since investment implies active economic interest in an area by well-resourced individuals. Consequently, geopolitical space is expected to be lower in these metropolitan regions than peripheral ones.

China's macroregions differed by population density and in the average population of the most basic commercial geographic unit, the central marketing system, within them. Macroregions with lower population density and mean central marketing system population should have concomitantly lower numbers and strength of social groups since these macroregions would be less economically advanced and commercially advantageous than those with higher densities and average populations. Skinner's data from the 1890s show that Northwest and Southwest China had the lowest population densities and mean central marketing system populations, making these macroregions the likeliest to have had high

degrees of geopolitical space on average relative to other macroregions. The Middle and Upper

Yangzi macroregions would be expected to have had the next highest degrees of geopolitical

space (Skinner 1977: 300). These areas would be the parts of China, then, where the availability

of geopolitical space should be most likely.

Degrees of geopolitical space can be determined not just in terms of the macroregion in

which a place is located but also by considering the geographic and social differences between

core areas within each macroregion and their associated peripheries. Most edges of regional

peripheries were characterized by rugged mountains, swampy marshes and deserts (Skinner

1977: 283). These areas were populated by unconventional social groups such as non-Han or

partially assimilated ethnicities or by members of illicit production networks, religious sects,

secret societies, bandit bands, and so forth (Skinner 1977: 322). These groups were among the

least wealthy or powerful in Chinese society, not least because of the unproductive and remote

lands they resided on. Even if peripheral areas were home to a number of these groups, their

organizational strength would not be expected to be high. Rural areas in general, by the 1920s,

underwent a decrease in local social density as intellectuals alienated from rural life, often the

educated gentry youth, migrated to urban China. This process left the rural areas "economically

disengaged and socially crippled" (Cheek 2015: 94), further underscoring the likelihood of lower

social density, and thus higher geopolitical space, in peripheral areas (which were much more

likely to be rural) than in the regional cores.

Given this reasoning, the parts of China that, by the 1920s and 1930s, had the highest

degrees of geopolitical space would have been peripheral rural localities in the macroregions of

the Northwest and Southwest. Rural peripheral areas in the Middle and Upper Yangzi

macroregions would likely have had the next highest degrees of geopolitical space, on average.

Of course, local variations (such as extraordinarily rugged terrain) would have made parts of the

Middle and Upper Yangzi regions have greater geopolitical space than parts of the Northwest

and Southwest. But, in general, the latter two macroregions' peripheries would have been the

most ideal places for unifiers to attempt to establish their initial bases of support. A paradox

concerning this conclusion, though, is that border regions and isolated provinces were also

likely to have fewer readily available resources than other areas, meaning that reunification

campaigns that started in them would have limited power in the short-run and thus vulnerable

to assaults by rival campaigns. The distribution of reunification campaigns by rival unifiers, then,

is likely to have a major impact on a unifier's early odds of success. Specifically, relatively

stronger rival campaigns that hold power in nearby areas are expected to be much graver

threats to a unifier than campaigns that are weaker, further away, or both. My framework does

not predict what this distribution should look like, and thus inductive analysis of our

reunification campaign of interest, Mao Zedong's, will have to serve as the method for

uncovering which parts of China would present Mao and the Communists' efforts with the

greatest threats. This analysis will be done in the next chapter.

The issue of rival reunification campaigns highlights how the availability of areas with

high degrees of geopolitical space functions as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for

successful state reconstitution. In areas like the Northwest and Southwest macroregions,

unifiers would have a considerably easier time contending with local elites than in other regions.

Disempowerment strategies would therefore be much more viable in these macroregions,

especially in their peripheral and rural areas. But disempowerment does not address the

challenge unifiers would face from rival forces, whether those are led by other unifiers, like Chiang Kai-shek of the GMD, or external forces, such as the Imperial Japanese Army. If these forces are able to project power into the areas that the unifier is working on building up his support base, they can neutralize the unifier's incipient campaign. Geopolitical space does not necessarily address these kinds of challenges. Even if a unifier is able to gain access to an area with a high degree of geopolitical space, he may still be vulnerable to hostile forces based outside the area in which he is operating. However, geopolitical space is necessary for disempowering local elites, which in turn can grant the unifier direct access to resources. This access can enable the unifier to construct a powerful support base that he can utilize to resist and even defeat rival forces. As we will see in the next chapter, Mao's reunification campaign encountered both of these situations, at first being vulnerable to rival forces and later superior to them.

Structural Conditions of Sengoku Japan

We now turn to the second principal case of this study, Sengoku Japan, which began in 1477 and ended in 1615. Before discussing how the three necessary structural conditions were manifest, I present a brief history of the case. Prior to the Sengoku Era, the previous state was the Ashikaga Shogunate, which, following the deadly internal conflict known as the Onin War (1467-1477), quickly lost nearly all control over the country and was abandoned by the country's political elite. The former central government came to control only the capital city of Kyoto and its environs. Because of its weak regional support bases and close ties to the

Shogunate, the authority of the regional elite, the *shugo*, collapsed shortly after the state itself

fell apart. What followed was a period of over one hundred years in which the islands of Japan

were wracked by internal disunity and increasingly intense and frequent warfare between

newly-emergent regional elites known as the *daimyo*, who were mostly distinct from the old

shugo families.

After the nadir of political decentralization in the early 1550s, a number of increasingly

powerful daimyo emerged as regional hegemons, each leading a coalition of samurai warlords.

One such hegemon, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, launched a reunification campaign in 1582 and

succeeded in reconstituting the Japanese state eight years later. His death precipitated a brief

civil war, with Tokugawa Ieyasu emerging victorious. Hideyoshi's son and heir retained his own

power base, however, posing as the final obstacle to Ieyasu's efforts to reunify the state under

his and his family's control. With the defeat of Hideyoshi's son and his supporters in 1615, the

Tokugawa Shogunate's authority became uncontested. The new state ruled supreme for over

two hundred and fifty years, until the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

Structural Condition 1: Availability of a Specialized Ideological Framework

I focus on four key ideological concepts that collectively formed a unifier-supporting specialized

ideological framework: the house code, or a set of laws that governed a daimyo's domain and

coalition; *kokka*, which refers to a daimyo's claims to exclusive territorial authority; *kogi*, or

public authority; and *tenka*, which refers to a universal conception of authority. These four

main concepts were formulated or modified by daimyo and Oda Nobunaga (d. 1582), the first

unifier of Sengoku Japan, prior to Hideyoshi's ascent as leader of a reunification campaign

himself. Unlike Marxism-Leninism in Republican China, there was no official organization

responsible for the development and dissemination for these concepts. Instead, individual

daimyo initially employed the first three concepts, the house code, kokka and kogi, to imbue

themselves with authority and impose discipline on their warrior coalitions. Nobunaga, over the

course of his failed reunification campaign from 1558 to 1582, adopted these concepts and

added his own, tenka, in order to develop an ideological framework capable of justifying Japan-

wide rule. In this section, I first delineate the historical development of these concepts and then

present a unified presentation of the Nobunaga ideological framework.

Development of Core Ideological Concepts: house code, kokka, kogi and tenka

House codes, which daimyo began formulating as early as the late 1400s but did not start to see

widespread use until the 1550s, represent the first use of ideology for the purposes of political

centralization. These legal codes asserted daimyo sovereign authority and legitimacy and

systematized a wide range of economic, social, and legal regulations (Berry 1982: 33-34; Hall

1970: 131-132; Souyri 2001: 207). They were the most prominent displays of autonomy for the

daimyo, asserting universal and final jurisdiction in their territories. Private land seizures, for

instance, were prohibited (Shizuo 1981: 109). The right to govern rested with the ruler, and did

not derive from proprietary rights, as had been the case previously (Ooms 1985: 24). In this

sense, the house codes represented the start of a revolutionary turn in the conceptualization of

authority in medieval Japan. A daimyo lord held ultimate exclusive authority over all the lands

he claimed. Proprietors, such as local samurai elites or religious institutions, could no longer

claim inalienable rights to property. Furthermore, at least one of these codes emphasized the

organic nature of society, led by the daimyo as the "roof" of his domain. The ruler must meet

the people's needs while every individual had her function to perform in service of the domain.

These functions were to be ranked according to their importance to society. In other words, the

house codes also served as "program[s] for rebuilding society" and as justifications for

sociopolitical hierarchy (Ooms 1985: 25). By justifying the daimyo lord's authority, house codes

performed a similar function to Marxism-Leninism's emphasis on the role of the Communist

Party as vanguard for the revolution. Moreover, the ranked, organic view of society that these

at least one of these codes embraced supported a particular sociopolitical hierarchy, just like

the Marxist-Leninist elevation of the proletariat over the other classes.

In addition to justifying daimyo authority over their territories, house codes regulated

the daimyo's core supporters, systematizing and justifying their hierarchical relations with their

lord. In line with this function, house codes in fact began as collections of moral precepts to

ensure the daimyo house's prosperity and dignity (Shizuo 1981: 103). By the middle of the

sixteenth century, though, the codes also delineated the expectations and mechanisms of

supporters' loyalty. Such mechanisms included: requirements that all disputes between vassals

be settled by the daimyo; explicit codifications of the priority of loyalty to the daimyo; bans on

the formation of private subgroups within the retainers' ranks; and prohibitions against any

kind of lateral relationships or alliances (Shizuo 1981: 107). Clear expectations of disciplined

behavior, then, were set down for supporters to follow, just like the CCP in Republican China

did for its supporters.

The daimyo who developed these codes associated them with the notion of *kokka*, or

the territorial sphere of political control claimed by the daimyo. As a political term, kokka had

been in existence since the seventh century and originally referred to the entirety of the

Japanese political system as embodied in the person of the Japanese emperor. However, by the

early sixteenth century, daimyo began using kokka to refer to their domains (Hall 1983: 10).

Thus, a concept that originally fused the political community with the ruling monarch was now

being used by daimyo lords. We can expect that the historical association of kokka with

personal authority enhanced the legitimacy of the individual daimyo who employed it to refer

to their own spheres of control. Indeed, daimyo would argue that because he was the ruler of a

kokka, his retainers must be loyal to him. Furthermore, kokka as a source of retainer loyalty

replaced the traditional modes of allegiance based on private samurai codes of honor (Shizuo

1981: 111). In return, the daimyo were obligated to defend and preserve their subjects.

Retainers often insisted that the daimyo were subject to the same laws, suggesting that kokka

was beginning to be seen as a source of authority residing outside the daimyo lord's person, at

least by his subordinates. Additionally, daimyo in the early sixteenth century clarified the

meaning of kokka to refer to territorial control specifically, rather than the relatively

amorphous political community or system that it had originally represented. Kokka can thus be

seen as justifying *state* authority in particular, a crucial innovation for later political actors who

wished to reconstitute the state.

In brief, daimyo used kokka as an ideology of political control to legitimate their claims

to territorial authority. House codes were taken seriously by core supporters because of the

ideological basis behind them: the daimyos' claims to kokka. Like the notion of the vanguard

party in Marxism-Leninism, kokka justified centralized political rule by the daimyo lord. Thus,

kokka converged with the house codes to form an ideological complex of legitimation.

A related concept, *kogi*, meaning public ceremony or affairs, was also used by daimyo to justify their rule (Hall 1983: 11, 22). In this case, the daimyo were explicitly making a claim to public, rather than private, authority over their territories. Kogi, like house codes and kokka, was used to create a new ideological foundation for authority by justifying political centralization by the daimyo.

The idea of *tenka*, or the realm, as an evolutionary extension of the notion of kokka, was tethered to kogi by Nobunaga to legitimize his rule and strategies (Ooms 1985: 27). Importantly, tenka was a holistic concept, encompassing a broad notion of authority and political community. In this sense, it reinforced later claims by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi to rule over Japan in its entirety. Thus, daimyo claims to authority over circumscribed territorial areas were transformed to claims over a universal realm. In other words, the ideology that tenka encompassed was a transformative one. Nobunaga spearheaded the active use of tenka to legitimize his goals; for instance, he included reference to tenka in the new seal he created for himself after defeating a powerful rival. He argued that tenka was a universal principle that transcended status; in other words, *he* was the tenka (Shizuo 1981: 120). When Nobunaga expelled the incumbent (and powerless) claimant to political authority over all Japan, Ashikaga Yoshiaki, from the capital in 1573, he rationalized his actions by arguing that Yoshiaki had lacked the ability to rule the tenka (Shizuo 1981: 121). Thus, Nobunaga's manipulation of the concept of tenka completed the development of his ideological framework that justified his centralized rule.

By this point, Nobunaga had successfully combined tenka with the older features of the house code, kokka and kogi to justify his claims to authority in the eyes of core supporters.

Moreover, by the end of his life in 1582 Nobunaga had managed to conquer a third of Japan.

His success was certainly part of the reason his subordinate and successor Hideyoshi adopted

the ideological framework Nobunaga and others had developed piecemeal. The framework was

specialized since much of it, like the house codes, was directed specifically at the daimyo's and

Nobunaga's samurai followers. Though other social classes were targeted as well by these

ideological concepts, the samurai were the main audience. The specialized nature of this

framework also meant that it likely would exclude certain social forces. Indeed, the fact that the

daimyo and Nobunaga were from the military caste meant that claims of authority arising from

alternative sources, specifically religious ones, would be irreconcilable with the samurai-

focused ideological framework discussed here. Buddhist monasteries and foreign religious

organizations, such as the Jesuits, would be viewed with suspicion and could not be

ideologically accommodated by the military caste unifiers of the latter decades of the sixteenth

century, Hideyoshi Toyotomi and Tokugawa Ieyasu.

The Nobunaga Ideological Framework

Sengoku Japan had a specialized ideological framework that fit the three criteria proposed by

the theory presented in the previous chapter. The concepts of tenka, kokka and kogi, combined

with the house code, justified claims to centralized political rule by a unifier. All four concepts

worked together to develop a conception of sociopolitical hierarchy considered appropriate by

core supporters. The house code, for instance, was centered on regulating members of the

samurai caste, implicitly acknowledging their attitudes of superiority vis-à-vis other social strata.

Finally, the concept of tenka, the unified realm, provided a long-term goal to which core

supporters could be dedicated. The historical continuity of Japan, as embodied in the emperor (discussed next), gave credence to Nobunaga's objective of reunification. Consequently, Hideyoshi and Tokugawa had an ideological framework available to them that they could use to create durable, dedicated and disciplined reunification coalitions.

Similar to Marxism-Leninism in Republican China, which elevated the proletariat and considered segments of the bourgeoisie to be inimical to revolution, the ideological framework of Nobunaga favored the samurai class over others. Tying sources of authority, such as kogi and tenka, to the samurai-focused house codes meant that the samurai would be treated preferentially by a unifier who adopted this framework, just like the proletariat would be for any Communist unifier in Republican China. As I show in the next chapter, the state that Tokugawa Ieyasu constructed in the early seventeenth century elevated the samurai to the preeminent position in Japanese society, realizing the hierarchical ideals of the early ideological innovators of the mid-Sengoku era.

Structural Condition II: Availability of a Nationally-Legitimated Symbol

In Sengoku Japan, the emperor was the primary nationally-legitimated symbol. Religious institutions, aristocrats and samurai lords viewed the emperor and the imperial court as the "deepest source of honor in the country" (Berry 1982: 171). The court was unique as a source of legitimacy and a symbol of social continuity and cohesion, with the emperor being considered the chief divine protector of Japan (Berry 1982: 173, 187; Gay 1993: 62). The imperial culture was emulated by rising warrior families, including those of the shoguns, the most powerful warrior lords in medieval Japan (Gay 1993: 63; Hall 1966: 202). Both the

aristocracy and warrior elites believed in the idea of an imperial state that held the Japanese

polity together and from which political authority was delegated, even during the great

upheavals of the sixteenth century (Hall 1966: 8; Butler 2002: 2). The emperor and his court

resided at the top of medieval Japan's symbolic hierarchy, with the aristocracy, religious

establishment and warrior families viewing him as the principal source of political authority.

Indeed, as mentioned in the previous section, kokka originally represented a somewhat vague

notion of political community that nonetheless was intimately connected with the person of

the emperor. Thus, the emperor, as a symbol, justified political centralization and was accepted

by the politically-relevant social forces of Japan.

The imperial court's culture and institutions buttressed the symbolic power of the

emperor. It had a system of court titles and ranks, for instance, historically granted only to

members of the aristocracy and religious establishment. But by the mid-1400s leading warrior

houses were also acquiring court titles (Hall 1966: 204). Even at the height of warrior power,

though, the court had exclusive rights over the bestowal of court ranks and titles. Additionally,

the court's ideological power was expressed in its dress, rank, office, arts and ceremonies.

Samurai wanted to take part in court culture, but to do so required establishing relationships

with the court and its members (Butler 2002: 4). The court also had extensive ties to Buddhist

and Shinto institutions (Butler 2002: 11), which often had followers from both wealthy and

rustic backgrounds (Tsang 2010). Thus, the imperial court's social presence was felt throughout

medieval Japanese society.

Clearly, if a unifier should wish to incorporate social groups beyond her core coalition of

supporters, appealing to the symbolic power of the emperor and his court would be the most

obvious choice. Just like the unified nation-state in Republican China, the imperial symbol in medieval Japan had ideational power over the politically-relevant social groups. Its manipulation could then be a broadly effective strategy. The key restriction, however, was that claims to authority that did *not* reference the emperor would almost certainly be viewed as illegitimate, probably dooming the offending unifier's reunification efforts. So long as this restriction is heeded, a unifier in Sengoku Japan, like Hideyoshi or Tokugawa, had a nationally-legitimated symbol available for them to utilize.

Structural Condition III: Availability of Geopolitical Space

The principal commercial region of Sengoku Japan, known as Kinai, was the capital area centered on the city of Kyoto. As the terminus for most provincial trade throughout the Sengoku era, it constituted the nucleus of the national economy. Powerful guilds controlled monopolies and strong independent cities dominated key industries (Wakita 1981: 226; Sasaki 1981: 125-126). Furthermore, even though aristocratic power had been almost fully eroded nationally by the start of the Sengoku era, aristocratic and religious institutions in Kinai continued to have considerable economic and territorial power.

The capital region and adjacent provinces were also home to horizontally-organized peasant associations known as *ikki*. These ikki, first emerging in force in the 1400s, appealed chiefly to commoners and peasants, but also to village priests and poor samurai. These organizations generally sought local social autonomy (Davis 1974:227-230), and, in some cases, were able to successfully resist daimyo authority (Davis 1974: 236). So not only would they be

likely to resist attempts by unifiers to establish direct resource access, they might even be successful.

Some ikki were religious, which gave them added social power. The *Ikko* ikki, for instance, was associated with a nationally-popular Buddhist sect and managed to establish strong power bases in provinces adjacent to the capital region (Davis 1974: 238). These religious ikki would prove to be some of Nobunaga's most powerful foes in his wars of reunification.

Provinces outside the capital region for the most part did not have strong ikki or substantial aristocratic or religious influence. Moreover, their relatively low commercialization meant they did not contain powerful guilds or independent cities; only warrior families and networks predominated here. Consequently, one can infer that non-capital region provinces, with the exception of the two that the Ikko ikki had taken control of, had relatively low social density and thus high degrees of geopolitical space. Moreover, since these provinces were dominated by the warrior caste, a unifier that also came from this stratum, such as Hideyoshi or Tokugawa, would likely have an easier time securing and mobilizing support than one who came from the religious, commoner, or aristocratic spheres. Additionally, a unifier who employs Nobunaga's ideological framework would be expected to foster samurai loyalty and cooperation since the framework treats this class most preferentially.

Still, powerful samurai lords could be expected to challenge attempts by emerging unifiers to develop rival support bases in the territories they controlled. Local elites who were facing pressure from a unifier could also have appealed to a nearby samurai lord for assistance

in exchange for, say, loyalty or military support. Thus, provinces that did not contain shugo or daimyo with sizable support bases would have been most desirous for emerging unifiers.

We can establish where these potential spoilers were located and thus where emerging unifiers, outside of the Kinai capital region, would likely have the most difficult time founding a reunification coalition. As already mentioned, the 1550s were the nadir of political fragmentation in Sengoku Japan, when the country had the fewest elites who could project power beyond their local areas. Still, some families who had been members of the collapsed shugo class persisted into the 1550s. Since they were able to survive such a major political upheaval, we can surmise that they had especially strong institutional bases of support which had endured from before the cataclysmic Onin War that triggered the fall of the previous state. These durable ex-shugo families could have also reinforced their power through institutional and ideological innovation. In fact, a number of former shugo families were responsible for some of the major ideological developments delineated above. Thus, areas where these families resided would be less desirable for emerging unifiers than areas without such families.

Ten former shugo families with substantial support bases survived into the 1550s (Berry 1982: 246, fn. 13). The Takeda and Imagawa families ruled in the provinces of Kai and Totomi and Suruga, respectively, in the Tokaido region to the east of the capital region. The Ouchi and Yamana controlled the provinces of Suo and Inaba, respectively, in the western region of the main island of Honshu. The Rokkaku, Kyogaku and Uesugi resided in provinces of Omi, Wakasa, and Echigo, respectively, to the north and northwest of the capital region. Between the two of them, the Otomo and Shimazu clans controlled almost all of the southern island of Kyushu. Finally, the Satake clan claimed Hitachi province in the far northwestern of the main island. As

the next chapter shows, Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and Tokugawa all originated from provinces that did not have a resident major former shugo family residing in them. Areas with high degrees of geopolitical space were thus in fact taken advantage of by the unifiers of Sengoku Japan.

Conclusion

Both Republican China and Sengoku Japan had the three structural conditions my framework proposes are necessary for successful state reconstitution. In the next chapter, I investigate how the unifiers of these two cases – Mao Zedong in China, and Hideyoshi Toyotomi and Tokugawa Ieyasu in Japan – took advantage of these structural conditions to pursue their reunification strategies.

Chapter Three: Necessary Strategic Conditions and State Reconstitution

In this chapter, I present each of the three necessary strategic conditions, as proposed in my theoretical framework, for Republican China and Sengoku Japan. Each section discusses the three conditions for each case, using the same format as in the previous chapter. These three strategic conditions are: *cohering of core supporters, incorporation of external social forces*, and *disempowerment of local elites*. Before discussing the cases, I explain what a strategic condition exactly is and its relation to structure. I also briefly review each condition and its causal significance.

A strategy is an intentional act, or set of acts, performed by an actor committed to the transformation of the social world in some way. In this way, strategies relate to the duality of structure since actors can utilize strategies to alter the structural nature of the social environment. A strategy is more than a speech act in that it involves concerted action on the part of the actor(s), not simply the stated desire or intention for such action and its effects to be realized. In other words, an act or set of acts must be implemented to be considered a strategy. This does not mean, however, that the strategy's implementation must also lead to the intended results. Strategies can fail and can have unintended consequences – including none of the intended ones! But in order for an act to be considered a strategy, the actor must put forth committed effort to see its successful implementation. A strategic condition is simply a strategy that has causal effects relevant to a particular theoretical framework.

In the context of a reunification campaign, a strategy is designed to further the aims and interests of the unifier, which can include (but are not limited to) the reconstruction of a state. A committed, intentionally transformative act does not need to actually have the potential for realizing a unifier's aims to be considered a strategy. The unifier must simply *believe* that such an act will be efficacious. Furthermore, the aim that the unifier believes the strategy should help to realize does not need to be primarily or directly concerned with state reconstruction. A unifier may implement a strategy for some other purpose, such as transformation of class relations. Nonetheless, the central problem unifiers must solve in order to successfully reconstitute the state is how to establish access to resources and control society. So long as the strategy is intended to enhance these two key state-building imperatives, it is relevant to state reconstitution.

Strategies relate to structure through their capacity, if successful, to alter the institutions and configurations of society. One way the transformative capacity of human actors is expressed is through strategies. Other ways include accumulative shifts in cultural practices and collective reactions to social stimuli such as economic or military crises. Strategies are distinct from these other forms of transformation in their intentionality, commitment and purposiveness. These special attributes grant strategies much greater transformative capacity than other kinds of action because they entail the concentration of human energies on a particular area of concern, that is, they call for utilizing the unique strengths of collective action for the achievement of specific goals rather than diffuse objects of interest. Thus, strategies should play a special role in the structuration process explicated by Anthony Giddens (1984). By focusing the analysis of structural change on strategies, the researcher can avoid placing too

much emphasis on conditions such as the universal human desire for order that are present across the population of cases of state collapse and are thus trivial. Instead, the strategies highlighted in this chapter pertain to *how* order can be reforged in a context of state collapse – that is, how a reconstituted state can be constructed.

As stated above, the two key imperatives of state-building are resource access and social control. The three necessary strategies I list above directly address this core concern. First, the cohering of core supporters involves inculcating both durable loyalty to the unifier and long-term commitment to the goal of state reconstitution. A specialized ideological framework is needed for such purposes. Cohering core supporters reduces the level of resources needed to keep the core coalition in line and operating effectively. Consequently, this strategy ameliorates the intensity of the imperative of resource access; fewer material resources are needed to achieve the same goals than if core supporters were not disciplined. Cohering also *enhances* the capacity for unifiers to access resources, since united and disciplined core supporters are less prone than they otherwise would be to fall prey to countervailing material inducements, such as from recalcitrant local elites not desirous to relinquish their power over societal resources. Core supporters are also more motivated in their efforts to help the unifier establish access to resources when they are disciplined. Additionally, cohering assists the unifier in imposing control over society. This strategy most directly helps the unifier establish command over her core supporters, who are also members of society and constituent groups. Supporters' social embeddedness means they can use their network connections with individuals outside the reunification campaign's core coalition to further the coalition's goals. Furthermore, the dedication and loyalty that cohering instills in core supporters increase the efficaciousness of

the supporters' attempts to help the unifier establish social control in the territories she claims authority over. All these potential benefits indicate that disciplining of core supporters is a highly and persistently salient strategy necessary for successful state reconstitution.

The second necessary strategy is the incorporation of independent social forces through the manipulation of an encompassing, nationally-legitimated symbol (or symbols). A social force – a group of individuals with collective power or identity – is independent if it is not part of the reunification campaign. Successful incorporation makes such forces allies or at least passive supporters of the unifier and his campaign. As a consequence, resistance to the campaign's territorial expansion and social penetration is reduced, diminishing the level of resources needed to establish social control. The struggle for resource access is thus less of an imperative than it would be without incorporation. Additionally, this strategy makes it more likely that external social forces will permit the unifier access to resources under their control. The unifier is then less compelled to use finite coercive and utilitarian power to gain access to these additional resources. Incorporation also assists the unifier in territorial expansion. In general, incorporation enhances the unifier's legitimacy, an attribute that all aspirant and actual state rulers ultimately need to ensure social control. This connection to the unifier's authority establishes incorporation as the second core necessary strategic condition for successful state reconstitution.

The final necessary strategy, the disempowerment of local elites, is critical for the unifier to gain direct access to societal resources. Local elites generally control these resources, to varying degrees depending on the context, and so their disempowerment opens the way for the unifier to gain access to these resources directly. Direct access to resources is crucial since it

obviates the need for the unifier to provide concessions to local elites in order to gain access to these resources, thus greatly enhancing the efficiency of the unifier's resource collection efforts. When a unifier is first establishing his support base, extraction efficiency is highly salient since the geographic extent of the unifier's control is limited. Furthermore, in general, high levels of efficiency in resource extraction directly correlate with high levels of organizational and coercive capacities, which are essential for controlling members of society in the areas the unifier seeks to control.

All three of these strategies are central to the transformation of social structure in a context of state collapse. Such transformation is intrinsic to the duality of structure, which state reconstitution by definition reflects. Most obviously, as I have asserted, these strategies are necessary for successful state reconstitution, which involves a transformation from a structural condition of state collapse to one of state reemergence. But these strategies are also involved in other social transformations. Core supporter unity and discipline helps create new structures of organizational capacity that can form the bedrock of an emergent state. Local elite disempowerment aids in developing parallel structures of extractive capacity. And incorporation of independent social forces affects the symbolic structural environment by altering the relational configurations of legitimation and authority since diffuse support for a symbol is translated to concrete support for a particular unifier and coalition. All three of these strategies increase the capacities and foster the success of reunification campaigns, which in turn help establish unifiers' core coalitions as distinct social forces. In other words, these three necessary strategic conditions not only crucially contribute to the reemergence of the state; they also transform the social environment within which the new state emerges and operates.

Consistent with Giddens' structuration paradigm, these three strategies not only

transform social structures but are also dependent on them. Specifically, each strategy is

associated with one of the three structural conditions analyzed in the preceding chapter:

cohering core supporters depends on the prior existence of a specialized ideological framework;

incorporating independent social forces requires the availability of a nationally-legitimated

symbol; and disempowering local elites can only occur where there is adequate geopolitical

space. Each of these structural conditions can themselves be altered by the strategies a unifier

adopts. But the initial adoption of the three key strategies I highlight here can only occur when

the three associated structural conditions are met. Consequently, the analytical framework this

study utilizes explicitly incorporates the structuration paradigm, that is, the two-way

relationship between agency and structure, with one influencing and transforming the other, is

reflected in the emphasis on both the structural and strategic conditions I argue are necessary

for successful state reconstitution.

In the remainder of this chapter, I present an analysis of the three necessary strategies

for, first, Republican China and, second, Sengoku Japan. The order in which the strategies are

presented corresponds with the order of the associated structural conditions used in the last

chapter. Thus, for each case, the cohering of core supporters is presented first, then the

incorporation of independent social forces, and finally the disempowerment of local elites. The

order in which the unifiers engaged in these strategies does not matter in itself. However, as

my theoretical framework predicts, certain strategies should be more salient in certain phases

of state reconstitution than others (see Chapter One).[10] While discussing how the three

strategic conditions were manifest in the two cases, I assess the extent to which the unifiers'

strategic decision-making accords with these predictions of salience.

Strategic Conditions of Republican China: the Campaign of Mao Zedong

Before analyzing the three strategic conditions as they pertain to Mao Zedong's reunification

campaign, we first have to address two issues related to how this case falls within the scope

conditions of the theoretical framework. This framework's focus is on internally-driven, or

endogenous, state reconstitution. Moreover, the framework is structured around the agency of

unifiers, political leaders who seek to reconstitute the state. Two key questions can be derived

from these scope conditions: is the state reconstitution process in fact being led principally by

domestic actors, and does the political leader that the case study focuses on in fact have

sufficient agency to pursue state reconstitution? Agency can be assessed by investigating the

extent to which the leader could make decisions autonomously from other actors and deemed

sufficient if this autonomy encompasses overall strategic decision-making for the reunification

campaign. For the case of Mao Zedong's reunification campaign in the Republican period, the

answer to both questions is yes. Addressing the historical facts clarifies the extent to which

Communist state reconstitution was primarily endogenous and the extent and time frame of

Mao's political agency.

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[10] Recall that these phases are: inception, extension and consolidation.

The influence of the Soviet government in Moscow was preponderant in the affairs of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through the 1930s. From the founding of the CCP in 1921, the Russians had considerable control over the strategic decisions Chinese communist leaders had to make (Ch'en 1986: 169; Pantsov 2012: 188, 288). As late as the early 1930s, the main leadership body of the CCP, the Central Committee, was making strategic decisions regarding the Chinese communist movement in accordance with directives sent from Moscow (Pantsov 2012: 229). Individual leaders of the CCP were deposed and promoted according to the wishes of the Russians (Pantsov 2012: 235). Both strategic and organizational decisions were dictated by the Soviets.

It was not until early 1933 that Moscow's influence began diminishing. At this time, the core CCP leaders that the Russians had principal contacts with had to flee Shanghai, where the Party's headquarters was, because of an intensified political terror campaign by their foes, the Nationalists or Guomindang (GMD). A year and a half later, the Russian Communists shut down their foreign affairs bureau in Shanghai that had been used as the chief organizational conduit between Moscow and the CCP (Pantsov 2012: 267). Following the Long March of 1934-35, which involved Mao and the main force of the CCP and its army fleeing a vicious assault by the GMD, Stalin continued to have ideological and strategic influence over the Chinese Communists, including Mao, but the CCP's strategic and organizational autonomy increased. Specifically, key leadership decisions were made without Russian input, including, most importantly, Mao's emergence as preeminent leader of the CCP. But by 1937 Russian influence was back to its original level, not least because of the continued financial and material dependence the CCP had on Moscow (Pantsov 2012: 304). For instance, the decision for the CCP to forge a united

front with their erstwhile foes the Nationalists to resist the invading Japanese forces was pushed by Stalin on a reluctant Mao Zedong. Broad strategic decisions were often made by Moscow and Stalin repeatedly had an active hand in the leadership struggles that recurrently beset the CCP.

The above facts suggest that Mao's reunification campaign was directed by an outside force. In other words, Chinese state reconstitution was *not* endogenously driven. But there were major decisions that Mao and other Chinese leaders did make autonomously that related to the nature and trajectory of the reunification campaign. For one, in the Communist leadership, both Chinese and Russian, Mao was the foremost proponent of guerilla, rurally-focused tactics, rather than pitched battles centered on major cities, and was often at loggerheads with his peers. Guerilla tactics, though, ultimately became the primary method of military conflict that the Chinese Communist forces utilized. A second example was land reform. From the late 1920s to the late 1940s, a period that encompassed the whole time Mao was in charge of the Communist reunification campaign, he implemented land reform policies that frequently went against the views of other senior Communist leaders, including the so-called Returned Students who had been educated in the Soviet Union and had the support of the Soviet leadership.

In fact, one of these students, Wang Ming, lost out to Mao for control of the CCP, despite having the support of Stalin and probably the Comintern as well (Van Slyke 1986: 616). Returning to China in late 1937, Wang advocated for the CCP to focus on the cities and recruitment of the urban proletariat. But by September 1938 he had lost to Mao's message of rurally-based resistance and saw the Comintern switch its support to Mao (Van Slyke 1986: 619).

Mao had been able to withstand a leadership challenge from a favored candidate backed by the Soviets, purported directors of the Chinese communist movement.

Also, key strategic decisions, such as moving Communist forces to southern Jiangxi province and, later, northern Shaanxi province were principally Mao's. Furthermore, though the CCP received considerable financial and material aid from the Soviets, the latter did not provide troops. The Chinese Communists typically were the principal decision-makers when it came to short-term tactical issues, especially so during the War of Resistance against Japan from 1937 to 1945. This strategic and organizational autonomy increased as the years went along, such that by the end of the War of Resistance Mao was readying for renewed civil war with the Nationalists despite Stalin's misgivings (Pantsov 2012: 347). Thus, though Mao and the Communists' reunification campaign did not have complete autonomy when it came to broad strategic issues and leadership questions, it was unquestionably an internally-managed and in large part an internally-directed political movement. Critical, decisive tactics were devised in China by Mao and his supporters.

The second issue of theoretical scope relates to Mao's leadership over the Communist reunification campaign. Mao's supremacy was more or less established by January 1935, though there were brief periods involving challenges to his leadership later that year and in 1937-38. Between mid-1940 and 1943 Mao solidified his complete control over the CCP (Pantsov 2012: 279, 288, 330; Van Slyke 1986: 615). However, even before 1935 Mao often had considerable autonomy in the regional affairs he was engaged in. In fact, in the period between 1927 and 1934, Mao developed and first implemented many of the policies that he would use as paramount leader to reunify the country under his authority. Thus, though we cannot truly

consider Mao a unifier (i.e., the leader of a reunification campaign) until January 1935 at the

earliest, analysis of his strategic decision-making, and how it related to the three necessary

strategic conditions highlighted here, should begin earlier, in 1927 when he first controlled with

relative autonomy regional political-military forces. Mao's leadership then does fall within the

scope of my theoretical framework.

What follows is a structured narrative of Mao's major decisions as they relate to the

three key strategies that my framework focuses on. Though other factors proved crucial for the

success of Mao's reunification campaign, such as the material support from the Soviets, they

are downplayed or not discussed since they are largely idiographic – that is, they are not

included in the generalizable framework I have proposed and there are no analogues present in

the other main case analyzed, Sengoku Japan. Additionally, though Mao did not become a

major leader in the CCP until 1927 at the earliest, many of his strategies were continuations of

previously-established CCP policies. Thus, events prior to Mao's emergence and ascendance are

discussed when they are relevant to discussing the three necessary strategic conditions, even

though they occurred outside the formal, explicit leadership of Mao as the unifier.

Cohering of Core Supporters

As discussed in the previous chapter, by the early 1920s, Marxism-Leninism had emerged as a

specialized, unifier-supporting ideological framework. It provided long-run goals, principally

concerned with social revolution, to which core supporters could be dedicated. These goals

justified the construction of a social hierarchy through the elevation of the proletariat. A

reconstituted state, itself a hierarchical structure, would be necessary to achieve such a utopia.

This proletarian utopia could serve as a sociopolitical hierarchy that core supporters considered appropriate. Additionally, Marxism-Leninism justified centralized political rule by the unifier through the concepts of the vanguard party and democratic centralism. A unifier can justify her personal rule or leadership by taking control of this vanguard and asserting authority over the party center.

Mao did just that. Over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, he and his close associates in the CCP utilized this ideological framework to discipline their core supporters. The goal of social revolution was persistently emphasized, if not always with the same level of intensity, even during periods when the CCP sought alliances with external social forces not supportive of such a goal. Additionally, policies that Mao and the CCP implemented were generally consistent with this primary social-revolutionary goal of Marxism-Leninism. Mao also used this framework to progressively concentrate power in his person by, for instance, employing the concepts such of the vanguard party and democratic centralism to imbue his efforts with legitimacy, as expected. Marxism-Leninism, coupled with his own theoretical contributions, served as an ideological resource for Mao to achieve and maintain core supporter loyalty and dedication, thus enhancing the efficacy of his reunification coalition.

Mao started using ideology for state-building purposes when in 1927 he led the few troops he commanded to the mountainous border region of Jinggangshan between Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. Here, he set up a soviet-style government that included an Assembly of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers' Deputies and a People's Assembly (Pantsov 2012: 202). The workers, peasants, and soldiers were the three revolutionary classes of Marxism-Leninism, as stated in the founding document of the CCP (Saich and Yang 1996). These organizations

effectively formed a soviet government (Pantsov 2012: 202). Additionally, in Jinggangshan the

CCP instituted a number of local government bodies that were designed, in part, to incorporate

non-party members (Averill 2006: 178). In principle, at least, these institutions illustrated the

Party's concern with representing the masses, not the elites. Almost from the outset, then, Mao

sought to indicate his own dedication to the goals of Marxism-Leninism.

Furthermore, Mao implemented an agrarian reform policy that confiscated land from

well-off peasants and landlords and redistributed it in a strictly egalitarian way (Pantsov 2012:

212). Such a policy matched the ideological goals of the CCP. In fact, in terms of ownership

policy, Mao was arguably more consistent than the leaders of the CCP who controlled the Party

prior to his ascent in 1935. In 1929, for instance, when Mao moved his core coalition to

southern Jiangxi province, he instituted land reform despite condemnations from the Party

Congress that he was moving too quickly towards social revolution. Mao simply ignored its

directives (Pantsov 2012: 218). These strategic choices indicate Mao's commitment to the

ideology he and other CCP members espoused. Ideological consistency is necessary for

maintaining the long-term dedication of one's core supporters, and from early on Mao's actions

adhered to his professed ideology.

Even when Mao was not its paramount leader, the CCP treated land reform as one of its

principal goals. From the early 1920s, when the Party's founding documents were promulgated,

to the Chinese Civil War of the late 1940s, the CCP remained committed in its language and

actions to the goal of egalitarian social revolution, of which land reform was a central part. The

Party adopted its first land policy in 1927 at the Fifth Party Congress. Though the policy was

geared towards achieving the goals of social revolution, at this point it was relatively mild in its

demands for redistribution of land. Still, it did call for the disarming of landlords and the

creation of peasant self-defense forces (Ch'en 1983: 523). Such a policy adhered to Marxism-

Leninism by supporting the enhancement of the coercive (and thus political) power of the

peasantry, thereby elevating one component class of the proletariat. Additionally, in 1931, a

major Communist congress passed a land law that strengthened the equal division of the

movable and real property of landlords and well-to-do peasants (Pantsov 2012: 251-252). By

1933, investigations of land ownership and use were well underway in Communist-controlled

areas. These inquiries were focused on uncovering exploitative individuals in rural society and

redistributing their land to poor peasants. The results were somewhat disappointing, but the

investigatory campaigns indicate that the CCP continued to be dedicated to its principles. An

updated land policy in 1935 sought to release the enthusiasm of the peasantry through land

reform in order to end the local monopolies of landlords and rich peasants (Ch'en 1983: 229).

Though land reform was moderated during the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945) to

ensure cooperation by the GMD against the Japanese, after the conflict Mao and the CCP

brought agrarian policy back to the fore, at least in North China where their most secure areas

were located (Pepper 1986). Thus, the Party, both before and during Mao's leadership, adhered

to clear and consistent ideological principles.

The Party's dedication to social revolution persisted even during periods of necessary

compromise with other forces in China. During the War of Resistance against Japan, the

Communists joined with the GMD in a front against their common foe (discussed in more detail

below). In his work *On New Democracy*, published in January 1940, Mao argued that the

current political situation required a democratic system encompassing all the people of China

regardless of class in order to combat feudalism and imperialism. Yet, he argued that this system was but an intermediary step on the road to a truly socialist system (Mao 1965b). So, even when political moderation was required, Mao stayed ideologically consistent. Such adherence could encourage the Party's core supporters' elongation of their time horizons, believing that their leaders were committed to the long-term goal they all sought.

Mao also utilized Marxism-Leninism to justify the hierarchical nature of CCP rule, primarily through the concept of democratic centralism. Developed by Lenin, this principle was adopted by the Chinese Communists and embraced by Mao. Though democratic centralism advocated for open discussion and debate of Party policy, ultimately the will of the majority and the Party leadership must be paramount. At the 1922 Second Party Congress, party centralization was emphasized, with a full chapter of its report on member discipline. The Congress decided that local and regional levels must obey policy decisions of the center (Ch'en 1983: 516). Democratic centralism was made the Party's explicit guiding principle in a revision to the CCP constitution adopted in 1927. A year later, Qu Qiubai, a major Party leader, argued that the CCP was an elite organization, a vanguard party, and must lead the revolution (Ch'en 1986: 169). Though not explicitly about democratic centralism, the idea of the vanguard party also justified the hierarchical nature of CCP rule: only the Party could lead society towards the goal of an egalitarian social utopia. Also in 1928, the Sixth Party Congress stated that the CCP must practice true democratic centralism to curb localism and factionalism (Che'n 1986: 171). Mao's conceptualization of the mass line, largely developed by 1933, emphasized the importance of listening to the people but also of the Party leading them (Ch'en 1986: 178). Thus, in the early years of the Chinese Communist movement, the Party made a concerted effort to

emphasize its hierarchical authority over the proletarian revolution, not least by following the principles of democratic centralism and the party as revolutionary vanguard. To the extent prospective or actual CCP members adhered to the general precepts of Marxism-Leninism, we would expect them to accept the legitimacy of the Party's claims to authority, a crucial strategic component of effective cohering of core supporters.

This emphasis on hierarchical authority continued through the War of Resistance against Japan. For instance, in his work *On New Democracy*, Mao declared democratic centralism to be the organizing principle of the future Chinese state (Mao 1965b). On the one hand, he argued, all revolutionary classes should be incorporated into this system. But on the other, he refers to the "joint dictatorship" of these classes and the government, a reference suggestive of hierarchy. Like the publication's declaration on the ultimate goal of socialism, Mao's discussion of democratic centralism indicates a continuation of ideological rhetoric despite the period's circumstances requiring political moderation. Hierarchical justification remained an important strategic imperative of Mao's.

Another example of this continued justification occurred during the Rectification Campaign of 1942. Mao identified sectarianism as one of the main problems facing the CCP, a notion that referred to members forgetting the ultimate authority of the Central Committee, and in particular Mao (Van Slyke 1986: 687-688). Sectarianism, in other words, was the opposite of democratic centralism. Ultimately, democratic centralism became a part of the 1954 constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the state that was reconstituted by Mao and the CCP. Thus, democratic centralism was an enduring ideological feature of the CCP's

reunification campaign that justified hierarchy. Mao, as paramount leader, would be at the

apex of this hierarchy that would in turn serve as the foundation of a new state.

Equally important as elongating core supporters' time horizons and justifying a unifier-

centric hierarchy is maintaining discipline within the reunification campaign's core coalition.

Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders used the tenets of Marxism-Leninism to instill

disciplined thought and behavior in their followers. As mentioned above, as early as 1922, Party

Congress documents were including full chapters on discipline. The Party wanted its members

to hold a philosophy of life that was collectivist, not individualist (Ch'en 1983: 518). This

collectivistic focus accords with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism; it also justified a tightly

cohesive core coalition. In 1926, there was a purge of the CCP's membership ranks, designed to

expel those who were not committed to the revolution. Next, at the Sixth Party Congress in

1928, the CCP stated that it must intensify the education and training of its members. And at

the Fifth Plenum in 1934, the leadership argued that victory depended on adherence to the

Marxist-Leninist political line, maintenance of unity of thought and action, fostering discipline

and the ability to lead the masses, and a firm opposition to any deviation from the Party line

(Ch'en 1986: 177). Discipline was central to CCP strategy. Importantly, Party leadership was

concerned with maintaining an ideologically united and organizationally cohesive coalition, an

essential aspect of effectively cohering core supporters.

Mao supported this concern with intellectual and practical discipline. For instance, he

believed that education could lead to better communication and information gathering

between the populace and the Party. He especially emphasized the politicization of the army,

ordering its soldiers to propagandize and help with political work amongst those governed by

the CCP (Ch'en 1986: 178). As early as 1929, while striving to build a support base in southern

Jiangxi province, Mao was using military personnel to propagandize among the rural populace

(Pantsov 2012: 224). In the 1930s, army development, as conceived by Mao, focused on

political training, discipline, and fostering awareness of the revolution's goals. The mass line, a

central Party principle, permeated the Red Army (Ch'en 1986: 197). The Party and Mao

inculcated in its members – cadres and soldiers alike – the importance of living Marxism-

Leninism, putting into practice its tenets of pushing forward the revolution and engaging with

the masses.

During the War of Resistance, when Mao was paramount leader, Party and army schools

were used for cadre training and indoctrination (Van Slyke 1986: 625). Additionally, during the

construction of support bases, the CCP used education, propaganda, and persuasion to get

locals to fight the Japanese (Van Slyke 1986: 649). The Rectification Campaign of 1942 was an

arduous exercise in discipline and consensus-building. Self-examination and coercive

persuasion were common mechanisms used to instill right thought in supporters' minds. One of

the principal defects Mao identified was subjectivism, or the failure to apply Marxism-Leninism

to actual problems. Thus, the unity of right thought and action was also emphasized during the

Rectification Campaign (Van Slyke 1986: 687-695). In sum, this enduring concern for ideological

discipline helped instill dedication and efficacy among the ranks of the CCP's and Mao's core

supporters.

What were the effects of implementing the overarching strategy of disciplining core

supporters through the use of an ideological framework? Republican China was a dangerous

and uncertain social environment, especially for the Communists. Warlord armies roamed the

countryside and occupied the cities. GMD forces put continuous pressure on Red Army units,

hoping to eradicate the Communist presence from China. And Japanese troops sought to root

out Communist supporters and other resistance fighters, often through horrific slaughter.

Nonetheless, Mao and the CCP were able to survive several serious setbacks and long periods

of continuous warfare. For instance, when the Party was first founded in 1921, it only had

about 130 members. By mid-1927, however, it had grown to around 60,000 members and was

able to withstand the GMD's intense persecution that began in that year, which led to its drop

to 10,000 members by the end of 1927 (Ch'en 1983: 526; Pantsov 2012: 205). For the next ten

years, the CCP struggled to establish a secure support base that would give them the protection

and resources for launching a country-wide reunification campaign. Still, the Party did manage

to replenish its membership back up to 60,000 and increase the size of the Red Army to 54,000

by 1930 and 84,000 by late 1934 (Pantsov 2012: 232, 272). In 1934, the CCP was expelled by the

Nationalists from its core base in Central China and had to endure what is known as the Long

March to Northwest China. There Mao and the Communists found relative safety but not

without first taking massive casualties as they fled the superior GMD armies: only five thousand

people survived the Long March (Pantsov 2012: 288). Again, though, the Party proved resilient.

At the beginning of the War of Resistance, the CCP had 40,000 men, but by the end of the

conflict, its membership expanded remarkably, up to around 1.2 million (Van Slyke 1986: 620).

By April 1945, it had nearly one million troops under its command (Van Slyke 1986: 709). The

CCP had not only survived these trying years, but also managed to dramatically expand its

organizational and military strength. Tables One and Two summarize this remarkable expansion.

Table Four: Expansion of Communist Military Forces, 1930-1945 adapted from Tables 17 and 31, Van Slyke (1986: 621 and 709) and Pantsov (2012: 232, 272)	
Year (month)	Total full-time forces
1930	54,000
1934	84,000
1937	92,000
1938	181,000
1939	320,000
1940	500,000
1941	440,000
1942	450,960
1943	464,892
1944 (June)	474,476
1944 (October)	570,000
1945 (March)	760,000
1945 (April)	910,000

Table Four presents the expansion of CCP forces in the 1930s and 1940s. As Van Slyke points out, the increases for 1944 and 1945 are mostly due to integration of regional forces into the main field forces of the Red Army (Van Slyke 1986: 709). Still, the field forces (the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies) were the premier troops of the CCP and comprised the top layer of its military structure (Van Slyke 1986: 622). Moreover, in July 1946, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies were merged and renamed the People's Liberation Army, which would serve as the principal force in the CCP's civil war with the GMD following the conclusion of the war against Japan. Thus, these numbers are a good estimate of how much the CCP's coercive power had increased by 1945.

| Table Five: Expansion of CCP Membership, 1921-1945 | |
adapted from Table 16 in Van Slyke (1986: 620)	
Year	Size of membership
1921	130
Mid-1927	60,000
Late 1927	10,000
1937	40,000
1940	800,000
1941	763,447
1942	736,151
1944	853,420
1945	1,211,128

Table Two presents the expansion of CCP membership from its founding in 1921 to the culmination of World war Two in 1945. Clearly, overall expansion was dramatic in this period. The period of contraction in 1927 coincides with the brutal White Terror campaign waged by the GMD against the Communist forces. The reduction of membership in 1941 and 1942 was due to both efforts by Japanese and GMD forces to weaken Communist power and the Party's own Rectification Campaign that focused on consolidation and the quality of the cadres rather than their quantity (Van Slyke 1986: 620). By the beginning of the second civil war with the GMD, though, Mao's reunification coalition was far larger than it was when he took over the party in the late 1930s.

In the areas it controlled following the War, the CCP implemented large-scale military recruitment campaigns in tandem with land reform efforts (Pepper 1986: 764). In other words, the Party remained ideologically consistent. During the civil war with the Nationalists, Communist troops proved superior in their training and tactically superior in their commander's thinking when fighting GMD forces. Furthermore, Communist forces had high morale and a sense of common purpose. In the Northeast, much of this morale was due to the popular

appeal of the CCP, which assiduously accommodated local forces by, for instance, letting

former warlord troops join the PLA as non-Communist forces (Pepper 1986: 766-767).

Ultimately, this strategic and organizational superiority led to a Communist victory and the

establishment of the People's Republic of China 1949.

Mao and the CCP leadership consistently and intensively employed the strategy of

cohering core supporters throughout the three phases of state reconstitution – inception,

extension and consolidation. As Chapter One's theoretical framework predicts, though, this

strategy was moderated during periods of extension. During the War of Resistance against

Japan, the CCP and GMD formed a united front to fight the invaders, despite being deeply

opposed to each other ideologically and politically. Mao's *On New Democracy* deemphasized

Marxist-Leninist principles such as the need for comprehensive land reform since this policy

could alienate independent social groups like the middle peasantry that was comprised of

proprietors. Additionally, following the war, when the CCP entered areas it did not control like

the Northeast, it weakened its ideological requirements for inclusion in its military forces. Still,

Mao and the Communists did not abandon their principles during these instances of

moderation. Thus, the salience of cohering core supporters varied in accordance with the

expectations outlined in Table Two of Chapter One. That is, it was high during periods of

inception and consolidation and more moderate during instances of extension.

The Party's resilience could likely have been because of the strength of ideology and

discipline that had been disseminated throughout its membership, leading to brotherly

comradeship and ruthless determination against the Party's foes (Ch'en 1983: 169). I argue that

ideology kept the Party intact through the late twenties, thirties, and forties, despite all the

severe challenges and setbacks that Mao and the Communists faced. This resilience during the War of Resistance permitted Red Army commanders to learn the superior tactics they would later use against the GMD armies in the Chinese Civil War, which they would win. Moreover, ideological discipline would be used in the 1950s to consolidate the new state led by a social-revolutionary regime with Mao as its helmsman.

Incorporation of Independent Social Forces

In addition to cohering their core supporters, Mao and other Communist leaders utilized the symbol of the unified Chinese nation-state to incorporate social forces outside their reunification campaign. This symbolic manipulation began in earnest in the early 1930s and was most actively pursued as a state-building strategy during the War of Resistance against Japan. External invasion generally proved useful in galvanizing support for the CCP when it chose to take symbolic advantage of it. By the end of the war, this strategy combined with other factors to give the Communists greater public legitimacy than their chief foes Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists.

Mao and the Communists first took advantage of nationally-legitimated symbols as a means to incorporate independent social forces fairly early in their reunification campaign. In September 1931, the Imperial Japanese Army orchestrated an explosion on a Japanese owned railway in Manchuria as an excuse to occupy the region and establish a puppet state there. Chinese nationalists were outraged. Anti-Japanese boycotts and strikes raged in Shanghai. The lack of resistance by Chiang Kai-shek's regime served as a point of criticism for those concerned about China's national sovereignty. Importantly, Mao saw this incident as an opportunity to

expand the CCP's patriotic appeal. In April 1932, while Mao was in charge of the Communist

government in southern Jiangxi province, he ordered the government to declare war against

Japan. This transformed the CCP into a nationalist force, which helped in its struggle with the

GMD (Pantsov 2012: 260). A dramatic mark of its success here was that 17,000 GMD troops

stationed in Jiangxi defected to the Communists after the GMD refused to defend Manchuria

from the Japanese army (Pantsov 2012: 257). Mao was able to capitalize on the Nationalists'

inability to defend China's sovereignty to position himself and his forces as protectors of the

nation, thereby incorporating independent social groups like ex-GMD soldiers.

Mao continued to look for opportunities to use nationalism for the purposes of

incorporation. Towards the end of the Long March in 1935, Mao was deciding on where to take

his troops. When he heard about a Communist support base that had been established in

northern Shaanxi province, near the Japanese front lines, he decided to redirect his forces there.

Moving to this area could be portrayed as designed to resist the Japanese invasion and thus

patriotic (Pantsov 2012: 287). Indeed, in 1936 Mao launched a military expedition against the

Japanese as a way of showing the CCP's determination to fight the invader. As a consequence,

the Red Army was joined by 8,000 new troops (Ch'en 1986: 220). Engaging in combat with the

Japanese symbolically identified the Communists as fervent proponents of the unity of the

Chinese nation-state, once again leading to incorporation of previously-independent members

of society.

Communist employment of incorporation reached its height in the late 1930s and early

1940s. In order to expand its local support base in northern Shaanxi, in late 1935 Mao

moderated the CCP's policies concerning land reform, declaring that rich peasants would not

have their lands confiscated and entrepreneurs would be supported (Zarrow 2005: 322-323).

Though in this case incorporation did not involve appealing to the symbol of a unified China, it

does accord with the theoretical expectation that this strategy would be employed most

assiduously during periods of extension. Mao utilized incorporation in multiple ways, not just

through the use of nationally-legitimated symbols.

Mao did use the symbol of the unified Chinese nation-state for other instances of

incorporation, though. For example, the Party's emphasis on fighting the Japanese appealed to

the chief warlord of northeast China, Zhang Xueliang, who wanted to cease following Chiang

Kai-shek's orders to eradicate the Communists and return to Manchuria to fight the Japanese

(Zarrow 2005: 323). This receptiveness to the communists' appeal to the nationally-legitimated

symbol of the unified Chinese nation-state compelled Zhang to hold Chiang hostage until he

agreed to form a united front with the CCP and focus on fighting Japan's forces in China. In this

case, incorporation resulted in the acquiescence to Mao's reunification campaign of one of the

most militarily-powerful individuals in 1930s China.

In November 1937, Stalin added his support to this idea of the CCP forming a united

front with the GMD against the Japanese, who were by this time launching a full-scale invasion

of China. Stalin further argued that the Party should publicly announce its goal as being the

establishment of a moderate democratic China, rather than a radical revolutionary one. The

expectation was that this would drastically expand the Party's mass base to include anyone

who opposes dictatorship. Mao followed Stalin's policy, arguing publicly that the CCP stood for

the "betterment of the people" and based its policies not just on Marxist-Leninist principles but

on Sun Yat-sen's as well (Pantsov 2012: 319-320). As discussed in the previous chapter, Sun Yat-

sen was a national hero in China and his Three Principles of the People held a major place in nationalist thought. Referencing such a figure appealed directly to social forces that were not part of the Communist movement but nonetheless were concerned about the national fate of China. The united front strategy appeared to quickly succeed in garnering support from independent social groups. Just a matter of months after the united front policy was adopted by the CCP, the policy's spirit "pervaded all social classes and political circles" in Wuhan, a major city in central China between the respective power bases of the Communists and Nationalists (Van Slyke 1986: 618). The united front – a chief manifestation of Mao's incorporation strategy – was reaching its peak intensity.

Even Mao's ideological framework reflected this incorporation strategy. In 1937, for instance, Mao published *On Contradiction*, one of his most important contributions to Marxist-Leninist theory.[11] In it, he argued that every phenomenon has its opposite with which it is in struggle and by which is mutually defined. Together, the phenomenon and its opposite represent a contradiction. Thus, the bourgeoisie and proletariat form two aspects of a contradiction by defining each other and being in mutual opposition. Which aspect of a contradiction is ascendant depends on the particular extant conditions. Furthermore, which contradiction is most salient is also dictated by the particular circumstances of the time (Mao 1965a).

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[11] Though there is debate as to whether the published version of *On Contradiction* is faithful to the 1937 version, there is substantial circumstantial evidence from the Yan'an period (when the tract was purportedly written) that Mao was actively thinking of the country's political context in terms of contradictions (Knight 1980: 642). Thus, the basic contours of the extant version of *On Contradiction* likely reflects his strategic thinking at this time.

In the late 1930s, the invasion of China by Japan meant that the principal contradiction was between the imperialist forces (i.e., Japan) and the domestic resistance. Even though the CCP and the KMT had been deeply at odds with each other since the collapse of the First United Front in 1927, the resurgence of this new, externally-originated contradiction diminished the salience of the CCP-KMT contradiction. Thus, the CCP and the KMT could and should work together to fight the invading imperialist Japanese forces. Once the Japanese were defeated and forced out, though, the previous principal contradiction between the proletarian, anti-feudal Communists and bourgeois, reactionary Nationalists would resume (Mao 1965a). Mao's emphasis on the national, rather than class, contradiction persisted into 1941 (Knight 1980: 647). Mao thus modified his ideological framework to justify making (temporary) peace with the KMT, since once the alliance was no longer in accordance with the principal contradiction of the moment, it could be discarded in favor of explicitly anti-feudal, anti-bourgeois policies.

Mao further developed his ideological framework to justify incorporating independent social groups in his 1940 Mao publication, *On New Democracy*, discussed in the previous section. This tract sought to diminish support for the GMD and appeal to a diverse array of social forces inside the country, including those that were not necessarily pro-Communist. In this document, Mao advocated for popular participation, multiparty democracy, and civil rights, principles that were part of Sun Yat-sen's ideal society, while also downplaying Marxist-Leninist social revolutionary principles (Van Slyke 1968: 664). Marxism-Leninism was amenable to nationalist modification since one of its chief tenets was that imperialism was the highest form of capitalism. In order to overthrow the latter, Communist movements needed to first destroy the former. Consequently, there was ideological justification for weakening (temporarily) anti-

capitalist policies in order to bolster anti-imperialist ones like uniting with non-revolutionary classes to fight the Imperial Japanese Army.

The CCP intended to use the united front strategy to incorporate all social forces in China (Van Slyke 1986: 668). This intention was made clear in Mao's *On New Democracy* document as well as in the aftermath of a military clash between the Communists and Nationalists during the War of Resistance, the New Fourth Army incident which occurred in 1940-1941 in central China. The basic issue was the presence of Communist forces in areas over which the GMD claimed operational control. Despite negotiations between the two sides, armed clashes broke out, with both sides suffering significant losses (Van Slyke 1986: 665-667). The CCP largely lost its secure support bases in central China because of the incident, but it was able to take advantage of this loss to further incorporate independent social forces. The Party argued that the GMD was trying to suppress the Communists, even as the war against Japan still raged. This enabled the Communists to issue propaganda arguing that the GMD was more interested in fighting civil conflicts than the invaders, threatening the unity that was so necessary for national independence. CCP propaganda thus played on the fear of many Chinese that open civil war could recur, allowing it to effectively portray itself as a party of national martyrdom (Van Slyke 1986: 667-668). As Chalmers Johnson argues, "[n]o single event in the entire Sino-Japanese war did more to enhance the Communists' prestige vis-à-vis the Nationalists than the destruction of the New Fourth Army headquarters while it was 'loyally following orders'" (Johnson 1962: 140). The CCP, in other words, employed the united front as an explicit incorporation strategy.

Mao's manipulation of the symbol of the unified Chinese nation-state seemed to have an effect on the support the CCP was able to garner from outside social forces. Indeed, during the first years of the War of Resistance, the Party's membership soared as intellectuals, students, illiterate peasants and middle class youths from Shanghai and even sons of landlords joined it (Van Slyke 1986: 688). Middle and upper peasants entered CCP-sanctioned popular organs despite being the hardest hit by the progressive taxes imposed by the Communist regime (Van Slyke 1986: 696-697). Even gentry and landlords, typically the most intransigent local elites, eventually came around to supporting the CCP because of its united front policies (Van Slyke 1986: 702-703). Mao's incorporation strategy substantially improved the Party's existential security. As Lyman Van Slyke notes, "[b]y 1940, under wartime conditions, the Communist movement had sufficient territorial reach and popular support to weather the storm" (Van Slyke 1986: 704). Before the end of the War of Resistance against Japan, the Communist reunification campaign not only had a secure support base in northwest China; it also had the acquiescence and even support of independent social forces.

In the end, by the end of Japan's surrender in 1945, public opinion had largely turned in the CCP's favor. There were a variety of reasons for this situation, including the public's perception that the Communists were more interested in preserving national peace and unity than the Nationalists and that the GMD was simply warlord militarism in new clothing (Pepper 1986: 748). The warlords were one of the nation's enemies according to Chinese nationalist discourse and so association with them and what they stood for was damaging. The CCP, by contrast, had assiduously avoided acquiring such an association. Even if many members of the public were not committed supporters of Mao and his coalition, they saw them as more

patriotic than the GMD. Additionally, a number of intellectuals actively supported the

Communists during the War of Resistance and after, though others were incorporated only

passively. They simply chose not to be obstacles to Mao's reunification campaign. As my

theoretical framework proposes, however, passive acquiescence is an adequate outcome of a

successful incorporation strategy.

The GMD regime did itself no favors either in terms of enjoying popular support. After

the War, its members engaged in rampant corruption, including widespread confiscation from

urban residents after they were liberated from Japanese forces. Additionally, Chiang Kai-shek's

government was unable to tame runway inflation that had taken hold. As a result, large

swathes of Chinese society considered the Communists to be preferable or at least viewed the

GMD as a political force that did not deserve their support (Pepper 1986). Thus, the CCP's

success in incorporating independent social groups was not entirely due to its own efforts. The

failures of the GMD were crucial contributing factors.

The relative salience of the CCP's incorporation strategy through the three phases of

state reconstitution accords with the theoretical expectations presented in Table Two of

Chapter One. Incorporation was only used to a limited extent in the early years of the CCP

movement (1921-1934), with the first United Front with the GMD from 1923 to 1927 serving as

the most impactful example. The CCP moderated its social-revolutionary rhetoric to some

degree during this period, but for the most party stayed focused on its ideological goals, as can

be seen in its sustained emphasis on land reform. Thus, in this early inception period the CCP

did not have a dedicated incorporation strategy. Not until it had established a secure base of

support in northern Shaanxi province did the CCP begin assiduously calling for a second United

Front with the GMD and other social forces to resist the Japanese military. This energized

incorporation strategy involved Mao even moderating his own ideological pronouncements, as

his work *On New Democracy*, published in 1940, indicates. In the extension phase of the CCP's

reunification campaign, then, incorporation was an especially salient strategy for the CCP. After

World War Two, however, Mao and the CCP emerged from the conflict with greater popular

legitimacy than Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD. During World War Two, the CCP had acquired

acquiescence and even support from a range of independent social groups and this trend

continued throughout the civil war with the GMD. As the theoretical framework predicts, the

CCP's efforts to defeat the GMD and establish dominion over the country, thereby

consolidating its power, were coupled with a renewed emphasis on land reform. In other words,

the consolidation phase of Communist-led state reconstitution involved a diminished emphasis

on incorporation.

The Communists successfully manipulated a nationally-legitimated symbol – the unified

Chinese nation-state – to incorporate a diverse array of social forces independent of the

reunification campaign. Mao continued to present himself as the defender of the nation after

the PRC was founded, even if social revolution ultimately became a more salient basis for the

regime's legitimacy.

Disempowerment of Local Elites

Mao's campaign also needed material resources. Disempowering local elites, especially

landlords, rich peasants and gentry, was necessary to gain adequate access to these resources.

Such a strategy, though, could only be effective in areas that had high levels of geopolitical

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space, the third structural condition. Mao seemed to understand this requirement, because he early on sought out isolated, poor areas in the border regions of provinces to set up his support bases. There was a clear correlation in where Communist support bases were established and the economic and geographic features of those locations. Specifically, the Communists tended to prefer areas that were hilly and had high densities of poor peasants (Ch'en 1986: 190). It was in these areas, such as the Hunan-Jiangxi border region and southern Jiangxi and northern Shaanxi provinces, that his campaign had its greatest success in disempowering elites.

Prior to the Long March of 1934, the CCP had struggled to establish a secure base of support. Even afterwards, its options were limited. Before and during the War of Resistance from 1937 to 1945, key areas were effectively closed off from the CCP because of hostile military power. Up to 1937-1938, the GMD enjoyed greater influence in southern and central China than in the north (Van Slyke 1986: 662). Furthermore, during the war, Japan's forces occupied major transportation routes in east-central China and major cities in the country. Japanese and allied Chinese forces were concentrated in the key strategic areas of the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou triangle in east-central China and the region north of the Yangzi River and east of the Grand Canal (Van Slyke 1986: 681-682). In the meantime, the Nationalists clung to power in the area around Chongqing in the southwest. Thus, areas in which the CCP did not have to face direct threats from rival military campaigns were largely restricted to the north and northwest of the country.

Not surprisingly, then, the Shaan-Gan-Ning base area, which by the late 1930s came to be the CCP's core support base, was located in the northwest. Established in the border region linking the provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia (from which its name is derived), this

support base took advantage of the high degree of geopolitical space in the area. The region

was remote and inaccessible, far from major provincial centers, and covered by rugged terrain

(Selden 1971: 3). By the 1920s, the gentry had largely lost its legitimacy in the countryside

because of sociopolitical changes and instead became primarily an urban absentee-landlord-

commercial class cut off from the peasantry. Furthermore, gentry-based clans had already been

much less powerful in northwest China than in the south (Selden 1971: 11-12). Even though

landlords were able to increase taxes on the peasantry in the 1920s and early 1930s, they were

unable to control the pervasive banditry in the area (Selden 1971: 15). In other words, the

gentry's political influence was increasingly tenuous. Not surprisingly, then, by Communist

mobilization was quite successful in northern Shaanxi, compared to other parts of the province

and China as a whole. Indeed, by the time Mao, the Communist leadership and the main force

of the Red Army arrived in 1934, there was already a sizable CCP presence in the area (Selden

1971: 53). It was on this organizational basis that Mao established his core support base that he

would use to launch his reunification campaign.

The tenets of social revolution served the strategy of local elite disempowerment well,

just as they did for cohering core supporters. Building base areas required manpower and

material resources, which could be obtained only through confiscating from the rich and

distributing some of these goods to the poor. A strong army could then be used to defend

Communist territory and introduce socioeconomic changes (Ch'en 1986: 189). Thus, land

reform, which disempowered local elites, was necessary to create conditions favorable to the

emergence of strong support bases, and also gave the Party the support of the peasants. As

Jerome Ch'en argues, "[i]t was this support that enabled the red regimes to survive before the

Long March and enabled guerilla areas to continue after it" (Ch'en 1986: 190). Peasant support

provided crucial material resources for the Communist reunification campaign.

Communists had difficulty implementing land reform in regions with many rich peasants

since those peasants tended to belong to clan associations and could use them to hide their

actual lands. Rich peasants also often pretended to be poorer than they really were in order to

infiltrate mass organizations and impede land reform efforts (Ch'en 1986: 193). These issues

contributed to the limited success of the 1933 land investigation campaign in enhancing Mao's

campaign's direct access to resources (Ch'en 1986: 196). Though at the time southern Jiangxi

province was one of the better areas in which the Communists could attempt to disempower

local elites, the relocation to the border regions in the North following the Long March proved

to give Mao much better opportunities.

Indeed, disempowerment of local elites in border regions was an effective strategy in

raising revenues. During the war, the taxes in all base areas impacted the rich most heavily (Van

Slyke 1986: 700). By 1941 most landlords in the Shaan-Gan-Ning base area had had most of

their land redistributed (Van Slyke 1986: 684). In the Jin-Cha-Ji base area, which, though further

east and thus closer to Japanese forces, had a strong CCP presence, landlord power decreased

materially between 1937 and 1943. Landlord families as a proportion of the total population

decreased by 21% while their share of landholdings decreased by almost 40% (Van Slyke 1986:

700). Clearly, the CCP was largely successful in diminishing the socioeconomic power of the

local elite class in areas it firmly controlled.

In addition to disempowering these elites, the CCP also raised revenue through

referencing the nationally-legitimated symbol of unified China. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of

the People were used to justify increases in resource extraction, which would otherwise typically encourage resistance from those opposed to agrarian reform such as landlords and other wealthy classes. This emphasis on the United Front materialized in the official three-thirds system, whereby democratic institutions would be equally represented by Communists, non-party leftists and moderates, which Mao explicitly characterized as the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry (Van Slyke 1986: 696, 701). This three-thirds system was most comprehensively implemented in the two most consolidated and productive base areas – Shaan-Gan-Ning and Jin-Cha-Ji. So, incorporation of local elites, not just disempowerment of them, aided the CCP in acquiring dear resources. Ultimately, though, during the War of Resistance against Japan, the Communist base areas progressively established robust taxation structures that to a large extent bypassed the power of the local elites.

As a consequence of this disempowerment of local elites, Communist production and taxation increased during the War of Resistance. From 1937 to 1945, grain production increased from 1.26m piculs to 1.6m while CCP grain collection (a form of taxation) increased from 10,000 to 125,000. Cotton production increased from virtually zero in 1937 to 3m catties of lint and 6m of seeds. Sown area almost doubled (Van Slyke 1986: 686-687). Considering how poor the region was,[12] this was an impressive achievement on the part of the Communists. Since the CCP was able to foster considerable support from the peasantry, we can expect that material support from this stratum went above and beyond the official taxes levied on it. The

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[12] According to Selden (1971: 18), one traveler who visited the area said it "seems to be the centre of the most desolate area, by far the poorest region I have traversed in China outside the actual deserts."

increases in production should have also translated into sizable boosts to Communist resource extraction.

The drastic increase in production and taxation undergirded a burgeoning of the coercive power Mao had at his disposal since by April 1945 Chinese Communist military forces numbered nearly one million (Van Slyke 1986: 709). The CCP had to implement a number of different monetary, tax and production policies in order for the Yenan economy to function effectively. But the fundamental basis upon which these policies depended was the disempowerment of local elites that Mao and the Communists implemented. Relatively direct access to resources provided the CCP with the material basis for the sustenance of their armed forces in the Chinese Civil War. Many factors accounted for the Communists' success in that conflict, but local elite disempowerment in North China was a significant, perhaps even necessary, contributor, since, without it, Mao would have been unable to a secure base of support. Local elite resistance, passive or otherwise, would have chronically undermined from below Communist resource extraction activities, as it did in Jiangxi in southern China in the early 1930s. In a struggle such as armed conflict, access to material and human resources is crucial. Though incorporation through the use of nationally-legitimated symbols also played a central role in ensuring the cooperation of local elites, it is unclear how durable this strategy could have been. The CCP's ideological goals, after all, were social-revolutionary in nature. As the deadly fate many members of the landlord class met after the CCP reunified the state makes clear, members of the economic elite were not core supporters of Mao's coalition. In fact, they were its targets, though to varying degrees depending on the wealth and conservativeness of the elite. Middle peasants were courted during the period of campaign

extension in the late 1930s and early 1940s. But once Mao began consolidating his campaign in the mid-1940s, social revolution came back to the fore in terms of policy. Had local elites not already been substantially disempowered in the core base area of Shaan-Gan-Ning , we would expect this policy reversal to trigger massive resistance from these individuals. In other words, disempowerment of local elites was essential throughout Mao's reunification campaign.

Strategic Conditions of Sengoku Japan: the Campaigns of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu

Addressing the place of Hideyoshi's and Ieyasu's reunification campaigns in the scope of my theoretical framework is much more straightforward than it is for Mao's. There was no significant foreign influence on the reunification efforts in Sengoku Japan, so state reconstitution was entirely endogenous. Furthermore, after the death of his lord, Oda Nobunaga, in 1582, Hideyoshi had no superiors or challengers in his organization with whom he had to contend. Instead, his rivals were all external to his campaign. Similarly, after Hideyoshi's death in 1598, Ieyasu was effectively independent from the other claimants to authority over all Japan. Thus, both of these men had clear control over their respective reunification campaigns.

Cohering of Core Supporters

To preview the argument of this section, Hideyoshi Toyotomi used the ideological framework of *tenka*, *kogi* and house codes to instill dedication and loyalty in his core supporters and justify his claims to hierarchical rule. Tokugawa Ieyasu, his eventual successor, largely did the same.

Tenka, or the realm, referred to the entirety of the Japanese political community. Kogi, in turn, represented the public authority that daimyo lords asserted within their circumscribed domains. As detailed in the last chapter, Nobunaga had expanded the writ of his kogi to include all of Japan. Finally, house codes were collections of rules and moral injunctions that daimyo lords had employed to discipline their followers and justify their rule. Though under Tokugawa additional ideological concepts were formulated, this trinary framework served as the ideological foundation of the cohering strategies of the two unifiers, Tokugawa and Hideyoshi.

Hideyoshi, Nobunaga's successor, utilized tenka to justify his rule. And, again just like Nobunaga, Hideyoshi used tenka to refer to himself. But Hideyoshi actively sought to interweave his use of tenka with the imperial court system, something Nobunaga had avoided (Shizuo 1981: 123). Specifically, Hideyoshi presented to his supporters his appointment by the emperor as *kanpaku*, imperial regent, in 1585 as justification for his rule as, and over, tenka (Hall 1981a: 197). The emperor, as an eternal symbol of all Japan, paralleled the notion of tenka. As discussed in the last chapter, the emperor held widespread symbolic legitimacy in Japanese society and so the position of kanpaku connected Hideyoshi to this nationally-legitimated symbol. Moreover, since 1477 the emperor had not been linked with any sort of actual central authority. By linking his claims to universal rule with imperial symbolic power, Hideyoshi was able to provide his supporters with a long-term goal they could find desirable, that is, the restoration of symbolic imperial authority. Thus, in this case, the nationally-legitimated symbol of the emperor served both incorporating (discussed next) and cohering functions in Hideyoshi's reunification campaign.

Significantly, Hideyoshi also incorporated his coalition of supporters into the court system. Thanks to his position as kanpaku, he controlled the awarding of court titles and ranks, using them as a means to reward and rank his own men. He also required his vassals to pledge loyalty to him in the name of the emperor (Hall 1981a: 197). His systematic adoption of imperial court ranks, and dispensation of these to his supporters, shows his clear and consistent adherence to the principle of imperially-bestowed legitimacy. Thus, incorporating the imperial system of prestige thoroughly legitimized Hideyoshi's reunification campaign. Moreover, Hideyoshi could use this system as a mechanism for disciplining his supporters, ensuring their loyalty and dedication, and for elongating their time horizons. If imperial court titles and ranks bestow upon their holders legitimacy in the eyes of forces in society, then supporters should want to acquire and retain them. Hideyoshi could use this desire for legitimacy as a means to encourage loyalty to his person and commitment to the policy and military goals he espouses.

Indeed, Hideyoshi employed his kanpaku position to pass many national-scale decrees, including a massive land survey and a comprehensive population census (Ooms 1985: 40; Berry 1982). The status of kanpaku enabled the effective proclamation of these policies because it was one of the most prestigious imperial titles. By referencing his position of kanpaku in the written orders he sent to his subordinates instructing them to carry out these state-building projects, Hideyoshi took advantage of the legitimacy bestowed upon him by the emperor. Moreover, by virtue of rhetorically employing his title in the promulgation of these national-scale policies, Hideyoshi enhanced his claims to hierarchical authority. Hideyoshi went beyond emphasizing his authoritative title, though, when justifying the initiation of his nation-wide land survey that was intended to fundamentally alter the proprietary framework of the country. He

also referred to the emperor's statement that had conferred hegemonic authority upon him:

"You shall exercise administrative functions over the more than sixty provinces of Japan in accordance with what is best for the land and the people" (quoted by Wakita 1991: 103). Land grants were to be held in trust for Hideyoshi, the hegemon, and could only be confirmed by his personal vermilion seal. Territorial control was thus intrinsically linked with his authority.

The unifier continued to utilize authoritative concepts and titles during the last years of his campaign. A 1587 decree by Hideyoshi, for instance, proclaimed that vassals must adhere to the laws of the realm, that is, tenka (Wakita 1991: 103). Once again, we see Hideyoshi employing the ideological concept of tenka to justify his claims to hierarchical authority. By 1591, when Hideyoshi had successfully unified the whole country, he had acquired by the emperor's decree the title of *taiko*, or retired kanpaku, which was the highest imperial title (Berry 1982: 179). Hideyoshi thus used imperial titles in conjunction with the concept of tenka to not only encourage discipline and loyalty amongst his supporters but also to justify his claims to hierarchical authority.

Hideyoshi also continued Nobunaga's tradition of using kogi to justify his authority as a protector of the public good. For instance, he deployed this concept when assuming administrative responsibility for ports, cities and mines and when promulgating his national-scale policies (see above) (Berry 1982: 158-159). Like Nobunaga, Hideyoshi utilized this concept to legitimate his claims to hierarchical authority.

Hideyoshi, however, employed the symbolism of the emperor much more assiduously than kogi when establishing his hierarchical authority. In 1588, for example, Hideyoshi entertained the emperor at the former's Kyoto castle-palace, which was an extraordinary

political event. Only two other times had an emperor visited a warrior residence (Elison 1981b: 234). In return for this subservient display, Hideyoshi restored the imperial house to financial solvency, rebuilt the emperor's palace and public paid homage to him (Elison 1981b: 236; Berry 1982: 181). Most crucially, perhaps, the emperor was now once again linked to a real center of hegemonic political power, which the imperial house had had no connection to since the end of the Onin War in 1477. Even if the emperor remained powerless in fact, the system of legitimacy he headed was now politically relevant given that Hideyoshi was actively using it to justify his rule. By doing so, Hideyoshi was invoking his kogi, or public authority, and linking it to the grand goal of imperial restoration. Since his kogi was universal in scope, Hideyoshi was actualizing tenka as Nobunaga could not do before his death. Tenka was now supreme, even if the cultural symbolism of the emperor imbued the notion of tenka with much of its persuasive force.

Hideyoshi employed a number of additional mechanisms to consolidate this symbolic linkage he formed between himself and all-encompassing authority, thereby cohering his core supporters. First, he required subordinates to submit formal oaths of loyalty (Hall 1981a: 200). Second, Hideyoshi affixed his personal seal to all letters he sent to his vassals. Since letter-writing was utilized by Hideyoshi to systematically maintain direct relationships to his subordinates, this personal-seal system was intrinsic to his method of consolidating and maintaining his hegemonic authority within his core coalition (Berry 1982: 101-102).

His vassals had an interest in sustaining Hideyoshi's system of self-legitimation since their own authority and political survival depended on the continuation of his authority. By ruling in his name, his vassals could justify their own claims to power to their subordinates and governed populations. Certainly, then, mutual self-interest maintained this symbolic system of

oath-making and seal-fixing. But the very consistency of the system (i.e., oaths were required

from all vassals, all letters were formalized with Hideyoshi's red seal) also played a crucial role

in its effectiveness. If these mechanisms were not consistently applied, their authoritativeness

would be lost since they would not be normatively associated with Hideyoshi's hegemony. In

other words, the regularity of authoritative practices is in large part what gives them their

symbolic force. Just like laws must be customarily followed to function as sanctioning rules

(Hodgson 2006: 6), practices that instantiate and communicate authority have to be

consistently performed in order to have justificatory power, for both the hegemon and his

subordinates. Thus, ideological consistency did not just alter the mindsets of Hideyoshi's

subordinates; it also appealed to their self-interest.

We can see the effects of Hideyoshi's cohering strategy by looking at the actions of his

core supporters. For daimyo, there were essentially two types of subordinate samurai: *fudai*

and *tozama*. Fudai were core supporters who were typically part of the daimyo's house band,

the most intimate set of followers. Tozama were other daimyo or powerholders who had

submitted themselves, but retained a significant degree of autonomy. Thus, they were more

likely to defect and so often required material inducements to remain allied with the daimyo.

We see in the campaigns of Hideyoshi that he systematically gave defeated tozama who

submitted to him considerable amounts of new land (Berry 1982: 68-70). However, Hideyoshi's

fudai, who had been loyal to him for decades, generally did not receive substantial rewards

over the course of his conquests (Berry 1982: 79, 84, 161). To illustrate this point, we can look

at the proportions of total landholdings held, respectively, by the fudai and the tozama. At the

time of Hideyoshi's death in 1598, thirty-six daimyo held fiefs of significant size.[13] Of these,

twenty-two were tozama and fourteen were fudai (Berry 1982: 130). Thus, we see that even

eight years after Hideyoshi had successfully reunified the country, he continued to favor

tozama over fudai in terms of landholdings. Yet, Nobunaga, during his campaigns, *did* primarily

reward his fudai, so there was a precedent (Berry 1982: 51). Nonetheless, Hideyoshi's fudai

stayed loyal to him to the end. Without the strategic use of house codes, tenka, kogi and

mechanisms of authority like oath-making and seal-fixing, these fudai would likely have

defected, since they received little material reward for participating in dangerous activities such

as military campaigns. The benefit of an orderly society could have been enjoyed by fudai even

if they were not members of Hideyoshi's coalition. Still, they chose not to free ride but instead

remained loyal to Hideyoshi and his cause. The utilization of ideology was thus likely crucial for

the long-run success of Hideyoshi's reunification campaign.

Ideology was also necessary for the preservation of tozama loyalty, and so played a key

role in Hideyoshi's incorporation as well as cohering strategies. As John Whitney Hall argues,

military power was necessary but not sufficient for Hideyoshi's administrative and proprietary

authority over the daimyo lords' domains. He also needed mechanisms of legitimation,

including the rhetorical deployment of concepts such as kogi and tenka, and the issuance of

house codes (Hall 1981a: 204). Tozama were expected to renounce their independent claims to

proprietary authority. This repudiation went against what daimyo had come to expect for

themselves, that is, control over their own kokka. As mentioned above, a number of Hideyoshi's

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[13] 100,000 koku or more (koku is a measure of land value)

edicts were national in scale, and required the cooperation of hundreds of daimyo with considerable autonomy. Though these projects often took a while to complete, in most cases finishing under Tokugawa's regime (after 1603), the persistence of those who implemented them suggests the strength of Hideyoshi's authority.

Tokugawa Ieyasu, Hideyoshi's successor, continued much of his and Nobunaga's strategies. In 1615, for instance, the Tokugawa Shogunate issued the *Buke Shohatto*, or Regulations for the Military Houses, which was essentially a house code for the entire samurai class in Japan. Its general purpose was to regulate and discipline the tozama and fudai daimyo lords to ensure their loyalty to the new state (Ooms 1985: 53). In 1617, his son and successor reconfirmed the fiefs of the daimyo, all of whom were present when he received a delegation from Korea (Ooms 1985: 51-52), thereby reemphasizing Tokugawa territorial authority. These strategies of ideological control, reaffirming the Tokugawa shogun's claim over the tenka and maintaining discipline and loyalty within the ranks of the new state's coalition, were repeated by later shoguns. In sum, the Tokugawa continued to implement the strategies Hideyoshi, Nobunaga, and daimyo before them had pioneered. The Tokugawa's ideological system was more severe than Hideyoshi's or Nobunaga's, supporting the expectation that discipline would become paramount when new rulers seek to consolidate their achievements. Overall, ideological discipline played a pervasive and crucial role in the reunification campaigns of Hideyoshi and Tokugawa.

Incorporation of Independent Social Forces

The exploitation of imperial symbolic resources extended beyond disciplining Hideyoshi's and Tokugawa's core coalitions. The unifiers also took advantage of the emperor and his associated system of ranks and titles to incorporate independent social forces, especially rival daimyo coalitions, to support or at least acquiesce to their reunification campaigns. By adopting and bestowing court titles, using imperial seals, referencing imperial concepts in their public pronouncements and forging superior personal relationships with the emperors, Hideyoshi and Tokugawa were in effect assimilating their power structures with the imperial tradition (Elison 1981a: 60). Doing so gave them access to the symbolic resources necessary for successful state reconstitution.

For Hideyoshi, use of imperial symbolism was especially important because he had been born a commoner. Not having the legitimacy bestowed on the members of the samurai and aristocratic classes by birth, he had to acquire it as an adult. During the 1580s, as he was conquering the country, he had himself adopted into the imperial aristocracy, acquiring a highly prestigious lineage in the process (Elison 1981b: 224). Furthermore, gaining the title of kanpaku (imperial regent) not only helped show his core supporters his dedication to reestablishing unified imperial (symbolic) rule, as delineated above. The title also gave him a special position in society that most daimyo, who were not part of his core coalition, recognized (Elison 1981b: 229). Importantly, Hideyoshi was the first warrior in Japanese history to become kanpaku. This fact likely burnished his prestige in the eyes of the other daimyo, none of whom were ever themselves or had ancestors who were kanpaku. Additionally, the emperor granted Hideyoshi a new noble house name – Toyotomi – in the same year he became kanpaku, which further

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elevated his pedigree (Elison 1981b: 232). Hideyoshi also took instruction in court-style poetry,

ceremony and drama (Elison 1981b: 235, 242). By embedding his public persona so deeply in

the symbolic system of the emperor, Hideyoshi closely tethered himself to the principal

nationally-legitimated symbol in Sengoku Japan.

Hideyoshi did more than just embed himself in this system; he also sought to dominate

it. He first had to ensure he enjoyed a greater degree of formal imperial authority than any

other member of the warrior class, the most coercively and politically powerful social force in

Japan. In the 1580s, Tokugawa Ieyasu, a major rival of Hideyoshi's, also embedded himself in

the imperial system of court ranks and titles (Asao 1991: 46-47). In order to ensure he rather

than Ieyasu incorporated independent social groups, Hideyoshi needed to acquire a superior

imperial rank. He did this by, first, having himself adopted into the Fujiwara lineage in 1585,

thereby enabling himself to be appointed kanpaku, which, as already explained, was the highest

imperial post below the emperor. Second, the following year Hideyoshi installed the sixteen-

year-old Go-Yozei on the imperial throne following the previous occupant's abdication.

Hideyoshi then had the young emperor anoint him grand minister of state at the junior first

court rank, superior to Ieyasu's junior *third* court rank (Naohiro 1991: 47). Hideyoshi thus

consolidated his control over the imperial legitimation system.

The emperor, though, remained as his nominal superior. Of course, he could not depose

the emperor and elevate himself since that would destroy the very source of his legitimacy. But

since Hideyoshi had Go-Yozei installed on the throne, one can surmise that he had a degree of

personal influence over the young monarch. In fact, in 1588, Hideyoshi had the emperor pay

him a visit for a highly ostentatious ceremony, as already discussed in the context of cohering

core supporters. Typically, members of society, no matter their station, visited the emperor. Such a move on Hideyoshi's part implied the subordination of the emperor to the newly-ascendant warrior ruler. Moreover, Hideyoshi had the daimyo whom he had defeated attend the ceremony and pledge in writing loyalty to him and the imperial family. The great majority of the signatories took Hideyoshi's new court-bestowed family name (Toyotomi) as their own and were listed under the court titles that Hideyoshi had granted them. The implication was that Hideyoshi was responsible for these men's recently acquired aristocratic prestige and that military rule and imperial authority were unified (Elison 1981b: 235-238; Hall 1981a: 197). Significantly, Ieyasu was one of these daimyo who paid homage to Hideyoshi (Naohiro 1991: 47), suggesting that Hideyoshi had successfully incorporated his chief rival. By symbolically emphasizing the authority he now had, Hideyoshi was incorporating these independent social forces – the daimyo and their retainer networks – into his reunification campaign's orbit. The submissive attendance of the emperor suggested that the de facto paramount authority in the realm was Hideyoshi. Only he was able to unify Japan and the emperor's attendance confirmed that. As George Elison observes, "[t]he Imperial Visit was conceived as the best possible symbol of Hideyoshi's grand pacification of the realm" (Elison 1981b: 236). Since even Tokugawa Ieyasu, a future unifier himself, submitted to Hideyoshi's authority, these events make clear that the kanpaku's reunification campaign was rapidly consolidating, in large part because of the assiduous and comprehensive manipulation of the nationally-legitimated symbol of the emperor and the imperial system.

Hideyoshi employed his positions as kanpaku and grand minister of state to justify his destruction of daimyo fortresses. Rhetorically, he asserted that he was doing so in order to

bring enduring peace to provinces. Even in areas Hideyoshi did not control, this strategy

succeeded in weakening their resolve to resist his reunification campaign. Certainly, as Asao

Naohiro suggests, the cessation of warfare was in their self-interest, especially since Hideyoshi

was also promising them secure land holdings under the new peaceful regime (Naohiro 1991:

48). Yet, the fact that he referenced his imperial positions while making these rhetorical pleas

suggests that at the very least Hideyoshi considered utilizing a nationally-legitimated symbol to

be valuable for such an incorporation strategy. Additionally, we can expect that these

authoritative references made Hideyoshi's aims to destroy their defensive coercive power more

amenable to the daimyo than if he did not explicitly espouse his imperial titles. After all, why

should a daimyo lord accept Hideyoshi's hegemonic goals and not his own or someone else's?

Hideyoshi's symbolic monopolization of imperial authority could have provided him social

influence beyond the sphere of material self-interest.

One concrete indication of this successfully incorporation strategy was the series of

invasions of Korea in the 1590s initiated on Hideyoshi's behest. He ordered the daimyo to raise

over 250,000 troops from all over Japan. Despite the massive levy, no significant resistance to

Hideyoshi's raising of troops emerged from society (Berry 1982: 209). Furthermore, the daimyo

themselves were not especially enthusiastic about the foreign venture. After Hideyoshi's death,

they quickly abandoned the war effort and withdrew their forces from Korea (Berry 1982: 213).

Still, the fact that the daimyo followed Hideyoshi in his pursuit of his grand goals of conquering

China suggests a strong sense of loyalty that could have been fostered through his

incorporation efforts.

Tokugawa Ieyasu and his successors continued Hideyoshi's strategy of using the

nationally-legitimated symbol of the emperor to incorporate external social forces. In many

ways, they went further in harnessing the symbolic power of the emperor. In 1606, for instance,

Ieyasu decreed that the imperial court could not issue ranks without his recommendation

(Ooms 1985: 51). In 1607, the first Korean diplomatic mission to Tokugawa Japan bypassed the

emperor and was received by Ieyasu directly. In 1615, Ieyasu passed, along with the

Regulations for Military Houses discussed above, Regulations for the Court (Ooms 1985: 53).

These Regulations indicated that the Tokugawa were intent on subordinating the imperial

house to their military government, the shogunate. Ieyasu's grandson's massive military parade

through the imperial city of Kyoto in 1634 further supports this possibility, as do the required

yearly imperial visits to Ieyasu's tomb (Ooms 1985: 54, 42).

Linking themselves with the native sacred tradition of Japan, Shinto, of which the

emperor played a central part, was also a key part of the Tokugawa's incorporation strategy.

Ieyasu referred to Japan as the Land of the Gods, a Shinto belief, and even proclaimed himself

to be a living god (Ooms 1985: 47). Ieyasu's grandson rebuilt his grandfather's mausoleum as a

means of burnishing the family's legitimacy. Furthermore, his grandson enhanced the sacred

and divine character of his grandfather's authority by having him posthumously referred to as

shinkun or divine ruler (Ooms 1985: 57). The warrior class was receptive to this strategy, and

thus this class was the principal audience for Ieyasu's and his descendants' strategy of using

Shinto concepts to legitimize their rule.

By manipulating the symbolic resources of the emperor, Hideyoshi and Tokugawa were

able to reconstitute and consolidate the state. Though achievement in battle was a crucial

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factor in these two unifiers' success, establishing the legitimacy of their rule was a necessary

additional requirement. The symbol of the emperor, when effectively utilized to incorporate

external social forces, legitimized these two political leaders in the eyes of politically-relevant

forces in society, thereby smoothing their paths to power and ensuring the preservation of

authority for their posterity.

Disempowerment of Local Elites

The principal local elites of Sengoku Japan were the samurai. These elites also controlled most

of the resources, specifically land and what was produced on it. For the unifiers, figuring out

how to disempower these local elites was vital since direct access to resources could not be

achieved any other way. Undermining the local power of samurai elites was one of the most

important imperatives for state-builders in this era. Additionally, in the Kinai region aristocratic

and religious institutions continued to hold power and would thus likely pose as obstacles to

the establishment of direct access to the resources they controlled. Hideyoshi built upon

Nobunaga's policies and devised his own to disempower these elites and Tokugawa ensured

their final implementation.

Before discussing these policies, I assess the locations of where major new daimyo lords

(including the three unifiers) emerged in the late Sengoku period (1550 on). Recall that in

Sengoku Japan shugo daimyo continued to have local control in this period, despite the collapse

of the state upon which their power had once depended. These shugo, by virtue of their

enduring power, could inhibit the emergence of rivals within their territories. Thus, we should

expect new daimyo to emerge in provinces that did not have a shugo presence. With the

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exception of Omi, no major new daimyo lords emerged in provinces with local shugo influence. There is a clear association, therefore, between where new political actors arose and the degree of geopolitical space.

Oda Nobunaga took advantage of his favorable geopolitical positioning to launch a reunification campaign directed at the central capital region. After establishing himself this area, he proceeded to adopt the cadastral form of land survey that had been developed by earlier daimyo and implemented it using his own representatives in the provinces of Ise, Echizen, Harima, Settsu and Tango (Wakita 1991: 101). Not surprisingly, all but Settsu were outside the Kinai region, identified in the last chapter as the region of Japan with the lowest degree of geopolitical space because of the enduring power of aristocratic and religious institutions. Furthermore, none of these provinces had been controlled by *shugo* families in the 1550s, samurai clans that had once held national power under the previous regime. Since these shugo survived the fall of the earlier shogunate that had once legitimated their power, we can assume that they had especially secure power bases and thus considerable influence in their provinces. Even if Nobunaga was able to impose his dominion over them on the battlefield, the shugo may still have had the capacity to at least spoil Nobunaga's efforts at establishing direct access to resources, which cadastral surveys were intended to do. Perhaps Nobunaga knew this and so focused his surveying efforts in provinces that did not have a strong shugo presence. The pattern of where Nobunaga implemented cadastral surveys suggests that this may have been the case.

As already suggested, these direct cadastral surveys were employed by Nobunaga to establish his rights to control and possess the land and distribute it as fiefs to proprietors

(Wakita 1991: 101). The comprehensive character of these surveys meant that Nobunaga could

not only formulate an accurate assessment of the potential resources at his disposal and but

also precisely reward supporters according to whatever criteria he decides. His most loyal

supporters, for instance, could be given the most desirable land. There were limits to this

system, though, since often Nobunaga was simply reconfirming land already held by his

retainers. Still, he did assign fiefs to his most important core supporters, such as Shibata Katsuie

and Hideyoshi Toyotomi (Wakita 1991: 102). If, however, the surveys did not provide Nobunaga

with an accurate understanding of the value of the land, this mechanism of rewarding loyalty

may not have been as effective since the best land would not necessarily go to the most loyal

supporters. Cadastral surveys thus served as a potent tool for a unifier seeking to create and

maintain an effective reunification coalition. The fact that they were almost entirely performed

outside the Kinai region indicates that low degrees of geopolitical space were strongly

correlated with strategies designed to establish direct access to resources.

Other surveys ordered by Nobunaga, however, were implemented by local proprietors

and thus not as thorough. Wakita Osamu surmises that this lack of thoroughness was probably

because these surveys were done in areas where the proprietors were temples and aristocrats

(Wakita 1991: 101, fn. 11). Where Nobunaga had to accept indirect land surveys were areas in

which he did enjoy total control over the land (Wakita 1991: 102). As this study's theoretical

framework expects, well-connected social groups – like temples and aristocrats – inhibited the

direct access to resources in areas where they held sway. Indirect surveys were done in the

provinces of Omi, Yamashiro, Yamato and Izumi (Wakita 1991: 101). Of these, all but Omi were

in the Kinai region. Consequently, the patterns of Nobunaga's surveying – cadastral (direct) or

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indirect – and, presumably, his direct access to resources largely accorded with the

expectations derived from the distribution of geopolitical space in Japan, as delineated in

Chapter Two.

By 1583, Hideyoshi controlled the central provinces of Japan, where he was able to

institute a cadastral land survey that sought to accurately determine the amount of arable (and

thus taxable) land. An accurate survey could then be used to most efficiently tax the land-

holding populace. Additionally, the execution of this survey would declare Hideyoshi the sole

superior proprietary authority, allowing him access to all parts of the polity (Hall 1981b: 17).

Over the next few decades, this survey system was extended across Japan. Hideyoshi and his

successor Tokugawa used this system to progressively sever samurai connections to the villages.

The samurai's income was decoupled from any specific piece of land, thus preventing them

from returning to their original sources of power. This was the most fundamental social change

during the late Sengoku Era (Hall 1981b: 19). Samurai went from being landowners to state

officials living in the castles of daimyo lords. By doing so, Hideyoshi and Tokugawa

disempowered the dominant local elite stratum – the samurai (Hall 1981a: 211). Though this

strategy's success varied regionally, it was most successful in the central provinces, which were

directly held by Hideyoshi and Tokugawa and thus served as their principal support bases. So

the disempowerment of local elites was most successful where it was most crucial for the

unifiers and their regimes.

Hideyoshi also actively implemented the strategy of transferring daimyo to provinces

outside their places of origin when they were made to submit to his authority and continued to

do so even after (Elison 1981a: 68). The daimyo's retainers would go with them, leaving the

local samurai in their home provinces without access to the political networks they had

cultivated ties with. Such a strategy not only removed the daimyo's support bases but also

exposed the local samurai to efforts at extending the unifiers' direct access to resources.

Hideyoshi's innovations in taxation were able to undercut the power of the local

samurai elite, thereby providing him with direct access to the resources he required for his

armies of hundreds of thousands. Tokugawa continued the same policies during his ascent to

power in the early 1600s. By the mid-1600s, during the reign of Tokugawa's grandson, the

transition of samurai from local powerholders to castle-bound officials was largely complete. As

a consequence, the shoguns and their daimyo allies were able to have mostly unfettered access

to the resources of the land. Combined with the ideological discipline and symbolic legitimacy

that the shoguns had established, the disempowerment of local elites ensured the

consolidation of the Tokugawa Shogunate, a state and regime that would last for nearly 250

years.

Chapter Four: Assessing the External Validity of the Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I conduct three plausibility probes to begin the process of determining the external validity of the theoretical framework I partially inductively derived from the two main cases discussed in the previous chapters. I utilize these case studies to investigate the extent to which this framework can be used to explain cases very different from the two used to derive the theory. Though comparative-historical analysis is not an approach that prizes generalizability above all other principles of research, it is still valuable to establish the scope of a theoretical framework through the progressive analysis of additional cases. Comparative-historical analysts embed their arguments within particular (often temporal-geographic) contexts, but it is worth testing the limits of the analytic equivalence of cases by assessing the validity of a theory in many dissimilar circumstances. This way, the true bounds of a theoretical framework can be uncovered.

My process of case selection for this stage of the study involves searching for successful cases of endogenous state reconstitution that occurred in contexts distinct from those found in Republican China and Sengoku Japan. Temporally, this method requires selecting cases from time periods distinct from the two main cases. Ideally, these additional cases' geographic locations would also be different from the principal cases used to derive my theoretical framework. The first two, Ethiopia and Uganda in the late twentieth-century, are distinct from Republican China and Sengoku Japan both geographically and temporally, thus achieving

variation on both dimensions. In addition, these cases are the only clear instances of successful endogenous state reconstitution in the post-Cold war world, thus making them highly relevant to the contemporary world. The third case, tenth-century China, is distinct temporally from both main cases, but only geographically distinguished from Sengoku Japan. Still, all five cases collectively exhibit considerable temporal and geographic variation. Since a most-different, same-outcome research design is best served by a comparative strategy that maximizes variation across explanatory factors, comparing cases as heterogeneous as these should provide considerable insight into the generalizability of the theoretical framework I have developed.

Put simply, the facts of these cases significantly support the external validity of this framework. Successful state reconstitution in both Ethiopia and Uganda can be explained by my theoretical framework, with each structural-strategic pair identifiably present in the events and processes that comprise these cases. Of the three pairs, the nationally-legitimated-symbol/incorporation-strategy one has the least supporting evidence, but nonetheless frames clear strategies by Ethiopia's and Uganda's respective unifiers. The third case, post-Tang Dynasty China in the tenth century, only partially supports the framework, suggesting limits to its theoretical scope. Still, major aspects of my argument do travel to this temporally distant case, including the nationally-legitimated-symbol/incorporation-strategy causal pair. In other words, though my argument's portability has apparent limits, it nonetheless has explanatory power well beyond the contexts from which it was partially derived.

For each case, I provide a brief narrative account of the process of state collapse and

reconstitution and then discuss the extent to which the case can be explained by the three pairs

of key necessary conditions that comprise the theoretical framework presented in Chapter One.

Supporting Cases: Ethiopia and Uganda in the 1970s through 1990s

Ethiopia from 1974 to 1995 and Uganda from 1979 to 1985 are both cases of state collapse and

endogenous reconstitution in postcolonial East Africa. In both cases, an opposition force

overthrew the previous regime but was unable to institute a stable substitute political order.

Eventually, a third force emerged from a position of remarkable weakness to one of national

hegemony, creating a consolidated, reconstituted state in the process. In both Ethiopia and

Uganda, this third force employed an ideological framework to create a durable and efficacious

core reunification coalition. Additionally, in each case the unifier utilized a nationally-

legitimated symbol to gain support or acquiescence from key groups in wider society. Finally,

each reunifying political force originated from and (in the case of Uganda) subsequently

reenergized itself in an area with a comparatively high degree of geopolitical space, permitting

the implementation of crucial early state-making policies. These policies, in turn, aided these

forces in establishing secure support bases from which they could launch reunification

campaigns. Thus, as with Hideyoshi and Ieyasu in Sengoku Japan and Mao in Republican China,

the unifiers of Ethiopia and Uganda implemented the three necessary strategic conditions

identified in my theoretical framework to successfully reconstitute the state.

For both Ethiopia and Uganda, I provide a brief narrative account of the sequence of state collapse and reconstitution, followed by discussions of how the three key strategic conditions were implemented by unifiers.

Ethiopia

Prior to the 1970s, Ethiopia was a consolidated political community. Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ethiopian emperors expanded the state, encompassing more and more ethnic groups through both conquest and diplomacy. By 1995, there were forty such groups residing within the borders of the Ethiopian state. Over the course of his reign between 1930 and 1974, the last emperor of the Solomonic Dynasty, Haile Selassie, publicly cultivated the notion of Ethiopia as "a multi-ethnic but unitary nation state" (Keller 2002: 28).Thus, for more than a century, Ethiopia had a legacy of political integration, despite its highly heterogeneous ethnic character.

However, there were considerable internal tensions in the Ethiopian polity. The imperial state exploited the peripheral areas, imposing tenancy on the local population, a process that instigated the emergence of nationalist sentiments within subordinate ethnic groups and fostered minority population resentment against the dominant Amharic ethnic group. In 1974, a military coup overthrew Haile Selassie's government in Ethiopia, bringing the Marxist-Leninist Derg regime to power. "Derg", meaning "committee" in Ethiopian, was short for the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army, the body that ruled the country during this period. Subsequently, the various ethnic communities' rising nationalist resentments exploded into armed uprisings on the peripheries of Ethiopian territory (Keller

1995b: 126-128). In particular, the Eritrean, Tigray and Oromo peoples founded a number of rebel fronts that challenged the authority of the regime. Ethiopia's internal heterogeneity, previously pacific, was now spawning considerable unrest and instability.

For the next seventeen years, the Derg attempted to consolidate control of the country, but was unable to do so in the face of numerous, persistent insurrectionary movements. The regime's own lack of respect for Ethiopia's diversity likely doomed its chances of reunifying the country. In 1991, the Marxist-Leninist government was overthrown by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), formed in the late 1980s as a coalition of opposition forces that had been hostile to the Derg almost since the latter's founding in 1974 (Keller 1995b: 125-126). The EPRDF was principally led by one of its constituent groups, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), established in 1975 in the region of Tigray, the homeland of the eponymous ethnic group from which the TPLF drew its membership and whom it sought to represent. The EPRDF and TPLF were under the unequivocal leadership of Meles Zenawi since 1989. In order to garner widespread support, the TPLF criticized the Derg's refusal to grant Ethiopia's nationalities self-determination. Instead, the TPLF explicitly recognized the autonomy of the country's ethnic groups, which appealed to their nationalist sentiments and consequently fostered their support for the TPLF's reunification efforts. Thus, the heterogeneity that had posed such an insurmountable obstacle to the Derg proved to be a crucial political resource for Zenawi and the TPLF.

In the early 1990s, under the presidency of Meles Zenawi, the EPRDF formed a new transitional government, which moved towards forging a stable, consolidated regime. Its initial efforts at granting self-determination to most of Ethiopia's nationalities actually led to another

round of civil war between many of these groups and the government. But by the end of 1993, the EPRDF managed to suppress the opposition, in large part by reducing the governing coalition to the EPRDF and groups it created (and that were thus loyal to its leadership) (Keller 1995b: 134-137). By 1995, the new state had been consolidated. Zenawi ruled Ethiopia until his death in 2012, while the EPRDF regime lives on.

Ideology and Cohering Core Supporters

From the outset, the TPLF sought to espouse and practice clear and consistent ideological principles, in large part drawn from Marxism-Leninism. This disciplined use of an ideological framework proved essential in maintaining its reunification coalition, comprised primarily of ethnic Tigrayans, through many years of insecurity, while gaining support from the wider populace, especially the peasantry. The TPLF had a very weak support base in the beginning, but, as John Young argues, "the extreme vulnerability of the TPLF in the early years may have been one of its greatest assets" (Young 1997: 114). This was so because the TPLF was forced to rely on the goodwill of the peasantry, which required that the coalition closely investigate its conditions. The TPLF's pre-existing socialist-populist ideology was thus reinforced by the objective conditions the Front faced and had to address.

The TPLF put in practice its clear and consistent ideological principles through its behavior towards the peasantry. Its cadres lived in purposeful poverty, despite many of them coming from wealthy backgrounds. They refused to live off the peasantry, instead preferring to exhibit self-sacrifice to those they wished to govern. In the mid to late 1970s, the TPLF's principal rival for control of Tigray was the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU). Unlike the EDU,

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the TPLF did not pillage, and in fact executed any of its members who did. Furthermore, the TPLF was dedicated to assisting the peasants, while the EDU was by contrast closely associated with the former nobility (Young 1997), which pitted it against the peasants. In addition, the TPLF followed through on its ideological principles by organizing voluntary mass associations wherever it established control, employing them to raise the political consciousness of the people the associations encompassed.

The TPLF also contrasted favorably with another emergent opposition front in the area, the Eritrean People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). The EPRP, like the EDU, was more conspicuously wealthy than the TPLF and was willing to use force against recalcitrant peasants. Furthermore, the land reform policies that the TPLF pursued were much more conscientiously implemented than the EPRP's, with its cadres accounting for differences in local conditions when allocating land to peasant families (Young 1997). Overall, the TPLF's commitment to its ideological principles presented a stark contrast with its chief rivals in Tigray.

Through the mid to late 1970s, the TPLF's survival was anything but certain. Assaults by rival forces, famine and cadre desertion all threatened to instigate a collapse of the Front. For instance, throughout most of the campaign against the EDU, the TPLF was regularly outnumbered and defeated by the Union's superior forces. Another example of the challenging conditions the TPLF faced was the Red Terror the Derg carried out in 1978 that killed thousands of individuals opposed to the regime. Tigray was not spared from this campaign of repression despite the Derg's limited influence in the region. Furthermore, between 1976 and 1978 a substantial number of cadres defected, probably because of the difficult conditions the Front

was facing (Young 1997). Like Mao and the Communists in Republican China, the TPLF's road to power was fraught with danger and uncertainty.

Ideological discipline, though, proved to be a superior asset in the TPLF's campaign for hegemony in Tigray. By the late 1970s, the peasantry was coming out in explicit favor of the TPLF, while rejecting the authority asserted by rival groups such as the EPRP and EDU. In 1979 the TPLF was able to definitively defeat both the EDU and EPRP in battle, leaving the former as the dominant opposition force in Tigray (Young 1997: 112). The Front's discipline paid off since the TPLF could now use its control of the region as a launching pad for reunifying the country as a whole.

Though ideological consistency on the part of the leaders did not prevent the coalition from hemorrhaging members for a time, the remaining core individuals did not let these demoralizing circumstances prevent them from staying the course. We can surmise that the elongation of these core members' time horizons is what preserved their dedication to the Front's goals of social revolution and state reconstitution. As the case summary above states, the TPLF, as the leading element of the EPRDF, was able to successfully reconstitute the state despite its humble and insecure origins in Tigray.

Nationally-Legitimated Symbolism and Incorporating Independent Social Groups

The TPLF not only utilized an ideological framework but also strategically employed the nationally-legitimated symbol of Ethiopia as a multiethnic state in order to incorporate independent social groups. As early as the 1970s TPLF cadres were stressing the importance of granting self-determination to Ethiopia's nationalities (Young 1997: 112). Although through the

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1970s the TPLF was emphasizing its Tigrayan nationalist nature, by 1981 it was advocating for

the voluntary integration of Ethiopia's ethnic groups generally. The TPLF likely focused on

Tigrayan nationality at first since Tigray was the region in which it was founded and from which

it drew its membership. Until the late 1970s, the Front had no secure support base and so

focusing on fostering support from the Tigray made the most sense. Once it had a secure base

of support, though, the TPLF could turn to its ambitious goal of reconstituting the Ethiopian

state under its authority. This strategic transition required expanding the symbolic community

the TPLF spoke to.

Expectedly, then, in the late 1980s, the TPLF joined forces with the Eritrean People's

Liberation Front (EPLF), a group primarily concerned with mobilizing the Eritrean ethnicity, to

fight the Derg regime.. At the same time, the TPLF formed the EPRDF, an umbrella organization

comprised of various ethnically-based anti-Derg fronts (Keller 1995b: 131). The TPLF allied with

the EPLF also because of the latter's dedication to Marxism and democratic centralism,

ideologies the TPLF itself espoused (Young 1997: 113). Alliance with an ideologically-similar

opposition force was further evidence of the TPLF leadership's dedication to its principles,

which was likely to have strengthened the loyalty of the TPLF's members to the party. Partly as

a result of its broad organizational and pan-ethnic base, the alliance was able to overthrow the

Derg regime in 1991; the EPRDF immediately established itself in the capital of Addis Ababa

(Keller 1995b: 132). Thus, the TPLF's incorporation strategy played a key role in reconstituting

the state.

The TPLF maintained its strategy of incorporating independent social groups following

the defeat of the Derg for the purposes of state consolidation. The transitional charter drawn

up in 1991 after the overthrow of the Derg was primarily written by the EPRDF, which, again, was a pan-ethnic, Ethiopian national organization. The charter guaranteed the right of all Ethiopian nationalities to self-determination. Specifically, this was to mean that ethnic identities were to be preserved, each nationality would govern itself within the federal Ethiopian system, and local and regional administrative units would be determined by nationality (Keller 1995a: 630). However, the charter was ultimately rejected by a number of ethnic groups including, most significantly, the Oromo, which comprise forty to fifty percent of Ethiopia's population (Keller 1995a: 623). A low-grade civil war commenced between these groups and the new, EPRDF-led regime, though by 1993 the chief Oromo political organization was weakened enough by the conflict that peace was restored.

Nonetheless, the EPRDF was intent on gaining at least the acquiescence of the Oromo and so established its own political organization in the Oromo region and had a prominent Oromo politician made president. Though under the post-transitional regime the prime minister holds principal executive authority, the presidency is more than just a figurehead position. Thus, as Edmond Keller asserts, this appointment "suggests that a conscious effort [was] being made to win legitimacy for the new Government among the Oromo" (Keller 1995a: 631). The EPRDF was aware of Ethiopia's multiethnic legacy and assiduously sought to respect and cultivate the nationally-legitimated symbol of the multiethnic state.

The federal constitution of 1994 followed through on the principles of the transitional charter by formalizing an ethno-regionally-based system of administration. Under the new constitutional system, nationalities could set up their own administrative and police systems and promote their own languages (Keller 2002: 31-32). Though power was centralized in the

federal state (which unilaterally granted the rights of nationalities), the EPRDF-led government emphasized in the years following reunification that its goals were the elimination of interethnic inequality and the realization of ethnic federalism (Keller 2002: 33; Keller 2010: 79). Despite the largely unitary-in-practice nature of the state, the realities and legacies of Ethiopia's multi-ethnicity have encouraged the EPRDF under Meles Zenawi's leadership to explicitly recognize and legitimize the corporate existence of the country's nationalities.

These efforts in favor of creating and preserving a multiethnic state do not suggest that the EPRDF intended to share actual political power with opposition groups, of which there remained at least a few.[14] In fact, by 1993 organized opposition was generally repressed and the ruling party has won every national election since and put in place loyal cadres at the regional and local levels (Keller 2010: 80, 83). Still, into the 2000s Meles Zenawi continued to emphasize the importance of respecting equally the history and culture of all Ethiopia's nationalities and making Ethiopian ethnic federalism a successful model that could be emulated by others (Keller 2010: 86).

In brief, nationally-legitimated symbolism and the incorporation of independent social groups played a major role throughout not only the TPLF's reunification campaign but also the EPRDF's subsequent consolidation process. Ethiopia has been a multiethnic polity since at least the mid-19th century. In the twentieth century, increasingly politically-active nationalist movements emerged throughout Ethiopian society. When the TPLF was seeking to take central power and consolidate a new state, it had to show respect for this multinational character of

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[14] In April 1993, for instance, the leaders of the EPRDF expelled five political groups from the governing coalition, suggesting that the opposition had a modest organizational basis (Keller 2010: 80).

Ethiopia when it engaged other ethnic communities and ethnically-based organizations and constructed the new state's constitutional apparatus. The TPLF's policies contrasted starkly with those of the Derg, which adhered to an ideology of 'scientific socialism' that downplayed the significance and legitimacy of Ethiopia's ethnic diversity (Keller 2010: 71-76). As a result, the ethnically-based opposition forces violently resisted its rule, with many of them joining the TPLF's reunification campaign. Somewhat paradoxically, then, in the contemporary era this internal political diversity has determined the social basis for the reconstitution of a consolidated Ethiopian state. Unifiers who did not, at least symbolically, take seriously the enduring, politically-mobilized ethnic communities would not be able to successfully reconstruct the Ethiopian state. Only by incorporating these ethnic communities through an appeal to the nationally-legitimated symbol of the multiethnic state could the TPLF gain the requisite social acquiescence or support for it to consolidate the new political order.

Geopolitical space and Disempowering Local Elites

In addition to employing the two ideational necessary strategic conditions identified by the theoretical framework (which were made possible by the availability of their associated structural conditions), the TPLF took advantage of areas with high degrees of geopolitical space to disempower local elites and build up its initial support base. Tigray itself is a border region with very difficult terrain. The TPLF established its base area in western Tigray, near the Sudanese border, a location that was relatively isolated with limited infrastructure and weak administration and thus difficult for the Derg to reach. As John Young notes, the TPLF established its initial support base in "outlying areas of Tigray to avoid the security apparatus of

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the state and thus be positioned to carry out peasant mobilisations" (Young 1997: 115).

Moreover, the national vacuum of effective state authority gave further space for opposition movements to emerge. All these factors led to western Tigray having a considerable degree of geopolitical space within which the TPLF could disempower local elites and gain access to socioeconomic resources.

The TPLF employed land reform to disempower these elites, like the CCP under Mao Zedong did in Republican China. Furthermore, like the CCP, the TPLF's implementation of land reform not only disempowered local elites but also put into practice the organization's peasant-focused ideology, thereby enhancing its leaders' consistency and legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters. The TPLF instituted land reform in areas it established control over and it was through this mechanism that it was able to gain resource access. The TPLF's land reform policy was egalitarian, taking land away from individuals who held disproportionate amounts and giving it to needy families. Additionally, the TPLF actively fought the peasantry's enemies – bandits and nobles (Young 1997: 111). These groups were in turn those who posed the most significant obstacles to the TPLF gaining resource access, with bandits enjoying substantial coercive power and nobles holding considerable economic power. The TPLF undercut this local elite power by going to the peasantry, as Mao did in Republican China. Like Mao, the TPLF gained the peasants' allegiance through land reform and leaning on their support in its fights against these elites and other politico-military forces in Tigray. Furthermore, fostering the peasantry's approval of the TPLF through land reform and other ideologically-based practices increased the likelihood that a peasant would give the Front material assistance. The high

degree of geopolitical space in Western Tigray gave the TPLF room to implement these policies, all of which disempowered local elites.

In sum, the TPLF in Ethiopia utilized the three key strategies that the theoretical framework highlights. By doing so, under the leadership of Meles Zenawi the TPLF was able to successfully reconstitute the state. Other factors, such as gaining the loyalty of the peasantry and the allegiance of non-Tigrayan, ethnically-based opposition forces (such as the Eritrean People's Liberation Front), also proved very significant in the TPLF's ultimate victory. As I argue below, in Uganda the National Resistance Army led by Yoweri Museveni pursued an overall strategy in many ways very similar to that of Zenawi's TPLF. Crucially, the outcome, successful state reconstitution, was the same as well.

Uganda

Following Uganda's independence in 1962, Milton Obote became its leader. In 1971, however, his regime was overthrown by the general Idi Amin and Obote fled into exile. Under both Obote and Amin, the Ugandan state saw its ties with the peripheral areas break down, severely diminishing the peasantry's confidence in the capacity of the state to perform basic functions (Khadiagala 1995: 37). In the early 1970s, a number of guerilla groups emerged that were opposed to Idi Amin's regime because of its economic mismanagement and brutal political repression. Yoweri Museveni, the future leader of Uganda, led one called the Front for National Salvation. At the behest of Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, these groups met in Tanzania in 1979 to form a united organization called the Uganda National Liberation Front (Tindigarukayo

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1988: 608). In April of that year, the Tanzanian military, along with the Ugandan rebel groups, invaded the country and toppled Amin's regime (Khadiagala 1995: 38).

Over the next several years, the country coped with a virtually destroyed administrative apparatus, and suffered from raping and pillaging by the remnants of Amin's military forces, economic instability and a succession of weak and unpopular leaderships (Tindigarukayo 1988; Khadiagala 1995: 38). Under the second post-Amin presidency, Yoweri Museveni served as defense minister, taking advantage of his new governmental authority to garner the support of soldiers from his home region of Ankole, a border area in southwestern Uganda. In May 1980, the military overthrew the president and established a military commission, with Museveni as vice-chairman (Tindigarukayo 1988: 613). Museveni's political party, the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), participated in the following election that June, though won only one seat out of 126 (Tindigarukayo 1988: 614). The new president, the returned Milton Obote, was able to get the country back on track economically but was incapable of ending domestic insecurity and armed opposition. Ethno-regional forces, supporters of recently deposed presidents such as Idi Amin and defeated political parties (like the UPM) resented Obote's return to power because of perceived electoral irregularities and long-standing hostilities, and consequently launched repeated guerilla attacks on his regime for the next five years (Tindigarukayo 1988: 616-617). The new government was unable to reassert state authority.

The strongest of the anti-Obote guerilla movements was Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA), which developed its support base in western Uganda. Moreover, many members of Obote's military perceived that he favored his own tribe in government appointments and military deployments, with other tribes bearing the brunt of the anti-guerilla campaigns

(Tindigarukayo 1988: 617). The combination of ethno-regionally-based opposition, guerilla-style insurrections and internal dissension proved too much for the Obote regime to handle. In July 1985, former government soldiers who were not from Obote's ethnic group defeated his forces and drove him into exile.

The resultant military council government, under Tito Okello, favored the ethnic group of the leader of the forces that had ousted Obote, the Acholi. Museveni and his NRA demanded equal representation for themselves, and when their demands were not met, they launched attacks against the new regime (Tindigarukayo 1988: 619). A peace agreement signed in Nairobi, Kenya in December 1985 was quickly shattered as the two sides resumed fighting each other. Museveni's NRA was better disciplined and trained than the regime forces and enjoyed stronger support from the populace, who had been suffering gross mistreatment by the government military. Museveni's forces successfully took control of the capital, Kampala, in January 1986 (Tindigarukayo 1988: 621; Khadiagala 1995: 38). He has been in power ever since.

The young regime, however, had a trying time consolidating the newly reconstituted state. Museveni's government had to cope with seven civil wars over the next couple of decades, though by 2002 only one remained, which has essentially been contained since 2006 (Lindemann 2011: 388). On the one hand, the continuation of civil conflict suggests that Museveni had difficulty consolidating the new state. But on the other, the fact that Museveni has stayed in power despite these conflicts suggests a qualitatively different degree of territorial political control from before, given that his predecessors were consistently unable to survive, let alone defeat, their own armed insurrections.

Ideology and Cohering Core Supporters

Like the TPLF in Ethiopia, Museveni's NRA implemented policies that favored the peasantry,

sought to disempower local elites and emphasized ideological consistency and discipline.

Museveni was the principal creator of the NRA's ideology, which he based on his lifelong

respect and concern for the peasantry. The leader of the NRA called for a localized system of

governance that would politically and economically liberate the peasant. Additionally,

Museveni was opposed to sectarianism (ethnic, parochial, religious) and argued that political

parties exacerbated these identity-based tensions in African societies at the cost of economic

development. His belief in the necessity of socioeconomic transformation was reinforced by his

Marxist education in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Museveni communicated his beliefs through his

writings and lectures, in which he emphasized the need for his core supporters to practice a

principled and disciplined form of governance and to mobilize and educate the masses, most

especially the peasantry (Rubongoya 2007: 61). At its core, Museveni's ideology was rurally-

based and populist in its orientation.

Official NRA ideology was thus based on the two key principles of national democracy

and popular mobilization. A number of clear strategic directives emerged from this ideological

framework. First, Ugandan democracy required removing the country's entrenched politicians

and military officers who would exacerbate ethnic tensions for political gain. Second, this

transformation necessitated a sustained armed campaign buttressed by mass support. NRA

leaders must engage with the rural masses of Uganda, encouraging "autonomous and voluntary

civilian participation" (Kasfir 2005: 274). This participation would be fostered through the

creation of Resistance Councils that would directly involve the people in their own government.

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Third, the NRA's national, rather than ethnic-sectarian, focus was apparent in its insistence on downplaying the country's ethnic cleavages, only agreeing that issues of ethnic autonomy would be decided following the end of civil war. It stayed committed to this principle throughout the years of conflict, even when the NRA was heavily dependent on the support of politically-ambitious ethnic groups such as the Baganda in southern Uganda (Kasfir 2005: 282-283). NRA leaders were thus committed to an ideology of national democracy and popular mobilization throughout their wars with the post-Amin regimes.

Instituting village democracy was the NRA's primary mechanism for pursuing the ideological goal of popular mobilization. The implementation of village democracy included educating the peasantry on the correctness of the NRA political line and raising the masses' political consciousness. This encouragement of village democracy was formalized through the Resistance Council system, which promoted individual merit, the empowerment of the masses at the local level and grassroots democracy (Rubongoya 2007: 65). When promoting this popular-mobilization strategy, the NRA presented elected village governments as evidence of its success (Kasfir 2005: 278). There were limits to the NRA's commitment to popular democracy, though, since at first it would establish relationships with traditional elites when entering villages, selecting them to head the secret committees the NRA set up (Kasfir 2005: 284). Still, during the NRA's time as a guerrilla force, its efforts at popular mobilization were well-received by the peasantry (Rubongoya 2007: 63). This popular support underscored Museveni and his rebel force's ideological consistency during their reunification campaign.

Instituting elected village Resistance Councils became official NRA policy by September 1982 as a result of its increasing military strength since Museveni initiated his guerilla campaign

against the Obote regime. This policy was not only in line with the NRA's stated ideology but also provided a stark contrast between it and the government, as well as greatly enhancing its mobilization capacity and expanding its access to socioeconomic resources. The NRA purposefully avoided interfering in the decisions made by the Resistance Councils and so ensured truly popular mobilization (Kasfir 2005: 286-287). Through the mechanism of village democracy, the NRA was able to highlight its dedication to its ideological principles throughout Uganda's civil war.

Museveni also followed through on his ideological principle of national democracy (as opposed to political sectarianism). For instance, when first constructing the NRA, he incorporated not just his own pre-existing support network, primarily comprised of ethnic Banyankore, but also the principally ethnic Baganda Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF) (Rubongoya 2007: 64). By doing so, Museveni was making explicitly his appeal to a pan-ethnic political community, a core component of his ideological framework.

The NRA's ideological consistency was also a positive trait in comparison to the Obote regime that claimed national authority throughout most of the conflict. Most Ugandans saw the Obote regime as having seized power illegitimately by interfering in the election process, and Museveni was able to exploit this widespread sentiment to portray his movement as a popular struggle against political corruption (Kasfir 2005: 278). He demonstrated this by forcibly removing officials of the regime and traditional chiefs from areas the NRA entered. In contrast to the government forces, who looted and attacked villagers, the NRA set up democratic village committees, as discussed above (Kasfir 2005: 280). Not only were the NRA's actions largely

consistent with its state ideology. They also contrasted favorably with those of the NRA's

principal foe, the Obote regime.

The NRA's popular mobilization efforts had significant effects on the coherence of its

core coalition. Even when the NRA was on the run and unable to defend the villages it had won

over, it continued to make rhetorical appeals for popular mobilization (Kasfir 2005: 280). The

movement's leaders' commitment fostered dedication on the part of its members and the

peasantry that supported the NRA's efforts, as can be seen in the durability of the core coalition,

despite years of insecurity and weakness. The NRA's clear and consistent adherence to its

ideological principles of national democracy and popular mobilization not only strengthened

core supporter discipline but also engendered broad support from the rural masses. Like the

TPLF in Ethiopia and the CCP in Republican China, the NRA under Museveni was able to

maintain a level of discipline that enhanced its ability to acquire material support from the most

populous stratum in Ugandan society – the peasantry. This support proved consequential since

Museveni was able to reconstitute the state in less than five years despite the extreme internal

chaos that beset Uganda during this era.

Nationally-Legitimated Symbolism and Incorporating Independent Social Groups

The NRA also sought to incorporate independent social groups through employing the

nationally-legitimated symbol of national democracy, which, as already discussed, was also one

of the force's two ideological principles. NRA ideology emphasized the non-sectarian,

egalitarian nature of the state the movement sought to construct, which would encompass the

pre-existing boundaries of the country. Uganda had been an integrated political community

since the time of British colonialism from 1894 to 1962. Rather than foment ethnic division, the NRA appealed to this history of inter-ethnic cooperation and national unity. For example, in the early stages of his reunification campaign, Museveni faced ideological conflicts between leftist and conservative wings of his coalition. He fostered reconciliation between these two factions by advocating a nationalist doctrine of political and social reconstruction. As Joshua Rubongoya argues, this doctrine is considered to have ensured that the NRA remained united during its campaign, one of the very few African liberation movements to do so (Rubongoya 2007: 66). At first, Museveni had to construct his core coalition out of disparate social groups. As the success of his new nationalist doctrine indicates, he was able to do so through the early implementation of an incorporation strategy that employed a nationally-legitimated symbol – in this case, the notion of national Ugandan rejuvenation.

Museveni utilized the symbol of national reconstruction following his ascendance to power in 1986 as well. Soon after the conclusion of his reunification campaign, a number of groups in the north and northeast resisted the new government. The NRA attacked these groups but also appealed to national unity, security, democracy and economic restoration in order to end the rebellions (Khadiagala 1995: 39). Additionally, under the new regime Museveni insisted on a form of 'no-party' democracy that would not permit partisan contestation of elections. Instead, this democracy was to include all social forces, regardless of past political affiliation and would empower all social groups, including historically marginalized segments of the populace such as women and certain ethnicities (Rubongoya 2007: 87). National rejuvenation that encompassed the whole of society would be the project of Uganda's new state institutions.

In the face of rising opposition in the early 1990s, Museveni reemphasized national rejuvenation (Khadiagala 1995: 40-41) and refused to permit sectarianism to divide Uganda again. These appeals may have had an impact over the next decade, as Museveni's regime managed to contain each insurrection facing the country, though ethnic tensions continue to persist (Lindemann 2011). From the onset of his campaign in the early 1980s through the mid-2000s, Museveni employed the symbol of national rejuvenation to incorporate social groups and, in the initial stages, to construct his core coalition.

Museveni also utilized the notion of a national, democratic constitution to garner widespread support for his new regime. As early as 1981, the NRA published plans for a post-reunification constitution in the movement's newspaper. After reconstitution, Museveni had a constitutional commission travel the country and request input from the masses on the drafting process. Popular participation was very high, with the commission collecting over 25,000 submissions (Rubongoya 2007: 76). Museveni's regime tasked the members of a Constituent Assembly to debate and approve a draft constitution. The 1994 elections for the Assembly saw record turnout, indicating strong societal support for Museveni's process of promulgating a constitution for the Ugandan nation (Rubongoya: 77-78). Like the symbol of national rejuvenation, the passage of a popularly-supported constitution incorporated independent social groups, thereby increasing their support for the newly reconstituted state.

Geopolitical Space and Disempowering Local Elites

Museveni and the NRA took advantage of the high degree of geopolitical space that was prevalent in the country to disempower local elites. From the outset, the NRA confronted

considerable uncertainty concerning its future success, especially in light of its initial lack of

organizational strength. As Nelson Kasfir notes, "the vulnerability of the tiny group of fighters

who initiated the rebellion cannot be overestimated" (Kasfir 2005: 281). The NRA had no

permanent or substantial support base and operated in unfamiliar territory, and, indeed, as late

as 1985 the NRA's victory was far from guaranteed (Kasfir 2005: 278). Consequently, the

country's collapsed institutions and weak rival forces proved to be considerable boons for the

NRA.

Uganda became a political vacuum following Idi Amin's ouster, with its authoritative

institutions in shambles. Still, the traditional chieftaincies that had persisted through the

colonial and post-colonial eras remained politically relevant. But these local elites' traditional

sources of regional political support had been destroyed by the British, as well as by Amin and

Obote (Dickovick 2009: 525). Thus, in general there were high degrees of geopolitical space

throughout the country.

Additionally, the Luwero Triangle, the region where the NRA first began mobilizing, was

not far from the capital, the headquarters of Obote's forces. Thus, the NRA faced significant,

repeated attacks from regime forces. However, after the NRA began mobilizing in the remote

western border region encompassing the Rwenzori Mountains, its fortunes began to turn and it

was able to construct a support base strong enough to launch a successful reunification

campaign (Kasfir 2005). The relative isolation and rugged terrain of this western border region

likely provided greater geopolitical space than the Luwero Triangle. It is probably no accident

that the NRA's shift to the west coincided with its significantly improved capacities.

The NRA took advantage of areas with high degrees of geopolitical space to disempower local elites and institute popular organs of governance. While leading his rebellion in the countryside, Museveni and his coalition removed Obote's government officials from power in the areas they liberated and subsequently instituted the Resistance Councils described above (Kasfir 2005; Dickovick 2009: 525). These Councils limited the power of traditional elites, who were made accountable to the popular constituencies that elected Council members, though following state reconstitution Museveni had the traditional elites' nominal privileges restored (Dickovick 2009: 527). From the early 1990s on, traditional political structures, such as the pre-colonial, ethnically-based kingdoms, were nominally recognized, and traditional chiefs incorporated into the state. However, state-created local councils, not traditional elite-run institutions, constituted the real governing structures at the local level (Dickovick 2009: 528). In other words, Museveni co-opted traditional elites into the new state structures he and his NRA created, but did not permit them to carve out autonomous spheres of power for themselves.

Like the TPLF in Ethiopia, the NRA in Uganda consistently employed an ideological framework, appealed to nationally-legitimated symbols, and disempowered elites in areas with high degrees of geopolitical space. And like the TPLF, the NRA under Museveni was successful in reconstituting the state. Thus, these two recent cases in East Africa provide independent support for the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter One. Their temporal and geographic distinctiveness compared with the two principal cases I have analyzed highlights the portability of the theory's claims and expectations.

A Partially Supporting Case: Post-Tang Dynasty China in the Tenth Century

Unlike twentieth-century Ethiopia and Uganda, tenth-century China does not fully

confirm the validity of the theoretical framework. More precisely, the rise of the Song Dynasty

cannot be explained by all three pairs of principal necessary conditions around which the

framework is organized. Two of the three structural conditions – the availability of an

ideological framework and the availability of areas with high degrees of geopolitical space – do

not appear to have been present in this era of Chinese history. A nationally-legitimated symbol

however, was available and in fact was employed by unifiers to incorporate key independent

social groups. So, only part of my argument is supported by this third test case.

Despite the absence of ideological and geopolitical-spatial structures, unifiers in late

tenth-century China did implement *alternative* forms of cohering core supporters and

disempowering elites. Although, in my framework, I argue that a specialized ideological

framework is necessary for effective cohering of core supporters and that access to areas with

high degrees of geopolitical space is required for successful disempowering of local elites, the

achievements of the founders of the Song Dynasty suggest that this may not be so. Still, their

experiences indicate that constructing disciplined and loyal core coalitions and undercutting the

independent power of rival (potential or actual) elites are necessary strategies for successful

state reconstitution.

Tenth-century China is a classic case of state collapse. As Paul Jakov Smith notes, "the

collapse of T'ang power in the final decades of the ninth century unleashed massive forces of

rebellion, warlordism, and territorial fragmentation, giving way to…political division and social

turmoil" (Smith 2009: 1). Significantly, this collapse led to the destruction of the aristocracy that had ruled the previous state. In its place, a new military elite emerged that fought dozens of wars for supremacy over North China (Lorge 2005). The founder of the Song Dynasty, Zhao Kuangyin, who belonged to this military elite (Smith 2009: 11), initiated his reunification campaign in 963. His successor completed the Song conquest of South China in 978. By 986, the final borders of the Song Dynasty had been largely established (Smith 2009: 14; Lorge 2005). Even though border areas that had once been part of the Chinese empire were no longer joined to it, the core areas of the Tang Dynasty had been reincorporated into a new state. The founders of the Song Dynasty, while not achieving completely successful state reconstitution, were able to construct a state that closely matched the geographic extent of the Tang, encompassing as it did the core areas of the North China Plain, Yangzi River Valley, Sichuan Basin and southern China.

Cohering Core Supporters without Ideology

Cohering members of his reunification coalition played a central role in Zhao Kuangyin's overall strategy. When his leader, Chai Rong, died, Zhao enjoyed the intense loyalty of the imperial army, in large part because of his military exploits. Additionally, he imposed strict discipline on his forces, subjecting them to centralized surveillance and control and insisting on civilian control of the military (Smith 2009: 11-12). He also held frequent imperial inspections in order to maintain troop quality and loyalty. Furthermore, looting and killing during military campaigns was severely punished (Lau and Huang 2009: 219). Zhao put in place trusted generals or sworn brothers as commanders of the central imperial armies, while ensuring that no single general or

official maintained an excessive amount of control over the armed forces (Lau and Huang 2009:

216). Thus, even without an ideological framework, Zhao was nonetheless able to impose

discipline and loyalty. This achievement was essential for Zhao's and his successor's

construction of an absolutist state that could reunify the country by force and maintain a

durable political order.

Nationally-Legitimated Symbolism and Incorporating Independent Social Groups

Zhao Kuangyin's successor, Emperor Taizong, utilized the nationally-legitimated symbol of the

imperial literary compilation to incorporate scholars from recently-conquered southern

kingdoms. Taizong sought to use the construction of compilations to integrate southern

scholars – who had been in the service of dynasties that had ruled for decades – into his new

ruling apparatus (Kurz 2001: 291). Following the defeat and forced incorporation of the

southern kingdoms by Taizong's predecessor, Kuangyin, many southern scholars were left

without official position, since the rising Song dynasty was principally staffed by northerners

(Kurz 2001: 293). Taizong ordered the creation of anthologies in fields as varied as geography,

religion, literature, medicine and the classics of Chinese literature and philosophy (Kurz 2001:

295), and had southern scholars and officials play a major role in their development, thereby

incorporating them into the new regime. If they had not been integrated into the newly

reconstituted state, this southern educated class could have served as the staff of a rebellious

center of power in the south. Additionally, by incorporating the southern scholarly class,

Taizong could claim that he was the emperor of a dynasty that had ended the long period of

disunity in the country (Kurz 2001: 302). Now, all of China's official strata, both northern and southern, were united under a single state authority.

Moreover, Taizong sought to legitimate his rule by engaging in a process (i.e., literary compilation) that had roots in the previous, pan-China dynasty, the Tang (Kurz 2001: 291). One of the principal southern kingdoms in the tenth century had a very substantial library of Tang-era literary works and manuscripts. After its defeat, this kingdom's library was seized by the Song rulers, who could now assert that they were the legitimate successors to the previous hegemonic dynasty since they possessed its scholarly heritage (Kurz 2001: 297-298). Furthermore, Taizong's compilation process emphasized the continuity between the Tang and the Song by imitating the latter's literary achievements (Kurz 2001: 302). The nationally-legitimated symbol of the literary compilation was thus utilized to incorporate both a specific social group (the southern scholarly class) and society at large.

The Song unifiers also sought to incorporate independent social groups through means not related to a nationally-legitimated symbol. Zhao Kuangyin, for example, employed members of previous military governments in his imperial bureaucracy (Smith 2009: 13). Zhao also convinced his generals to accept appointments as regional military governors and arranged marriages between their families and the imperial family (Lau and Huang 2009: 216). Additionally, Zhao treated defeated polities with generosity, sparring their people from having to pay severe taxes; besides, he generally permitted their soldiers to return to the farm. Officials were given posts in the new imperial administration and the ruling families were given titles, substantial stipends, and sometimes even appointments in the Song court (Lau and Huang 2009: 228). Thus, the politically-relevant forces of the former generals and military

governors and defeated ruling families were systematically incorporated into the new regime, neutralizing any motivation to rebel or challenge the newly-emergent Song state.

Disempowering Local Elites without Geopolitical Space

The founders of the Song also employed active strategies of disempowering elites. In the case of pre-Song China, the biggest obstacles to the unifier gaining control of socioeconomic resources were the military governors. Local elites appear to have been less of an issue, perhaps because of the collapse of the Tang era aristocracy as a result of the rise of the military governors in the last hundred or so years of the dynasty (Standen 2009). This aristocracy could have formed the foundation of a powerful local elite stratum, given its previously-strong hold over the country's landed resources. In any event, Zhao and his successor were able to destroy the independent power of the military governors, who had emerged as the new regional elite. By 977, the Song emperor had eliminated the jurisdictions of the military governors and put in their place civilians answerable directly to the center (Smith 2009: 13). He implemented a new system that rotated officers between the capital and regions, preventing the emergence of strong bonds between officers and troops or places (Lau and Huang 2009: 218). Furthermore, later emperors prevented the reemergence of an independently-powerful aristocracy by tethering government service to the civil service exam. The new political elite owed its power to "its mastery of learning and its prowess in the examination halls" (Smith 2009: 13). As a result, the Song founders were able to prevent the reemergence of regional elites who could resist or even challenge the authority of the new state.

Implications for the Theoretical Framework

The state-building strategies of Zhao Kuangyin and his successor indicate that this case only

partially supports the theoretical framework I have proposed. The three pairs of key necessary

conditions do not seem to play a role in the success of these individuals to found a new dynasty,

with the exception of the utilization of a nationally-legitimated symbol to incorporate

independent social groups. Still, the Song unifiers did employ alternative forms of constructing

a disciplined and loyal core coalition, and disempowering rival elites suggest, which suggests

that portions of the theoretical framework can be used to account for Zhao and his successor's

success in reconstituting the state.

As the case of tenth-century China reveals, there may be a number of different ways to

effectively implement the three *general* strategies of cohering core supporters, incorporating

independent social groups and disempowering local and rival elites. The "general" form of

these strategies is concerned with whether unifiers achieve the a) construction of a disciplined

and loyal core coalition, b) acquisition of support and/or acquiescence from forces in society,

and c) deprivation of rival and local elite power. The specific strategies I highlight in my

theoretical framework may be just certain ones out of many that can aid a unifier in achieving

these goals. In other words, the general forms of these strategies include ones that employ the

three structural resources I have emphasized and ones that do not.

Thus, strategic success in state reconstitution may be characterized by equifinality,

meaning that there are multiple causal combinations that can result in an outcome (Ragin 2008:

53-54). In this case, the equifinal "outcomes" are the intermediate ones of constructing an

effective coalition, acquiring social support/acquiescence and depriving rival or obstructionist

elites of their power. Each of these outcomes is "intermediate", in that their achievement is a

necessary step for unifiers to (ultimately) reconstitute the state. How these intermediate goals

are reached can vary by the context.

The following table summarizes the findings of the plausibility probes I conduct for the

cases outlined in this chapter. The table is organized by causal pair and identifies whether each

individual causal condition is present or absent in each case. Though in post-Tang China the

strategies of cohering core supporters and disempowering local elites were not implemented

according to my theoretical expectations, other, functionally equivalent, strategies were

employed instead. These functional equivalents are identified by the label "Alternate".

Table Six: Presence of the Six Causal Conditions in the Three Test Cases				
Case		Ethiopia	Uganda	Post-Tang China
Causal Pair 1	Ideological Framework	Yes	Yes	No
	Cohering Core Supporters	Yes	Yes	Alternate
Causal Pair 2	Nationally-Legitimated Symbol	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Incorporating Independent Social Groups	Yes	Yes	Yes
Causal Pair 3	Area(s) with (a) High Degree(s) of Geopolitical Space	Yes	Yes	No
	Disempowering Local Elites	Yes	Yes	Alternate

CONCLUSION

This study has been motivated by the question of how the state is put back together after it has fallen apart. In the contemporary world, state collapse and other forms of state failure have led to endemic, intractable violence and social and economic catastrophe in dozens of countries (Bates 2008). A handful of these societies – Ethiopia, Uganda, Liberia and Sierra Leone – have managed to reconstitute the state, but many of them – such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq – continue to be beset by war, instability and tragedy. Moreover, international efforts to reestablish political order in these societies have largely been abject failures (Lake and Fariss 2014), as can be seen in the ceaseless accounts of destruction and despair that are reported out of Iraq and elsewhere.

How can these apparently hopeless situations be turned around? How can the state be reconstituted and political order restored? It is my contention that investigating historical instances of successful state reconstitution can provide us with answers to these questions because of the unique advantages of comparative-historical inquiry. First, the enduring success of state reconstitution in such cases can be unequivocally assessed. Certainly, durable state reconstitution is both more analytically useful and normatively preferable to the transient kind. So utilizing a method that can uncover these instances of political durability can be empirically fruitful. Second, by reaching back to earlier eras, one can utilize a more diverse set of cases than if the analysis were restricted to the contemporary era, thereby potentially uncovering theoretical insights that transcend particular domestic and international contexts. There is no

reason to think that state collapse can occur only within certain cultural, temporal or political parameters. Thus, casting one's methodological net widely can help establish the truly requisite causal packages for successful state reconstitution, independent of particular social configurations. This study cannot be considered the final word on what these packages are, but I argue it is a systematic start. Third, if investigation determines that there are no truly universal determinants of durable state reconstruction, the analyst can delineate where the boundaries between distinct causal configurations reside. Instead of assuming (based on received wisdom) that particular historical eras must have unique political patterns, researchers can employ temporally-agnostic comparative-historical analysis to empirically determine what, for instance, truly makes the current era "modern". That is, rather than presuming that modernity is a fundamental break from the past, scholars should empirically uncover in what ways the premodern and modern are different. The patterns that we have observed to extend from tenth-century China and Sengoku Japan to contemporary Ethiopia and Uganda indicate that these two world-historical eras are less distinctive than perhaps many believe.

In this study, I employ this type of analysis by, first, comparing two cases – Sengoku Japan (1477-1615) and Republican China (1912-1949) – that were situated in distinct historical eras and, second, assessing the validity of the insights I glean from these cases for instances of successful state reconstitution in other, equally dissimilar, temporal contexts. This study's goal has been to implement this comparative method in order to determine the conditions necessary for reestablishing durable, state-based political order.

In the remainder of this chapter I undertake six tasks. First, I note the durability of the reconstituted states in Japan and China; second, I assess the relationships between structure,

agency and leadership regarding state reconstitution; third, I recapitulate the theoretical

framework that structures this study and its relationship to the cases of Japan and China; fourth,

I summarize the applicability of the framework to the three test cases discussed in Chapter Four;

fifth (to go with the fourth), I discuss potential modifications to the theory based on the

findings from these test cases; and, finally, I present some implications for contemporary

collapsed states and externally-led state reconstitution.

Durable State Reconstitution in Japan and China

The principal cases of this study – Sengoku Japan and Republican China – involved social actors

successfully reestablishing political order in their societies. Both cases culminated in the

foundation and consolidation of states that have proven (and in the case of China is *still* proving)

to be not just remarkably durable but also impressively adept at maintaining social order. The

Tokugawa Shogunate lasted for over two and a half centuries, while managing to prevent the

reemergence of the large-scale warfare that had previously consumed Japanese society.

Though peasant rebellions recurred at times throughout Tokugawa rule (Walthall 1991), they

were never able to truly threaten the regime. Instead, it took an external shock in the form of

the arrival of Western imperialism to trigger the downfall of the Tokugawa state.

The People's Republic of China, for its part, was built out of the chaos of the Republican

Era and is still intact today, 68 years later. Despite undergoing the social upheaval of the

Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao – its Great Helmsman – in the 1970s and

experiencing the collapse of international communism in the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese

Communist Party remains in power, its state apparatus secure (Shambaugh 2008). The remarkable social transformations that have occurred since the onset of the Reform Era in 1978 have yet to seriously challenge either the power of the Party or the durability of the state. Thus, these two cases are prime candidates for use as foundational instances of state reconstitution in formulating a theoretical framework that explains how such successful reconstruction can occur.

Structure and Agency in State Reconstitution

The creation and consolidation of a reconstituted state is the structural end-goal of reunification campaigns, which are in large part dictated by the strategic decisions of their leaders – that is, unifiers. This dynamic process demonstrates the equal importance of structure and agency that is at the center of Anthony Giddens' structuration paradigm, which forms the ontological basis of this study (Giddens 1984). According to this view, individuals are both socially embedded actors and conscious agents of change. Unifiers are no exception. As political entrepreneurs seeking to alter the social structures they are situated in, unifiers are shaped by, and must adjust their strategies to, their structural environment.

Yet their strategies intrinsically alter that environment. Unifiers *qua* leaders direct reunification coalitions for the purpose of a particular kind of structural change – state reconstitution. Leadership is central to this structural transformation. Specifically, unifiers must decide how best to craft and then use their coalitions so that their goals can be achieved. As the case studies have illustrated, though context limits the possible strategies that are available to

unifiers, these leaders can nonetheless be substantially autonomous in their strategic decision-making. *Successful* unifiers, especially, seem to have considerable strategic autonomy. An accurate understanding of such a transformative process as state reconstitution requires an analysis to interrogate the duality of structure in action by investigating the structural contexts and strategic decisions of key actors, most notably unifiers.

The duality of structure, analytically, begins with the structural influences on how unifiers select and implement their state-building strategies. For instance, upon the death of his suzerain, Zhao Kuangyin found himself in command of a loyal and well-developed army that he could use as his vehicle for reunification. But if he did not already have ready access to such a mature military organization, it is difficult to imagine how he would have been able to successfully reunify tenth-century China. This is so because, as is discussed below, he did not have access to a specialized ideological framework he could use to cohere core supporters and did not exploit areas with high degrees of geopolitical space in order to disempower local elites. Zhao could have retreated to a border region with high levels of geopolitical space and begun the arduous process of forming a core coalition from scratch. But he and his predecessors made names for themselves in the military regimes of Kaifeng (Smith 2009). He was thus deeply embedded in a pre-existing structure.

It is certainly plausible that Zhao could have abandoned the networks he was embedded in and retreated with his core supporters to the remote countryside, like Mao did centuries later. But abandoning one's social positions totally voluntarily seems unlikely. Indeed, Mao and the CCP fled southern China for the remote Northwest because they faced certain destruction at the hands of the Nationalist forces. The clear military weakness of the Communists through

the 1930s imposed severe structural pressures on their leaders' options (Pantsov and Levine 2012). More positively, the widespread and increasingly passionate nationalist beliefs in Republican China, especially in the urban areas, provided Mao with significant opportunities to legitimate his reunification campaign to wide swathes of society (Fitzgerald 1998). Whether in the tenth-century or the twentieth, unifiers in China contended with a profoundly constraining yet at the same time a potentially favorable structural environment.

The unifiers in Sengoku Japan and late-twentieth-century Ethiopia and Uganda also could not do as they pleased. Hideyoshi, for example, had to focus his incorporation strategies on the daimyo since these samurai lords held preponderant political and military power in Japan. Pursuing a strategy of pure conquest would have been much more challenging for Hideyoshi than employing both coercive and conciliatory measures. Furthermore, the emperor's preeminent position as a symbol of national unity meant that it would have been difficult if not impossible for Hideyoshi or Ieyasu to assert hegemonic authority without respecting and embracing the imperial system of legitimation (Butler 2002). As in China, structure had a profound influence on the state-building and coalition-forming decisions of Japanese leaders.

Unifiers in late twentieth-century East Africa also operated in a structurally-defined arena while leading their reunification campaigns. In Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) were astute in their continual recognition and utilization of the multiethnic legacy of Ethiopian. If they had tried to downplay and de-legitimate Ethiopia's history of unitary multi-ethnicity, Zenawi and the TPLF would have faced the same widespread resistance the Derg had. Additionally, the TPLF had little choice but to focus their mobilization

efforts in the northeastern countryside, since the towns and core areas were dominated by

their rivals such as the Derg (Young 1997). In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni and his National

Resistance Army had their greatest success after moving to the western highlands that were

distant from the capital controlled by hostile forces (Kasfir 2005). Moreover, the long-standing

sectarianism of Ugandan society meant that an effective coalition would have to be based on

policies informed by notions of national democracy. So the causal importance of structural

contexts is quite apparent in each of the five cases of state reconstitution this study examines.

Yet, as Giddens emphasizes, the transformative power of strategic choice should not be

underestimated. The three key strategies I highlight in this study were all employed by most of

the unifiers in these cases. However, variations in how these strategies were specifically

implemented underscores not just the unique structural contexts of each case but also the

analytic importance of leadership. Each unifier was capable of devising his own cohering,

incorporating and disempowering strategies. Even if effective incorporation, for instance,

required adherence to given configurations of symbolic legitimation, there was room for

unifiers to emphasis particular aspects of these configurations over others and to decide how to

interface these configurations with their ideological frameworks and organizational

apparatuses.

For example, though the ethnic and sectarian diversity of both Ethiopian and Ugandan

society proved to be a challenge for Zenawi and Museveni, it was not insurmountable. In fact,

their conscious decisions to rhetorically appeal to and legitimize this internal diversity played

major roles in their political projects, as can be seen in the ethnically federal character of

Ethiopia's constitution and the local democratic system that elevated disenfranchised groups in

Uganda. Unlike Zenawi, though, Museveni insisted on banning the operation of political parties in his new regime, arguing they cynically exploited rather than earnestly represented sectarian interests. Thus, the same general structural feature (internal diversity) was treated by these unifiers in some ways similarly and in other ways differently. In other words, the decisions of individual leaders of reunification coalitions are inherently contingent, even if the range of choices presented to them is constrained by specific structural conditions. These cases illustrate the dual role of agency and structure in Giddens' framework.

The causal power of coalitional leadership is also apparent in how most of the unifiers in these cases employed not only the three key strategies I highlight, but many other, complementary state-building approaches as well. Hideyoshi, for example, elected to order a national-scale cadastral survey and chose to maintain a rudimentary, under-institutionalized governing structure. Ieyasu, on the other hand, developed a highly elaborate and institutionalized state apparatus, despite facing a broadly similar context during his reunification campaign to the one Hideyoshi had faced ten to twenty years prior. Furthermore, Ieyasu enlisted intellectuals to substantially elaborate the ideological framework Hideyoshi had employed, including explicitly incorporating the Shinto belief system into the Tokugawa legitimation structures (Ooms 1985). Thus, though Ieyasu continued and extended Hideyoshi's core strategies, he and his core supporters applied their own bureaucratic innovations to the project of state reconstitution.

This strategic agency is also reflected in the Communist reunification campaign in Republican China. Mao's belief in the necessity of investigating and mobilizing the peasantry was resisted by the CCP leadership until well into the 1930s. Mao modified Marxist-Leninist

conceptions of proletarian revolution to emphasize the equal, if not primary, revolutionary

importance of the peasantry to that of the industrial working class. Of course, this modification

accorded with the overwhelmingly agrarian nature of China and its tiny industrial base. Yet

other Communist leaders, such as Chen Duxiu, did not conceive of or endorse such a novel

strategic shift. Furthermore, Mao's publications, *On Contradiction* and *On New Democracy*,

were original contributions to Marxist-Leninist ideology devised in order to justify a shift in

strategy towards incorporation of nationalist, but not necessarily leftist, social forces, thereby

initiating the Second United Front. The structural realities of the time (i.e., the invasion of China

by Japan) necessitated such a change, but Mao consciously chose to justify it through

intellectual and rhetorical appeal. Mao's agency as a leader is thus visible in theoretical and

strategic modifications like his turn to the peasantry and justification of the Second United

Front.

The state- and coalition-building innovations, policies and modifications of unifiers in all

these cases reside at the core of Giddens' duality of structure. While these leaders did not have

absolute autonomy in how they would formulate and implement their strategies, they did have

a substantial degree of independent decision-making power. As the various specific structural

influences indicate, these unifiers did not operate in a social vacuum. Yet through their

leadership they were able to fundamentally transform the structures of their societies.

A Theoretical Framework of State Reconstitution

I formalize this structure-agency duality in the theoretical framework I present in detail in Chapter One, which comprises two sets of necessary conditions. The first set encompasses three structural conditions: the availability of a specialized ideological framework, a nationally-legitimated symbol and one or more areas with a high degree of geopolitical space. I pair these three conditions, respectively, with the strategic conditions of the second set: the coherence of core supporters, the incorporation of independent social groups and the disempowerment of local elites.

These six conditions are not jointly sufficient for the outcome to occur; that is, they must be combined with other, case-specific factors to generate successful state reconstitution. By assuming that only through such a causal combination can a reconstituted state be constructed, the framework recognizes the analytical importance of accounting for factors peculiar to the internal and external contexts of the cases under investigation.

Thus, for instance, the invasion of China by Japan plays a central role in the causal narrative of Republican China. Another example is that this narrative explicitly addresses the limitations placed on unifier incorporation strategies because particular social groups were labelled national enemies by Chinese nationalists. In Japan, the political dominance of the samurai class generated limitations on the unifiers' reunification strategies since any incorporation strategy had to be targeted at them. Additionally, anti-samurai forces like the Honganji Buddhist organization, who were fundamentally hostile to samurai rule, could not be incorporated by a unifier without losing the support of the most powerful military caste in the

country. In other words, certain idiographic structural characteristics played key roles in how these reunification campaigns played out.

Only by assessing case-specific factors like these can a comprehensive account of state reconstitution in these societies be constructed, as I have tried to do in this study. I argue that the six necessary conditions I highlight are the most potentially generalizable and causally-significant factors present in the cases, but their operation can be adequately understood only through a complementary analysis of idiographic causal conditions present in each case.

As I argue in Chapters Two and Three, these six necessary conditions, in conjunction with case-specific factors, can explain why Mao Zedong's reunification campaign in China and Toyotomi Hideyoshi's and Tokugawa Ieyasu's in Japan were successful. Chapter Four tests the validity of these causal claims on three additional cases of successful state reconstitution: the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front's campaign in late twentieth century Ethiopia, Yoweri Museveni's in Uganda of the same era, and Zhao Kuangyin's in tenth century China. The first two cases largely confirm the significance of the six necessary conditions emphasized in the theoretical framework, with Ethiopia an especially supporting case due to a much more rapid consolidation of the new state than that observed in Uganda.

Zhao Kuangyin's reunification campaign, however, managed to reconstitute the Chinese state in the form of the Song Dynasty without appearing to take advantage of a specialized ideological framework or areas with high degrees of geopolitical space. Nonetheless, Zhao and his successor did place a heavy emphasis on cohering core supporters and disempowering rival elites. Moreover, they did employ nationally-legitimated symbols to incorporate independent social groups. As these three test cases show, the framework is significantly generalizable to

contexts considerably different from those of the cases I utilized to, in part, inductively derive the theory. Additional modifications may make the framework fully generalizable to cases such as the construction of the Song Dynasty Chinese state, without substantially diminishing its theoretical parsimony.

Potential Modifications to the Theoretical Framework

In this section, I propose two possible modifications to my theoretical framework. Before doing so, though, I consider why the framework is not fully supported by the last test case of tenth-century China. More precisely, why were Zhao Kuangyin and his successor able to reconstitute the state without employing an ideological framework or taking advantage of areas with high degrees of geopolitical space? One possible answer concerns the issue of mass communication. Unlike those in Republican China, political entrepreneurs in neither tenth- century China nor Sengoku Japan had access to printing presses or other technologies of mass communication. Ideologues in Republican China could utilize such technologies to disseminate standardized ideological pronouncements and guidelines easily and rapidly. The availability of media permitted a complex and highly developed ideological framework such as Marxism-Leninism to be communicated quite effectively to the members of a core coalition, even one geographically dispersed. In societies like tenth-century China and Sengoku Japan, though, such dissemination would have been much more costly, if even possible. Consequently, employing such a framework should have been impractical for cohering core supporters. The absence of key technological structures, in other words, can place crucial restrictions on the actions of unifiers.

However, in the case of Sengoku Japan, the existence of the imperial system of ranks and titles provided a preexisting nationally-legitimated, normative structure onto which an ideological framework could be grafted. Additionally, this system provided a preexisting symbol of potential political unity – the emperor. Since most elites in Japan at the time comprehended and recognized this system's symbolic power, Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu were able to employ its intricate hierarchy of ranks and titles as a shortcut for explicating and sustaining a new ideological framework to core supporters, despite not having technologies of mass communication at their disposal. Additionally, reunifying the state under the symbolic authority of the emperor was a preexisting long-run goal to which core supporters could be dedicated. By connecting this widely-held objective to ideological concepts like tenka and kogi, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu were able to associate their own personal goals with the imperial authoritative structure. So, even though supposedly essential communication technologies were not available, unifiers in Sengoku Japan exercised their agency by taking advantage of other structural features that favored the dissemination and acceptance of ideological frameworks.

In tenth-century China, by contrast, a preexisting authoritative structure like Japan's imperial system did not exist since the imperial authority had collapsed at the beginning of the century along with the Tang Dynasty. Despite this lack of a hierarchical normative system that could support an ideological framework, Zhao Kuangyin and his successor in tenth-century China were able to build and maintain their reunification coalition. This achievement suggests that there are alternative strategies for doing so, one of which is the harnessing of a professional military class. In north China during this period, a series of short-lived dynasties were indeed established by military men (Lorge 2005). The increasing centralization of each

successive dynastic state and recurrent warfare throughout the region would have been favorable for the emergence of a professionalized stratum of soldiers and commanders who could have, over time, developed norms of hierarchy and military service.

A unifier like Zhao Kuangyin, initiating his reunification campaign after several cycles of dynastic creation and collapse, could have taken advantage of this recently-developed professionalized military class. As a military general himself, he would have been able to establish himself fairly easily at the top of this hierarchy and could consequently have taken advantage of it to instill discipline and loyalty in his core supporters. Thus, in certain contexts, alternative, non-ideological structures can be used to cohere core supporters, given that the unifier recognizes the opportunities made available by these structures.

However, non-ideological strategies, I argue, would be less effective in cohering core supporters than ideological ones were they both available to all unifiers in a single society. As delineated in Chapter One, employing ideology for the purpose of cohering supporters requires fewer material resources and can foster greater dedication and loyalty. Thus, the first potential modification to my theory is that in societies that either have preexisting authoritative structures or mass-communication technologies, successful unifiers would have to employ ideological frameworks in their reunification campaigns. Otherwise, other actors would do so instead and thus enjoy the organizational edge. In contexts like that of tenth-century China, the inability of unifiers to effectively utilize ideological frameworks means that no particular unifier would have this advantage and so other strategies could instead fill the role of cohering core supporters. Structure, in other words, delimits the set of viable strategies and, consequently,

the relative efficacy of each strategy. As agents, unifiers must subsequently choose which strategy to implement.

Another theoretical issue concerning the case of the Zhaos' reunification campaign is that the two unifiers did not take advantage of areas with high degrees of geopolitical space. In fact, Zhao Kuangyin got his start as a general under the Later Zhou Dynasty's Chai Rong. Guo's adoptive father founded the regime at Kaifeng, one of the two major cities of northern China and the capital of three of the previous four dynasties (Smith 2009: 6-7). The origins of Zhao's political fortunes cannot be found in a border region akin to Jinggangshan or the Shaan-Gan-Ning base area, where Mao's campaigns got their starts.

How, then, was Zhao able to disempower rival elites, such as the military governors and generals who had influence throughout northern China? His military origins and the professional nature of the military class in northern China in this era may be the answer. Just as these factors could have enabled him to cohere his core supporters, they may also have given him the capacity to remove northern Chinese elites from power, most of who were military men themselves. Indeed, within a year of founding the Song Dynasty, Zhao Kuangyin used the occasion of a private drinking party to convince his generals to give up their posts for sinecures (Smith 2009: 12). We can expect that he employed his position in the northern military culture and hierarchy to disempower these powerful potential rivals. Thus, the second potential modification to my theory is that the existence of a professional military culture can obviate the need for areas with high degrees of geopolitical space in order to disempower rival elites.

Whether or not my hypotheses about the role of military professionalization in cohering core supporters and disempowering elites are true, what Zhao Kuangyin's reunification

campaign and those of all the other unifiers examined in this study make clear is that cohering

core supporters, incorporating independent social groups and disempowering local elites are

crucial strategies for successful state reconstitution. Unifiers need a reliable and effective

organizational vehicle they can direct for their goal of reunification. The integrity and efficacy of

this core coalition can be undermined by both internal and external challenges, yet

implementation of each of the three key strategies can significantly diminish the likelihood that

such challenges fundamentally weaken the unifier's coalition.

The first key strategy, cohering core supporters, can ensure that internal sources of

division and debilitation do not emerge or at least do not threaten the strength of the coalition.

As the case studies make clear, the implementation of this strategy can utilize a specialized

ideological framework or not.

The second vital strategy, incorporating independent social groups, prevents them from

rallying around rival political forces or undermining the ability of the unifier to expand the reach

of his authority. In all the reunification campaigns this study has investigated, the unifier, at

least to some degree, employed a nationally-legitimated symbol for the purposes of

incorporation. Other forms of incorporation are evident as well, such as Hideyoshi's guarantee

of landed wealth to his defeated rivals or Mao's moderation of his land reform policies to gain

the support of the rich peasantry. These types of incorporation, though, were more materially

costly than ones that employed nationally-legitimated symbols since they required the unifiers

to forego needed resources.

The final essential strategy, disempowering local elites, also contributes to the integrity

and effectiveness of reunification coalitions. Local elites can not only resist attempts to gain

access to resources they control but also impede efforts to maintain such access. Powerful

local elites can also weaken the discipline of core supporters by presenting opportunities for

self-aggrandizement at the expense of the coalition's collective interests. Disempowering these

elites is thus crucial for the formation and preservation of a coherent and dedicated

reunification coalition.

The case of Zhao Kuangyin's campaign does indicate that areas with high degrees of

geopolitical space are not truly necessary for the successful implementation of the

disempowering strategy. Nonetheless, the central role these areas played in all the other cases

of state reconstitution this study analyzes suggests they are highly advantageous for aspiring

unifiers, especially those that do not control a preexisting coercive apparatus like Zhao did. As

the above discussion of cohering core supporters and disempowering elites in tenth-century

China and Sengoku Japan highlights, the presence of certain structures can obviate the need for

others when it comes to implementing strategies. It is then up to unifiers to display their

capacity for political entrepreneurship and take advantage of the strategies that are made

available by these alternative structural environments.

State Collapse and Reconstitution Today

I conclude by considering the implications of this study's analysis of unifiers for the future of

collapsed states today. Unlike for Sengoku Japan and tenth-century China, the international

context regularly impinges on the domestic interactions and processes of collapsed states like

Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet many of the same

types of structural and strategic conditions that were crucial for the Sengoku and Song unifiers' success can also be found in cases like Republican China and late-twentieth-century Ethiopia and Uganda that did have to contend with active and influential international forces. Thus, it is conceivable that the lessons gleaned from all the cases covered in this study can be useful for understanding how state reconstitution could be forged in the aftermath of state collapse today.

I identify four such lessons. First, potential unifiers can be identified by their commitment to particular ideologies. Leaders who clearly and consistently espouse ideological beliefs can create and maintain support within a coalition of core supporters. Conversely, pragmatic technocrats would not be the best leaders of a reunification campaign since their lack of ideological commitment would discourage followers from foregoing their short-term interests in the face of the insecure and uncertain conditions that pervade collapsed states.

Second, the ideological influences of the TPLF in Ethiopia and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda show the wide appeal and utility of peasant-based ideology. Indeed, the TPLF was in large part inspired by what could be viewed as an ideological message in Mao's writings on the importance of building a mass organization upon the discontent of the peasantry. In collapsed states that have a large exploited agrarian class, peasant-based ideology may be an especially potent belief system for a unifier to espouse. As the experiences of Mao and the TPLF indicate, such an ideology not only aids in cohering core supporters; it also helps unifiers to disempower local elites since mobilized peasants are likely to quickly and eagerly respond to calls for the overthrow of local landlords.

The recent histories of Ethiopia and Uganda show that Maoist ideology has been widely disseminated beyond China demonstrates. Unifiers in other countries likely also have relatively easy access to an ideological framework well suited to conditions in their collapsed states. Where socioeconomic resentment pervades the peasant class, unifiers should thus employ Maoist, or Maoist-like, ideologies as part of their reunification campaigns. Unifiers in collapsed states without widespread peasant discontent, though, would need to develop alternative ideologies that may not be so readily available.

The third lesson is that potential unifiers should also employ nationally-legitimated symbols in order to gain the support or at least acquiescence of social groups outside their core coalitions. Purely military-based strategies are very costly and so taking advantage of available symbolic resources to diminish resistance towards one's reunification campaign can be crucial for unifiers who lack or choose not to employ overwhelming coercive power.

Most societies that have undergone state collapse today are impoverished. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan are, respectively, the 7th, 11th and 15th poorest countries in the world by GDP per capita, according to the World Bank (2017). Given their relative poverty, it would be surprising if these societies have enough available resources for a unifier to accumulate vast relative coercive power over his rivals. Thus, a unifier's military strength, on its own, should be insufficient for him to establish political hegemony. More likely, my research suggests, unifiers in collapsed states today who incorporate independent social groups, including rival military forces, stand a better chance of rebuilding their states than those who do not.

An available nationally-legitimated symbol, as we have seen, can play a central role in this strategy. China in the early twentieth century was one of the first non-Western countries to develop a strong sense of nationalism. In many ways, then, its leaders had no model of non-Western national development to which they could refer when directing their political projects. Today, though, nationalism has become well-established in the global imaginary; as a result, nationalist movements and concomitant national identities are present in many societies. Thus, to the extent that nationalism is a salient political force in a collapsed state, unifiers in principle have access to a symbolic configuration amenable to effective incorporation. Nationalism should therefore be a core feature of a unifier's strategic repertoire.

The fourth and final lesson to be drawn from this work is that aspiring unifiers are typically most successful in establishing secure support bases for their reunification campaigns when operating in isolated areas, especially border regions between political units. In areas with dense social networks, like ones at or near commercial centers, local elites can easily elicit support from allied social groups, thereby inhibiting unifiers' efforts at undercutting local elite power. Paradoxically, then, areas far away from loci of economic activity are amenable to building reunification coalitions since unifiers operating in them can disempower local elites more easily than those active in commercialized areas. As a result, they can gain access to resources necessary for launching a military campaign.

Despite the general trend of positive economic development in the world, many regions remain underdeveloped. In collapsed states today, this geographic unevenness is especially stark, as can be seen in the southern hinterlands of Libya and the mountainous border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Based on the findings of this study, successful reunification

campaigns are particularly prone to emerge from these types of areas rather than from those surrounding economic or political capitals since these areas have high levels of social-network density and concomitantly numerous potential allies for local elites. Thus, aspiring unifiers should seek out isolated, relatively poor areas, rather than well-connected, wealthy ones, to initiate their campaigns.

This last point suggests one of the major implications this study has for externally-led state reconstitution efforts. If foreign actors, such as the United States, wish to reconstitute the state in places like Afghanistan, trying to empower actors embedded in dense social networks may not be the best strategy. As the dismal track record of foreign state-building interventions indicates (Lake and Fariss 2014), externally-led reunification coalitions should not expect much success. Instead, finding well-positioned domestic actors should be central to these coalitions' strategies. Actors who are dependent on the cooperation of local elites may well face corruption within their supporters' ranks and inefficiency in their resource collection efforts.

Another key implication is that externally-led coalitions should embrace local actors who espouse peasant-based, or otherwise populist, ideologies, which can garner mass support and thereby enhance social control and resource access. Technocrats, exiled potentates and neoliberal politicians are not ideal candidates for taking the lead on the ground for foreign powers.

A final implication concerns nationally-legitimated symbols. If politically-relevant social forces do not collectively recognize such symbols, justifying the political centralization inherent in state reconstitution may be impossible. Furthermore, as the investigations of Sengoku Japan, Republican China and Ethiopia suggest, developing such symbols takes decades, if not centuries.

This is the case because symbolic development is largely an organic affair, emerging through the intersubjective discourses of many individuals (cf. Fitzgerald 1998; Dirlik 1989; Butler 2002). If an externally-led coalition attempts to manufacture nationalism in the course of directing its reunification campaign, audiences in society are not likely to be convinced since there is no pre-existing political culture backing up such symbolic creation.

Of course, the above implications only matter if foreign actors are actually serious about reconstituting the state in collapsed societies. Often, they are not (Lake and Fariss 2014). State reconstitution is a messy, uncertain, violent and arduous affair. In every case in this study, reunification necessitated sustained military conflict accompanied by atrocity and catastrophe. Rhetorically appealing to nationally-legitimated symbols and incorporating independent social groups can reduce the intensity and frequency of armed conflict, but these factors do not eliminate it. Thus, foreign actors intent on achieving state reconstitution will not only have to take seriously ideological, symbolic and geopolitical precursors but also be prepared for the terrible human cost this process requires.

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