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Foulds, Kim

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The Nile Basin Initiative in Ethiopia: Voices from Addis Ababaⁱ

Kim Fouldsⁱⁱ

Abstract

Based on interviews with a number of international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government officials, academics, and the donor community, the following paper analyzes the future of the Nile Basin Initiative, a program with the goal of just and equitable distribution of the Nile River among the 10 Nile Basin countries. Using interviewee responses to gather information not available through academic readings, I examine the three main challenges to the Initiative—the contentious historical legacy of the Nile Basin, World Bank involvement, and NGO participation. The interview excerpts highlight the differences between civil society and the donor community perceptions and experiences in Ethiopia.

ⁱ Research was funded by the Mellon Environmental Research Grant and Occidental College. I would like to thank the Nile Basin Society, Nabil El-Khodari, Desalegn Eyob, and all those interviewed for their guidance and research assistance.

ⁱⁱ Department of Education, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, Moore Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095.

Introduction

The ever-increasing need for international water agreements continues because of the escalating possibility for water-induced conflict from issues of water scarcity and degradation, posing as continual threats to local, state, regional, and international stability. Internationally shared bodies of water create political, social, and economic tensions and disputes concerning the distribution and use of resource management. Furthermore, when a resource base extends across a political border, misunderstandings or a lack of agreements about allocations are more likely.¹ The increased potential for conflict intensifies threats to state stability and national security. Individual states, armed with sovereign rights to territorial resources, use water to serve political, economic, and social goals. Scholars agree that conflict has the greatest potential to emerge when the downstream (most-vulnerable) nation is militarily stronger than the upstream (water-controlling) nation and it feels its interests are threatened, as in the case of the Nile River.²

In 2001 and 2002, I conducted field research on the World Bank-initiated Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). According to the NBI website, "the initiative provides a unique forum for the countries of the Nile to move forward a cooperative process to realize tangible benefits in the Basin and build a solid foundation of trust and confidence."³ All ten Basin countries – Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda – have equal stakes in the equitable development and distribution of the Nile waters through the NBI's two complementary programs: Shared Vision Program and Subsidiary Action Program.⁴

My research examined the NBI in Ethiopia and the challenges facing its goals for long-term cooperation between Ethiopia and Egypt. I conducted interviews both as an independent undergraduate researcher and as an intern for the Canadian-based Nile Basin Society (NBS). Fieldwork research was essential to my project. Secondary sources did not provide the voices of the involved parties and I knew I needed to bring these voices together if I was really wanting to understand the issue and contextualize the NBI. How could I analyze such a massive undertaking solely through scholarly journals, internet searches, or Western "experts?" With so many interested parties, face-to-face discussions were essential. Moreover, as an unplanned consequence of traveling to Ethiopia, the research became real and it developed into my passion. I truly cared about the issues affecting the Nile River because I began to understand that so much of Ethiopia's potential lies within its own borders. Passion is not required for a successful research program, but discussions with my interviewees and random conversations with taxi drivers, fellow bus riders, university students, and others reinvigorated my enthusiasm for the research project. Furthermore, by traveling to the source of the Blue Nile (Lake Tana)⁵ and the Blue Nile Falls, I could see it, touch it, hear it. It no longer was a research subject that I was analyzing for a degree requirement. Without these experiences in the field, I would have missed the point entirely. Research cannot exist around abstract ideas or distant places that seem intangible because of this distance. Only through my experiences in Ethiopia was I able to understand the value of fieldwork in investigating my research question.

My primary sources focused on interviews conducted with various non-governmental organizations

(NGOs),⁶ a major international aid agency,⁷ and Ethiopian government officials⁸ in Addis Ababa during December 2001 and January 2002. All interviews were conducted in English and the majority were tape-recorded. I had a broad list of questions to ask but most interviews became discussions and were much more insightful. Without these interviews, I never would have found the information gathered from secondary research sources. I learned from my conversations with various officials engaged in NBI-related activities that the role of third parties, such as the World Bank, continues to create a schism between the project planners and those individuals directly implicated by its construction or implementation. Therefore, due to the involvement of third parties, the absence of an NGO presence, and various aspects of Nile Basin politics, the NBI is likely to fail to achieve the intricate goals of conflict resolution and regional cooperation.

A number of the interviewees have since updated their interviews and the following presents excerpts from our updated conversations. I begin with a discussion of the history of the Nile Basin and provide interview excerpts that reveal the contention surrounding water policies. Next, I investigate the role of the World Bank, beginning with a general discussion of its history in African development. Considering this history, the interview excerpts that follow highlight the Ethiopian NGO community's perceptions of the World Bank as related to the NBI. Finally, I examine the role of NGOs in the NBI process through the very different lenses of the donor community, national government, and individual NGOs.

History of the Nile Basin

According to Drake, until the 1950s, British colonialism and administration reduced water resource development and use tensions.⁹ The political fragmentation of the independent Nile region began with the creation of sovereign states and an increasing ethnic consciousness, resulting in growing disparities and rivalries among the diverse populations of the Nile Basin. Consequently, all nations now take a more competitive and nationalistic approach to regional politics.¹⁰ During the 1970s, Ethiopia was ruled by Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam's Marxist regime. Soviet experts, invited by the colonel, began studying the possibility of damming the Nile's tributaries and exploiting its water, provoking Egypt to threaten the destruction of any new dams through military force.¹¹ Rushdie Saeed, an Egyptian expert on water issues, argues, "although such threats gave rise to the commonly held notion that future African wars would be over water, the fact is that these tensions were a spin-off of the Cold War."¹² Thus, based on Saeed's argument, present and future conflicts will have Cold War foundations. The tensions over Nile waters, however, have colonial underpinnings because of the consequences of the various Nile Waters Treaty, in which nations with colonial representation (Egypt and Sudan) were able to exploit the resources of those without (Ethiopia). The proposals made during the Cold War era were products of colonial actions, and the subsequent threats were a continuation of Egyptian fears regarding the maintenance of the Nile flows. Therefore, colonial policies and manipulations, not Cold War strategies, helped create the past tensions and potential conflicts over Nile waters.

Despite Saeed's position, since the end of the Cold

War, the Nile has continued to invoke political tension. During the early 1990s, for example, relations between Egypt and Sudan were strained following alleged efforts by the Sudanese government to overthrow Egypt's president, Hosni Mubarak. In addition, Sudan and Ethiopia formed the Blue Nile Valley Organization and pledged to study several major infrastructure projects despite Egyptian disapproval. In response, Mubarak threatened military intervention.¹³ The NBI would have been inconceivable at the time when US-Soviet Union antagonism played itself out in the various regional rivalries, including Sudan and Egypt. With the end of the Cold War, however, regardless of the foundations of conflict over the Nile, an initiative like the NBI has serious potential.¹⁴

While the necessity for Ethiopia to utilize its water resources persists with growing pressure from civil society and the international community, any development would alter the Blue Nile flow, which poses a threat to the agricultural, social, economic, and political livelihood of Egypt and Sudan. Despite the existence of water use treaties between Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia has not been party to these major agreements and, consequently, does not feel bound by them. Instead, Ethiopia claims sovereignty over usage of the Blue Nile and recognizes the untapped potential of irrigation projects and the need to expand its hydroelectric production.

Among my interviewees, there was a consensus that the history of the Nile Basin and the politics surrounding its use are prominent issues important to any water agreement among the Nile Basin countries. The following comments made by interviewees during my research demonstrate the challenge of the Nile's historical legacy in implementation of the NBI.¹⁵

Yacob Arsano, Professor of Political Science, Addis Ababa University¹⁶

Diplomatic agreements will give Ethiopia more negotiating power. Egypt, however, does not want to give its adversary more power. Egyptian fear is misplaced. They are afraid of their own interests. Egyptian paranoia can create Ethiopian fear that Egypt is too powerful.

He explains that regional cooperation has not yet been achieved because questions like With what ownership? and With what legitimacy? need to be addressed before cooperation can move forward. *Control is not the question, status quo is judicious because established during colonial times. Upstream countries cannot/should not use all water resources. Control is amount of water necessary to upstream, should be controlled by upstream, cannot be constrained.* He argues that there exists an Ethiopian belief that downstream countries have equal rights though not an absolute right because this is not a part of legal Ethiopian perspective.

Makonnen Loulseged, Head, Design Department, Ministry of Water Resources (Ethiopia)¹⁷

Until the agreement of 1959¹⁸ is null and void, cooperation will be unsustainable. Upstream do not typically like to see downstream countries implement consumptive projects, because it is against the principle of not to cause significant harm, showing other countries are committed to cooperation.

Seifulaziz Milas, Research Consultant, InterAfrica Group¹⁹

Egypt issues idle threats. Though they are stronger militarily than Ethiopia and other upstream countries, the geographical distances between NBCs creates a different

situation, one in which conflict is less likely to occur. Instead, Egypt's threats are used to discourage donor assistance to upstream countries. Thus, while confidence building is a goal of the NBI, it faces a much stronger adversary in terms of political relations and historical exploitation.

Jo Raisin, Consultant on issues of food security with the US Agency for International Development²⁰

The projects of the NBI will take at least 20 years to implement, because of the present political environment, in which each nation faces similar crises in terms of water scarcity, extreme poverty, food insecurity, recurrent drought, and large population increases. Egypt must trust that Ethiopia will export and sell their power supplies. Considering the historically volatile relationship between the countries, the issue of trust is considerable. Historical distrust, conflict over the Nile, and stale foreign relations are not issues solved quickly.

Interview Inferences

Clearly, there exists ill feelings between Egypt and Ethiopia and the use of the Nile is a particularly intense topic of debate. Decades of deeply entrenched distrust based on colonial legacies and the maintenance of these treaties must be addressed prior to implementing collaborative projects.

World Bank Participation

For Africa, the World Bank's first half-century of work resulted in increased malnutrition, currency devaluation, and more virulent strains of malaria. During the 1999 fiscal year, the World Bank (WB or "the Bank")

loaned US\$2.07 billion to Africa. The money financed fifty-six projects covering the "broad palette of World Bank expertise from environmental protection to infrastructure reengineering to bridging the digital divide."²¹ Since its establishment, the Bank has financed similar projects across Africa totaling US\$13 billion.²² Regarding loan policies, Nicholas Stern, WB's chief economist and senior vice president, stated:

The bank's current approach is to recognize that poor countries require a certain level of governance and accountability to be able and willing to use WB loans effectively. Countries with governments too corrupt, too predatory or too weak to ensure public safety will not get bank loans in the future, because the money would never reach the poor people for whom it is intended.²³

The WB's money, however, is not reaching its intended recipients. Ironically, in terms of acronym use, macroeconomic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, known as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), caused Africa's per capita income to fall 20% to levels that existed in the 1960s.²⁴ Furthermore, just to maintain the current dismal levels of poverty, African economies will have to grow by 5% per year, while Sub-Saharan Africa's total debt in 1994 amounted to 110% of its GNP.²⁵ The WB's work is clearly not serving to alleviate poverty but institutionalizing it.

In terms of environmental projects and programs, Bush argues that the "World Bank's record on environmental management has been disastrous."²⁶ Emphasizing his stance against the World Bank, he asserts that, since the early 1980s, the WB's strategy for structural

adjustment lending has encouraged export-led growth, which has contributed to the environmental problems of African countries engaging in strategies for sustainable forestry and the prevention of dry land degradation, similar aims of the NBI.²⁷ Therefore, in terms of the Nile, the World Bank's involvement in attempting to achieve equitable and sustainable use of Nile waters could result in greater degradation of cropland and water.

WB Operational Policy 7.50 (OP7.5) illustrates that the Bank's conflict of interest in the NBI. OP7.5 applies to the following types of international waterways: "any river . . . that forms a boundary between, or any river . . . that flows through two or more states, whether Bank members or not."²⁸ Regarding water resources development projects, OP7.5 affects the following: "hydroelectric, irrigation, flood control . . . industrial and similar projects that involve the use or potential pollution of international waterways."²⁹ OP7.5 prohibits WB assistance to water resource development projects of upstream countries without downstream approval, which serves to discourage downstream countries' participation in collaborative negotiations. For instance, OP7.5 states, "Following notification, if the other riparians raise objections to the proposed project, the Bank in appropriate cases may appoint one or more independent experts to examine the issues."³⁰ The following interview summaries demonstrate the frustrations NGOs have with the Bank and its problematic involvement in the NBI process, as well as the differing views of other members of the NBI donor community.

Yacob Arsano, Addis Ababa University Professor of Political Science³¹

The Nile Basin countries (NBCs) distrust the donor community and believe that they either do not understand or are not aware of the intricacies of the situation. Ethiopia will not develop because they do not want to show bad conduct to international donors. He states that the Ethiopian government will *accept whatever the WB says because they depend on WB funding. The WB, U.S., European Union, and Canada are concerned with Egypt interests as an entry to Mid-East. U.S. has given \$2.5 billion/year to Egypt just to be there.*

Akalewold Bantirgu, Christian Relief and Development Agency (CRDA)³²

CRDA has expressed concerns regarding the World Bank's treatment of NGOs, resulting from a lack of transparency. Recommend that the WB leave the Global Environmental Execution Facilitation. CRDA argues that *WB creates deliberate misunderstandings between NGOs and national governments and that WB creates contradictions between community-based organizations and individual communities.*

Girma Hailu, United Nations Development Program Assistant Resident Representative (NBI Donor)³³

The World Bank has not had a bad record in African-related matters.

Seifulaziz Milas, Research Consultant-InterAfrica Group³⁴

As Milas explains, the OP7.5 functions as more than a treaty on water use. Instead, it *operates as a veto for the Egyptian government concerning downstream water resource development. The OP7.5 is at the heart of*

the NBI, and its preservation will function as an instrument of failure in the NBI agenda. Thus, the WB's own policies will restrict the realization of the NBI's objectives. Egypt's well-known threats of military involvement serve more as a method of acquiring greater funding and support from the international community.

Camille de Stoop, ENDA-Ethiopia (Environmental Development Action in the Third World)³⁵

Government will accept whatever WB say because wants funding. WB and IMF caused havoc and have played single role in impoverishment of African continent.

Interview Inferences

The comments of the various NGOs working in Ethiopia and the NBI donor community combined with the WB's history and OP7.50 demonstrate that the Bank's involvement in the NBI process does not bode well for its success. If both international and national NGOs, as well as the academic community, vocalize their doubts of any successful development program involving the World Bank, what future does the NBI have? Without the trust and confidence of civil society, a program with intentions to include communities in its development has serious challenges to overcome.

NGO Involvement

According to the provisions of the NBI, the program "welcomes the contribution of NGOs and encourages NBCs to continue in close cooperation with civil society and the private sector."³⁶ In the *NGO and Civil Society Discourse Statement*, representatives of Nile Basin NGOs maintain that civil society needs to be

partners to the NBI for several strategic reasons. While acknowledging the involvement of NGOs in all aspects and stages of development programs such as the NBI is well established as "good practice," the inclusion of civil society and NGOs in the process will strengthen the NBI and help ensure its success.³⁷ Furthermore, within the Nile Basin region, limited human resources and skills exist. These resources and skills, however, transpire within NGOs and civil society institutions spread throughout the Basin. Nile Basin NGOs argue, "NGO and civil society involvement will help to facilitate the projects proposed by the NBI that will build confidence in these processes and contribute to convergence within the basin."³⁸

My discussions with many Ethiopian NGOs—including Pact Ethiopia, PANOS Ethiopia, Center for Human Environment, WaterAid, Christian Relief and Development Agency (CRDA), and the Institute for Sustainable Development—revealed a general sentiment that the government hinders social, political, and economic grassroots programs facilitated by NGOs.³⁹ Negative personification of NGOs through media, excessive formalities in the registration process, and the lack of due process in abolishing legitimate NGOs⁴⁰ enables the government to generate substantial challenges to NGO programs and missions. The following interview excerpts demonstrate the frustrations Nile Basin NGOs experience.

Akalewold Bantirgu, Christian Relief and Development Agency (CRDA)⁴¹

Akalewold explained that the Ministry of Water Resources states that *NGOs are executing partners rather than policy makers*. In contrast to IAG's assertions, Bantirgu argues that *the World Bank creates deliberate misunderstandings between the government and NGOs*.

Million Belay, Institute for Sustainable Development (ISD)⁴²

Belay also spoke on the challenges confronting Ethiopian NGOs. The public believes NGOs are there for personal financial interests but there are few NGOs in Ethiopia and they are accomplishing a lot. NGOs must sell themselves to the Government and media. ISD was able to do so by giving the Government an alternative to large-scale farming and agro-chemicals at a time when there was much resistance from farmers.

Girma Hailu, Assistant Resident Representative, United Nations Development Program (NBI Donor)⁴³

More realistically in terms of donor and government rationale, Hailu states that NGOs *should not be involved until political and legal affairs have reached consensus, because it is too early to involve NGOs on a political or legal level.*

Makonnen Loulseged, Head, Design Department, Ministry of Water Resources, Ethiopia⁴⁴

There is no hesitation in involving NGOs, civil society because NBI involves not just government but all Ethiopian people. They need to involve as many organizations as possible because there is a common ownership of resources. This is addressed through awareness from civil society and government, Confidence Building and Stakeholders Involvement project is just trying to address these issues.

Seifulaziz Milas, Research Consultant, InterAfrica Group (IAG)⁴⁵

Currently, IAG is the only Ethiopian NGO directly dealing with the NBI. Milas maintains that *their*

involvement is a result of previous research done on the Ethiopian component of the NBI. Despite IAG's successful involvement in the NBI process, the actions of the Ethiopian government function to undermine the efforts of other legitimate NGOs. Based on NGO interviews and statements, IAG's success regarding governmental cooperation appears more a result of their political connections to the government rather than their work as a "non-governmental" agency. All NGOs interviewed, with the exception of IAG, state that the majority of IAG employees are former Ethiopian government workers, thereby having established connections and relationships within the Ethiopian administration, which allows for a greater voice in political, economic, and social matter, including NBI proceedings.

Despite NGO consensus regarding government opposition and IAG's NGO legitimacy, Milas argues, *there is no hesitation from the Ethiopian government or the World Bank to involve NGOs because they realize that the NBI involves all Ethiopian peoples.* Research on Ethiopian part of NBI led to IAG involvement and the Nile issue is a leading concern of IAG because NBI promotes discourse between Government and civil society on Nile and attempts to prevent long-term conflict. Milas explains that *discussions between civil society and Government has yet to occur because the government needs to figure its position on the issue and among regional partners before it can include civil society in the discussions.* He agrees that the engagement of civil society will help make issue better known and increase discussion between civil society, Nile Basin countries, and governments.

Camille de Stoop, ENDA-Ethiopia (Environmental Development Action in the Third World)⁴⁶

National opposition to NGOs stems from the concern that Ethiopian NGOs will mobilize foreign governments to recognize the deficiencies of the Ethiopian government. NGOs are considered thieves because they take money from the Ethiopian people and keep it for themselves. Every 3 months, NGOs have to send in what their plans were, what they spent, and what they really do.

Dr. Tefera Wegdereseegn, Center for Human Environment (CHE)

Dr. Wegdereseegn discussed the general challenges of Ethiopian NGOs. NGOs have limited financial capacity so limited management of programs but they need government approval to do projects. NGOs are not allowed to create funding sources and cannot have fundraisers. Government opposes increasing awareness. For example, the Ethiopian government wants CHE to plant trees rather than teach people how to protect existing resources. There are extreme difficulties in registering. *Ethiopian government provides millions of reasons challenging registration: You don't have enough money, how can you be?* The government tells the public that NGOs embezzle and improperly manage money. They want government-supported NGOs to control all NGOs. These "NGOs" are shown to the international community to get money and to show Ethiopia's commitment to civil society. Wegdereseegn cites IAG as an example because they are an arm of the government but claim to be an NGO.

Interview Inferences

These interviews demonstrate conflicting ideas on the current role of NGOs in the NBI. NGOs see themselves

as essential players in the Initiative but assert they have been ignored, or worse, impeded. The government claims to want to involve NGOs but has failed to do so, with the conspicuous exception of IAG. A representative of the donor community asserts NGOs should not be involved yet. There is no consensus on the appropriate role of civil society in the Nile Basin Initiative. Without clear roles based on compromise, misunderstandings based on a lack of communication and understanding continue to hinder the NBI.

Conclusion

This research was based on the challenges facing the Nile Basin Initiative. The data gathered from the interviews previously discussed was invaluable and certainly inaccessible through any other method of research. Without carrying out these interviews, the research would lack significant voices and perspective. Although the voice of the World Bank is noticeably absent, efforts were made but representatives were not interested in participating in my fieldwork. Other challenges existed in conducting the interviews, including language barriers, time restrictions, scheduling conflicts, and the unspoken potential consequences of frank discussions of donor agencies and government practices. Nevertheless, the information gained from the interviewees paints a bleak picture for the NBI. Without first addressing the challenges emphasized in the interviewees mentioned in this research, particularly the historical relationships and the role of international and national organizations, the NBI is unlikely to achieve any of its goals of equitable distribution of the Nile River to promote development among the ten Nile Basin Countries.

Endnotes

¹ Ken Conca, Anne H. Ehrlich, and Peter Gleick, "Conflicts Over Resources," Draft Background Paper for Working Group 5: Resources and Environmental Degradation as Sources of Conflict (50th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: "Eliminating the Causes of War," Queens' College, Cambridge, UK 3-8 August 2000), 1.

² Peter Gleick, "Question of Equity at the Heart of Water Conflict Management," Water and Conflict Prevention (The Second World Water Forum, The Hague. The Netherlands 17-22 March 2001).

³ Nile Basin Initiative Available <http://www.nilebasin.org/aboutUs.htm>.

⁴ Projects include Nile Basin Regional Power Trade, Efficient Water Use for Agricultural Production, Water Resources Planning and Management, Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement, Nile Transboundary Environmental Action, Applied Training, and Socio-Economic Development and Benefit-Sharing. Please refer to www.nilebasin.org for more information on these projects.

⁵ 59% of the Nile River comes from Lake Tana.

⁶ I conducted interviews with NGO staff at: Oxfam, Center for Human Environment, Christian Relief and Development Association, InterAfrica Group, Institute for Sustainable Development, WaterAid, and PANOS Ethiopia.

⁷ I interviewed staff at the United Nations Development Programme.

⁸ Government officials interviewed were employed by the Ethiopian Ministry of Water Resources.

⁹ Christine Drake, "Water Resource Conflicts in the Middle East," The World & I 15, no. 9 (September 2000), 301.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 301.

¹¹ "Taming the Nile's Serpents," The UNESCO Courier, October 2001, 30.

¹² *Ibid*, 30.

¹³ *Ibid*, 30.

¹⁴ Bram Posthumus, "Nile Basin Nations Move Towards Cooperation." 15 March 2000. Online. <http://www.oneworld.org/euconnect/publicat/n13.1/page13.htm>.

¹⁵ Italicized texts are direct excerpts from interviews. All remaining text are abbreviations/summaries of relevant aspects of interviews.

¹⁶ Interview. 9 January 2002.

¹⁷ Interview. 1 January 2002. Updated 18 February 2007.

¹⁸ In November 1959, the Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters (Nile Waters Treaty) was signed with the following provisions:

*Due to evaporation and discharge, 74 BCM per year were to be divided between Egypt and Sudan. Of this total, Egypt was allocated 48 BCM and Sudan 4 BCM. The remaining benefits of 22 BCM per year were divided by a ratio of 7.5 BCM per year for Egypt and 14.5 for Sudan. Total allocations for Egypt equaled 55.5 BCM per year and, for Sudan, 18.5 BCM per year. *Any increases in average yield would be divided equally. A technical committee would discuss any significant decreases. *Egypt agreed to pay Sudan 15 million Egyptian pounds in compensation for flooding and relocations.²⁰

Egypt and Sudan determined that the combined needs of other riparians would not exceed one to two BCM per year. Any claims for additional allocations would be discussed under a unified Egyptian-Sudanese position. The provisions of the Treaty have been adhered to since its implementation.²⁰

Aaron T. Wolf, "Middle East Water Conflicts and Directions for Conflict Resolution," International Food and Policy Institute 2020 Vision Brief 31 (April 1996), 2-3.

¹⁹ Interview. 4 January 2002. Updated 19 February 2007.

²⁰ Interview. 3 January 2002.

²¹ Taylor Baines, "But What Have You Done For Me Lately? Fifty Years of World Bank Reforms and Africa Has Little to Show For It," E-Vent Horizon: Global Government Review 1 June 2001. Online. http://e-venthorizon.net/continentalism/what_lately.html.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Ken Ringle, "Bank Shot; Writing From the Inside, An Economist Says the World Bank is Failing Its Mission," The Washington Post (20 March 2002), C1.

²⁴ Steve Herrick, "The IMF, the World Bank, and the Poverty of Nations," Amber Waves of Green Online. [http://awog.editthispage.com/stories/storyReader\\$64](http://awog.editthispage.com/stories/storyReader$64). 10 June 2000.

²⁵ Milan Vesely, "Africa at the Crossroads," African Business 256 (July/August 2000), 14.

Herrick, "The IMF, the World Bank, and the Poverty of Nations."

²⁶ Ray Bush, "Africa's Environmental Crisis: Challenging the Orthodoxies," Review of African Political Economy 24, no. 74 (December 1997), 504.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 505.

²⁸ "Applicability of Policy," Projects on International Waterways: Operational Policies 7.50. (The World Bank Operational Manual June 2001).

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Interview. 9 January 2002.

³² Interview. 1 January 2002.

³³ Interview. 16 January 2002.

³⁴ Interview. 4 January 2002. Updated 19 February 2007.

³⁵ Interview. 28 December 2001.

³⁶ "Donor Community Supports Poverty Reduction, Prosperity, and Peace Through the Nile Basin Initiative: Expresses \$140 Million in Initial Aid." The World Bank 28 June 2001. Online. <http://nilebasin.org/pressreleases.htm#Geneva%2028June2001>.

³⁷ Patricia Kameri-Mbote, "NGO and Civil Society Discourse Statement," International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile Palais de Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 26-28 June 2001.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Interviews held from 26 December 2001 through 18 January 2002.

⁴⁰ The closing of the Ethiopian Women's Lawyers Association is a clear example of this. While it has since been reinstated, there was no legitimate reason given for its initial termination.

⁴¹ Interview. 1 January 2002.

⁴² Interview. 2 January 2002. Updated 20 February 2007.

⁴³ Interview. 16 January 2002.

⁴⁴ Interview. 1 January 2002. Updated 18 February 2007.

⁴⁵ Interview. 4 January 2002. Updated 19 February 2007.

⁴⁶ Interview. 28 December 2001.

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Appendix I: Useful Terms

CHE	Center for Human Environment
CRDA	Christian Relief and Development Agency
ENDA	Environmental Development Action in the Third World
EU	European Union
IAG	InterAfrica Group
ISD	Institute for Sustainable Development
NBC	Nile Basin Country
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OP7.50	World Bank Operational Policy 7.50
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WB	World Bank