

UCLA

Program on International Migration

Title

Differential Fairness: Native-Migrant Tensions and Policy Response in Singapore

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9n64v1df>

Authors

Zhan, Shaohua

Huang, Lingli

Zhou, Min

Publication Date

2020-09-25

Comments welcome via email
Please do not cite without authors' permission
Last revised on July 25, 2020

Differential Fairness: Native-Migrant Tensions and Policy Response in Singapore

Shaohua Zhan, Lingli Huang, Min Zhou

Authors contact info:

Shaohua Zhan (corresponding author)

Assistant Professor of Sociology, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Mailing address: 48 Nanyang Avenue, SHHK 05-38, Singapore 639818

Email: shzhan@ntu.edu.sg

Phone: +65 6790-4379

ORCID: 0000-0002-9996-8833

Lingli Huang

Postdoctoral fellow, Nanyang Centre for Public Administration, Nanyang Technological University

Mailing address: 50 Nanyang Avenue, S3.2 B4 04, Singapore 639798

Email: huanglingli@ntu.edu.sg

Phone: +65 69047265

Min Zhou

Professor of Sociology & Asian American Studies, University of California, Los Angeles

Mailing address: Department of Sociology, UCLA, 264 Haines Hall, 375 Portola Plaza

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1551

Email: mzhou@soc.ucla.edu

Phone: +1-310-825-3532

ORCID: 0000-0003-4692-7234

Differential Fairness: Native-Migrant Tensions and Policy Response in Singapore

Shaohua Zhan, Lingli Huang, Min Zhou

Abstract: Rapid globalization and accelerated immigration to Singapore have met social backlash, giving rise to public discontent and native-migrant tensions. Drawing on survey data, in-depth interviews, and analysis of policy documents, this paper focuses on examining natives' reaction to immigration and government's response to immigration backlash in Singapore. We employ the concept of "differential fairness" to capture natives' rationale against immigration and their demand for preferential treatment in employment and access to public resources. Responding to the demand for differential fairness, the Singapore government has adopted a two-pronged approach to immigration reform. While promoting immigrant integration, policymaking is oriented toward prioritizing natives over foreigners in terms of rights, entitlements, and access. We show that, although differential fairness deviates from the core values of liberty, equality and justice in Western liberal democracies, Singapore's parallel policies of differentiation and integration may provide another model of migration governance and conflict management. We conclude with a discussion of theoretical and policy implications.

Key words: differential fairness, differentiation, native-migrant tension, immigration backlash, Singapore

Introduction

Human movement across national borders contributes manpower, knowledge, and cultural diversity to host societies, but it can also become a potential source of tension and conflict between natives and migrants. In recent decades, native-migrant tensions appear growing in many migrant-receiving countries. For example, a large survey (N=28,080) in the European Union (EU) member states found that 38 percent of the respondents viewed immigration as a problem rather than an opportunity (European Commission 2018). In the US, UK, and Australia, negative media portrayals of immigrants as "floods," "invaders," and "parasites" have gained increasing popularity (Hogan and Haltinner 2015). Native discontent and adverse attitude toward immigration sometimes flare up into violence. In South Africa, a series of xenophobic attacks in 2008 left more than 60 dead and over 100,000 displaced (Landau 2012). The needs to reduce native-migrant tensions and prevent intergroup conflicts have become an urgent policy issue.

This paper focuses on examining natives' reaction to immigration and government's response to immigration backlash based on a case study of Singapore. Singapore is a city-state located in the Strait of Malacca. Historically it was country of immigration, attracting immigrants, mostly Malays and ethnic Chinese, from neighboring countries, such as Malaysia. Since 1990, it has become a preferred destination for immigrants from China and India. Natives in this paper refer to Singaporean citizens who are either native-born or foreign-born arriving in Singapore and acquiring citizenship statuses prior to 1990. Migrants refer to those arriving in

Singapore after 1990, including naturalized Singaporean citizens, permanent residents (PR), and non-residents.

Since the new millennium, native-migrant tensions in Singapore have been rising. We find that tensions emerge largely from natives' anxiety and fear of being out-competed by migrants over job opportunities and access to public resources, and that natives often consider "fairness" as having the rights and entitlements that are different from rather than similar to migrants. We call this notion *differential fairness*, which appears at odds with the core values of liberty, equality, and justice in Western liberal democracies (Chua 2017). The native demand for differential fairness has led the government to reform policies in ways that sharpen the boundaries between natives and migrants. Meanwhile, the government has implemented policies aiming at promoting the integration of migrants into the host society through interactions and mutual adaptations between natives and migrants. Does this two-pronged policy approach sufficiently address the native concerns and their discontents? Prior research often attributes natives' adverse attitudes toward migrants to cultural differences or economic competition (Gonzalez-Sobrinho 2016; Modood 2010; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Our case study shows that the larger socio-political context under neoliberal globalization has fostered a new morality - differential fairness - with which natives are equipped to justify the backlash against immigration and make citizenship claims in Singapore. This finding adds much nuance to previous cultural and economic explanations and bridges the divide between them. With regard to managing native-migrant tensions, existing research has paid little attention to differentiation policies; and when it does, it usually focuses on criticizing these policies as evidence of discrimination against migrants. The current study examines the mixed effects—both positive and negative—of differentiation policies on reducing native-migrant tensions, based on the Singapore case.

In what follows we first review the literature on sources of native-migrant tensions and policy response in addressing such tensions. We then introduce our central research questions, methods, and data, followed by an overview of immigration and immigration backlash in Singapore in the recent decade. Thirdly, we examine the idea of differential fairness as expressed by natives and analyse the ways that the government responds to natives' demands. We conclude by drawing theoretical and policy implications.

Sources of native-migrant tensions

The literature documents two main sources of native-migrant tensions. One is perceived cultural threat. Natives are anxious that different cultural values and practices that migrants bring with them would threaten, dilute, and even undermine the host society's core culture. The other is perceived economic threat. Natives are anxious about their own employment security and access to public resources because they tend to consider migrants unfair economic competitors willing to accept low wages, poor working conditions, and substandard living. It should be noted that native-migrant tensions can also be triggered by other factors, such as politicization of migration, media influence and xenophobia (Berezin 2006; Hopkins 2010). With regard to managing native-migrant tensions, the literature focuses mainly on dealing with cultural differences but much less on addressing economic competition, and there has been a debate on whether economic competition really exists.

Cultural differences and diversities

On cultural differences and diversities, the migration scholarship has discussed two main approaches—assimilation and multiculturalism. The assimilation approach requires migrants or minority groups to abandon “old” values and practices and adopt the mainstream culture of the host society. The underlying assumption of classical assimilation is that there is a homogenous mainstream society into which immigrants are expected to assimilate (Alba and Nee 2003; Waters et al. 2010). However, such assumption does not always hold true as the host society is often segmented into social classes and groups with distinct cultures and practices (Portes and Zhou 1993). Studies in the US and Europe have found that migrants assimilated into different social strata (“segments”), leading some migrants and their children to experience upward, downward or stagnant social mobility (Waters et al. 2010; Vermeulen 2010). Segmented assimilation and variations on outcomes reinforce racial or ethnic segregation, perpetuate social inequalities, and create new, or renews old, racial/ethnic stereotyping (Zhou and Gonzales 2019).

The approach of multiculturalism accepts cultural differences and recognizes diverse cultures, languages, religions and customs that immigrants bring with them as assets enriching the culture and life of the host society. Multiculturalism was practiced in many migrant-receiving countries, particularly in Western democracies such as Australia and Canada, in the last quarter of the 20 century (Kymlicka 2012). Since new millenium, however, a backlash against multiculturalism has emerged, particularly in Europe, in response to the influx of Muslim migrants and rising native-migrant tensions as celebraton of racial/ethnic diversity can cause anxiety of being overwhelmed by foreign cultures among natives (Modood 2010). Multicultural policies have been accused of perpetuating inequality, undermining unity and cohesion, endorsing reprehensible practices, and fostering segregation, crimes, and even terrorism (Joppke 2004; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).

Economic competition

On economic competition as a source of native-migrant tensions, scholars turn attention to the local labor market in the national economy. Segmented labour market theory suggests that migrant labourers usually take up jobs in the secondary sector, which are of low pay and unwanted by natives (Massey et al. 2008, 28-34; Piore 1979). The split labor market theory posits that employers seek to maximize profits by replacing native workers with migrant workers, who accept lower wages, and exert labour control by inciting racial conflicts between migrant workers and unionized native workers (Bonacich 1972; Brown 2000). The theory of ethnic competition suggests that native-migrant tensions would arise when the two groups compete for same jobs or economic resources (Gonzalez-Sobrinio 2016; Olzak 1992). Results from empirical research in the US and Europe are mixed. Some scholars find no clear evidence of competition between migrants and natives in the same sector or no significant effects of job competition on natives’ attitudes towards migrants (Dustmann and Preston 2006; Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015). Other scholars, however, reveal that job competition and tensions exist between the two groups (Gonzalez-Sobrinio 2016).

A key issue in intellectual disagreement is whether natives and migrants compete for jobs in the same labor market sectors. Segmented labor market theory was formulated in the US during the post-war economic boom, when native workers experienced upward economic mobility, leaving low-wage vacancies for migrants to fill. However, as deindustrialization and social polarization deepened in recent decades, some native workers experienced downward mobility and had to compete with migrant workers for low wage jobs. Faced with economic insecurity due to neoliberal restructuring, native workers would worry about job loss to migrants even though they do not face direct competition from the latter (Borjas 2013; Kunovich 2017). Furthermore, studies on native-migrant competition mostly focus on low-skilled migrants but leave out those highly skilled. Most of the highly skilled migrate legally and are perceived to be desirable to the host society. In large labor markets where high-paying jobs are plenty, the competition between skilled natives and migrants may be less intense than in smaller labor markets where such jobs are scarce. Singapore is a case in point. There has been simmering discontent, which is heated up to critical backlash in the recent decade against the inflow of highly skilled migrants in the city-state (Gomes 2014; Yeoh and Lam 2016).

Intensified market competition and increasing economic insecurity due to neoliberal globalization in the past decades have had a major impact on the perception and economic status of natives, no matter whether they are in *direct* competition with migrants or not. This is particularly so in small economies such as Singapore, where globalization has profoundly shaped the local labour market and everyday life. While managing cultural differences through assimilation or multiculturalism is still of great importance, it is also urgent to examine the comprehensive social and economic effects of neoliberal globalization on natives. This draws our attention to “non-liberal” differential fairness and differentiation policies, with which natives seek for a layer of economic protection. As Polanyi (1944) reminded us, society would act to protect itself against the expansion of the global free market.

The literature on native-migrant tensions also privileges research on immigration to Western developed countries. Much less attention has been paid to developing countries and economic centers in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which have witnessed the influx of large and diverse migrant populations in recent decades. Take Singapore as an example. The proportion of the foreign-born population reached 46 percent as of 2015 (Author 2015), which surpassed that of most developed countries in the Global North. Although Singapore is a developed nation, its immigration regime is quite similar to that in new migrant-receiving countries in the Global South. How this nation-state manages native-migrant tensions may provide a different model and a comparative case to Western democracies.

Research questions, methods, and data collection

Our study is based on the case of Singapore and centres around three research questions: (1) How do natives articulate their concerns over immigration and justify the backlash against immigrants? (2) How does the city-state respond to rising native-migrant tensions?, and (3) How effective are changes in immigration policy in reducing the tensions? We employ mixed methods, which include questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews, and policy analysis, to address these questions.

The data is derived from a large study on immigration and integration in three global cities including Singapore, Los Angeles and Vancouver, between September 2017 and June 2019. The study focused on the experiences of immigrants from China and India, as all three cities have been major destinations for migrants from the two countries. The study also collected data on natives' views on immigration. This paper only utilizes the data on natives in Singapore, which comprises a survey of 211 native respondents and 26 in-depth interviews. The survey respondents were selected from two sources: 101 respondents were randomly selected from the online panel data of a commercial survey company and the other 110 respondents were surveyed by the research team through a snowballing method. Although the study did not follow the probability sampling method, the survey data it generated were largely in line with Singapore's demographic profile in terms of gender, racial composition and religious affiliation. We only employ the survey data for descriptive statistical analysis. The 26 in-depth interviewees include 15 males and 11 females who aged from 25 to 60. The interviewees held a variety of occupations, including civil servant, teacher, engineer, financial consultant, lawyer, doctor, entrepreneur, taxi driver, and the unemployed. Each interview lasted from 50 to 80 minutes, and the interviewee was asked to recount their experiences with migrants, Chinese and Indian in particular, and share their views on immigration, integration, and policies. In addition to survey and interview data, the research team also collected and analyzed policy documents relating to immigration in Singapore between 1990 and 2019, particularly the new policies in the recent decade.

Immigration to Singapore and nativist backlash

Located at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, Singapore was a British colony before it joined Malaysia in 1963. It became an independent republic in 1965. During the colonial period, the island received numerous migrant laborers and traders from China, India, and the Malay Archipelago, and this migration history shaped the city-state's demographics. The government classified the population into four races after the independence: Chinese, Malays, Indians and Others. This official CMIO racial structure remains in place to date, with 74.4 percent of the resident population being Chinese, 13.4 percent Malays, 9 percent Indians, and 3.2 percent others in 2019 (Department of Statistics 2019).

Singapore's economy has been deeply embedded in global production and trade networks. It experienced rapid growth in the 1970s, driven by growing investments in marine transport, international finance, and export-oriented manufacturing. By the 1980s, the city-state had risen to be one of the four "Asian Tigers."¹ Rapid growth exhausted domestic labor supply, and it had to recruit migrant workers from surrounding countries. In the 1990s, the city-state planned a transition to a more competitive knowledge-based economy. To achieve this goal, the government sought to attract highly skilled migrants, also referred to as "foreign talent," to develop high-end industries such as finance, IT, petrochemicals, medical services, and higher education (Tan and Bhaskaran 2015). Meanwhile, economic growth and upward job mobility among native workers vacated low-skilled positions in industries such as construction, port

¹ The other Tiger economies are Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. The four Tigers were relatively small economies that underwent rapid industrialization and maintained exceptionally high growth rates between 1970s and 1990s.

services, retails, and domestic services, which the country had to import low-skilled migrants to fill.

Low fertility and population aging are another reason for immigration. The country's total fertility rate has been below the replacement level of 2.1 since the 1980s and it decreased further to around 1.2 in recent years. Low fertility hastened the pace of population aging. By 2019, the proportion of its citizens over 65 increased to 16 percent (Strategy group 2019). To offset the impact of population aging, Singapore permits naturalization and grants permanent residency to highly skilled migrants. As a result, Singapore's total population increased from 3 million in 1990 to 5.7 million in 2019, including 3.5 million citizens, 0.5 million permanent residents, and 1.7 million non-residents (the holders of nonimmigrant visas) (Department of Statistics 2019).

The rapid growth in the migrant population has triggered anxiety and frustration among natives. The discontent towards immigration emerged in the late 1990s (Koh 2003), but the booming economy kept it from spreading. The tipping point was the global financial crisis in 2008, which caused significant job loss in Singapore, with the unemployment rate surging to 4.5 percent in 2009 (Ministry of Manpower 2010, vi). Although the national economy quickly recovered, the discontent towards immigration exploded. In the 2011 General Election, the ruling party, People's Action Party (PAP) received only 60.1 percent of the votes, the lowest since the independence, mainly due to the dissatisfaction of citizens with immigration policy.

In online platforms, chatrooms, and social media, natives frequently vented their grievances and anti-immigrant attitudes (Gomes 2014). A population white paper released by the government in 2013, which projected an increase of the population to 6.9 million by 2030, caused another round of uproar from the native population. On February 16, 2013, about 5,000 people gathered at Speakers' Corner in Hong Lim Park to protest the government's newly issued population paper. The protest was said to be the largest since Singapore's independence in 1965 (Yeoh and Lam 2016).

“This is unfair”: differential fairness and natives' attitudes

Native-migrant tensions in Singapore bear similarities with those observed in Western migrant-receiving countries, except for two notable differences. First, in Singapore, native discontent is vented more toward highly skilled migrants, or the foreign talent, than toward low-skilled migrant workers (Yeoh and Lam 2016). In the US and Western Europe, low-skilled migrants are usually singled out as the targets of natives' anger and frustration. Second, in Singapore, native-migrant tensions occur generally between co-ethnics, whereas in contemporary American and European countries these tensions usually flare up between native whites and immigrant minorities. In Singapore, migrants from Mainland China and India consist of two major groups of foreign talent. The Singaporeans of Chinese and Indian descent, however, highlight the differences between them and their coethnic newcomers in values and cultural practices (Liu 2014; Ortega 2015).

The literature on immigration to Singapore has documented natives' negative attitudes towards migrants in general, and foreign talent in particular (Gomes 2014; Koh 2003; Liu 2014;

Ortiga 2015; Yang 2018; Yeoh and Lam 2016). However, previous studies were mainly based on news reports and online forum posts. While capturing some aspects of natives' attitudes, these studies tended to paint an extreme picture, as people who were most vocal were more likely to express extreme views in online media. Our analysis is based on data from questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews, which provide more structured and balanced views.

A dominant theme emerged from our data is a clear articulation of unfairness in the government's immigration policy and from perceived or experienced economic competition from migrants. This notion of (un)fairness is not based on equality for all, or individual rights, which is highly valued in Western democracies. Rather, it is on differential rights and entitlements, that is, the sense of fairness is premised on the differentiation of people based on national origin, identity, economic status, and cultural differences. We summarize three categories of unfairness expressed by our interviewees.

Unfairness in the job market

The majority of natives who responded to our questionnaire survey and participated in the interviews believed that there was competition between natives and migrants for jobs. Among 211 survey respondents, 133, or 63 percent, agreed that "immigrants compete with us for jobs," while only 32 (15 percent), disagreed with this statement, and the rest remained neutral, as shown in Table 1. Of 26 interviewees, 21 (81 percent) agreed that migrants competed with them for jobs. About half of all interviewees also argued that competition with migrants was unfair to natives.

[Table 1 here]

The first source of perceived unfairness in the job market comes from the pressure to balance work and life. According to our interviewees, migrants were like work machines. They were willing to work as much as they could and often worked overtime to earn extra money. Indira, 30, a college-educated professional working in commerce, pointed out that migrants were able to outcompete natives because they were here without families and could spend all their time working without worrying about family responsibilities. According to her,

"Singaporeans appreciate work-life balance. If it's an 8-5 job, then it's an 8-5 job. Anything after please pay us or let us go home to our family. But now [we] are forced to compete with people who do not prioritise work-life balance and are willing to put in longer hours for lesser income. They [migrants] are in a better situation to take jobs because employers like them...A boss would want to maximize profits so he will choose the cheaper and more hard-working worker."

Our interviewees also repeatedly voiced that competition with migrants forced natives to work harder and longer in order to retain jobs or get promotion. Benjamin, 29, married without children, worked in the aerospace industry. Many of his colleagues were professionals from China and India. Benjamin admitted that his migrant colleagues were highly intelligent and

extremely hard working, and he constantly felt pressure working with them. Such pressure decreased his quality of life.

“They [migrants] induce a bit of uneasiness in life because when you see someone so strong, at least for me, it really makes me wonder. Shit [sic], how am I gonna compete globally? Does that make me work harder? Uh I would say yes, but ...I feel more fear. Oh thank you for that push but I don't feel like I have the tools or the means to win the battle. So do they add to the quality of life overall? I would say no.”

Benjamin thus strongly advocated for immigration restriction. He argued that the government should control the inflow of migrants to reduce competition; otherwise he would be “slowly getting eliminated” in the job market.

Besides direct job competition, some interviewees suspected that multinational companies [MNCs] might have conducted unfair hiring practices. Of 26 interviewees, six held this view. These interviewees reasoned that the high concentration of migrants in certain industries, such as finance and IT, might have been due to MNC managers' preference in hiring people from their own countries. Gomes, 49, left his managerial job in the construction industry and planned to start a business while driving for Grab (a ride hailing company in Singapore). He was married and had one child. He said, “... if this is an Indian boss, they will hire Indians; if this is a Chinese boss, they will hire Chinese; if this is a European boss, they will hire Europeans.” Besides the factor of co-ethnic relations, Gomes added that migrants were flexible laborers who would be willing to move when MNCs relocate, whereas natives could not relocate overseas as their roots were in Singapore.

Unfairness in access to public resources

Natives also voice unfairness in access to public resources. Singapore is not a welfare state, but the government provides substantial subsidies for housing, education, and health care to its citizenry. As far as housing is concerned, 91.1 percent of resident households have home ownership in 2018, and 78.7 percent of the households lived in government-built public housing, also known as HDB (Housing and Development Board, the government agency in charge of public housing) flats.² The prices of the HDB flats are set by the government at levels affordable to ordinary households. A two-bed-room flat costs about five years of annual income for a median income household. HDB also provides housing grants and low-interest loans for middle and low-income households to purchase flats. Regarding education, primary and secondary schooling is basically free for children of Singapore citizens. According to the official source, every child would have received a total of more than US\$96,000 in education subsidies for primary and secondary schools. The government also provides subsidies for post-secondary education (Lim 2019). Access to these two types of public resources particularly concerned our interviewees, who felt entitled and frequently voiced greater differentiation between natives and migrants. They also expressed similar sentiments on access to other public resources such as health care, transportation, and neighborhood facilities.

² Data on housing is retrieved from Singapore's official statistics website: www.singstats.gov.sg.

With regard to housing, some migrants' high economic status and their ability to afford private upscale housing create a sense of unfairness among natives. In Singapore, the government allows for the development of private condominiums for sale in the market, which accounted for just 15.9 percent of all housing in 2018. Some migrants (and natives as well), particularly investors, business owners, and top employees in MNCS, are able to afford these expensive real estate properties. Because HDB housing are not open to foreigners, foreigners are highly visible in private housing ownership, which creates the impression that migrants live in better housing than natives and generates a sense of unfairness among middle- and lower-class natives. Sofia, 34, worked as a research assistant and earned an average salary, was such a case. "I always find this very disturbing." She complained, "This is our country. We Singaporeans live in HDB flats, but these people come to our country and stay in better private compounds. That is so unfair! Why do they get all these privileges and we get nothing? We have to work like mad, and think about money all the time."

After migrants are naturalized and become citizens, they are eligible to purchase HDB flats, and permanent residents can also purchase HDB resale flats, subject to some extra conditions. The blending of new citizens and permanent residents in public HDB housing also triggers the feeling of unfairness among native-born citizens. Yong Chee, a young entrepreneur in her late 20s, was anxious that naturalized citizens would purchase HDB flats in her neighborhood, which she held should belong to native-born citizens.

With regard to education, the increasing number of children of newly naturalized citizens and permanent residents creates the impression that immigrants take up seats held by natives in the public school system, leading natives to think that it is unfair to allow immigrant children to utilize the heavily subsidized system in the same way as natives. In the 2000s, the Singapore government also offered scholarships to draw top high school students from China, India, and other Southeast Asian countries to study at prestigious universities in Singapore. This policy triggered widespread resentment among natives and was seen as unfair to them because not all native students could receive scholarships or were admitted to top universities. Although these scholarship programs had been drastically scaled back during the period of our research, some of our interviewees still expressed discontent with them. Eugene, 60, worked as a part-time lecturer. He was married and had a daughter. He argued that the government should restrict migrants' entry into public schools and that offering scholarships to migrants was unfair to natives. "I was told that in a lot of undergraduate programmes Chinese immigrants are given grants to cover fifty percent of the cost. That is not being fair to Singaporeans by and large."

Unfairness in civic obligations

The sentiment towards access to public resources is closely related to civic obligations. Natives are particularly displeased with the differences between them and migrants in fulfilling two civic obligations: National Service and contributions to the Central Provident Fund (CPF). All male Singaporean citizens are obliged to serve a mandatory two-year full-time service in the military at the age of 18, and will be called back for reserve service occasionally after that. This obligation is also required for new citizens and permanent residents under age 21, but exempted for adult new citizens and permanent residents. CPF is a compulsive social security savings scheme for working Singaporean citizens and permanent residents, which primarily funds

retirement but is also used for healthcare and housing needs. Each working adult will contribute 20 percent of monthly wages to his or her CPF account, supplemented by 17 percent of monthly wages contributed by the employer. The adult will receive monthly payouts from the retirement account after 65. National Service and CPF contributions also reinforce the notion of loyalty and commitment to the country, which some natives argue migrants do not have. Most natives view whether to serve National Service and contribute to CPF as important distinctions between them and migrants, and feel unfair if they are not granted priority in government support and public services.

National Service requires substantial inputs of time and effort from citizens. Thus some of our interviewees felt strongly that it would be unfair for migrants not to serve the country while receiving benefits from it. Rudy, a 27-year old civil servant, suggested that natives were at a disadvantage in competing with migrants because the latter were exempted from National Service.

“What I honestly feel is that there is very strong public sentiment against immigrants who do not do army [National Service], particularly those who come in their twenties. [They] come here to study and work, but they don’t need to do army. After a couple of years, or five to ten years, they become PR; they become citizens, and in the end they really don’t need to do it. ...they don’t even have to spend two years or never have to be called back for re-service. These are the things that make the playing field unequal.”

Some native interviewees accused migrants of lack of loyalty or commitment to Singapore because the latter had not fulfilled the civic obligations. They held that the intention of migrants to settle in Singapore was not to serve the country but for the benefits on housing and education. Migrants would leave the country when they no longer enjoy these benefits or when the host country faces unfortunate circumstances such as war and economic recession.

It should be noted that, although most of the participants in our study were critical of immigration and migrants, many of them also saw the positive side of immigration and acknowledge migrants’ contributions to the host society. An analysis of our survey data reveals such contradiction and ambivalence in natives’ attitudes. The respondents complained about unpleasant interactions with migrants, decreasing quality of life, job competition, rising housing prices, and crowdedness, but they also recognized the country’s need for migrants, agreed that natives and migrants could get along, and expressed willingness to socialize with Chinese and Indian migrants (see Table 1 above). Nevertheless, the demand for differential fairness and simmering native-migrant tensions have pushed the Singapore government to take action, to which we now turn.

Policy measures to mitigate native-migrant tensions

Responding to natives’ discontent and demand for differential fairness, the Singapore government has implemented dual policies—differentiation and integration—while adjusting its immigration policy to make it more restrictive. Singapore has a complex immigration system to

control and and manage migration. The work pass schemes draw a sharp line between low-skilled and highly skilled workers, which comprise three major types of work passes—Work Permit (WP), S Pass (SP), and Employment Pass (EP). WP are mainly for low-skilled or semi-skilled workers who are hired to work in low-wage jobs in domestic services, construction, manufacturing, marine shipyards, and other service sectors. The WP is valid for up to 2 years and is renewable depending on the availability of jobs. WP holders have limited job mobility and little chance of changing sectors or employers. They are not allowed to bring family members to Singapore, and are ineligible to apply for permanent residency. In June 2019, the number of WP holders totaled 981,000, and more than half were domestic and construction workers (MOM 2020).

SP holders are middle skilled workers (e.g. technicians, nurses, sales managers), who usually work in industries such as retail, manufacturing, and healthcare. A SP holder must have an associate degree or above, and the qualifying salary for a SP is at least S\$2,400 (Singapore dollar) a month, which is about the starting salary for the occupation. The SP is valid for two years and renewable. EP holders are highly skilled professionals who hold advanced academic degrees and are employed in managerial, professional, or specialized positions such as university professors, scientists and engineers, financial consultants, and medical doctors. An EP holder must earn a monthly salary of at least S\$3,600 (S\$3,900 from May 2020 onward) and have acceptable qualifications, such as good university degrees, professional qualifications or specialist skills. EP is valid for three years and renewable.

Both SP and EP holders are allowed to bring their immediate families (spouse and children) to Singapore if they earn above a given level of monthly salary, which has been S\$6,000 since January 2018. The total number of SP and EP holders was 386,000 in June 2019 (MOM 2020). SP and EP holder are also eligible to apply for permanent residency, though only a small number would be successful. Permanent residents (PRs) are eligible for certain benefits and privileges which work pass holders do not have. For example, PRs can send their children to public schools and purchase resale HDB flats, and join the public health insurance scheme, but they must contribute to CPF. PRs can apply for citizenship status, after being PR for at least two years.

The work pass system is inherently differential. Yeoh (2006, 36) characterized it as a “bifurcated” migrant labour regime based on “differential politics” of inclusion (of highly skilled migrants) and exclusion of (low-skilled migrants). Ye (2017) adopts the concept of “differential inclusion” to capture the modes of governing diversities in Singapore. Both scholars see the policy or politics of differentiation as an initiative from the state.³ However, policy is driven by natives’ attitudes. Our study finds that natives openly and clearly articulate the idea of differential fairness and strongly demand for greater differentiation between them and migrants. In response to this demand and to mitigate the rising native-migration tensions, the Singapore government has adopted an array of differentiation policy measures after 2009. These new measures were aimed to further differentiate between natives and migrants, particularly between citizens and highly skilled migrants including PRs, while keeping differentiation between low-skilled and highly skilled migrants in place.

³ Teo (2015) argues that the Singapore state practices “differentiated deservedness” in social welfare as a form of governance. This practice has in turn shaped the public perception over differential rights and entitlements.

Differentiating citizens, PRs, and skilled pass holders

In August 2010, the Prime Minister of Singapore remarked in his annual National Day speech, “The basic principle for us is always citizens come first and that is how our policies are designed – citizens before PRs, PRs before other foreigners and non-residents” (Lee 2010). The speech was an attempt to appease natives’ discontent over immigration, which exploded in 2009 following the financial crisis. At the time, the government already started to take action to restrict immigration. For example, the number of newly granted PRs had declined rapidly from 79,167 in 2008 to 59,460 in 2009 and further down to 29,265 in 2010, and has remained around 29,000 thereafter (Strategy group 2019, 17). Restrictive immigration policy considerably narrowed the path to permanent residency, leading most of highly skilled migrants to work on a temporary basis (Author 2019). The outcome of the 2011 General Election and the outcry over the projected population growth through immigration in the 2013 white paper had further pushed the government to adopt differentiation measures, which we discuss as follows.

Differentiation in employment

Job competition has been a major issue on which natives voice unfairness. In 2013, the Singapore government initiated the Fair Consideration Framework that required employers to prioritize residents (citizens and PRs) over nonresidents in hiring. Employers must post vacancies in a government website, to which only citizens and PRs have access, for 14 days before hiring migrants. Employers can hire foreign workers only when no qualified Singaporeans or PRs apply for the job, and they are scrutinized and penalized if found to prioritize foreign workers over citizens or PRs. In addition, the government sets strict quotas on hiring middle-skilled foreign workers. The latest quotas are that SP holders must be capped at 13 percent of any company’s workforce in the service sector and 20 percent in other sectors. The government also levies a hefty fee for hiring each SP holder to make it more costly to hire foreign workers than natives.

Additionally, the government provides skill training and scholarships to citizens. For example, the SkillsFuture Council was established in 2014 to upgrade citizens’ skills. Each citizen aged 25 and above would receive S\$500 to attend training courses. But these resources are not open to PRs. In November 2016, the Human Capital Partnership Programme was launched to encourage companies to invest in the local citizen workforce (Seow 2016).

Differentiation in access to public resources

Differential policy also extends to access to public resources, particularly between citizens and PRs. For example, PRs can only buy resale HDB flats at market prices and can only do so at least three years after obtaining their PR status. PRs are not eligible to apply for any housing grants or subsidies from the government, and they would lose the right to own their HDB flats if they purchase condominiums in the private housing market. The differences between citizens and PRs are highlighted in the HDB official website to show that the government maintains a “Singaporeans First” policy (HDB 2020). Regarding education, citizens are given absolute priority over PRs and nonresidents in the enrollment of children to their preferred

primary schools. In addition, citizens pay almost no fees for their children in primary and secondary schools, but PRs and nonresidents would have to pay fees, which have been substantially increased since 2011 (Teng 2017). Besides housing and education, the government also provides more health care subsidies for citizens than for PRs and charges PRs and nonresidents extra fees for accessing some public facilities such as museums and parks.

Differentiation in immigration control

The Singapore government has applied more stringent measures to reduce and control immigration since 2009. One of the most impactful measures is the narrowing path to permanent residency, which works to further differentiate EP and SP holders from citizens and PRs. Another measure is to reduce immigration. Between 2004 and 2009, the population of Singapore grew by about 164,000 a year on average, mainly through immigration. This was reduced to about 91,000 a year between 2009 and 2015, and further down to 48,000 a year between 2015 and mid-2019.⁴ Immigration control also includes setting stringent requirements for EP and SP holders to bring along family members. The monthly salary criterion for an EP and SP holder to apply for dependent passes (spouse and children) increased from S\$2,500 in the mid-2000s to S\$6,000 in 2018, and the criterion to apply for the Long Term Visit Pass for ones' parents increased from S\$3,500 to S\$12,000.⁵

Our native interviewees were in agreement of the government's differentiation policies, and many noted that these policy measures were well justified. Beng Meng, 60, worked as a construction manager. He was an active participant of the grassroots organizations in his neighborhood such as the Community Club and the Residents' Committee. He recounted many differences in rights and benefits between citizens, PRs, and work pass holders. He pointed out that some native citizens wanted even more differentiation between them and migrants.

“Now everything we do, there's a difference between a SC [Singaporean citizens] and a PR, but some people think that we should widen the gap and let them [migrants] pay a bit more...As long as there is a gap, people are okay. [It is] because you can differentiate what is Singaporean, what is PR, [and] what is foreigner”.

Integration

The policy measures of differentiation respond to natives' demand for differential fairness. However, the government is concerned that extensive differentiation measures may have negative effects on social cohesion. When the population is separated into distinct social categories with varying rights and entitlements, it may backfire to fuel native-migrant tensions. Some of our interviewees expressed such a possibility. Dalilah, 31, was a teacher at a public secondary school. Her students comprised natives, PRs, international students from other Asian countries. She reported that differentiation measures affected the participation in educational activities. For example, PR and international students in her school were not allowed to join

⁴ The population figures are from government statistics. All are the year-end figures except for the figure of mid-2019.

⁵ See Yeo (2006) for figures in the mid-2000s.

school field trips and other enrichment activities which were subsidized by the government. She was particularly worried that the increasing differentiation would foster a stronger sense of privilege and entitlement among Singaporean students, which would deepen the sense of nationalism and reinforce “othering” in the next generation.

Dalilah suggested that the government should make efforts to integrate migrants in order to prevent social exclusion and disruption. This view leads us to explore the other set of policies that the Singapore government has implemented to mitigate the native-migrant tensions: the policy of integration. In 2009, the government established the National Integration Council (NIC) with funds to promote the integration of locals and newcomers. Integration policy measures, however, are mainly aimed to integrate new citizens, PRs, and skilled pass holders to the exclusion of low- to semi-skilled migrants. WP holders such as domestic workers and construction workers are seen as a transient labour force, and are ineligible to apply for permanent residency by law.

A key feature of Singapore’s integration policy lies at the neighborhood level. The city-state is experienced in managing interracial relations after several serious racial riots in the 1960s. In order to promote racial harmony and avoid racial segregation, the government has long established the ethnic quota policy in HDB housing. In any given HDB neighborhood, there is a limit on the maximum percentage of flats occupied by a certain race: 84 percent for Chinese, 22 percent for Malays, and 12 percent for Indian and Other, respectively. These quotas largely correspond to the four races’ percentages in the total resident population. Starting from 2010, PRs and non-resident renters are also subject to such racial quota policy. The government mandates that the percentages of PR households could not be more than five percent in any HDB neighborhood. PRs and non-residents are also subjected to the non-citizen quota if they rent a HDB flat, which is eight percent per neighborhood. The ethnic quota policy is intended to ensure a balanced mix of the four races in each neighborhood. It also makes sure that PRs and highly skilled pass holders will not concentrate spatially but mingle with local Singaporeans by living next to each other.

In addition, neighborhood-based and civic organizations such as community clubs and residents’ committees regularly organize public gatherings, holiday celebrations, parties, community events, home visits, and town hall meetings to provide common spaces for natives and migrants to interact and to build trust and friendships (Leong, Rueppel, and Hong 2014). Various ethnic organizations, such as the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations and the Singapore Indian Development Associations, also regularly hold activities to strengthen ties between natives and migrants (Liu 2014; Chacko 2017).

Effects of parallel differentiation and integration

Our interviewees mostly supported the policies of differentiation, and some of them even held that differentiation should go further so as to give more preference and priority to natives. Only four out of 26 expressed concerns over too much differentiation between the two groups. However, the majority of our interviewees (18 out of 26) also agreed that the government should do more to integrate migrants into the Singapore society. Three interviewees reported participating in integration activities organized by the government or community-based

organizations, and five mentioned that the government's integration policies made positive impacts. Most of the interviewees had made friends with Chinese or Indian migrants or were open to mix with migrants at work or in social life. Findings from our qualitative interviews are in line with our survey results. Of 211 respondents, 64 percent agreed that "natives and migrants got along with each other" and that 56 percent agreed that "it is enriching to get to know and interact with immigrants from China or India."

The parallel policies of differentiation and integration are effective to some extent in reducing the tensions between natives and migrants, particularly on the part of natives. In 2015, the People's Action Party, the ruling party in Singapore, won 70 percent of the popular vote, nearly 10 percent more than that in 2011. The growing support for the ruling party should be at least partly attributed to the adjustment of migration policies, particularly the change towards greater differentiation between natives and migrants (Koh 2015; Yeoh and Lam 2016, 638).

However, native-migrant tensions still widely exist in Singapore. Both our survey and interview data indicate that a large proportion of natives hold critical views of immigration policy and migrants. Their views range from a total ban on immigration to further differentiation between natives and migrants. Our findings are echoed by a study conducted by ILO and UN Women (2019), which surveyed 1,005 native Singaporeans in 2018-19. Of these respondents, 46 percent agreed that "we should make it more difficult for migrants to come and work in this country" and 60 percent agreed that "migrant workers should not receive the same pay and benefits as local workers." The study also found that the support for migrant workers in Singapore, measured by the KAP index,⁶ had declined between 2010 and 2019. Nevertheless, Singapore received the highest KAP score among the three Southeast Asian countries surveyed. Singapore scored 29 while Malaysia and Thailand only scored 13 and 12, respectively, despite the fact that migrants comprised 44 percent of the labour force in Singapore in 2017, but only 15 percent in Malaysia and 6 percent in Thailand. The Singapore government's policies of differentiation and integration should be credited for the relatively high level of support for migrants, which in turn helps reduce native-migrant tensions.

Conclusion

This paper has examined native-migrant tensions and policy response in Singapore. We have shown that natives' perceived unfairness in the job market and access to public resources appear to be the main causes of native-migrant tensions and that natives' demand for differential fairness is a major driver for policy response in the country. The parallel policies of differentiation and integration have to some extent reduced native-migrant tensions. Nevertheless, such tensions have remained considerably high in the city-state, due both to demand of natives for further differentiation and slow progress in migrant integration.

Our study draws attention to natives' demand for protection in the context of intense competition and increasing job insecurity caused by neoliberal globalization. Deviating from the core values of equality for all and respect for individual rights in liberal democracies, the demand for differential fairness among natives in Singapore is to draw clear boundaries between them

⁶ The KAP index measures knowledge, attitude and practice using a set of questions. The KAP index ranges from 0 to 100, with a higher score indicating more support for migrants.

and various groups of migrants. Such demand, aimed to ensure that natives receive preferential treatment in both employment and access to public resources, is not derived directly from interpersonal or intergroup economic competition. Rather, it is motivated by a morality (a principle of fairness) that has evolved to shape the perceptions and attitudes of natives toward immigration and migrants and justify their demand for differential treatments. Thus our thesis of differential fairness has broadened the scope of cultural and economic explanations, where the root cause lies in growing economic insecurity, accompanied by relative deprivation, within nation-states, produced by the neoliberal globalization.

Our study holds policy implications. Differentiation policies may play a positive role in reducing native-migrant tensions from the perspective of natives. From the perspective of migrants, however, such policies may be exclusionary. Thus these policies should be carefully designed as a part of migration governance. It should be noted that excessive differentiation may cause segregation and exacerbate native-migrant tensions. The policy of integration is thus needed to balance the negative effects of differentiation. Furthermore, full integration of migrants and their children into the host society depends not only on the part of migrants themselves but also on natives and host institutions. Thus integration measures should aim to gradually eliminating boundaries between natives and migrants in the long run.

Acknowledgements

This study is part of the project “Immigration, Integration, and Social Transformation in the Pacific Rim” (with Min Zhou as PI and Shaohua Zhan and Rich Ling as co-PIs) supported by Singapore Ministry of Education (MoE) Academic Research Council Tier 2 research grant (#MOE2015-T2-2-027). The authors thank Charles Woolfson for his comments on an earlier version of the paper and Rajiv Aricat and Hui Yang for research assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest.

References

- Alba, Richard D, and Victor Nee. 2003. *Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Berezin, Mabel. 2006. "Xenophobia and the new nationalisms." In *The Sage handbook of nations and nationalism*, edited by Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar, 273-284. London Sage Publications.
- Bonacich, Edna. 1972. "A theory of ethnic antagonism: The split labor market." *American Sociological Review* 37 (5):547-559.
- Borjas, George. 2013. *Immigration and the American worker*. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies.
- Brown, Cliff. 2000. "The role of employers in split labor markets: an event-structure analysis of racial conflict and AFL organizing, 1917–1919." *Social Forces* 79 (2):653-681.
- Chacko, Elizabeth. 2017. "Policies and Practices of Integration: High-Skilled Migrants from India in Singapore." *Papers in Applied Geography*:1-13.
- Chua, Beng Huat. 2017. *Liberalism disavowed: Communitarianism and state capitalism in Singapore*. Ithaca Cornell University Press.
- Department of Statistics. 2019. *Population Trends 2019*. Singapore: Government of Singapore.
- Dustmann, Christian, and Ian Preston. 2006. "Is immigration good or bad for the economy? Analysis of attitudinal responses." In *The Economics of Immigration and Social Diversity*, edited by Solomon Polachek, Carmel Chiswick and Hillel Rapoport, 3-34. Oxford, UK: Elsevier Ltd.
- European Commission. 2018. *Integration of immigrants in the European Union*. European Union.
- Gomes, Catherine. 2014. "Xenophobia online: Unmasking Singaporean attitudes towards 'foreign talent' migrants." *Asian Ethnicity* 15 (1):21-40.
- Gonzalez-Sobrino, Bianca. 2016. "The threat of the "Other": Ethnic competition and racial interest." *Sociology Compass* 10 (7):592-602.
- Hainmueller, Jens, Michael J Hiscox, and Yotam Margalit. 2015. "Do concerns about labor market competition shape attitudes toward immigration? New evidence." *Journal of International Economics* 97 (1):193-207.
- HDB. 2020. "Do HDB's housing policies put Singaporeans first?", accessed 18 January 2020. <https://www.hdb.gov.sg/cs/infoweb/hdbspeaks/housing-benefits-for-singapore-citizens-versus-singapore-pr>.
- Hogan, Jackie, and Kristin Haltinner. 2015. "Floods, invaders, and parasites: Immigration threat narratives and right-wing populism in the USA, UK and Australia." *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 36 (5):520-543.
- Hopkins, Daniel J. 2010. "Politicized places: Explaining where and when immigrants provoke local opposition." *American political science review* 104 (1):40-60.
- ILO and UN Women. 2019. *Public attitudes towards migrant workers in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand*. International Labor Organization and UN Women.
- Joppke, Christian. 2004. "The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: theory and policy." *The British journal of sociology* 55 (2):237-257.
- Koh, Aaron. 2003. "Global flows of foreign talent: Identity anxieties in Singapore's ethnoscape." *SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 18 (2):230-256.
- Koh, Tommy. 2015. "Ten reflections on GE 2015." *The Straits Times*, September 17.

- Kunovich, Robert M. 2017. "Labour market competition and immigration attitudes in an established gateway." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (11):1961-1980.
- Kymlicka, Will. 2012. *Multiculturalism: Success, failure, and the future*. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Landau, Loren Brett. 2012. *Exorcising the demons within: Xenophobia, violence and statecraft in contemporary South Africa*: Wits University Press.
- Lee, Hsien Loong. 2010. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's National Day Rally 2010 Speech (English). Singapore: Government of Singapore.
- Leong, Chan-Hoong, Patrick Rueppel, and Danielle Hong. 2014. "Managing Immigration and Integration in Singapore." In *Migration and Integration: Common Challenges and Responses from Europe and Asia*, edited by Wilhelm Hofmeister, Patrick Rueppel, Yves Pascouau and Andrea Frontini. Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung and European Union.
- Lim, Adrian. 2019. "Hefty subsidies in education to help all level up." *The Straits Times*, March 1.
- Liu, Hong. 2014. "Beyond co-ethnicity: The politics of differentiating and integrating new immigrants in Singapore." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37 (7):1225-1238.
- Massey, Douglas S, Joaquín Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and Edward Taylor. 2008. *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ministry of Manpower. 2010. *Singapore Workforce 2010*. Singapore: Government of Singapore.
- Modood, Tariq. 2010. *Still Not Easy Being British: Struggles for a Multicultural Citizenship*. Trentham Books.
- MOM. 2020. "Foreign workforce numbers." Ministry of Manpower of Singapore, accessed 16 January 2020. <https://www.mom.gov.sg/documents-and-publications/foreign-workforce-numbers>.
- Olzak, Susan. 1992. *The dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ortiga, Yasmin Y. 2015. "Multiculturalism on its head: Unexpected boundaries and new migration in Singapore." *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 16 (4):947-963.
- Piore, Michael J. 1979. *Birds of passage: migrant labor and industrial societies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Polanyi, Karl. 1944. *The Great transformation*. Boston: Beacon press.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Min Zhou. 1993. "The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants." *The annals of the American academy of political and social science* 530 (1):74-96.
- Seow, Joanna 2016. "It pays for firms to develop human capital." *The Straits Times*, November 17.
- Strategy group. 2019. *Population in Brief 2019*. Singapore: Government of Singapore.
- Tan, Kim Song, and Manu Bhaskaran. 2015. "The role of the state in Singapore: Pragmatism in pursuit of growth." *The Singapore Economic Review* 60 (03):1550030-1-30.
- Teng, Amelia 2017. "School fees going up for foreigners and PRs." *The Straits Times*, October 18.

- Teo, Youyenn. 2015. "Differentiated deservedness: Governance through familialist social policies in Singapore." *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and-National Studies of Southeast Asia* 3 (1):73-93.
- Trimbach, Sam. 2016. "Giving the Market a Microphone: Solutions to the Ongoing Displacement of US Workers through the H1B Visa Program." *Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business* 37 (2):275-300.
- Vermeulen, Hans 2010. "Segmented assimilation and cross-national comparative research on the integration of immigrants and their children." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33 (7):1214-1230.
- Vertovec, Steven, and Susanne Wessendorf. 2010. *Multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Waters, Mary C, Van C Tran, Philip Kasinitz, and John H Mollenkopf. 2010. "Segmented assimilation revisited: Types of acculturation and socioeconomic mobility in young adulthood." *Ethnic and racial studies* 33 (7):1168-1193.
- Yang, Peidong. 2018. "Desiring 'foreign talent': lack and Lacan in anti-immigrant sentiments in Singapore." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (6):1015-1031.
- Ye, Junjia. 2017. "Managing urban diversity through differential inclusion in Singapore." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 35 (6):1033-1052.
- Yeoh, Brenda SA. 2006. "Bifurcated labour: The unequal incorporation of transmigrants in Singapore." *Journal of Economic and Social Geography* 97 (1):26-37.
- Yeoh, Brenda SA, and Theodora Lam. 2016. "Immigration and its (dis) contents: the challenges of highly skilled migration in globalizing Singapore." *American Behavioral Scientist* 60 (5-6):637-658.
- Zhou, Min, and Roberto G Gonzales. 2019. "Divergent Destinies: Children of Immigrants Growing Up in the United States." *Annual Review of Sociology* 45:383-399.
- Zhou, Min Shaohua Zhan, and Rich Ling. 2016-2019. "Immigration, Integration, and Social Transformation in the Pacific Rim." A three-city (Singapore, Los Angeles, and Vancouver) comparative study supported by an Academic Research Fund tier 2 grant from the Singapore Ministry of Education, #MOE2015-T2-2-027.

Table 1 Natives' attitudes towards immigration and migrants in Singapore

Questions or statements	Response (N=211)		
	Yes or Agree (%)	No or Disagree (%)	Neutral (%)
Have you had unpleasant experiences interacting with immigrants?	55	45	-
Immigrants have decreased the quality of life in this city.	40	32	28
Immigrants compete with us for jobs.	63	15	22
Immigrants drive up the housing prices	58	16	26
There are too many Chinese immigrants in this city.	46	13	41
There are too many Indian immigrants in this city.	38	17	45
I prefer not to socialize with immigrants from China.	14	50	36
I prefer not to socialize with immigrants from India.	16	50	34
Do you think immigrants and natives get along well with each other?	64	36	-
Our city needs immigrants.	58	12	30
It is enriching to get to know and interact with immigrants from China.	56	9	35
It is enriching to get to know and interact with immigrants from India.	56	9	35

Source: Zhou et al. 2016-2019.