

UC Davis

UC Davis Previously Published Works

Title

What is the Price of Tea in China? Towards the Relative Cost of Living in Chinese and U.S. Cities

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9kn0v0nz>

Authors

Feenstra, Robert C
Xu, Mingzhi
Antoniades, Alexis

Publication Date

2017-02-01

Peer reviewed

What is the Price of Tea in China? Towards the Relative Cost of Living in Chinese and U.S. Cities*

Robert C. Feenstra
University of California, Davis
and National Bureau of Economic Research

Mingzhi Xu
University of California, Davis

Alexis Antoniadou
Georgetown University

May 23, 2017

Abstract

We examine the price and variety of products at the barcode level in cities within China and the United States. In both countries, there is a greater variety of products in larger cities. But in China, unlike the United States, the prices of products tend to be lower in larger cities. We attribute the lower prices to a pro-competitive effect, whereby larger cities attract more brands and retailers which leads to lower markups and prices. Combining the effect of greater variety and lower prices, it follows that the cost-of-living for grocery-store products in China is lower in larger cities. We further compare the cost-of-living indexes for particular product categories *between* China and the United States. In product categories with a significant presence of U.S. brands in the Chinese market, the availability of additional Chinese brands leads to greater variety than in the United States, and therefore lower Chinese price indexes for that reason. In product categories with much less presence of U.S. brands in the Chinese market, however, the observed prices differences between the countries (usually lower prices in China) are partially or fully offset by the variety differences (less variety in China), so that the cost of living in China is not as low as the price differences suggest, especially in smaller cities.

*We thank John Romalis and NBER conference participants for their helpful comments and Qi Liu for research assistance. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the China Scholarship Council is gratefully acknowledged, as are the elasticities of substitution provided by Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein (2016). Calculations are based on data from the Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, and from the Nielsen Company (China). ©The Nielsen Company. Please direct correspondence to: Robert Feenstra, University of California, Davis, rfeenstra@ucdavis.edu.

1 Introduction

In 2005, real GDP for the Chinese economy fell by 40%. Not in reality, of course, but in the estimates reported by the World Bank. As explained by Deaton and Heston (2010), the revised 2005 estimates made use of new price data collected for China under the International Comparisons Program (ICP):

... the 2007 version of the World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank (2007), lists 2005 per capita GDP for China as \$6,757 ... in current international dollars. The 2008 version, World Bank (2008), which includes the new [2005] ICP data, gives, for the same year, and the same concept \$4,088 for China ...¹

The cause of this fall in estimated real GDP for China is that the prices collected for China were higher than expected. In fact, prices had never been collected for China before the 2005 round of the ICP, so prior estimates of real GDP used imputed prices. Because the actual Chinese prices were higher than imputed, then the quantity of goods consumed by the representative Chinese individual were lower. It follows that real GDP was also lower – 40% lower for China!

Two explanations have been provided for the unexpectedly high prices collected for China by the ICP 2005. The first explanation is that urban regions were over-sampled in China and that rural prices would be lower. That claim is evaluated by Feenstra, Ma, Neary, and Prasada Rao (2013), who find that Chinese prices from the 2005 ICP round were indeed somewhat higher than for other developing countries at similar levels of GDP per capita. Besides the possible urban bias, another explanation has to do with a special feature of the 2005 ICP, whereby prices were collected in each region of the world and then “linked” to other regions using a different price survey conducted only in certain cities. Deaton and Aten (2017) and Inklaar and Rao (2017) argue that this “linking” procedure led to a systematic upward bias in the prices for Asia relative to the United States. That linking procedure was not followed in the 2011 round of the ICP, and as a result, relative prices in Asia and in other developing countries were lower than in 2005.

These facts, combined with anecdotal evidence of high prices in China,² are enough to convince us that a source of price information for China independent of the ICP is very important; crucial, in fact, to obtain reliable estimates of its real GDP. The goal of this paper is to compare the cost of living for cities in China and in the United States using two sources of barcode data: scanner data from grocery stores; and prices for grocery-store products scraped from a phone application. In scraping prices from a phone app we are following the lead of Cavallo and Rigobon (2016) who collect prices from internet sources to make time-series and cross-country comparisons. Such scraped data alone is not well-suited to compute cost-of-living indexes, however, because there is no quantity or expenditure data available with the scraped prices. While expenditure data is available from scanner data, it is prohibitively expensive to obtain for China in more than a handful of products.

¹Deaton and Heston (2010), p. 3. The World Bank references in this quote are to the World Development Indicators.

²Anecdotal evidence that prices in China are high comes from Chinese students in the United States who return home and find a local price for an item that is higher than the U.S. price at the official exchange rate. They will photograph that item and post it on their Facebook page!

Accordingly, in this paper we rely on Chinese scanner data for four product categories in 22 cities, purchased from Nielsen (China), and have supplemented these data with scraped prices for these same four products and a further 15 product categories over 60 cities, obtained from a mobile phone application that allows consumers to check for the various prices at supermarkets in each city. These Chinese price data are complemented by Nielsen (U.S.) barcode data at the city level. All data are for 2011 or more recent years.

In our results, we find that in both countries there is a greater variety of products in larger cities. That result has already been found by Handbury and Weinstein (2015) for the United States, and this paper is the first confirmation of the same result for China. For the U.S., the greater variety in larger cities offsets the higher prices found there, so that Handbury and Weinstein (2015) argue that the cost of living – incorporating both price and variety – is lower in larger cities. But in China, unlike the United States, we find that the prices of products themselves tend to be *lower* in larger cities. We attribute those lower prices to a pro-competitive effect, whereby larger cities attract more brands and retailers which leads to lower markups and prices. Combining the effect of greater variety and lower prices, it follows that the cost of living for grocery-store products in China is also lower in larger cities.

We further compare the cost-of-living indexes for particular products *between* China and the United States. In the four product categories for which we purchased Nielsen (China) scanner data, i.e., Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent, Personal Wash items and Shampoo, we expected a significant presence of U.S. brands in the Chinese market and that turned out to be the case. Then the availability of additional Chinese brands leads to greater variety than in the United States, and therefore lower Chinese price indexes for that reason. In the other 15 product categories for which we only have scraped data, however, there is much less presence of U.S. brands in the Chinese market. In these cases, the observed prices differences between the countries (usually lower prices in China) are partially or fully offset by the variety differences (less variety in China), so that the cost of living in China is not as low as the price differences suggest. This latter case applies to Tea, for example, because our data do not include the many Chinese varieties of tea that are not sold in supermarkets.

In section 2 we describe the nested CES framework that we shall use to measure the consumer gains from variety. Preliminary evidence from the four product categories with both Nielsen (China) barcode data and scanned prices is presented in section 3. A model of multi-product firms is described in section 4, from which we derive the solutions for firm pricing and product scope. These equations are estimated as regressions described in section 5. We extend our analysis to incorporate competition between retailers in section 6. Our empirical results on the prices of 15 other product categories is presented in section 7, and section 8 concludes.

2 Consumer Utility and Variety

We study an economy consisting of $c = 1, \dots, D$ cities or destinations, which differ in population L_c and labor income w_c . Labor is the only factor of production and it is not mobile across cities. A fraction ρ of total labor income is spent on the differentiated goods, and we denote that spending by $Y_c = \rho w_c L_c$.

The preferences of the representative consumer in each city are nested CES. Denoting the set of product varieties sold by firm f in city c by $i \in I_{fc}$, the sub-utility from the products of firm f are given by

$$X_{fc} = \left(\sum_{i \in I_{fc}} (b_{ifc} x_{ifc})^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma} \right)^{\sigma/(\sigma-1)}, \quad \sigma > 1, \quad (1)$$

where σ is the elasticity of substitution across products sold by a firm, and b_{ifc} are the taste parameters for each variety, which we will allow to differ across firms, products and to a certain extent across cities as explained below. Each firm is a manufacturing firm and not a retailer.³ Aggregating across firms $f \in F_c$ that sell in city c , utility of the representative consumer is,

$$U_c = \left(\sum_{f \in F_c} X_{fc}^{(\eta-1)/\eta} \right)^{\eta/(\eta-1)}, \quad \eta > 1. \quad (2)$$

As in Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein (2016), we expect that the elasticity of substitution σ across products within a firm is larger than the elasticity η across firms, so we assume that $\sigma \geq \eta > 1$. When the two elasticities are equal, then the nested CES system will collapse to a standard CES utility function as used in Feenstra (1994).

Let \mathbf{p}_{fc} denote the vector of prices p_{ifc} for firm f across all product varieties i , with the vector of taste parameters \mathbf{b}_{fc} , and let $P_{fc} = e(\mathbf{p}_{fc}, \mathbf{b}_{fc}, I_{fc})$ denote the minimum expenditure needed to obtain one unit of sub-utility, $X_{fc} = 1$. Then $e(\mathbf{p}_{fc}, \mathbf{b}_{fc}, I_{fc})$ takes on the CES form,

$$P_{fc} = e(\mathbf{p}_{fc}, \mathbf{b}_{fc}, I_{fc}) = \left(\sum_{i \in I_{fc}} (p_{ifc}/b_{ifc})^{1-\sigma} \right)^{1/(1-\sigma)}. \quad (3)$$

Feenstra (1994) shows how to measure the effect of new varieties on the exact price index. Specifically, consider firm f selling to destinations c and d . Suppose that there is a non-empty subset of "common" products $I_f \subseteq I_{fc} \cap I_{fd}$ sold by firm f in these two cities for which the taste parameters are equal, $b_{ifc} = b_{ifd}$, $i \in I_f$. Then the exact price index between the two cities can be expressed as

$$\frac{e(\mathbf{p}_{fc}, \mathbf{b}_{fc}, I_{fc})}{e(\mathbf{p}_{fd}, \mathbf{b}_{fd}, I_{fd})} = \left[\prod_{i \in I_f} \left(\frac{p_{ifc}}{p_{ifd}} \right)^{w_{if}(I_f)} \right] \left(\frac{\lambda_{fc}}{\lambda_{fd}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}. \quad (4)$$

The first term in brackets on the right of (4) is the Sato (1976)-Vartia (1976) price index, where $w_{if}(I_f)$ is the weight defined by:

³We examined the modeling of a retail sector as another nest in the utility function in section 6 below.

$$w_{if}(I_f) \equiv \frac{\frac{s_{ifc}(I_f) - s_{ifd}(I_f)}{\ln s_{ifc}(I_f) - \ln s_{ifd}(I_f)}}{\sum_{j \in I_f} \left(\frac{s_{jfc}(I_f) - s_{jfd}(I_f)}{\ln s_{jfc}(I_f) - \ln s_{jfd}(I_f)} \right)}, \quad s_{ifc}(I_f) \equiv \frac{p_{ifc} x_{ifc}}{\sum_{j \in I_f} p_{jfc} x_{jfc}}, \quad (5)$$

and likewise for the shares $s_{ifd}(I_f)$ in city d , also defined over the common set of products. The second term on the right of (4) is the adjustment needed to take into account differing sets of goods available in the two cities, and is defined by:

$$\lambda_{fc} \equiv \frac{\sum_{i \in I_f} p_{ifc} x_{ifc}}{\sum_{i \in I_{fc}} p_{ifc} x_{ifc}} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i \in I_{fc} \setminus I_f} p_{ifc} x_{ifc}}{\sum_{i \in I_{fc}} p_{ifc} x_{ifc}}, \quad (6)$$

To interpret these formulas, λ_{fc} in (6) denotes the spending in city c on the common products of firm f , sold in both cities, relative to total spending in city c on firm f 's products. Equivalently, it equals one minus the share of expenditure on the unique products sold by firm f only in city c . Having access to more unique varieties in city c implies a smaller expenditure share on common products, λ_{fc} , and a lower cost-of-living index in (4).

To extend the exact price index to the nested CES case, let \mathbf{P}_c denote the vector of CES price indexes P_{fc} shown in (3) for all firms $f \in F_c$ in city c , and let $P_c = E(\mathbf{P}_c, F_c) = \left(\sum_{f \in F_c} P_{fc}^{(\eta-1)} \right)^{1/(1-\eta)}$ denote the expenditure needed to obtain utility of one in city c . Let $F \equiv F_c \cap F_d$ denote the non-empty set of "common" firms selling to both cities c and d . Then again from Feenstra (1994), the cost of living between the two cities can be written as,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{E(\mathbf{P}_c, F_c)}{E(\mathbf{P}_d, F_d)} &= \left[\prod_{f \in F} \left(\frac{P_{fc}}{P_{fd}} \right)^{W_f(F)} \right] \left(\frac{\lambda_c}{\lambda_d} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta-1}} \\ &= \left[\prod_{f \in F} \prod_{i \in I_f} \left(\frac{p_{ifc}}{p_{ifd}} \right)^{W_f(F) w_i(I_f)} \right] \left[\prod_{f \in F} \left(\frac{\lambda_{fc}}{\lambda_{fd}} \right)^{W_f(F)} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \left(\frac{\lambda_c}{\lambda_d} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta-1}} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where the Sato-Vartia weights across firms are,

$$W_f(F) \equiv \frac{\frac{S_{fc}(F) - S_{fd}(F)}{\ln S_{fc}(F) - \ln S_{fd}(F)}}{\sum_{g \in F} \left(\frac{S_{gc}(F) - S_{gd}(F)}{\ln S_{gc}(F) - \ln S_{gd}(F)} \right)}, \quad S_{fc}(F) \equiv \frac{\sum_{i \in I_{fc}} p_{ifc} x_{ifc}}{\sum_{g \in F} \sum_{i \in I_{gc}} p_{igc} x_{igc}}, \quad (8)$$

and likewise for the shares $S_{fd}(F)$ for city d , also defined over the common set of firms. The final term on the right of (7) is defined by:

$$\lambda_c \equiv \frac{\sum_{g \in F} \sum_{i \in I_{gc}} p_{igc} x_{igc}}{\sum_{g \in F_c} \sum_{i \in I_{gc}} p_{igc} x_{igc}} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{g \in F_c \setminus F} \sum_{i \in I_{gc}} p_{igc} x_{igc}}{\sum_{g \in F_c} \sum_{i \in I_{gc}} p_{igc} x_{igc}}, \quad (9)$$

That is, λ_c denotes the spending on the common set of firms F relative to total spending in city c , or one minus the share of spending on firms selling only in city c . The greater the share of spending on unique firms selling only in that city, the lower is the exact price index in (7).

3 Evidence on Prices in Four Product Categories

3.1 Data

Our calculation of the cost of living relies on the data extracted from three sources. The first source is the Nielsen (China) Sales database which enables us to observe the annual sales and average price information of each product with a barcode.⁴ We purchased Nielsen (China) scanner data for four product categories, namely, Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent, Personal Wash items, and Shampoo, covering 22 cities in China, as shown in the red colored regions of Figure 1.⁵ Besides the sales information for each product, we also observe manufacturer information such as brand and sub-brand of each product. In our theory and empirical analysis, we refer to the brand as the firm (e.g. Crest or Colgate for toothpaste).

The regions covered by Nielsen (China) database are only large cities (most of them are capital cities). To address this limitation, our analysis also relies on our second data source, which are scraped prices collected in 2015 from a mobile phone application that allows consumers to check for the various prices at supermarkets in each city. Details on this second source of data are provided in Appendix, and it allows us also to include smaller cities in our sample (as shown in Figure 12 of Appendix A3). We end up expanding our sample to 60 cities, including the 22 cities provided by Nielsen (China) database, as shown in the yellow colored regions of Figure 1. Based on the first two data sources, we implement the formulas described above to calculate the cost of living in China for each of the four product categories. Our third source of data is the Nielsen Retailing Sales (U.S.) database, used to calculate the cost of living for 377 MSAs of the United States in 2013, for each of the four product categories.

We have prices for individual barcode products in four categories for 60 cities in China, but we have expenditure on these barcode products for only 22 cities in the Nielsen (China) database. We have implemented a Heckman procedure to estimate barcode-level expenditure in the remaining 38 cities, using a reduced-form equation for the barcode expenditure shares in the 22 cities for which we have those data. This Heckman procedure is described in Appendix B. The estimated expenditure shares are used to measure the terms λ_{fc} and λ_f appearing in the cost-of-living index (7).

Data are also needed on the elasticities σ between products within a firm, and η between firms. These elasticities of substitution differ across the four product categories. We rely on the estimates of these elasticities from Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein (2016), as shown in Appendix B. These authors estimate the elasticities from the Nielsen Retailing Sales (U.S.) database, which is the same data that we use for the United States. Our assumption is that, for each product category, the elasticities are the same in the United States and in China.

⁴We convert RMB data to U.S. dollars using the annual average exchange rate.

⁵We use 2011 and 2012 sales information for toothpaste, and 2014 for the other three product categories.




Figure 1: Regions included in Nielsen Sales Data and Scraped Price Data

Significantly, the barcode systems used in China is the European Article Number (EAN-13), whereas that used in the United States is the Universal Product Code (UPC). While it is not difficult to identify similar product *categories*, it is impossible to *exactly* match the items across countries by their barcodes since the barcode systems differ and product descriptions themselves do not match⁶. That difference in the barcode systems means that the consumer theory outlined above due to Feenstra (1994) cannot be applied *between* countries, since it assumed that there is a non-empty subset of “common” products $I_f \subseteq I_{fc} \cap I_{fd}$ sold by firm f in two cities c and d for which the taste parameters are equal, $b_{ifc} = b_{ifd}$, $i \in I$. We certainly cannot assume that the tastes for products are the same when we cannot even match products across barcode systems. Accordingly, for the next several sections we focus on comparisons of price across cities *within* China and the U.S. It will not be until section 7 that we attempt to compare across countries, using an alternative formulation of exact price indexes for a nested CES utility function due to Redding and Weinstein (2016).

3.2 Prices Across Chinese and U.S. Cities

Panel (a) of Figures 2 to 5 exhibits how the average price of the common products vary with respect to the city population for Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent, Personal Wash Items and Shampoo. We measure the prices in terms of dollars per ounce and calculate the average price using the Sato-Vartia

⁶As the UPC numbers in the U.S. Nielsen database are also based on the EAN convention (with the 13th digit dropped), there is a possibility to correctly link the Chinese and US products. However, in our four main products, the total number of exactly matched products are 3 for Toothpaste (0.65% of the total global products), 0 for Shampoo and Personal Wash Items, and 2 for Laundry Detergent (0.45% of the total global products). The Low match rate is mainly attributed to the fact that the global products sold in China is produced by the multinational firms and adopts a different EAN numbers rather than the one used in the United States. In the appendix, we provide the examples that are similar in China and the U.S. but have different EAN numbers.

weights, which is the numerator of the Sato-Vartia index in (7), while also calculating the numerator of the variety adjustment in (7):


$$P_c^{SV} \equiv \prod_{f \in F} \prod_{i \in I_f} (p_{ifc})^{W_f(F)w_i(I_f)}, \quad \Lambda_c^{SV} \equiv \left[\prod_{f \in F} \lambda_{fc}^{W_f(F)} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \left(\lambda_c \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta-1}}. \quad (10)$$

The terms P_c^{SV} and Λ_c^{SV} are shown in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 for Toothpaste, Figure 3 for Laundry Detergent, Figure 4 for Personal Wash items, and Figure 5 for Shampoo. In each panel and each Figure, we plot the variables for the United States (in blue dots) and China (in red x) against the log population of each city.


From panel (a), we observe that average prices P_c^{SV} of common products within the United States do not vary significantly between cities, whereas the average prices in China have a clear negative relationship with city size. We explore that finding more in the next section, where we argue that a pro-competitive effect in larger cities in China can account for that result. In panel (b) we see that the term Λ_c^{SV} , which measures the inverse of variety, falls slightly with city size in the United States (though this is barely visible), but falls very notably with city size in China.

Multiplying the terms $P_c^{SV} \times \Lambda_c^{SV}$, and choosing the normalization $P_{NY}^{SV} \Lambda_{NY}^{SV} = 1$ for New York, we obtain the exact price index for the United States shown in panel (c) of each Figure. These exact price indexes are slightly declining in city size for Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent, and Personal Wash items, but not for Shampoo. In the first three products, we therefore confirm the finding by Handbury and Weinstein (2015) for the United States that the greater variety in larger cities offsets the higher prices found there. But in China, unlike the United States, the prices of products themselves tend to be lower in larger cities, and that is reinforced by a much greater increase in variety in larger cities, too. For both reasons, the cost-of-living indexes $P_c^{SV} \Lambda_c^{SV}$ for China decline much more rapidly with population than in the United States.


Because the terms in (10) use the common products within each country, these variables are only meaningful when comparing prices and variety for each country. In section 7 we develop a method for comparing these indexes between countries, drawing on Redding and Weinstein (2016). Continuing to normalize $P_{NY}^{SV} \Lambda_{NY}^{SV} = 1$ for New York, we apply this between-country method to obtain the exact prices index for Shanghai, abbreviated as the point SH in panel (c). Then the indexes $P_c^{SV} \Lambda_c^{SV}$ for all other Chinese cities are measured relative to Shanghai and, by of the virtue of Redding and Weinstein (2016) method described in section 7, these can also be compared to those in the U.S. We see that the cost of living for each product in panel (c) is pulled down in China as compared to the Sato-Vartia geometric means in panel (a), especially in the larger Chinese cities. In other words, for all four product categories, the additional product variety (as shown in panel b) due to both U.S. and local brands in the larger cities in China lowers the relative cost of living for consumers there.




(a) Common Products Price Index



(b) Common Firm Sales Share




(c) Feenstra Cost-of-living Index




(d) Redding-Weinstein Cost-of-living Index

Data Source: City and MSA macro data are from China Statistical Yearbook and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.


Figure 2: Cost-of-living Comparison: **Toothpaste**




(a) Common Products Price Index



(b) Common Firm Sales Share




(c) Feenstra Cost-of-living Index




(d) Redding-Weinstein Cost-of-living Index

Data Source: City and MSA macro data are from China Statistical Yearbook and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.


Figure 3: Cost-of-living Comparison: Laundry Detergent




(a) Common Products Price Index



(b) Common Firm Sales Share




(c) Feenstra Cost-of-living Index




(d) Redding-Weinstein Cost-of-living Index

Data Source: City and MSA macro data are from China Statistical Yearbook and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.


Figure 4: Cost-of-living Comparison: **Personal Wash Items**




(a) Common Products Price Index



(b) Common Firm Sales Share



(c) Feenstra Cost-of-living Index



(d) Redding-Weinstein Cost-of-living Index

Data Source: City and MSA macro data are from China Statistical Yearbook and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Figure 5: Cost-of-living Comparison: **Shampoo**

We further illustrate the cost of living in each Chinese city relative to the average level of cost of living in the United States,⁷ by plotting these in maps shown in Figures 6 to 9. We use the cold color (blue) to indicate a Chinese price level lower than that of the U.S. average, and the hot color (red) to represent a higher Chinese price level. We see from Figure 6 to 9 that the exact price index is lower in China than the U.S. in all four product categories (the relative price varies from 0.24 to 0.71, with the U.S. average as unity). This occurs despite the fact that the Sato-Vartia average price for Shampoo is higher in China than in the United States.⁸ In addition, the exact price indexes are higher in inland cities than in the eastern coast cities that are usually of larger size. For example, the most expensive cities for Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent, Personal Wash items, and Shampoo are Baotou (1.00), Lanzhou (0.29), Baotou (0.44), and Hohhot (0.83) respectively. So the benefits of greater variety in China applies only to the larger cities, often found on the eastern coast and in certain inland locations such as Chongqing, which is highlighted in the maps near the center of China and has relatively low exact price indexes.

4 Firm Pricing and Choice of Variety

4.1 Nested CES Demand

To obtain the demand for each differentiated good consumed in country c , let us start at the firm level. Demand for the aggregate of firm f products is $X_{fc} = (Y_c/P_c)(P_{fc}/P_c)^{-\eta}$, where Y_c denotes total expenditure, P_c is the overall CES price index, and P_{fc} is the CES price index (or unit-expenditure function) shown in (3). Then demand for each variety equals $b_{ifc}x_{ifc} = [(p_{ifc}/b_{ifc})/P_{fc}]^{-\sigma}X_{fc}$. Multiplying by (p_{ifc}/b_{ifc}) and using the equation for X_{fc} , we find that spending on each variety is,

$$p_{ifc}x_{ifc} = P_{fc}X_{fc} \left(\frac{p_{ifc}/b_{ifc}}{P_{fc}} \right)^{1-\sigma} = Y_c \left(\frac{p_{ifc}/b_{ifc}}{P_{fc}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left(\frac{P_{fc}}{P_c} \right)^{1-\eta}. \quad (11)$$

We are now in a position to compute the elasticity of demand for an individual variety. We use the log of spending and differentiate to obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_{ifc} &= -\frac{d \ln x_{ifc}}{d \ln p_{ifc}} = 1 - \frac{d \ln(p_{ifc}x_{ifc})}{d \ln p_{ifc}} \\ &= 1 - (1 - \sigma) - \left[(\sigma - \eta) + (\eta - 1) \frac{d \ln P_c}{d \ln P_{fc}} \right] \frac{d \ln P_{fc}}{d \ln p_{ifc}} \\ &= \sigma - [(\sigma - \eta) + (\eta - 1)S_{fc}]s_{ifc}, \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

⁷The U.S. average cost of living is calculated as the geometric mean of all MSAs.

⁸We suspect that shampoo products in China are more likely to include additives that raise their prices.




Figure 6: Relative Cost-of-living in China: **Toothpaste**




Figure 7: Relative Cost-of-living in China: **Laundry Detergent**




Figure 8: Relative Cost-of-living in China: **Personal Wash Items**




Figure 9: Relative Cost-of-living in China: **Shampoo**

where $s_{ifc} = d \ln P_{fc} / d \ln p_{ifc}$ is the share of expenditure on product i within the sales of firm f , and $S_{fc} = d \ln P_c / d \ln P_{fc}$ is the total share of sales of firm f in city c .⁹

Our assumption that $\sigma \geq \eta$ implies that as the variety share s_{ifc} rises then the elasticity of demand will fall; likewise, as the firm share S_{fc} rises the elasticity also falls. If the firm ignored the cannibalization effect of each variety on other sales then it would charge a higher price whenever s_{ifc} or S_{fc} rises. But we now show that when the firm jointly profit-maximizes over all goods, taking into account cannibalization effects, then the price charged for each good will depend only the firm share S_{fc} and not on the within-firm variety share s_{ifc} .

4.2 Optimal Prices for the Multiproduct Firm

Consider a firm producing variety i in city c and delivering it to destination d . The firm chooses the range of products to sell in multiple destinations $d = 1, \dots, D$. The profit-maximization problem for this firm is

$$\max_{p_{ifd}, i \in I_{fd}} \sum_{d=1}^D \left\{ \left[\sum_{i \in I_{fd}} (p_{ifd} - g_{if}(w_c) - T_{cd}) x_{ifd} - k_{ifd} \right] - K_{fd} \right\} \mathbf{1}(I_{fd} \neq \emptyset), \quad (13)$$

where K_{fd} denotes the fixed costs to enter a city and $\mathbf{1}(I_{fd} \neq \emptyset)$ is an indicator variable that takes value of unity if $I_{fd} \neq \emptyset$ and zero otherwise. That is, the firm chooses whether to enter into each city d , and pays the fixed cost of K_{fd} only if it does, along with the fixed costs of k_{ifd} to sell each variety i in city d . We let $g_{if}(w_c)$ denote the (constant) marginal costs of producing good i in city c , with factor prices w_c , and selling it in city d with transport costs of T_{cd} . We assume that firms treat the prices of other firms as given under Bertrand competition, and that demand in the various cities is independent.

Focus initially on the choice of optimal prices. If the firm sold only a single product i in destination d , so that $s_{ifd} = 1$, then the elasticity of demand from (12) is $\epsilon_{ifd} = \eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd}$ so that $\epsilon_{ifd} - 1 = (\eta - 1)(1 - S_{fd})$. It follows from the usual markup formula that the optimal price is,

$$p_{ifd} = \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - S_{fd})} \right] [g_{if}(w_c) + T_{cd}]. \quad (14)$$

When the firm sells multiple products, however, then it must take into account how a reduction in the price of one will decrease demand for its other products: this is the cannibalization effect. Nevertheless, we show in Appendix C that the same pricing formula as in (14) is obtained.¹⁰ In other words, when the firm jointly maximizes over all its prices, the markup obtained is “as if” it was using the elasticity of demand in (12) but with $s_{ifd} = 1$, so that the markup depends only on the total market share S_{fd} of the firm in that city.

⁹Using our notation of section 2, the within-firm share of expenditure is $s_{ifc} = s_{ifc}(I_{fc})$, and the firm total share of expenditure is $S_{fc} = S_{fc}(F_c)$.

¹⁰This result is also shown by Feenstra (2016), chapter 9, and Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein (2016).

4.3 Optimal Variety for the Multiproduct Firm

For simplicity, suppose that in each city there is symmetric demand and marginal cost for the products of each firm,¹¹ and that the firm sells N_{fd} of these varieties in city d . We allow marginal and fixed costs to differ across firms. Then the profit maximization problem (13) is simplified as:

$$\max_{p_{ifd}, N_{fd} \geq 0} \sum_{d=1}^D \{N_{fd} [(p_{ifd} - g_f - T_{cd})x_{ifd} - k_{fd}] - K_{fd}\} \mathbf{1}(N_{fd} > 0). \quad (15)$$

where $x_{ifd} = x_{jfd}$ when $p_{ifd} = p_{jfd}$. The optimal price is still given by (14), though now with symmetric this price is the same across varieties i for each firm in city d . As the firm expands the number of varieties sold, it draws demand away from existing varieties. Taking this cannibalization effect into account, it is shown in Appendix C.2 that the optimal variety is determined by,

$$N_{fd} = \frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma - 1} \left[\frac{S_{fd}(1 - S_{fd})}{\eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd}} \right] \frac{Y_d}{k_{fd}}, \quad (16)$$

where $Y_d = \rho w_d L_d$ is the total expenditure in destination d . Substituting this equation into (15) and also using the optimal price from (14), it can be shown that the profits from entering a city, *before* deducting the fixed costs K_{fd} , are:¹²

$$\pi_{fd} = \frac{(\sigma - \eta) + (\eta - 1)S_{fd}}{\sigma - 1} \left[\frac{S_{fd}}{\eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd}} \right] Y_d. \quad (17)$$

4.4 Firm Entry

In order for the firm to serve city d , we must have $\pi_{fd} \geq K_{fd}$. To see how city size affects the entry of firms into cities, consider comparing a large city c with a smaller city d , with $Y_d < Y_c$. An equilibrium consists of a set of firms F_c and F_d selling in each city such that prices for each firm are given by (14), revenue per product is given by (11), and the number of products is as in (16), so that $S_{fc} = N_{fc} p_{ifc} x_{ifc} / Y_c$ with $\pi_{fc} \geq K_{fc}$ and $\sum_{f \in F_c} S_{fc} = 1$, and likewise in city d . There is ambiguity in the equilibrium set of firms that enter each city, because once a firm enters then demand for other firms is reduced. But regardless of this ambiguity, we assert that if $Y_d < Y_c$ then there exists a weakly smaller set of entrants $F_d \subseteq F_c$ in city d satisfying the equilibrium conditions, and that the entrants are definitely reduced if city d is small enough.

To establish this claim, start with the equilibrium conditions for city c and then reduce expenditure Y_c . From (16) we see that N_{fc} falls in direct proportion to Y_c provided that $S_{fc} = N_{fc} p_{ifc} x_{ifc} / Y_c$ is not affected. In fact, that is the equilibrium result because it can be confirmed from (11) that with all firms selling fewer products in direct proportion to the fall in expenditure Y_c , then the change in

¹¹In other words, we are assuming that $b_{ifd} = b_{jfd}$ and that $g_{if}(w_c)$ does not depend on i . In Appendix C3, we generalize the analysis to allow the rising marginal cost of products that are farther from the core-competency of the firm. If we restrict the analysis to iceberg rather than specific trade costs, then we find that the equilibrium condition for the scope of a firm is essentially the same as that shown by (16), but with an extra constant term.

¹²To derive (17) we use that fact that the revenue earned per product by firm f is $S_{fd} Y_d / N_{fd}$.

the CES price indexes P_{fc} and P_c ensure that revenue per product is not affected. Profits in (17) will fall in direct proportion to the fall in Y_c , however. It follows that for a sufficiently large reduction in expenditure, the firm with the smallest initial ratio $\pi_{fc}/K_{fc} \geq 1$ will be the first to have $\pi_{fc}/K_{fc} < 1$, and will therefore exit the market. It follows that $F_d \subset F_c$, as we asserted.

Denoting the firm that exits by g , the equilibrium condition $\sum_{f \in F_c} S_{fc} = 1$ will become $\sum_{f \in F_c \setminus g} S_{fc} = 1$, so the market shares of all remaining firms will rise as that firm drops out (because expenditure $p_{ifc}x_{ifc}$ on all remaining products increases as the price index P_c rises in (11)). By this argument, we see that smaller cities will have fewer firms in our model, with higher market shares. That will lead to higher prices in (14), since we have assumed that marginal costs for each firm are the same across cities. In other words, there is an anti-competitive effect in smaller cities, or a pro-competitive effect in larger cities. We now turn to the empirical analysis to find whether this prediction is borne out in the data for Chinese and U.S. cities.

5 Estimating the Firm Model

We will estimate (14) by moving the markup term to the left, so that the remaining marginal costs plus transport costs on the right will be estimated:

$$\begin{aligned} p_{ifd} \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - S_{fd})} \right]^{-1} &= g_{if}(w_c) + T_{cd} \\ &= \alpha_i + \alpha_p + \alpha_{cap} + \beta Dist_{cd} + \epsilon_{ifd}. \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

The first term on the right is an indicator variable for variety i , which together with the error term ϵ_{ifd} reflects the marginal cost of production. We include an indicator variable α_{cap} for the capital city of each province in China, and the distance $Dist_{cd}$ between the production in city c and the destination city d .¹³ α_p denotes the destination province fixed effects that controls for the additional cost incurred that are unexplained by the transportation cost (e.g. it could incur higher operation cost due to the higher rents when a firm sells in the bigger city).

Let $N_{f,min} = \min_c \{N_{fc}\}$ denote the ‘‘common’’ varieties sold by firm f in all cities within each country. Then the common-goods share of firm f in destination d is:

$$\lambda_{fd} = \frac{N_{f,min} p_{fd} x_{fd}}{N_{fd} p_{fd} x_{fd}} = \frac{N_{f,min}}{N_{fd}} = N_{f,min} \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{\eta - 1} \right) \left[\frac{\eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd}}{S_{fd}(1 - S_{fd})} \right] \frac{k_{fd}}{Y_d}, \quad (19)$$

using (16). The second regression equation comes from substituting $Y_d = \rho w_d L_d$ and taking logs,

$$\ln \lambda_{fd} = \gamma_{f,prov} + \delta_1 \ln \left[\frac{\eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd}}{S_{fd}(1 - S_{fd})} \right] + \delta_2 \ln w_d + \delta_3 \ln L_d + \epsilon_{fd}. \quad (20)$$

The first term $\gamma_{f,prov}$ on the right is an indicator variable for the firm-province, which together with the error term ϵ_{fd} reflects variation in $N_{f,min}$ and in the fixed costs k_{fd} of providing each product in

¹³We have checked via internet sources that the firms in our sample have only one manufacturing location for Tooth-paste, Laundry Detergent, Personal Wash items and Shampoo.

city d . The second term reflects an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the product scope of a firm and its market share S_{fd} , as shown by (16). Small firms have low shares and low scope, but large firms with high shares will hold back on product scope to avoid cannibalizing their own sales; product scope is maximized for an intermediate value of the firm share.¹⁴ The common-goods share of firms in each city, λ_{fd} , is *inversely* related to their product scope, so the second term on the right of (20) is a U-shaped function of the firm's market share, and should have a coefficient of $\delta_1 = 1$ in theory.

Notice that the presence of w_d and L_d in (20) reflects the fact that higher expenditure in larger cities *reduces* the common-goods share of firms in that city, λ_{fd} , thereby increasing product variety from each firm. In theory, the coefficients of these variables are both $\delta_2 = \delta_3 = -1$. A negative sign on these estimated coefficients will show how larger cities (measured by population or average income) have a lower common-goods share for firms, and therefore more product variety. We will likewise want to evaluate how prices charged by firms differ across cities of different sizes, and for this purpose we include the variables w_d and L_d in (18), so that we actually estimate,

$$p_{ifd} \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - S_{fd})} \right]^{-1} = \alpha_i + \alpha_p + \alpha_{cap} + \beta_1 Dist_{cd} + \beta_2 \ln w_d + \beta_3 \ln L_d + \epsilon_{ifd}. \quad (21)$$

5.1 Estimating the Pro-Competitive Effect

Our first testable hypothesis is the existence of the pro-competitive effect, which is evaluated with the price equation as shown in (21). For each of the four products, we use both the price (p) and the price divided by the markup ($p/markup$) as the dependent variables. We use the scraped prices at the barcode level and rely on Nielsen (China) data to calculate firm-destination shares and the markups. Information on city populations and average incomes, used to measure $Y_c = \rho w_c L_c$, are obtained for China and for MSAs in the United States, from standard sources. Finally, we used company reports to identify the factory locations in China, and therefore compute the distance between the factory and destination markets.

Table 1 shows the result for toothpaste. We use price-per-item (U.S. cents/item) as the dependent variable for specification (1) and (2), and unit-price (U.S. cents/oz) for specification (3) and (4). The coefficients of $\ln Population$ and $\ln Average Income$ are all significantly negative, which implies larger and richer cities will benefit from lower prices for a given product at the barcode level. Notice that in specification (1), the coefficient on $\ln Population$ falls by about one-third, from -4.19 to -2.72, when we switch from using the price as the dependent variable to using the price divided by markup. This finding implies a higher markup in smaller cities, as the markup-adjusted price (price divided by markup) rises less in smaller cities than the per-item price. We repeat the regressions but controlling

¹⁴In fact, product scope N_{fd} in (16) is maximized for $S_{fd} = \sqrt{\eta}/(1 + \sqrt{\eta})$.

Table 1: Price Regressions for Toothpaste

Dep Var.	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Price	P/mkup	Price	P/mkup	Unit-P	UP/mkup
<i>ln Population</i>	-4.189*** (0.240)	-2.716*** (0.153)	-2.934*** (0.497)	-1.453*** (0.321)	-0.698*** (0.128)	-0.359*** (0.083)
<i>ln Average Income</i>	-6.078*** (0.308)	-4.627*** (0.203)	-5.416*** (0.391)	-4.389*** (0.258)	-1.295*** (0.110)	-0.973*** (0.073)
<i>Capital City</i>	1.166*** (0.220)	0.662*** (0.135)	0.036 (0.272)	0.024 (0.169)	0.027 (0.069)	0.025 (0.043)
<i>Distance (1000km)</i>	1.430*** (0.236)	0.877*** (0.147)	0.569* (0.300)	0.520*** (0.182)	0.207*** (0.079)	0.169*** (0.048)
<i>Province FE</i>	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
<i>UPC – Retailer FE</i>	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	89,399	89,399	89,399	89,399	89,399	89,399
R-squared	0.015	0.019	0.026	0.030	0.019	0.021

Notes: *Average Income* is measured as GDP per capita in each city of the given *Population*. Prices (Price and P/mkup) are in units of U.S. cents and unit-prices (Unit-P and UP/mkup) are measured in U.S. cents per ounce. *Capital City* is dummy variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

for destination province fixed effects in specification (2) to control for the additional cost incurred that are unexplained by the transportation cost, such as rents. The finding of higher markup in smaller and poorer cities remains robust.

Specification (3) uses the unit-price (U.S. cents/oz) as the dependent variable¹⁵. We observe similar results as in specifications (1) and (2), and the pro-competitive effect remains significant: the coefficients of *ln Population* and *ln Average Income* are uniformly negative, and the coefficients are reduced when using unit-price/markup as a dependent variable rather than just unit-price.

In Table 2, we explore the pro-competitive effect for the other product categories (Laundry Detergent, Personal Wash items and Shampoo). We focus on the price regressions with per-item price and price/markup as the dependent variables, but the results using unit-price are similar. From these tables, we still observe that in richer and bigger cities prices are lower and that firms charge a lower markup, as shown by the smaller coefficients on the *ln Population* and *ln Average Income* when using the using the price divided by markup as the dependent variable. For all four products, therefore, we confirm a pro-competitive effect.¹⁶

¹⁵Specification (3) includes the province fixed effects. The estimated coefficients are somewhat larger when these fixed effects are excluded, but show a similar drop from replacing unit-price with unit-price/markup.

¹⁶Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) also find this result for thirteen retail trade industries across 225 U.S. cities.

Table 2: Price Regressions for the Other Product Categories

Dep Var.	(1) Laundry Detergent		(2) Personal Wash		(3) Shampoo	
	Price	P/mkup	Price	P/mkup	Price	P/mkup
<i>In Population</i>	-5.598*** (0.972)	-4.372*** (0.707)	-2.093** (0.978)	-1.651** (0.681)	-9.603*** (1.150)	-7.813*** (0.884)
<i>In Average Income</i>	-2.128*** (0.583)	-1.643*** (0.429)	-4.606*** (0.687)	-3.330*** (0.477)	-4.019*** (0.780)	-3.362*** (0.599)
<i>Capital City</i>	-0.488 (0.505)	-0.650* (0.363)	-1.077* (0.572)	-0.740* (0.399)	-1.519** (0.671)	-1.649*** (0.514)
<i>Distance (1000km)</i>	1.050 (0.856)	0.883 (0.619)	-0.493 (0.715)	-0.255 (0.500)	0.753 (0.887)	0.685 (0.678)
Observations	102,747	102,747	143,593	143,593	142,627	142,627
Number of group	26,396	26,396	32,782	32,782	32,600	32,600
R-squared	0.010	0.012	0.010	0.010	0.013	0.015

Notes: All regressions include Barcode and Retailer fixed effects. *Average Income* is measured as GDP per capita in each city of the given *Population*. Prices (Price and P/mkup) are in units of U.S. cents. *Capital City* is dummy variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and reported in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

5.2 Estimating the Variety Effect

Table 3 exhibits the result of our second structural equation as shown in (20). Motivated by the model, we add brand-province fixed effects to control for the fixed costs needed to sell each variety in each city, k_{fd} . The dependent variable is $\ln \lambda_{fc}$ which denotes the expenditure in city c on the common products of firm f relative to firm f 's total sales in that city. Columns (1) to (4) report results for Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent, Personal Wash items, and Shampoo respectively. The regressions results show that larger and richer cities are likely to have smaller expenditure shares on common products for a given firm. This result implies that larger and richer cities get access to more varieties than smaller cities. Consistent with model, the variable $\ln \frac{\eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd}}{S_{fd}(1 - S_{fd})}$ contributes to the common product share positively, but with a coefficient less than its theoretical value of unity.

These empirical results support the inverted U-shaped relation between product scope and market share in (16), from which the regression specification (20) is obtained. Feenstra and Ma (2009) showed that in a model with heterogeneous, multiproduct firms, an inverted U-shaped relation would hold between the productivity of the firm and its product scope: more productive firms initially add more products, but then reduce product scope as cannibalization becomes more important. Raff and Wagner (2013) have shown that such an inverted U-shaped relation holds empirically in a sample of German firms, and Macedoni (2017) obtains this relation in more general theoretical and empirical settings. Our results here are therefore consistent with these authors.

Table 3: Firm Share Regression

Dep Var: $\ln \lambda_{fd}$	(1) Toothpaste	(2) Laundry Detergent	(3) Personal Wash	(4) Shampoo
$\ln Population$	-0.209*** (0.037)	-0.236*** (0.030)	-0.295*** (0.034)	-0.156*** (0.021)
$\ln Average Income$	-0.059** (0.029)	-0.244*** (0.030)	-0.159*** (0.030)	-0.083*** (0.012)
$Capital City$	-0.125*** (0.023)	-0.179*** (0.029)	-0.136*** (0.028)	-0.069*** (0.015)
$\ln \frac{\eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd}}{S_{fd}(1 - S_{fd})}$	0.147*** (0.033)	0.609*** (0.070)	0.396*** (0.061)	0.002 (0.006)
Observations	660	420	600	840
Number of group	308	196	280	392
R-squared	0.376	0.662	0.586	0.348

Notes: All regressions include firm-province fixed effects. *Average Income* is measured as GDP per capita in each city of the given *Population*. *Capital City* is dummy variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at group level and reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

6 Extension of the Model to Include Retailers

In the previous analysis, we have shown that bigger and richer cities are likely to have lower markups, which we refer as the pro-competitive effect. On the one hand, the pro-competitive effect could be due to more entry of manufacturing firms in bigger cities. On the other hand, it could also be attributed to the competition within retailing sector, since bigger and richer cities have greater number of supermarket chains. In this section, we study the sources of the pro-competitive effect by extending the model to include retailers.

6.1 Optimal Prices for Retailers and Manufacturers

We extend our model by introducing retailers to the economy, so that we are able to take care of the pro-competitive effect in the retailing sector. The preferences of the representative consumer in each city are a three-level nested CES. Denoting the set of product varieties sold by retailer (or supermarket) r , produced by firm f in city c by $i \in I_{frc}$, the sub-utility from purchasing the products of firm f in retailer r are given by

$$X_{frc} = \left(\sum_{i \in I_{fsc}} (b_{ifrc} x_{ifrc})^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma} \right)^{\sigma/(\sigma-1)}, \quad \sigma > 1, \quad (22)$$

where σ is the elasticity of substitution across products sold by a firm, and b_{ifrc} are the taste parameters for each variety. Aggregating across firms $f \in F_{rc}$ that sell in retailer r and city c , the sub-utility of the representative consumer purchasing in retailer r is ,

$$\mathcal{X}_{rc} = \left(\sum_{f \in F_{rc}} X_{frc}^{(\eta-1)/\eta} \right)^{\eta/(\eta-1)}, \quad \eta > 1. \quad (23)$$

where η is the elasticity of substitution across firms within retailers. Finally, aggregating across retailers $r \in R_c$ that sell in city c , the utility function can be written as

$$U_c = \left(\sum_{r \in R_c} \mathcal{X}_{rc}^{(\theta-1)/\theta} \right)^{\theta/(\theta-1)}, \quad \theta > 1. \quad (24)$$

where θ is the elasticity of substitution across retailers. We assume the following order conditions for the elasticities, $\sigma > \eta > \theta$.

There are two kinds of firms: manufacturers and retailers. Each manufacturer produces multiple products and sells to all the retailers in each city. Both retailers and manufacturers are assumed to play their optimal strategies simultaneously in the subsequent analysis. Manufacturers are not able to sell their products directly to the consumers, and they must contract with and sell via the local retailers. We assume that the local retailers are homogeneous and maximize their profit by choosing the retailing prices, taking the city demand and wholesale prices q_{ifrd} (the price charged by the manufacturers) as given. Consider a retailer r selling product i (produced by firm f) in city c , for price p_{ifrc} . The retailer chooses the prices for all the products provided by each manufacturer, and whether or not to enter each city, with the profit-maximization problem:

$$\max_{p_{ifrc}, \forall i \in I_{frc}, f \in F_{rc}} \left[\sum_{i \in I_{frc}, f \in F_{rc}} (p_{ifrc} - q_{ifrc}) x_{ifrc} - K_c^R \right] \mathbf{1}(r \in R_c) \quad (25)$$

where K_c^R denotes the retailing fixed cost to enter in city c and $\mathbf{1}(r \in R_c)$ is an indicator variable that takes value of unity if retailer r decides to pay the fixed cost and enter city c , and zero otherwise.

Solving the above problem gives the optimal markup of the retailers, which is treated as fixed by the manufacturing firms. Consider a manufacturing firm producing variety i in city c , and delivering and selling it to *all* the retailers r in destinations destinations $d = 1, \dots, D$.¹⁷ The firm chooses the range of products to sell to all the retailers in each city where it enters, as well as the wholesale prices q_{ifrd} , with the profit-maximization problem:

$$\max_{q_{ifrd}, i \in I_{frc}} \sum_{d=1}^D \left\{ \sum_{r=1}^{S_d} \sum_{i \in I_{frc}} \left[(q_{ifrd} - g_{if}(w_c) - T_{cd}) x_{ifrd} - k_{ifd}^M \right] - K_{fd}^M \right\} \mathbf{1}(I_{fd} \neq \emptyset), \quad (26)$$

¹⁷Since the retailers of the same region are homogeneous, the manufacturers are indifferent in choosing among the retailers to accommodate their products.

where S_d stands for the number of retailers in city d , K_{fd}^M denotes the fixed cost to enter a city, and k_{ifd}^M is the fixed cost to sell a variety.

The final price paid by consumers is a natural extension of that shown in (14), and is given by,¹⁸

$$p_{ifrd} = \underbrace{\left[1 + \frac{1}{(\theta - 1)(1 - h_{rd})}\right]}_{\text{Retailer Markup}} \underbrace{\left[1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - h_{fd})}\right]}_{\text{Manufacturer Markup}} \underbrace{[g_{if}(w_c) + T_{cd}]}_{\text{Marginal Cost}}. \quad (27)$$

The first term in (27) denotes the retailer markup, and the second is the manufacturer markup. Larger and richer cities could have both greater number of retailers (lower retailer markups) and more entry of producers (lower manufacturer markups), which will decrease the product price in either way.

6.2 Pro-Competitive Effect Redux

We re-estimate the pro-competitive effect following the method discussed in Section 5. Table 4 shows the result for the four main products. We use price-per-item (U.S. cents/item) as the dependent variable for all product categories. The coefficients of $\ln Population$ and $\ln Average Income$ are all significantly negative, which implies larger and richer cities will benefit from lower prices for a given product at the barcode level. Comparing the first two columns for Toothpaste, the coefficient on $\ln Population$ falls by about 40%, from -2.93 to -1.65, when we switch from using the price as the dependent variable to using the price divided by retailer markup. This finding implies a higher retailing markup in smaller cities, as the markup-adjusted price (price divided by retailer markup) rises less in smaller cities than the per-item price. Comparing the second and third columns, the coefficient on $\ln Population$ further drops by about another 50%, from -1.65 to -0.83. The coefficients changes imply that the pro-competitive effect for Toothpaste is explained by both the entry of retailers and the entry of manufacturers. For Personal Wash Items and Shampoo, the pro-competitive effect from the retailing sector itself contribute more to the low prices in larger cities.

7 Extension to other Products

7.1 Measuring Product Variety

We now turn to the additional products for which we collected scraped data on their retail prices in 60 cities, but for which we do not have any scanner data purchased from Nielsen (China). This means that we do not have any information on their market shares, beyond knowing how many supermarkets in each city sell each product (as is evident from the scraped data). In addition, as noted earlier, the possibility of correctly linking the Chinese and US products is extremely low. For that reason, it is desirable to develop formula for the exact price indexes that do not rely on having

¹⁸The solution to the model is provided in Appendix D. To make the analysis tractable, we assume the full pass-through of the prices charged by manufacturers to the consumers, i.e., manufacturers are only able to affect the market price linearly following $p_{ifrd} = \mu_{rd} q_{ifrd}$, without affecting the retailer's markup μ_{rd} .

Table 4: Price Regressions of the Extended Model

Dep Var.	Toothpaste			Laundry Detergent		
	Price	P/MK _R	P/(MK _R MK _M)	Price	P/MK _R	P/(MK _R MK _M)
<i>In Population</i>	-2.934*** (0.497)	-1.650*** (0.253)	-0.836*** (0.163)	-5.598*** (0.972)	-3.101*** (0.488)	-2.404*** (0.355)
<i>In Average Income</i>	-5.416*** (0.391)	-2.716*** (0.199)	-2.207*** (0.131)	-2.128*** (0.583)	-1.145*** (0.293)	-0.879*** (0.216)
<i>Capital City</i>	0.036 (0.272)	-0.060 (0.138)	-0.036 (0.086)	-0.488 (0.505)	-0.322 (0.253)	-0.381** (0.182)
<i>Distance (1000km)</i>	0.569* (0.300)	0.284* (0.152)	0.261*** (0.092)	1.050 (0.856)	0.563 (0.429)	0.469 (0.310)
Observations	89,399	89,399	89,399	102,747	102,747	102,747
R-squared	0.026	0.026	0.030	0.010	0.010	0.012
Dep Var.	Personal Wash Items			Shampoo		
	Price	P/MK _R	P/(MK _R MK _M)	Price	P/MK _R	P/(MK _R MK _M)
<i>In Population</i>	-2.093** (0.978)	-1.291*** (0.492)	-0.995*** (0.342)	-9.603*** (1.15)	-5.543*** (0.581)	-4.471*** (0.447)
<i>In Average Income</i>	-4.606*** (0.687)	-2.472*** (0.345)	-1.782*** (0.240)	-4.019*** (0.78)	-2.192*** (0.396)	-1.822*** (0.303)
<i>Capital City</i>	-1.077* (0.572)	-0.772*** (0.287)	-0.532*** (0.200)	-1.519** (0.671)	-1.158*** (0.339)	-1.131*** (0.26)
<i>Distance (1000km)</i>	-0.493 (0.715)	-0.277 (0.359)	-0.148 (0.251)	0.753 (0.887)	0.4 (0.447)	0.36 (0.341)
Observations	143,593	143,593	143,593	142,627	142,627	142,627
R-squared	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.013	0.013	0.015

Notes: $\gamma_d = 0.1831$. MK_R and MK_M stand for the markups of retailer and manufacturer. Each regression include destination province and UPC-Supermarket fixed effects. *Average Income* is measured as GDP per capita in each city of the given *Population*. Prices (Price and P/mkup) are in units of U.S. cents. *Capital City* is dummy variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the UPC-Supermarket and reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

identical taste parameters b_{fic} for common goods that are available in every city and country.

We now show how the CES index derived by Redding and Weinstein (2016) allows for a much weaker assumption on taste parameters that allows the cost of living to be compared between countries. To briefly review the results of Redding and Weinstein (2016), we start with the demand for each product variety, which equals $b_{ifc}x_{ifc} = [(p_{ifc}/b_{ifc})/P_{fc}]^{-\sigma}X_{fc}$. Multiplying by (p_{ifc}/b_{ifc}) and dividing by $P_{fc}X_{fc}$, we obtain an equation for the share of each variety within the total sales of firm f , which depends on the CES price index P_{fc} . Inverting that equation to solve for P_{fc} , we readily obtain:

$$P_{fc} = e(\mathbf{p}_{fc}, \mathbf{b}_{fc}, I_f) = s_{ifc}^{1/(\sigma-1)} \left(\frac{p_{ifc}}{b_{ifc}} \right). \quad (28)$$

The term λ_{fc} defined in (6) equals $s_{ifc}/s_{ifc}(I_f)$, so we can replace the share s_{ifc} by $s_{ifc} = s_{ifc}(I_f)\lambda_{fc}$ in the above equation. Then because (28) holds for every product i , we take the unweighted geometric mean across all products to obtain the formula in Redding and Weinstein (2016):

$$P_{fc} = \left[\prod_{i \in I_f} s_{ifc}(I_f)^{\frac{1}{N_f(\sigma-1)}} \right] \left[\prod_{i \in I_f} \left(\frac{p_{ifc}}{b_{ifc}} \right)^{\frac{1}{N_f}} \right] \lambda_{fc}^{1/(\sigma-1)}. \quad (29)$$

Notice that this formula gives us the *level* of the CES price index P_{fc} , and not just its ratio as shown in section 2 by equation (7).

We can aggregate over firms in a city using a similar approach. The aggregate demand for each firm's products are $X_{fc} = (P_{fc}/P_c)^{-\eta}(Y_c/P_c)$. Multiplying by P_{fc} and dividing by Y_c , we obtain the share of each firm in city c , which depends on the CES price index P_c . Inverting that equation to solve for P_c , we readily obtain:

$$P_c = E(\mathbf{P}_c, F_c) = S_{fc}^{1/(\eta-1)} P_{fc}.$$

We again replace the share S_{fc} by $S_{fc} = S_{fc}(F)\lambda_c$, and take the unweighted geometric mean over the number of common firms M selling to *all* cities in each country. Then using that geometric mean along with (29), we obtain:

$$P_c = E(\mathbf{P}_c, F_c) = \left[\prod_{f \in F} \prod_{i \in I_f} \left(\frac{p_{ifc}}{b_{ifc}} \right)^{\frac{1}{MN_f}} \right] S_c(F)\Lambda_c(F), \quad (30)$$

where,

$$S_c(F) \equiv \left[\prod_{f \in F} S_{fc}(F)^{\frac{1}{M(\eta-1)}} \prod_{i \in I_f} s_{ifc}(I_f)^{\frac{1}{MN_f(\sigma-1)}} \right], \quad \Lambda_c(F) \equiv \left[\prod_{f \in F} \lambda_{fc}^{1/M(\sigma-1)} \right] \lambda_c^{1/(\eta-1)}. \quad (31)$$

The first expression on the right of (30) is a simple geometric mean of the prices of common products, but these prices are adjusted for the taste parameters b_{ifc} . We have earlier assumed in our discussion of (7) that the taste parameters b_{fic} are identical for common goods that are available in every city within each country. We can now follow the assumption that Redding and Weinstein

(2016) make in a time-series context, and use the *weaker* assumption that the geometric mean of taste parameters are equal in every city within each country:

$$\prod_{f \in F} \prod_{i \in I_f} (b_{ifc})^{\frac{1}{MN_f}} = 1, \quad \forall c \in \{1, \dots, D\}. \quad (32)$$

With this assumption, the first term on the right of (30) is easily measured as the geometric mean of prices. The second term $S_c(F)$ is a geometric mean of the common firms and common product shares, as shown in (31). We interpret that term as adjusting for differences in tastes for specific products *within* the common set, but subject to the maintained assumption that average tastes are the same as in (32). The third term $\Lambda_c(F)$ is the correction for variety outside the common set as in Feenstra (1994).

We see that (30) and (31) can be readily used to measure the CES price index P_c across all cities *within* each country. But what about when we compare China and the United States? In that case, we need some analogue to the assumption in (32) that we are willing to apply across countries. To develop this idea, let us denote the *global brands* by the name of the common firms that sell in both countries by the set $G \equiv F^{US} \cap F^{China}$, which we assume is not empty.¹⁹ We then pick the two large and comparable cities in each country, New York (NY) and Shanghai (SH). Our assumption is that there has been enough “convergence” of tastes and availability of global brands across these two cities so that the average taste parameters are the same,

$$\prod_{g \in G} \prod_{i \in I_g} (b_{ig, NY})^{\frac{1}{MN_g}} = \prod_{g \in G} \prod_{i \in I_g} (b_{ig, SH})^{\frac{1}{MN_g}}. \quad (33)$$

With this assumption, we can compare the CES price indexes P_c between *countries*, as follows. We first use (30) to measure the CES price index P_c for New York in U.S. and Shanghai in China, with the common international firms G , which are denoted as $E(\mathbf{P}_{NY}, G)$ and $E(\mathbf{P}_{SH}, G)$. Next, we apply the same calculations to the cost-of-living measures across all cities in China, with the common firms F^{China} , and all cities in the United States, with the common firms F^{US} . We then *renormalize* the Chinese and U.S. price indexes so that the cost-of-living indexes are the same for Shanghai and New York when using the common set as the global brands (G) and national brands (F^{China} and F^{US}). This is achieved by computing the terms in (30) for the global brands G only in New York and in Shanghai, and then renormalizing the same terms for the Chinese and U.S. sets of common product F^{China} and F^{US} as:

¹⁹The global brands by product categories are listed in Table 10 in Appendix A4. In practice, G is empty for Chips and we alternatively define $G \equiv [F^{US} \cap (\cup_c F_c^{China})] \cup [F^{China} \cap (\cup_c F_c^{US})]$, the global firms that are either sell national common products in China or in the U.S., and mark it with asterisk.

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{E}(\mathbf{P}_c, F_c^{China}) &\equiv E(\mathbf{P}_c, F_c^{China}) \times \frac{E(\mathbf{P}_{SH}, G)}{E(\mathbf{P}_{SH}, F_{SH}^{China})} \\ \tilde{E}(\mathbf{P}_c, F_c^{US}) &\equiv E(\mathbf{P}_c, F_c^{US}) \times \frac{E(\mathbf{P}_{NY}, G)}{E(\mathbf{P}_{NY}, F_{NY}^{US})}\end{aligned}\quad (34)$$

Since this renormalization is done for all cities in both countries, we obtain cost-of-living indexes that are fully comparable between cities and countries.

7.2 Cost-of-Living Indexes for the Four Main Products

We calculate the cost-of-living indexes in New York and Shanghai, making use of assumption (33) so that these indexes are comparable between countries. The renormalization in (34) has already been applied to the indexes in panel (c) of Figure 2 to 5, which are otherwise constructed according to the method of Feenstra (1994). For comparison, we also calculate the indexes for these four products according to the method of Redding and Weinstein (2016), which uses the unweighted geometric mean of prices in (30), denoted by P_c^G , together with the multiplied terms $S_c(F)\Lambda_c(F)$. Those indexes are illustrated in panel (d) of Figures 2 to 5, which are also renormalized according to (34).

A glance at those earlier Figures shows that the negative relationship between the exact price index and city size is noticeably weaker, especially for Toothpaste, when using the Redding-Weinstein (RW) index than when using the Feenstra index. To formalize that difference, in Tables 5 and 6 we report the coefficients of regressions of the exact price indexes and its components on the log of city size (measured now with city GDP). Specifically, we run the regressions:

$$\ln Z_c = \mu_1 + \mu_{cap} + \mu_2 \ln Y_c + \epsilon_d, \quad (35)$$

where Z_c denotes either of the two terms in (10) or any of the three terms on the right of (30). Table 5 uses the Feenstra exact index in (10) and its components, while Table 6 uses the RW index in (30) and its components.

For Toothpaste, we see that the coefficients of the Feenstra exact index, and its components using Sato-Vartia weights, are more than twice as sensitive to city size than the RW exact index, and its geometric price and variety components. The percentage contribution of these regression coefficients shows that the negative relationship between the exact price index and city size is caused roughly *equally* by the negative relationship between price and variety with city size. For example, out of the regression coefficient of the price index on $\ln Y_c$ of -0.122 in the first column of Table 5, around -0.055 (or 45.1%) is explained by the regression of the Sato-Vartia index $\ln P_c^{SV}$ on $\ln Y_c$, while about -0.067 (or 51.9%) is explained by the regression of $\ln \Lambda_c^{SV}$ on $\ln Y_c^{SV}$.

Table 5: Decomposition of Cost of living with City Size (Feenstra Method)

Dep.↓\Indep.→	Toothpaste		Laundry Detergent		Personal Wash		Shampoo	
	$\ln Y_c$	R^2	$\ln Y_c$	R^2	$\ln Y_c$	R^2	$\ln Y_c$	R^2
$\ln E(P_{fc}, F_c)$	-0.122*** (0.022)	0.424	-0.044*** (0.007)	0.419	-0.081*** (0.018)	0.320	-0.029*** (0.007)	0.233
$\ln P_c^{SV}$	-0.055*** (0.010)	0.363	-0.003 (0.006)	0.051	-0.021** (0.008)	0.122	-0.015* (0.007)	0.095
	45.1%		6.8%		25.6%		51.7%	
$\ln \Lambda_c^{SV}$	-0.067** (0.015)	0.361	-0.041*** (0.006)	0.524	-0.061*** (0.013)	0.395	-0.014 (0.009)	0.079
	51.9%		93.2%		74.4%		48.3%	

Notes: All regressions also include *Capital* dummy variable and constant, which are omitted in the table. P_c^{SV} denotes the Sato-Vartia weighted mean of unit prices, Λ_c^{SV} is the variety term in (10), and Y_c is city GDP. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Similar calculations are done in the other columns in Table 5, and in Table 6 which now also includes the term $\ln S_c(F)$. That final variable appearing in Table 6 is either insignificantly related to city size or has a very small coefficient. Thus, it is not the presence of that share variable in the RW

Table 6: Decomposition of Cost of living with City Size (Redding-Weinstein Method)

Dep.↓\Indep.→	Toothpaste		Laundry Detergent		Personal Wash		Shampoo	
	$\ln Y_c$	R^2	$\ln Y_c$	R^2	$\ln Y_c$	R^2	$\ln Y_c$	R^2
$\ln E(P_{fc}, F_c)$	-0.045*** (0.016)	0.166	-0.051*** (0.008)	0.453	-0.042*** (0.008)	0.357	-0.014 (0.007)	0.069
$\ln P_c^G$	-0.025*** (0.009)	0.185	-0.006 (0.006)	0.056	-0.004 (0.005)	0.058	-0.006 (0.005)	0.149
	55.6%		11.8%		9.5%		42.9%	
$\ln \Lambda_c(F)$	-0.027** (0.009)	0.261	-0.037*** (0.006)	0.478	-0.059*** (0.014)	0.363	-0.010 (0.009)	0.054
	60.0%		72.5%		140.5%		71.4%	
$\ln S_c(F)$	0.007 (0.017)	0.090	-0.008* (0.003)	0.094	0.021 (0.013)	0.121	0.002 (0.003)	0.027
	-15.6%		15.7%		-50%		-14.3%	

Notes: All regressions also include *Capital* dummy variable and constant, which are omitted in the table. P_c^G denotes the geometric mean of unit prices, $\Lambda_c(F)$ is the variety term, $S_c(F)$ is the share term in (25), and Y_c is city GDP. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

index that accounts for its reduced sensitivity to city size. But this variable *will* have a very important impact on the *average level* of the exact price index in China as compared to the U.S., especially as we turn to the other 15 products that we consider next.

7.3 Cost-of-Living Indexes for 15 Other Product Categories

When we have only scraped price data and not the Nielsen (China) barcode expenditures, it is challenging to construct the share term $S_c(F)$ and also the variety term $\Lambda_c(F)$ that appears in (30). We create a proxy for the expenditure on each barcode product by simply counting the number of retail stores that sell each barcode in a city (and dividing by the total number of retailers). That is, the sales share of each product is approximated by:

$$\ln \widehat{Share}_{ic} \propto \frac{\sum_{r \in R_c} \mathbf{1}(i \text{ is observed in retailer } r)}{N_c^{\text{retailers}}}, \quad (36)$$

where $\mathbf{1}(i \text{ is observed in retailer } r)$ equals unity if we observe price quotes of barcode product i in retailer r and zero otherwise; R_c denote the collection of retailers in city c ; and $N_c^{\text{retailers}}$ is the total number of retailer stores in city c .²⁰

In Table 7, we apply the RW index from (30) and (34) to our four main products and to the other 15 product categories. We summarize each component of the Chinese cost of living relative to the average value of its counterpart of the U.S. A value greater than one implies the corresponding variable is larger in China than in the United States. Beginning with the geometric mean of prices, as shown in the first column, these are lower in China for all products except for Shampoo, Baby Formula, Cereals and Milk Powder.

In the second column we show the ratio of the terms $[S_{SH}(G)\Lambda_{SH}(G)/S_{NY}(G)\Lambda_{NY}(G)]$ for Shanghai relative to New York. This is the key ratio that adjusts the relative geometric mean of prices to obtain the relative cost of living in these two cities. This ratio is less than unity for our four main products, indicating that there is greater product variety in China than in the United States. We interpret that result as saying that the global brands G are sufficiently common in China for these four products that the presence of *additional* local brands in China gives it greater product variety.

For the 15 other product categories, however, this ratio is greater than unity for all products except for three: Coffee, Gum and Milk Powder. Coffee and Gum are similar to our four main products, where there are (inexpensive) local brands in China that are sufficient popular to result in greater product variety there. Along with Soft Drinks, which also has local brands in China, these three products in addition to the four main products have cost-of-living indexes in China relative to the U.S. that are lower than the relative geometric mean of prices shown in the first column.

²⁰See Appendix B3 and Antoniadis (2017), where it is shown that the average market share is exponentially related to the proportion of available retailers carrying the barcode item. It follows that the log of the share is linearly related to this proportion.

Table 7: Summary of Cost of Living by Product Categories (relative to the U.S.)

Product Category\Variable	P_c^G	$\frac{S_{SH}(G)\Lambda_{SH}(G)}{S_{NY}(G)\Lambda_{NY}(G)}$	Other Terms	$\tilde{E}(P_{fc}, F_c)$
Four Main Products				
Toothpaste	0.81	0.64	1.13	0.58
Laundry Detergent	0.59	0.52	0.76	0.23
Personal Wash Item	0.80	0.62	0.55	0.25
Shampoo	1.59	0.66	0.61	0.65
Other Products				
Baby Formula	1.30	1.12	1.02	1.48
Batteries	0.24	1.01	1.27	0.31
Biscuits	0.64	2.18	3.05	4.23
Cereal	1.29	1.95	0.70	1.76
Chips	0.31	1.76	1.16	0.64
Chocolate	0.74	1.74	1.37	1.77
Coffee	0.70	0.97	1.00	0.68
Diapers	0.74	1.12	1.04	0.86
Dog Food	0.23	1.46	1.06	0.35
Gum	0.93	0.88	0.82	0.67
Milk Powder	5.29	0.74	1.60	6.20
Soap	0.37	4.28	0.89	1.43
Soft Drinks	0.41	1.19	0.67	0.33
Tea	0.81	2.13	1.12	1.93
Toothbrushes	0.53	1.57	1.13	0.93

Notes: The table summarizes population weighted average of each variable in relative terms (greater than unity implies the corresponding variable is larger in China.). P_c^G is in unit of cents per ounce for the four main products and dollars per item for other products; $\frac{S_{SH}(G)\Lambda_{SH}(G)}{S_{NY}(G)\Lambda_{NY}(G)}$ denotes the composite share of varieties in Shanghai relative to New York; and Other Terms is the further adjustment needed to obtain $\tilde{E}(P_{fc}, F_c)$, which is the cost-of-living index in China relative to the U.S.

Milk Powder is a unique case because there was a consumer scare about this product due to the Chinese milk scandal in 2008 and now the prices are higher than in the United States, as shown in the first column. Those high prices are slightly offset by a value of $[S_{SH}(G)\Lambda_{SH}(G)/S_{NY}(G)\Lambda_{NY}(G)]$ that is less than unity, but the exact price index shown in the final column is still much higher in China. That feature is shared by all the remaining ten products: the cost of living in China relative to the U.S., as shown in the final column, is *higher* than the relative geometric mean of prices. That higher cost of living in China for the remaining products is in most cases due to lower variety in China.²¹ In some products (Biscuits, Chocolate, Soap, and Tea), that lower variety is strong enough that it reverses the lower relative price in China, as shown by the geometric mean of prices, to become a higher exact price index in China.

It is surprisingly that there is lower relative variety in China to a product like Tea, since China has specialized in the product from ancient times. What seems to explain the lower relative variety in our data is that the many loose varieties of Chinese tea are barely sold in supermarkets, which is where we obtain our scraped data. So we miss entirely the local varieties of Chinese tea and end up with only Western-style teas, with Lipton as the unique global brand that is sold in all cities in both countries. The finding of a higher relative price of tea in China illustrates a deficiency of our data, or more precisely, of the attempt to correct the prices of barcode products for variety. It remains to be seen whether other methods of obtaining prices and expenditure data across countries can overcome this limitation.

For each of the 15 product categories, we also explore to what extent the three components (denoted by P_c^G , $S_c(G)$ and $\Lambda_c(G)$) contribute to the overall cost of living. Table 8 presents the regression results of the three components on city size (i.e. city GDP).²² . The first column is the elasticity of the cost-of-living index with respect to the city size. As expected, larger cities generally benefit from having a lower cost-of-living index. Cities with twice the market size have lower indexes with the declines ranging from 1% (Chocolate) to 10.4% (Cereal). Pro-competitive effects are operative in most cases, as shown by the negative coefficients in the second column, with the exception of Batteries, Biscuits, Chocolate, Milk Powder, Soap and Toothbrushes. The final two columns show the relative importance of the share term $S_c(G)$ and the variety term $\Lambda_c(G)$ in explaining the lower cost of living in larger cities in China. In most cases, it is the variety term that is the most important explanation for the lower exact price index and therefore the gains from living in larger cities.

8 Conclusions

Anecdotal evidence and price data collected by the World Bank in 2005 under the International Comparison Program (ICP) suggest that prices in China may be higher than expected. While part of the

²¹We further decompose $[S_{SH}(G)\Lambda_{SH}(G)/S_{NY}(G)\Lambda_{NY}(G)]$ into three margins as shown in the Appendix E, Table 14.

²²In each regression, we also include a dummy variable for the capital city which is not reported in the Table.

Table 8: Decomposition of Cost of living with City Size (Other Product Categories)

Product	$\ln \tilde{E}(P_{fc}, F_c)$	$\ln P_c^G$	$\ln S_c(G)$	$\ln \Lambda_c(G)$
Baby Formula	-0.014	-0.008	-0.003	-0.003
		59%	20%	21%
Batteries	-0.017	0.005	-0.013	-0.009
		-27%	76%	51%
Biscuits	-0.028	0.001	0.002	-0.030
		-2%	-7%	109%
Cereal	-0.104	-0.020	-0.013	-0.071
		19%	13%	68%
Chips	-0.019	-0.011	0.008	-0.016
		57%	-44%	87%
Chocolate	-0.010	0.003	0.005	-0.019
		-33%	-51%	184%
Coffee	-0.054	-0.012	0.003	-0.045
		23%	-6%	83%
Diapers	-0.020	-0.015	0.001	-0.006
		76%	-5%	29%
Dog Food	-0.069	-0.014	-0.020	-0.035
		20%	29%	51%
Gum	-0.029	-0.012	-0.008	-0.010
		41%	26%	33%
Milk Powder	-0.049	0.007	0.012	-0.068
		-14%	-24%	138%
Soap	-0.033	0.008	-0.015	-0.026
		-23%	45%	78%
Soft Drinks	-0.072	-0.022	0.003	-0.053
		31%	-4%	73%
Tea	-0.057	-0.006	-0.013	-0.038
		10%	23%	67%
Toothbrushes	-0.080	0.005	-0.026	-0.059
		-6%	32%	74%

Notes: The reported coefficients denote the elasticity with respect to the total market size. All regressions also include *Capital* dummy variable and constant, which are omitted in the table. Percentages describe the contribution of each margin to the overall cost-of-living elasticity. P_c^G denotes the geometric mean of unit prices, $\Lambda_c(G)$ is the variety term and $S_c(G)$ is the share term in (25), for the global brands G.

issue is related to sampling (Feenstra, Ma, Neary, and Prasada Rao (2013)) and procedural decisions made by the World Bank in linking regions with each other (Deaton and Aten (2017), Inklaar and Rao (2017)), there is still an open question as to what prices in China really are.

To address this question, and to overcome limitations in the ICP data, we have used barcode data on selected consumer goods to compare the cost of living in cities across and between China and the U.S. Specifically, we have obtained from Nielsen price and quantity information on Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent, Personal wash items and Shampoo sold in 22 cities across China, and combined those with additional price data on grocery-store products sold in sixty cities that we scraped from a phone application to compute cost-of-living indexes. We also used the Nielsen Retailing Sales (U.S.) database to calculate the cost of living in the U.S.

Our main finding is that the cost-of-living for grocery-store products in China is lower in larger cities. This is driven by two sources: more product variety in large cities and lower prices. The finding that product prices in large Chinese cities are lower contrasts with evidence from the U.S. that show the opposite relation (Handbury and Weinstein (2015)). We attribute lower prices to a pro-competitive effect, whereby larger cities attract more brands and retailers which leads to lower markups and prices. Greater variety in larger cities applies to the U.S., too, but it is more pronounced in China.

We further compare the cost-of-living indexes for particular product groups between China and the United States, which is the goal of the ICP. Other cross-country work by Cavallo and Rigobon (2016) uses a simple geometric mean of barcode level prices to compare price levels. It is noteworthy that the recent theory by Redding and Weinstein (2016), described in section 7, also uses a simple geometric mean of prices. In order to obtain an exact price index, that geometric mean is adjusted by two other terms: a term reflecting the firm shares of products within the geometric mean; and a term reflecting the expenditures shares on unique products in each city, that are not included in the geometric means and which indicate product variety as in Feenstra (1994).

The simple geometric mean of prices is lower in China than in the United States for most product categories: exceptions include Shampoo, Baby Formula, Cereal and Powdered Milk. By focusing on “global brands” to construct these geometric means, we can plausibly meet the theoretical restriction in Redding and Weinstein (2016) that the *average tastes* across barcode items in these global brands are the same in the two countries. It turns out that focusing on the global brands also reduces the differences in the firm shares, one of the terms adjusting the simple geometric means.²³

The main difference between the geometric mean and the exact price index, therefore, comes from the product variety term. The magnitude of these product variety terms in China relative to the U.S. differs across the products in our sample. In the four product categories for which we purchased Nielsen (China) scanner data, i.e., Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent, Personal Wash items

²³The term $S_c(F)$ shown in (31) is a geometric mean of the common firm shares $S_{f_c}(F)$ and common product shares $s_{f_{ic}}(I_f)$. If there is only one global firm, for example, then $S_{g_c}(G)=1$ so it does not vary across cities or countries. Appendix E shows the variation in $S_c(G)$ and $\Lambda_c(G)$ for Shanghai and New York across product categories, as an indication of where the variation in the exact price indexes between these two cities arises from.

and Shampoo, the availability of additional Chinese brands leads to greater variety than in the United States, and therefore lower Chinese price indexes for that reason. In the other 15 products for which we only have scraped data, however, there is much less presence of U.S. brands in the Chinese market. In these cases, the observed price differences between the countries (usually lower prices in China) are partially or fully offset by the variety differences (less variety in China), so that the cost of living in China is not as low as the price differences suggest. This latter case applies to Tea, for example, because our data do not include the many Chinese varieties of tea that are not sold in supermarkets. So we miss entirely the local varieties of Chinese tea and end up with only Western-style teas, with Lipton as the unique global brand of tea that is sold in all cities in both countries. This finding of a (supposed) higher exact price index for tea in China illustrates a limitation of our attempt to correct the prices of barcode products for variety, particularly when we only have supermarket information. It remains to be seen whether other methods of obtaining price and expenditure data across countries, while correcting for variety, can overcome this limitation.

Online Appendix – Not for Publication

A. Collection Method for Retail Price Data of China

Chinese retail price data are collected by scraping data from a mobile phone application. The mobile phone app that we rely on is *Wochacha* (the English meaning is “I search”), a leading consumer-product information platform in China.

A1. Introduction to *Wochacha*

The mobile phone application *Wochacha* was developed by Wochacha Info Tech Co. Ltd in January 2010. Detailed information regarding *Wochacha* can be obtained from its web-page.²⁴ It is a widely used price comparison app, using a QR code scanner so that people can see where a particular product can be bought at the lowest price. Consumers can also search for price quotes based on the barcode of the product. By February 2014, the number of users had exceeded 210 million and are distributed across all the provinces in China.

According to its Public Service Rules, *Wochacha* uses two methods to collect the retail price data. First, the firm hires and trains data collectors who visit supermarkets to collect prices. The second source of retail price data relies on partnerships with supermarkets, from which *Wochacha* directly obtains the scanner data. In either method, the collected prices are not published until *Wochacha* data auditors have examined them.

A2. Data Collection Example

Figure 10 exhibits the results when one search for prices quotes of Pampers²⁵ in Shanghai. Based on the results, there are eight retail price quotes varying from 112RMB in Walmart to 165RMB in Lotus. Besides the price-by-supermarket information, we also observe the producer name, country of origin, as well as the unit count and producer ID. We developed software to mimic the mobile phone app on the computer to automatically download price data for the given set of EAN codes in the selected city. Then we repeated this process across 60 sampled cities to construct our retailing price database. The collection took place from October to December in 2015

²⁴See <http://www.wochacha.com/about/index>.

²⁵The EAN-13 is 6903148040737.



Figure 10: Interface of *Wochacha* Application

A3. Example of Mismatch between U.S. and China Products

Figure 11 exhibits the example of the seemingly identical products in the United States and China but with the different EAN numbers. The item is “Sensodyne Maximum Strength Toothpaste with Fluoride Fresh Mint”, and the left and right figures show the toothpaste in the U.S. and China, respectively. The partial EAN of the toothpaste in the U.S. is “31015808189” while the EAN in China is “6913991300483”. Such examples are ubiquitous in other product categories and, therefore, it is impossible to exactly match the two products that are seemingly identical via the EAN system.



Figure 11: Sensodyne Maximum Strength Toothpaste with Fluoride Fresh Mint

A4. Cities for Analysis

Cities for which we scraped price data are listed in Table 9. We include 60 cities from 28 provinces, which are widely spread across China. As shown in Figure 12, many small cities are included in our analysis.




Figure 12: City Size Distribution of the Sampled Cities

Table 9: 60 Cities with Scraped Data

Province	City	Province	City	Province	City
Anhui	Hefei	Guizhou	Guiyang	Shanxi	Taiyuan
	Suzhou	Hainan	Haikou		Datong
Beijing	Beijing	Hebei	Shijiazhuang	Shan'xi	Xi'an
Fujian	Xiamen		Tangshan		Xianyang
	Fuzhou	Henan	Kaifeng	Shanghai	Shanghai
Gansu	Lanzhou		Luoyang	Sichuan	Chengdu
Guangdong	Guangzhou		Zhengzhou		Yibin
	Shenzhen	Heilongjiang	Qiqihar	Tianjin	Tianjin
	Dongguan		Daqing	Xinjiang	Urumqi
Guangxi	Nanning		Jiamusi	Yunnan	Kunming
	Guilin		Harbin	Chongqing	Chongqing
	Wuhan	Jiangxi	Nanchang	Zhejiang	Hangzhou
Hubei	Huanggang		Jingdezhen		Ningbo
	Changsha	Liaoning	Shenyang		Shaoxing
Hunan	Yueyang		Jinzhou		Taizhou
Jilin	Changchun		Dalian		Wenzhou
	Jilin	Inner Mongolia	Baotou		
	Nanjing		Hohhot		
Jiangsu	Suzhou	Shandong	Jinan		
	Wuxi		Qingdao		
	Xuzhou		Rizhao		
	Yancheng		Yantai		

Notes: Cities also included in Nielsen (China) sales database are marked in bold.

A5. Global Brands

The global brands for each product are listed in Table 10. For all products except Chips, the global brands are computed as the intersection of the common brands in the U.S. and in China, $G \equiv F^{US} \cap F^{China}$. For Chips this set is empty, so we adopt the broader definition of global brands as $G \equiv [F^{US} \cap (\cup F_c^{China})] \cup [F^{China} \cap (\cup F_c^{US})]$.

Table 10: List of Global Brands by Product

Product Category	Global Brands	Product Category	Global Brands
Toothpaste	Colgate	Chocolate	M&M
	Crest	Coffee	Maxwell
	Sensodyne	Diapers	Huggies
Shampoo	Dove		Pampers
	L'Oreal	Dog Food	Pedigree
	Pantene	Gum	Wrigley
Personal Wash Items	Olay	Milk Powder	Nestle
Laundry Detergent	Tide	Soap	Johnson
Baby Formula	Enfamil		Olay
	Nestle		Safeguard
	Similac	Soft Drinks	Minute Maid
Batteries	Duracell		Red Bull
	GP	Tea	Lipton
Biscuits	Meiji	Toothbrushes	Colgate
Cereal	Quaker		Crest
Chips	Doritos		
	Kellogg		
	Lay'S		
	Oishi		

B. Other Data

B1. Elasticities of Substitution

We use the elasticities of substitution for our four main products (Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent, Personal Wash items and Shampoo) as well as for other product categories from Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein (2016), which are listed in Table 11.

Table 11: Elasticity of Substitution

Product Category	Firm Elasticity (η)	Product Elasticity (σ)
Toothpaste	2.75	5.23
Laundry Detergent	3.85	6.60
Personal Wash	3.42	5.11
Shampoo	4.43	6.54
Baby Formula	7.47	14.62
Batteries	8.72	15.10
Biscuits	5.51	7.31
Cereal	2.25	4.66
Chips	4.37	7.32
Chocolate	5.13	7.44
Coffee	3.89	7.31
Diapers	7.44	24.30
Dog Food	5.51	8.15
Gum	3.14	4.86
Milk Powder	2.41	5.05
Soap	3.42	5.11
Soft Drinks	5.18	7.82
Tea	4.46	6.12
Toothbrushes	2.75	5.23

B2. Prediction Method in Four Main Product Categories

The cost of living calculation requires firm sales information, whereas the Nielsen (China) sales database only provide us with this information for only 22 large cities. To allow our analysis to also cover smaller cities, we estimate the market share by using the product, retailer and city information for the four main products, as discussed in this part.

For the four main products, we have the detailed EAN-level market sales in 22 cities, in addition to the price quotes collected by scraping the mobile phone application. We implement a Heckman two-step approach to estimate the product share within the 22 cities using the Nielsen (China) sales database, as shown below:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Prob}(\text{Share}_{ic} > 0) = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln Y_c + \alpha_2 \ln L_c + \alpha_3 \ln N_c + \alpha_4 \text{Capital}_c \\
& + \delta_i \text{Variety}_i + \gamma_{1r} \text{Region}_r + \epsilon_{icr}
\end{aligned} \tag{37}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
E(\ln \text{Share}_{ic} | \text{Share}_{ic} > 0) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Capital}_c + \phi_{ic} \text{Brand}_i \times \ln Y_c \\
& + \mu_{ic} \text{Brand}_i \times \ln L_c + \psi_{ic} \text{Brand}_i \times \ln N_c + \gamma_{2r} \text{Region}_r,
\end{aligned} \tag{38}$$

where (37) is the selection equation and (38) is the observation equation. Y_c denotes city c 's GDP; L_c is city population; N_c denotes the total number of differentiated products (at EAN level) in city c ; Capital_c is a dummy variable which equals unity if city c is a capital city; Region_r is a set of region

dummies (East, Middle and West China). Finally, for each product i at EAN-13 level, $Brand_i$ denotes a collection of Brand dummies, e.g., Crest, Colgate etc. for Toothpaste.; $Variety_i$ is a collection of variety categories which is constructed by jointly combining several product characteristics²⁶; $Share_{ic}$ is calculated as product i 's sales share in city c . The two-step Heckman approach is motivated by the fact that we only observe price quotes in the mobile phone application conditional on that product is sold in a particular city. To reduce the endogeneity issues in price regression, we do not include the product price on the right of the share specification (38).

After obtaining the coefficients $(\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}, \hat{\gamma}, \hat{\delta}, \hat{\phi}, \hat{\rho}, \hat{\psi})$, we predict the market share in the cities that do not have sales information, and we further re-scale them so that the sum of all product shares equals unity within each city. For consistency, we use the predicted shares to calculate the cost-of-living index for all cities, including the 22 for which we have the expenditure data from Nielsen (China).

Though this prediction method works well in most cities, it results in extreme predictions in some cities, particularly when some product accounts for 80% or more of the total market. To avoid this situation, we exclude cities that have the extremely low city's average firm sales share of common products $\prod_{f \in F} (\lambda_{fc})^{W_f(F)}$ from our analysis. Specifically, we firstly regress city's average firm sales share of common products, $\lambda_c^F \equiv \prod_{f \in F} (\lambda_{fc})^{W_f(F)}$, on city's population ($\ln L_c$), and derived the prediction error $\hat{u}_c = \lambda_c^F - \hat{\lambda}_c^F$. Then we drop the cities from our sample if its prediction error is twice larger than the standard deviation of the prediction errors, i.e., we exclude city c if $|\hat{u}_c| > 2 \times std(\hat{u})$ ²⁷. After implementing the criteria, we finally have (out of 60 cities) 58 cities for Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent and Personal Wash Items, and 57 cities for Shampoo. Table 12 reports the performance of using Heckman two-step method in predicting the market shares. The inverse mills ratios are significant in the majorities of the categories, which implies that it is necessary to include the selection equation.

B3. Prediction Method for Other Products

Consider a world where there are N distinct barcode products and M number of homogeneous retailers. For demonstration purpose, we assume the products can be classified into two broad categories. high and low, that differ in availability (this assumption is for simplicity, while in reality it could be many). Specifically, the probability of observing the appearance of any H -type and L -type products in any retailer are a_H and a_L respectively. Denote the share of H -type and L -type products are s_H and $s_L = 1 - s_H$. As all the $\{a_H, a_L, s_H, s_L\}$ are unobservable in data, we use expected share of a given product to approximate the real market share for both products. The expected market share of products that are observed in k outlet is $Share_k$ that is given as:

²⁶For example, for Toothpaste, we define a variety by brand, sub-brand, special function, flavors, and form. Variety *Crest-Complete Plus-Deep Clean-Mint-Paste* is different from *Crest-Complete Plus-Mouth Wash-Mint-Paste*

²⁷We also tried with one and three standard deviations, and the main results barely changed.

Table 12: Model Fit of Two Stage Heckman

Dep Var.	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
$\ln Share_{ic}$	Toothpaste	Laundry Detergent	Personal Wash Items	Shampoo
$\ln \hat{Share}_{ic}$	0.671*** (0.00867)	0.783*** (0.0120)	0.681*** (0.00840)	0.465*** (0.00548)
Constant	-1.920*** (0.0838)	-1.329*** (0.113)	-2.217*** (0.0856)	-3.853*** (0.0564)
Inverse Mills Ratio	2.230*** (0.377)	1.059*** (1.032)	1.764*** (0.418)	3.089 (0.412)
Observations	15,817	21,322	33,870	26,175
R-squared	0.275	0.166	0.162	0.216

Notes: The table summarizes the model fit of using Heckman two-step method to predict market shares. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

$$Share_k = s_H \binom{M}{k} a_H^k (1 - a_H)^{M-k} + s_L \binom{M}{k} a_L^k (1 - a_L)^{M-k} \quad (39)$$

where $\binom{M}{k}$ denotes the number of combinations of M choose k . It is immediate that the average market share is in exponential relationship with the proportion of the outlets selling that product (especially there are many types of products). To demonstrate this, we propose a numerical example where we set $a_H = 0.95$, $a_L = 0.8$, $s_H = 0.6$, $s_L = 0.4$ and $M = 10$, and plot the relationship between $Share_k$ and k/M as shown below:




Figure 13: The Expected Market Share of Products Available in k Retail Outlets

Because of the exponential relationship between $Share_k$ and k/M , we take the natural log to obtain equation (36) in the main text.²⁸

B4. Prediction Method in Four Main Product by Retailers

In our extended model (with retailers), we need the retailer sales share in each city. To begin with, we apply a fixed effect regression on the four main products as shown below:

$$\ln Share_{ic} = \eta_i + \sum_{r \in S} \kappa_r I_{ir}$$

where η_i denotes the product category fixed effects (Toothpaste, Laundry Detergent, Personal Wash Items and Shampoo). S is the complete collection of retailers observed in our sample of China. I_{ir} is an indicator variable which equals one if product i (at barcode level) is observed in retailer r . We use the logarithmic share of product i by cities as the dependent variable. The estimation results are reported in Figure 14.




Figure 14: The Estimated Retailer Fixed Effects (Top 80)

After obtaining retailer fixed effects $\hat{\kappa}_r$, we decompose the product share by retailers in each city. Denote the share of product i sold by retailer r in city c as $Share_{irc}$, which is derived as:

$$Share_{irc} = Share_{ic} \times \frac{\exp(\kappa_r) \times \mathbf{1}(\text{if } i \text{ is observed in retailer } r \text{ in city } c)}{\sum_{s \in S_c} \exp(\kappa_s) \times \mathbf{1}(\text{if } i \text{ is observed in retailer } s \text{ in city } c)}$$

²⁸The exponential relationship between the average market share and the proportion of the available retailers is empirically found in Antoniadis (2017).

where S_c is the set of retailers in city c . Finally, we calculate the expenditure share of retailer r in city c as:

$$Share_{rc} = \sum_i Share_{irc}$$

C. Solution to the Firm's Problem

C1. Choice of price by the firm

The solution to the problem (13) w.r.t. the price p_{ifd} is

$$x_{ifd} + \sum_{j \in I_{fd}} [p_{jfd} - g_{jf}(w_c) - T_{cd}] \frac{dx_{jfd}}{dp_{ifd}} = 0, \quad \forall i \in I_{fd}. \quad (40)$$

This expression is more complicated than for a single-product firm because the firm is selling all the products $i \in I_{fd}$, and therefore must take into account the effect of a change in each price p_{ifc} on all these products. To simplify this expression, it can be confirmed that the CES demand derivatives are symmetric, $dx_{jfd}/dp_{ifd} = dx_{ifd}/dp_{jfd}$. Using (40) and dividing by demand x_{ifd} , we can re-express the condition as

$$1 + \sum_{j \in I_{fd}} \left[1 - \frac{g_{jf}(w_c) + T_{cd}}{p_{jfd}} \right] \frac{d \ln x_{ifd}}{d \ln p_{jfd}} = 0, \quad \forall i \in I_{fd} \quad (41)$$

Let us denote the ratio of price to marginal cost, inclusive of transport costs, by $\mu_{ifd} = p_{jfd}/(g_{jf} + T_{cd}) \geq 1$. We can see that the expression in brackets in (41) equals $(\mu_{ifd} - 1)/\mu_{ifd} \geq 0$, which is the difference between price and marginal cost measured relative to price. This is the 'Lerner index' of monopoly power for a single-product firm, and with price chosen optimally will equal the inverse of its elasticity of demand. To see how this Lerner pricing rule is modified with multiproduct firms, let us conjecture a solution where the price-cost ratios are constant across all products sold by the firm in question, $\mu_{ifd} = \mu_{fd}$. Then it is immediately clear that the solution to (41) is

$$\left(\frac{\mu_{fd} - 1}{\mu_{fd}} \right) = - \left(\sum_{j \in I_{fd}} \frac{d \ln x_{ifd}}{d \ln p_{jfd}} \right)^{-1}. \quad (42)$$

Expression (42) says that the Lerner index for the firm equals the inverse of the sum of demand elasticities (rather than just the inverse of the own demand elasticity, as occurs for a single-product firm). In order for this solution to be valid, however, we need to have that the sum of elasticities on the right of (42) be independent of good i , because we have assumed that the markup is common across goods. This independence holds if an equi-proportional increase in all prices charged by a firm needs to lead to the same percentage drop in demand for any product sold by that firm. It turns out that this condition is satisfied for CES demands, in which case the sum of elasticities is²⁹

²⁹The cross-elasticity is $d \ln x_{ifd}/d \ln p_{jfd} = -[(\sigma - \eta) + (\eta - 1)S_{fc}]s_{jfc}$, for $i \neq j$ and along with (12) then (43) is obtained.

$$-\sum_{j \in I_{fd}} \frac{d \ln x_{ifd}}{d \ln p_{jfd}} = \eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd} > 1. \quad (43)$$

Notice that the expression on the right-hand side of (43) is precisely what we get from (12) if we replace the share s_{ifd} within the firm by unity, since the firm sells all of its own products. Then the pricing formula is obtained as (14).

C2. Choice of variety by the firm

The first-order condition of (15) with respect to N_{fd} yields³⁰

$$[p_{fd} - g_f(w_c) - T_{cd}]x_{fd} + N_{fd}[p_{fd} - g_{if}(w_c) - T_{cd}] \frac{dx_{fd}}{dN_{fd}} = k_{fd}. \quad (44)$$

Using the demand function, the elasticity of demand w.r.t. product scope N_{fd} is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \ln x_{fd}}{d \ln N_{fd}} &= (\sigma - \eta) \frac{d \ln P_{fd}}{d \ln N_{fd}} + (\eta - 1) \frac{d \ln P_d}{d \ln P_{fd}} \frac{d \ln P_{fd}}{d \ln N_{fd}} \\ &= \frac{\sigma - \eta + (\eta - 1)S_{fd}}{1 - \sigma}. \end{aligned}$$

The second inequality comes from $\frac{d \ln P_{fd}}{d \ln N_{fd}} = \frac{1}{1 - \sigma}$ when marginal costs are the same. Condition (44) can then be rewritten as (16),

$$N_{fd} = \frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma - 1} \left[\frac{S_{fd}(1 - S_{fd})}{\eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd}} \right] \frac{Y_d}{k_{fd}}.$$

C3. Model of core-competency and iceberg trade cost detailed

In this section, we solve the firm's problem with heterogeneous product marginal cost and iceberg trade cost. The production technology of the firm is characterized by a core competence for product $\omega = 0$, and firms are able to adjust the number of varieties with an adaption cost in marginal cost. Specifically, the marginal cost of producing variety ω is assumed to be monotonically increasing in ω . There is also a bilateral iceberg transportation cost τ_{cd} when firm sells to other cities. With these assumptions, the profit maximization of firm f in city c is expressed as,

$$\max_{N_{fd}, \{p_{fd}(\omega) | \omega \in [0, N_{fd}]\}} \sum_{d=1}^D \left\{ \int_0^{N_{fd}} [p_{fd}(\omega) - \tau_{cd}g_f(\omega)]x_{fd}(\omega)d\omega - k_{fd}N_{fd} - K_{fd} \right\} \mathbf{1}(N_{fd} > 0). \quad (45)$$

Following the steps shown in Appendix C.1, the optimal price is:

$$p_{fd}(\omega) = \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - S_{fd})} \right] \tau_{cd}g_f(\omega), \quad \forall \omega \in [0, N_{fd}]. \quad (46)$$

The first order condition with respect to N_{fd} yields,

³⁰As products have the same marginal cost, it is convenient to omit subscript i in the analysis.

$$[p_{fd}(N_{fd}) - \tau_{cd}g_f(N_{fd})]x_{fd}(N_{fd}) + \int_0^{N_{fd}} [p_{fd}(\omega) - \tau_{cd}g_f(\omega)] \frac{d \ln x_{fd}(\omega)}{dN_{fd}} d\omega = k_{fd}. \quad (47)$$

Using the demand function, the elasticity of demand with respect to product scope is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \ln x_{fd}}{d \ln N_{fd}} &= (\sigma - \eta) \frac{d \ln P_{fd}}{d \ln N_{fd}} + (\eta - 1) \frac{d \ln P_d}{d \ln P_{fd}} \frac{d \ln P_{fd}}{d \ln N_{fd}} \\ &= \frac{\sigma - \eta + (\eta - 1)S_{fd}}{1 - \sigma} s_{fd}(N_{fd}) N_{fd}. \end{aligned} \quad (48)$$

In this expression, $s_{fd}(N_{fd})$ denotes the within firm share of the very last product, indexed by $\omega = N_{fd}$, which is defined as,

$$s_{fd}(N_{fd}) = \frac{p_{fd}(N_{fd})x_{fd}(N_{fd})}{\int_0^{N_{fd}} p_{fd}(\omega)x_{fd}(\omega)d\omega} = \frac{g_f(N_{fd})^{1-\sigma}}{\int_0^{N_{fd}} g_f(\omega)^{1-\sigma}d\omega} \equiv H(N_{fd}),$$

where $H(\cdot)$ increases with its argument given $g'_f > 0$. Jointly using (47) and (48), the optimal scope is derived as,

$$H(N_{fd}) = \frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma - 1} \left[\frac{S_{fd}(1 - S_{fd})}{\eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd}} \right] \frac{Y_d}{k_{fd}}. \quad (49)$$

If we further assume $g_f(\omega) = w_c \omega^\theta$, with $\theta \geq 0$ and $\sigma < 1 + 1/\theta$, then $H(N_{fd}) = (1 + \theta - \sigma\theta)/N_{fd}$. Then the equation for λ_{fd} is derived as,

$$\lambda_{fd} = \frac{N_{fd}^{(\sigma-1)\theta} N_{min}^{1+\theta-\theta\sigma}}{1 + \theta - \theta\sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{\eta - 1} \right) \left[\frac{\eta - (\eta - 1)S_{fd}}{S_{fd}(1 - S_{fd})} \right] \frac{k_{fd}}{Y_d}.$$

D. Extension of the Model to Include Retailers

D1. Solution to the Model with Retailers

To begin with, we derive the elasticity of demand for a given product i (sold by firm f in retailer r of city c):

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_{ifrc} &= -\frac{d \ln x_{ifrc}}{d \ln p_{ifrc}} = 1 - \frac{d \ln(p_{ifrc}x_{ifrc})}{d \ln p_{ifrc}} \\ &= 1 - (1 - \sigma) - \left[(\sigma - \eta) + (\eta - \theta) \frac{d \ln P_{rc}}{d \ln P_{frc}} + (\theta - 1) \frac{d \ln P_c}{d \ln P_{rc}} \times \frac{d \ln P_{rc}}{d \ln P_{frc}} \right] \frac{d \ln P_{frc}}{d \ln p_{ifrc}} \\ &= \sigma - [(\sigma - \eta) + (\eta - \theta)h_{f|rc} + (\theta - 1)h_{rc}h_{f|rc}]h_{i|frc}, \end{aligned} \quad (50)$$

where $h_{x|y}$ denotes the conditional shares of x given y .³¹ The cross elasticity with respect to the products of the same firm f is $-[(\sigma - \eta) + (\eta - \theta)h_{f|rc} + (\theta - 1)h_{rc}h_{f|rc}]h_{i|frc}$. The cross elasticity with

³¹For example, $h_{i|frc} = d \ln P_{frc} / d \ln p_{ifrc}$ is the share of expenditure on product i within the sales of firm f in retailer r , while $h_{rc} = h_{r|c} = d \ln P_c / d \ln P_{rc}$ is the purchase share of retailer r in city c .

respect to the goods of another firm g is $-(\eta - \theta)h_{g|rc} + (\theta - 1)h_{rc}h_{g|rc}]h_{j|grc}$, and the cross elasticity with respect to the price of products of the same firm sold in another retailer s is $-(\theta - 1)h_{sc}h_{f|sc}h_{j|fsc}$.

We first solve the optimal pricing rule for retailers. The first-order condition of (26) with respect to p_{ifrc} is

$$x_{ifrc} + \sum_{j \in I_{frc} g \in F_{rc}} (p_{jgrc} - q_{jgrc}) \frac{dx_{jgrc}}{dp_{ifrc}} = 0, \quad \forall i \in I_{frc} f \in F_{rc}$$

.As we assume products are homogeneous everywhere (symmetry assumption), we can confirm that $dx_{jgrc}/dp_{ifrc} = dx_{ifrc}/dp_{jgrc}$, $\forall i, j, g$, and f . We rewrite the above the equation as:

$$1 + \sum_{j \in I_{frc} g \in F_{rc}} \left[1 - \frac{q_{jgrc}}{p_{jgrc}} \right] \frac{d \ln x_{ifrc}}{d \ln p_{jgrc}} = 0, \quad \forall i \in I_{fd}$$

.We conjecture that the markup of retailer r are the same across all the products sold in region c , and denote it as $\mu_{rc} = p_{jgrc}/q_{jgrc} \geq 1$. Then it is immediate that:

$$\left(\frac{\mu_{rc} - 1}{\mu_{rc}} \right) = - \left(\sum_{j \in I_{frc} g \in F_{rc}} \frac{d \ln x_{ifrc}}{d \ln p_{jgrc}} \right)^{-1}$$

Applying the cross-elasticity, we can derive that:

$$- \sum_{j \in I_{frc} g \in F_{rc}} \frac{d \ln x_{ifrc}}{d \ln p_{jgrc}} = \theta - (\theta - 1)h_{rc} > 1$$

which is consistent with what we conjecture. Therefore, the pricing rule is

$$p_{ifrc} = \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\theta - 1)(1 - h_{rc})} \right] q_{ifrc}, \quad \forall i \in I_{frc} f \in F_{rc}$$

Next, we solve for manufacturer's problem.³² The first-order condition of (26) with respect to price q_{ifrd} is:

$$x_{ifrd} + \sum_{s=1}^{S_d} \sum_{j \in I_{fsd}} [q_{jfsd} - g_{jf}(w_c) - T_{cd}] \frac{dx_{jfsd}}{dq_{ifrd}} = 0, \quad \forall i \in I_{ifrd}$$

By symmetry, $dx_{jfsd}/dq_{ifsd} = dx_{ifsd}/dq_{jfsd}$ and we rewrite above equation as:

$$1 + \sum_{s=1}^{S_d} \sum_{j \in I_{fsd}} \left[1 - \frac{g_{jf}(w_c) - T_{cd}}{q_{jfsd}} \right] \frac{d \ln x_{ifrd}}{d \ln q_{jfsd}} = 0, \quad \forall i \in I_{ifrd}$$

We conjecture that the markup of f are the same across all the products sold in region d , and denote it as $v_{fd} = q_{jfsd}/[g_{jf}(w_c) + T_d] \geq 1$. Then it is immediate that:

³²We assume full pass-through of the prices charged by manufacturers to the consumers, i.e., manufacturers are only able to affect the market price linearly following $p_{ifrd} = \mu_{rd}q_{ifrd}$, without affecting the retailer's markup μ_{rd} .

$$\left(\frac{v_{fd} - 1}{v_{fd}}\right) = - \left(\sum_{s=1}^{S_d} \sum_{j \in I_{f|sd}} \frac{d \ln x_{ifrd}}{d \ln q_{jfsd}} \right)^{-1}$$

Given the elasticities and the pricing rule of retailers, i.e., $p_{ifrd} = \mu_{rd} q_{ifrd}$, we are able to calculate the above expression as $(v_{fd} - 1)/v_{fd} = [\eta - (\eta - \theta)h_{f|rd} - (\theta - 1) \sum_s h_{f|sd} h_{sd}]^{-1}$. Due to symmetry, $h_{f|sd} = h_{fsd}/h_{sd} = (h_{fd}/S_d)/(1/S_d) = h_{fd}$ (recall that S_d is the number of retailers in city d), which helps to simplify $(v_{fd} - 1)/v_{fd}$ as,

$$\left(\frac{v_{fd} - 1}{v_{fd}}\right) = [\eta - (\eta - 1)h_{fd}]^{-1}$$

Therefore, the optimal prices charged by manufacture f to retailers r are:

$$q_{ifrd} = \left\{ 1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - h_{fd})} \right\} [g_{fi}(w_c) + T_{cd}], \forall i \in I_{f|rd} f \in F_{rd}$$

D2. Calibrating the Expenditure Share on Supermarket Chains

If consumption of city d is made partly from the supermarket chains (we allow for the existence of local convenient stores), the expenditure share of supermarket chains will be $\gamma_d \in (0, 1)$. We parameterize γ_d as

$$\gamma_d = \frac{N_d}{N_{max}} \gamma_{max}$$

where N_d denotes the number of supermarkets in city d , $N_{max} \equiv \max_c \{N_c\}$ is the number of supermarkets in the city which has the most supermarket chains. Both N_d and N_{max} are observables in the data. γ_{max} is the parameter to be calibrated, which denotes the expenditure share on the supermarket stores in the city which has the most supermarket chains. Given the GDP of each city, we calculate the overall expenditure share on supermarket stores as:

$$\bar{\gamma} = \sum_d \frac{Y_d}{\sum_c Y_c} \times \gamma_d$$

We calibrate γ_{max} such that the overall average expenditure share on the supermarket chains ($\bar{\gamma}$) equals the market share of physical store in the total retail of social consumer goods, which is 11% in 2010 according to the report by China Chain Store & Franchise Association (CCSFA).³³ The estimated value of γ_{max} is 18.31%, with which we recover the γ_d for all cities.

D3. Estimating Elasticity of Substitution θ

Our elasticities of firms (η) and varieties (σ) sources from Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein (2016) and we explain how we estimate the elasticity of supermarkets (θ) from our structure equations. We reform the price equation as:

³³The detailed information refer to Deloitte (2015).

$$p_{ifrd} / \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - h_{fd})} \right] = \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\theta - 1)(1 - \gamma_d h_{rd})} \right] \times [g_{fi}(w_c) + T_{cd}] \quad (51)$$

we further parameterize $[g_{fi}(w_c) + T_{cd}]$ as

$$[g_{fi}(w_c) + T_{cd}] = \alpha_i + \alpha_p + \beta_1 \text{Capital}_d + \beta_2 \text{Dist}_{cd} \quad (52)$$

where α_i denotes the product fixed effect (we use both UPC and UPC-Retailer specific fixed effects in practice and results barely change) to control the product marginal cost. In Dist_{cd} controls for the trade cost from c to d , and α_p denotes the destination province fixed effects.

Iterative Algorithm

Let A_{icd} represent equation (52) as a whole and we rewrite (51) as

$$p_{ifrd} / \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - h_{fd})} \right] = \underbrace{\alpha_i + \alpha_p + \beta_1 \text{Capital}_d + \beta_2 \text{Dist}_{cd}}_{A_{icd}} + \tilde{\theta} \frac{A_{icd}}{(1 - \gamma_d h_{rd})} \quad (53)$$

where $\tilde{\theta} \equiv 1/(\theta - 1)$ to be estimated. To do so, we adopt an iterative algorithm as explained below.

To begin with, we set the initial value of $A_{icd}^{(0)}$ as zero and estimate $\{\alpha, \beta\}$ from the linear regression of (53):

$$p_{ifrd} / \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - h_{fd})} \right] = \alpha_i + \alpha_p + \beta_1 \text{Capital}_d + \beta_2 \text{Dist}_{cd}$$

Given the estimated parameter $\{\alpha^{(0)}, \beta^{(0)}\}$, we predict

$$A_{icd}^{(1)} \equiv \alpha_i^{(0)} + \alpha_p^{(0)} + \beta_1^{(0)} \text{Capital}_d + \beta_2^{(0)} \text{Dist}_{cd} \quad (54)$$

Next, we use the updated value of $A_{icd}^{(1)}$ in (53), and repeat the linear regression:

$$p_{ifrd} / \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - h_{fd})} \right] = \alpha_i + \alpha_p + \beta_1 \text{Capital}_d + \beta_2 \text{Dist}_{cd} + \tilde{\theta} \frac{A_{icd}^{(1)}}{(1 - \gamma_d h_{rd})} \quad (55)$$

The linear regression of (55) yields $\{\alpha^{(1)}, \beta^{(1)}\}$ as well as $\tilde{\theta}^{(1)}$. We update A_{icd} in the same way as (54) and repeat the procedure. Specifically, after the n th regression, we update $A_{icd}^{(n)}$ which is used to estimate the $(n + 1)$ th regression:

$$A_{icd}^{(n)} \equiv \alpha_i^{(n-1)} + \alpha_p^{(n-1)} + \beta_1^{(n-1)} \text{Capital}_d + \beta_2^{(n-1)} \text{Dist}_{cd}$$

$$p_{ifrd} / \left[1 + \frac{1}{(\eta - 1)(1 - h_{fd})} \right] = \alpha_i + \alpha_p + \beta_1 \text{Capital}_d + \beta_2 \text{Dist}_{cd} + \tilde{\theta} \frac{A_{icd}^{(n)}}{(1 - \gamma_d h_{rd})}$$

The iterative procedure yields a collection $\{\hat{\theta}^{(1)}, \hat{\theta}^{(2)}, \dots, \hat{\theta}^{(n)}\}$, which stops when there is little changes between $\hat{\theta}^{(N-1)}$ and $\hat{\theta}^{(N)}$. Figure 15 shows the numerical convergence of $\hat{\theta}$ for the four main products. The point estimates are remarkably consistent with each other.




Figure 15: Numerical Estimation of $\hat{\theta}$

For robustness, we try with different values for the expenditure share on supermarket chains γ_d . Table 13 reports the results when we use large value of $\gamma_d = 50\%$, and the finding of higher retailer and manufacturer markup in smaller and poorer cities remains robust.

E. Summary of Decomposition of $S(G)\Lambda(G)$ for New York and Shanghai

Table 14 summarizes the population weighted average of the share term $S_c(G)$ and the variety term $\Lambda_c(G)$, which are components of the exact price index shown in (25), for Shanghai relative to New York (greater than unity implies the corresponding variable is larger in Shanghai).

Table 13: Robustness Check: Price Regressions of the Extended Model ($\gamma_d = 0.50$)

Dep Var.	Toothpaste			Laundry Detergent		
	Price	P/MK _R	P/(MK _R MK _M)	Price	P/MK _R	P/(MK _R MK _M)
<i>In Population</i>	-2.934*** (0.497)	-1.920*** (0.251)	-1.005*** (0.161)	-5.598*** (0.972)	-3.592*** (0.483)	-2.755*** (0.351)
<i>In Average Income</i>	-5.416*** (0.391)	-2.608*** (0.196)	-2.131*** (0.129)	-2.128*** (0.583)	-1.270*** (0.289)	-0.968*** (0.213)
<i>Capital City</i>	0.036 (0.272)	-0.206 (0.136)	-0.126 (0.085)	-0.488 (0.505)	-0.457* (0.25)	-0.477*** (0.18)
<i>Distance (1000km)</i>	0.569* (0.300)	0.269* (0.149)	0.250*** (0.090)	1.05 (0.856)	0.621 (0.423)	0.509* (0.306)
Observations	89,399	89,399	89,399	102,747	102,747	102,747
R-squared	0.026	0.026	0.031	0.010	0.011	0.013
Dep Var.	Personal Wash Items			Shampoo		
	Price	P/MK _R	P/(MK _R MK _M)	Price	P/MK _R	P/(MK _R MK _M)
<i>In Population</i>	-2.093** (0.978)	-1.712*** (0.486)	-1.285*** (0.339)	-9.603*** (1.15)	-6.742*** (0.574)	-5.375*** (0.441)
<i>In Average Income</i>	-4.606*** (0.687)	-2.729*** (0.340)	-1.959*** (0.237)	-4.019*** (0.78)	-2.414*** (0.395)	-1.990*** (0.303)
<i>Capital City</i>	-1.077* (0.572)	-1.185*** (0.283)	-0.818*** (0.197)	-1.519** (0.671)	-1.866*** (0.334)	-1.665*** (0.256)
<i>Distance (1000km)</i>	-0.493 (0.715)	-0.327 (0.354)	-0.182 (0.247)	0.753 (0.887)	0.432 (0.438)	0.382 (0.334)
Observations	143,593	143,593	143,593	142,627	142,627	142,627
R-squared	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.013	0.015	0.017

Notes: $\gamma_d = 0.50$. MK_R and MK_M stand for the markups of retailer and manufacturer. Each regression include destination province and UPC-Supermarket fixed effects. *Average Income* is measured as GDP per capita in each city of the given *Population*. Prices (Price and P/mkup) are in units of U.S. cents. *Capital City* is dummy variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the UPC-Supermarket and reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 14: Summary of Decomposition of $S(G)\Lambda(G)$ for New York and Shanghai

Product Category \ Variable	$\frac{\prod_{f \in G} S_{f,SH}(G)}{\prod_{f \in G} S_{f,NY}(G)}$	$\frac{\prod_{f \in G} \prod_{i \in I_f} s_{fi,SH}(I_f)}{\prod_{f \in G} \prod_{i \in I_f} s_{fi,NY}(I_f)}$	$\frac{S_{SH}(G)}{S_{NY}(G)}$	$\frac{\Lambda_{SH}(G)}{\Lambda_{NY}(G)}$	$\frac{S_{SH}(G)\Lambda_{SH}(G)}{S_{NY}(G)\Lambda_{NY}(G)}$
Four Main Products					
Toothpaste	1.01	1.53	1.55	0.41	0.64
Laundry Detergent	1.00	1.13	1.13	0.46	0.52
Personal Wash Item	1.00	0.60	0.60	1.03	0.62
Shampoo	1.06	1.05	1.11	0.60	0.66
Other Products					
Baby Formula	1.25	1.01	1.27	0.88	1.12
Batteries	1.00	1.35	1.35	0.75	1.01
Biscuits	1.00	0.98	0.98	2.23	2.18
Cereal	1.00	2.15	2.15	0.91	1.95
Chips	1.75	0.85	1.49	1.18	1.76
Chocolate	1.00	1.62	1.62	1.07	1.74
Coffee	1.00	1.20	1.20	0.80	0.97
Diapers	1.01	1.12	1.13	0.99	1.12
Dog Food	1.00	1.03	1.03	1.42	1.46
Gum	1.00	1.26	1.26	0.70	0.88
Milk Powder	1.00	0.60	0.60	1.24	0.74
Soap	1.46	1.18	1.72	2.49	4.28
Soft Drinks	1.05	1.56	1.63	0.73	1.19
Tea	1.00	1.52	1.52	1.41	2.13
Toothbrushes	1.99	1.33	2.65	0.60	1.57

References

- ANTONIADES, A. (2017): "Distribution as Expenditure," Working paper, Georgetown University.
- CAMPBELL, J. R., AND H. A. HOPENHAYN (2005): "Market Size Matters," *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 53(1), 1–25.
- CAVALLO, A., AND R. RIGOBON (2016): "The Billion Prices Project: Using Online Prices for Measurement and Research," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 30(2), 151–178.
- DEATON, A., AND B. ATEN (2017): "Trying to Understand the PPPs in ICP2011: Why are the Results so Different?," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 9(1), 243–264.
- DEATON, A., AND A. HESTON (2010): "Understanding PPPs and PPP-based National Accounts," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 2(4), 1–35.
- DELOITTE (2015): "China Retail Industry Development," *Report, China Chain Store & Franchise Association*.
- FEENSTRA, R. C. (1994): "New Product Varieties and the Measurement of International Prices," *American Economic Review*, 84(1), 157–177.
- (2016): *Advanced International Trade*, Princeton University Press, 2nd edition.
- FEENSTRA, R. C., AND H. MA (2009): "Optimal choice of product scope for multiproduct firms under monopolistic competition," in *The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy*, ed. by E. Helpman, D. Marin, and T. Verdier, pp. 173–199. Harvard university Press.
- FEENSTRA, R. C., H. MA, J. P. NEARY, AND D. PRASADA RAO (2013): "Who Shrunk China? Puzzles in the Measurement of Real GDP," *The Economic Journal*, 123(573), 1100–1129.
- HANDBURY, J., AND D. E. WEINSTEIN (2015): "Goods Prices and Availability in Cities," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 82(1), 258–296.
- HOTTMAN, C., S. J. REDDING, AND D. E. WEINSTEIN (2016): "Quantifying the Sources of Firm Heterogeneity," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 131(3), 1291–1364.
- INKLAAR, R., AND D. S. P. RAO (2017): "Cross-Country Income Levels Over Time: Did the Developing World Suddenly Become much Richer?," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 9(1), 265–290.
- MACEDONI, L. (2017): "Multiproduct Superstars Across Rich and Poor Countries. Theory and Evidence," Discussion paper, University of California, Davis.
- RAFF, H., AND J. WAGNER (2013): "Productivity and the Product Scope of Multi-Product Firms: a Test of Feenstra-Ma," *Economic Bulletin*, 33(1), 173–199.

- REDDING, S. J., AND D. E. WEINSTEIN (2016): "A Unified Approach to Estimating Demand and Welfare," NBER Working Paper 22479.
- SATO, K. (1976): "The Ideal log-Change Index Number," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 58, 223–228.
- VARTIA, Y. O. (1976): "Ideal log-Change Index Numbers," *Scandinavian Journal of Statistics*, 3, 121–126.