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**External Engagement:  
Explaining the Spread of Electoral Participation Provisions in Civil  
Conflict Settlements**

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**Abstract.** When do settlements to civil conflict bring former combatants into normal politics as political parties? Prior work shows that electoral-participation provisions in settlements correlate with enduring peace; such provisions help end some of the longest and deadliest civil conflicts. But they are not always included in negotiated settlements. This article presents original data showing that no settlements included electoral-participation provisions until the end of the Cold War. Since then, they appear in almost half of all settlements. What explains this pattern? I argue that combatants include electoral participation provisions to engage international actors; through these provisions, international actors can often enforce negotiated deals by monitoring and providing incentives conditioned on combatant compliance. This helps to overcome commitment problems that often prevent peaceful settlements of civil conflicts. An analysis of data on civil conflicts and settlements since 1975, as well as illustrative case evidence, provides support for this argument.

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In a breakthrough, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Colombian government negotiated clauses providing for the rebel group to transition to a political party and participate in post-conflict elections. Observers considered these clauses to be the “backbone for constructing a sustainable peace” in the September 2016 settlement (Christian Voekel, International Crisis Group, quoted in Brodzinsky 2013). But debate on these provisions proved tough and talks stalled (Castro 2013). Opposition politicians called them “shameful” (Miroff 2016). Many citizens agreed: these provisions were among the most unpopular aspects of the settlement, which voters rejected in an October 2016 plebiscite (Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz 2018).

Though sometimes controversial, provisions allowing rebels to compete as political parties increasingly appear in civil conflict settlements. I define *electoral-participation provisions* (EPPs) as clauses that establish post-conflict elections in which each combatant side is set to participate, typically by legalizing rebel political parties and scheduling government-run elections.<sup>1</sup> EPPs provide an alternative to other mechanisms, such as fixed formulas or territorial division,<sup>2</sup> for distributing power after conflict. While each mechanism allows the sides to “share” power, only EPPs do so via elections in which former combatants compete as political parties. Alternative forms of power-sharing do not rely on elections to share power, even if elections do eventually occur — for example, if each combatant side holds its own elections after a territorial split. I argue that using EPPs as a power-sharing strategy is important because they change the likelihood of international involvement.

Though never employed during the Cold War, EPPs appear in almost half of all conflict-ending settlements since 1990, as shown in Figure 1. Combatants included EPPs in settlements that ended some of the most destructive internal wars since 1945, such as the 2003 agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (a conflict that saw 145,000 battle deaths and 2.5 million related deaths over four years) and the current agreement in Colombia (seeking to end a 52-year war). In addition, EPPs arise in the aftermath of a variety of conflicts: those with strong and weak rebels (for example, Burundi, Indonesia); those mobilized on leftist platforms and ethnic cleavages (for example El Salvador, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and in states where elections had


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<sup>1</sup> The analysis section describes EPP coding in detail.

<sup>2</sup> Fixed formulas provide each side some number of seats, control of ministries, or another share of state structures without their planned participation in elections. Territorial division mechanisms give each side control over part of the state.

or had not occurred regularly (for example, the Philippines, Mozambique). However, EPPs are not universal (see Figure 1, comparing the filled and unfilled bars after 1989),<sup>3</sup> and some significant settlements lack them (for example, many secessionist agreements).<sup>4</sup>

**Figure 1: Settlements over Time**



Combatants’ increasing inclusion of these provisions in civil war settlements raises important questions. Under what conditions does the end of a civil conflict bring armed actors into normal politics? When do combatants negotiate settlements that bring former warring sides into elections as political parties? Exploring this variation not only help us understand how conflicts end, but also why some settlements last when others do not. Recent studies show that settlements that include EPPs experience lower rates of conflict recurrence than those that do not (Matanock 2012; 2017a; 2017b; Marshall and Ishiyama 2016).

This article seeks to explain variation in the use of EPPs in peace settlements. Combatants, especially rebel groups, otherwise worry that their opponents will fail to comply with settlements. I argue combatants can use EPPs to settle conflicts because, under the right

<sup>3</sup> This figure and a limited amount of other material in this article is also in Matanock (2017b), which is subject to copyright law, and so this is reprinted with permission under the terms that allow the author to use her work.

<sup>4</sup> See also Figure A0 in the appendix showing the regional spread over time of EPPs.

supply and demand dynamics, these provisions facilitate external actors' low-cost monitoring and enforcement of peace deals. Ideally, EPPs help establish coordinating cycles that encourage international involvement; they thereby engage external actors to enforce compliance.

Combatants should, therefore, seek out this low-cost mechanism — which is more likely to be credible and sustainable than approaches that require military enforcement, such as a fixed formula — through which external actors can detect and sanction noncompliance.

In reality, however, supply-and-demand dynamics affect the availability of EPPs for ending civil conflicts. On the supply side, the spread of democracy promotion institutions, and the norms accompanying them, enable external actors to implement settlements through EPPs; on the demand side, special relationships between the governments and external actors reduce rebels' desire to incorporate EPPs. I thus hypothesize that measures of these dynamics — which are proxies for combatant expectations of external engagement, including the regional spread of international democracy promotion (increased supply) and special partnerships (reduced demand) — correlate with variation in EPP inclusion.

I also consider three alternative explanations, which I derive from existing literature on democratization and elections pressures. These explanations, described the theory section, differ in their causal mechanisms. I treat international explanations as most-likely alternatives, as patterns in the data suggest internal variation plays a less important role in driving the inclusion of EPPs in conflict settlements.

The evidence supports my “external engagement” explanation. Drawing on new data identifying the inclusion of EPPs in all settlements to civil conflicts terminated between 1975 and 2005, my cross-national analyses show combatants include these provisions when they expect external engagement in the process. EPPs are thus positively correlated with the spread of international-democracy promotion programs. EPPs are negatively correlated with the existence of special relationships between governments and likely external enforcers.

This article takes a significant first step in understanding when and why settlements bring former combatants into electoral politics as political parties. It proceeds as follows. The first section seeks to explain variation in EPPs, especially the apparent international dynamics, by proposing the external engagement theory and alternative explanations. It also shows an illustrative case. The second section presents new empirical data on EPPs and offers quantitative tests of the theory. The final section concludes with implications of the results.

## EPPs and External Engagement

Prior work has addressed questions about the effect of EPPs on peace (Matanock 2012; 2017a; 2017b; Marshall and Ishiyama 2016) or new parties' success (for example, De Zeeuw 2007; Söderberg Kovacs 2007). But little work has systematically theorized about variation in EPP inclusion across settlements.

What do combatants need to sign a settlement? Certain conditions are widely explored in the literature. First, combatants must expect to benefit more from the deal than from continued fighting. Conflicts can be “ripe” for settlement, if, say, outside sponsors have grown weary of fighting or all sides have entered a stable stalemate; conditions such as balanced power across combatant sides make it easier to design and implement power-sharing agreements that benefit each side (for example, Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

Second, each side must believe its opponent is credibly committing to the deal. Existing research generally posits that commitment problems pose an enduring obstacle to securing settlements (for example, Walter 2002). Commitment problems occur when the balance of power changes during a peace process, and the temporary stronger side has incentives to violate the settlement. The challenge is not limited to overtly renegeing on settlement terms; concern that the other side is covertly failing to comply, perhaps even unintentionally, can also prove problematic. Since combatants often lack complete information about their opponents, the commitment problem is an informational *and* incentive problem. To secure a settlement, all sides must be confident that their opponents will comply or be sanctioned.

Based on existing theories of civil conflict, this article tests whether EPPs are simply included under the same conditions as other power-sharing provisions or when any settlement is signed. Most existing work on EPPs focuses on the quality of resulting parties or elections (for example, De Zeeuw 2007; Söderberg Kovacs 2007).<sup>5</sup> These studies primarily attribute the

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<sup>5</sup> Some recent cross-national research examines successful transitions by rebel groups to political parties during any type of conflict termination (Acosta 2014; Manning and Smith 2016); other studies suggest examining rebels that participate due to a settlement separately because the causal factors may be different (Matanock 2016). Indeed, the initial studies find these transitions are most common through settlements (or “political victories” as Acosta labels them), compared to military victories. Consistent with this article, Manning and Smith (2016) find significant international involvement correlates with participation (Cold War-era conflicts that end after 1990 and agreements with international involvement). This article therefore seeks to explain variation in this type of rebel participation in particular. Söderberg Kovacs and Hatz (2016) use a working version of this article to generate hypotheses about

inclusion of EPPs to combatants' desire to reach *any* settlement, such as *war weariness due to long or large civil conflicts (H0a)*. Moreover, power-sharing via any mechanism —EPPs, fixed formulas, or territorial control (see definitions above) — may be most likely when combatants believe each side will hold significant power (Walter 2002; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Mattes and Savun 2009), such as in *a balance in capabilities between the combatant sides (H0b)*. This balance allows each side to check the other(s) through mutual vetoes. Finally, EPPs are about elections, so perhaps they are most likely when *state institutions exist that ease the establishment of new parties and the holding of elections (H0c)*.

This article contributes to this literature by positing that the mechanism used to distribute power is an important design choice combatants make. Specifically, combatants are more likely to include EPPs when they help meet the conditions needed to sign a settlement, such as increasing the probability of sanction for noncompliance.

I theorize that EPPs provide combatants with crucial advantages by attracting external engagement that can help overcome commitment problems and secure settlements.<sup>6</sup> The patterns in Figure 1 suggest that some variation in EPP inclusion is likely due to international dynamics. First, EPPs were not included in settlements before the end of the Cold War. However, combatants have frequently included EPPs since then, even controlling for an increase in the overall number of elections worldwide. Second, EPP inclusion occurred first in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, regions most proximate to Western powers (see Figure A0 in the appendix). These patterns suggest international dynamics help determine the spread of such provisions.

I argue EPPs provide combatants these advantage of external engagement under the right supply and demand dynamics. Combatants, especially rebel groups, may hesitate to sign even

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rebel party formation in settlements — and they also find these provisions should be more likely after the Cold War and when external actors are included in negotiations. I also control for other domestic factors analyzed in these studies that are available, such as force size, group goals, and level of democracy.

<sup>6</sup> Elections, however, also complicate settlements: in order to arrange EPPs where one side will not be dissatisfied with the outcome, believe it has no chance to win, and return to conflict (for example, Walter 1999), the election must be structured to distribute power from voting to match the expected distribution from fighting (for example, consociationalism, see Lijphart 1968; and, in post-conflict contexts, see Wantchekon 2004; Durant and Weintraub 2014; Hartzell and Hoddie 2015). EPPs typically reduce the uncertainty of elections, establishing power-sharing *through* elections. Such provisions increase the puzzle around EPPs, as these provisions do not necessarily reflect electorate preferences and are thus less normatively appealing. This article seeks to explain why, despite these complications, combatants use EPPs in settlements, rather than another means of power-sharing, such as fixed formulas.

mutually-beneficial settlements because they are concerned that their opponents have opportunities to renege and gain more at moments of relative strength during implementation. EPPs can make enforcement credible by engaging external actors, facilitating international actors' monitoring and enforcement of peace deals. This mechanism is more credible and sustainable, and less costly, than military force to back an alternative form of power distribution between combatants. In an ideal world, then, combatants should therefore favor EPPs.

In the real world, however, supply and demand dynamics affect when this mechanism is available. In terms of supply, the spread of democracy promotion institutions, and the norms that accompany them, make external engagement more likely, increasing combatants' likelihood of including EPPs. In terms of demand, special relationships between governments and external actors make rebels less likely to see the latter as credible enforcers, decreasing combatants' likelihood of including EPPs. This section lays out this argument and associated hypotheses: proxies for combatants' expectations of external engagement change the probability combatants will include EPPs. This theory draws on existing studies of internationally enforcing compliance with treaties (for example, Simmons 1998). But international dynamics may play a variety of different roles in elections, so I also consider alternative explanations that may overlap with my "external engagement" theory.

**Combatants Often Need Help to Commit.** To sign an agreement, combatants must feel secure that a settlement will not be violated. Commitment problems occur when one side has an incentive to violate a mutually-beneficial deal (for example, Walter 2002). Combatants might foresee such problems even when implementing well-designed settlements. *De jure* power must change to match *de facto* power, and the situation must be demilitarized. Both are difficult tasks to accomplish with simultaneity and precision. Combatants, then, may require external enforcement to detect and sanction violations of the settlement, making noncompliance more costly than continued compliance. To serve this function, international actors need information about whether all sides are complying with the settlement, alongside conditional promises of rewards or threats of punishment for each. If combatants anticipate that external actors will change the expected cost of noncompliance for each side, their engagement can help overcome commitment problems. Combatants often hesitate to sign onto settlements without some form of external engagement (Walter 2002).



**Why Combatants Would Choose EPPs.** In an ideal world, combatants choose EPPs because they help produce secure settlements by credibly engaging external actors to enforce the terms.

Making external enforcement seem credible to combatants can be a challenge. Peacekeepers could respond to settlement violations with threats of force; for instance, if combatants are set to share power in the cabinet and military through a fixed formula, peacekeeping troops could threaten to punish either side identified as breaking the distributional terms (for example, Walter 1997). However, peacekeepers often reduce or withdraw their forces rather than punish non-compliers (Fortna 2008, 87-89). Moreover, troops are rarely deployed, and often for shorter periods than needed. However, mechanisms that do not require force, such as responding to combatant compliance by giving or withholding foreign aid, may suffice as sanctions.<sup>7</sup> The lower cost for external actors may make external enforcement seem more credible to combatants.

For combatants, designing a settlement around EPPs not only allows for power-sharing similar to mechanisms such as fixed formulas or territorial divisions, but it *also* provides for external enforcement under the supply and demand conditions that I describe below. EPPs enable external actors to obtain the information and conditional incentives needed for external enforcement at a lower cost, and thus more credibly and sustainably, than peacekeeping. How do EPPs do so?

For combatants to expect external actors to detect their opponents' noncompliance, non-partisan monitoring must take place throughout implementation. International actors can provide that around electoral cycles. The U.N. and regional intergovernmental organizations lead most observation missions during initial post-conflict elections, and then work with other international observers in subsequent electoral cycles. These extended missions allow full observation through the first power transition, and for each power transition thereafter.

Election observers provide information about whether power transitions occur according to the rules at states' pivotal moments (for example, Hyde 2011). Existing studies demonstrate that post-conflict electoral observers monitor compliance with terms of settlements. In Bosnia

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<sup>7</sup> The sanctions simply must make noncompliance more costly than compliance. The settlement's design can also reduce the sanction needed: it only need be greater than what can be seized through noncompliance, which can be minimized by incrementally implementing a settlement.

and Herzegovina, for example, the E.U. measured the 2010 elections against the benchmarks of the 1995 Dayton Accords, even though its reliance on ethnic quotas did not match that organization's democracy standards (Kelley 2012, 63; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134-56). These observers can be especially crucial at moments of power distribution: for instance, the El Salvadoran government attempted to move polling stations in rebel strongholds to a department capital, reducing the rebel party's vote share; the U.N. election observation mission disputed the government's claim of a security risk and provided additional security, reversing the planned move (Montgomery 1998, 131). External actors can monitor other benchmarks tied to elections, such whether each side is meeting demobilization targets and changing economic conditions, as well.

Conditional incentives accompany election observation in most post-conflict contexts. After the Cold War, the international community began to link the provision of aid such as development and, increasingly, democracy assistance to certain conditions (Carothers 1999, 6, 85). The United Nations and other regional intergovernmental organizations directly administer aid related to the elections but also coordinate with foreign donors. Many peace deals also include trust funds or other assistance for former rebel political parties. This assistance ensures that all sides face the threat of sanction, and even small reductions in resources can have effects (for example, Carothers 1999). Existing evidence indicates that conditionality *is* employed in post-conflict contexts, incentivizing compliance and reinforcing combatant expectations about the costs of noncompliance. Cross-national data show external actors' willingness to invoke conditionality around elections (Donno 2013) — especially post-conflict elections (Matanock 2012; 2017a; 2017b; Matanock and Lichtenheld 2016) — and a willingness to revoke benefits for failing to comply with governance conditions (for example, Öhler, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher 2012).<sup>8</sup> The strongest party is usually best positioned to violate the terms of the deal by repressing its opponents, for example. The government is typically stronger. International actors can condition state assistance on continued compliance to overcome this tendency. Assistance to all political parties, however, continues to keep even weaker parties in check. In Mozambique,

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<sup>8</sup> Some studies indicate election observation across contexts results in relatively few reductions in aid (Hyde and Marinov 2012), and electoral observers in violent contexts may refuse to punish fraud to avoid disturbing the peace (Kelley 2012, 63, 72-73). But they offer little evidence of these dynamics post-conflict, and they also acknowledge how difficult it is to identify threats, or even temporary reductions, that may improve behavior. Punishment in these cases then may be “off the equilibrium path,” as actors typically chose to cooperate after receiving credible threats (described by Weingast 1996).

for instance, the threat of losing a substantial trust fund kept the rebel group, Renamo, participating peacefully (Nuvunga 2007, 10-14). These elections are typically designed to prevent any side from taking complete control under a winner-takes-all system; so, even if the strongest side is most likely to violate, each side has incentives to comply.<sup>9</sup>

In short, EPPs can enable effective external engagement, helping combatants overcome commitment problems through information and conditional incentives. The institutional characteristics of this design choice ease coordination, and the context allows the mechanism to work.

The institutional characteristics of EPPs provide advantages to combatants. Like other mechanisms for distributing power, such as fixed formulas or territorial divisions, EPPs can be structured to match combatants' expected outcome from fighting. For example, EPPs might allow each side to gain a share of party funds or set quotas guaranteeing a set number of legislative seats.<sup>10</sup> Unlike other mechanisms, however, EPPs provide regular public benchmarks surrounding moments of power distribution. Such benchmarks make it less costly for outsiders to detect and sanction noncompliance, increasing combatants' confidence in the settlement. EPPs specify *publicly* who is eligible to run for office, what resources they have available, how the winner(s) will be chosen, what they will control, and when each step will occur; EPPs also establish *regular* intervals for when parties must enact each provision.<sup>11</sup> These benchmarks allow multiple points at which actors may observe compliance with procedural rules around elections — as well as other provisions including military reforms, human rights protections, and socio-economic policy changes.<sup>12</sup> As elections recur, combatants can expect continued monitoring of implementation, even as power changes hands.<sup>13</sup> Elections therefore occur at the culmination of

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<sup>9</sup> The design of an agreement to avoid a winner-takes-all system is therefore a scope condition. While designers violated this condition in an early case in 1991 Angola, few have done so since (for example, O'Toole 1997). Matanock (2017b) shows that second participatory elections are held without major delays after 90 percent of first participatory post-conflict elections, suggesting most cases meet this scope condition.

<sup>10</sup> These elections need not be particularly "open" or "free and fair" to establish these rules for power distribution, and they often are not, as discussed above.

<sup>11</sup> Elections have been identified as useful in other contexts because their publicity and regularity provides more accuracy in assessing leader performance and simultaneously allows those assessing to sanction deviations from the standard (Fearon 2011b).

<sup>12</sup> There is an extensive literature on the contributions of institutional reform to securing settlements, which this mechanism complements by making those reforms easier to enforce, especially security sector reform deadlines, which can be pegged to the electoral timeline (see Toft 2010, 32).

<sup>13</sup> See note 9: second elections are only not held following 10 percent of cases in which first elections are held.

each power-sharing cycle. Aware that they might lose assistance and power within the party or state, combatants are incentivized to comply.

Combatants commonly need international actors to help enforce deals because domestic actors, particularly civil society organizations, are typically polarized or weak, and thus unable to credibly enforce each side's compliance (for example, Arnault 2001, 11). Although domestic actors can help identify compliance and augment accountability, they may provide biased information. International actors, however, are often outside the partisan politics of the conflict, which helps them investigate and then sanction noncompliance (see below on demand).<sup>14</sup>

The current state of the international system makes EPPs particularly advantageous for combatants. First, electoral processes attract more attention than other political events. The dominance of liberalism has increased the cultural salience of electoral processes and produced normative conventions around compliance with electoral rules.<sup>15</sup> Leaders receive significantly more media coverage in U.S. news during election years, for example (Gorman and Seguin 2015). Post-conflict elections formed through settlements with EPPs receive even more election observation and assistance — and conditionality — than other elections (see Table A0 in the appendix).<sup>16</sup> Second, democracy promotion programs have become a uniquely legitimate form of international involvement (Hyde 2011). This legitimacy removes the international actor's need to overcome sovereignty concerns (Krasner and Risse 2014; Matanock 2014). Third, these programs' institutionalization eases the logistical burden of enforcement in post-conflict states.

**Supply and Demand of EPPs.** Ideally, these advantages should produce consistent “demand,” and combatants should include EPPs in their settlements. Contrast the EPP mechanism with fixed-formula power-sharing. Fixed-formula power-sharing often results in confusion about what constitutes compliance. In Chad, for instance, the government distributed cabinet positions to rebels signing settlements in the late 1980s. But the number of cabinet positions expanded and diluted the rebels' power. Rebels could not point to a clear violation because the rules of power distribution were never specified in the way elections require — and the international community did not pay attention. But the problem extends beyond information

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<sup>14</sup> Other work focused on domestic process have even noted the need for international actors to “mediate and supervise joint disarmament and state-building” (Wantchekon 2004, 17, 27). Over time, elections also gradually allow more input from citizens as they become more effective in this role (for example, Beaulieu 2014, 132).

<sup>15</sup> Author Interview with Condoleezza Rice, Former Secretary of State, 2013.

<sup>16</sup> Other evidence also suggests that external actors engage after EPPs, increasing foreign aid and international involvement (for example, Kumar 1998; Lopez-Pintor 2005; Lyons 2005).

and attention. When power has already been distributed between combatants, external actors lose their ability to leverage conditional incentives and accountability. Of course, combatants may seek to secure a settlement with an alternative enforcement mechanism, such as armed peacekeeping. However, these mechanisms are less likely to overcome commitment problems. Armed peacekeepers, for instance, may not be able to commit forces for the entire implementation period. Without external enforcement through EPPs, a settlement may not be secured at all, and combatants may simply continue fighting.

In the real world, combatants sometimes choose EPPs and sometimes choose these alternatives. I argue the extent to which combatants expect external actors to detect and sanction noncompliance with settlements under EPPs varies with international dynamics that change the “supply” and even “demand” — shifting the probability of EPP inclusion.

Combatants increasingly expect external enforcement as international system dynamics have shifted: international coordination on civil conflict termination has become more common, and democracy promotion programs have come to provide a less costly method of international involvement. With lessened concern of war between major powers, international actors have become more focused on civil conflict termination than other security threats (for example, Brown 1996). Peacekeeping, however, has never become pervasive (for example, Fortna 2008). Interest in terminating civil conflict at the end of the Cold War coincided with other changes in the international system, which provided different mechanisms for external engagement. Democracy promotion now provides a low-cost, long-term method for external actors to detect and sanction noncompliance with settlements (for example, McCoy 1993). Election observation and associated aid increased substantially as the Cold War ended, though it diffused unevenly across regions — appearing first in Latin America and last in Asia (Azpuru Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2008; Hyde 2011; Kelley 2012). Therefore, *EPPs should be more prevalent after 1989*, when election observation and aid increased, an implication substantiated by the data in Table 1 (and Figure A0 in the appendix).

Of course, the international community changed in many other ways at the end of the Cold War, so I focus on regional trends in democracy promotion programs, which should also alter the supply of external engagement. Donors have increased their use of conditionality — centered on democracy promotion rather than loyalty to capitalism or communism — since the end of the Cold War, although they have focused most on regions such as Eastern Europe (for

example, Kelley 2012). Regional organizations have played a central role in election observation, perpetuating regional differences (Kelley 2012). When regions developed rigorous observation and conditioned incentives, state leaders could expect international actors to detect and sanction noncompliance. They could also be criticized for not inviting external engagement, further strengthening these regional trends (Hyde 2011; Kelley 2012).<sup>17</sup> (The systematic regional differences are discussed further in “Independent Variables” below.) If EPPs make use of democracy promotion programs, then *EPPs should be more prevalent with higher regional rates of democracy promotion (H1a)*.

Before adopting these provisions, combatants must expect that democracy promotion programs will be available, but also that their opponents will be subject to external enforcement through EPPs. Further demand dynamics, therefore, interact with the supply dynamics. Even with a strong regional supply of democracy promotion programs, and, with other states inviting election observation and conditional aid, combatants may still hesitate to trust their settlement enforcement to EPPs. If any side has a “special” relationship with a potential external enforcer, combatants may not believe that side will be held to the settlement. During the Cold War, for example, the United States backed most anti-communist governments, so those governments could likely violate settlements signed with leftist guerrillas without sanction. Although such special relationships are rarer since 1989, the concern remains. If the rebels expect international actors may favor the government due to a strategic military partnership, long-standing colonial ties, or, perhaps, supply of crucial natural resources, those international actors can lose credibility as enforcers. For example, if a government is needed to fight local radicals as part of the U.S. “War on Terror,” or if a government has former colonial ties to Britain and France — powers that have remained deeply involved in internal politics (for example, Vallin 2015) — rebels may be concerned about whether external actors would sanction those governments. Natural resources provide an additional reason for rebels to lose trust: these assets may make governments less sensitive to external actors’ sanctions because they are less dependent on aid (for example, Girod 2012; Donno 2013). Weaker, more external ties are less likely to signal that an external actor will not seek to establish peace and overcome externalities caused by conflict.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> A similar argument is also made about human rights treaties, for example; see Simmons (2009, 18).

<sup>18</sup> Other alliances may be mainly external and not necessitate the government remaining in power: a mutual defense alliance against a third state could potentially withstand a change in regime, for example. Weak relationships, those

Therefore, *EPPs should be less prevalent in cases in which governments have special relationships with engaged international actors (H1b).*

Finally, the theory implies rebels are more likely to demand EPPs. While all combatants have incentives to overcome commitment problems that would otherwise block a mutually-beneficial settlement, rebels face more uncertainty about how state institutions work. As rebels integrate into these institutions, often while dismantling their own wartime institutions, governments may subtly decrease rebels' power. Rebels cannot always rely on state institutions to ensure their side of the deal through mechanisms such as fixed-formula power-sharing. Instead, rebels may seek external enforcement. While difficult to test across cases, the case illustrations *are likely to show rebels pushing for EPPs.*<sup>19</sup>

### ***Other Explanations***

The patterns in Figure 1 suggest that international dynamics help explain EPP inclusion, but one could derive alternative mechanisms from existing work. In contrast to the external engagement theory, none of these other international explanations require EPPs; government-run elections work in each case. However, these mechanisms could explain some variation in provisions for any post-conflict elections. Each is consistent with emergence after the Cold War (Figure 1) but otherwise different in empirically testable ways.

An “emulation” explanation might suggest that combatants choose EPPs to conform to models provided by the states to which they are closely tied.<sup>20</sup> Combatants may see states adopting elections or democracy and conform to socially-defined norms that include such institutions (for example, Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). They may especially conform to models provided by the powers with which they have the strongest relations. This mechanism is

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that are not partnerships dealing with internal threats, have less strategic value and so should be less likely to be the source of perceived bias.

<sup>19</sup> If rebel groups seek EPPs, should a particular type of group be more likely to secure them? Stronger rebel groups are more likely to obtain concessions, including consent-based peacekeeping missions (Fortna 2008). When a settlement is signed, the rebel group is demonstrating that fighting is more costly than the government's terms, so there may be less variation in relative power among these cases. Among all conflicts, however, stronger rebel groups and weaker governments should be more likely to include EPPs. I examine this additional implication, but the data limitations (discussed below) make it difficult to frame as a definitive test. I appreciate this suggestion from a reviewer.

<sup>20</sup> Emulation is a broad concept, potentially encompassing my external engagement theory, for example, which argues combatants adopt EPPs due to their demonstrated success in others cases and availability as regional democracy promotion programs spread, but I use the term for this particular mechanism in this article.

more plausible than some other diffusion mechanisms (Simmons and Elkins 2004): after colonialism, ties to European colonial powers influenced states' choices about institutions such as legal systems (for example, Brown and Paquette 2013), and close international partners have influenced states' decisions to sign onto the International Criminal Court (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2009). An "enjoinder" explanation might stem from a similar logic: external actors pressure combatants to hold elections because they prefer to provide aid under at least a façade of democracy (for example, Driscoll 2008). The enjoinder explanation is similar to the external engagement explanation: both imply that the U.S. and other international donors prefer to engage through elections, but the enjoinder explanation does not imply conditionality on compliance with a settlement. Like external engagement theory, both alternative explanations predict increased EPPs with higher regional rates of democracy promotion. However, these theories may also imply that *EPPs should be more prevalent in cases in which governments have special relationships with engaged international actors (H1b — alt)*.

An "escape" explanation from literature on post-conflict elections might suggest that external interveners impose post-conflict elections to expedite troop withdrawal; they either create a legitimately capable government or, more cynically, provide a nominally legitimate government to justify exit (Kumar 1998; Lyons 2005; Collier 2009). Contrary to the external engagement theory, both alternative explanations imply that *EPPs should only exist when external actors have troops on the ground to withdraw (H2)*.

While all based on international dynamics, these explanations have empirically testable differences. They also imply that *EPPs should be pushed by different actors, international interveners or the government*, rather than the rebels. To show the differences between these theories and external engagement theory, all explanations are summarized in Table 1.



**Table 1: Hypothesized Correlates of Electoral Participation Provisions**

	<b>The probability of including EPPs:</b>	<b>Actor(s) requesting EPPs is:</b>
<b>External Engagement Theory:</b>	Increases with the end of the Cold War (see Figure 1). Increases with higher regional rates of democracy promotion (H1a). Decreases if governments have special relationships with engaged international actors (H1b).	Combatants —typically the rebel group.
<b>Escape Explanation:</b>	Increases with the presence of peacekeepers or other armed interveners (H2).	International intervener.
<b>Enjoinder Explanation:</b>	Increases with the end of the Cold War (see Figure 1). Increases with higher regional rates of democracy promotion (H1a). <i>Increases</i> if governments have special relationships with engaged international actors (H1b — alt).	International intervener.
<b>Emulation Explanation:</b>	Increases with the end of the Cold War (see Figure 1). Increases with higher regional rates of democracy promotion (H1a). <i>Increases</i> if governments have special relationships with engaged international actors (H1b — alt).	Combatants.

### *Case Illustration*

A case illustration helps probe the theory’s plausibility before turning to cross-national data to test other empirical implications. If the external engagement theory is correct, I anticipate that expectations of external engagement will increase after the Cold War and that combatants will build EPPs into settlements more often. The post-Cold War change in major power relations made it easier for states to coordinate and help terminate conflict; the subsequent dominance of U.S. democracy promotion programs offered a low-cost, long-term mechanism to enforce settlements.<sup>21</sup> We should see the causal chain anticipated by the external engagement theory beginning in the late 1980s, as the major power rivalry wound down.<sup>22</sup> Among conflict active in 1989, Central American leftists fighting right-wing governments backed by the U.S. were especially unlikely to view external actors or associated international organizations as credible non-partisan enforcers of compliance. Assessing whether the rebels favored EPPs backed by

<sup>21</sup> Different language would describe this as a “shock” over which to compare a state to its best control, itself.

<sup>22</sup> Because these changes are driven by geostrategic factors exogenous to these civil conflicts, this is a particularly clean shock.

external enforcers thus provides a hard test of the external engagement theory. Other cases, which vary along dimensions such as combatant balance, reveal similar dynamics.<sup>23</sup> For the purposes of this article, however, the Guatemalan case offers a plausibility probe of the mechanism. To test the external engagement theory, I use government and private archive primary sources, interviews with decision-makers, and secondary sources.

The Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996) was a deadly conflict. Between 1981 and 1983, the U.S.-backed government countered the leftist guerrillas using brutal tactics like genocide. Tens of thousands were killed.

By 1984, a strategic defeat of the guerrillas opened a possibility for exploring a mutually-beneficial deal. But it was not until 1996 that a settlement terminated the fighting. In the intervening years, the rebels kept fighting, recognizing that disarmament would leave them vulnerable (Azpuru 1999, 101, 104; Allison 2009, 147-48, 197). According to the URNG's communiqués and statements, the guerrillas saw the U.S. as complicit in the violence, since they were assisting the government, rather than as a reliable guarantor of a settlement.<sup>24</sup> Electoral participation would therefore have offered insufficient protection (Azpuru 1999, 113). The URNG sought limited ties with the international actors it trusted most, including nonaligned countries (URNG 1986, 1). The rebels had no interest in participating in the elections in the 1980s without external enforcement; Walter Félix — a URNG rebel leader who would later serve as the member of Congress from Huehuetenango as part of the ex-guerrilla party — explained their position by noting that: “Guatemalans did not feel protected by [elections].”<sup>25</sup>

However, this changed as the Cold War ended.<sup>26</sup> The U.N.'s reputation for non-partisan involvement improved with cross-border peacekeeping centered on the Esquipulas accords to end the Central American conflicts;<sup>27</sup> the U.S. reputation changed with the 1988 election of the

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<sup>23</sup> For example, Matanock (2012; 2017b).

<sup>24</sup> Demanding in one such document policy changes to “STOP THE GENOCIDE BY THE U.S.-BACKED MILITARY REGIME!”; see URNG Undated [likely 1982 based on the context], 1-2. Carlos Mejía, Walter Félix, and other URNG guerrillas turned politicians also noted in my interview (Guatemala City, 2013) that they were concerned they would be targeted and the government would renege on policy concessions should any settlement be signed during this period.

<sup>25</sup> Author interview, Guatemala City, 2013.

<sup>26</sup> The end of the Cold War also produced other changes, potentially shifting power and widening combatant bargaining ranges. Overcoming the commitment problem need not be the *only* obstacle to ending a civil war. However, the settlement timing relative to Guatemala's self-coup (below) makes external engagement overcoming commitment problems an especially convincing explanation.

<sup>27</sup> This framework is positively cited as the rebels offered a ceasefire and proposals for a settlement, building on this framework but with Guatemala-specific components; see URNG (1987), 3; also on its importance, see Gabriel

Bush administration, which deemphasized anti-communist policies in Central America and even suspended military aid to Guatemala in 1990 due to a lack of progress on human rights. Primary source statements from the time highlight this attitude shift: the URNG's General Command even began to incorporate U.N. and U.S. statements condemning the government's behavior into its calls for a peace process (for example, URNG 1990, 1). These changes resulted in a URNG request for EPPs in the peace process, enabling "guerrillas to run for office" ("1990 Country Report...", 18; also see Washington Office on Latin America 1990, 10). As external engagement theory predicts, the URNG made its demands independently, during a meeting with civil society actors in the late 1980s (for example, Alvarez 2002, 46-7). (It had not done so after the 1984 strategic defeat or 1985 regime change.) While rebel confidence had increased, Carlos Mejía — a former guerrilla who later served in Congress — remembers that there was still "a lot of skepticism as to whether or not [the government] would comply, which is what generated the most tension."<sup>28</sup> URNG statements also raised concerns about government killings of its opposition (for example, URNG 1991, 2). Into early 1993, rebels believed the international community had "eased off" its attention, at least in pressing for negotiations (National Network 1993, 3), and its credibility and negotiations faltered (URNG 1991, 2).

Rebel confidence increased substantially in 1993 when the international community rejected a Guatemalan presidential attempt to seize power above institutional limits (Jonas 2000, 38). External actors signaled their trustworthiness as enforcers by condemning the "self-coup" and threatening to withhold economic benefits. The U.S. even froze aid to the government, making these threats even more credible (Jonas 2000, 51; Verstegen 2000, 48). After observing this international reaction, the General Command indicated in a memo to the URNG that the organization would pursue a primarily political strategy to resolve the conflict (cited in Vinegrad 1998, 218). URNG member Carlos Mejía noted "there were a lot of resources poured into letting people know about the peace accords and a lot of hope that the peace accords would be complied with."<sup>29</sup> The U.S. and other international actors were careful not to damage their "status as an honest broker in the peace process" ("Background Information..." 1994, 2). New negotiations culminated in the 1996 settlement centered on EPPs.

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Aguilera, a policymaker eventually responsible for implementing peace and security programs, cited in Azpuru (1999, 104).

<sup>28</sup> Author interview, Guatemala City, 2013.

<sup>29</sup> From my interview (Guatemala City, 2013).

While other factors such as war weariness made settling desirable, this change in expectations ultimately led to the settlement (Azpuru 1999, 107, 17, and author’s interview with URNG leadership, cited above). Expecting non-partisan external enforcement, the guerrillas requested EPPs. The settlement provisions then enabled each side to compete as a political party and engaged external actors to monitor and incentivize compliance with its terms — through U.N. observation, especially around the elections that coincided with many of the major settlement milestones in 1999, and other international involvement (for example, Matanock 2017b). URNG leaders credit “allied countries that have always kept their eyes on Guatemala and on the government, trying to enforce the peace accords” as crucial to the compliance achieved.<sup>30</sup>

### **Cross-National Analyses**

To test whether this theory is consistent with cross-national empirical evidence, I compare correlates of EPP inclusion across settlements and across civil conflicts.<sup>31</sup> I examine 1975 to 2005, meaning my analyses coincide with the third wave of democratization beginning in 1974 and compare countries that experienced normative pressure to hold elections (Huntington 1991).

The first analysis examines all settlements from this period. My initial dataset is from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, which includes all accords seeking to solve civil conflicts reaching the 25 battle-death threshold (Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006; Högbladh 2011).<sup>32</sup> I cluster continuous peace processes within a particular state, producing a set of complete or “final” settlements.<sup>33,34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Carlos Mejía from my interview (Guatemala City, 2013).

<sup>31</sup> The data, as well as additional variables and analyses, are available in the appendix.

<sup>32</sup> UCDP includes more agreements than other datasets, such as the Peace Accord Matrix (although they are similar once I cluster peace processes), and encompasses almost all the same accords (except Lebanon in 1989).

<sup>33</sup> Clustered peace processes include the accords El Salvador signed with U.N. help (1990-1992). In other cases, settlements are formed of multiple accords, but each is not recorded separately, so clustering also reduces bias (see Georgia). I also include but control for accords that had provisions calling for later negotiations that did not obtain (“aborted”), and the results below hold. Coding completeness on how the process will be conducted, and whether issues are settled or excluded, may be directly driven by the inclusion of electoral participation provisions. As a robustness check, however, I drop the UCDP-coded agreements that only “initiate a process” to resolve a conflict (often also “aborted”), and the results below still hold.

<sup>34</sup> I treat each government-rebel group dyad as an observation, which is important because much of the data available as controls, such as group aims and force size, are measured at the dyadic level, and while rare, rebel groups in the same states can agree to different terms. I thus prefer the dyad-level data, although only twelve settlements have multiple rebel group signatories, so results change little either way. I also cluster the standard errors by state.

However, difficult conflicts may not culminate in settlements. Thus, among *all* conflicts—rather than *just* settlements—EPPs could be correlated with different variables. As such, the second analysis uses the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset to examine all civil conflicts in the same period (Kreutz 2010). These data include all rebel group-government dyads, spanning from when the dyad starts fighting until when it ends. If the conflict ends only because its severity decreases or a temporary ceasefire takes hold, I still consider it a candidate for settlement for eight years; eight years is the longest any dyad in the dataset takes to reach a settlement. The analysis parses out which variables are associated with conflict termination through a settlement with EPPs, compared to other types of termination.<sup>35</sup>

Each test addresses the same question: what factors explain the inclusion of EPPs? But the comparison sets are different. Examining settlements is an effective test because when combatants sign a settlement, they indicate that the informational and distributional issues preventing an agreement are solved. The additional examination of civil conflicts assesses whether a selection effect is driving those results. It also evaluates which variables are associated with securing a settlement at all, whether with EPPs or different provisions.

### ***Dependent Variable: EPPs***

I collect new data for my dependent variable. EPPs exist when settlements provide for elections by a set date — or elections are already held regularly for two cycles — *and* for all signatories to run candidates as political parties.<sup>36</sup> In almost all settlements, governments conduct the elections, not rebel groups. To transition rebel groups, then, the settlement must legalize them as parties; create transitional governments incorporating them as parties; or, occasionally, recognize groups already participating as parties. EPPs are usually easily identifiable.<sup>37</sup> Each of these dimensions

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<sup>35</sup> Combatants in a few cases, like Liberia in the early 1990s, renegotiate a settlement without returning to conflict. The results are similar if I drop the renegotiations and only run the analysis on the first settlement.

<sup>36</sup> I also code implementation of EPPs (see Table A3 in the appendix), but doing so wraps ex-post processes and pressures into the assessment of whether the combatants planned to hold participatory elections.

<sup>37</sup> Each case is listed in the appendix (see Table A1). Less clear cases are recoded as robustness checks (also see Table A1), including settlements that open the way for multiparty competition broadly and those where combatants participated in pre-conflict elections. The more inclusive coding should identify all cases in which combatants could possibly intend to hold participatory elections. I also code the cases in which rebel groups participate in elections as further robustness checks — and almost all were enabled by EPPs. The results are similar with these changes.

A coding distinction that may be of interest for policymakers is the difference between EPPs created by implicitly legalizing rebel groups through inclusion in political parties in transitional governments, and explicitly legalizing them as political parties to run in elections. Many cases fall into the former category, as other work has noted (for example, Bekoe 2008). Separating these categories decreases the sample size, but the results are similar.

is crucial: clear, regular benchmarking for parties from each side distinguishes these provisions from other power-sharing mechanisms.

Of 122 dyadic settlements, 51 settlements (42 percent) include EPPs (see Figure 1; a complete list of cases is in Table A1 in the appendix). Those *without* EPPs usually have other institutional arrangements for sharing power. These arrangements might include regional autonomy or fixed formulas for governmental integration.<sup>38</sup>

### ***Independent Variables of Interest: Expectations of External Engagement***

These variables must capture combatants' beliefs about external actors' willingness to use elections to detect and sanction noncompliance. It is crucial to rigorously measure these expectations ex-ante. Building on my theory, I use systemic shocks and regional trends (excluding the state of interest) to measure supply-side factors; I use fixed or lagged characteristics of a given state for demand-side factors. These measures precede and are exogenous to combatants' decisions to include EPPs, supporting a causal effect.

**Regional Democracy Promotion Shocks and Trends.** The end of the Cold War increased international coordination on civil conflict termination and facilitated democracy promotion programs that ease observing and incentivizing compliance. Figure 1 shows that the end of the Cold War correlates positively with the inclusion of EPPs.<sup>39</sup>

Systematic variation in states' expectations of external engagement after the Cold War helps explain variation in EPPs. Democracy promotion programs spread at different rates in each region (for example, Hyde 2011; Kelley 2012). This existing empirical evidence indicates comparable states often adopt similar measures (also Santa-Cruz 2005). This work on regional trends suggests states in regions with higher rates of observation are more likely to expect external engagement; this result matches the expectation from external engagement theory. External engagement reached regions neighboring the U.S. and Europe first; it reached regions further away — especially Asia — last. We can therefore proxy for these expectations after the Cold War using: (1) the percentage of legislative elections in the region that international missions observed in the year prior to the settlement, excluding the state under analysis (Hyde and Marinov 2012); and (2) the percentage of development assistance provided to the region that

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<sup>38</sup> Unlike EPPs, these alternative arrangements do not become statistically significantly more common after 1989.

<sup>39</sup> Following Fortna (2008), I use 1989 as the cut point.

was devoted to democracy and governance, averaged over the two prior years (Azpuru et al. 2008).<sup>40</sup>

Importantly, these regional trends are plausibly exogenous to the settlements themselves and unlikely to be driven by mechanisms other than external enforcement. Whether combatants invited international election observers is endogenous to the settlement itself — for example, if combatants knew beforehand that their deal would be secure, they may have invited monitors and included provisions — but also an aspect of settlement implementation (“post-treatment”).<sup>41</sup> These regional variables — which are also lagged and exclude the state in question — are suited to identifying a causal relationship. Other work shows these trends are not simply artifacts of environments that were already ripe for peace or democracy (Simpser and Donno 2012, 507). Background interviews with Carter Center and U.N. officials indicate any selection would be biased toward less stable states. These regional proxies represent the best measures available (also used by Hyde 2011; Simpser and Donno 2012).

As expected, regional electoral observation and regional democracy and governance assistance percentages are positively correlated with each other. The value of each variable increases over time across regions. But the assistance variable is only available after the end of the Cold War, and it is less apt to deviate from simple time trends than observation (see Figure A1 in the appendix). In these models, I also include regional and time indicators and their interaction, which separate these trends from simple region or time trends.

**Special Relationships.** Special relationships between governments and potential enforcers may decrease combatants’ expectations that these external actors will sanction noncompliance. As argued above, international actors may find it difficult to effectively sanction governments with valuable natural resources (measured as a binary indicator of oil production); international actors may also be unwilling to sanction them (Ross 2011). In either case, rebels will be less likely to see EPPs as useful to secure a settlement. I consider alternative measures as well (see the Codebook in the appendix). Similarly, if a major power has a strong strategic partnership with a government, that potential enforcer may be less willing to sanction without

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<sup>40</sup> “Independent Variables” in the appendix discusses alternative measure specifications.

<sup>41</sup> Election observation is therefore “post-treatment” in that its invitation usually occurs after EPPs are included. In terms of variation, while many post-conflict elections receive some international election observation, with varying commitment to enforce compliance by each side, not all do. After agreements in Mali (1991) and the Philippines (1995), for example, no missions followed; most of these agreements also did not include EPPs, likely correctly expecting no such external engagement.

partisanship. As theorized above, the first measure of these partnerships is a binary indicator of military aid from the hegemonic U.S. (USAID 2009). The U.S. distributes military aid to states with a stake in a national security issue, such as the War on Terror. The second measure is past colonial ties between a state and a major power, which may signal a strategic position. In particular, Britain and France often partner with former colonies' governments (Fearon and Laitin 2003).<sup>42,43</sup> Past colonial ties are relatively exogenous; the other variables are lagged.

### ***Control Variables***

Other factors could lead combatants to include EPPs. For example, combatants may only include EPPs when a settlement is especially easy — or hard — to secure. The alternative explanations imply additional correlates of EPPs.

Existing work on settlement design, including H0a, H0b, and H0c, imply EPPs are driven by conflict duration, battle deaths,<sup>44</sup> the “stakes” of the conflict (for example, center-seeking or territorial, mobilized around identity politics or around a leftist ideology, and whether rebels seek total control of state structures), as well as governance quality (for example, Fearon (2011a) and Walter (2015) argue corruption may make it difficult to sustain peace). Each of these factors may have implications for the ease of maintaining a settlement (H0a)<sup>45</sup> and relative strength between sides (H0b). I also consider the degree to which the state is democratic, developed, and tied to the international community. These variables also may affect the ease with which elections are adopted (H0c and alternatives below) (for example, Mason and Fett 1996; Mason et al. 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Other relationships, such as normal alliances, may indicate willingness for external actors to engage in those states, rather than a strategic relationship that would prevent non-partisan enforcement, as theorized. However, I examine major power alliances and other similar variables as robustness checks, and the associations are not consistently statistically significant (see the Codebook in the appendix for these additional variables).

<sup>43</sup> The concerns are less acute with rebels: while data are hard to obtain, less than ten percent of militant groups appear to receive support from a Western power (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013). Moreover, rebels are often more concerned about government commitment than vice-versa (as discussed in “Empirical Implications” above). Partisanship toward rebels is therefore less likely to impede EPPs.

<sup>44</sup> I also include alternative measures of state weakness, including GDP per capita, state capabilities, terrain, and numbers of government and rebel personnel (see the appendix’s Codebook).

<sup>45</sup> I also include indicators of previous failed settlements and counts of fighting factions, which may make settlements more difficult (see the appendix’s Codebook).

<sup>46</sup> I include variables capturing the size of government troops and rebel forces to examine the possibility that stronger groups push for EPPs (footnote 19), but these measures are averaged over active periods and missing values even in the best data, making them less than certain.



Many of these control variables are tied to alternative explanations focusing on international dimensions. Organizational characteristics may affect norms and pressure for democratization, components of the emulation and enjoiner explanations. Some actors may simply be more willing to participate in elections. I examine measures of rebel aims. I consider ethnic distribution as an alternative. I examine measures of state development, institutions (including bureaucratic quality and regime type), and experience with elections and democracy. In addition, I examine ties between the state and international community that may foster democracy, including aid dependence and trade openness. At the global level, I examine regional democracy rates. As alternatives, I examine democracy rates in neighborhoods and IGOs to which the state belongs (for example, Pevehouse 2002).

One particular tie to the international community, armed peacekeepers, may indicate an urgent need to exit an intervention (H2 from the escape explanation). I use a variable capturing the presence of a U.N. peacekeeping mission when a settlement is signed.<sup>47</sup> Missions are coded by country, but coding by conflict changes few cases. The appendix contains summary statistics on variables in the analyses (Table A5), as well as a Codebook that lists sources and alternative measures.

### ***Analysis and Results***

Simple comparisons show the patterns expected by the external engagement theory. No settlements signed before 1989 include EPPs, while 48 percent include EPPs afterward (Figure 1), which is a statistically significant difference. Subsequent models include an indicator for the Cold War to control for this variation, while measuring correlations with other variables. The democracy promotion variables (split at their medians) are positively correlated with EPP inclusion: EPPs are included in 59 percent of settlements in regions with high rates of electoral observation, compared to 25 percent in regions with low rates; EPPs are included in 56 percent of regions with high rates of regional democracy aid, compared to 40 percent in regions with low rates; both associations are statistically significant (see Table A2 in the appendix).

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<sup>47</sup> This inclusive coding should work in favor of the escape explanation due to the distribution of EPPs. As alternatives, I consider whether the agreement committed to peacekeeping and the presence of peacekeepers by the year's end (earlier and later variables). I also consider non-U.N. interventions and past missions. I consider mission type, too, separating enforcement and monitoring missions. Finally, in secondary tests, I examine mission size according to the maximum number of troops involved, in case larger deployments are more likely to pressure exit.

For the settlement data, I fit a logistic regression model using a binary indicator of EPP inclusion as the dependent variable,<sup>48</sup> and EPP implementation as an alternative. The standard errors are clustered by state.<sup>49</sup>

The results demonstrate that expectations of non-partisan external engagement are correlated with EPPs in these data, consistent with external engagement theory. Regional rates of democracy promotion are positively associated with the inclusion of EPPs across settlements (Table 2).<sup>50</sup> Indicators of potential special or strategic relationships — lagged oil production, lagged U.S. military aid, and former British and French colonies — all have negative estimated coefficients. Most are statistically significant, especially when I include controls for conflict intensity. The exceptions are oil and British colonies in some specifications. The alternative measures of these variables produce similar results.

**Table 2: Inclusion of Electoral Participation Provisions in Settlements**

	1	2	3	4	5	Average Marginal Effects <sup>+</sup>
Regional Election Observation (Percent, Lagged)	2.24* (1.19)			3.86*** (1.27)		0.71*** (0.20)
Regional Democracy/Governance Assistance (Percent Development Aid, Lagged 2-year average)		7.06* (3.99)			13.39** (5.46)	
Oil Production Indicator (Lagged)			-1.00** (0.42)	-1.11** (0.45)	-1.63*** (0.47)	-0.20** (0.08)
U.S. Military Aid Indicator (Lagged)			-1.24*** (0.41)	-1.34*** (0.45)	-1.11** (0.44)	-0.25*** (0.07)
Former British Colony			-1.04 (0.75)	-1.78** (0.79)	-1.31* (0.74)	-0.33** (0.15)
Former French Colony			-0.99*** (0.37)	-1.69*** (0.47)	-1.42*** (0.51)	-0.31*** (0.08)
Number of Observations	107	107	107	107	107	
Pseudo R-Squared	0.04	0.03	0.13	0.21	0.20	
Log Pseudo Likelihood	-70.73	-72.00	-64.13	-58.15	-59.60	

Note: Method is logistic regression analysis. DV is settlement with versus without electoral participation provisions. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by state (maximum number of clusters is 41). Cold War indicator always included and perfectly predicts failure (so 15 Cold War observations drop in all models).

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

<sup>+</sup>For Average Marginal Effects: These are based on Model 4. Table presents  $dx/dy$ , which, for factor level variables, is the discrete change from the base level. Numbers in parentheses are delta-method standard errors (robust).


<sup>48</sup> Given the small size of the dataset, I also run linear regression models (Angrist and Pischke 2009) and test the outliers. The results are similar, and the DFBETAs show only one case over the recommended threshold for influence, and dropping it does not affect the results. I run the analysis dropping each case as robustness checks, too.

<sup>49</sup> To address independence concerns, I also run the analysis at the agreement instead of dyad level. The results hold.

<sup>50</sup> The variables are closely correlated, so rather than include both, I use regional election observation in the additional models because it varies most, and, as noted, deviates most from simple time trends.

To make these results more easily interpretable,<sup>51</sup> the final column in Table 2 reports the average marginal effects and Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities across rates of regional election observation. All of these effects are statistically significant. Moreover, the adjusted predictive margins on a case such as Guatemala at the end of the Cold War (where EPPs were included in the deal) estimate a 90 percent chance of EPP inclusion. In contrast, a case with opposite values on most of these independent variables had a 3 percent chance of EPP inclusion.

**Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Electoral Participation Provisions in Settlements**



For the conflict data, the variation of interest is an indicator of termination through a settlement that includes EPPs, compared to continued conflict and any other type of conflict termination. I run a competing risks analysis using a multinomial logit model. This commonly-used tool allows me to assess whether the combatant sides decide to remain in a conflict in a given year, provided they could terminate the conflict using different methods (Fortna 2015;

<sup>51</sup> The variation explained among settlements in these models is similar to other studies. Work on power-dividing and power-sharing provisions in settlements, for example explains up to 20 percent of the variation (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 59). Unexplained variation is potentially due to idiosyncratic determinants or noisy measures.

Leiras, Tuñón, and Giraudy 2015).<sup>52</sup> To capture time dependence, these models include transformations of conflict duration.<sup>53</sup>

**Table 3: Conflict Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (Multinomial Logistic—Relative to Ongoing Conflict and Accounting for Other Outcomes)**

	6	7	8	9	10	Marginal Effects <sup>+</sup>
Regional Election Observation(Percent, Lagged)	2.45*** (0.75)			2.20*** (0.66)		9.02*** (5.97)
Regional Democracy/Governance Assistance (Percent of Development Aid, Lagged 2-year Average)		0.05* (0.03)			0.07** (0.03)	
Oil Production Indicator (Lagged)			-0.48 (0.44)	-0.44 (0.40)	-0.73* (0.38)	0.64 (0.26)
U.S. Military Aid Indicator (Lagged)			-1.09*** (0.40)	-1.12*** (0.39)	-1.39*** (0.39)	0.33*** (0.13)
Former British Colony			-1.22* (0.64)	-1.16* (0.59)	-1.16** (0.58)	0.31* (0.19)
Former French Colony			0.15 (0.59)	0.11 (0.59)	0.14 (0.66)	1.12 (0.66)
Cold War	-15.43*** (0.47)	(No Obs.)	-16.62*** (0.31)	-15.54*** (0.46)	(No Obs.)	1.79e-07*** (8.29e-08)
Number of Observations	2,655	1,498	2,632	2,632	1,488	
Pseudo R-Squared	0.14	0.11	0.16	0.17	0.15	
Log Pseudo Likelihood	-1221.41	-769.76	-1181.18	-1173.41	-722.07	

Note: Method used is multinomial logistic regressions analysis. DV is conflict termination through settlements with electoral participation provisions, accounting for all other types of conflict termination (full results shown in appendix), compared to a baseline of continued civil conflict in each dyadic year. The full models are shown in the appendix. All baselines produce similar results (also shown in the appendix). Cold War indicator always included. Models also include duration specification described in the text; others are shown in the models in the appendix. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by state.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

<sup>+</sup>For Marginal Effects: These are the odds ratios from Model 9.


The conflict data produce similar results that are also consistent with the external engagement theory: regional rates of democracy promotion are positively associated with termination through settlements with EPPs; special and strategic relationships are negatively so

<sup>52</sup> I employ this method to estimate competing risks because I have discrete data and a smaller dataset. I also triangulate between methods, though, producing similar results. See “Competing Risks” in the appendix.

<sup>53</sup> I include models with duration, duration<sup>2</sup>, duration<sup>3</sup>, without duration, and with a logarithmic transformation of duration (see Tables 4A.0 and A4.2 in the appendix) (Dafoe 2013). The results hold.

(Table 3).<sup>54,55</sup> Again, to ease interpretation, I not only indicate the marginal effects (Table 3), but I also calculate the predicted effects, showing changes across rates of regional election observation (Figure 3). Change in overall conflict termination overall is probably influenced by many more factors, such as “ripeness,” than change in the particular settlement provisions. The smaller predicted effects of these variables in Figure 3 compared to Figure 2 are therefore not unexpected.

**Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Conflict Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions**



<sup>54</sup> See Table A4.0 in the appendix for each outcome compared to ongoing conflict. The results indicate the Cold War also negatively predicts settlements *without* EPPs, but otherwise the correlates of settlements *with* EPPs are specific to this type of termination. See Table A4.3 in the appendix for analysis relative to each different outcome, showing that the other correlates differentiate between settlements with and without EPPs.

<sup>55</sup> Finally, as expected (see footnote 19), conflicts with smaller government forces and larger rebel forces were more likely to have EPPs (see Table 4), but the results are not robust (likely due to inconsistent data) and only statistically significant in the conflict set (perhaps because the agreement set has less variation on relative strength).

**Control Variables and Robustness Checks.** These results hold after controls are added.<sup>56</sup> The coefficient on the regional election observation variable is always positive; the coefficients on the strategic and special relationship indicators are always negative. The size of these coefficients increases, suggesting the controls moderate the relationship or reduce noise.

The negative coefficients on the special and strategic relationship indicators, which are generally statistically significant, are not consistent with the hypothesized emulation or enjoinder theories — implying that states with special and strategic relationships are not pressured to include EPPs.

Not many controls are consistently correlated with EPPs across datasets (see Table 4). These results, though, can help further assess alternative explanations.<sup>57</sup> Contrary to the strictest version of the escape theory, which argues troop withdrawal is a prerequisite for these provisions, U.N. missions are only present in 41 percent of settlements that include EPPs (and 10 percent of settlements that do not include EPPs). However, in some specifications, the coefficient on the U.N. peacekeeping mission is positive and statistically significant. Alternative specifications of the peacekeeping variable, such as when peacekeeping missions are specified in the settlement, produce similar results. These results support either a weak version of the escape explanation or external engagement theory: including U.N. missions in the settlement may simply indicate expected enforcement.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> The summary table reflects their sequential inclusion based on the theories clustered together, as noted, unless highly correlated with each other, but the results are also similar when all those that are statistically significant are included together (and in other specifications tried); see Table A7 and A8 in the appendix.

<sup>57</sup> Again, full models including the controls are shown in Table A7 and A8 in the appendix.

<sup>58</sup> To further test escape, I include a model with the number of troops that accompany U.N. missions. Contrary to the alternative theory, the relationship is *negative*, though mostly not statistically significant (small sample).

**Table 4: Other Correlates of Electoral Participation Provisions across Models—Controls**

VARIABLES	DV: EPPs across Settlements	DV: EPPs across Conflicts
Regional Election Observation	++	++
Oil Production	--	-
U.S. Military Aid	--	--
Former British Colony	--	-
Former French Colony	--	0
<i>Escape, Enjoinder, Emulation (International Aid and Ties)</i>		
U.N. Peacekeeping Mission	0	++
Regional Democracy Level	0	0
Post-9/11	0	0
Aid as a Share of GDP	0	++
Trade as Share of GDP	0	0
Member of GATT or WTO	0	0
<i>Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Duration and Battle Deaths)</i>		
Conflict Duration	0	NA
Major Conflict Indicator (Based on Battle Deaths)	0	0
<i>Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Government Capacity)</i>		
Balance between Group and Government Capacity	0	--
Government Military Personnel	0	--
Rebel Fighters	0	++
Population in 1000's	0	0
Real GDP per 1000 Inhabitants	0	0
<i>Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Agreement Difficulty)</i>		
Past Agreement	++	++
Factions Fighting	0	0
<i>Emulation and Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Regime Type, Governance Quality)</i>		
Regime Type	0	++
Democracy Level	0	++
Ever Democracy	-	0
Change in Democracy in Past 5 Years	--	0
Corruption	+	0
Bureaucratic Quality	0	0
Law and Order	0	--
<i>Emulation and Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Stakes or Rebel Aims)</i>		
Territorial Conflict	0	0
Identity Conflict	-	++
Marxist Conflict	0	0
Militant Groups with Total Goals	0	0
Additional Controls*	Region, Five-Year Indicators, Interaction Included	Conflict Duration, Squared, Cubed (all 0), and Cold War (--)

Notes: first model is the same specification as Table 4; second model is the same specification as Table 5; the rest reflect sequential inclusion based on the theories clustered together as noted, but the results are also similar when those that are statistically significant are included together (and when other combinations are considered) — full models and results are in Table 4a and 5a.4 in the Appendix.

++ denotes a strong positive relationship; -- denotes a strong negative relationship; weak relationships or those sensitive to the inclusion of other variables have a single plus or minus; 0 denotes no relationship.

\*Alternatives measures for many of the controls are included (discussed in “Controls”); more detail on measures and sources is in the Codebook in the Appendix.

The other results also do not lend much support to alternative explanations. The selection hypothesis suggests EPPs are only included in cases that are “easy” to settle. Contrary to this hypothesis, indicators of conflicts that were *harder* to end, and with *poorer* governance, are positively correlated with EPPs (as seen through the coefficients on having failed agreements in the past; less balanced conflicts; higher levels of corruption; and lower levels of law and order). Changes in democracy (negative), having an open regime and democratic system (positive), and aid as a percentage of state GDP (positive) also have statistically significant associations with EPPs, although not consistently across both analyses. The result is consistent with external engagement theory, as well as the emulation and democratization explanations; however, the results for special relationships are only consistent with the former.

Finally, the analysis of the settlement data includes regional and decade indicators and their interaction. These are difficult tests of the regional democracy promotion variables, separating these correlations from simple region or time trends. (Due to the specification, duration variables are always included in the conflict data analysis.) The results hold.<sup>59</sup>

## Conclusions

Although strong evidence suggests that EPPs correlate with, and perhaps help produce, enduring peace, they are not consistently included in settlements. Moreover, as the Colombian example shows, they can be difficult to negotiate. We frequently see normative arguments, in addition to practical arguments, in favor of including civil society in peace processes (for example, Paffenholz 2010). But the question of including rebel parties does not see such theorizing. When and why do former combatants secure settlements that bring former rebels into electoral politics as political parties?

The data collected for this article show how settlement design transformed as the Cold War ended: non-existent before 1989, EPPs then became the centerpiece of settlements that ended some of the longest and deadliest civil conflicts. However, EPPs have been included in less than half of all settlements since 1989. Much of this variation depends on time and a

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<sup>59</sup> Correlations between EPPs and other provisions are not strong or consistent (Table A6 in the appendix), although EPPs appear to complement disarmament and, to a lesser extent, force integration, which are often linked to electoral calendars, helping ensure commitment to these provisions; they are essentially uncorrelated with other political power-sharing provisions (which do not increase in the post-Cold War period, as noted above).



country's distance from Western powers, suggesting international dynamics may explain important variation in EPP inclusion.

EPPs seem to provide an enforcement mechanism. These provisions enable external actors — when available — to monitor and incentivize compliance with a settlement. Combatants can thereby overcome commitment problems and secure negotiated settlements. My empirical analysis shows EPP inclusion — among all settlements and civil conflicts — correlates with expectations of non-partisan international involvement. The data do not strongly support other explanations. These are significant first steps to understand when and why settlements bring former rebels into electoral politics as political parties.

This research has important implications for securing settlements that terminate civil conflicts. Specifically, it indicates that combatants will sign agreements that include EPPs in the context of potential non-partisan external engagement around elections. However, the conditions that produce successful external engagement, and thus the inclusion of EPPs, are not always present. Thus, I identified supply-and-demand conditions that drive successful external engagement.

For settlements to succeed, international actors must show former combatants that they are willing and able to identify and sanction noncompliance with the settlement. Their credibility can be enhanced in two key ways. First, actors can be explicit about the goals of post-conflict elections. If the goal is externally enforcing compliance with a settlement, policymakers may be better able to monitor compliance. For example, prior to elections, policymakers may prioritize sending observers to former combatant strongholds over competitive regions; they may also agree to provide targeted aid only when former combatants comply with an agreement, supplying trust funds for combatant parties. Recognizing the mechanisms at work in maintaining peace may encourage such customization.

Second, robust international organizations are crucial for implementing election-oriented external engagement to end civil conflict. If international actors want to earn the trust of all sides (especially the weaker side), they must be interested but not partisan. Strong states that enjoy special relationships with governments in conflict may be unable to convince rebels of their impartiality. However, intergovernmental bodies that design policy by coordinating among their members — particularly those on different sides of geostrategic debates — could overcome concerns that one side will receive special treatment. Experimental studies on how international

election observers are perceived demonstrate disparities in credibility (for example, Bush and Prather 2018). Though it may take careful crafting to involve strong international organizations, such as the U.N.'s Security Council, they could enable the use of EPPs in a wider set of cases.

## Supplemental Information

An appendix, code to recreate the figures and tables in this document, and the data files are available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/matanock> and at the *International Studies Quarterly* data archive.

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