as both a research agenda *and* as a political project. What is perhaps different about inter/nationalism is that it is "more explicitly trained on the discourses and practices of political organizing" (151). This makes sense given that the resurgent presence of Palestine in American Indian studies was born out of political organizing to implement boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) resolutions within American academic institutions, another major topic of the book.

Recent BDS efforts build on long traditions of cooperation between Native and Palestinian liberation movements. In his chapter on Native poetry, Salaita points out that "Native poets do not mention Palestine as an abstract space detached from their own ancestral grounds. They instead treat it as a component of their own political identities" (104). He goes on to argue that "There is often a sense of reinvigoration of Native decolonial struggle through reference to or engagement with Palestine" (104). Salaita highlights the crucial fact that Palestinian liberation means more to American Indian studies than just research; Palestinian liberation is an essential component of indigenous nationalism and, thus, decolonization. To again draw from Tuhiwai Smith, decolonization is a dynamic material struggle that colonized peoples engage in together to abolish empire and achieve liberation. Omar Barghouti, whom Salaita quotes in length, makes a similar observation about decolonization: "in contexts of colonial oppression, intellectuals . . . cannot be just—or mere—intellectuals in the abstract sense; they cannot but . . . organically engage in effective, collective emancipatory processes" (62). Like the Black feminist framework of intersectionality, Salaita (and BDS) remind us that decolonization is a commitment and a relationship that must be fostered beyond the confines of research and critique, in the realm of material cooperation and political organizing for liberation.

Even though Salaita does not earmark it as a specific contribution of the book, his focus on political organizing offers a nuanced contribution to social movement theory and, perhaps more importantly, movement building. His discussions of BDS and US Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel offer a compelling model for the kind of decolonial political organizing that inter/nationalism advances. If American Indian studies is to carry out its commitment to decolonization as a research agenda *and* as a material political project, inter/nationalism must become a more prevalent feature of our field's efforts.

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The Land Is Our History: Indigeneity, Law, and the Settler State. By Miranda Johnson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 248 pages. $105.00 cloth; $26.95 paper; $25.60 electronic.

Miranda Johnson's ambitious study compares late-twentieth century indigenous activism in the settler states of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Her text demonstrates the ways in which indigenous activists—within the spaces of settler-colonial courtrooms—renegotiated constructions of indigeneity within the settler state through assertions of

land rights and political sovereignty. The monograph centers on three key court cases across the Commonwealth states: in Australia, the Gove land rights case (*Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. and the Commonwealth of Australia,* 1971); in Canada, the Paulette caveat case (*Re Paulette,* 1973); and in New Zealand, the Lands case (*New Zealand Māori Council v. Attorney-General,* 1987). These cases reveal how indigenous peoples have historically engaged with settler states and offers useful international context for American Indian activism. Utilizing legal case files, government policy debates, discussions in the press, and interviews with key participants, Johnson reveals how indigenous actors carved spaces in setter-colonial institutions such as Western legislature and judicial structures.

By asserting themselves as the first peoples, Johnson argues, indigenous Australians forced the Commonwealth of Australia to consider indigenous standing within settler law and the justifications for settler colonialism. In 1970, seven years following the "bark petitions" of 1963 wherein the Yolngu people demanded coeval political sovereignty within the Commonwealth, the Yolngu sued the Swiss bauxite mining company Nabalco and the Commonwealth of Australia for unlawfully invading their territory. Yolngu were not consulted about Nabalco's mining development, nor were they to benefit economically from the project. During the trial, however, Yolngu rights were not recognized and eventually the mine was built. Presiding over the case was Justice Richard Blackburn, who was considered sympathetic to the Yolngu when he admitted their oral testimonies and histories into evidence. Despite this, however, and similar to US Chief Justice John Marshall of the infamous Marshall Trilogy, Blackburn argued that Australian colonization was carried out "by a more advanced people" and that indigenous peoples' land rights are not inherent, but could be granted by the sovereign settler-state (44). Johnson, however, classifies this case as a success because "Yolngu people succeeded in that their story of the land, their relationship to it, and even their inherent rights over it, changed the political environment in Australia" (54). For the settler-state, this is the ideal form of decolonization: it is not required to give up anything.

In 1973, Dene leaders of the Mackenzie Valley in the Northwest Territories of Canada faced the threat of resource development in their homelands. When a Mackenzie Valley oil and gas pipeline that would connect reserves in the Arctic Sea to pipelines in southern Canada and the United States was proposed, Dene leaders brought to court the first collective land claim in the region. For their land rights to be recognized Dene had to demonstrate a continuous connection to their lands; in other words, they "were asked to produce static images of themselves as nomadic hunters who prized life on the land over all else" (57). Spurred by the Canadian "White Paper," in 1969 the sixteen chiefs formed the Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories. The Indian Brotherhood argued for a new interpretation of Treaty 8 and Treaty 11 based on the understanding of the treaty signatories that aboriginal title to the land claimed by the federal government would not be extinguished.

Considered unusual because the Indian Brotherhood's caveat concerned lands for which aboriginal title had been considered extinguished, the case was forwarded to the Northwest Territories Supreme Court. Legal commentators understood this case as a potential turning point in federal Indian policy. In demonstrating their connection to their homelands—the ways in which the land *is* their history—Dene focused on

subsistence practices such as hunting, fishing and gathering, whereas Yolngu emphasized the sacredness of the land. This case was also uniquely distinct from the Gove land rights case because in the past the Gove had entered into treaty negotiations, whereas the Yolngu had not. Johnson argues *Paulette* was successful in forcing the Canadian government to consult with Dene over the use of their lands and rewriting the history of the settler state.

In the 1980s, the emergence of new "treaty activism" encouraged the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act of 1985, which established a tribunal with retrospective jurisdiction to investigate claims dating back to 1840. The tribunal established that New Zealand and the Māori were in "partnership" and that the Crown was obliged to "protect" Māori interests, proposing that ambiguous clauses in the treaty be construed against its drafters (122). However, amidst a wave of neoliberal economic development, the Crown pursued privatizing and corporatizing natural resources, including coal mines and forests. In *New Zealand Māori Council v. Attorney-General*, commonly referred to as the "Lands case" (1987), Māori successfully appealed to the Supreme Court: the judges found the land transfer would not be acting in good faith, thus violating the treaty. While Māori spiritual relationship with the land was recognized in the courtroom, judges did not define the authority or power of Māori people. Johnson argues that the outcome was a new symbolic role for Māori people within the settler state as stewards and cofounders.

Indeed, much of Johnson's analysis, and other work focusing on legal relationships between indigenous peoples and the settler state, focuses on the "redemption of the settler state" (3). While Johnson acknowledges the Western courtroom to be a space of "asymmetrical power," she pays little attention to indigenous processes of jurisprudence (6). This text could be greatly improved through a thorough engagement with indigenous legal theorists and global jurisprudence literature. Specifically in the Australian context, I recommend C. F. Black's *The Land Is the Source of the Law: A Dialogic Encounter with Indigenous Jurisprudence* (2011); others include Walter Echo Hawk, Joanne Barker, and Greg Cajete.

As Black demonstrates, the basis of an indigenous jurisprudence is that land itself is the source of law. Indigenous peoples have the oldest legal systems in the world. Indigenous laws are not centered on humans, but balance amongst all creation. Natural law is inherently about relationship. A legal theory or system that views land not as ancestor or relative, but private property, can never help indigenous peoples, only hinder. Any decolonization gesture must take into account that indigenous peoples need their own legal spaces and only indigenous laws can secure this. While Johnson provides useful and detailed accounts of three monumental indigenous rights cases, much of her analysis is sympathetic to settler state redemption. As Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang write in "Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor" (26, 2012), decolonization requires the elimination of settler sovereignty. Additional research, therefore, must thoroughly and thoughtfully engage with indigenous legal thought; this is the only way a settler state can truly be redeemed.

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