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Intergroup Commonality through Shared Marginality

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

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by

Stacey Ann Greene

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Stacey Ann Greene

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Professor David O. Sears, Chair

Because racial and ethnic minorities each have recent histories of continuous acts of subordination and discrimination in the United States, members of these groups may be more aware of and sympathetic to other types of discrimination. In this dissertation, I address the question: do perceptions of marginalization within one disadvantaged group increase support for policies favoring another marginalized group? Using two multi-racial, nationally representative surveys, I examine the role of perceived marginality on support for a variety of policies. For racial minorities, I find that perceptions of discrimination against one's racial ingroup and linked fate with the ingroup predict support for of policies favoring other marginalized groups. As racial minorities perceive a more open society with opportunities for social mobility, the more likely they are to favor the status quo and oppose policy interventions.

The dissertation of Stacey Ann Greene is approved.

Lorrie Frasure Yokley

John R. Zaller

Jane Junn

David O. Sears, Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2016

For my mom and granddad

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C.V.

EDUCATION

2013: M.A. Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
2005: B.S. Computer Science, Loyola University, New Orleans

PUBLICATIONS

"Inter-group Relations, Neighborhood Context and African American Views toward Illegal Immigration" with Lorrie Frasure in Black and Brown Los Angeles: A Contemporary Reader, Josh Kun and Laura Pulido (Eds.) University of California Press.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE (Instructor)

Race, Ethnicity and the Politics of Difference (Spring 2016; Fall 2015) Santa Monica College
Research Methods co-teacher for Research Initiative for Diversity and Equity (Fall 2015) UCLA
Individuals Within Institutions (Spring 2015), UCLA
National and California Government (Summer 2014; Fall 2014), Santa Monica College
Thinking Racially: How Everyday Interactions, Media, and Our Brains Influence How We Understand Race (Spring 2012; 2013; 2014), UCLA

GRANTS AND AWARDS

Marvin Hoffenberg Graduate Research Fellow (2009-2010)
UCLA Graduate Division Graduate Summer Research Fellowship (Summer 2009)
Travel Grant for Yale Ethnography Conference (Spring 2008) UC DIGSSS
National Science Foundation's University of California Diversity Initiative for Graduate Study in the Social Sciences (NSF UC DIGSSS) Graduate Summer Research Mentorship (2008)
Eugene Cota-Robles Fellowship (2007)

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

"Misperceptions of Black Poverty: The Influence of Exaggerated Estimates on Support for Redistributive Policies" Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago 2011

"Inter-group Relations, Neighborhood Context and African American Views toward Illegal Immigration" co-authored with Lorrie Frasure. Presented at the American Political Science Association, Toronto 2009

"Putting Down Roots: Spatial Context and Inter-group Relations in Suburban Los Angeles" co-authored with Lorrie Frasure. Presented at the Western Political Science Association, Vancouver, 2009

"Racialized Language in Education Discourse," Presented at the Western Political Science Association, Las Vegas, 2007"

Introduction

"Section 2(B) of SB1070 has opened the door to racial profiling, wrongful detentions and arrests, putting everyone's civil rights at risk."
-- Omar Jadwat, attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union's Immigrants' Right Project

"Arizona police are charged with fairly and impartially enforcing the laws of this state, now including SB 1070. They bring... a solemn commitment to serving the public, protecting our citizens and upholding the law... including those barring racial profiling or discrimination"
--Arizona governor Jan Brewer

In 2012, Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, also known as Senate bill 1070 was in an image battle—simultaneously described as discriminatory and as completely fair. The bill, which had a series of provisions for identifying and punishing undocumented immigrants in Arizona, was described by supporters as protecting the state from illegal immigrants who were draining its resources. Opponents argued that the outcome would be state-sanctioned racial profiling of Latinos. The most controversial provision required police officers to determine the immigration status of anyone arrested or detained when there was a reasonable suspicion they were not in the U.S. legally[1].

While immigration enforcement is ostensibly a race neutral set of policies and procedures, the image of immigrant and especially undocumented immigrant has been largely associated with Mexicans (Molina, 2014; Nicholas, 2002). Throughout the 20th century, Mexicans have been racialized as "illegal" and the stigma attached to illegality also spills over to perceptions of Latino ethnic groups (Nicholas, 2002). Therefore what constituted "reasonable suspicion" was likely to draw on highly racialized notions of who undocumented immigrants are

[1] http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf

and potentially lead to racially profiling Latinos. Limiting the questioning only when another violation occurred did not comfort those who perceive the use of dubious traffic stops (e.g. broken tail lights, lane change violations) as a pretense for racial profiling. The atmosphere in Arizona was highly charged even before SB1070 and this was not the first time Arizona officials had been accused of racial discrimination. Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio had earned a national reputation for his "immigration sweeps." Civil rights activist/leader, Al Sharpton referred to the immigrant sweeps in Arizona as "nothing short of racial profiling", adding "we must stand with our brown brothers and sisters."

That claims of discrimination were so prominent in the discussion of SB1070 contrasts with another high profile immigration-targeted measure—California Proposition 187. In 1994, Californians voted on a proposition that required "violations of federal immigration status [to be] grounds for denying all public benefits, education and health services and require[d] all public employees to report anyone suspected of such violations to federal authorities" (HoSang, 2010, p. 161). In early polling, the measure was extremely popular. Although also ostensibly race-neutral, opponents maintained that it was racially targeted and motivated by a desire to have a scapegoat for the poor economy. HoSang (2010) argues that even those opposed to the bill did not challenge the underlying logic that undocumented immigration from Mexico was the source of the poor economy. As an example, an internal memo from a consulting firm hired to defeat Prop 187, they stated that it was fruitless to challenge voters' beliefs that "our illegal immigration problem [is caused by]...the flow of people coming across our southern border. You can't change that, the memo insisted. Don't try." (HoSang, 2010, p. 180). The interchangeable associations with undocumented immigrants, Mexicans, and a poor economy created an underlying racial logic that opponents worried would lead to racial profiling and discrimination.

There were groups that highlighted claims of discrimination, including the Spanish language media in Los Angeles. La Opinion, along with Glendale-based KVEA-TV, hosted a fund-raiser for Latino business leaders. The invitation to prospective donors stated that "Latino children, like our own children, may be detained, questioned and reported to INS (the Immigration and Naturalization Service) because of their surname and the color of their skin" (McDonnell, 1994). Others argued that enforcement of Proposition 187 might lead to discrimination primarily against people of color, and cause an increase in racial tensions (Park, 1996). However, there was disagreement among opponents of Proposition 187 about the best way to appeal to voters. Frank Wu, an attorney who volunteered with the Californians Against 187, says that he was initially persuaded by the logic of appealing to anti-immigrant sentiment after giving a series of public presentations to groups who were very hostile to "any perceived defense of undocumented immigrants." However in retrospect he notes that he "might have favored embracing what he describes as the "moral high-ground" argument which would foreground the human rights of undocumented workers and challenge the racist suppositions of the ballot measure (HoSang, 2010, p. 188).

The above examples illustrate policies that are seen by some as an attack on undocumented immigrants. However, opposition to the laws came from groups who were not undocumented immigrants and not directly targeted. Can the specter of discrimination galvanize marginalized groups against policies that are framed as discriminatory regardless of the targeted group? If so, racial minorities might come together based on feelings of shared marginality.

Does an appeal to a historically marginalized group like Al Sharpton's to "stand with our brown brothers and sisters" persuade Black voters to support pro-immigrant legislation? Does

racial group identity lead to political solidarity even when there are class and immigration status differences?

Research Question

To address these general questions, I focus on the primary question of the dissertation: Do perceptions of marginalization within one disadvantaged group increase support for policies favoring another marginalized group?

Background

Because racial and ethnic minorities each have recent histories of continuous acts of subordination and discrimination in the United States, members of those groups may be more aware of and sympathetic to other types of discrimination. Previous studies have shown perceptions of discrimination are related to sensitivity to gender discrimination among blacks (Kluegel & Bobo, 2001); increases in pan-ethnic identities among Latinos and Asians (Masuoka, 2006); and increases in Latinos' sense of commonality with Black people. According to Craig and Richeson (2012), perceived similarity between the ingroup's suffering and the outgroup's suffering motivates prosocial intergroup attitudes. They found that when reminding racial minority group members of discrimination their group has experienced increased positive attitudes toward another racial minority group (compared with not reminding them of discrimination at all).

These findings suggest that experiences of discrimination can act as an important component of intra and inter-group commonality. This commonality could theoretically lead to broader coalitions and political action. However, very few studies directly test the relationship between perceptions of discrimination against one's own group on political attitudes or behavior

toward other marginalized groups. Despite the sparse scholarly attention, there are widely held beliefs that people who experience discrimination should be more sympathetic to others who have also experienced discrimination (Fernández, Branscombe, Saguy, Gómez, & Morales, 2013).

If someone takes this obligation seriously, what would that entail? How can an individual reduce the suffering of others? With regard to political actions, a person may support policies that are billed as reducing or redressing discrimination. They may also be wary of laws they could increase discriminatory practices.

The theory of linked fate (discussed in chapter 1) provides a potential link between feelings of discrimination and commonality between marginalized groups. Linked fate is the belief that what happens to one's racial group effects an individual's life opportunities. Beliefs about discrimination become relevant because animus toward the group can potentially constrain individual opportunities. Previous studies have shown that feelings of linked fate are also positively related to perceptions of commonality with other racial and ethnic groups (Hurwitz, Peffley, & Mondak, 2015; Junn & Masuoka, 2008; Sanchez, 2008). Thus linked fate may predict how sensitive a person is to discriminatory policies and whether that sensitivity may lead to commonalities across groups.

Hurwitz et al. (2015) find that Blacks and Latinos who are high in linked fate are more likely to acknowledge the other group faces discrimination. They argue that "blacks and Latinos recognize a common sense of deprivation and discrimination and are likely to regard the other group as facing comparable victimization, potentially seeing the other group as a coalition partner for remediating mutual concerns" (p. 505). The authors speculate that there may be an opportunity for political coalition but do not directly test this. Group consciousness is an

awareness among group members that they belong to a disadvantaged group. Theories of linked fate are derived from group consciousness and they share the same understanding that an individual and their group share the same interests. Sanchez (2008) finds that Latino group consciousness and perceived discrimination contribute to Latino perceptions of commonality with African Americans. He concludes that "before any meaningful political alliances can be formed between the nation's two largest minority groups, Latinos may need to develop strong levels of pan-ethnic identity."

Despite the reasonable assumption that feelings of commonality may lead to political coalition, there have been few direct tests confirming this assumption. Moreover, much of the research on group consciousness and linked fate focuses on individuals' feelings about their own group. However, we know less about how feelings of marginality affect political attitudes and behaviors regarding outgroups.

In this dissertation I test for the direct effect of feelings of marginality—specifically discrimination, linked fate, and social exclusion—on policy preferences benefiting outgroups. I explore the influence of marginality with regard to both race and gender identities. By moving beyond a singular study of either race or gender, I add to an understanding within political science of how intersectional identities influence political attitudes. This is analysis also Latina and Asian women who have not been included in much of the previous research.

Research Design

The central question of this dissertation is whether perceptions of marginalization increase support for policies favoring another marginalized group. Yet, there is no consensus on what is in an individual's best interest, let alone the interest of an entire group. Differences in

political ideologies and values can lead two people with the same problem to favor radically different solutions. Despite this disagreement, I argue that there are outcomes which can commonly be agreed on as beneficial. Understanding that there may be disagreement with my assessment, I define policies as benefiting a group if they (1) provide more rights, resources, or protections to a group than they otherwise would have or (2) prevent rights, resources or protections from being taken away from a group.

Perceptions of marginality begin with people identifying with a group they believe is subordinate in society and vulnerable to discrimination. I theorize marginality in greater detail in Chapter 1. However, I operationalize this concept by examining variables measuring perceptions of group discrimination, linked fate, and social exclusion. I also include beliefs about social mobility and equality within the United States.

I use two nationally representative surveys. The first is the 2012 Comparative Multi-Racial Post Election Survey (CMPS), a national internet survey of registered voters residing in the United States. Surveys were administered in both English and Spanish using probability-based web panels designed to be representative of the United States. The CMPS contains 2616 respondents who voted in the November 2012 election and self-identified as Black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, or White, non-Hispanic. The survey incorporates several embedded experiments testing support for immigration policies by varying whether immigrants are referred to as "illegal immigrants" or "undocumented." This test of framing effects is ideal to investigate the relationship between perceptions of marginalization and racialized language.

The CMPS also asks White people about their feelings of linked fate and group discrimination—one of the few surveys that also asks these questions of White respondents. I can investigate the effect of majority group members feeling discriminated against. In addition, it

also allows for an examination of White women, who are in the racially dominant group but in a marginalized gender group.

The second data set I use is the first wave of The 2008 Election and Beyond Survey (EBS). The EBS is a nationally representative internet panel survey based on random digit dialing household sampling that includes oversamples of Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and young people ages 18–35. One-third of the Latino respondents come from Spanish language dominant homes and completed the questionnaire in Spanish. Collected in three waves over the course of one year, I use wave one which was collected in the period leading up to the 2008 presidential election (October 17, 2008–November 3, 2008). In contrast with the CMPS, the EBS survey includes both individuals eligible to vote and those who were not. The EBS includes measures of race and woman linked fate as well as beliefs about the prevalence of racism and sexism.

Overview of Dissertation

Chapter one provides a theoretical grounding for the dissertation by defining the central concept of marginality and describing how marginality is connected to policies meant to support out-groups.

Chapter two, focuses on issues related to illegal immigration—a highly racialized policy that is laden with symbolic weight as well as real economic consequences. Given that immigration is racialized as a Latino issue, I examine how blacks and White respond to immigration questions particularly when the policies have racial undertones through language and framing. I find perceptions of group discrimination and social mobility are related to preferences about illegal immigration but vary by racial group. In addition, I present evidence from a survey experiment that Blacks are in fact more responsive to appeals that have been racialized and associated with Latinos.

Chapter three moves beyond immigration and examines the effect of perceptions of the marginality of one's own ingroup on opinions about three other policy issues that vary in the extent to which they are racialized. I investigate attitudes toward gay marriage, voter identification laws, and affirmative action. I provide evidence that the more associated with race a policy is, the more feelings of racial marginalization matter. Yet the magnitude and direction of the effects vary substantially between racial groups. The influence of racial marginalization also does not seem to influence attitudes toward gay marriage.

Chapter four brings issues of sex discrimination and gender to the forefront. In the final empirical chapter I test to see how perceptions of sexism in addition to perceptions of racism influence policies toward outgroups. This chapter also includes a sub-analysis of race and gender groups to provide a more intersectional analysis of marginalization. I find that perceptions of sexism are not significantly related to preferences for policies related to race.

Chapter 1 Coalition, Indifference, and Competition at the Margins

Theorizing Marginality

Cohen (1999) defines marginal groups as "those who, to varying degrees, exist politically, socially, or economically 'outside' of dominant norms and institutions" (p. 37). Denied access to the resources and skills that allow for substantial participation in decisions about the quality of life, these groups often find that their members lack access to resources such as political and social capital."

One of the consequences of marginality that Cohen identifies is an altered worldview. When people live much of their lives both intimately familiar with dominant society but ultimately denied full participation, they often regard dominant institutions and leaders with skepticism and distrust. The day to day experiences of exclusion and discrimination combine with a historical understanding of how the group has been marginalized.

Michener (2011) warns that a trend within political science is to use the term marginality without much theorizing or explicit definition. She builds off the work of Cohen and emphasizes marginality as lacking the resources with which to participate in substantial decisions about life. Those groups in the center of a society have the most resources to makes decisions about their lives and those in the periphery have the least. Therefore marginality is not necessarily about belonging to a particular demographic (e.g. race, class, gender) "but the extent of engagement with social, political, and economic processes" (p. 57).

I use the same center and periphery logic but participation is not key to my conception of marginality. A group is marginal when their material well-being, life, and money are functionally

at the will of a dominant group. They are marginal in that something about their group identity provides justification for dominant groups to exclude and push them to the margins of society.

My goal is not to develop an all-encompassing theory of marginality but instead to test some of the main variables used to understand the similar processes of racialization and racial subordination that minorities experience. These include experiences of discrimination, relations to their group identity and individual identity, perceptions of social mobility and the extent to which they even see themselves as marginalized.

Do members of marginalized groups see commonalities with other marginalized groups? Do feelings of marginality induce more outgroup support?

Cross Marginal Understanding—Linked Fate and Group Consciousness

Before we can answer questions about out-group sentiment, we must (somewhat counterintuitively) turn to in-group sentiment. Past research has shown that much of out-group attitudes have to do with attachments and feelings about a person's ingroup. One of the most prevalent theories of the effect of group attachments on politics focuses on group consciousness.

The theory of group consciousness began with scholars trying to explain why African Americans had greater levels of political participation than traditional models would predict based on other demographics (Olsen, 1970; Verba & Nie, 1972). Olsen presented an "ethnic community thesis"—finding that blacks who identify as members of an ethnic minority participate in wide variety of activities from voluntary organizations to political organizations more than non-identifiers. Similarly, Verba and Nie (1972) argue that "over participation" result from an awareness among group members of their status as a deprived group. These works provided early theorizing about the role of racial group awareness.

Noting the different and inconsistent measures explaining the relationship between racial identification and participation, Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk (1981) refine the concept of group consciousness by distinguishing between group identification and a politicized group consciousness. Group consciousness according to Miller et al. "involves identification with a group and political awareness or ideology regarding the group's relative position in society along with commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interest" (pg.495). These components of consciousness form a political ideology for subordinate groups where "they express a sense of grievance as victims of injustice, perceive a lack of legitimacy in the social hierarchy, and eventually set about collectively to correct the injustices. Among the dominant groups, the ideology justifies advantage, gives legitimacy to their social status, and provokes action aimed at securing permanence for their position." (497). Group consciousness is more than a psychological attachment to a group. Instead it is a set of beliefs about a group's social standing as well as a belief that collective action is the best means to improve the group's status and meet its interest (Citrin & Sears, 2014; Miller et al., 1981; Sears & Savalei, 2006).

One of the most prevailing and important extensions to group consciousness is the concept of linked fate (Dawson 1994). Linked fate develops from an attempt to explain the Black electoral homogeneity (i.e., voting for Democrats) despite ideological and class heterogeneity. Dawson argues that because the fate of individual Black people has been so linked to the fate of Black people as whole, there is a group assessment in political decisions. He defines this consideration of the racial group as the Black utility heuristic—meaning that the fate of the group affects the fate of the individual. Linked fate is generally measured in surveys with two questions, "Do you think what happens generally to Black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" "Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very

much?" Dawson (1994). These measures have a high level of predictability for African American political behavior (McClain, Johnson Carew, Walton, & Watts, 2009).

Scholars have attempted to determine if linked fate exists among other ethnic minority groups and if its effects are similar to those among blacks. Many Asians do express feelings of linked fate but they vary between national origin groups (Lien, 2001; Masuoka, 2006). Latinos are more likely than Asians, but less likely than African Americans, to express linked fate (Sanchez and Masuoka 2008). Within groups there is variation. For example, younger Latinos are more likely to believe their fate is linked to their group relative to older Latinos (e.g., Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Valenzuela 2010).

Linked fate is also associated with feelings about and perceptions of other groups. McClain et al. (2006) finds that Latinos who feel a sense of linked fate are less likely to hold negative stereotypes of, and more likely to feel commonality with, blacks. In addition, Hurwitz finds that the more closely blacks feel linked with other blacks, the more they recognize anti-Latino bias in the criminal justice system. Given the link between linked fate and feelings of commonality, I expect that as linked fate increases there will be more support for policies meant to help other marginalized groups.

Nativity, which is also implicated in understandings of racial position is a major explanatory factor for Latinos' attitudes toward blacks, as foreign-born Latinos tend to perceive greater competition with African Americans than their native-born counterparts (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Socioeconomic status has also been identified as an explanatory variable in studies of Black-brown relations. For example, both African Americans and Latinos with low incomes are more likely than those with higher incomes to perceive members of other groups as economic competitors (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Latinos who are born in the United States

are more likely than foreign born Latinos/as to recognize commonalities with blacks. Although Sanchez does not find that income is statistically significant related to perceptions of commonality he speculates that the non-significant income effect suggests that group consciousness can overcome perceptions of economic threat.

Marginality: Discrimination, Exclusion, and Perceptions of Equality

Based on the above literature, I focus on three ways of measuring and understanding marginality: perceptions of discrimination, perceptions of social exclusion, and beliefs about equality and social mobility. These beliefs construct an understanding of what it means to be a part of a group that is subordinate in society. Just because people are in the same group, does not mean that they see the world in the same way. In addition, those who identify themselves as in a subordinate position have a variety of beliefs about how to exit that position. To further investigate the types of action seen as benefiting the group, it is necessary to evaluate the extent to which people understand their life chances and beliefs about equality. It may be that those who perceive greater opportunity for themselves unrestricted by societal barriers are more optimistic and have less reason to legislation meant to fix inequalities. Those who see a lot of discrimination, social exclusion, and few paths for mobility will likely differ significantly from those who don't perceive much discrimination or see many possibilities for social mobility.

Perceptions of Discrimination and Political Implications

Evidence of continued racial discrimination continues to be empirically documented in a variety of settings, including the criminal justice system (Alexander, 2012), lending (Been, Ellen, & Madar, 2009; Ross & Yinger, 2002), hiring (Pager, 2007; Pager & Shepherd, 2008), and healthcare (Smedley & Stith, 2003). Yet despite its prevalence, people have a difficult time

detecting discrimination at the individual level. This is in part because they cannot act as "their own control group" and would not know if they would be treated better in a more privileged group. Lack of information and psychological motivations to justify the status quo can also help explain why gender and racial minorities are more likely to see discrimination against their group than against themselves personally. Most people, regardless of race or gender, do not think they have been discriminated against.

However, among those who do perceive discrimination, perceptions vary greatly by racial group. Whites on average perceive much less discrimination against Blacks than Blacks themselves perceive. Even egregious examples of racial discrimination are explained away as atypical or aberrations (Bonilla-Silva, 2003). White people often respond in frustration when Black people want action to reduce discrimination, because Whites don't believe that discrimination is actually a barrier to Black success. Sniderman and Hagen (1985) argue that as a result of the segregated lives of Whites, they rarely experience the first hand discrimination of minorities that might allow them to believe otherwise (as cited in O'Connor, Tilly & Bobo). In addition, minority group members might perceive greater discrimination against their own group because they have more direct experience (Kluegel & Bobo, 2001) and close ties with others who share their own experiences.

While most studies of perceived discrimination focus on racial minority groups, there is mixed evidence about the extent to which White people see racial discrimination against their group. Norton and Sommers (2011) find that White people believe discrimination against whites has increased steadily since the 1950s and now is higher than discrimination against blacks. They conclude that whites view racism as zero-sum, such that decreases in perceived bias against Blacks over the past six decades are associated with increases in perceived bias against Whites.

This finding is also supported by a 2015 survey conducted by Public Religion Research Institute (Jones, Daniel Cox, Cooper, & Lienesch, 2015) which found that 50% of White Americans—including 60% of White working-class Americans—agree that discrimination against whites has become as big a problem today as discrimination against blacks and other minorities.

The same PRRI poll finds that White perceptions of discrimination are associated with candidate preference, with roughly three-quarters (74%) of 2016 primary Donald Trump supporters agreeing that discrimination against whites is as big or a bigger problem as discrimination against racial minorities. This is compared to 57% of supporters of all other Republican candidates. More than 42% of primary Trump supporters—compared to 30% of supporters of all other Republican candidates—say that White men face a lot of discrimination in the U.S. today.

In contrast, Gallup shows a *decline* in perceptions of discrimination among whites (Gallup, 2015). They began polling on this question in July of 2008 when 42% of White people believed that discrimination against whites was widespread. Perceptions of discrimination against White people peaked at 46% in 2009—directly after the first Black president was elected and dropped to 32% in 2015. That perceptions of discrimination coincided with the election of the first Black president provides some evidence of Norton's claim that White people see racism as zero-sum.

It's still unclear under what conditions White people perceive racial discrimination against their group. Wilkins and Kaiser (2014) find that racial progress threatens whites who endorse the status quo. Whites see racial progress of minority groups as an assault on whites' social standing—leading them to perceive greater amounts of racial bias against their group.

Status quo endorsing beliefs justify the subordinate position of low status groups by attributing low status to deficient behaviors as opposed to structural impediments. Examples of these types of beliefs are endorsement of the "Protestant work ethic", individual-mobility beliefs, and belief in a just world. They further argue that whites who endorse the status hierarchy are able to explain their decreased status as the result of minorities receiving preferential treatment.

The status quo justifying beliefs also correspond with the components of marginality dealing with feelings of social mobility and fairness. Based on the previous studies, I expect that as perceptions of racial equality increase whites will perceive more discrimination against themselves. Perhaps that will make them less supportive of other marginalized groups.

Perceptions of Fairness and Political Implications

These status justifying beliefs are at the core of dominant American ideologies. The national ideology of the United States assumes that fair treatment is the norm and any deviation from fairness is un-American and ultimately will be remedied. This ideology works in concert with other belief systems such as meritocracy (i.e., hard work determines success) and color-blindness (i.e., ignoring racial difference eliminates racism) to reinforce widespread beliefs in the inherent fairness of the American system. Racial minorities perceive personal discrimination and discrimination against their racial group more than White people do. Minority group members may be reminded of discrimination more readily than dominant group members. On the other hand, dominant group members should readily call to mind attitudes about fairness—especially that U.S. is mostly open and fair.

Consistent with this expectation, a variety of studies have shown that Black and Whites in the United States have divergent views of the fairness of various institutions in the United

States, such as the criminal justice system (Hurwitz et al., 2015). Sigelman and Welch argue, "it is hardly an overstatement to say that blacks and whites inhabit two different perceptual worlds. Whites do not acknowledge the persisting prejudice and discrimination that are so obvious to blacks" (1991, 65). Peffley and Hurwitz (2010), examining the context of police minority relations, find that "Blacks and Whites diverge sharply in the content of their beliefs about the justice system, but also that these beliefs influence the interpretation of police misconduct quite differently for blacks and whites, suggesting that 'fairness' often takes on a radically different meaning for the races." (25).

Discrimination and Immigrants

Both the Latino and Asian American populations include large numbers of immigrants. This makes it unrealistic to try and disentangle the racial experience from the immigrant experience. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is that families are often of mixed status, a combination of native and foreign born, unauthorized and authorized. The family relationships bring a direct political connection to immigration policies that may not be the same in the White and Black populations who are dominated by the native born.

The second reason is that both groups are highly racialized as immigrant populations. Asian Americans, regardless of how long they have lived in the United States, are often regarded as "forever foreign." A shared experience of being asked, "where are you *really* from" cuts across national origin group, socio-economic status, and generation. Latinos are also heavily racialized as immigrants but in particular as "illegal immigrants (Nicholas, 2002)." This broad

categorization and stigmatization can also be a shared experience despite national origin, socio-economic status and generation.

Although being viewed as foreign can lead to social exclusion and discrimination, it can also have some benefits. Waters' (1999) Using the theory of segmented assimilation (Portes & Zhou, 1993), Waters contends that the selective retention of the immigrants' culture of origin can have a protective effect for second-generation African Americans (Waters, 1999). In her ethnography of West Indians in New York, she finds that many new West Indian immigrants distance themselves from traditional "Black America." Waters' subjects believed that being viewed as an ethnic or "immigrant" African American is preferable to being a mainstream African American in terms of social status and socioeconomic opportunity in the United States. They found that emphasizing their accent or ethnic identity of the second generation could to some extent ameliorate racism and the socioeconomic disadvantages associated with the native born African American community. Waters finds evidence for this in interviews with White employers who believe West Indians to be a model minority in contrast to the negative perceptions they held of African Americans.

An important part of group consciousness and marginalization is an understanding of mobility and discrimination within society. The theories of *immigrant optimism and immigrant pessimism* which come from the education literature, can provide insight into perceptions of social mobility. Immigrant optimism (Kao & Tienda, 1995) suggests that second generation Asian American children are likely to be high achievers and highly motivated in school. Second-generation children are frequently reminded of the sacrifices their parents have made in order to come to the United States, often for the purpose of obtaining better socioeconomic opportunities. Immigrant parents may find their opportunities are limited and encourage their children to focus

on academics in order to maximize the chances for career success (Goyette & Xie, 1999). This immigrant optimism is based on an understanding of social mobility and the payoff of effort.

Immigrant pessimism, on the other hand, is a response to the expectation of discrimination (Louie, 2001). Parents push for academic achievement to shield their children from an unequal and discriminatory society. The parents hoped that education could "blunt the edge of discrimination" (Sue & Okazaki, 1990). Among other things, this research suggests that beliefs in the possibility of social mobility can coexist with varying levels of perceived discrimination.

Which Group? Group Consciousness and Multiple Identities

Intersectional theorists argue that women of color experience multiple sources of oppression, all of which are "mutually constitutive." As a result, no single oppression (e.g., that of race or that of gender) can be singled out and analyzed on its own. Moreover, people can experience both marginalization and privilege simultaneously. How does this combination of privilege and marginalization interact with feelings of group consciousness and opinions and behavior across groups?

In her theory of marginality, Cohen also addresses intersectional approaches. She argues that "a designation of marginal does not suggest, as it often does in traditional studies of power, that all resource-deficient groups can be summarily categorized as powerless. These groups cannot be understood to suffer from the same inequalities and the same strategies of exclusion, and to resist or struggle in the same ways" (p. 36). Because groups are racialized and marginalized in different ways it is necessary to avoid drawing broad conclusions about a general "marginalized population." Instead, analyses should take in to account the unique context and history that produce a particular subordinate status.

One of the struggles to fully developing an intersectional approach is that most empirical work on political behavior within political science has been based on survey data. Most surveys do not have enough racial minorities to examine differences between minority groups, and especially intragroup differences based on gender, class, or sexual orientation.

The intersectional political behavior research that has been done has almost exclusively focused on the effect of race and gender for Black women. Scholars find that for Black women, racial identity is often more politically salient than gender identity (Gay & Tate, 1998; Mansbridge & Tate, 1992). Yet, this does not mean that issues of gender or sexism do are not relevant. Surveys show that even in the early days of the women's liberation movement, Black women were more likely to favor policies supporting gender equality than White woman (Hancock, 2007). Gay and Tate (1998) also that find gender matters as much as race in forming the political identities of Black women. However, it is a racial identity that more strongly affects the political attitudes of Black women than one based on gender.

Framing and Priming Marginalized Identities.

Given the previous studies, there is reason to believe that racial minorities probably have more chronically accessible attitudes about discrimination, fairness, and how they relate to their group than do whites. Framing political issues in a way that primes attitudes about discrimination may be related to how minority people respond to racially inflected language. If an issue is framed as potentially discriminatory, racial minorities may reflect on their own experiences of discrimination and begin to oppose the policy.

Most political issues are multi-faceted and complex, which means they are subject to multiple interpretations. Framing works by altering the considerations that people use to come to

a conclusion about some topic or decision. This is effective because "framing presumes a mixture of positive and negative beliefs and therefore some degree of ambivalence" (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Different ways of presenting the same information can result in very different attitudes and stated preferences. Even small changes in wording can result in large shifts. Several scholars have found large shifts of stated preferences by small changes in wording, such as substituting "the poor" for "those on welfare" or "anti-abortion" for "pro-choice." (Bartels, 2008; Rasinski, 1989; Smith, 1987). Druckman (2004) differentiates between two types of frames: equivalency and issue. He argues that most studies of framing focus on "an effect [that] occurs when different, but logically equivalent, phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences" (p. 671). These are "equivalency frames" because they are logically equivalent. However, I will focus on what Druckman refers to as "issue frames." Issue framing occurs when people are directed to focus on a narrow set of considerations when forming an opinion. The classic example of describing a hate group march in terms of free speech as opposed to public safety causes people to base their opinions on free speech instead of public safety considerations. Both types of framing effects cause individuals to focus on certain characterizations of an issue or problem instead of others; however, issue framing effects do not involve logically equivalent ways of making the same statement (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997). Rather, issue frames focus on qualitatively different yet potentially relevant considerations (e.g., free speech or public safety).

Recognition of a racial hierarchy and expectations moving forward

In the following chapters I will test the influence on of perceptions of marginalization on support for policies that favor other marginalized groups. Previous studies focusing on marginality (specifically linked fate and group consciousness) generally establish when

commonalities between racial and ethnic groups are more or less likely. When commonality is established, there is an assumption that these feelings may lead to coalitional politics.

I argue that the link between feelings of group deprivation and marginalization on policy preferences should not be taken for granted. Moreover, I argue that there is more to inter-racial feelings of commonality than simply empathy.

Instead, consistent with the Racial Prism of Group Identity (RPGI) theory (Masuoka & Junn, 2013) a group's position with the racial hierarchy will provide a lens with which to understand public policies. Experiences of marginality and a history of discrimination should make members of disadvantaged racial groups more aware of how racial hierarchy works within the United States.

From the beginning of the United States, dominant group members (White men) established a racial ordering with each racial group having varying levels of access to power and resources. These differences were codified in the Constitution which enumerated several protections for the institution of slavery and enslavement of Black people (Finkelman, 1987). As the country included more immigrants from South and East Europe, Mexico and Asia, these new groups were positioned within the hierarchy (Barrett & Roediger, 1997; Higham, 2002). Asians and Latinos, while never receiving the protections or power that White people received, often had more access than Blacks or Native Americans.

Masuoka and Junn (2013) argue that policy preferences will vary, in part, due to the different positions of people in the racial hierarchy that groups inhabit. This is because "race is not simply a demographic characteristic or a product of personal preference but a structural attribute imposed on an individual with important consequences for individual life chances and political experiences." Members of groups lower in the hierarchy (i.e. blacks and Latinos)

experience more discrimination on average and these experiences will likely affect the way they interpret policy questions and their answers to those questions.

The process of racialization includes stereotypes, laws targeted toward groups, and general understandings about their place in U.S. society. Though each racial group is racialized differently and have different histories, they share a status where they are never full, unconditional, members of the community—instead belonging exists on a continuum that reflects the racial hierarchy (Masuoka & Junn, 2013).

These experiences put non-White groups on the margins of society at some point, where group members are vulnerable to exclusion from material benefits, targets of violence, and other types of discrimination. Given the vulnerabilities some people experience because of their group, I expect marginalized group members to be more aware of and sympathetic to the challenges of other marginalized groups.

Chapter 2 Group Discrimination and Immigration Attitudes

In the following chapter, I focus on two policy issues: a pathway to citizenship/amnesty for undocumented immigrants and a version of the D.R.E.A.M Act that would allow illegal/undocumented immigrants to qualify for in-state tuition if they came to the United States as children. By focusing on these two policies, I examine the racialized issue from the perspective of groups who vary in their place in the racial hierarchy. Issues of discrimination and fairness often undergird immigration policies—especially policies relating to illegal or undocumented immigrants. The discussion of immigration policies in the introduction highlights just some of the diverging views on this issue—an issue that is highly racialized but for which public opinion does not fall neatly along class, party, or racial lines.

In this chapter I test the relationship between feelings of marginality and policy preferences regarding illegal immigration. In the previous chapter I outlined three components of marginality: perceived group discrimination, linked fate, general beliefs about social mobility and equality in the United States. In addition to testing the direct effect of marginality on policy preferences, I also test the hypothesis that there will be an interactive effect of framing, perceived discrimination and beliefs about social mobility.

Immigrants on the Margins

If marginality is constructed as living most of life outside of the dominant society, denied access and full participation, but never completely outside of society—unauthorized immigrants certainly count as a marginalized group. Cohen (1999) delineates various structures that contribute to marginality including: identities and norms, institutions, ideologies, and social

relationships. The structure of immigration law defines unauthorized immigrants as outside of the political community. Though they retain some basic rights afforded to anyone on U.S. soil, unauthorized immigrants are excluded from many other protections, services, and resources they would have if they were authorized. Perhaps most importantly, they are always at risk of being physically removed though deportation. The dominant ideologies and norms of U.S. society legitimize this marginalization categorizing these people as criminal, dishonest, foreign, and rightly cast outside of society.

Concerns and debates about immigration are not about a neutral abstract idea of citizen. Instead, the history of immigration in the United States has always been tied to race and racial exclusion. Both the first naturalization act and the first immigration act laid out clearly who was seen as racially desirable and undesirable. For the first hundred or so years, immigration to the United States was not restricted. There was little political will to restrict movement and a belief that it really couldn't be done. However, there were heavy restrictions on who could be a citizen (and thus have political power). The Naturalization Act of 1790 limited naturalization to only *free White persons.* In 1875 the Page Act, the first restrictive immigration law, prohibited immigration of "undesirable" people. Undesirable was racially defined and used to exclude Asian immigrants.

Racialized notions of criminality, immorality, "feeble-mindedness" and inferiority were also used to exclude members of other disfavored racial groups while including people from Western Europe and reaffirming their assumed superiority and membership in the United States. Even after 1965, when the last racial language had been excised from federal law, the undeniable link among racial stereotypes, racial logic, and immigration policy still remained.

There is an ever recurring debate about whether racialized issues are about economic self-interest or driven by racial attitudes and symbolic concerns (Kinder and Sears 1981). In their review of research on public opinion about immigration, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) show that recent research consistently finds immigration-related attitudes are mostly driven by symbolic concerns about the nation as a whole. These concerns are most commonly thought to be cultural but are sometimes focused on economic matters. Masuoka and Junn (2013) show that in addition to economic and ideological considerations, a person's racial group should also influence attitudes toward immigration. They argue that "because race imposes differential constraint on agency, the influence of factors such as partisanship, group identity and economic outlook may have distinctive effects on political attitudes on immigration." These considerations make immigration policy an ideal domain for investigating the effect of marginality on support for policies that protect other racial minorities.

What We Call It Matters

What is the difference between amnesty and a pathway to citizenship? Functionally there is no difference as both terms reference the same general set of policies meant to provide some authorized status to undocumented/illegal immigrants. Yet recall from the introduction that even small changes in the way a question is worded or the features that are emphasized can move public opinion. The word amnesty is often associated with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) which provided legal status to 2.7 million undocumented immigrants (Merolla, Ramakrishnan, & Haynes, 2013). The bill is regarded by many as a failure because it did not decrease the number of immigrants entering the United States without authorization. Therefore, advocates for greater restriction and enforcement have an incentive to associate any

effort at legalization as an "amnesty." Pro-legalization advocates and legislators also recognize the political liability of the word amnesty and instead opt for the phrase "path to citizenship." The difference in labels can shift opinion on immigration issues (Merolla et al., 2013).

In addition to what the policies are called, also at issue is how politicians, pundits, and the public refer to immigrants themselves. Therefore even how immigrants are labeled (undocumented, illegal, unauthorized) is a contentious matter. Liberals are more likely to use the phrase "undocumented immigrant" while conservatives are more likely to use "illegal immigrant" or "illegals" (Merolla et al., 2013). The distinctions highlight where each group sees the relevant issue. Advocates of legalized status have preferred to use the term "undocumented" arguing that term "illegal immigrant" and especially "illegals" dehumanizes immigrants. Those who prefer the labels "illegal immigrant" and "illegals" argue the most relevant fact is that people are breaking the law. Merolla et al. argue that by framing the issue as entirely about legality, conservative groups have sought to direct attention primarily to policies of enforcement over more comprehensive solutions that include legalization. The frame of illegality also "helps restrictionists deflect criticism that their movements have anything to do with racial prejudice or ethnocentrism" (Merolla et al., 2013).

The issue of prejudice and ethnocentrism is especially relevant with regard to immigration issues. As noted in the beginning of the chapter, naturalization and immigration policies have a long history of being tied to ideas of racial hierarchy, with Whites at the top and assumed to be members of the community. When comparing "legal" immigrants with "illegal" immigrants, Masuoka and Junn find that White respondents overwhelmingly find illegal immigration to be a problem compared to "legal" immigration. Black respondents, on the other hand, seemed indifferent to the frame, and were more likely to see both legal and illegal

immigration as problems. Latinos were more likely to see neither as problems. Masuoka and Junn argue that the illegality frame is much more resonant for White respondents and that both blacks and Latinos report significantly lower willingness to impose punitive immigration policies with the Latinos the least likely. Brader, Valentino, Jardina, and Ryan (unpublished) find a similar pattern with regard to Blacks who are consistently more permissive on immigration than whites across a host of different policies. They find that group attitudes, not material interests, drive individual differences in both Black and White opinions about immigration.

The evidence is slightly mixed with regard to frame. When focusing on just illegal/undocumented immigrants, Merolla et al. find that there is no difference in policy support among the terms used to describe those without legal status (illegal, undocumented, or unauthorized). The one exception to this pattern is among first- and second-generation immigrants, who react against the illegal frame and become even more supportive of legalization and the DREAM Act (Merolla et al., 2013).Yet they did not disaggregate by race and their sample was largely White.

Data and Method

In order to understand the effect of framing and marginality support for immigration issues, I use data from the 2012? Comparative Multi-Racial Post-election survey (CMPS).

Independent Variables

In this project I seek to understand the influence of marginality on support for outgroups and attention to racialized language. I operationalize marginality by using the following questions:

Perceptions of group discrimination: "Do you think discrimination in the United States preventing [RACIAL GROUP] from succeeding is a major problem, minor problem, or not a problem at all?"
—No problem/ minor problem/ major problem

Racial group linked fate: "Do you think what happens generally to [RACIAL GROUP] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?"
—No / Yes

Social mobility: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? [RACIAL GROUP] can get ahead in the United States if they work hard."
—*Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Agree/ Strongly Agree*

In addition to the above variables of interest, I also include controls for ideology, age, gender, education and nativity. Table 2-1 provides summary statistics of the main variables in the analysis.

Dependent Variables

I examine the determinants of public opinion on two immigration issues, pathway to citizenship and in-state tuition for undocumented/illegal immigrants who came to the U.S. as children. The data were collected from the following ordinal Likert scale questions[2]:

Pathway/amnesty: "[Illegal/Undocumented] immigrants should qualify for U.S. citizenship, if they meet certain requirements like paying back taxes and fines, learning English, and passing a background check."
—*Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Agree/ Strongly Agree*

In-state tuition: "[Illegal/Undocumented] immigrants who grew up in the U.S. and graduated from High School here, should qualify for in state college tuition."
—*Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Agree/ Strongly Agree*

[2] Fifty percent of respondent receive the word "illegal" and 50% receive "undocumented." There is a significant effect of treatment ("illegal versus "undocumented") for both pathway/amnesty $t(2583)= -2.61$ $p > 0.0091$ and in-state tuition $t(2583)= -1.58$ $p < 0.0561$

Perceptions of Marginality and Immigration Policy

Group consciousness is about believing your group is subordinate and that collective action is the best way to improve conditions for the group. In the case of Latinos, this should translate into support for a policy that helps many members of their group and has the potential to decrease the stigma around undocumented immigrants which is often applied to Latinos as a whole regardless of an individual's immigration status. Because the vast majority of Black people in the United States are native born, as a group they would not share the same benefits from support for a pathway to citizenship. In fact, depending on how the issue is framed Blacks may perceive immigrants as economic competitors and be less likely to support a pathway to citizenship. However, high levels of linked fate, usually an intragroup perception, may also be associated with perceptions of commonality between different ethnic and racial groups. If Black people see themselves as marginalized in society and perceive commonality with other racial minorities they may be more supportive of laws to benefit undocumented immigrants.

Finally, although linked fate and other measures of group consciousness may lead to feelings of commonality between racial minorities, that may not necessarily the case for the dominant racial group. Miller et al. in their articulation of group consciousness expected that "group consciousness will be promoted among advantaged groups when they perceive their position in society as being threatened or challenged." (1981, p. 497)." Thus I hypothesize that perceptions of discrimination will increase support among minorities while decreasing support among whites.

H1: As perceptions of group discrimination increase, support for both immigration policies among Blacks and Latinos will also increase while support among White respondents will decrease.

H2: As linked fate increases, support for both immigration policies will also increase for Blacks and Latinos and decrease for Whites.

Based on the immigrant optimism literature, belief in social mobility can increase feelings of success and efficacy. When success is the product of one's own efforts, there may be less desire to reduce competition. On the other hand, if one views limited possibilities for social mobility because of systems of oppression such as racism or sexism, then an individual may believe that success is zero-sum—that minorities are fighting for the same scraps. Under this perception, people may want to limit immigration (and thus competition).

H3: For all racial groups, the more respondents believe that their group can get ahead with hard work, the more they will support both immigration policies.

The RPGI model suggests that because of their different positions in the racial hierarchy, members of different racial groups will have different notions of membership and belonging in America. These ideas about who belongs and the racial implications are central and have been central to immigration discourse in the United States. They show that by emphasizing the distinction between "legal" and "illegal," opinion leaders "focus attention to the values of fairness, importance of law, and protection of national identity as justification for more punitive immigration policies." The illegality frame may not resonate as much with Black and Latino respondents, because they may be more likely to perceive that those standards of equality and American law do not apply equally to them.

Although Merolla et al. found no differences between the use of "illegal", "undocumented" and "unauthorized," I suspect this may have been the result of a racially homogenous White sample. If focusing on "illegality" signals violating laws and fairness, I expect that White conservatives will be especially averse to supporting undocumented

immigrants while White liberals will not. Latinos may perceive the "illegal" frame as being an attack on their group and may respond more favorably to policies that favor undocumented immigrants. I expect that blacks will be more aware of and more likely to reject racially coded language. Finally, consistent with previous literature I expect that measures related to economic concerns will be less relevant because symbolic concerns largely outweigh realistic threat concerns.

H4: Support for both immigration policies will increase among Blacks and Latinos when immigrants are described as "illegal." The frame will not influence support for either policy among White respondents.

Table 2-1 Summary Statistics for Select Variables

	Black	Latino	White
Age	52	49	54
Education (1-14)	10.35	9.98	10.72
Woman	52%	48%	49%
Liberal	39%	34%	25%
Moderate	41%	31%	30%
Conservative	19%	34%	45%
Born in US	95%	63%	97%
Personal Discrimination	40%	20%	12%
Get Ahead (1-3)	2.49	2.74	2.70
Discrimination Major Problem	65%	40%	16%
Discrimination Minor Problem	25%	40%	35%
Discrimination No Problem	7%	19%	47%
Linked Fate	67%	42%	54%
Observations	804	934	878

Results

The first hypothesis was that as perceptions of group discrimination increase, support for both immigration policies among Blacks and Latinos will also increase while support among White respondents will decrease.

Table 2-2 presents results for six separate regressions, with each row representing a separate regression including controls not reported[3]. As predicted, the more group discrimination Blacks and Latinos report, the more they support a pathway to citizenship. For Blacks, moving from believing discrimination is no problem to a major problem moves about .75 units on a 5 point scale in support of a pathway to citizenship.

There is neither a substantive nor statistical effect of perceptions of discrimination for in-state tuition. The college tuition question is similar to wording for the federal D.R.E.A.M. Act which has high levels of support across a broad range of racial groups. Previous studies have found that the D.R.E.A.M. Act discussion primarily focuses on the children of illegal immigrants who were brought in as young children. Even among conservative news outlets, the focus tends to be on "innocent children" rather than illegality (Merolla et al., 2013). It may be that this issue is not as tied to racial threat and so feelings of group discrimination may not be as relevant for Black respondents.

For Latino respondents, moving from believing there is no discrimination to major discrimination results in about a 1 unit increase in support for pathway to citizenship--- for example from Strongly Disagree to Disagree or Agree to Strongly Agree. There is an even stronger effect for support for in-state tuition, with moving from no problem to a major problem being about a 1.6 increase in support. For White respondents, the more racial discrimination they perceive against their group, the less they support a pathway to citizenship and In-State Tuition. The effect is small and statistically non-significant for pathway to citizenship. However, moving

[3] The full table, Table 2-3, can be found on page 19 which includes all of the controls and findings for a later analysis.

from perceiving no discrimination to major discrimination results in about a 1.25 decrease—for example moving from Agree to Disagree for In-State Tuition.

Table 2-2 Support for Pathway and In-State Tuition for Selected Variables

	Pathway to Citizenship/Amnesty			In-State Tuition		
	Black	**Latino**	**White**	**Black**	**Latino**	**White**
Discrimination Problem	0.23** (0.10)	0.34*** (0.08)	-0.12 (0.08)	0.04 (0.12)	0.53*** (0.10)	-0.41*** (0.08)
Linked Fate	0.06 (0.14)	0.10 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.08 (0.16)	0.10 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.11)
Can Get Ahead	0.24*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)	0.12** (0.06)	0.16** (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)
Democrat	0.34 (0.23)	0.39** (0.17)	0.65*** (0.13)	0.06 (0.27)	0.84*** (0.19)	1.05*** (0.14)
Independent	0.48* (0.26)	0.56*** (0.19)	0.35*** (0.14)	-0.11 (0.31)	0.65*** (0.23)	0.43*** (0.14)
No Preference	0.29 (0.30)	0.48** (0.21)	-0.02 (0.21)	0.11 (0.36)	0.86*** (0.26)	0.38** (0.18)
Born in U.S.	(0.12) -0.09	-0.26** (0.12)	0.11 (0.32)	-0.44 (0.31)	-0.49*** (0.13)	-0.14 (0.31)

Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 show the same information as Tables 2.1 and 2.2 while focusing on the effect of perceptions of group discrimination. From the graphs we can more clearly see that for White and Latino respondents, the largest movement comes from moving from believing discrimination is no problem, to seeing it as a minor problem. For Black respondents, the greatest change comes from the difference between seeing discrimination as a minor problem versus a major problem (except for in-state tuition where there is no effect). So in all six cases, perceived discrimination does have the hypothesized effect of increasing support for policies that would benefit Latinos.

Figure 2-1 Support for Pathway/ Amnesty by Perceived Discrimination



Figure 2-2 Support for In-State Tuition by Perceived Discrimination



The second hypothesis was that believing that their group can get ahead with hard work will be associated with supporting both immigration policies. This was expected to hold for all

racial groups. As expected, the more Black people believe their group can get ahead, the more they support both a pathway to citizenship and in-state tuition. Believing they can get ahead has the same positive movement of .75 points as perceptions of group discrimination. It also matters for support for in-state tuition in the expected direction but the effect size of .36 is very small.

For Latino respondents beliefs about the ability to get ahead are positively related to support for both a pathway and the dream. However, as with Black respondents, the effect sizes are small at .42 and .36 respectively. For White respondents there seems to be neither a substantive nor statistically significant effect of beliefs about getting ahead. This is contrary to my expectations. Because the dominant group should expect and receive the guarantees of the "American Dream," I would expect that beliefs about getting ahead would be more influential.

Latinos agree most that their group can get ahead with hard work with an average of 4.3, followed by whites with an average of 4.1 and blacks with 3.8. Latinos as a group are characterized by a continuing immigration stream which means a shorter history and potentially a shorter collective memory than blacks. Although both groups perceive similar levels of group discrimination, Latinos may be more positive about the prospect for group mobility. This is also true of White respondents who report the lowest levels of perceived discrimination.

The third hypothesis is that support for both immigration policies will increase among Blacks and Latinos when immigrants are described as "illegal." The frame will not influence support for either policy among White respondents.

In addition to examining the role of discrimination, I also test for framing effects between the terms "illegal" and "undocumented." I expect that both Black and Latino respondents will be more attuned to the racial subtext even if the language does not explicitly mention race. Marginal groups form their world view from both present day experiences with inequality and historical

understandings of group discrimination. There is a long history of racially coded language being used to sway public sentiment. I expect that groups who have been targets of these racialized appeals with be more aware of them and more repelled by them.

Table 2-3 shows the relationship between measures of marginality alone (column 1), with controls (column 2), and with an interaction between group discrimination and frame (column 3) for Black respondents. Once I add the controls, beliefs about social mobility ("my group can get ahead") and perceptions of group discrimination continue to be significant. The more Black respondents believe discrimination is a problem, the more they support a path to citizenship. Their support is even stronger when asked about "illegal" immigrants rather than "undocumented immigrants." The regression table compares the effect to the reference group, those Blacks who think discrimination is no problem.

Table 2-3 Support for Pathway to Citizenship/Amnesty---Black Respondents

	Marginality	Controls	Interaction
Can Get Ahead	0.23***	0.24***	0.23***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Linked Fate	0.08	0.06	0.04
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Discrimination Problem	0.24**	0.23**	
	(0.10)	(0.10)	
Age		0.00	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education		-0.01	-0.01
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Woman		0.05	0.04
		(0.12)	(0.12)
Born in US		-0.09	-0.16
		(0.29)	(0.29)
Democrat		0.34	0.32
		(0.23)	(0.23)
Independent		0.48*	0.44*
		(0.26)	(0.26)
Other Party		-0.42	-0.62
		(0.60)	(0.60)
No Preference		0.29	0.28
		(0.30)	(0.29)
Illegal			-0.92**
			(0.38)
Discrimination Minor Problem			-0.30
			(0.29)
Discrimination Major Problem			0.03
			(0.30)
Minor Problem x Illegal			1.17***
			(0.42)
Major Problem x Illegal			1.02**
			(0.40)
Constant	2.55***	2.10***	2.58***
	(0.24)	(0.55)	(0.61)
Observations	753	752	752
R-squared	0.07	0.08	0.10

Table 2-4 Support for In-State Tuition for Immigrants--Black Respondents

	Marginality	Controls	Interaction
Can Get Ahead	0.12**	0.12**	0.12*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Linked Fate	0.09	0.08	0.05
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Discrimination Problem	0.06	0.04	
	(0.12)	(0.12)	
Age		0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education		0.06	0.06
		(0.04)	(0.05)
Woman		0.13	0.14
		(0.15)	(0.15)
Born in US		-0.44	-0.52*
		(0.31)	(0.29)
Democrat		0.06	0.05
		(0.27)	(0.26)
Independent		-0.11	-0.16
		(0.31)	(0.30)
Other Party		-0.66	-0.78
		(0.71)	(0.71)
No Preference		0.11	0.12
		(0.36)	(0.35)
Illegal			-0.50
			(0.38)
Minor Problem			-0.42
			(0.36)
Major Problem			-0.17
			(0.35)
No Problem X Illegal			0.00
			(0.00)
Minor Problem X Illegal			1.07**
			(0.46)
Major Problem X Illegal			0.58
			(0.42)
Constant	2.82***	2.60***	2.90***
	(0.29)	(0.71)	(0.72)
Observations	754	753	753

Compared to blacks who think there is no problem, moving to just thinking it's a minor problem is over a one-point scale in support of a pathway to citizenship. It may seem that this is simply a partisan effect with more blacks who perceive discrimination to be 'no problem' perhaps more likely to be Republicans and have conservative politics. But this is not the case. In fact, the 65% of blacks (37 respondents) who say that there is no problem identify as Democrats. Below, I include a graph to better see the relationship which shows that effect is being driven by those who think that discrimination is no problem for both a pathway and dream act. The relationship between minor and major discrimination is less clear but shows small increases in support when immigrants are described as "illegal" versus "undocumented."

Figure 2-3 Support for Pathway/ Amnesty by Discrimination---Black Respondents



Table 2-5 Support for In-State Tuition by Discrimination---Black Respondents



Table 2-7 show a very different relationship. Unlike with Black respondents, there is no framing effect for Latinos. It doesn't matter whether they are asked about "illegal" or "undocumented" immigrants. Again, we can see that the more perceived discrimination, the more support (with the line for Major Problem above Minor and No problem way below). These results are extremely similar between support for the pathway to citizenship and for in-state tuition.

Table 2-6 Support for Pathway to Citizenship/Amnesty--Latino Respondents

	Marginality	Controls	Interaction
Can Get Ahead	0.15***	0.14***	0.13**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Linked Fate	0.17	0.10	0.10
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Discrimination Problem	0.39***	0.34***	
	(0.08)	(0.08)	
Age		-0.01*	-0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education		0.02	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Woman		0.07	0.08
		(0.11)	(0.11)
Born in US		-0.26**	-0.26**
		(0.12)	(0.12)
Democrat		0.39**	0.38**
		(0.17)	(0.17)
Independent		0.56***	0.55***
		(0.19)	(0.19)
Other Party		0.27	0.26
		(0.56)	(0.53)
No Preference		0.48**	0.49**
		(0.21)	(0.21)
Illegal			-0.18
			(0.29)
Discrimination Minor Problem			0.41*
			(0.24)
Discrimination Major Problem			0.71***
			(0.22)
No Problem x Illegal			0.00
			(0.00)
Minor Problem x Illegal			0.24
			(0.34)
Major Problem x Illegal			0.08
			(0.32)
Constant	2.76***	2.79***	2.81***
	(0.27)	(0.48)	(0.52)
Observations	898	896	896
R-squared	0.09	0.13	0.13

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2-7 Support for In-State Tuition for Immigrants--Latino Respondents

	Marginality	Controls	Interaction
Can Get Ahead	0.16**	0.16**	0.15**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Linked Fate	0.24	0.10	0.09
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Discrimination Problem	0.67***	0.53***	
	(0.10)	(0.10)	
Age		-0.01*	-0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education		-0.03	-0.04
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Woman		-0.04	-0.03
		(0.13)	(0.13)
Born in US		-0.49***	-0.47***
		(0.13)	(0.13)
Democrat		0.84***	0.83***
		(0.19)	(0.19)
Independent		0.65***	0.64***
		(0.23)	(0.23)
Other Party		-0.39	-0.43
		(0.28)	(0.28)
No Preference		0.86***	0.86***
		(0.26)	(0.26)
Illegal			-0.36
			(0.33)
Minor Problem			0.50*
			(0.28)
Major Problem			1.09***
			(0.27)
No Problem X Illegal			0.00
			(0.00)
No Problem X Illegal			0.54
			(0.39)
No Problem X Illegal			0.13
Constant	2.16***	2.64***	2.76***
	(0.30)	(0.50)	(0.53)
Observations	899	897	897
R-squared	0.14	0.24	0.25

Even though there is no interaction effect, the graph is still informative in that it still demonstrates the effect of discrimination. The more perceived group discrimination, the higher support for both policies.

Figure 2-4 Support for Pathway/Amnesty ---Latino Respondents



Figure 2-5 Support for In-State Tuition by Discrimination---Latino Respondents



Table 2-8 Support for In-State Tuition for Immigrants--White Respondents

	Marginality	Controls	Interaction
Can Get Ahead	-0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Linked Fate	0.07	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Discrimination Problem	-0.55***	-0.41***	
	(0.08)	(0.08)	
Age		0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education		0.03	0.03
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Woman		0.21**	0.21**
		(0.11)	(0.11)
Born in US		-0.14	-0.13
		(0.31)	(0.31)
Democrat		1.05***	1.04***
		(0.14)	(0.14)
Independent		0.43***	0.42***
		(0.14)	(0.14)
Other Party		0.74	0.75
		(0.47)	(0.47)
No Preference		0.38**	0.36**
		(0.18)	(0.19)
Illegal			0.16
			(0.15)
Minor Problem			-0.39**
			(0.16)
Major Problem			-0.62**
			(0.25)
No Problem X Illegal			0.00
			(0.00)
Minor Problem X Illegal			-0.09
			(0.23)
Major Problem X Illegal			-0.34
			(0.31)
Constant	3.12***	1.98***	1.93***
	(0.25)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Observations	840	838	838
R-squared	0.08	0.18	0.19

Finally, examining Whites' attitudes, I expected there would be no framing effect. I find none, for either pathway or in-state tuition. Instead, the most important variables are simply party identification for a pathway to citizenship. As White respondents perceive more discrimination against their group, the more the less they support in-state tuition.

As with the Latinos, there is no framing effect, but again we see that feelings about discrimination matter for support. For White respondents it is in the reverse direction, with those perceiving more discrimination against their own in-group less supportive of both pathway and in-state tuition.

Figure 2-6 Support for Pathway/ Amnesty ---White Respondents



Figure 2-7 Support for In-State Tuition by Discrimination---White Respondents



Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to determine to what extent feelings of marginality, and perceived discrimination and social mobility influence support for a pathway to citizenship and in-state tuition. For each of the racial groups studied, there was an effect of perceived group discrimination. For blacks and Latinos the more discrimination they perceived against their own group, the more supportive of pro-Latino policies. For White respondents, the more perceived anti-White discrimination, the less supportive of pro-Latino policies.

For Black people, low rates of immigration and potential economic competition from immigrants is the quintessential policy that is about another marginalized group. As Blacks perceive more racial discrimination against their group, the more they supported a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. This finding provides evidence for perceptions of marginality increasing support for policies that favor other groups.

Contrary to my expectation, there was only a small framing effect for African Americans and no effect for White people. There was however an effect of belief in mobility and equality (with

hard work you can get a head) for Latino respondents. Part of the American ethos is that hard work is both necessary and rewarded. Those who are successful are successful because of their own efforts and those who are not successful need to try harder. The unequal playing fields for various racial groups make these expectations tinged with racial undertones.

In this chapter I have shown that a group's position in the racial hierarchy combined with beliefs about discrimination produce unique effects across racial groups. For White people they respond by trying to maintain their privileges, while Black people respond in something like solidarity. In the next chapter, I test to see if these results persist across a more diverse set of issues.

Chapter 3 Group Discrimination and Racialized Policies

In the previous chapter, I examined the relationship between feelings of discrimination and social mobility with the contentious and racialized issue of illegal immigration. In the following chapter, I extend this analysis to three other policy issues which vary in the extent to which they are racialized.

Because my hypothesis is that attitudes will be different for racialized versus non-racialized policies, I chose three policies that vary with regard to which race is invoked. Race sensitive admission policies (even those not considered affirmative action) are some of the most contested and debated. Race is not only invoked because of racial diversity targets but also because of stereotypes and assumptions about meritocracy, fairness, and discrimination. Providing extra effort to find Black and Latino students is the most racialized of the policy issues.

Voter identification laws have emerged with the stated purpose of reducing voter fraud but have been criticized for making it more difficult for non-majority groups to vote. Race is both implicitly and explicitly invoked in these debates. Opposition groups argued that voter identification laws target racial minorities (among others) and result in the disenfranchisement of non-White groups. Moreover racial considerations are also implicitly at play because of the historical linkages of voter suppression of Blacks. Voter identification laws have also been framed in much more universal terms as potentially discriminatory against a broad range of the electorate (e.g. students, the elderly, and the poor). Thus, I consider this policy as racialized to a lesser extent than affirmative action.

Finally, I examine opinion on banning gay marriage. I argue that this issue is not racialized. Although, popular media have included a racial narrative by criticizing Blacks (to the exclusion of other voters) for being particularly homophobic— attitudes about race are not central to attitudes about this issue and I consider it non-racialized.

Method

Just as in the last chapter, I use data from the Comparative Multi-Racial Post-election survey (CMPS). In order to test the effect of perceptions of marginality on policy preferences I use the same measures of linked fate, perceived group discrimination and social mobility. In addition to the previously stated controls, I add a question regarding church attendance which is associated with attitudes toward gay marriage.

Dependent Variables:
I test the influence of perceptions of marginalization on the following variables:

> **Ban on gay marriage**: "We need an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would ban marriages between gays or between
> Lesbians
> —*Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Agree/ Strongly Agree*
>
> **Voter identification:** "Everyone should be required to provide a driver's license or state-issued photo identification card in
> order to vote on election-day?"
> —*Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Agree/ Strongly Agree*
>
> **Extra effort:** "An extra effort should be made to make sure that qualified Blacks and Hispanics are considered for college and university admissions."
> —*Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Agree/ Strongly Agree*

Ban on Same-Sex Marriage

Background

In 1993, The Supreme Court of Hawaii decided in *Baehr v. Lewin* that denying same-sex couples the right to marry may have violated that state's constitutional prohibition on sex discrimination (Gregory B. Lewis & Gossett, 2008)." Before then, the authors argue, the idea of same-sex marriage was so unthinkable that it didn't receive much attention and the Hawaii decision vaulted the issue in the national stage. The reaction among political elites was swift and negative. Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) two months after *Baehr v. Lewin*. "When Massachusetts' high court ordered that state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples (Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 2003), President Bush argued for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriages, and 23 states amended their own constitutions to do so."

In chapter one, I discussed intergroup attitudes toward immigration policies concerning undocumented immigrants. While there were certainly admonishments from elites for blacks to support progressive immigration policies, in the case of same-sex marriage these admonishments were more direct primarily because of the similarities between gay marriage and interracial marriage.

In 1967, the Supreme Court found in *Loving v. Virginia* that anti-miscegenation laws were unenforceable. Although the litigants in the Loving case were a Black woman and a White man, laws restricting interracial marriage extended beyond just Black and White marriages. Yet, I argue that at least as far as the public discourse was concerned, interracial marriage was decidedly a Black victory and as such Black people should be willing to extend those same rights to other groups. Because White people (particularly White women) were prohibited from marrying non-whites, it would be reasonable to expect that they would see this as a win for the

rights of their group. However, the right to interracial racial marriage is typically not framed that way and White racial identity has not been associated with the obligation to give marriage rights to others.

Polls show that Blacks have lower levels of support for gay marriage than other racial groups (Newport, 2015; Pew, 2015). Lewis (2003) found that despite their greater disapproval of homosexuality, Blacks' have similar opinions to whites on sodomy laws, gay civil liberties, and employment discrimination and Black people are more likely than whites to support laws prohibiting antigay discrimination.

African Americans who are both highly likely to identify as Democrats and highly religious can produce a cross-pressure on issues of same-sex marriage. This is because Democrats are more supportive of same-sex marriage while the highly religious are more opposed (Pew, 2015). Table 3-1 shows data from Pew Research center on the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Because same-sex marriage is often framed as a civil rights issue it is an ideal test to examine the relationship between perceptions of racial marginalization and support for another marginalized group.

Figure 3-1 Race, Religion and Support for Same-Sex Marriage





Racial Discrimination and Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage

The link between discrimination and same-sex marriage attitudes was quite forcefully made in journalistic writing. Writing for the liberal magazine *Mother Jones*, Brandon Ellington Patterson, in a piece titled "Why You Can't Be Pro-Black and Homophobic at the Same Time," echoes these types of arguments. Patterson links the struggle for rights and reminds people that Black rights and LGTB rights are not mutually exclusive.

> The simple truth is this: It's problematic for members of any one marginalized group to challenge the progress made by members of another, especially when both groups suffer as a result of the same system—a system that favors being White, male, straight and "cisgender"… But it is especially problematic for Black people to reject the LGBT rights struggle, especially when, over the past year, Black people have been particularly vocal about their own racial oppression.

He continues by invoking the Black Lives Matter movement.

> There is no caveat or asterisk on the phrase "Black lives matter." All Black lives matter, not just the ones you are comfortable with. You cannot be pro-Black if you oppress Black

> people. And, more importantly, you cannot love all Black people if you oppress Black people.

The above excerpt is similar to the higher moral authority theory. In addition, Ellington explicitly references the racial hierarchy in which Black people continue to be in a subordinate position and argues for progressive political stances regarding LGTB issues. In addition to perhaps carrying a great "obligation," race and gay rights are also complicated by intersectional struggles. In his interviews of Black gay and lesbians in New York, Hunter (2013) finds that racial considerations may not work. Corey (22-year-old Black gay New York resident) makes the point:

> White gay people do their own thing and don't include me, just like Black people do their thing and don't include me... what's different is that when you're Black you have a similar experience because you're Black, you know, White people are the ones doing shit to you, especially White men. So even though White gay people are gay, they are still White and they are still White men... they aren't really much like me.

To test the hypothesis, I then run a regression to see if there is an association between support for a ban on gay marriage and feelings of discrimination. The idea is that people with higher perceptions of marginality might want to act on behalf of outgroups more than those with lower levels. Only 2% of the sample identify as gay or lesbian so the vast majority of those responding are giving an opinion about the rights of an out-group.

There are some limitations with this measure. Opposing a constitutional amendment does not necessarily mean that you support gay marriage. It could be that people are indifferent to the issue or they may even support a state law or amendment. Additionally, many who oppose gay marriages do not see themselves as opposing a group. Instead, they argue, opposition is about a set of values and boundaries about the definition of marriage as an institution and not an indictment of people at all.

Results

Figure 3-2 Support for a Ban on Same-Sex Marriage



As we can see from Figure 3-2, there are similar levels of agreement across racial groups. Roughly a quarter of each racial group agrees or strongly agrees that there should be a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. There is more variation in those who disagree with the statement. Blacks are the least likely to strongly disagree or disagree that a constitutional amendment is necessary. Latinos follow and almost 50% of White respondents disagree.

Table 3-1 Gay Marriage Ban--- White Respondents Bi-Variate Regressions

	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standard Error	Constant
Personal Discrimination	0.06	(0.20)	2.60***
Discrimination Problem	**0.57*** **	(0.08)	2.19***
Get Ahead	0.05	(0.07)	2.40***
Discrim Problem- Major	**0.70*** **	(0.13)	2.45***
Discrim Problem- Minor	**0.45*** **	(0.13)	2.45***
Discrim Problem- None	**-0.86*** **	(0.12)	3.00***

Note: Each row represents an single bi-variate regression

In the bi-variate regressions group consciousness variables do not matter for either Black or Latino respondents, but do for White respondents. Table 3-1 shows the initial relationship without controls for White respondents.

The measures of discrimination are not related to support for a ban on gay marriage except in one case. Believing that racial discrimination against whites is "no problem" is associated with opposing a ban on gay marriage. Recall that 50% of those whites who believe that racial discrimination is a major problem for their group are Republicans. Thus there is a strong partisan component to this variable and the attitudes about gay marriage could be just about these respondents being more Republican (and thus more supportive of a ban on gay marriage).

Across racial groups, respondents who were Democrats and had more education opposed a ban on gay marriage. While being older and engaging in greater church attendance was associated with support. Perhaps one implication of these findings is that feelings of group consciousness and racial discrimination do not generalize to non-racial domains. These data do

not support the hypothesis that feelings of racial marginality lead to opposition of a law meant to provide reduce rights of another (non-racial) minority group.

Group identity threat might predict that feelings of discrimination could lead to opposition to other groups. However, for Blacks and Latinos perceptions of marginality do not matter either way.

Table 3-2 Support for Gay Marriage Ban

	Black	Latino	White
Discrimination Problem	0.01	0.09	0.23***
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Can Get Ahead	0.01	-0.01	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Linked Fate	0.06	-0.16	-0.11
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.12)
Age	0.01*	0.01	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Education	-0.17***	-0.02	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Woman	0.17	-0.07	-0.18
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.11)
Ideology	0.15**	0.23***	0.43***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Church Attendance	0.09**	0.22***	0.15***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	3.05***	0.83	1.81***
	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.53)
Observations	646	770	709
R-squared	0.12	0.15	0.32

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Voter Identification Laws

Background

As of 2014, thirty-two states required voters to present identification to vote in federal, state, and local elections (Hicks, McKee, Sellers, & Smith, 2015). Although the justification for these laws is to prevent voter fraud, opponents argue the laws are meant only to depress turnout of likely Democrat voters. While there is inconclusive evidence that voter identification reduces turnout, there is evidence that the law disproportionally affect poor and racial minority voters (Hajnal, Lajevardi, & Nielson, 2014; Horwitz, 2016a). In a comprehensive review of restrictive voter ID laws, Hicks et al. (2015) find that voter identification laws are more likely to be adopted in states where Republican electoral coalitions are declining, elections are competitive, and restrictive laws are a way of maintaining Republican electoral control.

Opponents of these laws argue that they are similar to those used to disenfranchise Blacks before the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed. After the brief period of Reconstruction following the civil war, African Americans in the South were functionally stripped of their voting rights by a series of restrictive voting laws. White politicians implemented laws such as literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and poll taxes for the sole purpose of denying Blacks access to the ballot while superficially upholding the fifteenth amendment. With the passage of the Voting Rights Act it became illegal to have such obstacles to voting. Despite the legal victory, Blacks in the South continued to struggle to secure their voting rights as they continued to be terrorized with threats of violence.

Supporters of identification requirements dismiss allegations of racial animus or political maneuvering arguing the requirement is needed to combat voter fraud. Republican governor Pat McCrory appealed to this popular sentiment stating, “common practices like boarding an

airplane and purchasing Sudafed require a photo ID, and we should expect nothing less for the protection of our right to vote."(Horwitz, 2016b).

The disparate impact to poor and minority voters as well as the historical similarities to voter disenfranchisement of African Americans makes opinion on this issue particularly relevant to this study. Given that a large majority of Black people are Democrats, I expect that partisanship alone would lead them to oppose voter identifications laws. However, there is also a long history of voter disenfranchisement of Black voters that may also be a factor in their opinions.

Results

The descriptive statistics in Figure 3-3 show that significant majorities of Latino and White respondents favor voter identification laws while only 40% of Blacks agree that there should be such laws. Black respondents are about equally dived among agreeing, not taking a position, or disagreement. It is noteworthy that despite the historical relevance of voting laws to Black people in the United States, there does not seem to be any racial group consensus. Instead, it is White respondents who show the highest level of group cohesion on this issue.

Figure 3-3 Support for Voter Identification



Given the previous findings that show linked fate can produce feelings of intra and interracial commonality, I hypothesize that Black and Latinos who feel linked fate with their group will oppose voter identification laws. There is also a group interest in that poor Black and Latinos are disproportionally affected by these restrictions. Latinos may also see similarities between these laws and immigration policies requiring proof of citizenship.

It is unclear what linked fate among Whites means in practice. It could be a recognition of privilege (i.e. the White group is privileged and thus so am I as an individual). For White people who perceive discrimination against their group, feelings of linked fate could mean perceptions of racial threat. Although it is White politicians who almost exclusively favor these laws, I don't expect feelings of linked fate to be related to the issue for White respondents.

Voter ID laws have been framed in the media as both racial discrimination and a common sense way to avoid fraud. Given these two perceptions, I expect that feelings of fairness and discrimination should weigh heavily in people's assessments of the laws. I expect that people

who believe their racial group can get ahead with hard work will support voter identification laws more than those who believe otherwise. While the relationship between social mobility and voting laws may not seem direct, I argue that beliefs about social mobility imply an understanding that institutions and structures in the United States are relatively fair and legitimate. Otherwise, hard work would not be related to hard work. This legitimacy might provide reassurance that identification laws would be applied uniformly and fairly.

On the other hand, I expect that Black and Latinos/as who perceive racial discrimination against their group will be more attentive to policies that may lead to further discrimination. For that reason, I expect as perceived group discrimination increases for Black and Latino respondents, support for voter identification will decrease. For White respondents, perceived racial discrimination should lead to favoring policies which will maintain the status quo of White political dominance. For this reason I expect that as White respondents perceive more racial discrimination, they will also favor voter IDs laws more.

H1: Black and Latinos who express linked fate will oppose voter identification restrictions more than those who do not feel linked fate.

I expected that feelings of linked fate would be associated with opposition to voter ID laws because they disproportionately affect poor Black and Latinos. In addition, even if Latinos did not see a link to their own racial group or those who are not poor did not see a class connection, linked fate may have operated to induce a feeling of commonality and opposition to voter identification.

The results of the multiple regression (shown in Table….) shows that linked fate is statistically significant for Black respondents. This finding suggests that African Americans see these laws as relevant to their entire group regardless of class, as expected. However, the lack of

effect for Latinos does not support a theory of marginalized groups voting to protect or extend rights to other marginalized groups.

H2: Increases in perceptions of social mobility will be associated with support for voter identification laws.

Consistent with these expectations, the more people believe that their racial group can get ahead with hard work, the more they support voter identification laws. The effect is strongest for Latino respondents. *Get Ahead* is a standard 5-point Likert scale. Latino respondents moving from strongly disagreeing that their racial group can get ahead to strongly agreeing increases support by 1.25. For Blacks it is an increase of .8 and White respondents only .04.

These findings provide additional support that beliefs in social mobility are associated with more conservative policies even when controlling for beliefs about discrimination.

H3: As perceptions of group discrimination increase, support for voter ID will decrease among Black and Latinos/as and increase for Whites.

Opponents of voter identification laws charged that these laws directly discriminated against racial minorities. However, in this analysis beliefs about group discrimination are only statistically significant for White respondents. The more White people see discrimination against their group, the more they support voter identification laws. Perceptions of group discrimination among White people continue to be relevant across a number of policies.

Table 3-3 Support for Voter Identification

	Black	Latino	White
Discrimination Problem	-0.05	-0.03	0.34***
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Can Get Ahead	0.16***	0.25***	0.08*
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Linked Fate	-0.41***	-0.17	0.06
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Age	-0.00	0.01**	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.10***	-0.02	-0.09***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Woman	-0.02	0.08	0.15
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.09)
Ideology	0.15***	0.20***	0.33***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Born in US		0.11	
		(0.14)	
Constant	3.67***	1.74***	2.82***
	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.41)
Observations	746	898	841
R-squared	0.11	0.12	0.26

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Extra Effort in College Admissions

Background

The link between discrimination is that popular beliefs define any race sensitive policy as discriminatory. In the case of affirmative action, one of the reasons that there is such a gap in White-non-White support is because many whites believe that affirmative action is an example of "reverse racism" and they are unfairly discriminated against in favor of racial minorities.

Almost all Supreme Court challenges to affirmative action policies have dealt exclusively with whites' claims of being discriminated against.

The 1976 Bakke decision established the edict that the only "compelling interest" a university can pursue is the benefit of "educational diversity"—that is, the idea that all students receive a better education if their classrooms include students of different racial groups. This reasoning stayed with the court and in 2003 in *Grutter* they would explicitly find that diversity was a compiling state interest.

Diversity as the only compelling interest has reframed much of what the original contention of affirmative action was about—redressing pervasive, intractable government discrimination based on race that left non-whites in inferior schools and economic positions. When discussed as an interest in diversity, instead of a way to address the historical and contemporary effects of discrimination, a host of racialized narratives come to bear on the situation. For many, a focus on diversity triggers whites' beliefs that "diversity" is a code word for anti-White attitudes and practices (Dover, Major, & Kaiser, 2016). Moreover, many whites in the U.S. view racism as "zero-sum," in which less bias against minorities means more bias against whites (Norton & Sommers, 2011; Wilkins & Kaiser, 2014).

For many racial minorities perceptions of discrimination are also linked to affirmative action. However, they are more likely to see race-sensitive admissions policies as necessary to redress both past and current discrimination. The respondent's racial group is also an important predictor, with racial minorities being more supportive of affirmative action policies than Whites (Haley & Sidanius, 2006; Steeh & Krysan, 1996).

In addition to race, previous research has consistently shown that support for affirmative action policies varies as a function of the respondents' political orientation, with liberals being

more supportive than conservatives (Aberson & Haag, 2003; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). In addition, the details of the policy or how the policy is framed also influences support or opposition (Bell, Harrison, & McLaughlin, 1997; Haley & Sidanius, 2006). Haley and Sidanius (2006) found that respondents (in all racial groups) were least supportive of "quotas" and "set-asides." Respondents were most supportive of policies that were framed as "training" or "outreach." Finally, there was mixed support for those policies that involved "tie-breaking" or "one factor among many." While Steeh and Krysan (1996) find that White adults are especially opposed when affirmative action programs are framed as "preferences, quotas, or economic aid for blacks" (p.140).

Yet even here, there is still a strong race/ethnicity effect. Even for the policies that were most acceptable, White respondents were overall much less in favor than minority respondents. Consistent with these findings, Fu (2005) finds that Blacks and Latinos are much more likely to support affirmative action policies than Whites. She also finds that Asians had attitudes that were closer to Whites.' Even accounting for socio-economic factors and racial prejudice, Blacks are more supportive of race sensitive policies, Whites the least, and Latinos and Asian generally taking intermediate positions (Lopez & Pantoja, 2004).

I expect that whites will, as in the previous literature, be more opposed to any race sensitive policy. In addition, I also expect that this opposition will be magnified for White people who feel that whites are discriminated against.

Results

The descriptive statistics show a majority of Blacks and Latinos support extra effort in admissions while only 24% of whites do (**Error! Reference source not found.**). Because

lacks and Latinos are explicitly mentioned in the question wording as benefiting from the policy, the difference may be a result of perceived self or group-interest.

Figure 3-4 Summary for Extra Effort



The results of the multiple regression (Table 3-4) show that perceived group racial discrimination is related to support for extra effort for all the groups. For both Blacks and Latinos, the more they see racial discrimination against their group as a problem, the more they support extra effort in college admissions. In contrast, the more White respondents they see racial discrimination against their ingroup as a problem, the less they support the policy.

Only for Latinos was the belief that they could get ahead with hard work a significant predictor. Perhaps this makes sense because extra effort is seen in traditional American ideology as providing a way to get ahead. Education is a predictor for both Black and White respondents. The more education Black respondents have completed the more they favor extra effort. The more education White respondents have completed the less they support extra effort. There is no effect for education for Latinos. Finally, party identification is important for both White and

Latino respondents. For White respondents Democratic Party identification moves them almost an entire point on the scale in favor of extra effort compared to Republic whites. For Latinos, Democrat party identification moves them about half way up the scale in favor.

Table 3-4 Support for Extra Effort in Admissions for Blacks and Latinos

	Black	Latino	White
Discrimination Problem	0.31***	0.59***	-0.31***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Can Get Ahead	0.04	0.17***	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Linked Fate	0.02	0.19	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.07**	-0.05*	-0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Woman	0.15	-0.07	-0.09
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Ideology	-0.09**	-0.08*	-0.28***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Born in US		-0.24*	
		(0.13)	
Constant	2.72***	3.10***	4.84***
	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.48)
Observations	753	897	839
R-squared	0.09	0.21	0.20

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Gender Differences

There is little difference in the perceived effect of discrimination between Black and Latino/a men and women. However, for White respondents there is a pronounced difference between men and women (Table 3-5)**Error! Reference source not found.**. The effect of perceived discrimination is driven almost entirely by White women. When the regression is disaggregated by gender, the effect of perceived discrimination becomes non-significant for men but remains highly significant for women. Moving from seeing racial discrimination against whites as no problem to seeing it as a major problem decreases support for extra effort by almost 1.5 units on the Likert scale. This data suggests that there may be a stronger aversive effect of perceived racial discrimination among White women.

The previously discussed Public Religion Research Institute survey showing that White men feel the most discriminated against, as well as popular news accounts of "angry White men," seem to contradict this finding. Further investigation is necessary to understand the effect of racial threat and gender among White respondents.

Table 3-5 Support for Extra Effort in Admissions for Blacks and Latinos—White Sub-sample

	White Men	White Women
Discrimination Problem	-0.14	-0.45***
	(0.11)	(0.08)
Can Get Ahead	-0.11	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.06)
Linked Fate	0.08	-0.09
	(0.16)	(0.12)
Age	0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.10**	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ideology	-0.28***	-0.29***
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	5.26***	4.32***
	(0.64)	(0.66)
Observations	424	415
R-squared	0.16	0.29

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Race and Ideology

Besides being about stigmatized groups, each of the policies also falls clearly on partisan lines. Perhaps an effect of conservatism is operating here that is not being adequately addressed with the control variables. I attempt to verify this by running the analysis on a variable which is highly associated with ideology but not widely seen as associated with a marginalized group.

Table 3-6 Support for Abortion in all cases

	Black	Latino	White
Discrimination Problem	0.27**	0.16	0.02
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Can Get Ahead	0.10	-0.11	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Linked Fate	-0.14	0.22	-0.11
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.11)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Education	0.06	0.11***	0.10***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Woman	0.21	0.16	0.31***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Ideology	-0.17***	-0.32***	-0.34***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Church Attendance	-0.19***	-0.25***	-0.30***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Constant	3.10***	4.00***	4.44***
	(0.60)	(0.58)	(0.59)
Observations	645	763	704
R-squared	0.11	0.27	0.32

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

If the model was mis-specified, then some of the marginality measures should be associated with abortion rights as well. However, the only measure of marginality that is associated with support for abortion rights is that Blacks who feel racial discrimination against their group are more likely to support unrestricted abortion even controlling for ideology and church attendance. Further evidence that abortion rights are not central to the phenomenon of marginality is that whites' opinions are centrally related to political ideology and religiosity, as has usually been found in other research (e.g., Sears & Huddy, 1990), and not to marginality.

Conclusion

In this chapter I examined the effect of feelings of marginality on support for outgroups and support for racialized policies. I found that consistent with previous literature on race sensitive admissions policies, only a small minority of White respondents supported extra effort to provide higher education for minority groups, while most Black and Latino respondents supported that policy. Perceptions of discrimination were significantly related to support for all three groups. The more White respondents felt racial discrimination against Whites was a problem, the less they supported extra effort in college admissions for Blacks and Latinos. The effect of group discrimination was still significant even after controlling for partisanship and education.

For both of the racial issues, feelings of social mobility were significant for Latinos/as. The importance of social mobility, the beliefs that hard work can lead to success, was also statistically significant in the previous chapter for policies about illegal immigration. While perceptions of group discrimination are important for both African Americans and Latinos, the effect appears larger for Blacks. In addition, the effect of perceived social mobility seems to be a factor of marginalization that is more significant for Latinos/as than Black people. The effect of perceived group racial discrimination is statistically significant for White respondents in all three cases.

Chapter 4 Equality, Sexism & Gender

In the previous chapters I showed evidence of the effect of perceptions of group discrimination and social mobility on various policies. In this chapter, I focus on two additional concepts of marginality, social exclusion, and perceptions of sex discrimination. I test to see if perceptions of sex discrimination act in similar ways as perceptions of racial discrimination and if there is a unique effect for racial minority women who may experience both sex discrimination and racial discrimination.

Data and Method

To investigate these questions, I use the Election 2008 and Beyond survey. This is a dataset including perceptions of equality, social exclusion, linked fate, prevalence of racism and prevalence of sexism. I use marginality to predict support for policies favoring other marginalized groups. The dependent variables are: historic injustices (government apologies for slavery and the internment of Japanese Americans), the importance of English in American life (providing ballots in languages other than English, the importance all Americans speaking English); and non-racial issues (support for gay marriage).

Independent Variables

In this project I seek to understand the influence of marginality on support for outgroups and attention to racialized language. To that end, I identify three components of marginality that I

focus on: perceptions of group marginality, perceptions of general equality/inequality in the United States, and linked fate. I operationalize marginality by using the following questions:

> **Racial group linked fate:** "Do you think what happens generally to [RACIAL GROUP] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?"
> —Yes / No
>
> **Social Mobility:** How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the government and American society: In the United States, everyone has an equal chance to succeed.
> —*Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Agree/ Strongly agree*
>
> **Social exclusion:** Whatever your formal citizenship status, please answer the following questions. Generally, I feel like a full and equal citizen in this country with all the rights and protections that other people have. Do you…
> —*Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Agree/ Strongly agree*
>
> **Prevalence of racism:** "Some people say that the nomination of Barack Obama for president of the United States suggests that racism no longer exists in American society and politics. Would you say that…"
> —*Racism has never been a major problem in our society/ Racism once existed but no longer exists in our society/ Racism exists today but is not a major problem / Racism remains a major problem in our society*
>
> **Prevalence of sexism:** "Some people say that Hillary Clinton's candidacy in the Democratic primaries and Sarah Palin's Republican nomination for vice-president of the United States suggests that sexism no longer exists in American society and politics. Would you say that"
> —*Sexism has never been a major problem in our society/ Sexism once existed but no longer exists in our society/ Sexism exists today but is not a major problem / Sexism remains a major problem in our society*

The measure of prevalence of linked fate, sexism, and social mobility require additional explanation. In the previous analysis using 2012 CMPS data, all racial groups were asked about racial linked fate. Unfortunately, the EAB survey used in this chapter does not ask White respondents about racial linked fate or about racial equality for White people. This means that most of the analysis for White men is restricted to general perceptions of equality in the United States.

With regard to sexism, some men also report that they are the victims of sexism. In the theory chapter I reviewed some evidence that suggested that White men in particular feel marginalized because of their race and sex. However, the survey question references only women (i.e. Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin) making the question clearly about sexism against women.

The measure of social mobility does not use the same exact wording as the question in the CMPS. While the CMPS asks whether respondents believe their racial group can get ahead with hard work, the EAB asks about the ability for people generally to succeed. Though not perfectly parallel, I argue that both questions are measuring similar concepts that tap into the idea of success through effort.

I also chose control variables that are standard for models of public opinion or are known to be associated with any of the political outcomes of interest, including: age, education, income, ideology, nativity, and whether a respondent is a born-again Christian.

Dependent Variables

I chose the following dependent variables for three reasons. First, they specify particular racial populations, which will allow for clear distinctions between ingroups and outgroups. Second, I chose variables that were relevant to different historical eras. The questions about apologies relate to government actions associated with *de jure*, explicitly racist practices. The question about racial profiling after 9/11 references the contemporary issue of the "war on terrorism." Third, I also selected some issues that did not explicitly concern racial minorities in order to test the influence across marginalized populations.

Apology for slavery: "Do you think the federal government should or should not apologize to African Americans for the slavery that once existed in this country?"
— Should not / Should

Apology for internment: "Do you think the federal government should or should not apologize to Asian Americans for the internment camps that existed in this country during World War II?"
— Should not / Should

Speak English: "How important do you think it is for all Americans to able to speak English?"
—Not important at all / Not very important / Somewhat important/ Important / Very important

Multi-lingual ballots: "Election ballots should be printed in languages other than English in areas where a lot of people don't speak English."
—Not important at all / Not very important / Somewhat important/ Important / Very important

Racial profiling: "Especially in a post-9/11 world, racial profiling helps to keep our country safe from terrorists. Racial profiling is when law enforcement and other authorities target racial and ethnic minorities in the belief that they are more likely to commit certain crimes."
—Strongly disagree/ Disagree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Agree/ Strongly agree

Gay marriage: "Which statement comes closest to your own views:"
Same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry or form civil unions / Same-sex couples should be allowed to legally form civil unions but not marry / Same-sex couples should be allowed to legally marry

The Effect of Marginality

Linked fate

Previous studies have shown that increases in linked fate can lead to increased perceptions of commonality between groups. As a result, I expect that greater linked fate among racial minorities would be associated with favoring policies that protect the interests of other minority groups. Specifically, this means favoring apologies for both slavery and internment, and providing ballots in languages other than English. Increases in linked fate should also be associated with opposition to racial profiling.

Finally, the previous results from the CMPS did not show an effect of discrimination or linked fate for attitudes toward gay marriage. I expect the same finding using the EAB data. The lack of effect may be because gay marriage is not framed as a racial issue. Although gays and lesbians

are also marginalized in certain ways, racial attitudes may not predict support for reducing discrimination against them as a group.

Prevalence of Racism and Sexism

Another measure of marginality is beliefs about the prevalence of racism. I expect that all racial groups who see racism as a problem will also favor policies that are seen as protecting racial minority groups. The previous chapter showed that the more racial discrimination White people felt against their group, the less supportive they were of policies meant to help marginalized groups. However, because the question about racism refers to Barack Obama and implies racism against minority groups, I don't think White respondents will believe this to be a threat against whites. I do not expect beliefs about the prevalence of racism to affect support for gay marriage.

One of the central questions of this chapter is whether beliefs about sexism will affect attitudes concerning racial issues. The previous literature shows that for Black women, perceptions of sexism are just as relevant as those about racism in identity development. However, attitudes about racism are more politically relevant. There are few studies with which to derive hypotheses about the extent to which beliefs about sexism influence racialized policies, especially for Asian and Latina women. Therefore I don't have strong *a priori* expectations about the relationship.

Social Mobility and Exclusion

Social exclusion, separation from society, is directly relevant to marginalization. The survey question asks about whether respondents feel excluded regardless of their citizenship status. This is important because as the numbers of immigrants grow, their perceptions of inclusion into the

broader society may lead to alienation. Moreover citizenship is not necessarily a guarantee of inclusion. Groups that are perceived as violating the norms of society or who are considered foreign may also feel excluded. How might these feelings relate to support for other marginalized groups?

The Policies

Apologies for Slavery and Internment

The incarceration of roughly 130,000 Japanese descent people (the vast majority of whom were American citizens) was based on the assumption that Asians could never assimilate and would be disloyal to the United States. Moreover, White farmers in the West had long resented the competition of Japanese farmers and internment was pressed for as a way to reduce competition. Slavery of course relied on the racial logic of Black inferiority. The economic impact of forced labor over hundreds of years provided the economic foundation of the United States. The cases contain both similar and different racial and economic logics.

The official response to both of these atrocities has also been radically different. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed legislation, complete with reparations, extending a formal apology for Japanese-American internment during World War II. By contrast, congressional resolutions apologizing for slavery, passed separately by the House in 2008 and the Senate in 2009, were never reconciled, or signed by the president. The issue of reparations for descendants of slaves was a primary point of contentious and debate between the two versions.

I expect three components of marginality to be the most important: linked fate, social exclusion (for Asian Americans), and perceptions of equality. Because linked fate is a measure of group consciousness which is politicized, I expect increases in linked fate to be associated

with more support for the direct political action of an apology. Social exclusion has been shown to be particularly relevant for Asian Americans because of the "forever foreign" stereotype. Finally, I expect that greater perceptions of equality will be associated with greater opposition to apologies. This is because apologies for historical wrongs may not seem necessary when society has subsequently moved in an egalitarian direction.

The descriptive statistics are presented in Figure 4-1. Among all groups except for Blacks, there is more support for an apology for internment than an apology for slavery. The groups that are most supportive are Blacks and Asians (although only the Japanese were interned). Among Black people there is almost equal support for an apology for both events, while among Asian Americans, there is significantly lower support for an apology for slavery than for internment.

Figure 4-1 Average Support for Apologies by Racial Group



Table 4-1 Support for Apologies for Slavery and Internment

	Apology for Slavery				**Apology for Internment**			
	Asian	Black	Latino	White	Asian	Black	Latino	White
Linked Fate	0.11*	0.07*	0.07**		0.11**	0.10**	0.07**	
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)		(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
Not Equal	-0.09**	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Equal Chance	-0.06*	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.03*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Racism Problem	0.03	0.05	0.09**	0.13***	0.12*	-0.03	0.09**	0.10***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Sexism Problem	0.08	-0.03	0.04	0.04	0.02	-0.02	0.05	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.00**	-0.00	0.00*	0.00*	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.00	0.01	-.07***	0.02	-0.08**	0.04	-0.04	0.06***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income	0.01	-0.02***	0.00	-.01***	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Woman	0.02	0.04	0.12***	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.07	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Ideology	-.09***	0.02	-0.03**	-.05***	-0.02	0.02	-.03**	-.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Born in U.S.	-0.19**		-.15***	-0.02	0.08	-.17***	-0.08	0.05
	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	0.53	0.22	0.40*	0.04	0.23	0.51	0.36	0.16
	(0.38)	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.18)
Observations	336	721	849	939	336	719	845	936
R-squared	0.20	0.04	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.06	0.08	0.13

White respondents were not asked about linked fate in the survey. For all other groups, an increase in linked fate is related to increased support for both apologies. The effects are small, though, and only marginally significant. The effects are roughly equal across groups. This means that moving from no linked fate to feelings of linked fate do not shift the cross-group baselines and do not equalize the opinions across groups.

Asians who have feelings of social exclusion are less likely to support an apology for slavery. Unlike linked fate which creates cross group commonality, social exclusion may associated with threat and thus distancing from other minority groups. Asians who perceive more social mobility (everyone has an equal chance to succeed) are also more likely to oppose an apology for slavery.

I expected that when people perceived more racism, they would also support an apology for slavery. Yet beliefs about racism were only significant for Latinos/as and White people for both slavery and internment. The more Asians see racism, the more they support an apology for Japanese internment.

The Politics of English Language

Speaking English has been tied to belonging and critiques of new immigrants. There is widespread endorsement of the idea that speaking English is important and necessary for economic success. In addition, the charge of not speaking English has been used against groups to show that they lack the desire or ability to assimilate into U.S. culture.

Because of the past history of English language being linked to belonging, I expect that increases in feelings of social exclusion will be associated to opposition to the idea that all

Americans should speak English. Similarly, social exclusion should be associated with support for multi-language ballot, especially among Blacks and Latinos/as.

Most Black people in the United States speak English as their first language so they are less directly impacted by language politics. However, I expect that blacks who see racism as a problem will be more supportive of ballots in multiple languages. This is consistent with my general hypothesis that feelings of marginality are likely to be associated with policies meant to protect other racial minorities. The issue of ballot access might also resonate with African Americans because of their own long history of voter disenfranchisement.

The descriptive statistics in Figure 4-2 show that most people across racial groups believe that all Americans should speak English. However, there is variation with regard to multi-language ballots. Latinos have the highest levels of support, followed closely by Blacks, while Asians and Whites show the least support.

Figure 4-2 English Importance



Table 4-2 Support for Speaking English and Multi-language Ballots Table 4-2 shows the results of the multiple regression. Those high in linked fate are more likely to support having ballots in

languages in addition to English. Latinos high in linked fate also are slightly less supportive of the idea that all Americans should speak English. These findings support the hypotheses that linked fate not only produces ingroup solidarity but also support for policies meant to protect other racial groups.

As with previous issues, there is some overlap between benefits to ingroups and outgroups. For example, Asians and Latinos/as have relatively high proportions of non-English speakers who would potentially also benefit from multi-language ballots. However, although the EAB survey was conducted in both English and Spanish, it was not conducted in any Asian languages. Therefore the survey has a bias toward Asian respondents who speak English and so are less likely to need non-English ballots. African Americans in the sample are also mostly English speakers and so have less self-interest.

Feelings of social exclusion are only weakly related to attitudes about English language. Black people who feel social exclusion are slightly less supportive of the idea that all Americans should speak English. Latinos who feel social exclusion are more likely to support multi-language ballots. In both of these cases, increases in social exclusion are related to increased protections and rights for the non-English fluent.

Beliefs about equality and social mobility are only statistically significant for White respondents. White respondents who believe that everyone has an equal chance to succeed are slightly more likely to believe everyone should speak English than White people who think otherwise. Whites who perceive more equality are slightly less likely to believe that ballots should be provided in multiple languages.

Perceptions of racism and sexism have some of the largest effects on support for multi-language ballots. For White respondents, increases in perceptions of sexism and racism are

associated with more support for multi-language ballots. In both cases, moving from believing that sexism was never a problem to believing that it remains a major problem is .72 and .68 move on the Likert scale.

For Asians increases in perceptions of sexism but not racism increase support for multi-language ballots. Moving from believing that sexism was never a problem to believing that it is a major problem, increases support for multi-language ballots by 1.5. For Latinos/as on the other hand, increased perceptions of racism but not sexism increase support for multi-language ballots over 1 point on the Likert scale. Neither perceptions of racism nor perceptions of sexism were significant for Black respondents.

Contrary to my expectations, perceptions of racism were not significant for all racial groups. Instead, the effects vary widely in significance in magnitude between racial groups. These findings suggests that perceptions of marginality (in this case beliefs about the prevalence of racism and sexism) generally predict support policies meant to help other marginalized groups. However, the specific belief about marginality have differing effects across groups.

Table 4-2 Support for Speaking English and Multi-language Ballots

	Important to Speak English				**Ballots in Languages Other Than English**			
	Asian	Black	Latino	White	Asian	Black	Latino	White
Linked Fate	-0.05	0.07	-0.10**		0.50***	0.37***	0.27***	
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.09)	
Not Equal	-0.12	-0.10**	-0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.13**	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Equal Chance	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.04*	-0.05	0.07	0.03	-0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Racism Problem	0.13	0.09	-0.03	0.01	-0.22	-0.08	0.25***	0.17*
	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Sexism Problem	0.02	-0.02	0.04	-0.05	0.37*	-0.03	-0.04	0.18**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Age	0.00	-0.00	0.01***	0.00***	-0.01*	0.00	-0.00	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.02	-0.03	0.09**	-0.10***	-0.11	-0.17**	-0.19***	0.10*
	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Income	-0.02		-0.02**	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04***
	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Woman	0.03	0.02	-0.15*	0.04	0.06	0.10	0.20*	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Ideology	0.06*	0.01	-0.02	0.08***	-0.14*	0.02	-0.13***	-0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Born in U.S.	-0.10		-0.19**	0.11	0.11	0.46	-0.44***	-0.12
	(0.12)		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Constant	4.20***	4.43***	4.70***	4.23***	3.02***	2.72***	3.26***	2.71***
	(0.84)	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(1.14)	(0.77)	(0.58)	(0.51)
Observations	338	733	859	948	338	732	857	950
R-squared	0.10	0.03	0.09	0.12	0.17	0.09	0.20	0.16

Racial Profiling

I expect that feelings of linked fate will be related to opposition to racial profiling across racial groups. I also expect that feeling racism is a problem will be related to opposition. Racial profiling is one of the most explicit forms of racial discrimination and marginalization because an individual is more highly scrutinized and suspect simply because of their group categorization. Although the question is framed in terms of "keeping American safe from terrorist," implying a focus on profiling Muslims, the issues of racial profiling for Blacks should also be especially salient. Perceiving that the United States is equal, however, should be linked to more support because of the belief that the system will not target or punish innocent people. Because White people do not generally expect to be targeted because of their group identities, I expect that only ideology and education will be predictive of their views.

Figure 4-3 Support for Racial Profiling



Table 4-3 Support for Racial Profiling

	Asian	Black	Latino	White
Linked Fate	0.02	-0.06	-0.07	
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.08)	
Not Equal	-0.16	-0.09	-0.04	0.03
	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Equal Chance	0.31***	0.19***	0.00	0.09**
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Racism Problem	0.15	0.19	-0.11	-0.08
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Sexism Problem	0.02	-0.16	0.12	-0.05
	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Age	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.20**	-0.28***	-0.09	-0.17***
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Income	-0.05**	-0.05***	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman	-0.14	-0.07	-0.17	-0.14
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Ideology	0.16***	0.09*	0.09**	0.17***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Born in U.S.	-0.06	0.40	0.12	0.05
	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Constant	2.56***	3.24***	3.25***	2.87***
	(0.69)	(0.78)	(0.58)	(0.45)
Observations	338	730	859	942
R-squared	0.25	0.18	0.04	0.13

Support for racial profiling is the lowest for Blacks, followed in order by Asians, Latinos and Whites. Surprisingly, feelings of linked fate are unrelated to support for racial profiling. The only measures of marginality that are significant are beliefs about equality and social mobility. The more that Asian, Black, and White respondents believe that all people have an equal chance to succeed, the more they support racial profiling. It seems that even groups who have been the targets of racial profiling may support the policy if they feel it is applied in a fair system. The more educated respondents show more opposition to racial profiling. Conservatives also, not surprisingly, show more support for profiling.

Support for Gay Marriage

Gay marriage as an issue represents a conservative test of the marginality hypothesis because it does not involve an ethnic or racial group. The descriptive statistics show the average group support for gay marriage running on a scale from 1-3. Asians are the most supportive of gay marriage followed by Latinos/as, White and Blacks are the least supportive.

Figure 4-4 Support for Gay Marriage



Table 4-4 Support for Gay Marriage

	Asian	Black	Latino	White
Linked Fate	0.13	-0.01	-0.07	
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	
Not Equal Citizen	0.00	-0.07	0.05	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Everyone Equal Chance	-0.04	-0.00	-0.03	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Racism Problem	0.21*	-0.10	-0.01	0.07
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Sexism Problem	0.08	0.25***	0.05	0.10*
	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Age	0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.09	0.00	0.02	0.06**
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Income	-0.00	0.01	0.02**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman	0.11	0.08	0.24***	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Ideology	-0.13***	-0.07**	-0.08***	-0.17***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Born Again	-0.53***	-0.55***	-0.57***	-0.47***
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Born in U.S.	-0.04	-0.14	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Constant	1.12	2.54***	2.32***	2.26***
	(0.78)	(0.50)	(0.40)	(0.30)
Observations	331	701	847	933
R-squared	0.26	0.21	0.20	0.34

In previous research, feelings of racial marginality were not related to attitudes about gay marriage for Black, Latino, and White people. This finding is generally supported in the EAB data as well. Linked fate, social exclusion, social mobility, and equality do not have either a statistical or substantive effect on attitudes toward same-sex marriage rights. Rather, the usual predictors of opposition to gay marriage have strong and significant effects: conservative political ideology and being a born-again Christian.

The exception appears to be perceptions of racism, which are quite strongly related to greater support for same-sex marriage rights among Asian Americans. The gay marriage question is measured on a three point scale (no civil unions or marriage, civil unions only, and marriage). An Asian American respondent moving from believing racism has never been a major problem to believing it remains a major problem increases support for marriage rights almost a full point.

Another apparent exception is that beliefs about the prevalence of sexism are also related to support for gay marriage. The more Black and White respondents believe that sexism is a problem, the more they support marriage rights. Moving from believing sexism has never been a problem to believing that sexism remains a major problem increases support for marriage rights one full point for Blacks. For example, this is a move from favoring only civil unions to supporting marriage. White respondents increase support almost a half point on the scale.

Finally, there is also a significant effect for gender. Women are more likely than men to support same-sex marriage. I didn't have strong expectations for the effect of gender or beliefs about sexism. Thus far the most significant gender effect has been for White women around the issue of extra effort in admissions. White women who felt racial discrimination were more strongly opposed to the policy than White men who also felt discrimination. In the case of gay

marriage, the feelings of sexism seem to reverse in direction: perceptions of sexism led to increases in support for same-sex marriage. Whether this is a chance reversal or not will require additional research to determine.

Race and Gender Effects

The final question that this chapter considers is the interaction of race and sex on public opinion. I expected that women who are racial minorities will be more supportive of policies to help other marginalized groups than either White women or men who are racial minorities. This is because those women experience marginality in multiple ways and may be more aware of and opposed to discrimination against other groups. Next, I present two subgroup analyses to examine the intersectional effects of race and gender.

Table 4-5 Policy Preferences—White Women

	Racial Profiling	Slavery	Internment	Speak English	Ballots	Gay Marriage
Not Equal Citizen	0.07	0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.06	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Everyone Equal Chance	0.08	-0.01	-0.03	0.04	-0.10	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Racism Problem	-0.24**	0.15***	0.15***	-0.08	0.35***	0.10
	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.07)
Sexism Problem	0.14	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03	0.06
	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.07)
Age	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.16*	0.00	0.02	-0.13***	0.10	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Income	0.02	-0.02**	-0.02***	0.01	-0.03*	0.02**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Ideology	0.14***	-0.04***	-0.07***	0.09***	-0.16***	-0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Born Again						-0.45***
						(0.09)
Constant	2.84***	0.11	0.52*	4.81***	2.65***	2.15***
	(0.79)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.80)	(0.40)
Observations	478	472	471	480	481	477
R-squared	0.10	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.12	0.33

Table 4-5 shows the results for White women. Across the various policies the prevalence of racism is the only statistically significant marginality variable. Because the EAB does not directly measure White people's feelings of racial discrimination or gender discrimination, the measures reflect their impressions of society as a whole. White women who perceive racism to be a larger problem are the most likely to support policies that give or protect resources for outgroups, such as opposing racial profiling, supporting apologies for slavery and internment, and supporting multi-language ballots.

Surprisingly, perceptions of sexism are not related to opinions about any of these policies. This lack of an effect provides additional evidence that experiences of marginality may not be generalizable across domains. Put differently, there is no evidence that beliefs about the marginalization of women have an effect on support for policies related to marginalization based on race or sexual orientation. Policies related to sexism may have had a different effect.

Table 4-6 shows the same analysis across policies for racial minority women. This group pools Black, Latina, and Asian women. I am not arguing that there is a monolithic "women of color" group. Instead, I am interested if there are similar effects of being in the subordinate group for both race and class. I expect that perceptions of marginality for both racism and sexism should be significantly related to policy opinions.

Table 4-6 Policy Preferences— Women of Color

	Racial Profiling	Slavery	Internment	Speak English	Ballots	Gay Marriage
Linked Fate	0.04	0.09**	0.06	0.06	0.18	0.06
	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.07)
Not Equal Citizen	-0.12**	0.01	-0.01	-0.10***	0.10*	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Everyone Equal Chance	0.14***	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.10	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Racism Problem	-0.10	0.12***	0.05	0.05	0.14	-0.05
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Sexism Problem	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	0.18***
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Age	-0.00	-0.00*	0.00	0.01**	-0.01**	-0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.09*	-0.05**	-0.03	0.09**	-0.19***	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Income	-0.03***	-0.01***	-0.00	-0.02*	-0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Ideology	0.09**	-0.01	-0.00	-0.04*	-0.07*	-0.08***
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Born in U.S.	0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.08	-0.09	-0.07
	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.07)
Born Again						-0.54***
						(0.07)
Constant	3.48***	0.60***	0.64***	4.61***	3.59***	2.39***
	(0.49)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.39)	(0.55)	(0.40)
Observations	1,156	1,137	1,131	1,155	1,152	1,122
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.01	0.07	0.08	0.19

Counter to expectations, the effect of linked fate is only significant for slavery, where those who feel linked fate with their racial group support an apology for slavery. Feelings of social exclusion have had mixed results in the previous for other policies—sometimes leading to support for outgroups and other times opposition. For racial minority women, increases in social exclusion are related to less support for racial profiling, all Americans speaking English, and support for multi-language ballots. In these cases, increases in marginality relate to preference for policies that protect marginalized groups.

Unlike White women, perceptions of racism are only related to one policy issue among women of color. This may be because the effects of perceptions of racism may vary between the racial groups with no singular "woman of color" effect. Finally, as with White women perceptions of sexism are relevant for gay marriage.

Conclusion

In this chapter I examined two additional components of marginality: social exclusion and perceived sexism. I also tested six additional policy questions to better understand the influence of marginality on policies meant to help outgroups.

I found that beliefs about the prevalence of racism generally (as opposed to racism directed at one's own racial group) predicted support for liberal policy outcomes. However, feelings of linked fate were more likely to predict support for policies meant to help outgroups. For example an apology for internment and multi-language ballots are policies that do not generally affect the majority of Black people. Yet for each of these policies, linked fate among Blacks predicted support for the policy while beliefs about racial discrimination were not

predictive. These findings provide some evidence that linked fate can lead not just to feelings of commonality but support for policies that directly affect other racial minority groups.

This chapter also tested the influence of perceptions of sexism. Perceptions of sexism were generally unrelated to policy preferences for the race specific policies. They were significantly related to attitudes toward gay marriage, however. As perceptions of sexism increased, support for gay marriage also increased. Although perceptions of sexism were not related to racial policies, they be related to policies concerning other marginalized groups such as sexual or gender minorities.

Chapter 5 Conclusion

At the outset of this dissertation I questioned whether perceptions of marginality with one group would predict supporting policies for another group. Perhaps those who have experienced discrimination can act as a bulwark against future practices of discrimination. Of course, given the vast diversity among people, even those who have experienced marginalization, I did not expect a uniform political response. Instead, I hypothesized that three conditions of marginality might be especially predictive in support for policies meant to favor other groups: perceptions of discrimination against one's racial ingroup, linked fate with the ingroup, and perceptions of obstacles to social mobility in American society.

Perceptions of racial group discrimination and linked fate both rest on an understanding that one is a member of a racially marginalized group. I argued that this understanding should make a person more aware of other groups that might be marginalized by the same systems. I expected that this awareness would also vary by one where stood in the racial hierarchy. Thus, I expected Black, Latino, and Asian people who expressed linked fate with their group and perceptions of discrimination to favor policies helping other groups. In contrast, I expected White people who perceived racial discrimination against their group to be opposed to policies helping other groups and diminishing their dominant status.

I also hypothesized that beliefs about social mobility would predict preferences, yet in the opposite direction as discrimination and linked fate. Dominant group members experience the most congruence between their efforts and their outcomes. While every person faces challenges, racial and gender majority members do not experience additional challenges based on their identities. Because of this, belief in unrestricted social mobility is part of the dominant ideology.

I expected that people of all racial groups who have perceptions of relatively easy social mobility would be less likely to support policies favoring marginalized groups. If a person believes that individual effort is enough for success then they will likely not see the need to change any laws.

The relationship between perceptions of discrimination and policy support provides the most consistent evidence for my hypothesis, especially among Whites. For all but one policy issue, as White people perceive more racial discrimination the more they favor the conservative policy outcome. Whites who see themselves as victims of racial discrimination were more likely to support a ban against gay marriage; support voter identification laws; oppose in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants and oppose extra effort in college admission for Black and Latinos. The conservative position for each of these policies either reduces rights or protections or fails to provide additional rights or protections to marginalized groups.

Increased perceptions of discrimination also predicted support for extra effort in college admissions and opposition to voter ID laws for Blacks and Latinos/as. However, both Black and Latinos/as are directly implicated in the policy and there is no way to disentangle support for outgroups with group self-interest.

The relationship between policy support and linked fate were more mixed. For Black respondents, however, linked fate significantly predicted support for policies that did not affect their group. There was a significant relationship between Blacks' perceived linked fate and the liberal position for voter identification; apologies for slavery and internment; and providing ballots in languages other than English. Each of these issues has a link to historic civil rights injuries (voting, slavery, and internment). It may be that linked fate for African Americans more

powerfully predicts policy support on issues that have a direct link to traditional civil rights struggles.

Linked fate among other racial minority groups had statistically significant associations with fewer policies than it did among Blacks. However, linked fate was always positively related to policies favoring other groups. For example, Asian, Black, and Latino people high in linked fate supported having ballots in multiple languages—an outcome that would extend additional privileges to language minorities.

Finally, perceptions of ready access to social mobility were generally associated with favoring the conservative policy outcome. Black, Latino, and White people who felt their racial group could '*get ahead with hard work*' were more likely to support voter identification laws. White people who believed that everyone had an '*equal chance to succeed'* were also less likely to support an apology for internment, ballots in multiple languages, and support racial profiling.

Limitations

One of the limitations of the study is that many of the policies examined in this research provide benefits to multiple groups. The overlap in beneficiaries does not allow me to perfectly test policy preferences that only affect outgroups. Although this is a weakness in the study, it also reflects the real world where there are not usually clearly defined lines around groups or around who benefits from a policy.

Being marginalized is not a unique experience to racial minorities. Gender, LBTQ's, and other minority and stigmatized groups also experience deprivation and discrimination. As discussed earlier, these experiences are not all the same. Though each is susceptible to marginalization, a Black woman does not have the same experiences of marginality as a White

gay man. I attempted to see if marginalization of racial and ethnic groups might affect their policy attitudes toward a marginalized non-racial group. However I was only able to examine attitudes toward gay marriage. A more complete analysis would include policies meant to address discrimination related to other groups.

Finally, although my measures of marginality were derived from the literature, the study could benefit from a more expansive theorization of marginality. Perhaps there are additional components that may also influence policy preferences for outgroups.

Implications

As the population becomes more multi-ethnic, there is the potential for both greater cleavages as well as greater coalitions between minority groups. This study found that intergroup support was often based on perceptions of group discrimination. This finding provides hope that as society struggles to achieve equality, various groups could come together in support of each other. The bad news is that once individuals are less constrained by discrimination (or at least believe they are) they are less likely to support the policies that may help reduce inequality, especially in domains that most affect members of other groups.

In the previous chapters I also explored how forms of marginality in addition to race might influence support for outgroups. In the 1960s and 70s, racial civil rights movements were largely dominated by men and sidelined the unique concerns of women. In addition, the most prominent groups often relied on a politics of respectability which attempted to silence "non-respectable" members such as sexual minorities, unmarried mothers, and others who didn't conform to dominant standards. As discussed in chapter one, women of color were often asked to choose loyalty to either their race or gender groups.

Social norms are changing and the politics of respectability is eroding to some extent. What this means is that people will be less likely to subsume other identities such as sexual orientation, gender, and ability, in the fight for racial equality. In order to better understand how these new coalitional movements might behave it is necessary to consider an intersectional analysis of politics.

These data show very few divides along gender lines on racial issues. It is unclear whether the dominance of racial considerations will continue. Gender identity and perceptions of sexism were linked to policies extending rights for gay marriage. The difference provides some evidence that racial marginalization may act in unique ways compared to other types of marginalization.

Finally, being a racial minority in the United States is not a complete barrier to success. There are undoubtedly opportunities for individuals to succeed personally, professionally, and economically. Stories of success for racial minorities are often quite visible. Against the backdrop of White male dominance, the first Latina Supreme Court Justice and first African America president are clear reminders of racial progress. Entertainers and athletes of all racial groups are in the public eye making more money than the average American of any race can imagine. These visible markers of success stand in contrast to less visible occurrences of discrimination and inequality, such as persistent patterns of lending, hiring, and housing discrimination that disproportionally affect racial minorities. Environment racism where poor communities of color are much more likely to be the sites of toxic dumping and industrial pollution are even more removed from the view of the general public.

The data presented in this dissertation show that when people perceive racial equality they often favor conservative policy outcomes. Conservative outcomes in this sense mean

maintaining the status quo. Therefore if people are not exposed to discrimination they may falsely believe there is none and prolong the problem by voting against policies meant to reduce discrimination. Colorblindness is the idea that in order to move beyond discrimination, we should stop talking about race and differences. These data suggest that a color-blind perspective could further elide evidence of inequality and thus lead to opposition to policies meant to reduce inequalities.

Future Research

One of the limitations of this study was that I could not establish a causal relationship by just examining cross-sectional survey data alone. As with all complex issues, a multi-method approach would add needed details. Given the persistent effects of linked fate, it would be helpful to have a more specific understanding of what people mean when they are answering this question. Future research could address some of these questions with qualitative data asking people exactly *why* they believe their fates are linked. In addition, it would help understand intergroup commonality to understand what specific experiences they perceive as sharing in common with other groups and which they don't.

Overall this dissertation provides a mixed outlook for the possibility that perceptions of marginality lead to political action on behalf of other marginalized groups. On one hand, the robust linkage between feelings of linked fate and liberal positions on issues associated with historical civil rights issues may mean that if attention can be drawn to historical injustice groups may find commonality.

On the other hand, commonality based on experiencing marginality provides an unstable and problematic foundation for empathy and coalition. As the previous chapters show, success

(or perceived success) can diminish the coalition even if there is still discrimination or inequality. In addition, previous research has shown that drawing attention to race can produce a backlash effect and stimulate resistance. These questions will continue to be important as the United States continues to grapple with discrimination while the population and electorate continue to become more diverse.

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