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Publication Date

1989

A1458
no. 89-1
Mar. 1989

✓ 3/14/89
✓ 3/23/89

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Working Paper 89-1 ✓



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ETHNIC CHANGE

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March 1989
Institute of Governmental Studies
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the way subjective conceptions of national identity influence the mass public's reactions to the changing ethnic composition of American society. Using the symbolic politics model of opinion formation to analyze survey data collected in early 1988, the paper demonstrates that normative beliefs about Americanism strongly influence general attitudes toward cultural minorities and, when the appropriate symbolic cues are present, policy preferences on ethnic issues.

E pluribus unum? The ubiquity of ethnic conflict makes clear that reconciling unity and diversity is an exacting ideal. Throughout America's history, religious, cultural and racial differences have shaped the competition over wealth, prestige and power. And on several occasions the clash of ethnic strains broadened to encompass debate over the very meaning of national identity. At these moments, the incorporation of cultural pluralism into America's self-image was a divisive political issue.

Higham's classic Strangers in the Land (1985) identifies the conditions that gave rise to outbursts of nativism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The spirit of exclusiveness and anti-foreign sentiments spread when a rapid influx of immigration coincided with a major domestic or international crisis. Under these circumstances, significant segments of American society felt that national unity and the stability of American institutions depended on cultural homogeneity (McPherson, 1988; Gleason, 1980; Smith, 1988). Sometimes it was the religion of the newcomers, sometimes their political ideas, sometimes their race that provoked such a defensive reaction (Higham, 1985). Nevertheless, the consistent nativist response was to demand a restrictive definition of the ethnic and ideological boundaries of American nationality.

This paper explores Americans' conceptions of civic identity in a contemporary context. Due to immigration patterns and group differences in fertility, the ethnic composition of American society is changing. Census figures indicate a rapid growth in the Hispanic and Asian segments of the population (Glazer, 1985). The specter of linguistic diversity already has sparked insecurity about national cohesion, and one response is a movement to formally designate English as the country's official tongue (Mackaye, 1987; Gurwitt, 1988). More generally, although it is concentrated in California, Florida, New York, Texas and other states near the Mexican border, the massive increase in people who differ racially and culturally from the white "Anglo" majority has repercussions for national policy in the areas of immigration, public education, affirmative action and voting rights.

Against this background, the descriptive purpose of this paper is to assess the potency of the exclusionary impulse in popular thinking about American identity. We employ survey data to ask: what criteria does the mass public use to define American nationality and what are current attitudes toward the

growing number of Hispanics and Asians?

From a theoretical perspective, the issues raised concern the connections among subjective conceptions of American identity, evaluations of cultural minorities and preferences on policies involving ethnic considerations. Both historical patterns of nativism and the "symbolic politics" model of opinion formation (Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen, 1980; Sears and Citrin, 1985; Sears and Huddy, 1987) that informs this analysis imply that attitudes toward Hispanics and Asians will vary according to perceptions of the threat these groups pose to the continued dominance of prevailing notions of Americanism.

Symbolic Politics and Ethnic Issues

The application of symbolic politics theory to ethnic conflict rests on the following chain of reasoning. We assume first that among the individual's politically relevant attitudes are a subset that have unusual persistence and power (Sears, 1983). This group of attitudes, called symbolic predispositions, have the following characteristics: they are established early in life; they are frequently and consistently reinforced by later learning; their objects are invested with emotional meaning; and they are central to one's self-concept.

Because group worth can powerfully affect self-esteem, racial, religious or linguistic identifications are a leading category of potent symbolic predispositions (Sears and Huddy, 1987). Fundamental value orientations such as individualism and egalitarianism (Feldman, 1988) comprise another. What we refer to in this paper as the individual's conception of American identity or "Americanism" clearly has the same theoretical status.

Second, symbolic politics theory holds that when a political issue engages longstanding predispositions of this kind, the emotional defense of one's prior identifications rather than a reasoned calculation of one's material interests is likely to govern the position one adopts (Sears and Huddy, 1987). The nature of the cues that are emphasized in a political conflict thus powerfully influences whether and which symbolic attitudes are engaged. Whatever the precise issues raised, if ethnic or cultural symbols are prominent, public attention is likely to center on the status to be accorded a group by virtue of their way of life, including their customs, values and language, rather than on the distribution of material rewards (Horowitz 1985;

Gusfield, 1963).

Self-interest, defined as one's tangible, personal stakes in a policy outcome, is an important determinant of mass opinion only when material costs and benefits are clearly visible and widely perceived as substantial and certain (Sears and Citrin, 1985; Citrin and Green, 1985, Green, 1988). But for many ethnic issues-- bilingualism, affirmative action and even immigration policy -- these cognitive preconditions for the influence of self-interest on mass opinion do not generally apply.

Third, which symbolic predisposition influences political belief and conduct should depend on the particular symbols that become associated with a policy--that is, on how the issue is symbolically framed (Kinder and Sanders, 1988). For example, the determinants of support for bilingual education differ according to whether the objective of this policy is perceived as the maintenance of a Hispanic subculture or a means to speed the assimilation of non-English speakers (Sears and Huddy, 1987). More generally, the manipulation of symbolic cues is a critical determinant of the outcome of policy conflicts.

The main prediction of this paper, then, is that the way people define themselves as Americans, their particular sense of civic identity, influences their outlook on the changing ethnic composition of American society. Beliefs about American identity should also influence public opinion on policies that clearly channel benefits to cultural minorities.

Clearly, "Americanism" is not the only symbolic predisposition these policies might engage. The specific issues we shall examine-- the voting rights of non-English speakers, affirmative action and bilingual education-- arose in the context of the struggle for racial equality. The advocates of bilingual education, for example, deliberately allied themselves with other civil rights groups to place their demands on the legislative agenda (Moran, 1987; Thernstrom, 1980). Equality and discrimination are symbolic pegs commonly used by elites to frame public discourse on ethnic issues. To the extent these symbols dominate discussion of policies bearing on immigration or cultural diversity, ideological and partisan predispositions are likely to be engaged and the alignment of popular opinion should resemble the divisions that arise on racial issues, with liberals and Democrats opposing conservatives and Republicans.

This suggests that the independent influence on public opinion toward ethnic issues of beliefs about

American identity is not uniform. Across issues, the activation of sentimental attachments to "Americanism" should be more likely to occur when the symbols that become salient in the policy debate refer to the recognition and status of culturally distinct groups rather than to general values such as equality. The appropriate statistical test for the influence of alternative conceptions of national identity, therefore, is a multivariate analysis that controls for the potential impact both of material concerns and other long-standing predispositions such as ideology, party identification and racial prejudice.

Data

The geographic focus of this paper is public opinion in California, where the proportion of Hispanics among the state's residents is expected to grow from 19.2% to 28.5% between 1980 and 2000 and the proportion of Asians to rise from 5.6% to 10.6% (California Department of Finance, 1986). Our study is principally based on the results of a survey of a representative cross-section of California residents over eighteen years of age. This poll (n=1011) was conducted on the telephone by The Field Institute in February 1988.¹ Wherever possible, we report the results of national and other state surveys.

At the time the survey was conducted, the changing ethnic composition of California was on the public agenda. The demographers' projection that ethnic minorities would comprise a majority of the state's population early in the next century was widely publicized. Beginning in 1983, both the Los Angeles Times and San Francisco Chronicle had published lengthy series of stories about the impact of the influx of Hispanics and Asians on the political economy of California. The efforts of state and local officials to deal with the consequences of ethnic change in the public schools, colleges and universities also received substantial coverage, as did periodic legislative hearings on immigration, discrimination and ethnic differences in political participation. Not long before our survey was conducted, in November 1986, the state's voters passed by a two to one margin a constitutional amendment declaring English the state's official language.

¹ The data were made available by the State Data Program of the Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley. The sample was derived using Random Digit dialing procedures and each number received four callbacks before being dropped from the sample. There was no effort made to convert refusals with a second call. According to The Field Institute which conducted the poll, the response rate for this survey was 55%.

Since then, several local communities in California have taken similar actions (Gurwitt, 1988). We therefore are confident that respondents in the 1988 survey generally were aware of the issues raised in the interview.

Because of the paucity of minority respondents in the survey and because our principal concern is the outlook of the dominant ethnic group, most of the data analysis is confined to the opinions of the "Anglo" (or non-Hispanic white) members of the sample (n=800). The results of this analysis are presented in the following order.

The next section measures normative beliefs about American identity among the California public and explores the degree to which social and political consensus concerning the boundaries that subjectively define American nationality prevails. We then employ an attitude measure labeled "Traditional Americanism" to investigate the ways in which both symbolic predispositions and personal interests shape images of the growing Hispanic and Asian communities and preferences on specific policies in which ethnic considerations are prominent. The conclusion comments on the implications of these results for the pattern of ethnic politics in California and nationwide.

American Identity

As used here, the term "national identity" refers to the characteristics that subjectively define membership in a particular political community. Thus, while there is a formal or legal reply to the question, "Who is an American?," our concern here is with the psychological answer, with what underlies a shared sense of distinctive peoplehood.

In most countries, national identity is founded on a common language, religion or ethnic heritage. The dominant view of both foreign and domestic observers, however, is that the foundations of American identity is fundamentally different (Kohn, 1957; Gleason, 1980; Huntington, 1981; Harrington, 1980). These authorities maintain that American nationalism is ideological or political in nature, meaning that from the outset the United States defined itself in terms of commitment to a set of liberal political principles. Whatever one's origin or background, to be an American one simply had to endorse this national "creed" (Huntington, 1981).

Since eight of ten white Americans were Protestants of British descent in 1790 (Gleason, 1980, p.32),

the founding generation tended to downplay the role of a common ethnicity in their effort to elaborate the elements of a new national identity.² For example, Adams, Jefferson, Marshall and others recognized that a common language would be a force for unity, but decided against designating an official national language because they assumed that "an identity of language" would develop and persist throughout the United States and that the language of general use would perforce be English (Heath, 1981). In this expectation they were correct. The United States has become ethnically the most heterogeneous nation in the world, but linguistically it is one of the most homogeneous (Thernstrom, 1980, p.619).

Despite the unifying features of their common background, the English origins of most new citizens also posed a problem for developing a conception of a specifically American identity. If nationality was defined ethnically, could the psychic separation from the mother country be complete? Emphasizing acceptance of certain ideological principles as the unique features of Americanism could solve this dilemma and define a new, political identity that was, in theory, ethnically inclusive (Gleason, 1980, p.33).

About the particular values that constitute the ideological conception of American nationality, there is little disagreement. From de Tocqueville on, the litany (Lipset, 1964; Williams, 1960; Huntington, 1981; Pole, 1967; Kohn, 1957) is remarkably similar: democracy (republicanism, popular sovereignty), liberty (freedom), equality (of opportunity, in manners), and individual achievement (individualism, self-reliance). In psychological terms, the liberal version (Smith, 1988) of the concept "sense of American identity" thus refers to the strength of emotional attachments to these symbols and to the institutions and practices that embody them (Delameter, Katz and Kelman, 1969).

Smith (1988) traces the development of a rival though not mutually exclusive conception of American identity in the nineteenth century. "Nativists" could endorse liberal political ideals as inherently American and simultaneously maintain that only Anglo-Saxons possessed the moral and intellectual qualities required for democratic citizenship. Ethnic restrictions on immigration and naturalization reflected partisan and economic motives to be sure. But they also reflected a concern that Jefferson himself expressed--that racial

² Ethnic considerations were not entirely absent the early conceptions of American nationality. Blacks and Indians were excluded from citizenship.

and cultural differences made certain aliens a threat to national cohesion and stability. At the core of what Smith (1988) labels the ethnocultural conception of American nationality, then, is the belief in ascriptive criteria for citizenship, the idea that only some races, religions or cultures are "truly" American.

To what extent do Americans today endorse the liberal conception of national identity? How much support is there for an exclusionary definition of Americanism based on ethnicity? To address these questions, the present study asked respondents in the February 1988 California Poll how important each of the following characteristics is in "making a person a true American": believing in God, voting in elections, speaking and writing English, trying to get ahead on one's own efforts, treating people of all races and backgrounds equally, and defending America when it is criticized. In regarding responses as indicators of a sense of national identity, we are presuming that the "true American's" defining attributes are positive symbols. Given that previous surveys consistently report overwhelmingly favorable evaluations of the American form of government, way of life, flag, anthem and other emblems of nationhood (Craig and Niemi, 1988; Sniderman, 1981; Lipset and Schneider, 1983), this assumption seems quite plausible.

The image of the true American that emerges from this measure obviously is a function of the descriptors made available to respondents. There is, however, substantial justification for the qualities that were included in the question in our survey. Political participation, economic individualism and egalitarian social manners are virtues long enshrined in the American cultural tradition and are prominently featured in the liberal conception of American identity outlined above. By contrast, belief in God and competence in English are particularistic characteristics that help define a more restrictive, ethnocultural version of American identity. Finally, an earlier study found that standing up for one's country against its critics was a frequent answer to an open-ended question about what makes someone a "good American" (Delameter, Katz and Kelman, 1969).

Nevertheless, our list of potentially "American" traits is hardly exhaustive. Respondents who endorsed them might well have mentioned additional qualities if given the opportunity. As for those who rejected the proffered attributes as ideally American, we have no evidence concerning their positive vision of national identity.

INSERT TABLE 1

Table 1 summarizes the normative beliefs about American identity among demographic and political groups in California.³ The high level of consensus on several constituent elements of Americanism is striking. There is almost complete agreement on the importance of "treating people of all races and backgrounds equally." Voting and striving to get ahead, universalistic criteria that appear prominently in liberal conceptualizations of American nationality, were deemed "very important" by three-fourths of the sample.

Although competence in English is a more restrictive basis for civic identity that clashes with egalitarian norms, 76% of the California respondents endorsed this idea, a clear indication of the hostility that proposals to promote "language rights" usually elicit (Marshall 1986; Kloss, 1977). On the other hand, the idea that believing in God is a necessary ingredient for being a good American is contested. While 60% of the sample agree to this proposition, approximately 40% opt for a more secular conception of national identity.⁴

The similarity of opinion among ethnic groups is further evidence of conformity in beliefs about Americanism. Table 1 suggests that when it comes to the values of equal treatment, political participation and individual achievement, there is little variation in belief for social and political factors to explain. To be sure, Hispanics and Asians were least likely to consider competence in English as a criterion for being

³ This question preceded any reference in the interview to Hispanic and Asian immigration or to other ethnic issues.

⁴ The opinions of respondents in our California survey closely resemble those expressed in a number of recent national polls. For example, the 1984 NORC General Social Survey inquired about what Americans "owed their country." 78 per cent of the sample believed that voting in elections was a very important civic obligation; 82 percent regarded speaking English in this way. In a June 1986 Roper poll conducted for U.S. News and World Report, 89 per cent of the sample felt that freedom and liberty was a major reason for America's "greatness" and 72 per cent said that the free enterprise system played this role. Fewer, 59 per cent, believed that America's "greatness" depended mainly on her religious and moral beliefs, while 49 per cent said this about our "melting pot culture."

Several surveys also confirm the continuing commitment to the values of economic individualism (Feldman, 1988). And a 1985 Harris poll found that 71 per cent of a national sample were optimistic that in the United States anyone who worked hard would get ahead.

a true American. But even among the groups that have a different native language, a large majority agreed that English-speaking is a very important aspect of American identity.

Predictably, Republicans and self-styled conservatives were more likely than Democrats and people who called themselves liberals to endorse the religious, patriotic, linguistic and individualistic conceptions of Americanism. For example, only 26% of the strong liberals accepted that believing in God was very important in making one a true American, whereas 64% of the self-styled strong conservatives felt this way.

The college-educated, relatively young and those at the upper end of the income distribution were less likely than other groups to endorse an ethnocultural conception of American identity. The impact of formal education was strongest when it came to acceptance of the religious or patriotic definitions of Americanism. This supports the results of recent research on the correlates of political and racial tolerance (McClosky and Brill, 1983; Davis, 1975; Sullivan, Marcus and Piereson, 1982; Schuman, Bobo and Steeh, 1985). These studies argue that distinctive socialization experiences and differential capacities for social learning have led the young and better-educated to support the rights and aspirations of political, racial or religious minorities more strongly than the rest of the population. Wildavsky (1982) characterizes the cultural outlook of these strata as "secular egalitarianism," and it appears from our data that this spirit infuses their ideas about American identity as well.

Nevertheless, the dominant finding of Table 1 is the broad area of agreement about the symbols of American nationality. More than 60 per cent of the small group of "strong" liberals believed that competence in English was "very important" in making a person "a true American." Even more striking evidence of ideological consensus is that conservatives were as likely as liberals to endorse the principle of equal treatment. The staying power of Lockean liberalism (Hartz, 1955) in American political culture is impressive. As long as it is spoken in English.

The distribution of opinions reported in Table 1 indicate that many respondents espoused elements of both the liberal and ethnocultural conceptions of American identity. Table 2 reports the results of a factor analysis of the six individual items listed above. These data, which refer only to the responses of the "Anglos" (non-Hispanic whites) in the sample, show that beliefs about the importance of religiosity,

patriotism, economic self-reliance and speaking English were very closely interrelated and fell along a single underlying attitudinal dimension.

INSERT TABLE 2

We therefore added responses to these four items to create a Traditional Americanism Index. Due to its substantially lower factor loading and the difference in content, the question about the importance of voting in elections was omitted from the index. With each response given a score ranging from 4 ("very important") to 1 ("not at all important"), the mean Index score for the Anglo respondents was 13.3.⁵ Again, this indicates that a large segment of the public conceives of American identity in terms of a symbolic commitment to God, country, the English language and individual achievement. In modern political terms, this is a conservative outlook.

The multiple regression analysis reported in Table 3 delineates the social and political correlates of beliefs about American identity more precisely. Social background and political orientation had distinct, though overlapping effects on support for Traditional Americanism. Formal education had relatively the strongest influence, but age, self-designated ideology and party identification retained significant independent effects. The sharp attenuation of the statistical effect of income in the multivariate model suggests that generalized feelings of intolerance based on socialization patterns rather than economic self-interest fostered an exclusionary image of Americanism among lower income groups.

INSERT TABLE 3

With respect to beliefs about the importance of voting, only gender and age had statistically independent effects. The virtue of political participation, apparently, is ideologically neutral. Table 3 also confirms that there is a virtually universal commitment to the norm, if not necessarily the practice, of treating people of all backgrounds equally.

⁵. The reliability of this 4-item measure (Cronbach's alpha) was .66.

Reactions to Ethnic Change

The evidence from the polls is that current feelings about new immigrants are mixed. Opening the door to America wider is unpopular, and while it is recognized that immigrants as a group may have positive qualities, the general attitude is at most accepting, but not welcoming. For example, a national survey conducted by the New York Times in 1986 found that 50% of the public wanted the number of immigrants permitted to enter the United States should be decreased, while only 9% wanted the number increased. An August 1988 Los Angeles Times poll found that 64% of a national sample believed that immigrants get more from the U.S. economy in social services and unemployment insurance than they contribute in taxes and productivity.

On the other hand, 73% of those surveyed in a 1987 California Poll stated that immigrants made just as good citizens as native-born Americans. The 1986 New York Times survey found that 45% of the public thought that today's immigrants work harder than people born in America, while only 8% felt they did not work as hard. And a 1986 U.S. News survey found that only 28% of a national sample believed that immigrants "take good jobs away from Americans."

The February 1988 California Poll asked respondents specifically about the increasing numbers of Hispanics and Asians in the state rather than about immigrants in general. Once again, there were indications of anxiety and a number of specific complaints about the consequences of ethnic change, but no sign of pervasive alarm or xenophobic anger. For example, only 18% of the Anglo respondents were very worried that the influx of Hispanics and Asians into California would make it hard to maintain "the American way of life,"⁶ whereas 42% were not at all worried about this.

⁶. The question was: "Because of immigration and other factors, the population of California is rapidly changing to include many more people of Hispanic and Asian background. Some people are worried that the changing makeup of California will make it hard to maintain the American way of life. Others say this is not a problem and that these groups quickly adapt. How about you? Would you say that you are very worried, somewhat worried or not at all worried about this?"

More than two-thirds of the Anglos in our survey said that the influx of cultural minorities had not made an impact on themselves or their family "personally." Only 20% believed that the growth in Hispanics had affected their personal lives negatively, and even fewer, 14%, gave this unfavorable response about Asians.⁷ Thus, the group that claimed to have suffered personally and who were also very worried that ethnic change posed a threat to established American traditions comprised less than 10% of the Anglos surveyed. And whereas 77% of the Anglo respondents believed that speaking English is crucial for making one a true American, when asked directly less than 30% regarded the increased size of the Hispanic and Asian communities as a serious threat to the dominant role of English.

Ambivalent reactions predominated when respondents were asked about the concrete economic and social consequences of the increasing numbers Hispanics and Asians in California.⁸ Table 4 shows that in the economic realm, for example, a majority of Anglo respondents said that the increasing number of Hispanics and Asians would cause taxes and unemployment to rise, but also promote economic growth and improve the quality of effort in the work force.

INSERT TABLE 4

Although questions about the likely consequences of more Hispanics and Asians call for a cognitive judgment, it seems clear that generalized affect toward the group in question would influence one's estimates (Sears, Peplau, Freedman and Taylor, 1988). By combining responses to the items listed in Table 4, therefore, we created a Hispanic Impact Index and an Asian Impact Index to measure general attitudes toward the two groups.⁹

⁷. A split-sample design was employed here. Half the sample was asked about the impact of Hispanic growth, half about the increase in the number of Asians. It should also be noted that the question about the personal impact of ethnic change was placed near the end of the interview, after respondents already had commented on the likely consequences of more Hispanics and Asians for the state as a whole and expressed their opinions about bilingualism and affirmative action.

⁸. This list was culled from a review of journalistic and scholarly discussions about the costs and benefits of the current wave of immigration (Muller and Espenshade, 1985; McCarthy, 1987).

⁹. The scoring procedure employed was to code beliefs about positive consequences from 5 (very likely) to 1 (not at all likely) and beliefs about negative consequences from 1 (very likely) to 5 (not at all likely), with "don't know" answers being given the middle score of 3. Item scores were then added to create two equivalent indices (Hispanic, Asian) with a potential range of scores from 9 to 45. Respondents who

What explained differences in outlook toward Hispanics and Asians? Table 5 provides powerful confirmation of the hypothesis that conceptions of American identity had a considerable effect on attitudes toward these minority groups. The Traditional American Index had a correlation of $-.36$ (Pearson's r) with the Hispanic Impact Index and an even higher association of $-.45$ with the Asian Impact Index.¹⁰ Party identification and political ideology also had weaker, though statistically significant, relationships with these group evaluations.

INSERT TABLE 5

Of these interrelated symbolic predispositions, however, only Traditional Americanism retained a statistically significant effect in the multiple regression model summarized in Table 5. This regression analysis also indicates that material concerns were not an important influence on judgments about Hispanics and Asians. Despite much talk about economic anxiety as a source of opposition to immigrants, Table 5 shows that, even at the bivariate level, neither feelings about one's personal financial circumstances nor sociotropic assessments (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981) of the state's economic climate, were significantly related to scores on the ethnic impact indices. Moreover, these results were unchanged when we pruned these indices and retained only those items that asked about the purely economic consequences of growth in the Hispanic or Asian communities or when we considered only the opinions of the lower income respondents who presumably are more vulnerable to competition for jobs from new immigrants.

Another putative indicator of personal interest, having a school age child, also was unrelated to judgments about the impact of Hispanics or Asians. Indeed, this held true even when we examined responses to the specific item about the impact of the more worrisome Hispanic group on the quality of the schools.

An important issue in the study of intergroup relations is the role of personal contact on group attitudes

answered more than four of the items "don't know" were treated as missing data and given no index score. The reliabilities for these measures were $.67$ for the Hispanic Impact Index and $.71$ for the Asian Impact Index (Cronbach's alpha). Mean scores for the Anglo respondents were 25.8 and 29.6 respectively, another indication of relatively balanced views about the impact of ethnic change on California society.

¹⁰ Among Anglo respondents, the Traditional Americanism Index correlated $.38$ with the question that asked whether respondents were worried that the increase in Hispanics and Asians would make it hard to maintain the American way of life.

(Harding, Proshansky, Kutner and Chein, 1969). Using 1980 U.S. Census data, respondents were classified according to the proportions of Hispanic and Asian residents in their counties. This obviously is a very crude measure of personal experience with cultural minorities. Nevertheless, the regression analysis summarized in Table 5 failed to detect contextual effects linking the concentration of cultural minorities and evaluations of their impact on society. The statistically significant, although weak bivariate relationships apparently reflected differences in the social and ideological composition of California counties.¹¹

The available measures of self-interest may be too blunt to identify specialized groups who have suffered material losses as a result of the influx of Hispanics and Asians. In addition, the influence of education on the Ethnic Impact indices suggests that to some extent these measures assess generalized feelings of ethnic prejudice and tolerance. It does seem clear, however, that among the general public a major source of antagonism toward cultural minorities is the perception that they fail to conform to cherished notions of Americanism.

American Identity and Public Policy

For symbolic predispositions to influence opinion formation on specific issues, they must be engaged by relevant cues. In the present context, this implies that the importance of "Americanism" in shaping policy preferences depends on the symbolic meaning of the issue raised. Thus, the more proximate the association of the "object" of a policy proposal to the symbols and values that constitute one's conception of national identity, the more powerful the impact of this underlying orientation on one's issue position.

The present study considered three issues in which ethnic considerations figure in the proposed allocation of costs and benefits. Because of the importance attached to voting as both a right and obligation of American citizens, proposals to restrict the franchise to certain groups provide a direct opportunity for

¹¹. Another possible indicator of self-interest was the question asking whether a respondent had been personally affected by the increasing number of Hispanics or Asians. Answers to this question, which some might be tempted to call "subjective self-interest", were strongly related to the group Impact Indices. Yet these self-reports of a negative personal impact were unconnected to social background, place of residence or economic anxiety. They were, on the other hand, strongly correlated with symbolic predispositions, including Americanism, suggesting that they are projections of generalized feelings about the groups in question as much as accurate accounts of actual experience. For this reason, we excluded this variable from the equation.

the expression of exclusionary sentiments. The February 1988 California Poll found that 64% of the Anglos surveyed believed that "citizens who can't read English should not be allowed to vote", an obvious slap at the bilingual ballots mandated by law and another indication of the potency of language as a symbol of civic identity.

By challenging the symbolic hegemony of English, bilingual education programs also raise the problem of American identity. These programs vary widely in both their educational and ideological purposes (Sears and Huddy, 1987; Thernstrom, 1980; Kloss, 1977). One version of bilingual education is temporary instruction of non-English speaking children in their native tongue to facilitate the acquisition of competence in English while ensuring the development of other basic skills. In this incarnation, bilingual education is a transitional step on the road to linguistic assimilation that is consistent with the idea American citizenship entails the ability to speak English.

The second leading version of bilingual education, cultural maintenance, rejects this conception of American identity and seeks to preserve the language and traditions of one's country of origin. From this perspective, the English language has instrumental value but no special symbolic status. To the contrary, advocates of the cultural maintenance school of bilingual education defend a "pluralist" conception of American identity which emphasizes the need to use state power as necessary to safeguard the vitality of ethnic life against the forces of cultural homogenization (Walzer, 1980; Pettigrew, 1988; Triandis, 1988).

Public opinion appears to favor bilingual education when such programs are viewed as transitional in nature, but to strongly oppose the idea of cultural maintenance (Sears and Huddy, 1987). For example, a 1986 Gallup Poll found that 33% of the public supported English-only instruction in the public schools, 42% approved of a transitional period of bilingual instruction and only 21% supported a program aimed at cultural maintenance. Our own survey found that 74% of the Anglos in California were unwilling to pay any more in taxes so the public schools could teach Hispanic and Asian children in their native tongue "if they don't know English well." Clearly, question wording may be one reason for this overwhelmingly negative response. Neither the duration nor purpose of bilingual education is mentioned, and there is an explicit reference to cost in the form of higher taxes. Nevertheless, it seems that the public firmly believes

that all Americans should know English, but it reluctant to pay for the bilingual education programs that might achieve this goal. The onus of assimilation is placed on the immigrants themselves.

Affirmative action refers to both legally prescribed and voluntary efforts to increase the number of racial minorities and women in three crucial areas: jobs and employment, education and housing (Glazer, 1988). Implementation of this policy creates a collision between two fundamental American values, individual opportunity and social equality, and public opinion on affirmative action seems to depend on how these policies are framed.

When programs refer explicitly to the removal of discriminatory barriers and the expansion of individual opportunities for minorities or women, the public is favorable (Glazer, 1988; Kluegel and Smith, 1986). Anything that smacks of quotas, however, is overwhelmingly rejected, presumably because this violates the principle of equal treatment based on individual merit (Kinder and Sanders, 1987). In our 1988 California survey, 84% of the Anglos (as compared to 79% of the entire sample) were opposed to giving Hispanics special preference in hiring and promotion to make up for past disadvantages. A similar majority was opposed to reserving openings in colleges and universities for either Hispanic or Asian students.

Respondents were also asked whether blacks, women or Eastern European immigrants should enjoy the benefits of affirmative action in employment or education. In every case, a majority was opposed, and although this attitude was slightly less pronounced in the case of women and blacks than the remaining three ethnic categories, the differences were small, never exceeding 10% among Anglo respondents. General values rather than attitudes toward specific cultural minorities appear to govern opinions on preferential hiring and admissions. Compared to the issue of language, the symbols raised by the conflict over affirmative action are more remote from the problem of how ethnicity bears on national identity.

INSERT TABLE 6

Table 6 analyzes the relationships between conceptions of American identity, group evaluations, (as indexed by the Hispanic and Asian Impact Indices), ideology and party identification on the one hand and

opinions about the voting rights, bilingual education and affirmative action programs on the other.¹² On all three issues, there was a significant bivariate association between policy preferences and each of the four interrelated symbolic predispositions. In particular, a high score on the Traditional Americanism Index, reflecting support for a nativist conception of American identity, is strongly associated with opposition to voting rights for citizens who cannot speak or read English ($r=-.39$) and to bilingual education ($r=-.26$).

In order to isolate the unique effect of "Americanism" on policy preferences, we conducted a multivariate analysis that included both the above-mentioned symbolic predispositions and the familiar measures of social background, social location and both personal and sociotropic economic judgments as predictors. Because the dependent variables in the analysis are dichotomous, the functional specification employed was probit. Again, the analysis was conducted separately for respondents who were queried about Hispanics and Asians respectively.

The results summarized in Table 6 indicate that when the joint influence of the interrelated cluster of symbolic predispositions is partitioned in the multivariate model, the independent effect of any particular attitude is relatively weak, even when statistically significant. Nevertheless, there is support for the proposition that the influence of Americanism is discriminating rather than reflexive, varying in a plausible way with the symbols most prominently associated with a given policy. Traditional Americanism had a significant direct influence on the belief that only English-speaking citizens should be allowed to vote. As suggested above, the relevance of bilingual education to beliefs about citizenship and nationality is ambiguous. Accordingly, Table 6 indicates that the influence of Traditional Americanism on opposition to bilingual education was mediated by the group evaluation variables. When the Hispanic (or Asian) Impact Index was omitted from this equation Traditional Americanism, but not party identification or ideology, did

¹² Responses to the questions about preferential treatment in employment and education were combined to form two additive indices--one focussing on policy toward Hispanics, the other on policy toward Asians. Scores on the indices were dichotomized, with respondents grouped simply according whether they supported affirmative action in either employment or education or in neither domain.

have a statistically significant effect.¹³

On the policy of preferential hiring and admissions, on the other hand, ideological self-designation rather than beliefs about American identity appeared to undergird the formation of mass opinion. This result conforms to the by now familiar alignment of liberal and conservative elites on affirmative action policy. As suggested above, this issue appeared to engage basic attachments to the values of individualism and equality rather than feelings about the particular groups designated as the beneficiaries of preferential treatment.

Finally, Table 6 once more shows that social background and several other crude indices of self-interest available to us had an insignificant role in shaping preferences about affirmative action and bilingualism. For example, despite the common complaint that bilingual education programs divert funds from other school activities that benefit English-speaking children, there was no difference between the opinions of Anglo parents with children in the public schools and those of respondents without this personal stake in the issue.

Discussion

Three main conclusions emerge from our study of current attitudes toward American identity. First, the dominant conception of Americanism, in California at least, incorporates both liberal and ethnocultural or exclusionary elements. Alongside the consensual belief in the virtues of political participation, social equality and economic self-reliance, there was widespread acceptance of the nativist ideas that to be truly in American one must speak English and believe in God. Support for a linguistic definition of American identity, in particular, cut across conventional lines of partisan and ideological division.

Second, our data confirm the utility of applying the symbolic politics framework to studying ethnic politics. An individual's conception of American identity influenced his or her attitudes toward cultural minorities and their impact on society's well-being. Although symbolic predispositions about Americanism, partisanship and political ideology were interrelated, Americanism was the more important source of

¹³. We do not include these results in the Table for the sake of brevity. The authors will supply the relevant figures on request.

opinions about Hispanics and Asians. Moreover, social class and other available, albeit imperfect, indicators of material interest did not affect public images of these groups. For most citizens, then, ethnic politics seems to center on the symbolic issue of group worth and recognition.

Third, as the symbolic politics theory framework implies, the particular values and predispositions that shaped public opinion varied with the cues raised by an issue. Beliefs about Americanism exerted their strongest influence on issues involving the status of English, where the problem of cultural identity is transcendent. Future research should extend our preliminary findings by developing more comprehensive measures of American identity and applying our analytic model to additional domains such as immigration and trade policy.

The pattern of opinion described above points to a significant gulf between the attitudes of political elites and ordinary citizens. The distinctive views of the highly-educated in this study provide a hint of this conflict. The surveys conducted by McClosky and Zaller (1985), Verba and Orren (1985) and Lichter and his colleagues (1988) confirm that the elite strata in most sectors of society are less chauvinistic and more sympathetic to the political demands of ethnic minorities than is the general public. In California, for example, most political leaders of both parties opposed the initiative to declare English the state's official language. More generally, many legislative and judicial actions at both the national and state levels confer legitimacy on the allocation of rewards on the basis of ethnicity.

What are the implications of the ideological tension between the state's political establishment and the Anglos who comprise a disproportionate share of the voting population in California (Citrin, 1987)? In part this depends on the salience of ethnic issues, and, as our survey revealed, there is concern but no great alarm over Hispanic and Asian immigration or its impact on the continuity of established cultural traditions. If the historic tendency of immigrants to rapidly assimilate to American life prevails among Hispanics and Asians, this would reduce the political import of latent nativist sentiment. In addition, legally imposed changes in institutional behavior and the diffusion of elite values by the media may change public attitudes toward ethnicity and erode established views of American identity.

Nevertheless, the success of recent ballot initiatives in California, Arizona, Colorado and Florida that

elevate the status of English to an official language confirms the potential for populist outbursts. When voters were presented with the opportunity to translate attitudes into action, there was no doubt that in America as elsewhere language is a powerful symbol of national identity among most social and political groups. Symbolic challenges to the status of English and to the status of the dominant culture in general inevitably arouse hostility among the majority. Yet aggressive promotion of the primacy of English provokes cries of discrimination and injustice from minorities and their allies.

The resurgence of ethnicity in the late 1960s was in considerable part a political strategy, an option designed to enlarge a disadvantaged group's claim on a larger share of society's goods. The justification of these claims in terms of the values of cultural diversity, however, has sparked nativist reactions among the more established groups. More generally, the symbolic dimension of the politics of ethnicity suggests that the acceptance of change in the status of cultural minorities is enhanced when policies are framed in ways that affirm, not challenge dominant conceptions of American identity.

Acknowledgements. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1988 Annual Meeting of the International Society for the study of Political Psychology, Secaucus, N.J., July 1-5, 1988. We are greatly indebted to David Sears, John Robinson and Robert Luskin for helpful suggestions and criticisms. We also acknowledge the invaluable bibliographic assistance of Evelyn Walters. This research was made possible by grants from the Institute of Governmental Studies and Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley.

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TABLE 1: Social Background and American Identity -

Question: People have different ideas about what is really important in making someone a true American. I'm going to need a list of things that have been mentioned. For each one, please tell me how important it is in making a person a true American.

	Believing in it	Voting	Speak- ing English	Trying to Get Ahead	Treating All Equally	Speaking Up for Country
Ethnicity						
Anglo (N=791)	36	78	77	77	89	51
Black (N=52)	65	71	85	69	84	63
Hispanic (N=92)	48	69	67	67	81	54
Asian (N=43)	35	70	70	56	93	43
Education						
High school diploma or less (N=267)	59	75	83	82	86	71
Some college (N=406)	40	79	81	77	90	55
College grad (N=142)	27	72	65	67	91	40
Advanced degree (N=186)	15	72	63	65	90	25
Gender						
Male (N=527)	31	73	74	70	86	48
Female (N=475)	46	79	78	77	91	55
Age						
18-29 years old (N=245)	30	65	71	64	89	47
30-39 (N=274)	32	70	71	69	91	39
40-49 (N=165)	38	78	71	79	91	53
50-59 (N=109)	47	85	80	75	86	47
60 and older (N=210)	53	69	90	90	87	74
Family Income						
Less than \$10,000 (N=46)	56	76	80	76	91	60
\$10,000-\$19,999 (N=147)	52	31	82	81	92	64
\$20,000-\$29,999 (N=131)	47	73	81	79	90	60
\$30,000-\$49,999 (N=301)	35	76	74	68	88	48
\$50,000-\$69,999 (N=168)	31	75	73	74	89	44
\$70,000 and above (N=123)	20	73	67	77	89	35
Region						
Northern California (N=444)	33	77	72	73	89	46
Southern California (N=559)	42	75	79	76	89	56
Party Identification						
Strong Democrat (N=162)	34	85	65	71	93	46
Weak Democrat (N=194)	32	72	71	69	90	49
Independent-Democrat (N=108)	33	68	70	72	87	35
Independent (N=81)	37	55	84	75	91	44
Independent-Republican (N=118)	37	75	84	75	88	51
Weak Republican (N=179)	42	73	81	78	88	59
Strong Republican (N=161)	50	90	80	83	87	68
Ideological Identification						
Strong Liberal (N=93)	25	76	62	66	91	32
Moderate Liberal (N=140)	20	66	65	64	88	34
Moderate (N=412)	34	74	75	74	89	51
Moderate Conservative (N=198)	48	76	82	81	86	61
Strong Conservative (N=133)	63	69	86	83	92	73

Source: The California Poll, February 1988

* Entries are percent responding "very important."

TABLE 2: Factor Analysis of Beliefs About American Identity
(Anglo Respondents Only)

Rotated Factor Matrix:
(Varimax Rotation)

	<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Factor 2</u>
Believing in God	.72	-.12
voting in elections	.51	.04
Speaking and writing English	.71	-.01
Trying to get ahead on one's own efforts	.59	.30
Treating people of all races & backgrounds equally	-.01	.96
Defending America when it is criticized	.78	.02

N=760

Source: The California Poll, February 1988

TABLE 3: Political and Social Sources of Americanism

(Anglo Respondents Only)

	Correlations (Pearson's r)	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient
Traditional Americanism Index			
Age	.28	.031●	.21
Gender	.15	.451●	.09
Education	-.42	-.353●	-.32
Family Income	-.26	-.099*	-.08
Party Identification	.27	.185●	.16
Ideological Identification	.35	.406●	.18
	N=728	$R^2 = .342$	
Voting in Elections			
Age	.17	.006●	.15
Gender	.13	.128●	.10
Education	-.08	-.012	-.04
Family Income	-.10	-.012	-.04
Party Identification	.04	.011	.04
Ideological Identification	.06	.007	.01
	N=742	$R^2 = .050$	
Treating All Equally			
Age	-.03	-.001	-.05
Gender	.06	.053	.06
Education	.03	.009	.05
Family Income	.00	-.001	-.00
Party Identification	-.01	-.007	-.04
Ideological Identification	.04	.029	.08
	N=741	$R^2 = .010$	

* $p \leq .05$

● $p \leq .01$

Source: The California Poll, February 1988

See Appendix A for coding of variables.

APPENDIX A

Coding for Variables in Table 3

I. Traditional Americanism Index:

Respondents were given high scores if they thought believing in God, speaking and writing English, trying to get ahead on one's own efforts, and defending America when it is criticized were very important. Respondents were given low scores if they thought these things were less important. The scale is an additive index with a range of 4 to 16.

II. Voting in Elections: Treating All Equally

1. Not at all important
2. Not too important
3. Somewhat important
4. Very important

III. Age:

Respondent's age in years is recorded.

IV. Gender

1. Male
2. Female

V. Education:

1. 8th grade or less
2. Some high school
3. Graduated high school
4. Trade school/vocational school
5. 1-2 years college or university
6. 3-4 years college or university
7. Graduated college - Bachelor's degree
8. 5-6 years college or university
9. Masters degree
10. Graduate work past Masters degree

VI. Income:

1. <\$10,000
2. \$10,000-\$19,999
3. \$20,000-\$29,999
4. \$30,000-\$39,999
5. \$40,000-\$49,999
6. \$50,000-\$59,999
7. \$60,000-\$69,999
8. \$70,000+

VII. Party Identification:

1. Strong Democrat
2. Weak Democrat
3. Independent-Democrat
4. Independent
5. Independent-Republican
6. Weak Republican
7. Strong Republican

VIII. Ideological Identification:

1. Strong liberal
2. Moderate liberal
3. Moderate
4. Moderate conservative
5. Strong conservative

TABLE 4: Impact of Growing Hispanic and Asian Populations in California

(Anglo Respondents Only)

Question: I am going to read a list of possible results from the increase in the number of Hispanics/Asians in California. For each of these items, please tell me how likely it is to happen.

	<u>Very likely</u>	<u>Somewhat likely</u>	<u>Not too likely</u>	<u>Not at all likely</u>
Higher economic growth				
Hispanics (N=392)	12%	40	36	11
Asians (N=357)	11	48	23	7
Lower quality of education in the public schools				
Hispanics (N=404)	28	36	26	11
Asians (N=368)	15	20	33	32
The place of English as our common language being endangered				
Hispanics (N=411)	30	25	20	25
Asians (N=374)	20	20	26	33
Our culture being enriched by providing new ideas and customs				
Hispanics (N=406)	19	45	17	8
Asians (N=373)	35	45	14	6
An increase in crime				
Hispanics (N=400)	33	43	16	7
Asians (N=364)	28	27	30	15
Providing needed labor for new jobs				
Hispanics (N=394)	30	49	14	7
Asians (N=366)	26	48	14	10
Higher taxes due to more demands for public services				
Hispanics (N=408)	45	37	14	4
Asians (N=370)	35	33	25	6
Increasing the number of people anxious to work hard				
Hispanics (N=399)	24	47	21	8
Asians (N=369)	44	40	12	4
Increasing the amount of unemployment in the state				
Hispanics (N=408)	42	36	17	5
Asians (N=369)	32	28	29	11

Source: The California Poll, February 1988

TABLE 5: Social and Symbolic Determinants of Ethnic Impact Indices

(Anglo Respondents Only)

	Hispanic Impact			Asian Impact		
	r ^a	b ^b	β ^c	r	b	β
Social and Economic Factors						
Age	-.12	-.033	-.08	-.06	.020	.05
Gender	.01	.542	.04	-.07	.207	.01
Education	.28	.371*	.14	.40	.820●	.26
Family Income	.14	.194	.06	.14	-.110	-.03
% Hispanic population (in R's county)	-.13	-.086*	-.11	NA	NA	NA
% Asian population	NA ^d	NA	NA	.11	-.054	-.03
Personal Economic Well-Being	-.05	-.213	-.08	.04	.096	.03
California Econ. Well-Being	-.03	.065	.02	-.01	.142	.05
Kids in School	.01	-.311	-.02	-.09	-.797	-.05
Traditional Americanism Index						
	-.36	-.497●	-.20	-.45	-1.065●	-.37
Other Symbolic Predispositions						
Party Identification	-.20	-.160	-.06	-.15	-.160	-.05
Ideological Identification	-.27	-.658*	-.12	-.14	.038	.01
	N=343		R ² =.193	N=318		R ² =.270

a Pearson's correlation coefficient

b Unstandardized regression coefficient

c Standardized regression coefficient

d Not applicable

* p ≤ .05

● p ≤ .01

Sources: The California Poll, February 1988; 1980 U.S. Census (Report 3: Social Indicators for Planning and Evaluation - Table 1)

See Appendix B for coding of variables.

APPENDIX B

Coding for Variables in Table 5

I. Hispanic and Asian Impact Indices:

Respondents who thought the various positive consequences of the growing Hispanic/Asian population were very likely were given high scores (5). Respondents who thought the various negative consequences of the growing Hispanic/Asian population were very likely were given low scores (1). Those who responded "don't know" were given neutral scores (3), unless they responded "don't know" to more than four of the nine items in the index. Scores on these nine questions were then added to make an index ranging from 9 to 45.

II. Hispanic/Asian Populations:

The percentage of Hispanics/Asians residing in the respondent's county, as indicated by the 1980 Census, is recorded.

III. Personal Economic Well-Being:

An additive index reflecting the respondent's evaluations of his or her current and future personal finances. Respondents who felt their finances were better than the previous year and that their future financial situation would improve even more scored high. Respondents who felt their finances were worse than the previous year and would get worse in the future scored low. The index ranges from 2 to 10.

IV. California Economic Well-Being:

Same as Personal Economic Well-Being, but in reference to the current and future state of the California economy.

V. Kids in school:

- 0. No children in school
- 1. Yes, children in public and/or private school

VI. Age, Gender, Education, Family Income, Traditional Americanism Index, Partisan Identification, Ideological Identification:

See Appendix A.

TABLE 6a: American Identity and Policy Preferences

(Anglo Respondents Only; Hispanic Half-Sample)

	Voting Rights for Non-English Speakers			Support for Bilingual Education			Affirmative Action for Hispanics		
	r ^a	β ^b	SE ^c	β	β	SE	β	β	SE
Social and Economic Factors									
Age	-.21	-.007	.01	-.13	-.012	.01	-.12	-.009	.01
Gender	-.12	-.174	.16	.05	.135	.16	.07	.302	.16
Education	.24	.037	.04	.16	.095	.04	.11	.020	.04
Family Income	.08	-.018	.04	.01	-.037	.04	.02	-.011	.04
% Hispanic population	-.03	.005	.01	-.06	.002	.01	-.01	.011	.01
% Asian population	.10	.027	.02	.03	-.022	.02	NA	NA	NA
Personal Econ. Well-Being	.06	.001	.04	-.00	.005	.04	-.05	-.021	.04
California Econ. Well-Being	-.03	-.010	.04	-.09	-.005	.04	-.08	.008	.04
Kids in school Attending Calif. University	NA ^d	NA	NA	.02	.034	.13	NA	NA	NA
	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	-.03	-.230	.19
Hispanic Impact Index									
	.32	.057	.01	.29	.038	.01	.32	.061	.01
Traditional Americanism Index									
	-.39	-.172	.04	-.26	-.053	.04	-.20	-.028	.04
Other Symbolic Predispositions									
Party Identification	-.14	-.021	.04	-.17	-.076	.04	-.18	-.033	.04
Ideological Identification	-.17	.060	.08	-.20	-.036	.08	-.24	-.176	.09

Intercept	0.47			-1.42			-2.60		
Chi-square	354			359			416		
Degrees of Freedom	325			324			321		
N	338			338			334		

^a Pearson's correlation coefficient.

^b Probit coefficient.

^c Standard error of probit coefficient.

^d Not applicable.

Sources: The California Poll, February 1988, 1980 U.S. Census (Report 3: Social Indicators for Planning and Evaluation - Table 1)

TABLE 6b: American Identity and Policy Preferences

(Anglo Respondents Only: Asian Half-Sample)

	Voting Rights for Non-English Speakers			Support for Bilingual Education			Affirmative Action for Asians		
	ρ^a	ρ^b	SE ^c	ρ	ρ	SE	ρ	ρ	SE
	Social and Economic Factors								
Age	-.21	-.012	.01	-.13	-.003	.01	-.11	-.007	.01
Gender	-.12	-.295	.17	.05	.082	.17	.07	.189	.18
Education	.24	.092	.04	.16	-.033	.05	.10	-.020	.05
Family Income	.08	-.055	.04	.01	-.028	.05	.01	-.020	.05
% Hispanic population	-.03	.012	.01	-.06	-.010	.01	NA	NA	NA
% Asian population	.10	-.032	.02	.08	.006	.02	.12	.036	.02
Personal Econ. Well-Being	.06	.040	.04	-.00	-.001	.04	-.06	-.051	.04
California Econ. Well-Being	-.03	.038	.04	-.09	-.056	.04	-.02	.031	.04
Kids in school Attending Calif. University	NA ^d	NA	NA	.02	-.020	.19	NA	NA	NA
	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	-.03	-.188	.20
Asian Impact Index									
	.36	.064	.01	.29	.063	.01	.22	.049	.01
Traditional Americanism Index									
	-.39	-.097	.04	-.26	-.027	.04	-.18	.008	.05
Other Symbolic Predispositions									
Party Identification	-.14	-.030	.04	-.17	-.011	.04	-.15	-.003	.05
Ideological Identification	-.17	-.055	.08	-.20	-.106	.09	-.24	-.168	.09

Intercept	-1.36			-1.05			-2.39		
Chi-square	324			312			307		
Degrees of Freedom	303			299			288		
N	316			313			301		

a Pearson's correlation coefficient

b Probit coefficient

c Standard error of probit coefficient

d Not applicable

Sources: The California Poll, February 1988, 1980 U.S. Census (Report 3: Social Indicators for Planning and Evaluation - Table 1)

APPENDIX C

Coding for Variables in Table 6

I. Voting Rights for Non-English Speakers:

- 0. Opposes letting citizens who cannot read English vote
- 1. Favors letting citizens who cannot read English vote

Bilingual education:

- 0. No, unwilling to pay more taxes for bilingual education
- 1. Yes, willing to pay more taxes for bilingual education

Hispanic/Asian affirmative action:

- 0. Opposed to affirmative action both in hiring and promoting and in university admissions
- 1. in favor of affirmative action in hiring and promoting and/or in university admissions

II. Attending California University:

- 0. Neither the respondent nor anyone in his or her immediate family is currently enrolled at University of California, California State University, and/or at one of California's community colleges.
- 1. The respondents and/or someone in his or her immediate family is/are enrolled at U.C., C.S.U. and/or at a California community college.

III. Age, Gender, Education, Family Income, Traditional Americanism Index, Party Identification, Ideological Identification:

See Appendix A

IV. ⌘ Hispanic/Asian Populations, Personal and California Economic Well-Being, Kids in School:

See Appendix B

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