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The Ecstasy and Anarchy of Nonviolence: the Khudai Khidmatgar Resistance in the North-West Frontier of British India

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature

by

Safoora Arbab

2019

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Ecstasy and Anarchy of Nonviolence: the Khudai Khidmatgar Resistance in the North-West Frontier of British India

by

Safoora Arbab

Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature

University of California, Los Angeles, 2019

Professor Aamir R. Mufti, Chair

The emergence of the largest "army" of nonviolence on the heavily policed North-West Frontier of British India is a unique yet silenced history. The Khudai Khidmatgars, or the Servants of God, were organized to reform Pashtun society through modern means: education, the emancipation of women and the reinterpretation of traditions, especially of normative violence. They became an anti-colonial resistance movement after the Peshawar Riots of 1930 and, despite being brutalized by colonial authorities, the ranks of this "army" swelled to a hundred thousand volunteers in a relatively short span of time. Almost every household in the Province had a member enlisted in the grassroots Khudai Khidmatgar army, and yet this remarkable phenomenon remains unrecognized in global narratives of nonviolent resistance. The idea of Pashtun nonviolence was so contrary to long-standing tropes classifying them as an intrinsically

violent and martial race—with the additional tropology of Islam as an intrinsically violent religion—that it silenced this unique expression through the dominant representational framework which categorized them as such. Generally called the "Pathans," I use "the figure of the Pathan" as a signifier for the epistemological framework that produce both the tropology and the silences. Moreover, by reading colonial literary and ethnographic representations against the grain, I trace how this figure was produced in tandem with the tripartite, north-western frontier of imperial India, which, although one of the first "scientific" borders of India, has not received the scholarly attention it merits.

In contrast, how nonviolence was embodied on such a massively, popular scale becomes much clearer in reading the rarely analyzed Pashto resistance literature of the Khudai Khidmatgars, one that included a significant number of women contributors writing in their journal the *Pukhtūn*. By closely reading this heretofore unexamined literature, the women's discourse in particular discloses the quotidian ways in which nonviolence was embodied through altered constellations of normativity affecting subject formation. I also contest the hitherto scant scholarly literature explaining Khudai Khidmatgar nonviolence as an exception of the Pashtun habitus, one that is credited to the exemplary character of Abdul Ghaffar Khan alone. More widely known as the Frontier Gandhi, or Bāchā Khan in the vernacular, he is attributed to have singlehandedly transformed the Pashtuns to the ideology of nonviolence, yet who, in turn, is classified as merely a follower of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

Instead, by reading their vernacular literature I argue that the Khudai Khidmatgars were positing a new kind of political altogether by interpreting nonviolence through local registers: the indigenous codes of Pashtunwali, including local forms of radical democracy, the discourse of a liberatory Islam—especially calling upon its poetic metaphors of ecstatic enlightenment—and an

anarchic nonstate imaginary. I compare Khudai Khidmatgar self-representations of nonviolence, in which love, friendship and justice were central concepts, with Jacques Derrida's formulation of "a politics of friendship." In opposing the normative political, one that Carl Schmitt articulates through the "friend-enemy" binary, this new political in particular posed an anarchic threat to colonial state structures. As such, they were always more suspect and policed much more harshly than other nationalist movements of the time, while their location upon the strategic yet ever-restive North-West Frontier of Imperial India justified the brutal disciplinary measures constantly meted out against them.

Given that the postcolonial nation-state of Pakistan was also grounded upon the normative political of the colonial state, the Khudai Khidmatgars were, inevitably, charged with sedition in 1948 and the movement and its literature destroyed, while its history defamed and distorted through state narratives. Right before the partition of India, therefore, the call for Pashtunistan represented, as I postulate, not only Ghaffar Khan's utopian aspirations but was premised upon the new politics of friendship that had been painstakingly cultivated. A political toward which Gandhi's own utopian vision of "enlightened anarchy" also aspired but which the Khudai Khidmatgars had made concerted efforts to actualize in their own terms. Therefore, as the vernacular literature aptly illustrates, the philosophy of nonviolence represented a much broader and a much more ambitious endeavor than narrow definitions of the term denote; more than merely a non-engagement with physical violence the Khudai Khidmatgar articulation was a radically new narrative for organizing communities differently, one that resonates with silent significations and urgently calls upon us to examine more closely today.

The dissertation of Safoora Arbab is approved.

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2019

To my father, Arbab Mukhtar Ahmed,

who wanted me to be a "doctor."

And to the courage, dedication and dreams of all the Khudai Khidmatgars:

"Everything must be remembered. Nothing must be forgotten.

We must explore the new imaginary not as experts but as witnesses.

We must retrieve history from memory."

Corinne Kumar, *Asking We Walk: The South as the New Political Imaginary.*

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List of Abbreviations

AINCC/Congress	All India National Congress Committee
FCC/ FC	Frontier Congress Committee/ Frontier Congress
AIML/ML	All India Muslim League/Muslim League
FML	Frontier Muslim League
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
NWF	North-West Frontier (including Tribal Territories)
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
TT	Tribal Territories
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulation

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"Ecstatic Nonviolence in the North West Frontier of British India;" keynote talk at The Institute of World Culture, Santa Barbara, January 2019.

Introduction

nən pâ nəwəy məsẗəy məsẗâ
pākâ wiynâ də pukhẗūn šwâ
wələy gowrâ kâ ləylā' biyā
ẗesh pâ miynâ də məjnūn šwâ

today a new intoxication intoxicates
the Pukhtun's blood now purified
let's see if Laila can once again
abandon herself to Majnun for love alone

— "Nonviolence" by Ghani Khan

The famous modern Pashtun poet, Ghani Khan, wrote infrequently and indirectly about the Khudai Khidmatgar movement except for one poem entitled *" 'ədm-e-ẗushdəd"* or "Nonviolence."[1] I quote the last *shirs* of this *nazm* to begin my dissertation because it expresses the paradox of Pashtun nonviolence that lies at the core of my project: categorized as a martial and violent race they readily embraced the ideology of nonviolence to transmute it into the vernacular, not as an act of translation but as revelation. They interpreted it through the indigenous codes of Pashtunwali—or Pashtun codes of conduct—with Khudai Khidmatgar literature revealing the quotidian character of its tenets and methods of embodiment. Ghani Khan's poetry especially embeds nonviolence into Pashtunwali, not as ideology but as a way of life. I argue that this was one of the main reasons that the KK[2] embodied it so readily, on such a massively popular scale, and in such a short span of time. The quotidian perspective, as well as

[1] Khan, Ghani. *Latūn*. (Peshawar: Jadoon Printing Press, 2000), 687-8.
[2] Used in place of "Khudai Khidmatgar" henceforward.

the desire to change undesirable aspects of their culture, transmuted into what I describe as a radically alternate socio-political imaginary, especially once the ideology was grafted onto their own indigenous ways of being and living. As such, the Khudai Khidmatgar "army" interpreted the tenets of nonviolence and their own traditional codes in a particularly unique way; it is the desire to understand this embodiment, as well as the profoundly ambitious significations attached to nonviolence—especially the utopian aspirations for creating an alternate form of political community—that is the focus of my research project.

The Khudai Khidmatgars, or the Servants of God, were organized as a social reformation movement in 1929, based in the Peshawar valley region of the North-West Frontier Province. With the intent of reforming Pashtun culture, they later became the largest, anticolonial and nonviolent resistance "army" in British India. By the time of Indian Independence and partition they had also become the major political force in the Province and, allied with the All India Congress Committee, at the national level as well. Inhabiting one of the largest Muslim majority provinces of India, this was also largely a subaltern, rural and volunteer organization. Along with their political branch, the Frontier Congress Committee who were elected through popular mandate in the Province to form the government three times, they were adamantly against the partition of India along religious lines. Consequently, shortly after the Partition of 1947 they were declared traitors to the emergent post-colonial Pakistani state, forcibly disbanded and the Frontier Congress government was dissolved in the Province. All traces of KK history and literature—even the fact that they were the largest nonviolent resistance movement—were destroyed or corrupted by the postcolonial nation-state.

However, even the few sympathetic histories that were written about the organization inadequately explain the KK's conception of nonviolence. Instead, these accounts are heavily

laced with the presumption that this was an aberration of Pashtun society brought about by the exceptional character of the KK leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Known also as the Frontier Gandhi, or Bāchā Khan in the vernacular, he is given sole credit and even thaumaturgic powers for changing an ostensibly martial and lawless people into a disciplined, nonviolent army. Without a doubt, Ghaffar Khan's fearless leadership, moral integrity and staunch belief in nonviolence was one of the prime motivating factors—his moral integrity is even acknowledged by his detractors (who, because of his firm ideological stance also ascribe a certain political naiveite to his character)—yet this explanation alone neither accounts for the ready acceptance of nonviolence as both ideology and way of life, nor the fact that almost every household in the Province had at least one member, if not more, who was part of the KK movement in some fashion.

The lack of adequate explanation in prior histories—the few that do exist—and the view that this was an exceptional phenomenon driven solely by Ghaffar Khan's leadership, was one of the motivating factors for my research. Moreover, the ascription this exceptional phenomenon proved the rule that the Pashtuns, or the Pukhtuns,[3] are an inherently violent race but had become nonviolent mainly for tactical reasons—and would resort back to default mode once the colonial threat was vanquished[4]—also impelled a comparative analysis: to read this emic history against

[3] The pronunciation of "Pashtun" is prevalent for the Pashtuns straddling the western side of the Durand Line, in Afghanistan and Baluchistan, while the harsher "kh" sound of "Pukhtun" predominates on the eastern side of the border, especially in Peshawar and the surrounding areas. As the Khudai Khidmatgars were mainly from the east they refer to themselves as "Pukhtun" (also spelt "Pakhtun"). The Pashto script allows the same word "پښتون" to be pronounced either as "Pukhtun" or "Pashtun" depending on the dialect. However, "Pashtun," "Pashto" and "Pashtunwali" are more commonly used in English and, therefore, I use that more generally as well, but I also use "Pukhtun," "Pukhto" and "Pukhtunwali" in translation as that is the term used by the KKs self-referentially.
[4] Even Gandhi toys with these conclusions when he closely questions the KK to see if they are genuinely embodying nonviolence, or merely following Ghaffar Khan's commands, when he visited the Frontier Province in 1938 and then again the following year alongside with his wife Kasturba. For historical details on Gandhi's visit see, Rajmohan Gandhi, *Ghaffar Khan, nonviolent badshah of the Pakhtuns*, Penguin lives, (New Delhi ;: Penguin Viking, 2004). 118.

the tropology of "the figure of the Pathan." The comparative reading is necessary to highlight both the ostensible paradox and the lack of adequate explanation which my writing hopes to address.

The racial categorizations of the Pashtuns can be traced to colonial, but also indigenous South Asian, ethnographic and literary representations. Because the Pashtuns were (and often still are) called "Pathans" I use that as a signifier to denote a tropological framework in which the tropes have transmuted into truths and the lens through which the Pashtuns are interpreted. The racially constructed figure of the "Pathan" has become a hegemonic epistemological framework, one which not only obfuscates indigenous and alternative narratives that run counter to it, such as the history of a nonviolent Pashtun movement, but it also produces policies that govern them. This, more often than not, also justifies widespread (state) violence against them. The geographical location of the North-West Frontier grounds the production of this framework: denoted as either the gateway to India, or the crucial yet ever-restive frontier of empire (and now of the nation-state), this border spatiality produces the tropology of the "Pathan." Thus, throughout my writing "the figure of the Pathan" signifies this tropological framework, one that also produces and fortifies this modern, "scientific" border.

Representational frameworks, as Edward Said brilliantly elucidates in *Orientalism* (via Michel Foucault's theory of biopower), produce interpretations taken as real or true but which are in essence manufactured through mechanisms of power. It is the dominant interpretive framework that silenced the history and erased the literature of the KKs that I contrast with the movement's own imaginaries, particularly the Khudai Khidmatgar women who remain veiled to the present day and whose articulations have been doubly silenced, to point to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's influential essay, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Alongside with *Orientalism*,

this text forms the critical methodology for reading this silenced subaltern literature. The fact that the KK movement included a large contingent of women amongst its ranks has hitherto never been analyzed. Most surprisingly, my research disclosed that it was the women's voices that demanded the change in normative values that nonviolent transformation necessitated, especially that of altering subject formation. Although some of the women participated in the public rallies, demonstrations and picketing, the majority of them contributed through their pens from the segregated spaces of their homes, but it was their writings in particular that instigated the changed habitus.

I compare the fore-grounded figure of the "Pathan," in its various registers of meaning, with Pashtun self-imaginaries articulated in KK vernacular literature. I do so in order to highlight not just the glaring discrepancies between the two sets of representations but specially to see how nonviolence was embodied so readily by the Pashtuns. And, more crucially, what are the ways in which this articulation of nonviolence speaks to us today as a universal human aspiration. In closely reading this hitherto silenced literature, radical forms of political and social organization disclose themselves as possible solutions for organizing communities differently. So that, instead of reading these emic narratives only through a literary, historical or ethnographic lens my research is aimed toward a more utopian end: in trying to understand the attributes of the alternate, anarchic and radically democratic forms of socio-political the KK were aspiring toward, I ask if they also translate into universal signifiers? Although, the intention is not merely aimed at disclosing universally translatable signifiers, even if there are universals that can seamlessly translate across cultures, languages and histories, but instead to point out that the principles of nonviolence may in fact be emic to every ethos but remain unrecognized because of its quotidian character.

I start by analyzing the socio-semantic instability of the figure of the "Pathan" in colonial literature which, despite the obvious representations of a martial and violent race, is also an ambivalently paradoxical discourse. The paradoxical ambivalence manifests itself through denotations of both admiration and disparagement, with the figure often viewed through the lens of the noble savage and the primitive barbarian, while the vocabularies of both are heavily laced with homo-erotic desires. However, the instability of these representations takes on a much more ideologically cohesive form when charted alongside imperial, nation-state and neo-imperial attempts to fortify and police the ever-tenuous frontier territory which the figure inhabits. Discursively produced because of its geographical location on the edge of empire, "the figure of the Pathan" is constantly foregrounded within this (on-going) contested border zone, and, therefore, its representations cannot be separated from imperial (and nation-state) desires of appropriation. Combined with the fact that the Pashtuns comprise one of the largest autonomous tribal groups in South Asia, ones that remain intractable and in constant resistance against the state—Mughal, as well as colonial, postcolonial and now neo-colonial attempts at domination—reveal the ideological grids upon which these representations can more easily be mapped.

In contrast, because the ahistorical "figure of the Pathan" is cast within an empirically racial genealogy, the constant violence meted out to it and to the land it inhabits becomes justified as a matter of course. It is precisely because this discursive figure, as well as the creation of this border territory remains largely uncontextualized—even though the Durand Line was the first partitioning of India—the violence routinely meted out does not elicit the kinds of moral condemnation that other racial oppressions do. Even indigenous South Asian representations of

the figure are largely rendered in elementary colors, ones that recirculate and become definitive tropes in the popular imaginary;[5] consequently, local voices are also hardly ever raised in protest against the injustices routinely inflicted upon the inhabitants of this land.[6]

One of the main foci for my research is the *Pukhtun* journal, which Ghaffar Khan launched in 1928 a year prior to the formation of the movement. This vernacular literary platform became the crucial site on which KK ideology and the production for change were articulated; it especially created the space where women had a public voice for the first time and a number of KK women became quite famous through their frequent and often incisive literary contributions. I read the Pashto poems, articles, commentaries, news, histories, pedagogical and ideological dogmas in the journal in order to explore how the KK imagined and embodied the ideology of nonviolence, and also to understand how they interpreted and envisioned its telos.

Although I deploy an interdisciplinary methodology, the predominate lens is a literary one which is more salient in analyzing, interrogating and giving voice to this silenced history. Despite tracing the details of this movement through historical archives, the colonial as well as nationalist texts continue to be enmeshed within state mechanisms and its disciplinary apparatus', especially in India and Pakistan. As the colonial archive was produced through the power structures I am reading against the grain, a historical lens alone is insufficient in disclosing the silenced subaltern embedded within it. It is also through a literary analysis that KK

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[5] Such as Rabindranath Tagore's famous short story "Kabuliwala" and various Bollywood representations of "Pathans" in films such as *Kabuliwala*, based on Tagore's story, *Zanzeer*, *Khuda Ghawah*, and *Mission Kashmir* (the last one having the added dimension of the Taliban as also representative of the figure of the Pathan), to name a few of the more popular ones.

[6] A recent exception to garnering widespread national support has been the burgeoning Pashtun Tahfuz Movement, a nonviolent Pashtun resistance movement started by young activists from Waziristan protesting the heavy-handed military brutality meted out to the residents of the Tribal Territories quite routinely, and especially since the War on Terror. Further, they are demanding that the many cases of the "disappeared" be investigated and as such have generated widespread national support at their rallies even in Lahore and Karachi outside of the Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa Province. But because the legitimate demands of the movement have caught the imagination of other Pakistanis it has since been quite ruthlessly suppressed by state establishment.

resistance literature can be situated within its own milieu to support the argument that its expression of nonviolence was generated from within, and, genealogically, on a continuum with other indigenous movements.

A large body of my dissertation is a close reading of the KKs literary articulations, self-representations and emic histories. Although this literature, as well as archival records of the organization were suppressed, censored and distorted once the KK movement was charged with sedition by the Pakistani state in 1948—and its members imprisoned for longer durations than the colonial government had done, nevertheless, a significant body of the original texts have been coming to the fore since the last few years. While the reputation of Ghaffar Khan and the KK are being reclaimed within the annals of anticolonial resistance in Pakistan as well.[7]

Significations of Khudai Khidmatgar Nonviolence

I closely analyze the formation of this "army" that wore distinctively brick-red *kĥadār*, or homespun, uniforms—and as such were also known as the *sūrex posh* or the Red Shirts. The KK army had a strict training regimen and the volunteers in this army were enlisted only when they swore an oath of fealty to the tenets of nonviolence.[8] Moreover, a large part of their duties included social service such as the sanitation, schooling and policing of villages, and, quite interestingly, poetry readings, dramatic and musical performances. What is even more remarkable was that the pledge of nonviolence was not merely considered an oath upholding the

[7] Abdul Ghaffar Khan's grandson, Asfandyar Wali Khan, leads the Awami National Party that was elected into power in "Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa" in 2008. (The NWFP was been renamed as such in 2002). They were instrumental in reclaiming this history from the shadows, which is why I was able to find extant copies of the *Pukhtun* journal in a public library a few years ago. However, even though the ANP is a left wing, secular and socialist political party—and speaks on behalf of Pashtun nationalism once again—they no longer uphold or practice the tenets of nonviolence that the KK and Ghaffar Khan articulated or practiced.

[8] There is no definitive version but a number of oral and written versions of the pledge, and I include one version in the appendix.

ideology for strategic purposes but rather it was a declaration of an inner, subjective transformation. And by most KK accounts, some of which I explicate in Chapter Two, it denoted a lifelong change and a permanent commitment to an alternate way of being and living. The oath, therefore, signified a transformed engagement with themselves and their fellow human beings, transcending narrow cultural prescriptions of revenge and retaliation. The code of *badal,* for example—often translated in its narrow meaning of "revenge" or "retribution"—with which the Pashtuns have long been identified, was transmuted into its broader, and more accurate, meaning of "reciprocity."

As such, becoming a KK was not merely depicted as volunteering in a resistance army but instead, it was deciphered as a rite of passage which, akin to mystical self-transformations, signified an enlightened state of being and a liberation of the human spirit. The KK, therefore, imagined themselves not merely as volunteers in a resistance army, but rather, instigators of a new way of being in the world. It was interpreted as a more genuine and authentic way of being human, one that expressed the essence of both Pashtunwali and of Islam. As a pointer towards its mystical connotations in the vernacular, I have titled their nonviolence an ecstatic transformation. They believed that this radical inner or subjective change would produce the requisite outer or socio-political expression. Voiced through their poetry, nonviolence was seen as a path to *fanā*, or the annihilation of the ego-self, which would then unite the purified self with the sacred divine. Thus having believed or experienced the ecstatic truth of nonviolence most KK members became steadfast to its tenets and practices unto death and referred to themselves by their army ranks and continued to add "Khudai Khidmatgar" as an honorary title after their

given names even after their pariah status in Pakistan.[9] However, I do not dwell upon the ego-annihilation and self-transformation latent in mystical aspirations but rather how this was interpreted by the KK through the lens of nonviolence.

Furthermore, I point out how the transformation of subjectivity that was embodied through registers of mystical ecstasy connects with the anarchy intrinsic to the philosophy of nonviolent resistance. As I will examine more closely, philosophical anarchy was not a novel concept for the Pashtuns; it under-girds their indigenous forms of democracy which Pashtunwali attempts to codify. It is the anarchic core of nonviolent resistance that, as I argue, made it not only attractive and understandable but found a ready home amongst the people of the NWF to flourish quite dramatically, and in a uniquely indigenous way. Amongst the representational tropes about the "Pathans" their "lawlessness" and "anarchy" predominate and, although not agreeing with the derogatory meanings given to those terms, I also point to the codes of Pashtunwali and the geographical location as explanations. However, I contend that the representations of "lawlessness" and "anarchy" that are leveled as accusations against them, and as proof of their pre-civilizational status in colonial literature, also, paradoxically, establishes the fact that they had their own laws and normative codes of conduct. But because the narrow lens of colonial "law and order" rendered all alternate forms of socio-political organization, such as Pashtunwali, threatening and transgressive, that is the meaning attached to the term "anarchy" in colonial literature.

Far from the sense that colonial literature deploys, Pashtunwali is a set of oral codes that govern and shape private and public ways of being, but because they remain uninstitutionalized

[9] Banerjee records many such accounts about the KK in her book: Mukulika Banerjee, *The Pathan unarmed : opposition & memory in the North West Frontier*, World anthropology, (Santa Fe, N.M.: School of American Research Press, 2000).

through state mechanisms they are categorized as "tribal" customs predating "civilization." In other words, Pashtunwali, and the designation of "tribal" in itself, points to the temporal horizon within which alternate "systems" or ways of being are classified as "backward." It discloses a linear conception of time whereby humanity progresses from barbarism to civilization, and people who have not achieved statehood in the colonial or European sense are situated upon a prior temporal position in this classification. Therefore, the designation "tribal," "nonstate" and "lawless" are not just ontological categories but disclose a particular spacio-temporal framework of understanding. Within this linear conception, the laws of the state are classified as progressive and evolved; whereas, unwritten tribal codes signify an archaic and primitive way of being. However, once these frameworks of interpretations are understood as socio-political, and especially racial constructs, produced in particular historical contexts and through particular configurations of power—and not as ontological givens—then different temporalities and cosmologies can become available as alternate frameworks for understanding.

The overall thrust of my writing highlights not only the unique phenomenon of Pashtun nonviolence, but, even more compellingly, the fact that KK became a unique nexus in which existent normativities, communal forms of organization, and even radical forms of democracy converged; therefore, the philosophy of nonviolence created, to call upon Gandhi's utopian ideal as a descriptive, "a state of enlightened anarchy."[10] As such the term "nonviolence" is perhaps an inadequate one as it seems to denote only an opposition to, or a negation of existing, physical forms of violence, instead of its actual ambitious scope: a methodology that both deconstructs systemic forms of violence and one that posits a different set of normativities in its place; normativities that are, moreover, derived through alternate epistemological frameworks.

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[10] Gandhi: "Enlightened Anarchy—A Political Ideal," *Sarvodya*, Jan. 1939. In, *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, ed., Raghavan Iyer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. Vol III, 602.

Certainly, the term “non-violence,” with a hyphen, does not capture the full conceptual spectrum of “nonviolence” as an oppositional “system,” therefore, despite the apparent inadequacy of the term, I use the nonhyphenated spelling to denote the latter, more broader and much more ambitious meaning alongside with its utopian aspirations.

Additionally, the geographic designation of the North-West Frontier, both the Province and especially the “Tribal Territories”—as discursive as well as cartographic border zone and nonstate space—also played a decisive role in producing this anarchic nexus. I define in more depth what I mean by the term “anarchy” throughout my writing but suffice it to say at present that it denotes the philosophical sense of the term: self-sovereignty in opposition to state governance. However, in this case, the philosophical sense is tempered by the ideology of nonviolence to mean much more than violent resistance against the state. This sense of “anarchy” is closer to the Tolstoyian one,[11] but because it was generated, in this case, by interpreting indigenous ontologies through new norms, its particular radical ascriptions cannot be fully appreciated through given conceptions of the term.

However, my central argument is not only that Ghaffar Khan and the KK interpreted the traditional codes in new ways through the lens of nonviolence, but that in grafting the new upon the given, they took their existing socio-political organization, its geographic imaginary, and historical context to produce a nexus that was at once embedded in its own ethos and yet also quite novel. One that, furthermore, was not just envisioned as particular but also as universal. This historical model also illustrates how alternate cosmologies, especially those grounded upon philosophical nonviolence, can be produced while being deeply entrenched within systemic

[11] Such as in Tolstoy’s essay, “Patriotism and Government” (1901), and his book, *The Kingdom of God is Within You* (1894).

violence. It is the latter possibility that gives it universal and contemporary significance.

Extant literature on the KK and Ghaffar Khan

Little academic attention has been paid to the vernacular registers of interpretation through which the Khudai Khidmatgars, or the Servants of God, embodied nonviolence. Despite the movement's unique political, literary and historical significance, one of the main reasons for the historical silences that have surrounded it—starkly in contrast with Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and the nonviolent resistance that took place contemporaneously in the rest of India—is the geographical location of its actors. The geographical "gateway to India" was transformed into an ever-restive border zone through colonial cartography, in tandem with the three-layered frontier of imperial manufacture, and this is why its recalcitrant people were portrayed through progressively denigrating representations. As such, the tropological framework of the Pathan, (as well as other peoples classified as the "martial" races of British India) rendered the people intrinsically incapable of "pacifism," or of authentically practicing nonviolence. Additionally, these particular border people are also largely Muslim and thus narratives about them are also burdened by tropes that represent Islam as an intrinsically violent religion; tropes that continue to be regurgitated and loudly voiced even today and have gained the widespread status of truisms. Academic research has also largely been carried out through these frameworks of interpretation, so that the little attention the KK have received has framed the movement as a miraculous kind of anomaly of a "brutal warrior culture"[12] brought about by the saintly character of Abdul Ghaffar Khan—one who, as the scant literature also states, practiced the ideology of nonviolence

[12] As stated in the documentary film, *The Frontier Gandhi*, by Teri McLuhan. Similar sentiments are also articulated in the few books written on Ghaffar Khan, the most well-known of which are, *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam* by Eknath Easwaran and *Abdul Ghaffar Khan* by D.G.Tendulkar.

because he was an acolyte of M.K. Gandhi. This classification is substantiated by the fact that Ghaffar Khan was a leading member of the All India Congress Committee, and the Frontier Congress Committee was largely composed of KK members, but this does not explain why other members of the national party did not have similar influence upon their own communities or why the KK and their leaders had such a determined stance about nonviolence.

Several books and articles have been written about Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and recently a documentary film has been made about the movement, all of which explain the extraordinary phenomenon of Pashtun nonviolence under Ghaffar Khan's leadership. The most notable books, by D.G. Tendulkar, Eknath Easwaran, and recently, Raj Mohan Gandhi, all ascribe the inexplicable transformation of the Pashtuns to Ghaffar Khan's character. As I mentioned above, that, in turn, is explained by Ghaffar Khan's close association with Gandhi and his Congress Party affiliation. To put it reductively, Ghaffar Khan's ideology becomes a derivative of *ahimsa* and his leadership a mimesis of Gandhi. This is made quite explicit by the title of "Frontier Gandhi" by which Ghaffar Khan is more globally recognizable, when and if he is recognized at all, and which is also the title of the only extensive documentary film about him and the KK movement. Despite Teri McLuhan's nuanced and historically contextual documentary, as well as the many years of research, filming and production she undertook, the central focus of the film is, once again, Ghaffar Khan's charisma, because the underlying presumption of an intrinsically violent society is never questioned. Without a doubt, Ghaffar Khan's leadership was the impetus and driving force for the movement, and his moral stature and integrity unimpeachable. But the ascription of the radical socio-political transformation of the people of the NWF (not limited only to the Pashtuns or the Province but included other races, religions, and people in the Tribal Territories and Afghanistan) to only his leadership—or the Khudai Khidmatgar ideology to

simply an adoption of Gandhian *ahimsa*—neither explains the massive following of the movement in the region nor its lasting significance in the imaginary until today. It is this lack of adequate explanation that my scholarship hopes to address.

One of the few exceptions is Mukulika Banerjee's very well researched book, *The Pathan Unarmed,* which was initially a dissertation research project. She personally interviewed many Khudai Khidmatgars that were still living at the time;[13] she also points to the fact that this was a popular, subaltern, grass roots movement, one that was horizontally rather than only vertically organized. She examines first-hand the claims by many Khudai Khidmatgars who viewed Ghaffar Khan as a prophetic figure, and thus obliquely undermines other accounts of the movement that characterize it simply as a miraculous redemption of the violent Pashtun by a messianic figure. By examining the tropology of South Asian holy figures, which forms the context in which the figure of Ghaffar Khan is often depicted even indigenously—and using the framework of Shahid Amin's seminal article "Gandhi as Mahatma"[14] that examines Gandhi as a thaumaturgic figure created in the mind of the masses—Banerjee points to the similarities but also the differences between these representations. Unlike Gandhi, as Banerjee says, Ghaffar Khan was never a figure removed from the people of the Frontier region but personally interacted with most of them quite often, and on a much more egalitarian footing. In effect, she argues, that from the local perspective, equating Ghaffar Khan's status with that of the figure of Gandhi as Mahatma is erroneous:

> I would argue, however, that in contrast to Gandhi Badshah Khan was never such a remote or mysterious figure in the Pathan's imagination…On innumerable occasions I was told that there was not a single village, or even household, in the whole of the Frontier, which Badshah Khan had not visited. Moreover, such statements were backed up with very concrete details—in several households,

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[13] It was originally Banerjee's dissertation project that later got published as the book, *The Pathan Unarmed*.
[14] Amin, Shahid: "Gandhi as Mahatma" in *Selected Subaltern Studies*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 288-350

> they pointed me to a room at the end of their courtyard where Badshah Khan had slept when he was in their village. Others remembered noticing his long legs, or his 'big feet, like those of the *powindah* [pastoral nomads]'. They tell stories about his big nose or how little he ate, and the ways in which he spoke, all of which indicate an intimacy of a kind which did not arise in India with Gandhi the Mahatma.[15]

Banerjee also attempts to answer the question of how—to quote from the back cover of the book—"the notoriously violent Pukhtuns were converted to an ethic of non-violence." As I do, she answers this question by illustrating how the Khudai Khidmatgars interpreted Pashtunwali and Islam through the lens of nonviolence, but, in contrast to my approach, she does not substantiate her research through vernacular literature, and so she misses the fact the this was not so much a "new" interpretation as a reinterpretation of the given ethos: nonviolence was understood as part of Islam and Pashtunwali and a more authentic interpretation of both. The meaning-making frameworks that made it immediately understandable—or that acted as the lens that revealed the truth of nonviolence—was the rich legacy of Sufism that predominated in the culture, in which its metaphors of enlightenment, annihilation-union with the sacred beloved, and, of course, "love," comfortably intermingled with the Pashtunwali codes of forgiveness, sanctuary, hospitality, and even a reinterpretation of the foremost code sanctioning retributive violence, that of "*badal,*" reinterpreted in its broader linguistic meaning of "reciprocity," that generated an indigenous vocabulary for nonviolence. While Banerjee does quite rightly point to the reorganized class and social structures that the KK organization instigated, as well as the changed economic structures that colonial rule brought in its wake, she misses, or does not dwell upon, the existing egalitarian systems that were harnessed and extended, even if only in the imaginary, to strengthen existing horizontal social structures.

Continuing to call themselves the "Afghan Jirga" even after the KK were elected into

[15] Banerjee, *The Pathan unarmed : opposition & memory in the North West Frontier*, 131.

power, and even though they were referred to as the Frontier Congress Committee in official documents, the title signified more than their ethnic identity and relative autonomy from the central AICC, as Stephen Alan Rittenberg explains in his extensive political history of the movement. The title also pointed to a desire to (re) establish the democratic forms already present in the indigenous imaginary and, furthermore, to salvage the *jirga* system from the corruption that colonial governance had produced by infiltrating and utilizing its form towards its own ends. Rittenberg's dissertation, and his later publication, *The Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province, 1901-1947*, provides a nuanced and well researched history of the movement as well as providing valuable details about the Frontier branch of the All-India Muslim League Party's opposition to it. In contrast with Banerjee, however, it is largely a textual and archival analysis of the movement. Nevertheless, this research also heavily informs my own historical analysis, but once again, by not tapping into the vernacular registers of meaning both Rittenberg and Banerjee do not access the multifaceted indigenous interpretations through which nonviolence was not considered an exceptional phenomenon. On the contrary, throughout this dissertation I will identify why the KK do not point to nonviolence as an exceptional phenomenon and what the lack of this discourse signified. Furthermore, I also locate the Khudai Khidmatgars within the larger pantheon of Pashtun resistance movements, which have a long legacy of instigating social transformation through literary articulations as well.

Two other fairly well-known historical analysis do take the vernacular into account: another dissertation, written by Abdul Karim Khan in 1997; and a number of books by Syed Wiqar Ali Shah. The latter's books, written in English, present a fairly cursive analysis of KK politics, largely in relationship with the Muslim League and the formation of Pakistan; although I

do not refer to these, his Pashto book on the KK women's literature is a highly valuable reference for my work. However, that book is less a critical analysis than a verbatim compilation of much of the women's literature originally published in the *Pukhtun* journal. Largely extant at the time of its writing, the original copies of the journal that were censored by the Pakistani state have since re-emerged in public archives; thus, I also came across many of the original versions that Shah extensively quotes. And although Shah's book is much more accessible, where I have access to the original texts I do not rely on his rendition. On the contrary, Karim Khan's dissertation is an extensive analysis of both the history and literature of the movement, giving valuable vernacular insights into both, but because the history was largely familiar to me, I also do not rely on his dissertation in any substantial way. While the vernacular literature is only presented through his translation and he does not undertake a close reading, I refer to this text quite cursively. Unless otherwise noted, I translate all the Pashto texts to read them both closely and through (the lens of) a hermeneutics of suspicion.

With the exception of Wiqar Ali Shah's book, previous research has also largely ignored (or were ignorant of) the large participation in the KK movement of Pashtun women,[16] whose writings endorsed not only political independence but, much more crucially for them, their emancipation from the patriarchal subjugation of their own culture. In Chapter Three I look closely at the poetry of some of these Khudai Khidmatgars women, who regularly contributed to the *Pukhtun* journal, and the parallels they draw between imperial domination and traditional masculine control. While they use the rhetoric of "modernity" and "progress" to call for a unified Pashtun nation, one that ought to, according to their writings (voicing a very modernist aspiration prevalent at the time), take its rightful place amongst a global league of nations, they emphasize

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[16] Nehru's trip to the North-West Frontier in 1938 specifically mentions the large turn-out of women to his rally that I read in "The Cunningham Collection" of private papers in the India Office Records at the British Library: R/3/I/45.

the role of the liberated and unveiled "modern" woman as the keystone to achieving this progressive counter-possibility. They point out that unless the emancipation of Pashtun women forms the core of the movement, neither its nationalist objectives nor the integrity of its ideology can be upheld (by the KK men).

Frameworks of Knowledge

Although my project did not self-consciously begin as a feminist one, my understanding of nonviolence as both a radical idea as well as a very quotidian one—one that remains unrecognized and unacknowledged because of its ubiquity—was clarified by my readings of the KK women's literature. It is their understandings and their ways of embodying nonviolence that largely informs my own now. And I deliberately use the term "embodiment," instead of "practice," throughout my dissertation because the women's voices starkly disclose that what nonviolence is resisting, and the change it is aspiring towards, was deeply connected with the body. Gandhi's *satyagraha,* of course, is very much body centered: the unarmed body becomes an offering to the system's force of arms and this vulnerability—the shared condition of "precariousness" to use Butler's term—is meant to arouse the opponent's conscience, the onlooker's empathy, and the resister's passion. However, the KK women's sense of embodiment is different: firstly they speak about incarcerated and chained female bodies as a norm against which their rhetoric is directed; secondly, they question why the female body is the site upon which public values, such as (male or tribal) honor, are inscribed yet must remain private and veiled; and finally, they loudly voice that the desired change of norms, both Pashtun and colonial, can only be generated through the female body. In KK literature, the mother, as nurturer of households, becomes the site through which new normativities will become new

norms.

Despite the fact that the female body is always enlisted by nationalist discourse, and such discourse was deployed in full measure by KK men, including Ghaffar Khan, there is a marked difference in this case. In the women's discourse, the female body was not enlisted to re-inscribe patriarchal visions of the nation, but, instead the women question and condemn oppressive traditions in the name of a liberatory Islam. And in that sense, the women's discourse tacitly pits itself against the men's rhetoric in which nonviolence was being interpreted as part of the normative values of Pashtunwali. Even more interestingly, there is very little mention or discussion of the ideology of nonviolence in their writings; explaining this glaring lack, I argue that they address the grounds of nonviolent transformation: altering the normative subject. Nonviolence opened the space of resistance that allowed them to criticize patriarchal traditions, and through the discourse of emancipating their caged bodies, they used that as a site to reinscribe the systemic violence of their condition.

The KK women also disrupt representations of the veiled, docile and voiceless Pashtun woman who passively accepts her subordinate role within a traditional patriarchal society. While the movement as a whole disrupted the binary categorization in which male virility—especially the hyper-masculine figure of the "Pathan"—is associated with violence and nonviolence with effeminacy or a lack of virility. In looking at how representations of gender (both colonial and indigenous) are disrupted by the active participation of women in the organization I also want to point to the disruption of Pashtun masculinities which the KK negotiated within the ideological framework of nonviolence. In other words, representations of the "figure of the Pathan," which are almost always depicted as exhibiting an essential masculinity through acts of violence, are dissonant with a nonviolent Pashtun. But because longstanding tropes, ones that have transmuted

into truths, were being disrupted through KK self-representations, they were stigmatized by colonial authorities (and later by the Muslim League) with charges not only of effeminacy—they were no longer true Pathans but had been corrupted by Gandhi's "Hindu" (and effeminate) ideology—but this was inscribed upon their bodies as well: KK prisoners were sexually tortured and even castrated to denote this evaluation of manhood, or its lack thereof because nonviolence signified "pacifism."

I look much more closely at how nonviolence and Islam are represented in KK and Pashtun self-imaginaries largely through the work of the iconic modern Pashtun poet, Abdul Ghani Khan. Ghani Khan was also a KK and the eldest son of Ghaffar Khan, and it is his poems that capture, quite brilliantly, how nonviolence was rooted in both Pashtunwali and Islam, yet reinterpreted in ways that were considered both novel and authentic. However, and in keeping with the poet's mystical Sufi orientation, this authenticity—or the quest to find the truth of nonviolence—was not temporally oriented towards a golden past or an ideal new future but, in messianic fashion, it was already present and at hand. Ghani Khan's poetry implies that it is erroneous customs—or interpretations of it—that veils the truth of its presence. However, his poetry also captures the seemingly paradoxical modalities in which nonviolence was interpreted and understood.

Even more curiously, Ghani Khan, who penned a prolific amount of poetry during his lengthy life, wrote only a couple of poems about the KK movement directly. One is the poem I quote a *shir* from as epigraph to this introduction, "Nonviolence" or *"'ədm-e-ẗushdəd."* The poem voices not only his paradoxical relationship with the ideology of nonviolence but it also reflects the kinds of paradox it presented to the Pashtuns more broadly. Not the paradoxical enigma that most analysis about the movement ascribe to Pashtun nonviolence, but rather, the

paradox of how the Pashtuns were aroused for war in terms of nonviolence as a mystical ecstasy. It is the latter sense of nonviolence, as an ecstatic awakening to the truth, or a mystical enlightenment, that creates the paradox of an enlightened nonviolent warrior that Ghani Khan's other poem about the movement, "Bāchā Khan's March on Mardan," captures so lucidly. However, the incongruous conjunction of metaphors, allusions and concepts in his poetry also point to an underlying skepticism about the efficacy of absolute nonviolence. Favoring an agnostic, materially grounded, lived experience, in direct contrast with the ideals of his father, Ghani Khan, nevertheless, reinforces the rapt wonder with which the unfolding phenomenon was viewed and interpreted.

These two poems also point out how nonviolence was not conceived as a pacification of the Pashtuns, despite self-representations of indomitable and honor bound warriors. Instead, it was conceived as a mystical transcendence of their warrior spirit: a vital ecstatic force that conquered and possessed its end through love alone. These poems also highlight the particular interpretations of Islam which unselfconsciously grounded the movement and were expressed through the syncretic Sufi vocabulary that was widely prevalent in the region at the time—however, one which is not associated with the Pashtuns either in popular depictions or even in scholarly analysis. Yet, Ghani Khan interpolates not only indigenous codes and practices with traditional Islamic tropes of enlightenment but also with nonviolence. In other words, Ghani Khan captures the paradox of Pashtun nonviolence on its many registers of meaning that I explore in my research.

It is also by closely reading these poems, as well as poems by other KK contributors in the *Pukhtun* journal, that the concept of "ecstasy" finds itself in the title of my dissertation. Embodying nonviolence was not just considered parallel to mystical enlightenment, but it

demanded the same requisites: self-transformation and a readiness for self-annihilation. While I analyze "anarchy," in its philosophical sense, more thoroughly in Chapter Four, I also point to the colonial (or the state) sense of lawlessness, chaos and disorder as a critique of the term's more widespread meaning. Ghani Khan addresses both senses of the meaning in the speeches he gave as a member of the Indian Legislative Assembly; with great ironic wit, he illustrates Pashtun "anarchy" as both "lawlessness" (in the colonial sense) and self-sovereignty, in the sense that I use the term in reference to the KK. In choosing to follow their own codes they were designated "outlaws," and Ghani Khan uses that colonial categorization as a lens to point to the philosophical sense of anarchy they were embodying through nonviolence.

Poetic articulations of resistance to foreign domination, as well as constant refrains of pan-Pashtun unity and nationalism, have a long literary tradition in Pashto, both written and especially oral.[17] Arguably, some accounts go so far as to ascribe the advent of written Pashto literature solely as resistance to South Asian imperial domination of the area.[18] However debatable that conjecture maybe, the political and the poetic almost always go hand in hand in the Pashto literary tradition, with the Khudai Khidmatgar movement especially instigating the advent, and even, by some accounts, the renaissance of modern Pashto literature.[19] The pan-Pashtun aspirations of the KK movement also situated the emergent political within the trans-global discourse of modernization and progress of its time. A situatedness in modernity that, although at the intersections of coloniality, cannot solely be ascribed that genealogy. Instead, as Walter Mignolo argues, even though the imaginary of the modern "world system" is largely

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[17] *Afghanistan in Ink: literature between diaspora and nation*, edited by Nile Green and Nushin Arbabzadah. (London: Hurst & Company, 2013)
[18] Wide, Thomas: "Demarcating Pashto: Cross-border Pashto Literature and the Afghans State, 1880-1930, in *Afghanistan in Ink,* 92
[19] Shaheen, Salma: Modern Poem (Nazm) in Pashto. (University of Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 2013), 75.

produced and interpreted through the epistemological framework of colonialism, nevertheless, at its borders this system "cracks" to disclose subaltern, indigenous knowledges; destabilized at the margins, these alternate frameworks of interpretation resist yet intersect with the colonial imaginary. In other words, colonial modernity affects indigenous and local knowledge frameworks, but it is not the only source of modernity.

Moreover, like Mignolo, I would like to offer a clarification for the term "imaginary:" I use it in Edouard Glissant's sense rather than the Lacanian one that contrasts it with "the Symbolic and the Real." Instead, as Mignolo states: "For Glissant the imaginary is all the ways a culture has of perceiving and conceiving of the world. Hence, every human culture will have its own particular imaginary."[20] If Time is the "essence" of modernity" as Mignolo claims, then the indigene imaginary can clearly be situated in the visible shift from a spatial to a temporal conception of life. If that is indeed the criteria for denoting "modernity," then the KK discourse of teleological ends, replete with concepts of (national) progress, development and education, or in other words, linear conceptions of time, would also squarely situate it within the episteme of modernity. However, eschatological time, that of presence, is also part of the KK imaginary; this presence would become manifest through a unified and liberated nation once they had transformed-purified themselves through the embodiment of nonviolence. Therefore, what I am arguing against is not only that colonialism is the only source, or harbinger, of modernity, but that there is only one definition of modernity, and that one which is traceable to European Enlightenment. I am arguing that the episteme of modernity is much more inclusive, global and, logically speaking, all-encompassing, and KK articulations (amongst many other indigenous and subaltern voices), fragments the narrow, homogenous and singular conception of modernity that

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[20] Walter Mignolo, *Local histories/global designs : coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking*, Princeton studies in culture/power/history, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 23.

the dominant epistemology produces. Instead it introduces alternate frameworks of knowing that are not part of the given discourse on modernity, and are, therefore, rendered invisible and silent.

However, KK interjections into this hegemonic framework, as well as the ideology of nonviolence more broadly—much more clearly articulated through Gandhi's writings—disrupts the singular conception of modernity through an "other thinking" and a "third way." Articulated by the Moroccan philosopher, Abdelkebir Khatibi, "an other thinking is a way of thinking without the Other,"[21] as Mignolo explicates. While "this third way"[22] is neither a desire to revert to nationalistic jingoism nor a desire to reproduce the modernity of the West, but a liminal space or a bridge between the two. It also contains the corollary imperative "of a double critique," both of "imperial discourses…as well as of national discourses asserting identity and differences."[23] As such the double critique of "an other thinking" implies a familiarity with colonial epistemological frameworks and is situated at its intersections and boundaries, what Mignolo calls "border thinking": an existential position dwelling upon the borders of "coloniality,"[24] or the epistemological framework made universal through colonial domination. A framework that fashions modern subjectivity predicated upon difference, especially of gender and race. However, on the edges and on the other side of the borders of "coloniality" are subaltern perspectives from which colonial epistemology and its hegemony are recognized and resisted. So that this "third way" is also a "decoloniality," or a deconstructive analytic of colonial frameworks of knowledge while, much more crucially, resisting it and thinking the future in a different way.[25]

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[21] Mignolo, 67
[22] Mignolo, 74
[23] Mignolo, 69
[24] As Mignolo also clarifies the relationship between colonialism and modernity: "Modernity cannot be understood without coloniality; coloniality cannot be understood without modernity," 202
[25] From a talk on "The Concept of Decoloniality" that Walter Mignolo gave August 13st, 2014 at Duke University. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=skoL6ngD7Gs&list=PL_5SPSQ4y8ZEUKgxo3nrJo5mTIBisyxcS

Therefore, continuing to expound on the thought of Khatibi, Mignolo states that decolonization is also "a deconstruction": the critique of modernity is also carried out from the perspective of modernity itself. The defining characteristic of "deconstruction," according to Derrida, is the fact that it is not a critique from outside but a genealogical unearthing from within its own architecture. Similarly, Mignolo interprets Khatibi's "decolonizing deconstruction" as a double critique from within, "Western logo- and ethnocentrism that has been exported all over the planet" but situated in "a Third World perspective." A perspective "that will complement a postmodern deconstruction a la Derrida or in the form of Foucault's archaeology or Nietzsche's genealogy" [26] and, especially in Khatibi case, it is also a perspective from a Muslim and an Arab vantage point. The KK are similarly situated in a Muslim vantage point, with the additional perspectives of their particular habitus, a border territory, a nonstate imaginary, popular subaltern resistance and the ideology of nonviolence, creating a unique nexus from which their decolonization and their deconstruction was generated.

Therefore, I use the term "deconstruction" not only in the sense that Mignolo defines, and conjoins with "decolonization," but also in the Derridean sense: a critique of that which is not natural but appears naturalized; or *poiesis* that dissimulates as the given and the natural. As such, Derrida warns against naturalizing that which is conditioned by history, society, and (humanistic) institutions, but as he clarifies, the disruptive force of deconstruction is not generated from outside, or afterwards, but from within and at the same time; one needs to do "memory work" in order to "deconstruct."[27] Deconstruction also discloses the binary hierarchies of classical

[26] Mignolo, *Local histories/global designs : coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking*.
[27] Derrida clarifying the concept of "deconstruction" in a talk recorded on YouTube:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgwOjjoYtco

philosophy, and points to an inequality that grounds Western knowledge systems so that, according to Derrida, this classical opposition must be reversed "through a double gesture."

> In a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand. To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy of a given moment. To overlook this phase of overturning is to forget the conflictual and subordinating structure of opposition.[28]

Like Khatibi's "other thinking," deconstruction is the double gesture that is critical yet immanent to Western knowledge systems and is deployed not just as critique but in order to refashion the dominant epistemology. Although, a discursive intervention in this field of oppositions, deconstruction also points to the fact that this dominant knowledge system has very material, "non-discursive" and violent effects. I am ascribing this deconstructive force and potentiality to "nonviolence," as well as pointing to its (organically) generative capacity to produce "an other thinking," one that is positing "a third way." It acts with the same impetus "in order to breach" the dominant epistemological structures that colonialism has made global, produces alternate frames of knowledge in which the "other" is no longer perceived as a threat to be eliminated, and it posits alternate socio-political forms of communal organization grounded upon an egalitarian ethos.

Another lens of interpretation that is central to my own analysis, and which I am implicitly, even if not always explicitly, addressing throughout my writing, is Spivak's seminal essay, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In her essay, Spivak describes "how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one," and as she famously asks:

> Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, Aboriginals, the lowest strata of the urban

[28] Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 41.

> subproletariat…We must now confront the following question: on the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside *and* outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, *can the subaltern speak?*[29]

Spivak describes the double bind of this epistemic violence within the dominant framework of knowledge that both disables the voice of the subaltern globally and, additionally, in the case of the "Third World" subaltern woman, through indigenous patriarchal structures as well.[30] While ostensibly upholding a set of universal humanistic values, colonial hegemony established this epistemic violence through the systemization of indigenous "laws" and "traditions," and the production of normative legal and educational systems. But this globally dominant framework—or this "vast two-handed engine" where the center works inter-relationally with its margins—also obfuscates the fact that the marginalization of fringe peoples and the disenfranchisement of alternate knowledges is inherent to its homogenizing systems. To refer to Spivak again:

> Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative of imperialism be recognized as 'subjugated knowledge,' 'a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity."[31]

However, the question that this acute observation entails—one that is quoting Foucault—is how, or even, can subjugated knowledges be recognized through the same frameworks that continue to render the subaltern silent? If these silenced narratives form the palimpsest upon which the dominant narrative inscribes itself then how can the erased markings be retrieved or read from

[29] Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak, *Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea*, ed. Rosalind C. Morris (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 37.
[30] Spivak also describes a third and fourth layer to this silencing: by intellectuals in their desire to represent the voiceless subaltern. Both European intellectuals who ignore, and thus perpetuate, the structures of silencing that colonialism established globally, and also, by the Subaltern Studies groups of historians who, even while reading the colonial archive against the grain, create an idealized, objective "subaltern" figure rather than allowing them to speak for themselves.
[31] Spivak, *Can the Subaltern Speak?* 35.

below or beneath? How will these lower level, "naïve" knowledges, on either side of the "international division of labor," become legible if they cannot even be interpreted from within the dominant epistemology and remain incommensurable with its global ordering systems? Without addressing, and somehow circumventing the boundaries of this ostensibly all-encompassing framework altogether—one which Spivak's text implies is impossible in the given context—how will recognition be granted or an outside posited? In other words, is there really no alternative to the totalizing system that Spivak presents? Similar to the Subaltern Studies historians she is critiquing, Spivak's aim here does not seem to be the retrieval of the silenced subaltern voice or of subjugated knowledges, but rather, to critique those who attempt to do so without taking the formation of the dominant epistemological framework into account—especially a fact often ignored by European intellectuals. That colonialism was the mechanism that produced this singular, globally hegemonic framework is without doubt a necessary critique of European intellectuals who gloss over this crucial history, but not to posit a boundary, or an outside, to this (ostensibly) totalizing knowledge system also creates an impossible bind.

Finally, the methodology for reading the colonial archive against the grain that Ranajit Guha develops in his essay, "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency," as well as the other Subaltern Studies historians work, namely Partha Chatterjee, Shahid Amin and of course Spivak, strongly ground the methodological frames of my work. Guha's analysis in particular allows me to question not only the "elitist"[32] nationalist historiography that positions Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the position of sole originator of Pashtun nonviolence but also, more crucially, to decipher the counter-codes and antonymous meanings[33] in the colonial archive in order to unearth the

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[32] Ranajit Guha, ""The Prose of Counter-Insurgency"," in *Selected Subaltern Studies* ed. Ranajit Cuha and Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 38.
[33] Guha, 58

unwritten history of this resistance and extricate it from its ubiquitous registers of representation. Since the indices of codification, as Guha explains, are ideologically shaped, they are also markers of the normative—read dominant—systems of knowledge within which only certain registers of meaning and of representation can be articulated, heard or even understood. As such, this method of decodifying the colonial archive discloses not only a silenced subaltern history but it also, simultaneously, foregrounds the borders of knowledge systems within which normativity—and normative representations—are constructed.

Although these theoretical frameworks will be crucial to my project, I nevertheless also want to point to the bounded epistemological field upon which the Subaltern Studies historians ground their largely Marxist critique. I especially want to criticize the fact that the Subaltern Studies historians neither pay much heed to the ideology of nonviolence nor do they take it seriously enough to address it on its own terms. Instead, they often dismiss it out of hand without trying to understand its intent. For example, Guha classifies nonviolent resistance as a form of "Rightful Dissent" embedded in the Western idiomatic concepts of "Resistance" which he claims is part of the already given (colonial) legalistic and political discourse. I will critically analyze Guha's formulation in Chapter Two but suffice it to say for now that within the Subaltern Studies framework, resistance and "anarchy", especially "peasant" rebellions, are always formulated as violent ones; the subaltern neither engages in nor is capable of authentically practicing a nonviolent form of rebellion.[34] Nonviolence, therefore, is never given the serious consideration it warrants and it is never formulated as a form of anarchic resistance that I am ascribing to it, except in a cursory way in Partha Chatterjee's work. Whereas, I am claiming that the ambitious

[34] The incident at Chauri Chaura in 1922, where a group of peasants set fire to a police station in Gorakhpur and burned the police officers within it, is the classic example cited to illustrate the subaltern's naturally violent inclinations, and to point to their inability to understand or practice nonviolent resistance.

implications of nonviolence, when taken to its logical utopian conclusions—(and by utopian I do not mean unrealistic but the ideal it aspires towards)—are philosophically anarchic in a profound sense. I substantiate this conclusion through both KK articulations and Gandhi's writings.

Nonviolence as Deconstruction and Third Way

In contrast with the discursive framework that Spivak elucidates, one in which the subaltern cannot even attempt to speak, Derrida's formulation of "deconstruction," Mignolo's decoloniality and border thinking, Khatibi's other thinking and third way, and, most importantly, KK and Gandhian nonviolence offer not just a discursive space, but especially, as I am arguing, they produced an alternate socio-economic-political form. In other words, modernity is not as dominant as it appears; according to the philosophy of nonviolence, its semblance as a totalizing structure is upheld by the quotidian reinscriptions of its norms. However, it is also precisely this fact, and an oppositional reinscription of normative values through quotidian acts that gives nonviolent resistance its potency.

Gandhi's seminal text, *Hind Swaraj,* both critiques the epistemological framework of modernity that grounds colonialism while quite brilliantly also formulating an alternative ground, one that underpins nonviolent resistance. However, his critique is equally directed against Indians and their acceptance, and reinscription, of these knowledge systems, even by the nationalists who position themselves in opposition to colonial rule. Gandhi argues that this is a collaboration with the system, even if it is an unwitting one; one that enables colonial hegemony. As such, Gandhi points to the crucial fact that effective anticolonial resistance must also be situated outside the boundaries of the dominant epistemology of modernity. Emancipation and self-rule, or *swaraj,* are made possible first and foremost by a self-

decolonization from imperial knowledge systems and their hegemony upon the imaginary and daily acts—or upon the habitus. Therefore, in Gandhi's formulation "nonviolence" is the alternate framework through which a truly emancipatory resistance can be produced. And although he defers to and even upholds state law on many occasions, it is this radically utopian vision of a community, or a nation organically generated through an emancipated subjectivity, that is the anarchic element in Gandhi's conception of self-rule.

Frameworks of Representation: The Figure of the Pathan

Because the lenses of interpretation and the production of knowledge are always contextual, as Said seminally elucidates in *Orientalism*, representation does not merely depict objective knowledge but, especially when produced through mechanisms of power and (colonial) domination, shapes "reality" to fit its particular ideological forms. It is not just that these frameworks create stereotypes and false knowledges that can be discounted once the "truth" is known, but, much more insidiously, epistemological frameworks shape realities and create particular truths that justify systemic violence—physical as well as discursive (representational)—and, furthermore, are made to seem like totalizing systems in order to serve ideological ends upholding the power from which they are generated. Using Foucault's archeological method to deconstruct the nineteenth century discipline of Orientalism, Said reveals that it was an expression of the culture that produced it, (in this case the West), rather than representing "its putative object" of analysis.[35] Using its own cultural vocabularies and categorizations, Orientalism creates a "system" through which representations of the Orient, of the East and of "oriental" people, are not just deciphered but are established and produced as

[35] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 1st Vintage books ed. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 22.

authoritative and objective knowledge; this knowledge has power-over its object of analysis and "in a sense *creates* the Orient" and, as such, "the Oriental is contained and represented by dominating frameworks."[36] However, as Said illustrates in quite some detail, this framework of interpretation not only produces the Orient in an inverse relationship with the West, it, in fact, defines the West's own imaginary through this difference: its culture, biases, norms, normative values, religious beliefs (specifically Christianity) and nineteenth century theories of race and prescriptive gender roles, are impelled not just by imperial desires of appropriation and control but through the production of the "Other." In short, Said argues that the discipline of Orientalism, without any self-reflexive consciousness, expresses the culture that produced it and replicates its epistemological structures as universal, rather than—as it defines itself—being an authoritative discipline interpreting an "objective" body of knowledge.[37]

> It is Europe that articulates the Orient; this articulation is the prerogative not of the puppet master, but of a genuine creator, whose life-giving power represents, animates, constitutes the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries…the motif of the Orient as insinuating danger.[38]

Informing all that is interpreted through its framework, Orientalism is at once, "a historical phenomenon, a way of thought, a contemporary problem, and a material reality" that continues to shape and manipulate our world towards certain political ends. An epistemological framework very much utilized in the world today to uphold the binary between West and East, and "a clash of civilizations" between "us" and them, or the "Other" of the West.[39] The "Other," as the inverse reflection of the "us," produces the singular identity of the West predicated upon this essential difference. And the violence stems from the fact that these representations of

[36] Said, *Orientalism*, 40.
[37] Said, *Orientalism*, 24-28.
[38] Said, *Orientalism*, 57.
[39] Said, *Orientalism*, 45-46.

incommensurability get expressed as an omnipresent danger through constant depictions of disturbing, even threatening, unfamiliarity with the people, and descriptions of a forbidding and brutal landscape illustrate, and reinforce, this threatening alterity through sensual perceptions.

> In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of the given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it…I called such a relation between Western writing (and its consequences) and Oriental silence the result of and the sign of the West's great cultural strength, its will to power over the Orient.[40]

Similar to Said's formulation of Orientalism, I use the figure of the "Pathan" as a signifier to denote an epistemological framework through which the Pashtuns and the North-West Frontier have been, and continue to be, interpreted, produced and controlled. Although I mainly read colonial literatures against the grain to disclose this interpretive lens, the tropes describing the figure of the "Pathan" are neither limited to, nor only used in the service of imperial (and neo-imperial) desires of appropriation but extend to South Asian representations as well. For example, some of the tropes that occur in colonial literary texts, such as Rudyard Kipling's works, also appear in Tagore's influential short story, "Kabuliwala," (also made into a Bollywood movie of the same name which was even more influential). Although I am not suggesting that one writer influenced the other but only to point to the circulation of some of the common tropes. However, I will not delve into South Asian representations, instead the main thrust of my close reading in chapter one will be on colonial texts and the intertextuality of those primary sources with ethnographies, travel literature, journalistic writings, political discourse and films.[41]

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[40] Said, *Orientalism*, 94.
[41] This wide gamut has become intertextual with an even wider range of contemporary literature in the wake of the

Although representations of the figure of the Pathan are not the primary focus of my dissertation they nevertheless are the ubiquitous backdrop against which I am reading Pashtun self-representations. I point to the tropological framework of the "figure of the Pathan" to disclose the spirit of Nietzsche's exhortation about "Truth," or how truths are socially produced yet evaluated as ontological givens:

> A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphism, in short a sum of human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time, strike a people as firmly established, canonical, and binding; truths are illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors which have become worn by frequent use and have lost all sensuous vigour, coins which, having lost their stamp, are now regarded as metal and no longer as coins.[42]

In tracing the origins of these tropes, and (more briefly) why they recirculate with such regularity that they are now considered "truths," it becomes clear that the figure of the Pathan was created in tandem with the cartographic inscriptions of the three-layered colonial border of the North-West Frontier of British India. This figure justified and enabled the enforcement of colonial laws and policies upon this precarious and restive border, so that an ancient frontier space could be delineated as a closed border territory. As such the imaginary of a cosmopolitan crossroads—the ancient gateway of India—was willfully changed from a space of access to British India's "scientific" north-western border through heavily militarized means. Its colonial nomenclature—the North-West Frontier and the North-West Frontier Province[43]—is an obvious denotation of this modern imperial imaginary. As such, the figure

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War on Terror that has brought the figure of the Pathan to the forefront of the news again.

[42] Fredrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense."
[43] Referred to as the NWFP since the name of Province was changed to Khyber Pukhtunkhwa in 2012.

of the Pathan mutates in colonial literature from a noble savage—one who is uncivilized yet honorable and follows an independent set of laws—to an unpredictably violent, treacherous and lawless one; one whose virile fierceness also becomes a befitting foil for another tropological figure: the heroic colonial officer who valiantly polices these restive frontiers of empire. These two figures not only become conduits that discursively inscribe these scientific borders, but the "manliness" of these warrior figures also discloses the construction of gender alongside with colonial state formations.

Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India responsible for the creation of the North-West Frontier Province in 1901, delivered a lecture on the importance of frontiers at Oxford in 1907, later published simply as *Frontiers*. In this text Curzon extols the importance of "scientific" frontiers for the colonial state but he also lauds how its challenges and harsh conditions instilled manliness and virility in young British officers serving in the Indian army. As such the frontier becomes the ideal school shaping the "national character" of the Anglo-Saxon race and the ideals of British manhood. According to Curzon, the "ideal frontier officer" will have "a taste for languages, some scientific training and a powerful physique," one who is "explorer, administrator and military commander," ever vigilant and on guard against physical attack from the "knife of the Pathan fanatic." Thus the "Frontiers of Empire continue to beckon," as Curzon poetically concludes, to fashion a distinctively masculine British identity as well as having the potential to limitlessly expand the imperial state. [44] The marks of the ideal British officer that Curzon describes, especially the dexterity to look, sound and become a "native"—not just knowing the language but one who seamlessly, and convincingly, replicates the mannerisms and ethos of the native to the degree that his disguise even convinces the locals—become embodied

[44] Curzon 56-8

by an almost ubiquitous array of literary British heroes, the most well-known being, of course, ones by Rudyard Kipling.[45] These heroic figures are often also portrayed as surveillance agents, who, quite famously in the case of *Kim* can look convincingly like the natives because of their liminal upbringing. [46] The amazing dexterity with which they disguise themselves as natives is largely for masterful control of the unruly north-western borders.

Kipling's novels and short stories are one of the primary sources for descriptions about the manly, heroic, colonial figure serving upon the Frontiers of British India. Often paired with the figure of the Pathan, the latter acts not just as foil for the former literary figure but one that also expresses imperial desires to shape reality to its particular ends. Thereby, Mahbub Khan in *Kim* and Khoda Dad Khan in "Head of the District" collaborate with, and uphold imperial desires by their service, even if they act like treacherous rebels temporarily. In either case, tropes depicting them as a virile warriors produce an, almost, fitting match for the British officer.

Another stock tropological figure in Kipling's writings that serves as a foil for both is the Bengali Babu. The anglicized, overly intellectual and somewhat effeminate Bengali Babu contrasts with depictions of the illiterate, simpleminded and savage Pathan and the erudite, linguistically dexterous and heroic British officer, and defines the masculinity of each one. As Mrinalini Sinha describes in her book, *Colonial Masculinity*, although the pairing of the Pathan and colonial Frontier officer are not reinforced through an oppositional characterization,

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[45] Also, in the writings of G.A Henty, and more recently, John Masters and M.M. Kaye's *The Far Pavilions,* amongst many others, recirculate the tropes.

[46] It is telling that Colonel Creighton in Kipling's *Kim* is both ethnographer and spymaster extraordinaire who orchestrates his multifaceted surveillance operations specifically against threats to the northwestern frontier of imperial India. The ominous backdrop of the "Great Game" that pervades and structures the novel refers not just to maneuverings of imperial strategies—ostensibly Russian, French and British desire for control of central Asia and India—but especially to the policing of borders and the control against insurgencies on those borders by intractable natives. However, the external policing of borders is points more towards the internal policing of possible insurrections in the wake of not just the 1857 Mutiny, which is distortedly mentioned in the novel, but the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1839-42 that is deliberately obscured and silenced yet pervades the actions of all the characters in service of gathering intelligence for the Raj in the novel.

nevertheless, they are still “constitutive of each other.”[47] These figures, as Sinha explains, are “‘overdetermined’ by various intersecting late nineteenth-century ideologies of race, ethnicity, class, religions, and sexuality.”[48] But quite interestingly, as Sinha also points out, homoerotic desire and practices were associated with the more “‘manly and ‘virile’ native races” such as the frontier tribesmen rather than the effeminate yet heterosexual Bengalis.[49] Both of Kipling’s short stories that I read closely in Chapter One, “The Head of the District” (1890) and “Dray wara yow dee” (1888), as well as his definitive novel, *Kim*, serve as especially good examples that construct gender not just through a homoerotic lens, but also establish the colonial state and its borders through a tropological frame.

In *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge,* Bernard Cohn clarifies how the “imperial project” was also “a cultural project” which consisted of comprehending the new and unknown colonial territory via “a series of facts” especially through bureaucratic idioms, ethnographic categorization and by translating the unfamiliar into easily recognizable signifiers. As Cohen explains, “the British believed they could explore and conquer this space through translation: establishing correspondence could make the unknown and the strange knowable.”[50] This was not merely a linguistic endeavor but an ethnographic one: knowledge about the people was one of the foremost mediums through which the colonial world was translated into legibility. The “Mutiny” fundamentally structures colonial epistemology, as Nicholas Dirks points out in *Castes of Mind,* whereby, after that definitively traumatic event, “anthropology supplanted history as the principle colonial modality of knowledge and rule” in the late nineteenth century. Imperial

[47] Sinha, Mrinalini: *Colonial Masculinity: The ‘manly Englishman’ and the ‘effeminate Bengali’ in the late nineteenth century*. (Manchester University Press, 1995). 7
[48] Sinha, 11
[49] Sinha, 19
[50] Cohn, Bernard. “Introduction” to *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 1996)

anxiety and ambitions for epistemological control, as Dirks explains, replaced earlier mappings of peoples and cultures in which unknowability and difference do not pose problems for colonial categorizations. However, suspicions aroused after the "Mutiny" led to an anxious imperative to control and map the colonized and their cultures through empirical knowledge systems; acts of discursive appropriation and translation especially made the unknown and unfamiliar legible.[51] However, as Dirks also points out: "The empiricist response was always to know more, even as the British could never acknowledge the deep uncertainty about the possibility of real knowledge about subjects increasingly cast in terms of incommensurability. The flip side to imperial empiricism was the sense of ultimate inscrutability."[52] Thus ethnographic knowledges, and I would add, all manner of literary texts, become heavily laced with the sense of anxiety that this (discursive) incommensurability fostered.

It is also especially illuminating to see how porous the boundaries between ethnographic and literary texts are in colonial writings, especially when reading Kipling, and the lasting and multivalent legacies his tropes have bequeathed. Not only are some of Kipling's novels and short stories informed by prior ethnographic writings but his works become embedded as authoritative "facts" in subsequent ethnographic, travel, historical writings, and even area studies and government policy analysis—the figure of the "Pathan" being an especially pregnant case in point. As Corinne Fowler describes in *Chasing Tales*, Kipling's writings were central to the development of British ideas about India and the Afghans, especially through the short story "The Man Who Would Be King" and the novel *Kim* which, as she says, "represents the single biggest literary influence on subsequent travel narratives." I expand the latter genre considerably,

[51] Dirks, Nicholas: *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 43.
[52] Dirks, 44

however, as I examine a few seminal ones in my writing.

Mountstuart Elphinstone wrote the first ethnography of the Afghans, one that still remains an "authoritative" text on the region and its people but, like Kipling, he never travelled much further than the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province. Both these highly influential accounts set a precedent for other colonial writings about the area with, what Fowler calls, a form of "absentee authority."[53] Kipling visited the borders of the Frontier[54] only once in his life as a young journalist, and apparently his wariness of crossing the border between the settled areas and the tribal territories stemmed from being shot at in Jumrod (a border town) by a tribesman—an account that has since been discredited by his biographer, David Gilmore. Whether real or imagined, this wariness and dread of the lawless and unpredictable tribals, or of the tribal territories as menacing "terra incognita," finds voice in his writings and sets a precedent for subsequent writers as well.[55] But as Fowler also points out, this wariness stems largely from the haunting defeat the British suffered in the first Anglo-Afghan war:

> The psychological impact of the First Anglo-Afghan War on British imaginations cannot be underestimated. The political consequences, too, were grave: British power had been destabilized in Central and South Asia, and British unpopularity reached new heights in Afghanistan even while Russia was increasing its influence in the region…The first Anglo-Afghan War was significant for Victorians for other reasons, not least because it served as a warning of the potential for successful insurrection in British India…the significance of Britain's tarnished military reputation was not lost on the Mutineers' fifteen years later…Published just six years before the 1857 'Mutiny', Sir John Kay's *History of the War in Afghanistan (1851),* seems plagued by its shadow-story; the future possibility of a major uprising in India.[56]

As colonial uncertainty and anxiety increased after each native revolt, or in the case of the

[53] Fowler, Corinne: *Chasing Tales: Travel Writing, Journalism and the History of British Ideas about Afghanistan.* (Rodopi: Amsterdam-New York, 2007), 7
[54] The area was often simply called the "the Frontier" or the NWFP for short.
[55] Fowler, *Chasing Tales,* 27
[56] Fowler, 25

northwestern borders, successively after each of the three Anglo-Afghan wars, representations of alterity and incommensurability increased in inverse proportion to it.

A recent publication points out how Kipling continues to be considered an authoritative source and his perspective still influential upon how the region is viewed today. Ben Macintyre's *The Man Who Would be King: The First American in Afghanistan*, published in 2004, traces the inspiration and source of Kipling's short story of the same name to the adventures of Josiah Harlan, an American Quaker who, after a twenty-year journey raised the American flag and declared himself Prince of Ghor in a mountainous part of the Hindu Khush, in 1838. Macintyre describes Harlan as a "soldier, spy, doctor, naturalist, traveler and writer" who was "the spiritual heir to Alexander the Great" and whose adventures are a true tale of "freelance imperialism."[57] What is even more telling about Macintyre's disclosures are not only that Harlan evokes the heroic colonial officer that Curzon described, and which Kipling ubiquitously portrays, but his representational frame is, in turn, constructed through the literary works of the iconic author. As a journalist based in Peshawar covering both the Soviet-Afghan War and the post September 11th attacks, or the War on Terror, Macintyre recounts how he and other journalists were not only "living out our romantic fantasies in a land that invited and nourished them" but also, how they spent their leisure time:

> During the day we lounged by the pool and relaxed by swimming, planning and Kipling. The works of Rudyard Kipling were required reading, for Britain's bard of imperialism captured the wildness and the wonder of the North-West Frontier like no other writer, before or since. It was in Peshawar, fresh from my foray into Afghanistan, that I first read "The Man who Would be King," Kipling's timeless short story that John Houston later adapted into a film starring Sean Connery and Michael Caine.[58]

[57] Macintyre, Ben: *The Man Who Would be King: The First American in Afghanistan*. (New York: Farrar. Straus. Giroux, 2004), 5

[58] Macintyre, 4

Not only does this passage substantiate my argument about the recirculation of Kipling as an authority on the North-West Frontier and its people, and the transmutation of literary tropes into ethnographic ones, and vice-versa, but it also reveals how the imaginaries evoked by these classic tales impinge upon state policies, journalistic reporting, travel writing and popular depictions in film as well.[59] To recall Said's argument again, once a particular framework of representation is established as authoritative all subsequent knowledge about the "area" is filtered through its lens. Or, as he more forcefully puts it, representations created through the "gross political fact" and power structures of imperialism are always "impressed" and "violated by" that fact.[60] This "imaginative geography and history" produces not just alterity but, in fact, it establishes the shapes of those very power structures.[61] Which is thus the reason why such geographies of difference are upheld so fiercely.

As Corine Fowler points out, the protagonists of "The Man who would be King," Dravot and Peachey, and their attempt to "conquer the region becomes a parodic replay of the First

[59] The film, *The Man Who Would be King*, directed by John Houston in 1975, exaggeratedly illustrates the ongoing circulation of this Orientalist framework; the tropes recirculate in such an obvious, reductive and taken for granted ways that it is almost embarrassing to point them out. In fact, the recirculation is so obvious that one is almost tempted to interpret the filmmaker's intention as a deliberate parody of it. Although Kipling does in fact deploy both irony and the lens of the absurd to critique the protagonists proto-imperial aspirations, Houston does not seem as self-reflexive in his deployment of Orientalist tropes. Firstly, the film is shot partly in Morocco, with obviously Arab background actors, sounds and landscape, however this unproblematically represents the Kafirs or the indigenous tribes of the Hindu Kush. Berber tribes and customs are comfortably substituted for the "Kafirs" or the Kalash people in the film whose representations, despite the fact that Kipling's short story describes the people as fair skinned and light eyed—or ostensibly descendants of Alexander the Great—can be represented by the Berber's instead. According to the logic of this representational framework, because they are all tribal peoples they must also all share similar cultural, racial, and religious systems. The fact that the film was shot in 1975, whereby the director, cinematographers, script writers etc. could easily have been aware of the fact that northern British India, now Pakistan, was far different from Morocco, or North Africa, both in the features of its people and the landscape, has been elided by the presumption that all "oriental" peoples must share common characteristics. Further, fine distinctions between not only North African Berbers and Kalash peoples, but also between Middle Eastern Muslims and "Kafirs" did not trouble the filmmakers either, despite the important fact that the latter translates into "nonbelievers" or non-Muslims. This lack of distinction continues even till today in the popular imaginary. What is especially disturbing, in the great acclaim the film has received, is that there is not the slightest criticism, or even recognition, of the intermingling of distinct races of peoples, languages, cultures and landscapes into a monolithic representation that the film undertakes so blithely.

[60] Said, Orientalism 11

[61] Said, Orientalism 54

Anglo-Afghan War" written as it was in the wake of the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-1880),[62] the story itself illustrates the authority of second-hand knowledges that underpinned literary as well as ethnographic texts. As Peachey and Dravot come to the unnamed narrator of the tale for "Books and Atlases" about Kafiristan, the texts listed are actually authors who are still, in many cases, considered authorities on the frontier region, and they include some of the colonial texts I examine in the first chapter. So that the narrative both parodies and illustrates the stature of authoritative knowledges, and despite the fact that such knowledge was hardly ever acquired first-hand they gain their authoritative stature largely because they were colonial texts. As the story humorously illustrates, conquering Kafiristan becomes viable through this mechanism of "absentee authority."[63] Further the story also quite masterfully illustrates the interrelationship between literary, ethnographic texts and colonial state building.

Peachey and Dravot, the protagonists who want to conquer Kafiristan, turn to the unnamed narrator of the tale to ask for "Books and Atlases" about this unexplored and unmapped territory. As they explain to the narrator—a journalist working in a Lahore publishing house, often considered a surrogate for Kipling himself—they plan to rule that part of the world despite the fact that they know nothing about it. Precisely because the land is categorized as "terra incognita" they assume that colonizing it will give it meaning and shape. The following dialogue regarding colonial ethnography and mapping illustrates that:

> Carnehan: "We have come to you to know about this country, to read a book about it, and to be shown maps.
>
> And Dravot adds: 'As big a map as you have got, even if it's all blank where Kafiristan is, and any books you've got. *We can read, though we aren't very educated.'*
>
> I uncased the big thirty-two-miles-to-the-inch map of India, and two smaller

[62] Fowler, *Chasing Tales*, 39 & 29

[63] This is in reference to Kipling, Fowler, 7

> *Frontier maps*, hauled down volume INF-KAN of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and the men consulted them.
>
> 'See here!' said Dravot, his thumb on the map. 'Up to Jagdallak, Peachey and me know the road. We was there with Roberts' Army. We'll have to turn off to the right at Jagdallak through Laghman territory. Then we get among the hills—fourteen thousand feet—fifteen thousand—it will be cold work there, but it don't look very far on the map.'
>
> I handed him Wood on the *Sources of the Oxus*. Carnehan was deep in the *Encyclopedia*.
>
> 'They're a mixed lot,' said Dravot reflectively; 'and it won't help us to know the names of their tribes. *The more tribes the more they'll fight, and the better for us.* From Jagdallak to Ashang --- H'mm!'
>
> *'But all the information about the country is as sketchy and inaccurate as can be,' I protested. 'No one knows anything about it really*. Here's the file of the *United Services' Institute*. Read what Bellew says.'
>
> 'Blow Bellew!' said Carnehan. 'Dan, they're a stinkin' lot of heathens, but this book here says they think they're related to us English.'
>
> I smoked while the men pored over Raverty, Wood, the maps, and the *Encyclopedia*."[64]

Despite the fact that no Englishman has set foot in Kafiristan it has been mapped, surveyed and catalogued and in order to know a country all they need to do is to read these second-hand knowledges reputed to be authoritative. As this account humorously illustrates, translating the unknown through mapping the land and its people becomes the first step to imperial appropriation, and classifying the people as a "a stinkin' lot of heathens" is enough to justify such desires.

The ethnographers and texts mentioned in this account, Wood, Raverty, and Bellew continue to be considered experts on the North-West Frontier of India, and, even till today, are consulted for scholarly research as well. Wood was a cartographer and explorer who mapped parts of central Asia while traveling there. He was also one of the first colonial figures to survey

[64] Kipling, Rudyard: "The Man who would be King," Project Gutenberg: http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/8, PDF pg. 6

the river Indus. Henry Bellew was part of the British diplomatic delegation to Kabul, sent to Afghanistan after the first Anglo-Afghan War to appease, map and catalogue the peoples and their land. Ironically, he was also one of the first victims of the second Anglo-Afghan war after he had reassured the Indian Government that the natives were now placated and wanted to be governed by the British Raj. While Henry George Raverty, an officer in the Indian Army, who, as a linguist, wrote several dictionaries, grammar books and translations of Pashto and its poetry. He also wrote an influential ethnography, *Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan*. And, Peachey and Dravot's reference to having served in Robert's army is a direct reference to the second Anglo-Afghan war, in which Fredrick Sleigh Roberts distinguished himself in the1879 Battle of Kabul by carrying out mass executions in retaliation for the British losses suffered in the first Anglo-Afghan war.

Borders, Frontiers & Nonstate Spaces

The unbounded spaces on the margins of the state are intrinsically destabilizing while defining and establishing it; blurring state boundaries as gateways, they also have the potentiality for situating alternate, even radical and subversive imaginaries, which is why the state imposes its writ so forcefully upon its borders. As James C. Scott points out in his book, *Seeing Like a State,* nonstate spaces follow a logic and cartography very different from that of the centralized modern state,[65] which is why state mechanisms must homogenize, incorporate or willfully oppose them. As Scott explains: "These stateless zones have always played a potentially subversive role, both symbolically and practically. From the vantage point of the court, such spaces and their inhabitants were the exemplars of rudeness, disorder, barbarity against which the civility, order

[65] Scott, James, C. *Seeing Like a State.* (Yale University Press, 1999),186.

and sophistication of the center could be gauged."[66] I argue that because the North-West Frontier ambiguously occupies the imaginary of both stateless zone and border territory it is transformed—through the logic of difference and otherness—into a space that becomes intrinsically subversive to state structures.

Even though the creation of the north western frontier of British India was one of the first cartographic divisions that partitioned India, surprisingly little academic attention has been paid to its particular formation—one could say, that its tropes and representations have yet to be decolonized by a postcolonial critique and thereby regurgitate unproblematically within neocolonial discourses. Using the lens and vocabulary of Pierre Clastres *Society Against the State,* I frame the theoretical boundaries within which the North-West Frontier, both as border territory and nonstate space, can be situated and examined. This theoretical framework allows me to also argue that the indigenous codes of Pashtunwali are situated not only in the production of a nonstate imaginary but also in a space prior to it yet one which has since become an anarchic ethos vis-à-vis the state. Furthermore, because of its historically contested geographical status as border territory, alongside with the fact that it houses one of the largest tribal groups in Asia—tribes that also have a long record of resisting (imperial) state dominations—differentiates it from most other borders that are often the subject of theoretical analysis in the emergent field of "border theory."

Although Clastres text largely focuses on native American societies, which he posits are structurally anti-statist, his analysis can be extended to include most stateless, and especially tribal, societies—a generalization which he also deploys throughout his book. However, Clastres formulation of two types of societies—one "primitive" and stateless and the other "civilized" and

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[66] Scott, 187

statist[67]—is not meant to denigrate the former but rather to critique the binary and hierarchical categorization that these terms generally denote. Clastres' designation of "primitive" acts as a pointer to both the overarching discourse of "civilization" that statist rhetoric ascribes to its own form, and, at the same time, how it renders invisible alternate forms of socio-political organization by designating them as, precisely, "primitive," "backward," "prehistoric," "lawless," "uncivilized," "barbaric," "tribal"—the list of categories rendering such societies to the margins and silencing its alternate cosmologies is indeed long.

Clastres further argues that particular modes of power are operative in the structures of the state: power as domination and force or "the new vertical ordering of things"[68] that legitimizes and monopolizes the use of physical violence. Thus the "essence" of the state is "violence," [69] and because it is embedded in its foundation, violence is not outside of, or in addition to the state's administrative structures but that which gives rise to them and keeps it functioning. In contrast, the distinguishing characteristics of "primitive" stateless societies is a lack of central authority that acts as "the legitimate source of the law" or, in other words, "the State machine."[70] The tribal chief's word, on the contrary, "carries no force of law" or the threat of violence that creates the force of the law, but instead the chief must persuade the community which s/he serves because they do not rule over them. As such, "the real locus of power" in tribal societies resides in its horizontal, egalitarian structures and the inter-relationships of its community, and, contra state structures, power is not conceived as domination or force. [71]

My point in calling upon Clastres is that his work also argues that such alternate societies

[67] Clastres, Pierre: *Society Against the State.* Zone Books: New York, 1987.pg. 200
[68] Clastres, 198
[69] Clastres, 204
[70] Clastres, 205
[71] Clastres, 205

are intrinsically anarchic vis-à-vis state structures, while explaining why state mechanisms police such modes of communal organization as harshly as they do. Because the nation-state model has globally become the overarching form of organizing communities, it also needs to be pointed out that it is on a seemingly unstoppable trajectory to homogenize, incorporate or annihilate the last vestiges of alternate socio-political forms, wherever they may still exist.

However, in the scant texts that do analyze the North-West Frontier as one of the first modern "scientific" borders, Magnus Marsden and Benjamin Hopkin's *Fragments of the Afghan Frontier* contest the appellation that it is an "anarchic" space, and the description that it is "populated by state-evading peoples" who constantly resist until they are forcibly incorporated into an "all-seeing, all-knowing modern state."[72] Pointedly arguing against James Scott's anthropological work on South East Asia's upland areas, one that builds upon Clastres' theoretical framework to designated these fuzzy border territories not just "nonstate" spaces but intrinsically "anarchic" ones, Marsden and Hopkins posit that "the Frontier has been mythologized as a space of freedom from and resistance against state authorities."[73] Instead, they argue that the Frontier is not a homogenous "non-place,"[74] but that it has been categorized as such since British India's desires and anxieties in the "Great Game;" and that these representations continue to regurgitate and flatten the region into a monolithic zone of violence, terrorism and drug trafficking, which the designation "Af-Pak" currently denotes.

Furthermore, they argue, that the Westphalian model of the state was not merely a colonial imposition upon unwilling populations or indigenous models of statehood in Asia, but rather an " 'indigenization' of European norms and forms of political intercourse"[75] embodied by

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[72] Magnus Marsden and B. D. Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan frontier* (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 4.
[73] Marsden and Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan frontier*, 3.
[74] Marsden and Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan frontier*, 2
[75] Marsden and Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan frontier*, 26

local governments themselves. They point to the creation of the Persian-Afghan borders of 1870-72 as (the primary) example of this argument, whereby, indigenous governments demarcated a modern border towards their own territorial ends rather than through imperial pressure or manipulation.[76] This border, which is the main focus of the text, was, as the authors rightly point out, created twenty years prior to the contentious Durand Line of 1893 and not as under colonial duress. Quite surprisingly though, they neither critically analyze the creation of the crucial tripartite North-West Frontier of British India in comparison, nor how this was produced differently, at least not in any substantial way. The fact that it was produced directly by imperial desires that incorporated formerly "nonstate" spaces and manipulated indigenous forms of communal organization is not only overlooked but in fact the authors use the term "anarchic" in the same sense as the colonial one: a derogatory sense of lawlessness. Moreover, even though the Afghan-Persian border may not have been territorially controlled by an imperial power, or as the authors put it, "[t]his transformation was not simply imposed by the region's colonial hegemon, British India, whose power was too ephemeral to warrant such an assertation," it was nevertheless part of the imperial "spheres of influence" of the time. This is exemplified through the authors own detailed history of how the border was negotiated and mapped by the British colonial "Goldsmid mission;" which does not preclude, and in fact often exemplified (especially in the case of Afghanistan), that "indigenous actors" created "a hybrid political order" through negotiations organized by imperial overseers.[77] Hybrid new forms, as Homi Bhabha persuasively illustrates, were produced even with direct colonial rule[78] and not just, as the authors argue, by "indigenous actors" through the subversion of British notions of statehood. To argue that "the

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[76] Marsden and Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan frontier*, 25
[77] Marsden and Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan frontier*, 24-25
[78] Bhabha, Homi. *The Location of Culture* (New York Routledge 1994).

multifaceted hybridity of the [Persio-Afghan] Frontier's construction" somehow reflected a geographical imaginary informed by, yet distinct from, imperial desires, and that they were acts of transformative resistance because of it, does not take into account how the concept of "scientific" borders is very much part of the paradigm of modernity and not just of colonialism; as an intrinsic expression of the episteme of modernity, colonial cartography was articulating this normative telos, even if indirectly.

Also, Marsden and Hopkins only briefly touch upon the fact that the colonial state was a model for organizing space in very distinct ways, one that has since become normative. Even if there was no direct imposition of "scientific" borders (in the Persio-Afghan case), nevertheless, particularly modern ways of mapping territory, and peoples, also produced this border, even if indirectly. As the authors themselves highlight, the first investigations of the Afghan/Pashtun peoples by the Mountstuart Elphinstone mission of 1808-09 were impelled by and desired to impose such normative forms:

> By assigning people to a specifically topographical space in the cartographic representations of political order, the British territorialized people more powerfully and profoundly than through any other medium. For the official of British India, mapping was an examination and disciplining of space and knowledge, and thus a mechanism of control. By mapping the Afghans, Elphinstone and Macartney established the hegemony of colonial knowledge over the area for future generations of colonial administrators.[79]

As they clearly argue here, it is the technologies of cartography, and the discipline of ethnography, that territorializes people in ways particular to colonialism, or more accurately, to modernity. As I am stating, the Goldsmid mission's aim was also to organize space through cartographical delineation, and as such, the political limits of the Persian and Afghan states were clearly situated within this epistemological framework. Therefore, even if indigenous actors

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[79] Marsden and Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan frontier*, 42

defined the cartographic lines, this cannot be construed as resistance, as the authors argue; by defining cartographic lines they were not necessarily acting independently, because this does not take into account the fact that the concept of "scientific borders," is, in and of itself, an expression of colonial (epistemological) hegemony.

As Thongchai Winichakul's incisive analysis of modern systems of mapping points out in *Siam Mapped*, the concept of fixed boundaries was a European invention imposed upon Asia by colonial systems of organizing space that had particular "laws and customs associated with it" unknown to older, indigenous forms of mapping and imagining territoriality.[80] He illustrates the difference in the conceptual frameworks by comparing British cartography with Siamese ones, whereby in the latter boundaries signified, "areas, districts or frontiers, not boundary lines. They mean a limit—an extremity without a clear-cut edge and without the sense of division between two powers."[81] As such, previously fuzzy frontier zones were never determined or administered by the central authority of the state but were conceived upon a horizontal undemarcated plane rather than as border lines "where the vertical interfaces between state sovereignties intersect the surface of the earth."[82] On the contrary, the modern colonial state system was made legible through its particular mapping systems, which then informed their territorial treaties and border policies.

An examination and implicit critique of colonial borders, frontiers, or what Winichakul calls "boundaries," leads inevitably also to an examination of modern state formation. And although Marsden and Hopkins argue that "the modern delineation of territory through boundaries is first and foremost an exercise of state power," rather than that of the "nation,"

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[80] Winichakul Thongchai, *Siam mapped : a history of the geo-body of a nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 74
[81] Winichakul, 75
[82] Winichakul, 74

particularly in the "Afghan case where the territorial genesis of the state preceded the tentative emergence of the Afghan nation."[83] However, "nation," particularly in the Afghan case, has a very long lineage that not only precedes modern state formation but it also transcends its territorial imaginary, as I will especially argue in my last chapter when I analyze the call for Pashtunistan. Suffice it to say, at this juncture, that the Afghan or Pashtun "nation" or "qəwm," as they are often referred to, is conceived as an ethnic body located (without defined perimeters) in the lands that now make-up north-western Pakistan, northern Baluchistan and largely eastern Afghanistan.[84] Conceived as an imagined community in ways similar to indigenous American tribes, who refer to themselves as a "nation," and not in Benedict Anderson's terms as that which precedes and gives rise to the modern nation-state; the term does not denote the limited definition that Marsden and Hopkins are employing.

Winichakul also rightly points out that Anderson's "imagined community" does not comprehensively define the preconditions of the modern nation-state, especially since this definition is limited to a common language. While even more cogently, Winichakul argues that language must also be understood in the broader sense as a mode of mediation between humans and the world rather than simply a vernacular linguistic idiom of communication.[85] Instead, he postulates the term "geo-body," to state that it would more adequately describe how particular technologies of territoriality and cartography inscribe the state in material rather than idealized terms.[86] The inscription of the modern (nation) state, in other words, is made possible by a different conception of space and territory, a conception that has a particular materiality and is

[83] Marsden and Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan frontier*, 27
[84] The designation "Afghan" and "Pashtun" were synonymous until the formation of the modern nation-state of Afghanistan which incorporated other races under the term "Afghan."
[85] Winichakul, 15
[86] Winichakul, 16

not just a discursive imaginary. However, I would argue that the two modes of conceptualizing and inscribing the modern nation-state—through the imaginary or materially—cannot be separated: the technologies of territoriality, or the "geo-body," are in dialectical relationship with an imagined nation or what Winichakul calls a "discursive construct;" an "imaginary" is not just the prerequisite for the nation-state but its ongoing conditionality and is inscribed materially through modern technologies of the state and culturally, linguistically, but especially, representationally. As such, the conceptual frameworks that give rise to colonial technologies of organizing space can neither be separated from the material realities of the modern (nation) state nor its discursive and ostensibly "immaterial" articulations which act as organizing technologies.

The State, Law, Lawlessness and Anarchy

Quite paradoxically colonial ethnography and literary texts about the North-West Frontier also voice an ambivalent admiration about the wild, lawlessness and autonomy of the Pashtun border tribesmen, while, at the same time, bemoaning the anarchy that destabilizes and frustrates imperial desires. In mapping this ambivalent yet clearly gendered admiration, the categorization of "lawlessness" and "anarchy" are framed within what Upamanyu Mukherjee calls the colonial "rhetoric of crime." This rhetoric, as Mukherjee states in *Crime and Empire*, becomes "a political and cultural preoccupation and the rule of law becomes central to the construction of authority in British society."[87] So that colonialism justifies itself—its illegality one could say—by the moral argument of bringing law and order to "an essentially anarchic and criminal country."[88] The rhetoric of the law was (and continues to be) further complicated in the

[87] Mukherjee, Upamanyu. *Crime and Empire*. Oxford University Press, 2003.
[88] Mukherjee, (vi)

case of the North-West Frontier because of its strategic location on the edge of empire and its designation by the colonial state as a stateless or nonstate space. This designation of difference is further amplified by temporal categorizations of its people, as stated earlier, of "tribal," "primitive," "savage," "backward" etc., so that not only is the space differentiated from the state through its "nonstate" designation, but its forms of communal organization are differentiated through time. Furthermore, in this model of time the state is constructed as the telos toward which all societies are naturally evolving, one that represents a transcendence of, and liberation from, the natural human condition.

However, there is a constant tension embedded within this colonial discourse, wherein nature is antithetical to civilization, one that both justifies the violent disciplinary mechanisms of the state and is represented by the figure of the "noble savage," (or the "barbarian" in more derogatory terms). The state of nature, or natural existence, is conceived as oppositional to civil society or civilization; on the one hand, it is necessary to "civilize" and institutionalize stateless/nonstate peoples-places, while on the other, there is a nostalgia and longing to embody the ostensible innocence and autonomy of "the state of nature." In Rousseau's configuration of this dichotomy, justice and morality can only be cultivated once natural "instinct," "appetite" and "physical impulse" are constrained by civil society, elevating humans from "a stupid, limited animal" to "a creature of intelligence and a man."[89] Unlike Hobbes, however, Rousseau does not create a discursive opposition between freedom and the rule of civil society (or the Leviathan State), but nevertheless similar to the former philosopher, he situates real freedom in the transcendence of the state of nature; a transcendence which only an evolved rational-moral human being is capable of achieving. For Hobbes, however, because humans are conceived as

[89] Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Charles Frankel, *The social contract*, The Hafner library of classics ; no. 1, (New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1947).Book 1, Chapter 8, "Civil Society".

inherently violent beings—unlike Rousseau's theory of human nature in which man is an essentially noble creature even in its natural condition—this transcendence can only by achieved via the state. In re-reading Hobbes' famous position on the state of nature, and the natural human propensity to violence, it should be noted that civilization cannot unfold without this transcendence. In the state of nature, as Hobbes famously puts it:

> In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short…To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.[90]

This iconic view of human nature also leads to his logical presumption: in order for society to flourish it must create conditions that transcend the given which are only, "short, nasty and brutish." For Hobbes, the domination and fashioning of the earth to facilitate both consumption and culture, the framework of the "law" and of "justice" were the necessary prerequisites to creating "civilization." According to Schmitt explicating Hobbes, the state of nature is a "no man's land" in which the "wolf-character of men" is free to prey upon others and gain power over the land, much like a wild animal. As such, the constraints of the law are imperative, as is a strong Sovereign to impose them, so that the state can become the arena in which civilization is cultivated and the human can flourish.

Although, as Schmitt also points out, the Latin axiom *homo homini lupus*—man is a wolf to man—or even *homo homini deus*—man is a god to man—underlies this view, there is also another oppositional axiom marginalized by these dominant views: *homo homini homo*, or man

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[90] Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, Chapter 13

is a man to man.[91] In contrast to Hobbes, for whom the first two maxims apply, the last one underlies the figure of the noble savage, and Rousseau's view of man. However, this premise also underlies anarchist conceptions of the human, but despite this more optimistic view, the central and unquestioned premise remains the transcendence of nature in order for the human to become civilized. With the law as the foremost framework through which this transcendence is achieved. For both Hobbes and Rousseau, civilization or civil society—and even "public enlightenment" in the latter philosopher's case[92]—are cultivated through this paramount framework. In Hobbes case the abstract concept of the "law" is embodied by the Sovereign as "common power" and for Rousseau by the collective will of the people. The "lawgiver," therefore, plays a central role in the creation of a just civil society. But, unlike "primitive societies" in which the lawgiver is also accorded special stature, in this case the stature can only be established by the state.

Franz Kafka's depiction of the law brilliantly opposes the construct of the Law as a sacrosanct primeval founding, a construct that renowned humanist thinkers such as Gimbatesta Vico (*The New Science*) , Freud (in *Moses and Monotheism)*, and Schmitt (in *Nomos of the Earth)*, amongst others, depict. On the contrary, Kafka, most famously in the parable "Before the Law" in his unfinished novel, *The Trial,* illustrates the many absurdities, contradictions but also the brutality at the heart of this man-made construct. Much more cogently, he depicts that the ostensibly awe-inspiring representation of the lawgiver and the impregnable edifice of the law are produced and upheld through the very concept of its transcendence. Moreover, the parable satirically and quite disparagingly illustrates that

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[91] Schmitt, Carl, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. New York: Telos Press, 2003.
[92] Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Book II, Chapter 6, "On Law."

justice is quite antithetical to, and never to be found within its ostensibly impregnable structures; it is meted out neither to the citizen, (such as Joseph K the protagonist of "The Trial"), nor to those standing outside its borders, such as the man from the country in "Before the Law." The man living in a lawless nonstate space is doubly damned and never receives justice through the apparatuses of the law. In fact, quite the opposite; the edifice of the law discloses that justice is absent from its structures. As Jacques Derrida points out, the inaccessibility of the law creates a particular subject of the state that always stands before the law but who is also always outside its structures, an outlaw. I analyze this parable alongside with Derrida and Agamben's analysis of it in greater detail in chapter four, and I also put the consequences of the law, and of outlaws, in dialogue with the colonial rhetoric of the law.

It is the spatial position occupied by the outlaw that is especially relevant to the framework with which I am viewing the figure of the "Pathan," and the colonial discourse of the law produces that position discursively. However, not only are individual figures situated in this position, but it often extended to people in the NWF collectively, as in the case of the KK. Because the irrational grounds of the law are revealed quite starkly upon the border territory they occupy, the frayed edges of the imperial state provide the most appropriate arena in which to closely examine the normative discourse of law, and the injustice it meted out with violent regularity in name of upholding "law and order." A violence not only limited to surveillance, policing, punishment and wars but one that also engendered conflict in order to both establish its own legitimacy, especially in order to obfuscate its own illegitimate grounds. As Ghaffar Khan states in his voluminous Pashto autobiography:

> There is no law to follow; any whim and fancy of every Englishman and person in authority is considered to be the law. Other countries have one law for everyone. In our country, there is one law for the British, and another for the local; there was

> one law for the Government servants, and another for the common citizens; one law for the rich, and another for the poor. The British law is like a noose made of wax; no matter in which direction it is turned, it adjusts itself.[93]

The laws constituted for the North-West Frontier especially, as for most border territories, were created in the name of maintaining "law and order" but deliberately fostered violence instead. Specifically, the "Frontier Crimes Regulations" of 1901, were established by Curzon at the same time as the Province was administratively separated from the Punjab, largely in order to police the Province as a border zone, or an exceptional space. Furthermore, it quite starkly differentiated the "Federally Administered Tribal Areas," (known more commonly by the acronym FATA) from the provincial areas (known throughout its history as the NWFP [94]) to eventually create a border more impregnable than the one between India and Afghanistan. The border between the Tribal Territories and the Province not only became more heavily policed and impermeable but, through juridical and legislative difference—especially the designation of the Tribal Territory as nonstate space—another two distinct layers were added to the Durand Line border which divided the two states. Each of the three distinct layers of this border were created shortly after each of the three Anglo-Afghan wars. Yet, because the tribes who inhabit

[93]Abdul Ghaffar Khan, *zmā žwand āw jdow-jeẖd.* (Peshawar, 1983), Autobiography 161 (My translation)

[94] The name of "North-West Frontier Province," more commonly just called the "Frontier," is obviously derived from colonial cartography. Nevertheless, the postcolonial Pakistani state continued to call it that despite many objections and calls to change the name of the Province, especially by Ghaffar Khan and the KK, who suggested the name "Pukhtunistan" to reflect the majority of the population that reside there; this, he said, would be in keeping with the other three Provinces which are named for its major ethnic group: Baluchistan in which the Baluch people are a majority; Punjab in which Punjabis predominate; Sind for the indigenous Sindhi people. However, not only was this designation of the Province steeped in political controversy—which I detail in my last chapter—but the cartographic name, as well as its legal status as a contentious border territory and nonstate space that needs to be policed quite strictly, serves the Pakistani state in a similar fashion to the colonial one. The name of the Province has only been changed to "Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa" in the last few years. This semi-cartographical designation—as "Khyber" is the famous border pass between Pakistan and Afghanistan—is not only extremely difficult to pronounce for non-Pashto speakers but leaves out the other major ethnic group of the Province, the Hindko speaking Hazara people. Nevertheless, it did finally rectify a long-standing contention regarding the cartographic name of the Province.

these spaces have been divided on either side of the border—both between the Province and the Tribal Territories, and between British India and Afghanistan—the contentious make-up of these borders has been a volatile problem ever since. However, it was the legal framework of the Frontier Crimes Regulations that positioned the Tribal Territories and, to a lesser degree, the Province, before the law; the designation of "lawless" space, and its inhabitants as "outlaws," legitimized all manner of state violence.

Specifically devised to curtail resistance upon the Pashtun and Baluch British Indian frontiers, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) had its origins in the Murderous Outrages Act of 1877 and the 1898 Codes of Criminal Procedure; these juridical codes were applied to the Frontier after the first, and especially after the second Anglo-Afghan War when opposition against British rule intensified after the demarcation of the Durand Line in 1893. (A demarcation that also continues to be a bone of contention between the Pakistani and the Afghan states). Although the FCR upholds the *de jure* independence of the tribal territories as semi-autonomous nonstate spaces and allows the tribes to conduct daily affairs according to their own traditional methods, the positioning of these areas outside the bounds of state laws creates the conditions in which any kind of law or punishment can be meted out it by the state, without being held accountable to its own juridical, moral or socio-political standards. Further, traditional forms of adjudication and conflict resolution, such as the *jirga* system, were infiltered by corrupt local members in the pay of colonial administrators,[95] overseen by Political Agents in charge of that district. Although the endorsement of the *jirga* system, or the "Council of Elders "as it is termed in the FCR, to mediate local issues according to

[95] See Saurabh Pant, "The Frontier Crimes Regulation in Colonial India:Local Critiques and Persistent Effects," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, no. 41:4 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2018.1531470.

custom seems, at first glance, to concede autonomy to the tribes in their daily affairs, on a closer reading, however, it becomes apparent that the provisions of these laws makes the Deputy Commissioner and the District Magistrate the ultimate lawgivers. All members of a jirga have to first be approved by the Political Officers in charge of the district and these officers have veto power over all the decisions the jirga makes. And no one can (these laws are still in place) subsequently appeal the Political Officers decision in a civil court. Additionally, arrest without a warrant or due cause continues to be quite common under the "reasonable suspicion" clause of the law, so that anyone who tries to evade or resist arrest can be killed with impunity.[96] Even more egregiously, the Deputy Commissioner was granted the power to hold whole tribes accountable for any of its members "acting in a hostile or unfriendly manner towards the British Government or towards persons residing within British India."[97] This collective punishment clause includes fines, confiscation of properties, forfeiture of revenues and, although this is not directly stated in the Regulations but continues to happen with disturbing regularity, aerial bombardment of the villages and the razing of homes and infrastructures.

In short, far from romantic notions of autonomous nonstate spaces, this status is a double-edged sword: free from state laws it becomes the arena is which all manner of state crimes are committed without recourse. In fact, the strictly cordoned border between the Province and the Tribal Territories disallows these crimes from being designated "crimes" and this configuration of the border shrouds all manner of injustices from visibility, acknowledgment or recourse. Justice, in effect, becomes antithetical to the law and is situated

[96] FCR Section V, 38
[97] FCR Section IV, 21

outside the bounds of this political space. Throughout my writing I analyze the implicit and explicit separation between the law and justice, and how the KK and the ideology of nonviolence stepped in and situated itself in this crucial rift.

Outlaws, Resistance Fighters and the KK

A triangulation of resistance against British colonialism existed between Fazli Mahmood Makhfi, Fazal Wahid—better known as Haji of Turangzai—and Ghaffar Khan, with each one becoming a node disrupting the impermeability of the three-layered colonial border, situated as each one was in Afghanistan, the Tribal Territories and the NWFP, respectively. Both Turangzai and Abdul Ghaffar Khan were originally from Charsadda, which was also the home base of the KK, while Makhfi, although not originally from the same district, grew up there as well. Together they created the organization, *Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afghania*, or the Society for the Reformation of the Afghans. This organization had the modernist aspiration to reform vernacular culture through education—an aspiration shared by many nationalist organizations of the time. The Society started a school system that Ghaffar Khan later modified into his Azad madrassahs: a vernacular school system which he established throughout the Province and in some parts of the Tribal Territories. Haji Turangzai was one of the first reformists and resistance fighters who organized a boycott of the British school system and set up local schools in opposition. Because colonial authorities charged him with setting up a parallel government, he sought shelter in the Mohmand tribal territories and became a life-long opponent of the colonial government, waging his resistance upon many fronts from the Tribal Territories until he died a natural death in 1937. Even though Turangzai's armed resistance differed from Ghaffar Khan's staunchly nonviolent ones, as close allies—they were also related through marriage—the Khudai Khidmatgar's

ideology was developed in relationship with, and, what James Caron calls, "the variegated politics"[98] of Haji Turangzai. A politics, as Caron rightly points out, in which devotion, theological and poetic articulations do not have discrete boundaries but interweave to form indigenous modes of being and resistance. Such interwoven modes necessarily need to be pointed out, as Caron also argues, in order to counter not only colonial categories that segregate but also more recent narratives that are grounded upon these former imperial categorizations. So that the singular lens through which the Pashtuns and Afghans are often analyzed—the lens of religion being the predominate one, and that too through a problematic interpretation of Islam—needs to be muddied and reconceptualized through "emic histories," in order to disrupt the two dimensional models often ascribed as causes for their resistance or "militancy;" religious piety being the ascription given to those especially situated in the Tribal Territories.[99]

Makhfi, Turangzai and Ghaffar Khan not only had robustly inter-twinned modes of producing prescriptive new normativities, or reinterpreting given ones, but, irrespective of their geographic situatedness, they demonstrated that colonial borders are largely upheld or breached by granting them the recognition demanded. When, in reality—or on the ground—these borders are ever-porous and tenuous; (a reality that the Taliban are now also reproducing in an inverted form to this resistance). Dispelling the illusion of impermeable colonial borders, their collaborative resistance also implicitly rejected notions of racial essentialism and, cognizant of the fact that Pashtunwali was not an essential or timeless code of conduct, they interpreted it anew through a pragmatic politics and read its various registers through the lens of modernity. In

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[98] James Caron, " Sufism and liberation across the Indo-Afghan border:1880–1928," *South Asian History and Culture* (2016): 10, https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19472498.2016.1143667, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19472498.2016.1143667.

[99] Caron specifically points to Sana Haroon's *Frontier of Faith* in his critique, which, as he states, in overlooking emic narratives "risks reinscribing imperial violence and misses important lineages of politics". 16-17 However, one can add a whole slew of literature that is written through the lens of religion (as militancy) that has emerged as a veritable market since the War on Terror.

other words, the codes of Pashtunwali were deliberately (re) interpreted from within the historical context of their times and grafted onto both traditional practices and modern ideas to create the new, progressive politics each one was striving toward. This cross-border triangulation is not often pointed out in scholarship surrounding these figures, and each resistance fighter is often portrayed in isolation. Although indigenous histories are cognizant of the intertwined nature of this anticolonial resistance—even Kamila Shamsie's novel, *A God in Every Stone*, briefly points to the contemporaneous resistance of Turangzai and Ghaffar Khan—and the progressive new coalitions and concepts of nationalism, education, and Pashtunwali each one was proposing, an in-depth analysis about the relationship between these figures is lacking largely because of a scarcity of reliable chronicles and archives. Although my focus is not upon the specifics of this relationship either, I do want to point to its existence and the important discursive and physical opposition this triangulation posed towards colonial domination and its hegemony. Furthermore, the silencing of these interrelationships is also a pointer towards colonial (and nationalist) historiography that finds the unification of the Pashtuns across these three borders particularly threatening; the colonial state especially did all in its power to disrupt such cross-border alliances and pan-Pashtun unity that would have destroyed their three-layered border. The colonial effort to disrupt such alliance intensified after the yearlong Peshawar riots of 1930.

Fighting ideologically, if not always physically, alongside with Haji Turangzai, the poet Fazli Mahmood Makhfi is associated with the modern renaissance of Pashto literature, especially of bringing modern poetic forms and nationalist content to Pashto poetry, but he was also responsible for the curriculum of the vernacular school systems that Turangzai, and later Ghaffar Khan established. The latter acknowledges his deep personal debt to Makhfi and uses one of the

poet's nationalist poems as an epigraph to his Pashto autobiography. All three were also educated at *Daru'l-'Ulum Deoband*, and their desires, and even some of their means, to transform the social have strong roots in the robust anti-colonial ethos of that university. An ethos that loudly emphasized a vernacular reorientation of the educational system as the platform for both change and autonomy.[100] And although these aspirations and methodologies became a common platform across South Asia, largely through the Deoband University's influence upon anti-colonial resistance movements, it is interesting to note that in this case transnational networks were also established across the Indian Subcontinent. As Ghaffar recounts in his autobiography, it was on the advice of Shaikh-ul-Hind, the principal of the Deobandi University, and Ubaidullāh Sindhi, a close associate who spent almost seven years in Afghanistan and the Tribal Territories, that Haji of Turangzai migrated to Waziristan so that he could raise the tribesmen against British "and light the fire of insurrection on all the frontiers of British Hindustan." Furthermore, according to Ghaffar Khan, the Deobandi leaders urged Turangzai to persuade the Afghans—especially once Amanullāh came to power—to ally with the Turks against the British during the first World War.[101] This eventually led to Shaikh-ul-Hind's arrest, in what was termed by the Rowlatt Committee Report of 1918 as the "Silken Letter's Conspiracy": the Deobandi principal had written letters from Istanbul to Sindhi in Afghanistan on pieces of cloth, or silk handkerchiefs, assuring him of the Turkish government's support for their plans to attack India via the Khyber Pass, and to ready the tribesmen and the Afghans to that end.[102] Although more research would be needed to explore the details of these alliances,

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[100] See Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic revival in British India : Deoband, 1860-1900* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).
[101] Ghaffar Khan, Pashto Autobiography, 95.
[102] Zīya'ulḥasan Fārūqī, *The Deoband School and the demand for Pakistan* (New York: Asia Pub. House, 1963), 59-62.

nevertheless, even the readily available secondary sources counter the assumption that the KK organization was only narrowly focused on an ethnocentric nationalism; on the contrary, the history points to a resistance, and even a vision of the future, that transcended both colonial boundaries and the simple territorial agenda of self-autonomy; furthermore, the KK shrewdly understood that the viability of even such a narrow agenda required transnational networks of decolonization.

As Ghaffar Khan also mentions in his autobiography he tried his best to set up schools in the tribal territories but apart from the areas under Turangzai's influence the schools were shut down by the British under charges of sedition. Although disagreeing with the Haji's methods of "jihad," Ghaffar Khan nevertheless adopted many ideological facets of Turangzai's resistance, especially the vernacular education system, but modified it through the ideology of nonviolence.[103] With Makhfi at its helm, the new schools were also modelled upon the more modern educational system that Amanullah had established in Afghanistan. It was largely this transnational and cross-border educational renaissance that helped both the KK anti-colonial resistance, as well as its nationalist message of pan-Pashtun unity, to flourish as widely and as quickly as it did.

It was also Makhfi's emphasis on the literary and the centrality of vernacular literacy for the sake of pan-Pashtun unity that impelled Ghaffar Khan to also organize the KK through the strong literary ethos already existing. His role as a trans-border political figure[104] especially illustrates the intertwined nature of the political with the literary which, although commonplace

[103] Ghaffar Khan, Pashto Autobiography, 96

[104] Makhfi also become a close aide of the new Amir of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, aiding him to wrench power from his father, the pro-British ruler Amir Habibullah Khan in 1919. Amanullah was responsible for launching the third Anglo-Afghan war and continued his staunch opposition to British imperial designs upon Afghanistan for most of his life. He is also the ruler accredited with modernizing Afghan society and emancipating women from traditional customs, and for encouraging and making widespread women's education.

in most of South Asia, was articulated through KK's literary resistance in an especially exaggerated fashion. Largely because they were exploring alternate avenues of nonviolent affect that the *Pukhtun* journal became the primary platform for its socio-political revolution. This in turn effected a renaissance of Pashto literature more broadly, while Makhfi's turn away from traditional poetic forms heavily influenced modern Pashtuns poets to explore alternate poetic styles, metaphors and topics.[105]

Caron also traces the multivalent and transnational alliances and especially the influence on Makhfi of English and Urdu print culture, namely Maulana Azad's "pan-Islamic Urdu print activism" and the close relationship that the two activists had with one another. That Azad's *Al-Hilal* journal had a profound impact on all anti-colonial resistance movements, especially Muslim ones and specifically the *Pukhtun* journal is not in doubt. However, Caron's claim—especially Caron's close reading of Makhfi's poem, one that Ghaffar Khan uses as epigraph to his autobiography, and which I examine in Chapter Five—that Azad's nationalism also heavily influenced Makhfi's interpretations is much more debatable; (the concept of course of "influence" can also be questioned here, with its presumption of an original source and its replication). Furthermore, Caron also contends that Azad's interpretation of God, as a self-sufficient who requires no service—and, therefore, the only way to serve the divine is to serve mankind—was the source for the name of the Khudai Khidmatgars is even harder to validate. According to Caron, Ghaffar Khan derived the name of the KK from the first chapter of Azad's *Tarjumān-al-Quran,* yet Azad's interpretation is divided into sections that follow the format of the Quran and there is no mention, even in the Preface, of this particular interpretation of divinity. That Ghaffar Khan named the KK "Servants of God" because of it may perhaps be

[105] Ghani Khan attributes his own innovative style and content largely to Makhfi's influence as well.

found in the body of Azad's text, but even so, the premise of this ascription takes away from the very argument Caron is making: that "emic" narratives, actors and ideas should be recognized on their own terms, from within their own milieu, and not be ascribed solely to outside influences. Which is not to deny the "influence" of Urdu print culture upon Pashto and the creation of the *Pukhtun* journal along similar lines as Azad's *Al-Hilal,* but the fact that Gandhi's *Harijan* and *Young India* as well as a slew of other popular, nationalist journals existed at the same time must also then be termed "influence." Nevertheless, in a similar vein to Caron's concept of "emic histories," I am proposing an alternate framework of analysis that takes into account the transnational networks of affect and cross border alliances already in place, and tries to contextualize Makhfi, Turangzai and especially Ghaffar Khan and the KK within this existing milieu. So that these histories should be read taking its contextual ethos into account much more so, instead of merely interpreting them through a framework of dominance and margins. I am suggesting, that an intertextual reading be brought to bear upon reading these silent histories.

Nonviolence and the literary resistance of the Khudai Khidmatgars

The *Anjuman-e-islahul-e-Afghania* organization was also very active in the *Khilafat* movement and it was replaced by the more provincial KK organization largely due to the impressive failure of the *Hijrat* to Afghanistan which occurred in 1920. Thinking they would be welcomed with open arms by King Amanullah, the *khilafatists,* who had emigrated across the border in such large numbers, overwhelmed the resources of the country so that the King finally demanded they leave. It was this political debacle which also made Ghaffar Khan realize, as he says in his autobiography, not only that the *Hijrat* was a failure and the Muslims of India suffered because

of it but also that the British decided to depose King Amanullah from this time forward.[106] More crucially he realizes that for political change, or "revolution," to come about its ground had to be reconceptualized through a philosophy of nonviolence:

> Revolution is neither a matter of haste nor an easy thing. Revolution depends on a man's fortitude. Revolution needs scholars and intellectuals; revolution [in fact] needs many scholars and intellectuals. Along with knowledge, the nation must be aroused and desire revolution, and be motivated to bring about revolution. You saw how our passionate friends came out with such fervor; but they have all dispersed [now]. So, I sat down (with myself) to think deeply and I came to this conclusion: our nation neither has the skills for commerce nor industry; neither for agriculture nor education. On the other hand, they are deeply entrenched in their traditions and customs. They busily engage in clan rivalry; such a nation cannot bring about a revolution but must be freed from its demons first so that it can develop political consciousness; and this work needs an atmosphere of calm stability. Till now I understood that violence was the quickest and most successful means, amongst all others, for bringing about a revolution, but experience made it clear to me that during wartime horses cannot be trained, so I decided to return back to my village and [to now] work with the tenets of nonviolence [instead]; firstly, I realized [that in order] to create revolutionary experts I must create national madrassahs and that's why I came to Ůthmānzow. When I returned after the *Hijrat* I tried to reopen the madrassahs that the British had closed down during the war.[107]

That Ghaffar Khan's concept of revolution is grounded upon a change in consciousness—what he calls an "intellectual revolution"—is the key to understanding how nonviolence was conceived as the rubric for bringing about the radical change he sought. It was not merely an anticolonial or nationalist tactic—a claim that is often leveled at Ghaffar Khan and the KK's nonviolence—because the prerequisite for revolution was a change in thinking and not violent action. This passage suggests this was a deeply thought out realization; a changed habitus could only come about through a change in consciousness. Which was why education became the ameliorative means to alter the political not from the top down but by altering subject formation.

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[106] Ghaffar Khan, Pashto Autobiography, 174-76
[107] Ghaffar Khan, Pashto Autobiography, 182-83

Moreover, this realization also included the awareness that change had to be instigated at the local and not the national or international level; instead the village was seen as the basic unit of social reorganization. Therefore, he returned home and, starting with his own village, Ůthmānzai, it became the base both for the KKs and the first Azad School madrassah. This also became the conceptual model for making the village the basic building block for the KKs social reformation which, along with the school system, were then replicated throughout the Province. Making the village central to his thinking at the outset of adopting the philosophy of nonviolence was, as I will argue in the last chapter, an organic choice for Ghaffar Khan. This natural embeddedness in the village, that become pivotal to the socio-political change, also affected, as Ghaffar Khan states in his autobiography—and I will look at in more detail in the last chapter—the conceptual centrality of the village for Gandhi's political mobilization. That the concept of the "village" became the central building block in both their utopian aspirations, Pashtunistan and *Ram Rajya,* is an interesting parallel that has not, heretofore, been examined given the long and close relationship the two leaders of nonviolence had with one another.

Although the KK movement was initially created for older, generally illiterate political activists, with a different branch of the organization for the youthful literati called *Zalmo Jirga*, the subaltern branch eventually overshadowed its intellectual counterpart not only because of its grass roots popularity and ease of access, but also because the poets and the playwrights all found voice within the larger KK movement itself, especially through its print media. However, it was specifically the launching of the *Pukhtun* journal in 1928, a year before the formation of the KK, that caught the imagination of the Province on the literary as well as the nationalist fronts—the two fronts in fact were never separate—which made the intellectual branch of the organization redundant. The journal—which cost four rupees for a two-year subscription, and

was half-price for students, with a sizeable circulation in the diaspora as well—tightly interwove national consciousness, reformation and the literary. Poetry and drama were enlisted through its pages and also, more pertinently, as a part of the KKs military style camp training. Regular oral poetry contests were held by the KK and, as Waris Khan, a Khudai Khidmatgar, states in his memoirs: "In that period, all poetic genres—*ghazals, tappas*[108]*, charbaytays*—all were nationalist. Poets eschewed the traditional motifs of the nightingale and the rose, red lips and doe-eyes, and long tresses."[109]

Even more crucially, the *Pukhtun* journal not only gave the subaltern a voice of resistance, but it also allowed women to participate in a public and political forum for the first time. The journal in fact supplanted the male public space of the *hujra*—a semi-private guest space in most Khan's houses used to house male visitors, hold discussions, gain village consensus and as a forum for other public village events—and turned a physical space limited only to the male members of a village into a discursive, national and gender inclusive platform. As the porous border between public and private space in each large (and generally elite) household in a village, the *hujra* functions much like the proverbial town-square, although the latter is, architecturally, only a public space while the former is the passageway between public outdoor space and the inner sanctum of the women's quarters, or the *zenana*. The *Pukhtun*

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[108] *Tappas* or *tappay* are a folk poetic tradition with a precise structure and rhythm: nine syllables for the first line and thirteen for the second, though they are often spontaneously composed, and mainly by women. As one of the most widely used oral poetic forms, with utterances upon a wide range of themes expressing the most meaningful private or public concern of the day, *tappay* often featured as quick and powerful emotive expressions for the Khudai Khidmatgars ideology in daily life.

[109] As one of the few literate people in his area Waris Khan states: "I used to read every article and every poem in the *Pukhtun* again and again, and I would read them aloud to the people," many of whom would also eagerly await the occasion of its publication. It was his brother who got him a subscription to the journal not only for his benefit but so that he could teach his sister-in-law how to read and be politically informed, creating "an educated and up-to-date" woman. So that, according to Waris Khan, his brother was "the first Pakhtun who considered the abolition of old customs regarding women to be necessary for the progress of the nation." (Waris Khan, 78)

journal not only provided a new option for a public-private space through print media, but in making it much more egalitarian, inclusive and broader in scope it created a third space at the intersections of tradition and modernity; it was a more dynamic, fecund and gender-neutral space than the hujra space could ever be.

As the unsigned editorial of one of the first issues of the journal states, "through the voice of the newspaper" you can "talk to thousands at one and the same time." As the editorial explains: the *Pukhtun* newspaper was started so that in the political, educational, social, national and global fields the Pashtuns do not remain behind any other nation that have adopted these new printing methods. Even though there are so many newspapers these days, the editor continuous to argue, and it is hard to read or keep up with all of them, it is necessary to have a newspaper in one's own language. The editor then goes on to give a brief history of newspapers, referring to several European journals by name, including *The Times of England* which, he informs his audience, has endured since January 1785 because of the quality of its content. Thus, the success of the *Pukhtun,* the editor states, which serves the Pashtuns of South Asia and the diaspora will also depend on its popularity, and that, in turn, depends on the relevance and quality of its content like other major newspapers that have endured. Therefore, the editor enjoins its readers, "whoever wants to can contribute their *muzmun* to the *Pukhtun*" but this should only be good quality work: "like wearing good clothes a newspaper's dignity is maintained by the quality of its *muzmununan*," or its contributions.[110]

The reason I point to this early editorial is not only to show the global awareness of print media in the Pashtun provincial milieu at that time but, moreover, that the orientation in most of its *muzmun*, and its editorial staff's intent to emulate existing popular papers, was generally

[110] *Pukhtun*, May 1928, 5-8.

directed westward: towards Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and even Europe and much less towards the Urdu print media. Arabic and Arab countries were in fact more frequently citied than Urdu-Hindi or the Indian Subcontinent's indigenous languages. Which is of course not to say that they were not affected by them, even if unacknowledged, but that the overt or self-conscious networks allied themselves with the nations across its north-western borders. Additionally, nationalism, and the cross-border solidarity of the Pashtuns, is the more prevalent preoccupation of most *muzmun*, not just in this issue of the journal but more broadly as well. While surprisingly, there is very little mention of nonviolence or editorials explaining its ideology; instead, because the *Pukhtun* represents, "*qəwmi žjwendun"*—which can be translated both as, "the life of the nation/people," and/or, "the nation/people/*qəwm* have become alive" because of the journal. The title of the journal is also deliberately conflated with the *qəwm*, the Pashtuns or "Pukhtuns" as the eastern Pashtuns colloquially refer to themselves. As the editor concludes: through a "common language" the nation can be unified, and "you can talk to thousands at one and the same time"; the journal would also allow the Pashtuns to make themselves heard upon a global arena because, "this is not the age of silence."

Another constant theme in the journal that gets articulated in this first issue is the discourse on the "true" meaning of Islam, and this is often paired with the rights of women. Ghaffar Khan uses this discourse constantly, but religion is often the justificatory rhetoric of choice when enjoining the Pashtuns to emancipate women. Later when KK women start contributing their *muzmun* to the journal, the rhetoric of religion is used much more forcefully to denote the intrinsic rights and freedoms that Islam granted to women, and most interestingly, it is pitted against the discourse of tradition or entrenched interpretations of Pashtunwali. I analyze this more closely in Chapter Three, alongside with the significance of the surprising lack of

discourse on the ideology of nonviolence. I argue that this lack, as does the women's discourse more broadly, points to the likely fact that nonviolence was not considered a novel concept and it addresses the ground of nonviolent transformation, namely the creation of new normativities and subjectivities. Although not overtly discussed as much as expected in the *Pukhtun*, the ideology of nonviolence did, however, produce the space in which this alternate discourse could take place, and the journal became the platform upon which these alternate normativities were shaped. As such, expanding upon the traditional locus of the *hujra*, the journal created a community space in which (re) interpretations of the habitus could take place collectively.

The discourse in the *Pukhtun* journal more broadly also suggests that the transformation of the socio-political can only be brought about through refashioning the human, or of refashioning subjectivity through "education." And the emancipation of women and their equal status with men in Pashtun society would become the signifier of such a successful transformation having taken place, so that it is women's education that becomes the paramount imperative. Although I neither intend to collapse the discourse about women with women's own voices, nor the rationale given for emancipating them—largely to serve nationalist ends—with self-disclosures of subjugation, nevertheless, both discourses were made possible by, and embedded in, the space that nonviolence had opened up; and it is this space that I am also categorizing as feminist one in a very radical sense. Although I did not begin my research with the overt intention of making a feminist intervention—a categorization that none of the KK women self-consciously make either—nevertheless, I became aware of doing so as I understood that the discourse of nonviolence is in itself a radically feminist position, even if that often remains tacit and unrecognized. The awareness of this subterranean layer of nonviolence, and the parallels of its philosophy with feminism, came about while teaching courses on the literatures of

nonviolence and its "new story," in which I had to connect disparate threads and clarify how they all came under the rubric of "nonviolence." Once I realized the vast breadth and ambitious scope implied by this signifier, and the ways in which KK and Gandhi deployed it, the connections and parallels it has with radical feminism became much clearer. Corinne Kumar's call for "a new imaginary to birth a new cosmology,"[111] and Judith Butler's desire to "devise new constellations for thinking about normativity," [112] evoke the "new story" that nonviolence is also calling for most forcefully. Although a lot of meaning has been attached to the signifiers "nonviolence" and "feminism," both essentially propose radical transformations, ambitious interventions, alternate imaginaries, and a displacement of present normative narratives as an imperative toward producing fundamental change. Despite the fact that feminism does not often engage in the discourse of self-transformation, which is the pre-requisite for the "new story" of nonviolence, nevertheless, Butler points out the parallels: if the "subject" is understood not as constant and fixed, but instead, a vacillating being whose subject-ness is a constantly alterable process—through performance and affect—then a crucial space for change opens up. This presumption also disallows deterministic conceptions of the future, which means that even if the subject is habitually produced through frameworks of violence, and seems permeated by its violent origins, this would not necessarily determine its future trajectory. It is for this reason that, according to Butler, nonviolence (like self-transformation) becomes a constant, ethical choice in the practice of daily living and not merely a disembodied ideal or universal principle, but instead, an ongoing struggle against the possibility of violence. As Butler elaborates in her essay on nonviolence: "violence is not foreign to the one to whom the address of non-violence is directed; violence is

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[111] Corinne Kumar, "South Wind," in *Dialogue and Difference: Feminists Challenge Globalization* ed. Marguerite Waller and Sylvia Marcos (New York Palgrave Macmillan 2005).
[112] Judith Butler, "The Claim of Non-Violence," in *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* (New York: Verso, 2009).145

not, at the start, presumptively 'outside.' Violence and non-violence are not only strategies and tactics, but form the subject and become its constitutive possibilities and, so, an ongoing struggle."[113]

Layout

In Chapter One I focus on the colonial production of the figure of the Pathan. As Kipling's literary works are an especially fecund fount for the production of that figure I closely read his short stories, "Dray Wara Yow Dee" (1888), "Head of the District" (1890), and his iconic novel *Kim* (1901). Furthermore, because these works also exemplify the porous boundaries between literary and ethnographic representations, I look at the dialectical relationship between them and the three Anglo-Afghan wars. This relationship becomes much clearer in colonial texts considered authoritative on the region; they conjoin ethnographic analyses with spatial and political mappings. Mountstuart Elphinstone's *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*,[114] written from the political perspective of the East India Company, was one the first accounts about the Pashtuns/Afghans that illustrates this relationship; Alexander Burnes, *Cabool: A Personal Narrative,*[115] written just prior to the first Anglo-Afghan war, with Burnes having a large role in instigating the war that became the first major defeat for the Indian Army on this border—with Burnes one of the victims of the massacre in Kabul that killed most of the British troops stationed there; Henry Bellew's *Afghanistan and the Afghans,*[116] written at the beginning of the

[113] Butler, "The Claim of Non-Violence." 165

[114] Elphinstone, Mountstuart. *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul And Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India.* (Austria: Akademische Druck-u.Verlagsanstalt Graz, 1969. Original publication London, 1815)

[115] Burnes, Alexander. *Cabool: A Personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in that City, in the years 1836,7, and 8.* (London: John Murray, 1843).

[116] Bellew, H. W. *Afghanistan and the Afghans: Being a Brief Review of the History of the Country and Account of its People with a Special Reference to The Present Crisis and War with the Amir Sher Ali Khan.* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1979—originally published 1879)

second Anglo-Afghan war; and finally, Winston Churchill, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force,*[117] that was originally written as a series of newspaper reports about a significant battle during the third Anglo-Afghan war, largely instigated by the Durand Line Agreement. All these texts speak of the importance of fortifying the borders of the North-West Frontier of the imperial state, but they also make clear how particular tropes and representations were produced, and then disseminated as "facts," in tandem with the tripartite border. Foremost, these texts established particular racial theories about the Pashtuns and the Afghans[118] that not only recirculate and reincarnate in different guises in the popular imaginary, but which continue to affect how this frontier zone and its people are interpreted and policed.

Chapter two presents the history and literature of the KK movement in dialectical opposition to the figure of Pathan; the opposition, however, remains largely tacit. In other words, colonial representations of the "Pathans" as an inherently violent people is posed as a critical backdrop to the analysis of the KKs in order to contrast it with the fact that the ideology of nonviolence was embraced as a mode of self-transformation and not merely for strategic purposes. In becoming a massively popular provincial movement, and the largest nonviolent "army" in British India at the time, I look at how their formulation of an inner self-transformation was akin to mystical enlightenment that enabled its embodiment through vernacular registers of meaning.

As such, I argue in this chapter that this remarkable expression of nonviolence was largely because its tenets were not unfamiliar when interpreted through the ethos of Pashtunwali and Islam; in fact, it was considered a more authentic interpretation of both. Kamila Shamsie's

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[117] Churchill, Winston. *The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War*. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1898)

[118] The term "Afghan" originally designated the Pashtuns/Pukhtuns and only after the creation of the nation-state Afghanistan which included other ethnic groups did the nomenclature change to only "Pashtun."

novel, *A God in Every Stone*, also embeds KK nonviolence in its own geographical and historical context, and not in the context of a contentious border imaginary. Instead, she draws a much wider temporal circumference to include the Maurya King Ashoka and the Gandhara Buddhist legacies of nonviolence to illustrate how they were materially embedded in the land and its imaginary. And she situates Ghaffar Khan and the KKs upon a long continuum of indigenous resistance movements, beginning with Syclax's resistance to the Persian emperor Darius in 6th century BCE.

In making the claim that the KK nonviolence was a desire to produce an alternate political, I put some of their literature, especially the poetry of the prolific KK poet, Abdul Malik Fida, in conversation with Derrida's *The Politics of Friendship*. I do so not only to draw parallels between KK nonviolence and Derrida's articulation of a new kind of political, but to draw on the latter's critique of Carl Schmitt's *Concept of the Pollical*; a theory, as I further argue, made globally normative through colonial domination.

In Chapter Three I closely read the KK women's literature published in the *Pukhtun* journal. Focusing on the poetry of Syeda Bushra Begum in the prewar years of the journal, and Alif Jan Khattak in the postwar period. Both these prolific contributors, as well as other KK women's writings, demand radical change of normative customs and traditions that subjugate women. In contrast with their male counterparts, they call upon a "true" Islam to validate their demands for intrinsic rights. The women also make the concept of the "human," and what is befitting to it, a central marker denoting the success of the KK movement. As their discourse states, only when these intrinsic rights are granted to them will the movement have achieved its real goals of social transformation. As they also cogently voice, their dehumanizing subjugation

at the hands of indigenous patriarchy parallels colonial domination and, therefore, the KK demand for autonomy will ring hollow until women are emancipated.

This chapter forms the core of my research project not only because it discloses the radical feminism intrinsic to the discourse of nonviolence, but it also addresses how self-transformation is the pre-requisite for socio-political change. Furthermore, it illustrates that nonviolence was embodied through ubiquitous and quotidian acts. The women's discourse and methods of embodying change revealed that it was by altering subjectivity and changing normative values that transformation was wrought. As such, the women make education the ameliorative means for liberation both from their own traditions—men, according to the KK rhetoric, were also subjugated by cultural codes sanctioning violence—and from foreign rule. Thus, the KK women articulate the core of nonviolent resistance and how it was tangibly manifested.

In Chapter Four I continue the exploration of nonviolence, but this time through an analysis of the imaginary. The poetry of Ghani Khan illuminates how Pashtunwali and Islam were interpreted in ways not often foregrounded—in fact often obfuscated through the interpretative lens of the "Pathan." Another crucial element in the transformation was the interpretation of the "true" spirit of the Pashtun ethos, but in contrast with the women's discourse that illustrated how change was embodied through daily acts, Ghani Khan's texts disclose how the imaginary was enlisted to produce the requisite change. Illustrating, in this instance, that it is not only the imaginary that produces the "nation," but, contra Benedict Anderson's formulation, it is an ongoing dialectical relationship between imagination and material inscriptions that are necessary factors in producing a changed habitus.

In this chapter, therefore, I also argue that through the discursive and physical inscription of the tripartite frontier, the colonial state produced not only a zone of exception, but it rendered its inhabitants, in Giorgio Agamben's terms, as *homo sacer*. In expanding on Schmitt's "state of exception," Agamben situates the figure of the *homo sacer* in the exceptional space outside the bounds of the law. I interpose Kafka's parable "Before the Law" into this conversation, which illustrates the absurdity, imagined impregnability and injustice at the heart of the law. Alongside with Derrida's interlocution of the short story, I argue that the Pashtuns, especially in the Tribal Territories were—and continue to be—deliberately situated in a state of exception. Rather than in the sense of abjection, it is the condition of standing outside and before the law as "outlaws" that renders the inhabitants into the figure of the *homo sacer.*

The last chapter deals with the possible shape that the KK, and especially Ghaffar Khan's utopian desires were aspiring towards. I argue that, when the partition of India became inevitable and the KKs protest against the division fell on deaf ears, the call for Pashtunistan represented the shape of this utopia. While their adamant refusal to participate in the normative political that produced Pakistan led to charges of sedition that destroyed the organization, only substantiates the fact that their aspired for political was in stark contra-distinction to that which grounded the emergent postcolonial nation-state. Therefore, in this chapter I compare the imaginary of Pashtunistan with the political that produced Pakistan to argue that the former, grounded as it was upon an anarchic presumption of an alternate socio-political organization, was aiming at a radically new form of the political. In comparison, the political that founded the nation-state of Pakistan was derived from the colonial model of the state, at the heart of which lies the perpetual friend-enemy binary that Carl Schmitt assigns as a marker of the normative political.

Using a metaphoric lens to contrast these two forms of the political I parallel them with Amitav Ghosh's fictional account of Morichjhapi and Hamiltonabad in his novel, *The Hungry Tide*. Although based on a real community, which East Bengali refugees founded on the island of Morichjhapi in the Indian Sunderbans, it becomes a utopian signifier in the novel for an alternate, subaltern, and grass roots form of organizing community. I parallel Morichjhapi with the aspiration for Pashtunistan and the synthetic creation of Hamiltonabad with that of Pakistan in this chapter. And, like the novel, I argue that despite the latter's overtly utopian intentions, it merely replicate the normative political. I substantiate this argument by reading some of Jinnah's speeches, letters and other writings.

Finally, in Chapter Five I also argue that the model of the village as the building block for the desired future community would not have been unusual for the rural KK organization, rooted as they were in an agrarian imaginary—the village, in fact, was a commonplace form of community for the Pashtuns. As such, through an extensive reading of Ghaffar Khan's voluminous Pashto autobiography, (one that has yet to be published in translation), and his claim that he suggested the centrality of the village to Gandhi, may be one of the reasons for the striking parallels between Gandhi's utopian conception of *Ram Rajya* and Ghaffar Khan's aspirations, which the call for Pashtunistan represented at the time of Partition. Therefore, I argue that a dialectical relationship between Gandhi and Ghaffar Khan's concepts and KK practices is a logical presumption that previous scholarship has not addressed.

Chapter One

The Figure of the Pathan: Colonial Representations Inscribing the North-West Frontier of British India

> the most turbulent race under the stars. To the Afghan neither life, property, law, nor kingship are sacred when his own lusts prompt him to rebel. He is a thief by instinct, a murderer by heredity and training, and frankly and bestially immoral by all three. None the less he has his own crooked notions of honour, and his character is fascinating to study. On occasion he will fight without reason given till he is hacked to pieces; on other occasions he will refuse to show fight till he is driven to a corner. Herein he is as unaccountable as the gray wolf, who is his blood-brother. (Kipling: "The Amir's Homily" (1891))[119]

The socio-semantic instability of the figure of the "Pathan" articulates itself even in its naming, known as the Pashtuns or Pukhtuns they are called the "Pathans" in South Asia and named as such in colonial literature; but the denotation of "Pathan" takes on particular tropological significations in the latter as a framework that not just maps but also shapes the people and the land according to a desired colonial imaginary. Rather than a phenomenological representation, the often unstable and paradoxical tropes that signify "facts" categorize the people and the land in ahistorical and static ways. However, when charted alongside attempts to inscribe and police the ever-tenuous north-western borders of British India, the instability of these representations takes on a much more ideologically cohesive form. Particularly, when mapped upon the formation of this tri-partite imperial frontier, the progressively denigrating depictions of the figure of the Pathan become that much more coherent as a signifier of imperial desires, representations and policing.

[119] Burton, Antionette, *The First Anglo-Afghan Wars: A Reader.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2014. 198

The fact that the Pashtuns comprise one of the largest autonomous tribal groups in South Asia, ones that have historically remained intractable and in constant resistance to the state—Mughal, colonial, postcolonial, and now, neo-imperial—partially reveals the ideological grids upon which these representations are mapped—especially denotations of a "martial" race—but the constant foregrounding of the figure of the Pathan within a globally contested frontier zone discloses the full measure of an *a priori* gridwork. As such, its analysis is inextricably intertwined with the frayed edges of the imperial (and nation) state and must be analyzed in the context of how the fortifications after each of three Anglo-Afghan wars were established.

Rendered in broad brush strokes with elementary colors this discursive figure comes to life through definitive tropes that continue to regurgitate in many guises till today. The quote from Kipling that is the epigraph for this chapter is a case in point: it especially exemplifies how the figure of the Pathan—also called the Afghans[120] as in this case—was depicted ahistorically and uncontextually. Written after the second Anglo-Afghan war, the "Amir" in this homily is Abdur Rahman Khan, known as the "iron-fisted Amir because of his harsh measures to control the tribes, largely at the behest of the British. He was also responsible for signing the Durand Line Agreement, pressured, according to the Amir, by Mortimer Durand. This first layer of the tri-partite border partitioned not only India from Afghanistan but it also, more expressly, divided the unruly Pashtun tribes on either side of the cartographic line, and instigated the second Anglo-Afghan war in opposition to the arbitrary division. Kipling's descriptions, far from being considered hyperbolic have since become common racial tropes: the Pathans-Afghans are rebellious and lawless by nature; they are bestial, primitive and savage; they are thieves and murders, and yet also, quite paradoxically, they have "crooked notions of honour" and will fight

[120] The term "Afghan" originally designated the Pashtuns/Pukhtuns and only after the creation of the Afghanistan did the nomenclature of the people change.

to the death if they so choose. The interesting ambivalence of these representations points to an admiration for the figure, especially as an example of a noble savage, alongside with moral condemnation of its recalcitrance against imperial desires. As in Kipling's articulations, the rebelliousness/lawlessness becomes a signifier for both an independence of spirit as well as an intrinsic criminality. Similarly, Pashtun codes of conduct, or Pashtunwali, that regulates socio-political and juridical norms, are described either, or both, as admirable forms of self-governance or regressive tribal customs illustrating the pre-civilizational status of the people. This temporal evaluation of the Pathan's social evolution is reinforced by the tropes of bestiality and savagery that liken him to predatory animals—generally wolves and panthers—and these descriptives happily co-exists with tropes about his virility and martial prowess.

Even though the creation of the North-West Frontier of British India was one of the first cartographic divisions partitioning India, surprisingly little academic attention has been paid to its particular formation. As such, its tropes and representations have yet to be decolonized by a postcolonial critique and thereby regurgitate unproblematically within neocolonial discourse. Because the ahistorical figure of the Pathan cannot be untethered from its geographical location it is necessary to map it upon the precarity of colonial state formation; in fact, it is in large part an anxious expression of such precariousness. Therefore, in order to contextualize this ostensibly ahistorical figure it must be looked at in relationship with the formation of the three layers of this border: the first, the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 that defined not just the north-western border of imperial India, but also the perimeters of the modern nation-state of Afghanistan. The latter was very much part of the imperial "sphere of influence," and in that sense also part of the first layer of the border, and more colloquially referred to as "a buffer zone" between India and Russian imperial expansion. The second layer was the creation of the Tribal Territories, which,

because of the designation "tribal," defined it as the other of the state, or a "nonstate" space—once again, a temporal situatedness as well as a geographic one. Although granted *de jure* autonomy the Tribal Territories in fact became a garrisoned space to be governed according to specific colonial laws—the Frontier Crimes Regulations—that denied its inhabitants any juridical recourse against the laws or the modes with which the colonial governance enforced them—which is largely why anti-colonial resistance often arose from the Tribal Territories. The third layer of this border was the North-West Frontier Province created in 1901, prior to which it had been administered as part of the Punjab Province. It was the least precarious layer and the one most fully incorporated into the colonial state, but nevertheless, it was policed much more harshly than the other provinces because of its border status. Especially since the Province blurs unsettlingly into the "tribal" districts in many places, (as do the Tribal Territories with Afghanistan), the border between Province and Tribal Territory was, and continues to be, policed much more strictly, and is far less permeable than the border between India (now Pakistan) and Afghanistan.

As an act of translating the unfamiliar when extensive mapping of the land and the people living upon it were carried out, the discursive production of the figure of the Pathan created the conceptual framework through which the physical borders were then inscribed. In other words, the figure produces this imperial frontier not just discursively but allows it to be policed physically to establish its contours. In focusing on the role that representations play in producing particular kinds of materiality, I want to point out that despite the seeming intangibility of tropes they nevertheless—especially when transmuted into "truths"—enable state violences that get inscribed upon bodies in the shape of laws and policies. While the production of this discursive figure reveals far more about imperial desires and the structures of the colonial state than any

kind of accurate ethnographic account about the Pashtuns, nevertheless its affect upon the inhabitants was—and remains—extremely palpable, particularly as justificatory discourse for the use of (state) violence against them. Moreover, the figure of the Pathan also becomes a foil for another tropological figure constitutive of the colonial imaginary: the manly and heroic colonial officer. As I elaborated in the Introduction, it especially represents, in George Nathaniel Curzon's words, the "ideal frontier officer" who is defined by his constant vigilance against the "knife of the Pathan fanatic."[121]

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, and especially after the appointment of Curzon as Viceroy of India, colonial frontier policy and territory began to be structured in ways that would determine its future shape; a shape that remains largely in effect till today. With the creation of British Baluchistan and the five "Political" agencies of the North-West Frontier—Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, North and South Waziristan—a new type of British "Soldier-Sahib" also came into being. Axiomatically representative of the heroic colonial figure, the Political Agent serving upon the wild and savage frontiers of empire, alongside with the Frontier tribesman, became transmuted into one of the most iconic, romantic literary tropes in nineteenth (and twentieth) century British literature about imperial India. As Christian Tripodi describes in *Edge of Empire*, the Political Agent in the colonial imaginary walked "unarmed and unaided among the tribes of the Frontier. The image of the brave and resourceful officer striding through the mountains of Waziristan or Khyber, stopping to chat with the ferocious tribesmen, joking amiably with them in fluent Pashtu before sternly reminding them not to misbehave, was a seductive one for Victorian and Edwardian elites, and the public as a whole."[122] As this

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[121] Curzon, George, Lord of Kedleston. *Frontiers*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.) (Original publication 1908) lecture delivered in 1907)
[122] Tripodi, Christian, *Edge of Empire: the British political officer and tribal administration on the North-West frontier, 1877-1947*. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 5.

caricatured sketch illustrates, the hallmarks of the ideal frontier officer included, linguistic dexterity and fluency in native languages; a manly virility represented by his fearlessness amongst dangerous tribesmen; and the gravitas of a stern disciplinarian in the service of empire. In fact, the Political Agent represented the heroic colonial officer par excellence: he was linguist, scholar, soldier, spy, negotiator, peacekeeper, disciplinarian and law giver. These representations were as applicable for real officers as literary ones, in fact the lines between the two are often blurred as Rudyard Kipling's works testify: "The Head of the District" being a case in point, which can be read alongside with Curzon, or even Tripodi's, descriptions quite seamlessly, as I analyze below.	Although Tripodi warns that such romantic depictions, both of the Political Agent and of the "ferocious tribesmen," belied the conditions on the ground, yet he too accepts such characterizations, often at face value, especially about the "inherently martial nature of the indigenous population combined with the testing physical environment."[123] So enmeshed are these tropes in the popular imaginary that making such racial claims, which would in other circumstances be deemed offensive, or at the very least, unscholarly, are in this case articulated unreflexively. In fact, hyperbolic descriptions about the Pathans seem to be the norm in colonial as well as modern day texts, as Tripodi himself exemplifies despite his otherwise nuanced scholarly analysis of the Political Agent and the conditions on the ground where they served. Not only do the tropes that Kipling and colonial ethnography originally sketch out, especially of the Pathans as wild animals, regurgitate even in today's environment of political correctness about race, such as Charles Miller's contemporary book *Khyber,* that Tripodi also quotes to illustrate the hyperbolic descriptions considered the norm. Miller's description exemplifies the tropology of the figure of the Pathan: "Between a dust layered blue turban and a shaggy, scrofulous beard

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[123] Tripodi, *Edge of Empire*, 5

were fixed the eyes of a hawk, the beak of a vulture and the mouth of a shark. The owner of these features…moved with the silent grace of the tiger on a stalk…here was a creature whose sole purpose and pleasure in life was the inflicting of a death as uncomfortable and prolonged as it might be possible to arrange."[124]

Perhaps it is the inability to translate the complexity and alterity of the tribal way of life, as well as constant recalcitrance against state laws that predisposes writers towards these hyperbolic descriptions. However, what gives rise to the images of alterity may in fact stem from their particular ways of being, as Tripodi's descriptions of actual tribal-colonial relationships inadvertently points out: "although the tribes maintained their own perfectly workable systems of regulation and authority, these were difficult for outsiders to detect, with the result that early British administrators perceived a worrying lack of any identifiable structural cohesion among the frontier tribes in general. As a consequence, they nominated forms of organization in an effort to create perceptible and hierarchical political formations that they could identify and engage with."[125] Thus, the untranslatability of the tribal Pashtun way of life into colonial modes of understanding produces the tropes of alterity which point towards a perception of almost absolute incommensurability. It is not just resistance against colonial rule, therefore, that creates the tropology, because, as Tripodi also points out, not all tribes or *khels*—clans or the subgroups within each tribe—engaged in outright resistance against the British, and many in fact facilitated colonial rule.[126] Many tribals acted on behalf the Political Agents, especially with the later establishment of Maliks who headed each village and were appointed by the colonial District Officer to head local jirgas an favor colonial decrees. Nevertheless, the fact that tribal forms of

[124] Tripodi, *Edge of Empire*, 3
[125] Tripodi, *Edge of Empire,* 10
[126] Also, many tribes that were classified as waring with one another had sub-groups or *khels* that comfortably co-existed with each other.

social organization followed close knit, indigenous systems that could not be incorporated into state structures, but instead had to be translated to fit those structures, is perhaps where the sense of incommensurability and absolute alterity arises.

The figure of the Pathan paired with the tropology of the valiant colonial officer also serves as an illuminating lens through which to discern the porous boundaries between literary and ethnographic texts in colonial writings. As such, in this chapter I will closely read some of Kipling's works alongside with seminal ethnographic texts written prior to, or during the production of each layer of the tri-partite frontier. Kipling's representations, quite distinctly, foregrounds this dialectical relationship between literary representation and imperial ethnography as the ideological matrix through which colonial state policies were produced. Beginning my analysis with Kipling's "The Head of the District," (1890) which, in addition, exemplifies how normative gender tropes were establishment with the paring of the Pathan and colonial frontier officer, as well as another tropological figure that, as I explained in the Introduction, serves as a foil for the masculinity of both: the Bengali Babu. Further, comparatively analyzing James Clifford's, *The Predicament of Culture*, with a close reading of another short story by Kipling, with the Pashto title, "Dray Wara Yow Dee" (1888), I highlight not only the intertwined relationship between the literary and the ethnographic, and the latter's inculpation with colonial hegemony, but to foreground the methodology that the textual expressions of both share. I end the analysis of Kipling's figures by briefly looking at his iconic novel on India, *Kim,* (1901), in which not only is the ideal colonial officer, represented by Colonel Creighton, both ethnographer and spymaster extraordinaire, but in which the imperial imaginary is reinforced through the figure of the Pathan who, in this text, happily serves the Great Game of empire and safeguards its precarious north-western borders. I then move on

tracing the construction of this figure in seminal colonial ethnographies starting with Mountstuart Elphinstone's *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* (1815), written after he led the first diplomatic mission to Afghanistan commissioned by the East India Company; followed by Alexander Burnes, *Cabool: A Personal Narrative* (1842), which not only details the conceptual context for the first Anglo-Afghan war but also the role Burnes played in instigating it; similarly Henry Bellew's *Afghanistan and the Afghans* (1879), gives the rhetorical context for the second Anglo-Afghan war and how the tropes progress alongside with its historical context; while Winston Churchill's newspaper reports that were later published as a book, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force* (1898), is historically situated at the time of a Pashtun insurrection against the Durand Line border agreement; finally I end with Olaf Caroe's *The Pathans* (1958) to closely read one of his translations of the famous Pashtun warrior-poet Khushal Khan Khattak. The ethnographic readings are undertaken not only to trace the tropology of the figure of the Pathan but to give delineate the historical context against which that epistemological framework was established; a context which is glaringly omitted from tropes of an essentialized figure; one that, moreover, delineates how racial and gender constructs also express a desired colonial reality and the repetitive inscriptions of normativity establish them as such.

Kipling's short story "The Head of the District" not only helps to establish the tropological framework of the figure of the Pathan, with its ubiquitous pairing of savage tribesmen with ideal frontier officers, but it illustrates how this framework also delineated normative gender tropes upon these as yet unfortified borders. The martial Pathan, painted in elementary colors to signify primitive manliness, defines, both through similarities and incommensurable difference, the even more virile warrior figure of the colonial officer, and the former's savagery only highlights the latter's civility; while it racially triangulates both with the

effete and law abiding Bengali Babu. In Kipling's writings the Babu figure signifies the contemptible mimic man, because he willingly fashions his subjectivity by parroting British mannerisms, and paradoxically, the ideal colonial subject. In contrast, the Pathan is depicted as the more admirable figure not only because his savagery demonstrates a primitive virility, but his recalcitrance also denotes a sense of autonomy as yet untamed by the civilizing force of colonialism. Nevertheless, his way of life is so incommensurable with colonial norms that it elicits not just moral condemnation but a sense of dread: a constant undertone renders the figure inexpressibly hostile and sinister; in other words, the alterity is not just contemptible, as in the case of the Babu, but threatening. Thoroughly assimilated into the colonial state system, the Babu, in contrast, represents the perfect product of the English Education Act of 1835 that Thomas Babington Macaulay outlined in his famous "Minute on Indian Education." Given in the same year, Macaulay's Parliamentary Minute persuasively argued in favor of the virtues of an English education for the colonial subject in order to, as the Minute states, "alter" a new generation "before they reach manhood." Instead of an education in the native languages of India, specifically Sanskrit and Arabic, Macaulay declares that English ought to be the language of instruction in the colony as this would create "a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect;" a class of natives who would be "interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern." Although Kipling's construction of the Bengali Babu personifies this colonial aspiration, its satirical and caricatured depiction is also a scathing critique of such aspirations and policies. However, the contempt is directed not only towards liberal political aspirations of the Metropole, that ran counter to Kipling's paternalistic, conservative values, but additionally, the Babu's overt intellectualism, alongside with a racially inherent incapacity for war or violence, renders the figure unmanly. And even though the

"lawless" and recalcitrant Pathan is condemned for his rebellion against colonial domination it is the figure's virility, sketched in homo-erotic terms, that elicits the writer's admiration.

Just before he dies at the beginning of the short story, the old Deputy Commissioner, Yardley-Orde, in "The Head of the District" [127] describes how painstakingly he created peace and order in this (unnamed) border district. Surrounded both by fiercely loyal Pathan tribesmen—whose fealty he had masterfully cultivated—and his coterie of officers, his injured body is carried on a litter to the banks of the Indus. Despite his fatal injuries, or the fact that his wife awaits him on the other side of the Indus, Yardley Orde's foremost concern on his deathbed is for the District he has administered so successfully for the last three years, but whose harsh conditions have finally felled him like other frontier officers serving before him. His dying words are to Khoda Dad Khan and five other loyal tribesmen, who belong to "a frontier clan that he had won over to the paths of a moderate righteousness, when he had broken down at the foot of their inhospitable hills,"[128] and calls for a jirga, "my last public audience." This is the advice he gives to the tribesmen "in the vernacular":

> But you must be good men when I am not here. Such of you as live in our borders must pay your taxes quietly as before. I have spoken of the villages to be gently treated this year. Such of you as live in the hills must refrain from cattle-lifting, and burn no more thatch, and turn a deaf ear to the voice of the priests, who, not knowing the strength of the Government, would lead you into foolish wars, wherein you will surely die and your crops be eaten by strangers. And you must not sack any caravans, and must leave your arms at the police-post when you come in; as has been your custom, and my order. And Tallantire Sahib will be with you, but I do not know who takes my place. I speak now true talk, for I am as it were already dead, my children,—for though ye be strong men, ye are children.'

'And thou art our father and our mother,' broke in Khoda Dad Khan with an oath. 'What shall we do, now there is no one to speak for us, or to teach us to go wisely!' [129]

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[127] Kipling, Rudyard, "The Head of the District," referred to as HOD in citations online version downloaded from the Kipling Society, UK on 3/5/14: http://www.telelib.com/authors/K/KiplingRudyard/prose/LifesHandicap/headofdistrict.html
[128] Kipling, HOD, 1
[129] Kipling, HOD, 3

Yardley-Orde, in the voice of the paternalistic "ma-baap" colonizer—or imperial domination as a mother-father's loving but strict rule—articulates the discourse of colonial "law and order," defined, as it usually was, in contrast with indigenous "lawlessness" and "anarchy," in this case the Pathans way of life. For this discourse to become fully legible, however, an implicit, *a priori* framework about the figure of the Pathans is being evoked as well: although headstrong and lawless the Pathans are also simple, childlike and volatile in temperament and, therefore, need to be firmly yet kindly guided; their constant rebellions against the government are instigated by fanatical priests who take advantage of these simpleminded people to lead them astray; their criminal behavior is due to their immoral, misguided ways of life because they are in the prenatal stage of civilization, and, therefore, must be resolutely brought into the modern age by the colonial state. And a stern yet just colonial officer is the necessary means to enlighten and lead them, one who has the strength and the skills to keep these unruly people in check both for their own benefit as well as for the colonial "order" that is being established—the two go hand in hand in the tropology of the ideal frontier officer. Furthermore, Pathan disobedience and recalcitrance are tolerated, to a certain degree, because it sharply hones the manliness of the frontier officer.

This deathbed scene sets the narrative frame for the short story, one in which the ideal frontier officer, according to Kipling, is now a dying breed because, to the horror of the tribesmen and the other colonial officers, the Indian government replace Yardley-Orde with a Bengali District Officer. Reading the passage against the grain, however, illuminates what the tropology of the Pathan and the colonial officer were tacitly, and defensively, shaped against. Firstly, Yardley-Orde makes a distinction between frontiersmen who live within state borders, those who pay their taxes "quietly," and those who, on the contrary, live in the hills and come down to raid, steal cattle and rebel against the government because they follow their own ways

of life rather than obeying colonial laws or the District Officer. Tribal “lawlessness” thus points to alternate modes of life and alternate laws that the indigenous people follow, modes of communal organization that somehow disrupt state mechanisms; thereby, the need to tackle, contain and subvert these indigenous systems becomes the main objective of the colonial officer. As the latter description obviously points to the Tribal Territories, disarming and compelling these tribals into, at least, nominally becoming obedient citizen-subjects of the imperial state becomes the foremost task for the District Officer, and Yardley-Orde serves as the mouthpiece for this imperial aspiration. And, in Kipling’s view, this kind of strong and manly officer that epitomizes Curzon’s “ideal frontier officer” is a rare and almost extinct breed. However, Kipling is not only reflecting the colonial imaginary, as he often does through the voices of his various characters, but in a sense, he produces it by constructing the tropological framework, in such decisive terms, through which this reality is then enforced.

In Homi Bhabha’s analysis the concept of ‘fixity’ in colonial discourse is a “major discursive strategy” in the “ideological construction of otherness”—an otherness that is “at once an object of desire and derision.” And yet, as he argues, the “stereotype” also denotes this alterity in perpetuity through a “process of ambivalence.” Like Bhabha, my close reading of the figure of the Pathan is not to merely point to the tropes that have since become “facts,” only to dismiss them as discursively constructed stereotypes, but to understand and point out that the methods of constructing such “truths” in fact produced colonial power. According to Bhabha the stereotype as a “mode of knowledge and power” is given its force through not just the process of fixity but through the ambivalence of its representations, which then allows for constant possibilities of its reproduction. The ambivalence, therefore, “ensures its repeatability in changing historical and discursive conjectures; informs its strategies of individuation and marginalization; produces that

effect of probabilistic truth and predictability which, for the stereotype, must always be in *excess* of what can be emphatically proved or logically constructed." As such, the "function of ambivalence" becomes a strategy encapsulating racist and gender stereotypes in frameworks that can adjust and reproduce perpetually as matrices of power. Once it is understood that this is also a "process of subjectification," or, in other words, a process that produces particular kind of subjects, ones that, furthermore, cannot merely be dismissed through "functionalist modes of conceiving of the relationship between discourse and politics," [130] it points out how ambivalence (and stereotypes) do not just inform governance but produce it.

The figure of the Pathan and the Bengali Babu, as well as the ideal frontier officer that reinforces the British-ness of subjectivity in contrast, are not only constructed via ambivalent and seemingly paradoxical tropes, which, despite its critiques of certain colonial policies, largely reinforce a normative view of imperialism. Through the figure of the Bengali Babu, Kipling not only critiques the Indian Education Act and makes dire predictions about the outcomes of such policies but which, the narrative also illustrates, can only be contained by the paternalistic model that imperialism has no choice but to embrace. The figure of the recalcitrant Pathan tribesmen demonstrates the inadequacies of liberal ideas in face of normative modes of colonial governance. Thus, Pashtun resistance against colonial rule is reduced to inept colonial policy and does not in any way critique the concept of British domination per se. Which is why ideal officers such as Yardley Orde's are depicted as the only method by which imperialism can fulfill its mission; moreover, such manly strength of character would not only keep the tribesmen in check but can become an object of devotion and desire—and by extension a love of empire as

[130] Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 94-96

well—whereas the racially inferior Bengali could never command such allegiance, thus demonstrating the ill-conceived notions of liberal policies, such as the English Education Act.

The fairly lengthy passage in which Kipling contrasts the Pathan with the Bengali Babu illustrates the interwoven tropology of both figures that expresses the colonial imaginary: when Khoda Dad Khan first meets the new Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Grish Chunder Dé, and, mistaking him for an office clerk, despite the fact that the Bengali acted "more English than the English,"[131] asks him where his "master" is, this is the interchange that takes place:

> 'I am the Deputy Commissioner,' said the gentleman in English.
> Now he overvalued the effects of university degrees, and stared Khoda Dad Khan in the face. But if from your earliest infancy you have been accustomed to look on battle, murder, and sudden death, if spilt blood affects your nerves as much as red paint, and, above all, if you have faithfully believed that the Bengali was the servant of all Hindustan, and that all Hindustan was vastly inferior to your own large, lustful self, you can endure, even though uneducated, a very large amount of looking over. You can even stare down a graduate of an Oxford college if the latter has been born in a hothouse, of stock bred in a hot-house, and fearing physical pain as some men fear sin; especially if your opponent's mother has frightened him to sleep in his youth with horrible stories of devils inhabiting Afghanistan, and dismal legends of the black North. The eyes behind the gold spectacles sought the floor. Khoda Dad Khan chuckled, and swung out to find Tallantire hard by.[132]

The sketch of the Pathan's unabashedly menacing virility, one that overpowers the overly-educated and effete "Babuji," illustrates both the tropology of the figure of the Pathan and its interwoven reliance upon the figure of the Bengali Babu, but also assumes that nineteenth century European racial categorizations were natural ones and, therefore, universally shared. The Pathan, thereby, expresses Kipling's view in this instance: outraged by the idea that the a Bengali Babu would presume to act like a "Sahib" and try to rule over him, he not only psychologically cows the District Officer by his tropology—one that also circulates in the South Asian imaginary

[131] Kipling, HOD, 4
[132] Kipling, HOD, 7

as Kipling rightly points out here—but the intrinsic violence with which he is endowed can overpower the Babu physically as well. Thereby, Kipling warns through the narrative, that such rebellions will become the norm rather than the exception if colonial policy does not take into account the essential nature of the Pathan, or the Bengali.

While the battle ready yet "uneducated" Khoda Dad Khan elicits Kipling's admiration it is not only by way of contrast with the essential colonial mimic man, but also both stock figures reinforce normative gender tropes: as Mrinalini Sinha describes in her book, *Colonial Masculinity*, and, as I also explain in the Introduction, homoerotic desire and practices were associated with the more "'manly and 'virile' native races" such as the frontier tribesmen rather than the effeminate yet heterosexual Bengalis.[133] So that the pairing of the Pathan with colonial Frontier officer reinforces the notions of manliness precisely through erotic desire, and the ambivalence with which the Pathan is represented is not always an oppositional one because it also constitutes the masculinity—or lack of it in the case of the Babu—of the other.

After the rebellion is crushed by the Assistant District Commissioner, Tallantire, who is another example of the ideal frontier officer, he harshly reprimands Khoda Dad Khan and holds the Pathan personally responsible for the revolt of all the tribesmen. Despite the fact that it is Khoda Dad Khan's collusion with the British that allows the colonial authorities to gain the upper hand, Tallantire holds him harshly to account for the actions of his whole community—a reference to how the Frontier Crimes Regulations, or laws specifically designed for border territories, enforced its writ through collective punishment. The Frontier Crimes Regulations, or FCR, were administered by the central government and not the provincial one, under the aegis that the Tribal Territories were "autonomous" and not part of the state. This designation was a

[133] Sinha, Mrinalini: *Colonial Masculinity: The 'manly Englishman' and the 'effeminate Bengali' in the late nineteenth century*. (Manchester University Press, 1995). 7

double edged sword: ostensibly granting independence to the tribes to conduct their daily affairs according to their own laws and customs—systems that were heavily infiltrated by local collaborators and often even directly administered in the shape of *jirgas*, or indigenous modes of conflict resolution, by Political Agents, District Officers etc.,—the tribes had no legitimate recourse to the harsh policing and collective punishments often rained down upon them except for mass revolts and acts of rebellion. And resistance was often led by local priests, so that the "Blind Mullah" in the narrative represents another stock figure in the tropology of the Pathan: fanatical priests that lead the simple-minded tribals astray. The Mullah, even more tellingly in the story, instigates the revolt by announcing that "Border-Law" cannot be enforced by a Bengali. By referring directly to the FCR, Kipling upholds its necessity while condemning its feeble enforcement through liberal policies that will only continue the viscous cycle of punishments and "pacification."

When Khoda Dad Khan comes to ask Tallantire for forgiveness on behalf of his people, and to discuss the terms for peace, this is the dialogue that ensues between them:

> 'Who art thou, seller of dog's flesh,' thundered Tallantire, 'to speak of terms and treaties? Get hence to the hills—go, and wait there starving, till it shall please the Government to call thy people out for punishment—children and fools that ye be! Count your dead, and be still. Rest assured that the Government will send you a *man!'*
> 'Ay,' returned Khoda Dad Khan, 'for we also be men.' As he looked Tallantire between the eyes, he added, 'And by God, Sahib, may thou be that man!'[134]

It is in this passage, much more overtly, that Kipling reinforces the manliness of each figure through its dialectical relationship with the other, but the ambivalent evaluation that it elicits reinforces what Bhabha calls "strategies of individuation" intrinsic to the "analytic of ambivalence;" one that is especially fruitful for literary productions of normative subjectivity.

[134] Kipling, HOD, 14

Both Yardley Orde and Tallantire are literary representations of Curzon's ideal colonial officer: they communicate in fluent Pashto, are at ease with the tribals and know their "district blindfold;"[135] they are strong and harsh yet just and benevolent administrators, or the colonial "ma-baap" figure. Nevertheless, despite the stature accorded to both the Pathan and the English as warrior races there are crucial differences Kipling draws in the racial representations of both figures. Whereas the Pathan revels in, and thinks nothing of, murder and violence the colonial officer, on the contrary, is sorely disturbed by the necessity of killing—while the Bengali District Commissioner slinks away in fear for his life once the fighting begins. After the British troops crush the revolt and kill many tribesmen, Khoda Dad Khan riles up the villagers to hold the Blind Mullah to account, who, Kipling informs the readers on a side note, hated Khoda Dad Khan with an "Afghan hatred"[136] because the fanatical priest was a rival for the position of tribal leader. Not only is the scene of this local "justice" depicted as a bloodthirsty sport, in which even young children gleefully participate to terrorize the Mullah, but the Pathans feel no pity and express no sense of remorse after cold-bloodedly killing the priest,

> They tickled him gently under the armpit with the knife-point. He leaped aside screaming, only to feel a cold blade drawn lightly over the back of his neck, or a rifle-muzzle rubbing his beard. He called on his adherents to aid him, but most of these lay dead on the plains, for Khoda Dad Khan had been at some pains to arrange their decease. Men described to him the glories of the shrine they would build, and the little children clapping their hands cried, 'Run Mullah, run! There's a man behind you!' In the end, when the sport wearied, Khoda Dad Khan's brother sent a knife home between his ribs. 'Whereof' said Khoda Dad Khan with charming simplicity, 'I am now Chief of the Khusru Kheyl!' No man gainsaid him; and they all went to sleep very stiff and sore.[137]

In contrast, the paragraph right after this description of the cheerful murder of the Blind Mullah, is Tallantire's keen sense of grief and remorse at killing the rebellious "Khusru

[135] Kipling, HOD, 10
[136] Kipling, HOD, 6
[137] Kipling, HOD, 12

Kheyl."[138] Tallantire breaks down after the battle when he realizes he has killed many members of the tribe that Yardley-Orde had entrusted to his safe-keeping, and becomes completely hysterical—bursting into laughter and sobs simultaneously—when he looks at his bloodied sword, and a soldier points out that a horse's ear has been sliced off by someone as well. By juxtaposing the two kinds of killings in the narrative Kipling wants to point to the moral difference between acts of war carried out by the Pathans and the British: the brutality and barbarity of the former, who kill with impunity, cannot be equated with the dire necessity to kill in the name of policing and justice; so that even if the tropology of each constructs them as warriors figures, nevertheless, even the motives to kill are rendered incommensurable with each other.

As Edward Said states in *Orientalism*: "Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense *creates* the Orient, the Oriental, and his World…The point is that in each of these cases the Oriental is *contained* and *represented* by dominating frameworks."[139] It is this ability to create a desired reality through tropological frameworks that makes them much more insidious and menacing than merely idealized expressions of imperial desire, but rather, as Bhabha's states, this "apparatus of power" produces a racial genealogy specifically to establish systems of surveillance, "justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction."[140]As Said further argues, Orientalism is not merely a discipline in collusion with imperialist forces that plot to subjugate the Orient, but rather, (and one can substitute colonialism for Orientalism as their ends remain complimentary), as he puts it:

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[138] The name of this tribe, like much of Kipling's nomenclature, is part of his literary imaginary rather than an actual designation. Like his other seemingly authentic sounding native words and phrases it merely imitates the intonation of the words rather than a transliteration of the original.
[139] Said, Edward. *Orientalism*, 40
[140] Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 100-101

> It is rather a *distribution* of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction…it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is manifestly different…shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also a whole series of "interests" which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but maintains; it *is,* rather than expresses a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual…power cultural…power moral (as with ideas about what "we" do and what "they" cannot do or understand as "we" do). Indeed my real argument is that Orientalism is—and does not merely represent—a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to with the Orient than it does with "our" world.[141]

The willfulness to control, manipulate and to understand—or rather to translate into signs and symbols legible to Occidental forms of understanding—is directed towards the creation of a desired ideological reality. A reality that is not necessarily always self-serving either, as it is also produced clumsily and in haste, through second-hand knowledges or absentee authorities and mistranslations, so that it runs counter to the ends envisioned—which, however, does not denote an innocent "absentminded-ness" either. It is aim of incorporating difference into sameness that is in itself an act of domination, especially when undertaken through the differentials of power that colonialism entailed, so that the epistemological frameworks through which the Orient and the colonized world were (and continue to be) interpreted and made legible, are part of the problem and lasting legacy of colonialism. Until the epistemological framework itself, as Said is also pointing out, is deconstructed through a decolonial critique it will continue to maintain those power differentials and subject particular peoples to it.

[141] Said, *Orientalism,* 12

Ethnographic methodology and literary expression

Although James Clifford, in his book *The Predicament of Culture,* acknowledges that the discipline of ethnography was fully entangled with colonial methods of cataloguing the colony, nevertheless, he tries to redeem the discipline as a scientifically valid method of understanding people and cultures—of learning truths about them—even if the "truth" obtained through ethnographic methodologies and the science of anthropology are no longer stable and unchallenged by its history.[142] Clifford, however, is speaking about twentieth century ethnography and not nineteenth century texts written by colonial administrators, travelers and missionaries, yet one can see the roots of the modern science in the methods of these initial categorizations of cultures—especially the impetus that led to such cataloging—within present ethnography, even after it has undergone the modifications that Clifford outlines. It is interesting to notice that the colonial roots can be traced even from the self-reflexive reformative impulse of contemporary ethnographic methodology. These modifications and new methodologies, in other words, reveal, in itself, that the origins of ethnography are firmly embedded within colonial power differentials, despite the fact that colonial ethnography was not formalized as a science or a discipline at its outset in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries.

The foremost tool for the ethnographic interpretation of culture is language. As Clifford explains, Margaret Mead is the anthropologist who defined the shape of this tool and how to interpret the data gathered through it. She endorsed that only a rudimentary knowledge of the vernaculars was necessary to interpret a culture and that attaining "virtuosity" in native

[142] Clifford, James: *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature and Art.* (Harvard University Press, 1988), 23, 24

languages was unnecessary. The rationale being that all that was required of the ethnographer was to be able to communicate daily life activities in the native languages in order to establish a rapport with the subjects of observation. She thought, as Clifford continues to explain, that mastering local languages was quite unnecessary for the ends of ethnography which was to classify prototypical specimens of a culture.[143] In contrast, Wilhelm Dilthey's experiential argument proposed that ethnographers immerse themselves in a culture in order to interpret it from within the framework of a "common sphere" of experience. He was, as Clifford points out, one of the first modern theorists to posit that understanding cultures was comparable to the reading of texts. Paul Ricoeur's model, however, provides the most elaborate method of "looking at culture as an assemblage of texts to be interpreted," in which textualization, in fact, becomes a "prerequisite to interpretation."[144] The relationship between text and the world is similar to the philosophical understanding that the world cannot be apprehended directly but must be inferred from its discrete parts; experience is posited as a synecdochic representation of the world. In the second part of Ricoeur's theory, where "'discourse' becomes text," Clifford explains that discourse is situated in the dialogic moment of its occurrence and implies "the presence of the discoursing subject" marked by the pronouns—I and you.[145] In other words, it is a performative act and utterance is also a synecdochic mode of representation. The performer (the person discoursing) becomes, in effect, a "type" who then represents the whole culture. As a representative type, the data need not be ascribed to that particular person, but rather, they merely give voice to "the native point of view," and as such the production, or the research process is separated from the text and a generalized and absolute author is assigned to the work

[143] Clifford, 30
[144] Clifford, 38
[145] Clifford, 39

instead, such as "the native point of view." In effect the process generates not only a "fictive world," as Clifford points out, but also, because ethnographic representation of the discourse lags in time it merely simulates the immediacy of the utterance; it is, in fact an act of translation.[146]

That ethnography is an interpretative account dependent upon the epistemological lens the ethnographer brings to bear, as well as its historical situatedness, is not such a novel disclosure, however, the fact that interpreting a culture is the same as reading a text, or that ethnographic data ought to be converted into (linguistic) signs and symbols allowing it to be read like a text, not only points to the similarities between the literary reading of texts—especially a philological close reading—and ethnographic denotations but it also, quite remarkably, points to similar methods of production. Furthermore, that the vernacular need not be understood completely or contextually, as Margret Mead endorsed, yet nevertheless it can construct a native "type" authoritatively, one that can further be classified as a synecdochic representation, moves perhaps even beyond the ambitions of literary categorizations. The parallels become keener, and the more interesting conclusions to be drawn from Clifford's analysis clearer, when literary texts are structured in similar ways as ethnographic methodology endorses, such as a first-person narrative that produces, or simulates, the voice of the native which becomes representative of the culture as a whole. Kipling's short story, with it Pashto title "Dray Wara Yow Dee," or "All Three are One," published in 1888, is narrated through the voice of its Pathan protagonist—an Afridi from the tribal areas—ostensibly in the vernacular. Told in the first person and as dramatic monologue, the stylistic structure of the text recalls the performative mode that Ricouer outlines, wherein a discoursing subject, marked by the pronouns "I and you," points to not only an authentic native utterance, but it renders the performative act as synecdoche.

[146] Clifford, 40

Even though Kipling did not have even a rudimentary knowledge of the language, nevertheless, the title of the short story—one that is, at least ostensibly, a vernacular proverb—is told in Pashto. Further the stylistic manner of telling the tale simulates the native point of view, and, through this literary device, the protagonist is represented as a prototypical specimen of the Pathans. The nameless Pathan narrator, who is telling his tale to a silent "sahib," or a colonial officer with whom he is apparently on familiar terms, is a monologue simulating as a dialogue; neither the sahib nor any other character has a voice except through the Afridi's responses to their unheard questions. Using the literary technique of dramatic monologue creates not only a sense of intimacy with the narrator but his account also creates the illusion of authenticity, despite the fact that we are told the Pathan is an unreliable narrator, nevertheless, the reader is compelled to view the world from his perspective. Thus, the reader occupies, for the space of story, the world-view of a Pathan, and even the Sahib's silent interjections, objections and questions, do not take away from, but in fact enhance, this "native" perspective. In effect, Kipling creates an ostensibly authentic Pathan way of being in the world, and simultaneously, compels the reader to inhabit it and to step into the shoes of the lawless tribals.

The Afridi narrator is telling his tale to the Sahib while he rests wearily from a long journey through Hindustan. Although he says he is a trader selling dried fruits and horses from Afghanistan and Central Asia—much like the Cochis or Powindahs, the nomadic Pashtun tribes that trade wares from Central Asia and India as they seasonally migrate to different climates and grazing grounds of the region—the story later reveals that not only is the Afridi actually a horse-thief, but he hides an even deeper and more sinister motive for this travels: he is in relentless pursuit of the man who has dishonored and cuckolded him so that he can exact his vengeance. As

a synecdochic representative of tribal Pathans, therefore, the narrator is not only a liar and a thief, but his codes of honor impel him to commit murder which he thinks nothing of.

The Afridi at first feigns outrage at the Sahib's pointed allegations that the horses are stolen, but then, quite quickly, confesses the truth: "Forgive me, my brother. I knew not --- I know not now --- what I say. Yes, I lied to you! I will put dust on my head --- and I am an Afridi!"[147] The passage alludes that although stealing and lying are quite normal for an Afridi he has to tell the truth because he is speaking with an English Sahib, who, as the narrator implies, is a former frontier officer and sees the truth of the matter which elicits the Pathan's confession; the ideal officer gets defined even through his silent articulations. However, the trope of being a "horse thief" can be historically contextualized: it points to the constant raids the tribals carried out against British garrisons in the settled districts, or the North-West Frontier Province, where they especially stole horses belonging to the Indian Army. Although a foremost crime under British Common Law, stealing horses from the English was not considered a crime by the tribes that carried out the raids; on the contrary, it was seen as both a means of survival, because of the harsh blockades against them, and as an attack upon the enemy, one who was, moreover, forcibly trying to dominate them. However, in Kipling's story this context gets translated into a disregard for colonial writ and an intrinsic propensity for lawlessness, to produce the tropes about the Pathans as thieves and criminals.

Therefore, it is quite significant that the Afridi begins the narrative by mocking colonial law, as well as the concept of borders: "Your Law! What is your Law to me? When the horses fight on the runs do they regard the boundary pillars; or do the kites of Ali Musjid forbear

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[147] Kipling, Rudyard, "Dray Wara Yow Dee" in *Black and White*, New York: Lovell, 1899

because the carrion lies under the shadow of the Ghor Kuttri?" The reference is clearly to the boundary pillars erected to mark the Durand Line and also those that demarcate the Tribal Territories from the Province, but it also points to the Frontier Crimes Regulations that enforce colonial laws and inscribe these borders in daily life. The Afridi tribes especially inhabit the lands around the Khyber Pass, which is the most heavily policed part of an already precarious and permeable border because of its status as the "gateway" to empire. However, in the tropology the contempt for colonial laws is translated not just into the Pathan's barbarism, or the pre-civilizational temporality they occupy, but that, in turn, is equated with being in the state of nature: they want the natural freedom that kites and carrion enjoy but which colonial law is curtailing.

However, there are a further set of interrelated tropes that get foregrounded when the main plot of the narrative unfolds, and the Afridi finally divulges the real reason for his exhaustion and disheveled appearance: it is the tireless journey of revenge he has undertaken. In recounting his story to the Sahib, he elucidates how he caught his wife and her lover unawares and although he has already killed his wife he has yet to exact his vengeance against the lover who fled the scene. And he describes the interaction with his wife just before he kills her:

> 'O woman, what is this that thou hast done?' And she, void of fear, though she knew my thought, laughed, saying: 'It is a little thing. I loved him, and *thou* art a dog and cattle-thief coming by night. Strike!' And I, being still blinded by her beauty, for, O my friend, the women of the Abazai are very fair, said: 'Hast thou no fear?' And she answered: 'None --- but only the fear that I do not die.' Then said I: 'Have no fear.' And she bowed her head, and I smote it off at the neck-bone so that it leaped between my feet. Thereafter the rage of our people came upon me, and I hacked off the breasts, that the men of Little Malikand might know the crime, and cast the body into the watercourse that flows to the Kabul river. 17 *Dray wara yow dee! Dray wara yow dee!* The body without the head, the soul without light, and my own darkling heart --- all three are one --- all three are one!

The passage, as well as the overall plot of the short story, illustrates the code of Pashtunwali that has become most famously, or infamously, a marker of the Pathans in countless ethnographies about them: the code of *badal* or "revenge." Although the broader interpretation of the term is "reciprocity," it is translated more commonly in the narrower sense to describe violent retribution as a normative aspect of the Pashtun habitus, and, as such, the code of "*badal"* has become the foremost signifier of the Pathan's inherently violent nature. That the narrator then goes into a frenzy and hacks off his wife's breasts, as a marker of her infidelity, and throws her body into the river only substantiates this intrinsic savagery. While the fact that the woman faces her husband's wrath without fear does not really point to any sort of agency on her part, at least not in Kipling's narrative as she has no voice in the story other than this excerpt,[148] but rather it reinforces the fact that the people are by nature inured to death and killing, while their fearlessness is also an intrinsically racial characteristic. Finally, to round out the tropology of *badal,* the narrator will relentlessly pursue his wife's lover across Hindustan, even unto death, in order to exact retribution, with an almost erotic pleasure: "I will follow him, as a lover follows the footsteps of his mistress, and coming upon him I will take him tenderly."

This tropology of violence is particularly steeped in Bhabha's analytic of ambivalence, denoting both the primitive nature of the Pathan and his martial instincts, so that the racist stereotype functions in "excess" of itself to adjust and reproduce perpetually, modifying according to circumstance. In this case, once again, it also becomes the foil for the colonial officer as a comparative warrior figure. At the end of the narrative the Afridi tries to persuade the

[148] Earlier in the story the narrator reminds the Sahib of their "customs…who sell their wives and their daughters for silver" which is a reference to the tribal custom of a women's dowry, often translated in ethnographic literatures as "bride price." However, it is not often mentioned in ethnographic discourse that a woman's dowry is in fact considered a mark of honor and does not denote that she is chattel for sale, as is portrayed by the narrative.

Sahib to take up his rightful role once more, presumably as a former frontier officer: "Come back with me. Let us return to our own people!" As a "true man" the Pathan can address the British officer as an equal to remind him of his role, both in terms of a warrior and through a matrix of homoerotic desire; he gives voice to the ambivalent yet multivalent colonial desire that inflects the construction of these paired figures.

At the beginning of the short story the narrator informs the Sahib of news on the road that he came across, however, the tenor of the information sounds very close to a surveillance report; it includes information about some Pathans he had encountered whom, he reports, wanted the English to, "send guns and blow the Amir into Hell." The Amir in question is Mohammad Ayub Khan, who led the Afghan forces at the decisive Battle of Maiwand, in 1880, to defeat the British Army during the second Anglo-Afghan war. Expressing imperial desires through the voice of the native is a device that Kipling uses with regularity in his literary works. As this story was published after the second Anglo-Afghan War, the figure of the Pathan, at this point in time, is also informed by that backdrop. Moreover, the Afridi horse trader, especially while voicing this information to the colonial officer, is a precursor for the character of Mahbub Ali, the Pathan horse trader and British spy in *Kim*. Kipling famous novel about India is also set after the second Anglo-Afghan war, but the "big war" obliquely mentioned in that book refers to the first war; a war that preceded "the Mutiny" of 1857 and imprinted itself as a traumatic scar upon the collective British psyche imaginary, in many ways foreshadowing—and most likely inspiring—the sepoy rebellion that followed. Nevertheless, the sense of omnipresent danger which the "Great Game" represents and that pervades the novel is the fact the Durand Line Agreement had already come into effect, (following the second Anglo-Afghan war), and had instigated much resistance against colonial writ on the borders, once again. It is at this time that colonial

representations of the Pathans transmute from noble savages to a treacherous, faithless and violent race of people. As Kim, the protagonist of the novel, says in a moment of fury to Mahbub Ali, ostensibly quoting a vernacular proverb: “Trust a Brahmin before a snake, and a snake before a harlot, and an harlot before a Pathan, Mahbub Ali.”[149] Like the Afridi narrator of “Dray Wara Yow Dee” the character of the Pathan horse trader in *Kim* is laden with tropes of betrayal, lying and deceit, despite the fact that the latter is not just a native collaborator but a major player of the Great Game.

Malcolm Yapp argues that the term the “Great Game” did not have the same salience for Kipling as it acquired in political discourse after World War Two, and that the clash between Kim, the Lama and the Russian and French agents—which denotes Russian and British imperial conflict to control Central Asia—is a relatively minor, tangential incident in the novel. The term instead signifies “secret intelligence work within and outside India,” and, as Yapp goes on to argue, it is more concerned with internal policing rather than with international expansion; it is always used in the novel, as Yapp points out, by Indians (and Kim), when they are speaking in the vernacular and about situations internal to India. In fact, Yapp concludes, that for Kipling the term might only be an abstract concept, “one which ranks with other loaded and capitalized concepts such as the Law, the Road, the Wheel, the River, the Search and, of course, the Way, with which the Game is frequently juxtaposed.”[150]

Although the Way and the Game are often made synonymous in the novel, however, they are far from abstract concepts that have no bearing upon tangible reality; in fact, as a transcendent and omnipresent backdrop it becomes an absolute horizon against which all the

[149] Kipling, Rudyard, *Kim*, Penguin Books, 1989, 158
[150] Yapp, Malcolm, “The Legend of the Great Game,” *Elie Kedourie Memorial Lecture*, SOAS, University of London, 16 May 2000.

characters and the plot are fashioned. So totalizing is the Great Game that Teshoo Lama and his mystical Way are also put in the service of the game; this was historically the case as well as pundits, often disguised as wandering mendicants, were deployed for cartographic mapping, especially in areas perilous for the colonial government to show its face. In 1815 the British East India Company began the Great Trigonometric Survey of India, estimated to take five years it took well over sixty to complete, with the job eventually completed by the British Raj in 1899. The survey measured the heights of the Himalayas, including K2 and Everest, and mapped the frontiers of India bordering China, Tibet, Persia, Central Asia, and Assam. Because the British were forbidden entry into, and could not map certain areas, such as Tibet, or where it was too dangerous for Europeans to travel, such as the tribal and frontier regions, local surveyors called pundits were used instead. They would travel in disguise, often as lamas, with rosary beads used as measuring counters and prayer wheels to hide maps, and with the dual role of cartographic surveyors and intelligence agents. They would also note the peculiarities of the people inhabiting the terrain they were mapping and a rudimentary form of ethnography went hand in hand with the initial cartography of the land. In other words, the pundits gathered relevant information as avant-garde guides for the armies that followed.

As Karen Piper states in her book *Cartographic Fictions*, which looks at the role cartography plays in literature, "in the 'frontier operations' of Asia, England would serve as both definer and implementer of boundaries—defining through cartography and implementing with battalions."[151] As Piper clarifies, even though the triangulation measures were carried out by local surveyors the results of these field observations could only be determined by British superintendents in the Trigonometrical Survey office itself. The pundits were purposely not

[151] Piper, Karen. *Cartographic Fictions: Maps, Race and Identity.* (Rutgers University Press, 2002), 41.

taught how to translate their observations diagrammatically, the purported reason being that Indians would "fabricate fictitious work,"[152] therefore, only Europeans had authority over the delineation of formal maps and the exact co-ordinates of locations in relation to their surroundings; and these cartographical endeavors were characterized as "native enterprise directed by English intelligence."[153] The surveyors often became very wealthy and some even quite famous, such as Pundit Nain Singh Rawat, who received a medal after mapping the Himalayas, and Kinthup, a Tibetan associated with a monastery though not a monk himself. The latter may possibly be the model for Teshoo Lama in *Kim*, as he embarked on a treacherous journey in the 1880's to find the mysterious Tsangpo river which was thought to flow into the Bay of Bengal.

The main players of the Game in *Kim* are also mostly cartographical surveyors, in all likelihood modeled upon the actual pundits of the Trigonometric Survey—pundits who, like E.23, presumably also a Pathan from the North-West Frontier, had no name but only a number and a letter so that their identity would not incriminate the colonial state—who, paradoxically, helped the state to delineate its identity. While it is telling, or perhaps fitting, that Colonel Creighton is both head of the Ethnological Survey and spymaster extraordinaire, orchestrating his multifaceted surveillance operations through the rubric of the Great Game. Surveillance, as the novel illustrates, is closely intertwined with ethnography, cartography and especially with linguistic dexterity. Language, especially fluency in native languages, was not only a mode of mapping an unknown territory and its peoples but also as a means of translating unknowable symbol systems into commonly understood forms of legibility. Because Kim speaks the vernacular like a native he is the exemplary colonial translator; a requisite feature that the literary

[152] Piper, 44
[153] Piper, 48

imperial hero shares with the ideal frontier officer. The hero is rendered heroic precisely by the fact that he can grasp the unfamiliar through his rationality and understanding and masterfully translate it into the world of the familiar. Kim speaks the many languages of Hindustan—although it is unclear which ones precisely—with the ease and inflection of the native to ostensibly become undetectable as an Englishman. Although not the strapping manly figure like most other literary heroes about imperial India, Kim typifies the ideal cartographer-spy because of his unique ability to transform into and become indiscernible as a native, to the extent that he can even think like one and is tormented about his true identity. Nevertheless, his English essence always comes to the rescue of his identity. The conflict in Kim's soul, therefore, is not reflective of a choice between two equally valid worldviews, because the unquestioned nineteenth century premise underlying the novel is, as Said puts it, "the extraordinary status of racial theory, in which it was scientifically proven that the white man stood at the pinnacle of civilization"[154]—in other words, it reflects a fantasy, or a desire in which the white sahib can enjoy the complexities of the Orient without undue anxiety about a loss of an essential self.

Lurgan Sahib too is another white Sahib in the novel who is both linguistically dexterous in the vernaculars and knows more about the native world view than even perhaps the natives, and thus supremely qualified as the spy-trainer. He can fashion even recalcitrant Pathans into loyal citizen-subjects of the Raj, so that Mahbub Ali, who was "a bewildered, impertinent, lying, little North-West Province man"[155] was transformed into a native player of the Game, one that, as the spy master articulates, "never ceases day and night, throughout India." While the Pathan horse trader represents, not just of the figure of the Pathan, but one has transmuted even more considerably than Khoda Dad Khan into another ubiquitous figure in Kipling's novels: the native

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[154] *Kim,* 30
[155] *Kim*, 223

collaborator. Unlike the Pathan in "The Head of the District," however, Mahbub Ali, is neither a tribal nor ambivalent about the cause of empire, but in fact a staunch believer and one of the foremost players in the Great Game. Congratulating Kim and himself on a successful espionage job, he says, "The game is well played. That war is done now, and the evil, we hope, nipped before the flower—thanks to me—and thee."[156] The "evil" is a reference to the tense Anglo-Afghan relations—the historical context is never made clear in the novel—and although many Pashtuns served in the British army, some probably also as spies, it was highly unlikely that they would refer to either of the Anglo-Afghan wars as 'evil.' This interjection, and the general character of Mahbub Ali, especially his zealousness for the "Game," is, once again, Kipling's idealized imperial desire projected unto his literary characters, especially the willing native collaborator without whom, quite tellingly, Kipling implies the Raj would not exist. And because this perspective is articulated through the utterance of the native it acquires a sense of authenticity, at least for the nineteenth century colonial reader. The fact that the Afghan-Pashtun psyche was as scarred by the wars as the British, with a lasting and deep distrust emanating since then in refrains of English duplicity and craftiness, never comes into play in the text. Instead, to cloak the underlying reality of mistrust and animosity, and reshape it according to a colonial imaginary Mahbub Ali states: "'The English do eternally tell the truth,' he said, 'therefore we of this country are eternally made foolish.'"[157] As Edward Said puts it, such "imperialist polemic" leaves behind "the world of history," and seems to, almost magically, want to create the desired imperial reality through an ascription of native utterance. As a Pathan, Mahbub Ali's happy collaboration with the British against his own people—reveals how far Kipling is "from showing

[156] *Kim*, 182
[157] *Kim* 188

two worlds in conflict…that he has studiously given us only one, and eliminated any chance of conflict altogether."[158]

Although a quasi-mythical creation, founded upon desire rather than reality, it, nevertheless, produces a totalizing worldview that shapes and molds all within its purview, and spawns many another fabulous fabrication from this desired imaginary, as effects and reactions, and forms the ground upon which various fantasies of India and, in this case, the Afghans and Pashtuns, are subsequently erected. While occluding from its horizon what makes such fabulous creations possible in the first place, or, what grounds such fantastic desires and allows them to come to life; in the words of Said:

> I call this a fantasy because, as both Kipling and Lawrence endlessly remind us, not one—least of all actual whites and non-whites in the colonies—ever forgets that 'going native' or playing the Great Game are facts built on rock-like foundations, those of European power. Was there ever a native fooled by the blue or green-eyed Kims and Lawrences who passed among the inferior races as agent adventurers? I doubt it, just as I doubt that there existed any white man or woman within the orbit of European imperialism who ever forgot that the discrepancy in power between the white rulers and the native subject was absolute, intended to be unchanging, rooted in cultural, political and economic reality.[159]

However, Yapp questions the "authenticity" of the great game in *Strategies of British India* and asserts that Russia posed no imminent threat to British India. According to the Russians the threat was "simulated" to gain commercial advantage in Central Asia, but Yapp argues, the simulation was designed to cloak British fears of "an internal insurrection," one which could "cause unrest in India" if there were a Russian presence upon its borders. The danger was that Russian influence could spread from Iran into Afghanistan and meeting it would tax the precarious financial resources of British India. The "external enemy" was re-fabricated to

[158] *Kim,* Introduction, 26
[159] *Kim* 44

control "the internal enemy."[160] However, what Yapp glaringly fails to take into account were the two disastrous Anglo-Afghan wars that had already taken place, and which contributed to the construction of the term, the Great Game, both as a construct for internal control but also as a constantly looming sense of disaster upon the imperial horizon.

Contexts of Colonial Ethnography: the Anglo-Afghan Wars and the Tripartite Border

Unlike Kipling's seemingly ahistorical characterizations, ethnographic depictions of the figure of the Pathan can more easily be traced to the ideological colonial contexts of its production. The original seminal ethnography, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* by Mountstuart Elphinstone in 1815,[161] was undertaken when the East India Company sent its first delegation across the Indus River. Written when the Company's interest was not yet significant, this initial yet extensively detailed narrative classifies the Afghan-Pashtuns and maps their terrain in fairly laudatory terms in contrast with later accounts. Although many of the tropes that will acquire derogatory connotations in the future lie latent within it, overall, however, the Pathans are depicted as exemplary noble savages, especially in contrast with the other inhabitants of India Elphinstone denotes them as markedly different. The differences are categorized racially, in obvious keeping with nineteenth century hierarchical racial categorizations that also denoted a temporal situatedness: each race was situated upon a linear, social evolutionary scale. This epistemological framework interprets the data accordingly: the Pathans more robust physical appearance and lighter skin tone denotes their Aryan lineage and hence they are akin to the Europeans, both genealogically and temporally; their fierce sense of autonomy and equality—

[160] Yapp, Malcolm, E. *Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran and Afghanistan 1798-1850*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 14-15.
[161]

they look a stranger directly in the eye—denotes a superior race (to the rest of India); their modest and voluminous dress denotes their more evolved sense of moral consciousness than the "half-naked Hindus."

Interestingly, he compares these "rudimentary virtues" not only to the intrinsic deficiencies of all "Orientals," but from two imaginary perspectives that an Englishman might have of them: firstly, the perspective of an Englishman newly arrived from England, and secondly, the perspective of "an English traveler from India." The Englishman unfamiliar with the Orient would discover a wild land without "productions of human industry and refinement" yet he would also be delighted with "the fertility and populousness" of certain areas and the fact that the land was "laboured with an industry…nowhere surpassed." And although this Englishman would "find it difficult to comprehend how a nation could subsist in such disorder," and without any civic institutions, to pity the people "trained by their unhappy situation to fraud and violence, to rapine, deceit, and revenge," yet, nevertheless, "he would scarce fail to admire their martial and lofty spirit, their hospitality, and their bold and simple manners."[162] Although this initial mapping generates many of the tropes about the Afghans/Pashtuns that subsequently will become derogatory "facts," they are almost equally paired with an admiration for their "many virtues," even through the evaluation of an Englishman unfamiliar with "Asiatics." So that, the lawlessness and autonomy signify that modernity has not yet constrained them; the violence and crimes attributed to the lack of government and police control; the simplicity of and "tribal" lifestyle attributed to their prenatal stage upon the human evolutionary scale. In short, the Pathans are admired through the nineteenth century Romanticist lens of the noble savage that

[162] Elphinstone, 149.

lauds the pre-civilizational stature of humans in contrast with the deformation of spirit caused by civilization and modernity.

More surprisingly, in Elphinstone's description from the perspective of the Englishman from India the Pathans would be viewed with an even "more favourable eye:"

> He would be pleased with the cold climate, elevated by the wild and novel scenery, and delighted by meeting many of the productions of his native land. He would first be struck by the thinness of the fixed population, and then the appearance of the people; not fluttering in white muslins, while half their bodies are naked, but soberly and decently attired in dark coloured woolen clothes; and wrapt up brown mantles, or in large sheep-skin cloaks. He would admire their strong and active forms, their fair complexions and European features; their industry, and enterprise; the hospitality, sobriety, and contempt of pleasure, which appear in their habits; and above all, the independence and energy of their character. In India, he would have left a country where every movement originates in the government or its agents, and where the people absolutely go for nothing; and, he would find himself *among a nation where the controul (sic) of the government is scarcely felt, and where every man appears to pursue his own inclinations, undirected and unrestrained*. Amidst the *stormy independence of this mode of life*, he would regret the ease and security in which the state of India, and even the indolence and timidity of its inhabitants, enable most parts of the country to repose. He would meet with many productions of art and nature that do not exist in India; but, in general, he would find the arts of life less advanced, and many of the luxuries of Hindustan unknown. On the whole, his impression of his new acquaintances would be favourable; although he would feel, that without having lost the ruggedness of a barbarous nation, they were tainted with the vices common to all Asiatics. Yet, he would reckon them virtuous, compared with the people to whom he had been accustomed; would be inclined to regard them with interest and kindness; and could scarcely deny them a portion of his esteem."[163] (My italics)

It is telling that "sobriety" and a "contempt for pleasure" would be counted as virtues by the Englishman from India, but what is more telling is his admiration for the "stormy independence," one that is, even in Elphinstone's description, an anarchic way of life. The lack of any kind of state control and a people who follow their own codes of conduct, one which also imbues them with a profound sense of self-direction and egalitarianism, become progressively

[163] Elphinstone, 150

denigrating tropes in colonial ethnography but rarely considered admirable characteristics as they are in this account. So that for a bureaucrat of the East India Company, one who would become Lieutenant-Governor of Bombay in 1827 and credited with introducing state education in India, to be so admiring of the autonomy generated by "this mode of life" is not just remarkable but also quite telling on many accounts: it points mainly to the fact that the real crux of both the admiration—at this stage—and the problem, progressively onwards in time, was precisely this particular way of life.

The first attempt by the British East India Company to safeguard the western gateway of India from possible external influence—the French being the major threat at this point with Napoleonic power at its height—was through Elphinstone's diplomatic mission to Afghanistan in 1808. His delegation was sent to solicit the Afghan Amir, Shah Shuja Durrani, however, as the winter "Court of Caubal" of the Durrani rulers was in Peshawar, Elphinstone did not venture much further than that city, and certainly not into the heart of (present day) Afghanistan. Shah Shuja was being solicited by the British in favor of Dost Mohammad Khan, who, also vying for the Afghan throne, was not unfavorable to the behests of the Company. However, instead of focusing on a discussion of policy, Elphinstone is far more taken by the appearance of the Afghan on his first meeting, bedazzled by the jewels that the Amir is adorned with:

> We thought at first that he had on armour of jewels…his real dress to consist of a green tunic, with large flowers in gold, and precious stones, over which were a large breast plate of diamonds, shaped like two flattened fleur de lis, an ornament of the same kind on each thigh, large emerald bracelets on the arms (above the elbow), and many other jewels in different places. In one of the bracelets was the Cohi Noor, known to be one of the largest diamonds in the world. There were also some strings of very large pearls, put on like cross belts, but loose. The crown was about nine inches high, not ornamented with jewels as European crowns are, but to appearance entirely formed of those precious materials. It seemed to be radiated like ancient crowns, and behind the rays appeared peaks of purple velvet: some small branches with pendants, seemed to project from the crown; but the

> whole was so complicated, and so dazzling, that it was difficult to understand, and impossible to describe.

The description of the Prince's magnificent appearance continues for another three pages in the book as they meet in private afterwards in the Balla Hissar, or the Fort where the Afghan monarch's resided when in Peshawar. The Koh-i-Nur diamond famously exchanges hands with each conquest of Peshawar: first appropriated by Ranjit Singh when he captured the city from the Afghans and in exchange for Shah Shuja's freedom, and then by the British when they took over the rule of the Punjab after the Maharaja's death. Peshawar and what later was called the North-West Frontier Province was administered as part of the Punjab until 1901.

The relatively brief description of the political discussion with the Amir, who, according to Elphinstone not only had the "manners of gentleman" but was also "anxious to please," is completed in the Introduction to the almost 700-page book. Written in a fluid, gracious and easily readable style, the rest of the book is devoted to a compendium of other topics: a cartographical survey of the area; an excruciatingly detailed ethnographic survey of the Afghans, especially focusing on the tribal configurations and relationships between them; a survey of the surrounding provinces of Balkh, Herat, Sistan, Baluchistan, Sind and Kashmir; several chapters devoted to the governmental and administrative organization of Afghanistan; many, even more excruciatingly detailed, appendices on the biographies of recent Afghan rulers; a memoir of one of the cartographical surveyors who was also part of the mission; and, last but certainly not least, a Pashto glossary. Such all-encompassing narrations by government officials, or soldier-scholars, was to become the norm in India, and, apart from its role as the avant-garde of colonial forces, it established its authors as authoritative voices on the area, whose categorizations would inform understandings of those people henceforward in time. And the vocabulary of definitive tropes it generates take up a life of its own often till the present day; almost impossible to erase

or transcend they define, what Curzon called the "political geography" that concerned modern statecraft, or the classification of peoples alongside with the fortification of borders.

Most of India's borders were defined by natural boundaries except for the geographically porous northwest; the early nineteenth century alliance with the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh, who controlled the Peshawar Valley, the Punjab, Kashmir and the trans-Indus territories, established a buffer zone for the British who, till then, only had control up to the Sutlej River. Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who was originally appointed governor of Punjab by the Afghan Amir, Zaman Shah Durrani, gained these territories when Afghanistan went into civil war after the death of the succeeding ruler, Ahmad Shah Durrani. This is when Afghanistan assumed its strategic status as a territory to be controlled not just for the lucrative Central Asian trade, that was perhaps the foremost consideration for the British behind the diplomatic maneuverings of the Great Game, but ostensibly against Russian and French expansionist desires.

Shortly after Elphinstone negotiated an Anglo-Afghan alliance in Peshawar, Shah Shuja was ousted as Amir of Afghanistan but, while taking refuge in India, he continued to be favored for the Afghan throne for the next twenty-three years in several schemes orchestrated by the British. Shah Shuja was seen as the means to firmly establish the Afghan nation in the British "sphere of influence," however reinstalling the unpopular former monarch as Amir led to the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1839, despite strenuous negotiations undertaken by Alexander Burnes with the populist leader Dost Mohammad Khan. Burnes, who was appointed British envoy to Kabul in 1837, but actually serving as an undercover political agent upon the wild frontiers of empire, also embodies the ideal colonial figure: a young Highland Scot who, as adventurer/traveler, had spent a decade in India in the service of the Company Bahadur and was

also, apparently, fluent in Persian and Hindustani.[164] Acting as liaison between Dost Mohammad, and his desire to form an alliance with the British, and the governor-general of India, Lord Auckland, who was sympathetic to Shah Shuja's cause, Burnes' efforts, appeals and attempts at persuasion were constantly rebuffed. Disappointed by the British reaction and angered by their support for Ranjit Singh who occupied the city of Peshawar—a historical stronghold and the winter capital of the Afghan rulers—Dost Mohammad Khan became amenable to solicitations by the Tsar's envoy who was also present in Kabul during Burnes' stay. Although the tenuous alliance was more an act of necessity than of treachery, as the British later portrayed it, Lord Auckland's Simla Manifesto of 1838 overtly stated that in order to secure the north-west frontier of India the ruler of Afghanistan had to be an ally of the British. This, according to Antionette Burton, "was not exactly a declaration of war against Barakzai rule, though it was a pretext for intervention in Afghanistan. Failing to garner Dost Mohammad's cooperation, in March of 1839 Sir Willoughby Cotton's advance through the Bolan Pass, installed Shuja as the new emir, and occupied Kabul."[165]

After his somewhat self-aggrandizing overtures to Kabul, and pragmatic entreaties to the Government of India failed to achieve the political ends he desired, Burnes returned to Peshawar in 1838 where he wrote an account of his travels and mission, *Cabool: A Personal Narrative.*[166] Although not as all-encompassing as Elphinstone's account, this ethnography is also a detailed travelogue and topographical sketch of the Afghan nation, written in the standard format of colonial narratives. Burnes begins with the requisite cartographical survey,[167] followed by a

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[164] See William Dalrymple, *Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013. pp., 56-66
[165] Burton, The First Anglo-Afghan Wars, 3
[166] Burnes, Alexander. *Cabool: A Personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in that City, in the years 1836,7, and 8.* (London: John Murray, 1843).
[167] Burnes, especially Chapter VI, 119.

descriptive commentary upon the fecundity (or lack thereof) of the land—seen through the lens of its economic productive capacity—and, unusually in this account, the industrious nature of the Afghans.[168] In comparison with Elphinstone, the most discernible change is the tone and tenor of Burnes' work: the voice no longer assumes an unaffected, lofty impartiality of the former but acquires a much more guileful preoccupation with the land and its people, not-withstanding the personal style of both authors. And although the latter work is also premised upon racial hierarchy, in this account the assumption is not stated simply as fact but has the specific end of justifying British domination; further, this assumption clouds discernment and phenomenological perception to the extent that, in an unpleasantly self-aggrandizing tone, Burnes believes the natives will welcome British rule with open arms.

To substantiate his assumptions Burnes quotes an Afghan who apparently advises him on how the British should deal with Afghanistan: "You stand aloof from us, but you will be unable to continue this course: our country is good, but it is without a head; and, like a beautiful widow, it voluntarily avows her attachment to you, and you cannot refuse to accept her as a wife."[169] Orientalist discourse is rife with images of the colonized as feminine who willingly, or not, must submit to the colonial master. Often depicted as a penetration into the culture, this discourse justified colonial domination through, simultaneously, the construction of normative gender; in Burnes' words the Afghan transmute themselves into the ideal feminine, desiring such a patriarch and wanting to submit as one of the many wives of the British empire. The text, obviously aimed at persuading the Indian government to give credence to his views and follow through with his recommendations, nevertheless, deploys metaphors that not only recall

[168] Burnes, 154. Usually colonial accounts comment upon the fecundity and productive potential of the land and generally always juxtapose it with remarks about the laziness and unproductiveness of the people.
[169] Burnes, 270.

Kipling's literary texts that create the desired imperial imaginary—in the belief that representation will manifest into reality—but, in this case, it did translate into tangible effect: the outbreak of the first Anglo-Afghan war where the Indian government actually believed they would be welcomed with affection by the Afghans.

The most significant difference to Elphinstone, however, is that Burnes' ethnographic texts was amongst the first to definitively shape the tropology of "the figure of the Pathan;" tropes that have since gained stature as "facts" through its repetitive deployment. Heralding Kipling's "The Amir's Homily," that was written about sixty years later, this is one of the earliest accounts that make the Pathan synonymous with wild beasts and, moreover, paired with the British colonizer, define the latter as masterful in stark contrast:

> The Afghan invasions of India were not made by open warfare: they were as the prowling of wild beasts after their prey; and, like them, the invaders were contented secretly, and by surprise to obtain their spoil and drag it back to their dens. Happily, neither the Afghan, nor his neighbour the Tartar, any longer dares to ravage the land. British supremacy now hems them within their own limits; and the vast power which we have established brings these nations as suitors for our alliance, instead of invaders of our territory.[170]

The contrast of metaphors is, of course, obvious and telling: prowling wild beasts, who maraud and ravage the land, in contrast with a superior ordering system that clearly demarcates the land—hemming in and enclosing wild beasts in their pens—defines British dominion as a powerful civilizing force. And, once again, the tropology simultaneously delineates normative gender, this time through ambivalently homoerotic imagery: British mastery becomes an object of conjugal desire to which the natives willingly subjugate themselves.

Burnes later returned to the garrisoned city of Kabul as political agent in 1839, after Dost Mohammad Khan had been ousted and was allowed an "honourable" exile to India. But the

[170] Burnes, 274-5.

British did not foresee the unpopularity with which Shah Shuja would be received by the Afghan's, not only because the former Amir had been popular and was forcibly removed, but precisely because the latter was perceived as a puppet monarch. As such, the British had to maintain a number of Indian army garrisons in order to uphold the monarch's tenuous rule in Kabul, with accelerating Afghan discontent and suspicion catching them unaware when it reached its disastrous pinnacle, perhaps far too easily believing Burnes' account of the willing and desirous Afghan subject. In the subsequent uprising Burnes was, ironically, or justifiably, one of the first to be killed as he tried to mollify a rowdy crowd in Dari. And because the British forces were blockaded on all sides, the troops were massacred when they tried to withdraw back into India through the narrow passes.

Although most of the women and some of the native troops survived, the iconic image that is forever etched in the British imagination about the first Anglo-Afghan war is Elizabeth Butler's painting of Dr. Brydon: "The Remnants of an Army" depicts a wounded and weary rider, in a desolate desert landscape, as the sole survivor of the British cantonment in Kabul. The British were so unwilling and unprepared for such an eventuality that the psychological wounds inflicted by this war continue to reverberate through different mediums in colonial texts. Even though the Indian Army returned to Kabul in 1842 and retaliated with great vengeance, pillaging and burning the city—with General Roberts leading several campaigns against the Afghans to inflict a brutal retribution strategy to mollify them—nevertheless, according to Charles Lindholm, the humiliating British defeat of 1841 forever scared the confident colonial self and their "sense of manifest destiny;"[171] further Burnes' death, who was "an immensely popular figure in British imagination," had a profound effect in the metropole even at that time.

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[171] Lindholm, Charles. *Frontier Perspectives: Essays in Comparative Anthropology.* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 8.

Moreover, events leading up to, and especially the after-effects of this war, also deeply scared the Afghan and Pashtun psyche, who henceforth became immensely suspicious of British schemes and averse to their designs upon their lands or the policies that manipulated their rulers. But most crucially, the first Anglo-Afghan war shattered the myth of colonial invincibility, rippling into the Indian army and affecting the sepoys courage to revolt in 1857. Thereby colonial frontier policy was primarily aimed at producing bulwarks against the reoccurrence of such scenarios, with an acute suspicion of the Pathans/Afghan intentions towards them ever since.

Surprisingly, however, the "forward policy" regained momentum only a few years after proponents of the "closed border policy" blamed the Afghan war on such a precedent. The expansionist imperial desire was re-galvanized by Russian control of the mouth of the great waterway, Syr Darya in 1853, and of Samarkand in 1868. But more paramount was the desire to reestablish their northwest frontier, in the form of a quasi-protectorate, within the British sphere of influence. This was initiated by tentative talks with Amir Sher Ali Khan (son of Dost Mohammad Khan) around 1868, and a British mission was reestablished in Kabul two years later. Thereby a new scheme to expand British control was firmly underway, but this also necessitated that Afghanistan be structured like a modern-nation state, with definable borders and a foreign policy that served British imperial interests. However, the endeavor to extend, or push forward the Indian frontier via diplomatic means went as awry as the attempt through physical means had done. Written right before the second Anglo-Afghan war, Henry Bellew's ethnography, *Afghanistan and the Afghans,* gives the rationale for these maneuvers.[172]

[172] Bellew, H. W. *Afghanistan and the Afghans: Being a Brief Review of the History of the Country and Account of its People with a Special Reference to The Present Crisis and War with the Amir Sher Ali Khan*. (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1979—originally published 1879)

Born in 1834 in India, Bellew was a British medical officer appointed first as an assistant surgeon to the Bengal army and later as Surgeon-General of India. In the interim he was sent on a mission to Afghanistan where he learnt enough Pashto to write a number of books on the language, including the first dictionary and grammar of Pashto into English, and, as such, became an authority figure on the ethnography of the people. In his book he describes the sorry state of affairs in Afghanistan by way of explaining, and justifying, the British government's firm measures against the recalcitrant and ungrateful Sher Ali Khan, and why they ought to both take control of the country directly and demarcate the frontier much more definitively. According to Bellew, what triggered the onset of this crisis was Sher Ali's impertinent contempt that signaled a "warlike action" by "the premeditated and unprovoked insult of a spoiled and petted barbarian neighbour"[173]: the Amir had refused the Viceroy's invitation to attend the Imperial Assemblage of 1877 in Delhi. Bellew's tone, throughout the book, is a bizarre mixture of an acrimonious, autocratic patriarch and a petulant, jilted paramour who cannot quite comprehend how a purported vassal of the British Empire could act with such audaciousness and treachery. Thereby, as Bellew remarks with biting sarcasm, "our erstwhile professed ally and friend" amply demonstrated the "proverbial fickleness and faithlessness of the Afghan."[174] Although the defeat is never directly mentioned, the specter of the first Afghan war obviously produce these perceptions, nevertheless, it also produces the tropes of betrayal and treachery around the figure of the Pathan, one that at this time in history get quite firmly established as "truths." In contrast, British coercion is defined as "the mollifying and salutary influence of a long-suffering patience and conciliatory goodwill," who forbear to "coerce the Afghan

[173] Bellew, 6
[174] Bellew, 13-14

authorities into proper subordination."[175] Never mentioning the disastrous consequences of Burnes' mission to Kabul, it is described instead as "the prelude to a new phase in the history of Afghanistan" catapulting the nation into the pivotal role it now played in Central Asia, and its "increasing interest to the nations of the world."[176]

Along with outlining the contours of the great game, and the necessity for the British and the Afghans to play it, there enters into this discourse of empire a strident new note of antipathy against Islam, one that also strongly colored perceptions of the region from then on.

> The opening out of this close-shut region, the petty principalities of which were ever varying in limits, and ever at war amongst themselves, and in which, without exception, the fanatic bigotry and ignorance of an exclusive and intolerant Islam racked the land with anarchy and oppression, and enslaved the people in chains forged by an arrogant and jealous priesthood—the opening out of this region was destined sooner or later, but infallibly, nevertheless, to involve the two Great European Powers, whose might and greatness were inseparably connected with their conquests and empire on the broad field of the Asiatic continent in a vigilant and jealous rivalry for the maintenance of a just equilibrium."[177]

Both these themes run throughout the book: an oppressive Islam that keeps the populace bound to a medieval age (while only elliptically mentioning, at this ethnographic stage, that it incites people to violence), and the need to clearly delineate and safeguard the borders of the British Empire, which Bellew envisions are directly contiguous with the Russian Empire—a "natural geographical and ethnological and political boundary between the Tartar and Aryan races."[178] Transmuting tropes of the figure of the Pathan from natural or racial ones, such as noble savages or wild animals, to socially constructed ones: it is Islam, their tribal structures, fanatical priests, incompetent and unjust rulers that produce the conditions of "anarchy and oppression." Such a

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[175] Bellew, 15
[176] Bellew, 42
[177] Bellew, 42-43
[178] Bellew, 44

premise logically leads to the conclusion that Bellew's argument is obviously aiming at: alternate socio-political systems than the ones the Afghans have must be installed, both to serve imperial goals and, justifying such an imposition, to reform, liberate and incorporate the people into the modern world.

To liberate the Afghan populace from the shackles of their oppressive, Muslim rulers, Bellew states, a natural boundary between the two Empires, and between the two races, needs to be created—implying that Afghanistan would serve as the ideal boundary between the British and Russian empires; also, he continues to argue, in fortifying the nation along modern lines (with clearly demarcated borders) would "open" up the region to serve their imperial designs even further. According to Bellew, even Dost Mohammad Khan, who was a popular and successful ruler greatly admired by his own people, "did nothing to improve the condition or advance the domestic welfare of the people" during his long reign, but instead he kept his country as "a close borough of Islam, stationary in the ignorance of the middle ages, and pervaded with the religious bigotry of that period."[179] Completely obfuscating how Dost Mohammad Khan was ousted, Bellew states, that unlike Sher Ali Khan the former ruler at least had the good judgment to ally himself with the British—one who was "a barbarian nevertheless"[180]—while the present ruler, who is more deeply indebted to the British for his undisturbed, prosperous rule, has imprudently rejected British friendship, an imprudence "which is condemned by a very large portion of his own subjects."[181] According to bazaar reports and the gossip of Afghan traders coming into India, (as the road to Kabul was closed to foreigners at this time), Bellew states that the people strongly disapproved of Sher Ali's conduct towards the

[179] Bellew, 97-98
[180] Bellew, 99
[181] Bellew, 174

British, and while the "Englishman, officially denounced at Kabul as the infidel and all that was vile, was spoken of by these people, away from the restraint of their rulers, as the patron of justice and the herald of peace and prosperity. Whilst the Amir Sher Ali, at no time a popular ruler, was upbraided for his ingratitude and faithlessness, abused for his tyrannous oppression, and viewed as a traitor for admitting the Russians into Afghanistan."[182]

That Bellew is quite transparently laying the justificatory ground for another British attempt to control Afghanistan directly is far too obvious, and like all such attempts is explained as a mission championing the common people, yet it shares in Burnes' astoundingly sincere belief that the populace would actually herald them as saviors. One wonders at the judgment (or lack of it) displayed by such beliefs, particularly those portraying the Afghans as a desiring subject after the catastrophic consequences of prior attempts to do so. And yet there is a new, even more thick veneer of hubris in the self-representations of the British visible through Bellew's rhetoric, one that has also considerably evolved since Burnes' more obvious but shallow self-aggrandizements.

Bellew also admits that the British may be at fault in arousing Sher Ali's ire,[183] as the Amir became "highly incensed" when, through British arbitration, the Sistan was handed over to Persia instead of to Afghanistan. The Afghan Amir was further angered by the constant British interference in the internal affairs of the state, which Bellew states, were merely measures of self-defense to "resist by force and punish from time to time the raids of his independent tribesmen along the frontier." However, these complaints are dismissed as the petulance of a petty barbarian prince because, "the orderly settlement and material development" of Afghanistan could not have occurred without the British "pressing very necessary reforms upon

[182] Bellew, 146-47
[183] Bellew, 123-135.

them" while making "so conciliatory a deference to their lawless proclivities;" so that, as Bellew concludes, the balance tips greatly in favor of the "Sirkar" ruling the country. [184] Not only because the Afghans themselves desire British rule and the benefits of civilization long denied them by their own (Muslim) rulers, but—and here Bellew finally gets to the crux of his long drawn-out rhetoric—it is an opportunity to "settle the question of our Indian frontier" once and for all.

> Finally, it will illustrate the error of trusting—without adequate guarantee, as we have done—the safety and peace of the Empire to the hands of a barbarous and untrustworthy neighbour, who claims all manner of support and assistance as the guardians of its most important frontiers, and *yet scorns control* and the free communication absolutely necessary under the altered circumstances of his position, not only to the prosperity of his own kingdom, but to the well-being of the paramount Empire, and who holds himself at liberty to dispose of his country and his power for or against the Empire to which he owes his very existence, as it may seem to suit his own fancy or ambition—forgetful alike of past favours, and the value of the friendship he has rejected. [185]

Keeping Afghanistan within its sphere of influence, and making sure rulers beholden to the British govern according to imperial decrees, is no longer the way to control a recalcitrant people, but instead Bellew envisions direct control: calling for garrisons at Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Balkh, which he thinks will not only pacify Afghanistan and allow the people to "devote themselves to industry and the profits of a for long untilled soil,"[186] but it would also definitively secure, establish, and enlarge India's frontiers.

Although there are several colonial accounts about the second Anglo-Afghan, which lasted far longer than the previous one, from about 1878 to 1880, it is only expected that any losses, or on the contrary, Pashtun/Afghan victories are hardly ever recorded; colonial defeats are

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[184] Bellew, 134
[185] Bellew, 229-30
[186] Bellew, 178

recounted only by way of instruction in the errors of judgement that led to them, generally blamed upon an individual or mistaken political policy. That indigenous resistance to colonial forces was at times far superior is never even tacitly conceded. However, taking for granted that such silences are the norm in histories written from a position of power, it is, however, even more telling that any women that may have been part of the resistance are completely disregarded, even as anecdote or recounting folk tales.[187] The quasi-legendary figure of Malalai of Maiwand is a case in point, although there are several articulations about this decisive battle that turned the tide in the second Anglo-Afghan war in favor of the Afghans, including a poem by Kipling titled "That Day" written in 1892, and by the Scottish poet, William McGonagall, "The Last Berkshire Eleven." As oral Pashto accounts state, the Battle of Maiwand, fought in the summer of 1880 near Kandahar, was going in favor of the overwhelming British forces when a young girl, whose father and fiancé were fighting alongside with Ayub Khan, (ruler of Herat and Sher Ali Khan's son), rallied the dispirited Afghan forces to victory. As the Afghan troops were losing the will to fight after suffering heavy losses, Malalai is said to have picked up either the Afghan flag when it fell, or she took off her chador (veil) and made it into a rallying flag and taunted the troops with a *tapâā*, or a distinctive style of short verse spontaneously articulated by women. The *tapâā* pointed to the soldiers cowardice and shame if they did not fight the British. She is also said to have sung a *landāi,* or another specific short verse form, praising the brave for dying in defense of their land. She was killed in battle and buried in her native village of Khig where her grave has turned into a shrine. She remains a revered figure in Afghanistan, where the highest award for women is called the "Malalai, Heroine of Maiwand Medal," and with many public institutions, roads and girls named after her. Yet her prowess and tale remain silent in

[187] There is a recent book about the battle that does tell of the "Legend of Malalai," by Edmund Yorke, *Maiwand 1880: Battle Story*. Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2013, 149.

colonial literature, and apart from a couple of present-day texts, popular accounts about Afghanistan, especially those concerned with the subjugation of Afghan women, likely have not heard of the national legend either.

Fearful of Sher Ali Khan's intentions the British occupied Quetta, officially a part of Afghanistan at the time, and when the Afghan Amir refused access to Lord Lytton's mission to Kabul through the blockaded Khyber Pass, it was considered the final insult and the colonial government attacked Kabul, triggering the two yearlong second Anglo-Afghan. The British engaged the Afghans with a much larger army this time around and although they did not win an outright military victory, and in fact lost many battles, uprising and revolts—the Battle of Maiwand being the most famous and decisive one—they did, at the end of the day, incorporate Afghanistan more or less permanently into the British sphere of influence. However, Bellew's fervent desire that India expand its frontiers by controlling the country outright did not materialize, and in fact, the colonial government had to concede that there would be no direct British presence or interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, however, this was conceded in exchange for directing Afghan foreign policy. Moreover, they negotiated favorable terms with the new ruler Abdur Rahman Khan, grandson of Dost Mohammad Khan, as Sher Ali Khan had sought political asylum in Russia during the British attack on Kabul, and it was the new Amir who has since become, famous, or infamous, for signing the Durand Line Agreement three years after the end of the war —which he later claimed was done under British duress. Although the British could not directly rule Afghanistan as Bellew (and others) had hoped, they did gain their objectives in establishing a "scientific" border and turned Afghanistan into a quasi-protectorate state. While the Durand demarcation was aimed at dividing a people it could not

otherwise control or govern, it was an attempt do so through the legitimacy of political agreements.

According to Sir Mortimer Durand it was very important that the Agreement reached with Amir Abdur Rahman be “a really friendly settlement,” and not forced upon the Afghan, but instead be “the result of mutual concessions” that were “freely and willingly accepted by him.” As he states in the official letter accompanying the dispatch of the Agreement, the main thrust of the settlement was that the Amir would not interfere with the “Bajauris, Afridis, Waziris, Kakars, and other tribes on our frontier,” though the “amount of independent territory surrendered on both sides” is “very largely in our favour, and gives us practically a free hand in dealing with the frontier tribes for the future.” But also telling is Durand’s recommendation: “It is important that steps should be taken without much delay to cinch the agreement by demarcation, where demarcation may be desirable and possible, or some of the advantages of the settlement may be lost.”[188]

Not only did this agreement define the borders of imperial India and Afghanistan henceforward in time but it also, more crucially, divided some of the most restive tribes on either side of it. Furthermore, the agreement allotted the larger portion of the as yet autonomous tribal territories to India which, in effect, extended the imperial state so that its writ could, with

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[188] *The Durand Line Border Agreement*, 1893. Edited by S. Fida Yonus. (University of Peshawar press, 2003), pgs. 18 &19. Copies of the Agreement and documents accompanying the settlement are included in this publication, the quotes above and following are from the letter of Sir H.M. Durand wrote from Calcutta to W.J. Cunningham, dated 20th December 1893, paragraph 14 &15.
Also, an interesting side note is Durand’s depiction of the Afghan soldier: “It need hardly be said that, from an English point of view, Afghan troops are not smart. If you speak to an officer, the men within hearing will freely join the conversation. When escorting you along a road, men will fall out as they please to chat with a friend or say their prayers. A guard, if taken by surprise, would often turn out and present arms with their rifles in their covers. The sentries would fall into various easy and picturesque attitudes, putting down their rifles if it was cold, to warm their hands over a fire, or, in the Jallalabad valley when the sun was hot, sling their rifles over their backs and opening an umbrella. Nevertheless, the Afghan troops, so far as I could judge, seemed to me to be very good material; they are strong and healthy, and I should say capable of enduring great privations.” (Paragraph 25, pg. 29)

legitimacy, be extended there as well. The Durand Line Agreement was, in short, a maneuver to enforce the laws of the colonial state upon a land that had, in fact, been an independent, nonstate space until then, and transmuted a fuzzy frontier space, and one of the main thoroughfares to India, into a definitive, scientific border; a border which remains contentious till this day.

Cinching the agreement and marking the demarcation on the ground, as Durand endorsed, however, was neither as easy as drawing a political agreement or inscribing the line upon a map, nor did the Pashtun tribes accept the legitimacy of colonial writ quietly. Insurgencies broke out in many parts of the Tribal Territories, including an extended attack on the British garrison in Malakand in 1897, led by Mullah Saidullah whom the British called the "Mad Fakir" or the "Mad Mullah"—recalling Kipling's "Blind Mullah" who was also a priest that led the insurrection against the British in "The Head of the District." As a twenty-two-year-old press correspondent, Winston Churchill was attached to the expeditionary force sent to relieve the British garrison and wrote newspaper articles for The Daily Telegraph reporting the siege, which were later published as a book, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force*.[189] His emblematic bombastic style was well established even in this early work; a style generously laced with his supremely confident bravado and the triumphalism of a proud subject of the British Empire. More striking though is the evolution of the figure of the Pathan in his account, as the tropology now included derogatory depictions of Islam which become inextricable with the racial characteristics of the figure from then on. Even though Bellew had also made pejorative remarks about the role Islam played in keeping the populace subjugated in a medieval and tyrannical

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[189] Churchill, Winston. *The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War*. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1898)

system, nevertheless, Churchill's descriptions sound a much more dangerous view: Muslims are intrinsically fanatical and violent. Thereby the tropology of colonial ethnography has not only transmuted the Pathan from the figure of the noble savage into simply a savage, but because of their faith they now also exist in a perpetual Hobbesian state of, in Churchill's words, "warlike leisure."[190]

> Every influence, every motive, that provokes the spirit of murder among men, impels these mountaineers to deeds of treachery and violence. The strong aboriginal propensity to kill, inherent in all human beings, has in these valleys been preserved in unexampled strength and vigour. That religion that was above all else founded and propagated by the sword—the tenets and principles of which are instinct with incentives to slaughter and which in three continents has produced fighting breeds of men—stimulates a wild and merciless fanaticism.[191]

Not only are the Pathans anthropological specimens of a prehistoric and pre-civilizational era, but, as such, they validate the Hobbesian theory that human nature is inherently violent in a state of nature; with its coupling with Islam, that somehow fosters these primal instincts to new heights of barbarism, a tropology of a people is produced that dehumanizes them almost completely—a view of Muslims that sounds quite contemporary in its resonance, and which Churchill's newspaper publications, amongst others, helped disseminate in mainstream consciousness. The figure of the Pathan becomes doubly damned: not only because of the intrinsic violence of human nature outside of state control but also their zealous religiosity fosters such natural instincts.

Recalling Kipling again, the historical context for the uprising never enters Churchill's narrative, except obliquely, illustrating once again the interconnections between the literary and ethnographic representations. Instead, Churchill attributes the cause to "the warlike nature of the people and their hatred of control," which creates, he states, "such a disposition, combined with

[190] Churchill, 22
[191] Churchill, 23

an absolute lack of reverence for all forms of law and authority;" however—and here he gets to the heart of the problem—it is the Pathans "complete assurance of equality" that is the real "cause of their frequent quarrels with the British."[192]

When unpacked from the turgid rhetoric framing the ubiquitous Orientalist allusions, Churchill's text encodes a counter narrative, to call upon Ranajit Guha's methodology of reading the unwritten and the unsaid, yet the implicit, in colonial literature: the Pashtuns operate outside the bounds of modern state laws; a democratic spirit disallows a meek submission to colonial authority; and a sense of egalitarianism does not recognize the British as superior or their masters. Although it is not so straightforwardly portrayed; the Pashtun code of conduct that Elphinstone admired and denoted as an unusual independence of spirit is now characterized as a, "system of ethics, which regards treachery and violence as virtues rather than vices," one that "has produced a code of honour so strange and inconsistent" as to be "incomprehensible to a logical mind."[193] Yet it is precisely this code that seems to rub Churchill most uncomfortably the wrong way and, in pointing to it as the root of Pashtun waywardness, merits his most grandiloquent disparagement. In reading these oblique references against the grain, the codes denote much more than an impediment to the exercise of colonial authority but rather, what Churchill calls an alternate system of ethics is precisely that: an alternate and antithetical way of being-living than that which the colonial state wanted to structure—and by logical extension what modern statecraft deems normative. It is in this sense that Pashtun disobedience to laws other than their own becomes a profoundly anarchic threat, and, therefore it is grounds that generate the antithetical modes that were (and are) being opposed, pacified and contained within the bounds—quite literally through the enforcement of borders—of the colonial state. In other

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[192] Churchill, 25
[193] Churchill, 26

words, the normative codes that give rise to Pashtun difference are being disfigured because they point to an epistemological, and an ideological, incommensurability with colonial law. As Fowler articulates, the trope of the lawless frontier was consistently presented as "the antistudy of British India in its approach to law and order."[194]

Even in subsequent, ostensibly positive descriptions of the Pathans this historically fashioned tropology not only reincarnates but becomes a totalizing interpretative lens, so that even literary translations are not exempt from being made legible through it. The last, and perhaps the most famous ethnographic tomes written by colonial soldier-scholars was Olaf Caroe's *The Pathans.* Serving as Governor of the Province right before the partition of India, and responsible for relentlessly suppressing the KK movement—who accuse him of favoring the Frontier Muslim League and pushing for the creation of Pakistan—is, once again, considered an authoritative scholar because of his knowledge of Pashto. Because of his knowledge of the vernacular he also translated a number of poems by the famous Pashtun poet Khushal Khan Khattak, alongside with Evelyn Howell, another colonial officer who served as a Political Agent in the Tribal Territories.[195] Not only do they publish a book together devoted solely to translations of the poems, but a number of these translations are included in Caroe's voluminous ethnography as well.

One of the poems, "Spring Thoughts," (number 15 in the book with Howell) is given as an example of a quintessential Khushal poem, which, Caroe states, he translated into heroic rhymed couplets to recreate the spirit of the original ghazal form.[196] However, the static form of the translation neither recreates the original metrical scheme nor the poems meaning with any

[194] Fowler 57-58
[195] *The Poems of Khushhal Khan Khattak,* with English translations by Evelyn Howell and Olaf Caroe. Peshawar University Press, 1963 (98pp)
[196] Caroe, Olaf Sir. *The Pathans.* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1958), 236

accuracy but, in fact, recrafts the verses into English by reading them through the tropology of the Pathan. Comparing a literal translation (that I have done) of the seventh and eighth *shirs* of the poem with Caroe's rendition elucidates this interpretative lens: "Pukhtun youth have again reddened their hands / Like the falcons talons when it hunts / Black and white the flower meadows are made with blood/ In midsummer (June-July) the buds become tulip fields." Whereas, Caroe's translation reads: "These years our tulips flower a richer red / Incarnadined with blood our foes have shed, / Hawk-like our warriors dip their hands in gore / And flush their swords that were so pale before." Although the inadequate translation could be attributed to an insufficient command of Pashto, despite Caroe's reputation for proficiency, yet even so, the particular formulation of the poem's meaning, completely shorn from its context, cannot. The more likely explanation is that the tropology of the Pathan had acquired such force at this point in time that the translation was not only shaped through it, but further, each new interpretation reinforced the truth of the framework dialectically, exemplifying how ideology is reinscribed through the circular enactment of its "truths." The reinscription of the trope of the intrinsically violent Pathan is fairly obvious here, with the martial imagery repeated more often, and in more descriptive ways, than in the original, especially through repeated metaphors of blood. That such categorizations be accepted as essential truths are of course dependent upon a complete erasure of the context in which Khushal Khan wrote the poem: he was attempting to arouse and unite the Pashtuns against imperial Mughal domination and, as such, he was calling for a "spring" awakening to rise up in resistance. Comparing a literal translation of the thirtieth and thirty-first *shirs* in Pashto—in this lengthy thirty-seven *shir* ghazal—with Caroe's rendition reveals the historical context he omits: "Pukhtuns, if they don't contemplate any other aspect of their existence / This darkness cannot be overcome without such work / Until the Mughal [remains],

the Pukhtun with sword is best / If there are some wise ones amongst the knowledgeable Pukhtuns." And Caroe's translation reads: "The sword alone can give deliverance, / The sword wherein is our predominance. / Our sword is matchless even our foes confess, / Would that our wisdom matched our hardiness." Even in a literal translation that does not take into account the subtleties of nuance, allusions, word choices and rhyme scheme, the discrepancy of meaning is quite glaring; the fact that Caroe does not translate "Pukhtun" or "Afghan," which points to Khushal Khan's whole endeavor, speaks volumes about how the epistemological framework both imposes ideological meanings while also reinscribing the tropology. The Pathan is presented with an unequivocal desire for violence disconnected from any historical motives that impels him to fight in particular circumstances, but instead, it vacuously exemplifies a marital race. Caroe's explanation following his translation states as much:

> This poem is a revelation of much that is admirable in the person of Khushhal (sic) himself and of the lights and shades in Pathan character generally, in its more inspired moments. Every word is instinct with fortitude and a simple manliness. There are no introspections here; Khushhal, like most Pathans, despised subtleties and saw life but as a clash of opposites, for God and friends a clean-cut loyalty, for the unworthy, the enemy, a hatred and an abomination.[197]

That the poem, and the character of Khushal Khan that Caroe interprets through it, becomes a synecdochic model representing the "Pathan character generally," not only implicates the ethnographic methodology that Clifford (explicating Ricoeur) outlined,[198] but in presenting the translation as the authentic utterance of the "the native point of view," it discloses both the use of, and the need for, such methodology in the colonial endeavor. Ethnographic knowledge, as the preliminary act of appropriation, with translation as the means of interpreting foreign signs and symbols back into a common language of understanding, was the first means of incorporating

[197] Caroe, *The Pathans.* 238
[198] Clifford, 40

difference into sameness. The production of particular representations, or a tropological framework, one that was interpenetrated by cartographic depiction, therefore, not only facilitated colonial hegemony, which then led to physical domination, but in fact continues to subjugate its object of analysis within the ideological grids of its classifications. The primary one, in this case, is the conjunction of manly virility with violence that both shapes normative gender and makes it a pointer denoting the natural and the given; so that this already racialized figure disarms, in advance, any self-reflexive critique that this ideological construct serves the utilitarian end of upholding particular power differentials.

I enumerate these tropes in such detail not only because the figure of the Pathan has not undergone a decolonial critique or been deconstructed through postcolonial historical analysis, and, thereby, continues to recirculate, but to use the data from these methods of historical construction as foil against which to read the KK literature. Not merely to contrast the ideologically constructed figure of the violent Pathan—one that also strongly affects Pashtun self-imaginaries despite, or because of, being a political construct—with an indigenous embodiment of nonviolence. But also, as Bernard Cohn endorses, to read history in new ways. If the historian is to narrate not just new, hitherto silenced histories, but breakthrough "to new views of social change," then the search is not only, as Cohn states, "for new source materials but for new ways of handling source materials. Increasingly the historian must take an 'inside' view of the society" and understand the "interaction between symbols and the symbol system."[199]And I would add, that the interaction between symbols and symbol systems should not merely be a translation of the unfamiliar into sameness but that the differences, once

[199] Cohn, *An Anthropologist Among Historians*, 197

acknowledged and explored as difference, may in fact signify radically new possibilities and alternate cosmologies that have hitherto been lost in translation.

Chapter Two

Nonviolence and Decolonization: The Khudai Khidmatgar Politics of Friendship

maidān tâ waẗey yū da meynay məhəbəẗ da pārâ
da khudāi məxlūq ẗa wasŷaẗ kṛu da ūlfaẗ da pārâ

we've come out onto the (battle) field for the sake of love and affection
counseling god's creatures for the sake of loving friendship[200]

> Everyone in the Walled City seems to have heard what has happened, dozens making their way to the Street of Storytellers; people standing on roofs and leaning from balconies catching rumours out of air and tossing them down into the alley. A car on fire. An Englishman knocked down with a stone. A horse, something about a horse. An Englishman run over by a horse. No, an Englishman run over by a motorcycle. No, an Englishman on a motorcycle run over by horse. No, a horse which refused to fight killed by an Englishman. An armoured car reversing into—a horse? An Englishman? A motorcycle? A gun. A stone. An unarmed crowd.[201]

The Qissa Khwani Bazar had yet another tale to recount: it witnessed the slaying of hundreds of unarmed Khudai Khidmatgars as they poured into its narrow lanes to protest the arrest of their leaders. When the colonial authorities sent armoured cars to control a crowd they claimed was dangerous, they ran down some Peshawar city dwellers; consequently, some in the crowd set fire to the tanks; others—probably the women in the apartments above the narrow streets witnessing the Indian Army's heavy handed brutality—pelted stones at the Army officers below.[202] The

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[200] Fida, Abdul Malik, "de khudāi khədmətgār 'əqiydâ," *Diwan-e-Abdul Malik Fida.* Peshawar: Manzur Alam, (First published 1957; 2nd pub: 1972), pg., 154. My translation from the original Pashto as "The Tenets of the Khudai Khidmatgars."

[201] Shamsie, Kamila. *A God in Every Stone.* New York: Atavist Books, 2014, 284-85

[202] There are conflicting archival reports about the actual events of the day. In fact, in reading the *Peshawar Enquiry Report,* which the AICC commissioned, against the (defensive) colonial inquiry conducted by Sulaiman and Pankridge, two parallel narratives emerge: on the one hand, peaceful demonstrators were willfully attacked by hysterical and panic-stricken colonial authorities, and in the other, the *Sulaiman-Pankridge Enquiry Report*, a savage mob had to be severely disciplined. The colonial authorities justified their use of force by claiming the demonstrators were throwing stones and occasionally firing at them and, therefore, they had to restore "law and order." The multiple narratives and confusing nature of the reports describing the day of the riots is captured quite brilliantly by the quote I use as an epigraph to this chapter. In Kamila Shamsie's novel, *A God in Every Stone*, the fragmentary nature of the archival records that chronical this event are brought to the forefront, but this quote, and

soldiers were ordered to fire upon the crowd, inevitably killing and injuring many in the tight confines of the Bazar, but the most surprising event, in the three days of rioting that ensued throughout the Province after the April 23rd 1930 shootings, was the soldiers refusal, in two platoons of the Indian Army's distinguished Garhwali Regiment, to fire upon the crowd.

Echoing, yet inverting, the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919, the killings in the historic story-teller's bazar also created shock-waves throughout India. The ruthless policing of the Province for over a year after this incident, and the Khudai Khidmatgar's nonviolent resistance, made this a pivotal moment both for the nationalist movement and the North West Frontier in the annals of Indian independence. While the Garhwali Regiment's refusal to fire upon the protestors substantiated the fact that they were unarmed and not the unruly crowd that required "disciplining," as the British authorities quite defensively maintained.

It was a pivotal moment for many other reasons as well: it made the rest of India aware of the extraordinary phenomenon that a large nonviolent resistance "army" existed in the volatile North-West Frontier Province, whose ranks were, even more surprisingly, comprised largely of Pashtuns or Pukhtuns[203]—a fact which undermined a long history of racial representations about the inherently violent "Pathans." After the Peshawar Riots, the deliberate and brutal imperial policing swelled the ranks of the Khudai Khidmatgars even more dramatically from a few hundred volunteers to many thousands; eventually most people in the Province either belonged to the movement or had family members who did. While it also sharply brought into focus the

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her novel more broadly, also point to the necessarily fragmentary nature of the original events from a subjective perspective. While it also points out how ostensibly "objective" historical reconstruction uses such fragments to create a coherent narrative of an event.

[203] The pronunciation of "Pashtun" is prevalent for the western Pashtuns—straddling and the Afghan side of the Durand line, while the harsher "kh" or "x" sound of "Pukhtun" predominates on the eastern side. I use the eastern "Pukhtun" pronunciation in translation because that is where the Khudai Khidmatgar movement were located and how they refer to themselves.

harsh and repressive disciplinary measures routinely inflicted upon a cordoned off strategic military zone designated as the "scientific" frontier of imperial India. Represented in colonial (and popular) discourse as an unruly border territory inhabited by untamable tribals, the region has acquired a distinct identity as an oppositional space to the State and its civilizing structures. While designated as an (ostensibly) autonomous, nonstate space this discursive imaginary particularly lends itself to multivalent interpretations. It was the appropriation of particular aspects of this nonstate imaginary—especially its indigenous aspirations and apparatuses of radical democracy—that enabled the Khudai Khidmatgars to create an alternate communal organization that became an intrinsically anarchic threat to the state, both imperial and nationalist.

I analyze the extraordinary phenomenon of Khudai Khidmatgar nonviolence, including the fact that they were the largest organized resistance "army" in British India, to draw attention not only to how they subverted long held tropes (that had transmuted into truths) regarding the Pashtuns and the North West Frontier, but especially to focus on the radically alternate political imaginary they created for a brief moment in history. An alternate political that was tacitly antithetical to the philosophical foundations that under-grid the normative political of the colonial State—one that was also, as I contend, seamlessly adopted by the All India Muslim League in their call for a separate Muslim state that led to the partition of India. As such the Khudai Khidmatgar ideology of nonviolence was a radical epistemological and ontological decolonization, and in this chapter I try to explore some of the anarchic forms these took. I explain this alternate political through the framework of Derrida's "politics of friendship," and contrast it with the normative political that Carl Schmitt articulates through the "friend-enemy" binary, at the core of which violence is the norm rather than a state of exception. However, what

makes this unique embodiment of nonviolence even more extraordinary is not only its embeddedness in the ethos of Pashtunwali—the indigenous tribal codes of conduct—but especially, its geographical location on the intractable North-West Frontier of British India.

The Garhwali Regiment's Mutiny

There are conflicting archival reports about the Qissa Khwani Bazar killings. In fact, in reading the *Peshawar Enquiry Report,* commissioned by the AICC, against the colonial inquiry report written by the judges, Sulaiman and Pankridge, two parallel narratives emerge: on the one hand, peaceful demonstrators were willfully attacked by over-reactive and aggressive colonial authorities, and on the other hand, in the *Sulaiman-Pankridge Enquiry Report*, an unruly and violent mob had to be severely disciplined. The colonial authorities justified their use of force by claiming the demonstrators were throwing stones and occasionally firing at them and, therefore, they had to restore "law and order." Whereas, the Congress report emphasized the peaceful nature of the protest—a protest instigated by the imprisonment of various local nationalist leaders—and how the army had brought in armored vehicles into the narrow streets to police the crowd. The multiple conflicting narratives and the confusing nature of the reports describing the events of the day is captured quite brilliantly by the quote I use as an epigraph to this chapter. In Kamila Shamsie's novel, *A God in Every Stone*, which I analyze in more detail later in the chapter as well, she captures the fragmentary nature of the archival records that chronicle this event; but this quote, and her novel more broadly, also point to the fragmentary nature of subjective perspectives and implicitly contrasts that with the "objective" omniscient perspectives of historical narratives.

However, evident from the archival materials surrounding the Garhwali Mutiny, written from a singular perspective and with great certainty, the colonial authorities deem it imperative to deny that the soldiers were ordered to fire upon unarmed protestors. In the words of one official letter four years after the event, written in response to public outcries against the harsh sentences meted out to the soldiers/mutineers: "we should let pass the statement that the men were sentenced for refusing 'to comply with an order instructing them to shoot down unarmed Indian demonstrators at Peshawar on the 30th April 1930'." A handwritten comment in the margins of this letter, dated 13th July, 1934, corroborates: "I agree that the point should be made that the men were not sentenced for refusing to shoot down unarmed demonstrators."[204] Seven years after the mutiny the issue was still a live one with national queries about the fate of the remaining soldiers whose sentences had not yet been remitted; while, of the seventeen convicted thirteen had been released two to three years after serving rigorous imprisonment. However, the soldiers who headed the two Battalions, Havildar Chandar Sing Shandari, Havildar Narain Sing, Naik Kechar Singh and Naik Jit Singh were sentenced to, respectively: transportation for life, 15 and 10 years each. And although a death sentence was initially considered, the person responsible for confirming the sentences of the prisoners, W.R. Birdwood, stated in another letter that he would give it "the very greatest consideration" but was reluctant to pass such a conviction because of "what the Garhwalis and other troops were subjected to in Peshawar City of the 23rd April. This being the case, one cannot help having the very greatest sympathy for them; but even so, you will know that it must be impossible to overlook what technically, at all events, amounts to mutiny."

[204] IOR_L_MIL_7_7282_009 (British Library India Office Records)

A tone wavering between sympathy and condemnation laces most of the colonial documents surrounding this incident; on the one hand the texts speak of the "extreme provocation" the troops suffered at the hands of the Peshawar City dwellers, and on the other, how this shocking breach of military discipline had to be dealt with utmost severity. Shocking, because one of the most distinguished units of the Indian Army had refused to obey orders, also evoking memories of an earlier "Mutiny" and its cross-communal native collusions against British rule. To allay the deep-rooted fears this insurrection aroused, a particular narrative was deployed to explain the Garhwali soldiers mutiny in terms other what it implied: a crack in the foundations of imperial rule. As the Court of Enquiry stated, when it tried the soldiers four days after their mutiny, the troops had been subjected to very "demoralizing and degrading treatment at the hands of a savage mob in the Peshawar City riot on 23rd April, in that they, on this day, for a period of between one and two hours were subjected to treatment no soldier wearing the King's uniform should be asked to stand without retaliation."[205] Colonial narrative repeatedly describes the soldiers disobedience as demoralization: they did not obey the orders to fire upon the crowd because the mob, in constantly taunting them for about two hours, sapped their virility. Alongside with which, the narrative also constantly emphasizes: "No intercourse or sympathy with the present so-called non-violent revolution can be traced to exist in the Battalion," although, as the trial report adds, the two N.C.O.s of the Battalions were suspected of belonging to the Arya Samaj Society because they "had been in the habit of visiting Peshawar City frequently."[206]

As even this inadvertent acknowledgement in the report tacitly denotes, it was significant enough to warrant explanation that the soldiers heading the regiments would frequently visit the

[205] IOR_L_MIL_7_7282_019 (India Office Records, British Library)
[206] IOR_L_MIL_7_7282_022

city which meant that the soldiers would, most likely, have been exposed to Khudai Khidmatgar or nationalist ideology before the riots; and as there is no further proof given that they did in fact belong to the Arya Samaj Society it seems like a questionable presumption, one that merely classifies the soldiers as "Hindu" and, therefore, implying that they would not have any sympathy with a "Muslim" organization. The soldier's political proclivities thus get neatly filed within given colonial categories; a system of categorization heavily reliant upon 19th century racial representations that generate particular kinds of tropes to explain the most seemingly mundane of details, as this example illustrates. So that even legal judgments effecting the lives of these soldiers get grounded upon racially determined classifications and the "psychology of the Garhwali soldier" explains their behavior on the day of the riots:

> The Garhwali soldier is naturally very staunch—brave and uncomplaining. Blindly obedient to all orders and easily led. Slow in the uptake and in realizing exactly what is required of him when suddenly faced with an entirely novel situation…The display of these very qualities on the 23rd and 24th April, have been wrongly construed, and the forebearance [sic] shown by the men, has been taken to indicate that the Battalion was disinclined to act against the mob.[207]

Classified as another martial race, the Garhwali were considered natural soldiers, both brave and obedient, and this categorization eliminates any possibility that they may want to practice nonviolence; however, even in colonial accounts about the day of the insurrection—which was the day after the Qissa Khwani Bazaar shootings on the 24th of April—as well as some of the details explaining the actions of the soldiers, signals that these soldiers were not only affected by the protestors, but moreover, were undertaking a nonviolent protest of their own. The two Garhwali Battalions were called up after the police could not control the situation in the Bazaar., but, as the Inspector General of Police states: "They came forward somewhat hesitatingly" and

[207] IOR_L_MIL_7_7282_021 (India Office Records, British Library)

orders had to be repeatedly shouted to them through a megaphone to assume routine postures of "aggression." The IG Police continues to describe, Captain Ricketts, the head of the Garhwali Regiment, "actually got hold of some of the men and pushed their rifles up to the High Port, the position he wanted to hold them in," yet the soldiers were still, "holding their rifles at their right sides, and had *adopted no menacing attitude"* (my italics), even after Captain Ricketts was injured by a brick hitting the back of his head. The official narrative explains this lack of aggression to the considerable delay in receiving official orders to fire upon the crowd, and therefore, the provocation of the "mob" not only stretched the limits of forbearance but it also demoralized them. However, this narrative neither adequately explains the extreme reluctance of the soldiers in presenting themselves for duty nor their refusal to assume combative positions, let alone the absence of any aggression towards a crowd that was purportedly attacking. A crowd which, as the report states, "was right down on the top of the men," and where, "individual attempts were made to get hold of the rifles."[208] Furthermore, the next day when the soldiers were called for duty not only was a "case of slackness" evident but one soldier, as the official report states, started crying when told to board the buses taking them to the city. Furthermore, the heads of the Battalions had presented resignation papers, duly signed by everyone in the regiment, stating: "We don't want to serve we want to be given our discharge within 24 hours."[209] These acts, once again, were explained at the trial as the effect of a demoralized spirit brought about by the extreme provocation they had suffered at the hands of the crowd the previous day. Whereas, the rationale that the insurrection could have been instigated by the demonstrators being unarmed is constantly dismissed as a preposterous one. The report

[208] IOR_L_MIL_7_7282_029 (India Office Records, British Library)
[209] IOR_L_MIL_7_7282_035 (India Office Records, British Library)

substantiates the preposterousness of such a claim by pointing to one of the soldier's statements as the reason for the dispiritedness:

> "Yesterday when in the City, those people down there (meaning the crowd) said, when we have our Government, we will make the Garhwalis and Gurkhas into sweepers, giving them brooms, and make them do sweepers work". This is sufficient evidence, therefore, (if any is required), to dispose of the belief that there was any collusion between the Royal Garhwal [sic] Rifles and the *scum* of the city. Another remark heard at the same time was "our izzat (honour) is no better than that of dogs".[210] (My italics)

To be likened to a sweeper is automatically classified as an insult, which, with the presumption of a rigid caste system, may in most circumstances be the case. As neither the Garhwalis nor the Gurkhas belong to the lower, untouchable castes, or those designated "sweepers" in a system classifying caste, then what the "scum" of the city said to the soldiers would be presumed a deliberate slur upon their social standing. That this classification system is a definitive one in the minds of the British officers presiding over the trial is clear because no alternate interpretation is even considered. Pointing either to an *a priori* lack of knowledge about the significance of sweeping, and the broom, in the symbology of nonviolence—perhaps even a willful ignorance—or the more likely explanation, that such a possibility lay outside of the military tribunal's interpretative framework. Especially the possibility that the reference to sweeping may signify the soldier's bias towards the ideology of nonviolence; a bias which the nonviolent protestors recognized and articulated in this comment. The sanitation of villages was a foremost duty for the Khudai Khidmatgars and, as such, sweeping was carried out by all individuals who were enlisted in this nonviolent army, and it was considered a crucial aspect in their social transformation. Although often vocalized by Gandhi and the *Satyagraha* movement that the service to one's community was an integral part of the practice of nonviolence, including the

[210] IOR_L_MIL_7_7282_035 (India Office Records, British Library)

sweeping of toilets, the possibility that the Pashtuns could also have be practicing similar forms of service lies outside the boundaries of colonial representation. The Pashtuns, or the "Pathans," as I detail in the first chapter, functioned only within a particular tropological framework, and designated a martial race the practices of nonviolence lay outside the boundaries of that interpretative framework, and thus it was rendered completely invisible. Alongside with the Pathans, the Rajputs, Punjabis, and the Garhwalis (amongst others) were similarly classified as the martial races of India, and the fact that they predominated in the Indian Army as well, only substantiated this colonial classification.

However, if the soldier's statement is interpreted through the framework of nonviolence, it would mean that that the Garhwalis and the Gurkhas will, because of their reluctance to engage the protestors with violence, are being transformed into soldiers of nonviolence. Rather than signifying a denigrated social status, as the British tribunal interprets, the act of sweeping is elevated from its association of abjection into a symbol of ontological resistance. transform them into soldiers of a nonviolent army, but, much more crucially, they would be resisting empire at level. Thus, the *jāṛū* or broom, and the *čərkhâ* or spinning wheel, became the symbols of nonviolence on a massive scale because of its ontological resistance against colonialism on several levels. First and foremost, it negated colonial classifications of race, caste and class; secondly, in deconstructing colonial (as well indigenous) classifications of race and class/caste the sweeper is no longer a figure of abjection but elevated into a signifier of equality or the egalitarianism that nonviolence was aspiring toward; next, making manual labor, especially of the most humble kind, into a signifier of revolutionary change also changed the concept of work and, relatedly, the dignity—or humanity—it confers on the human; thereby, the conceptual framework of humanism is shifted from the grounds of Western Enlightenment, that colonialism

imposed as normative, to the humanization of the human that nonviolence was now postulating; finally, the nonviolent soldier-sweeper embodies a power that no soldier with guns can overcome, and, in fact, as this case illustrated, it undoes that very same soldier and converts him into a "sweeper" as well.

The court report also misconstrues that the soldiers *ʻəzāt* or honor was also redeemed by their insurrection whereas, what made them "dogs," lacking self-respect, was being lackeys in an imperial army. Therefore, rather than denigrating or insulting them, as the court interprets, the soldiers were in fact being honored by the crowd; and, because they were affected by the demonstrators to the degree that they adopted similar methods of resistance in turn, then their resignation signifies, in broader terms, the undoing of the British Army had such practices been adopted en masse. The subtext of the colonial report refuses to acknowledge that the demonstrators were largely nonviolent because such a recognition would have articulated it as a latent threat to the core of imperial power: the unraveling of its army. Thus, the colonial archive itself testifies to the anarchic quality of nonviolence.

That the demonstrators in Qissa Khwani Bazaar had such a profound impact upon the soldiers also substantiates the fact that the protest was largely unarmed as the KK claimed. Yet despite the fact that the Province was severely "disciplined" and garrisoned under martial law for almost a year after this event, which in turn swelled the ranks of the KK to become the largest nonviolent "army," there is hardly any mention in the colonial archives about people practicing "nonviolence." Not only did such practice deconstruct the tropological framework of the inherently violent "Pathans" but this incident clearly illustrated that it had the power to undermine colonial state structures quite directly, and it is for these reasons that its lack of acknowledgment is also a tacit admission of its power.

Suppression in the Province

The year-long Peshawar Riots that followed the Qissa Khwani Bazaar killings were prompted not only by the brutal handling of the demonstrators in the Storytellers Market but, moreover, by the British government's overt desire to "smash" the "Red-Shirt" movement completely, so that, "a terrible reign of repression followed."[211] The Province was cordoned off and strict martial laws imposed upon it for over a year, impelling Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other leaders of the movement to join the All India National Congress Committee.[212] In his Pashto autobiography, *zmā žwand āw jdow-jeẖd,* he explains why they allied themselves with the Congress Party instead of the All India Muslim League.[213] While imprisoned in Gujrat Jail, Ghaffar Khan recounts that some Khudai Khidmatgar members came to report the harsh conditions of the garrisoned Province, and he advised them to make the Muslim League leaders aware of the atrocities the colonial authorities were committing in the Province. He tells them to go and ask "our Muslim brothers" for help in broadcasting this news to the world-at-large; and, he enjoins, to inform them that "the Khudai Khidmatgars are only a reformist party" and not a political one. However, after the Khudai Khidmatgar members follow Ghaffar Khan's advice, they

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[211] From a Congress report, "North-West Frontier Province", AICC (1st Installment), P-35/1932, (pg. 1/306), NMML

[212] This section is taken in part from my article, "Nonviolence, Pukhtunwali and Decolonization: Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgar Politics of Friendship," published in *Muslims Against the Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan,* edited by Ali Usman Qasmi and Megan Eaton Robb. Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp 220-254. I elaborate on this point in much more detail and do a comparative analysis of Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgar's intended "imagined community" versus Mohammad Ali Jinnah's call for a separate Muslim nation.

[213] Abdul Ghaffar Khan, *zmā žwand āw jdow-jeẖd.* (Peshawar, 1983), Autobiography. (My translation from the original Pashto). This Pashto autobiography needs to be distinguished from the one he narrated in Urdu to K.B. Narang and which was later translated into English as *My Life and Struggle.* Delhi: Hind Pocket Books Ltd, 1969. The Pashto autobiography is, in contrast, over seven hundred pages long. It is also tinged with a distinctly defensive tone as it was written well after various Pakistani governments had imprisoned him for much longer terms than the colonial one had, and when the Khudai Khidmatgar organization had been effectively destroyed. They were declared traitors to the new postcolonial nation-state in the 1950's and all traces of the movement were systematically destroyed.

despondently return to report: "we went to meet all the Muslim League leaders, but they are not ready to help us. They are not ready (to help us) because they are a faction the English have created to oppose the Hindus, and our fight is with the English, so why would they help us?"[214]

That the All India Muslim League were aided by the British is a constant refrain in Ghaffar Khan's writings and speeches, and in other Khudai Khidmatgar literature.[215] The fact that they neither had a grass roots, anti-colonial organization, nor were any of its leaders deemed threatening enough to be silenced or arrested by colonial authority, corroborated the view that AIML's primary objective was not decolonization[216] per se. As the AIML's own discourse iterated they were, instead, the "sole" representatives of an ostensibly homogenous Muslim community, with the steadily increasing objective to transcend the status of "minority" altogether.[217]

Therefore, after the attempt at soliciting help from the AIML failed, Ghaffar Khan elaborates how the Khudai Khidmatgars allied themselves with the AICC instead:

> After this I told them (the KK members): then go and meet other parties in Hindustan and tell them about our condition.
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> They went and after sometime when they came back they told us they had gone far and wide but apart from the Congress no one offered to lend a hand. The

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[214] Khan 1983, 386-387 (My translations from the original Pashto)

[215] See Khan 1983 autobiography, *Facts are Facts* by Wali Khan, and especially, *De Azaday Tareekh* by Waris Khan, in which this refrain about the Muslim League occurs frequently. In fact, they quite forthrightly state that the AIML were a party specifically created by the British to divide India and disempower the large mass and diversity of Muslims living in it. Alan Rittenberg also mentions how this allegation occurs frequently in KK writings and speeches. See his dissertation (later published), *The Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province, 1901-1947.*

[216] I am using the term "decolonization," in the sense that Walter Mignolo uses it as form of resistance that necessarily has to deconstruct the systemic fabric of colonialism, especially its epistemological structures and ontological ground. Including the ontological ground that gives rise to the normative political of the imperial State which later gets incorporated into the structures of the postcolonial nation-state. Mignolo, Walter. *Local Histories/Global Designs*: *Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking.* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[217] See Faisal Devji especially on Jinnah's notion of nationalism as "the transcendence of the given" *Muslim Zion*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013, 139. As well as Ayesha Jalal on the context of Jinnah's famous remark that justified his tactical collaboration with the British during the war: he was ready to become an "allay of even the devil," in order to achieve his objectives, in *The Sole Spokesperson*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 45.

> Congress leaders asked us our reasons for fighting the English. We told them: "to free our country." Then they asked us with what means were we fighting them [the English]? We said: "with nonviolence." They told us: "this is our endeavor and our creed also; you are enslaved, and we are also enslaved; the English are your enemy and they are also our enemy; you want freedom and we want it also. If you want to become our *friends* ("*malgəray"*) then we are ready to help you."
>
> So, after they related this to us [GK and other KK leaders in Gujrat Jail] we told them to go back to their own neighborhoods and discuss this amongst themselves and convene a Provincial Jirga—whatever their decision we will agree to abide by it. The Provincial Jirga decided to become the *friends* of Congress, saying: "Today we are being destroyed and are drowning in a raging river; whoever extends us a helping hand we will take it." After this the Jirga made a pact with Congress…[218] (my italics)

I quote this longish passage from Ghaffar Khan's autobiography to point to a number of salient formulations that encapsulates both the self-conceptions of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, and my explorations in understanding it. Firstly, harnessing the powerful motivating principle of *azadi* or autonomy—which has historically impelled even feuding Pashtun factions to unify together against a common enemy—the Khudai Khidmatgars were able to organize one of the largest resistance movements in British India. However, there were crucial ontological differences between their articulation of *azadi*: not only with prior Pashtun resistance movements but also with the broader Indian nationalist movements of the time. That the conscripts of this "army" took an oath to fight nonviolently differentiated them from other Pashtun resistances, while their unique geographic imaginary positioned the Khudai Khidmatgars in a context quite different from other anti-colonial frameworks. By grounding and legitimating their ideology of nonviolence in the ethos of Pashtunwali, and harnessing an anarchic nonstate imaginary, they differentiated their methods of decolonization from other nationalist movements of the time.

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[218] Khan 1983, 387 (My translation from the original Pashto)

Their call for "*azadi"* was, I will argue, an ontological decolonization, but not just of the Pashtun habitus or space.

Additionally, rather than Ghaffar Khan exercising his decision-making prerogative as the leader, the passage points to the Khudai Khidmatgar organizational grounding in Pashtunwali: he defers the decision-making process to local bodies, firstly, in the villages and then through a provincial Jirga. At least nominally, the Pashtunwali ethos of egalitarianism gives the jirga system a democratic right of voice to all who participate, even if in practice it is not as egalitarian as conceived. And despite the Khudai Khidmatgar's military organizational system, with its similarities to the affiliative[219] structure of the British Army,[220] their novel ideology was grafted onto local forms of social organization in ways that also disrupted traditional filiative bonds and kinship structures. Moreover, rigid class and economic distinctions were also disrupted as the ranks of the Khudai Khidmatgars were largely composed of subalterns who often rose to the top echelons of power.[221] Thus, one of the ways in which the Khudai Khidmatgars reformulated the habitus was by grafting modern affiliative social relations onto

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[219] In "Introduction: Secular Criticism," Edward Said describes "affiliation" as a new form of social relationship and also, "a new system:" a system that transplants natural "filiative" or kinship bonds with transpersonal social and cultural relationships; a relationship of choice rather than one of necessity, 21-22

[220] Arguably, Kamila Shamsie ascribes the egalitarian structure and sense of fraternity of the Khudai Khidmatgars to the organizational structure of the British Indian Army in her novel *A God in Every Stone.* New York: Atavist Books, 2014. Although the KK army contained many ex-service men, who generally assumed the role of trainers, it does not follow that this necessarily also cultivated and reproduced the same kind of fraternity which the British Indian army instilled.

[221] Though GK and other senior member of the KK organization, and especially the Frontier Congress ministry, were also composed of the landlord class or Khans, nevertheless they could be classified, in Ranajit Guha's words, as that indeterminate "dominant indigenous groups at the regional and local levels." Gayatri Spivak cities Guha's classification in her essay, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," stating that this group "was heterogeneous in its composition and, thanks to the uneven character of regional economic and social developments, differed from area to area…This could and did create many ambiguities and contradictions in attitudes and alliances, especially amongst the lowest strata of the rural gentry, impoverished landlords, rich peasants and upper middle class peasants all of whom belonged, ideally speaking, to the category of 'people' or 'subaltern classes.'" Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" From C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. (Macmillan Education: Basingstoke, 1988), 79-81

customary practices; and in reinterpreting long standing meanings and tropes of Pashtunwali they represented it as a more progressive and enlightened aspect of the traditional ethos.

Finally, and most centrally for my argument, Ghaffar Khan gives voice to the concept of "friendship" that pervades the discourse of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. I deliberately translate the original Pashto term of "*malgəray*" and "*malgərthyā*" quite literally into the English "friend" and "friendship." Although *malgərthyā* is a common enough political term in colloquial Pashto discourse, I retain the original word in order to point to the radical form of the political that these terms also implied. I argue that the Khudai Khidmatgar articulation of "*malgəray*" not only denoted the affiliative social systems with which they tried to disrupt traditional kinship relations but, like Jacques Derrida's formulation of a "politics of friendship,"[222] it also pointed to the radically new political they were fashioning. I especially maintain that the Khudai Khidmatgar ideology of nonviolence and its politics of friendship were attempting to iterate an alternate set of normativities for the political, and I elaborate on this in more detail later in the chapter.

The "Red-shirt" organization, as it was called by both the British and Indian nationalists, was formally included as a part of the All India Congress Committee by the Congress Working Committee in Bombay, August 1931, making Abdul Ghaffar Khan responsible for all Congress representation in the Province from thence forward. What disallowed the Khudai Khidmatgars from allying themselves with the Muslim League instead were these alternate set of normativities that were intrinsically contra-distinctive to the political that structured the colonial state and tacitly adopted by Jinnah in his vision for a new polis. Explained in Khudai Khidmatgar literature as the Muslim League's unwillingness to oppose colonial hegemony, I believe this

[222] Derrida, Jacques. *The Politics of Friendship*. (Verso, 2005), 28

unwillingness described not so much a lack of motivation to resist imperial domination, but rather, an inadvertent adoption of colonial epistemological frameworks as a normative standard, one in which violence was (and continues to be) considered an inevitable norm.

Sent by Mahatma Gandhi, who wanted "some English-man to visit the North-West Frontier Province" and "see what was really happening there" following the Peshawar riots, Father Verrier Elwin, an anthropologist and ethnologist who came to India as a missionary but later abandoned the clergy to actively participate in the Independence movement, wrote a report on behalf of the AICC titled, "What is Happening in The North-West Frontier Province?" In the report Elwin points out that the colonial government's aim was not only to "maintain law and order" but, more crucially, as one official put it, "[t]his Red-shirt business…must be smashed, and we are determined to do it." The reasons Elwin gives are as follows:

> By this time, Government had begun to be seriously alarmed. The numbers of the red-shirts had swelled to over a hundred thousand: its organisation was perfect; it was in a position to paralyse the administration; a parallel Government had practically been established; the prestige and influence of Abdul Ghaffar Khan was paramount.[223]

The paradoxical outcome of the brutally repressive colonial policing after the Qissa Khwani Bazaar killings was a dramatic increase in the ranks of the KK, and it became a matter not just of honor but of privilege to belong to the organization. Eventually most people in the Province were a part of the movement or had family members associated with it. The unusual allegiance and unity that it fostered amongst the Pashtuns—with non-Pashtuns and non-Muslim residents of the Province also participating in it—its grass roots organizational structure, and its embeddedness within its own milieu, especially in the codes of Pashtunwali and the tenets of Islam, made the movement a force which the colonial government could only counter with violence, especially at

[223] NMML, AICC (1st) P-16/1932 (pp. (1-18/137-154), 13/149 & 7/143

its early stages. It was the indigenous nature of the organization, as well as the radical practice of nonviolence, that alarmed the colonial government as it did, because it threatened to unify not just the Pashtuns in the Province but also in the Tribal Territories and Afghanistan. This potentially unifying factor, and the fervent allegiance it aroused across colonial borders, produced the parallel form of anarchic authority that had the potential to systemically undermine the colonial state.

Secondary colonial literature also points to the anarchic potentiality that the "Redshirts" posed to the Provincial-Tribal divide, as Charles Chenevix Trench outlines in his book, *The Frontier Scouts:*

> Ostensibly dedicated to social and religious improvement, in fact it was highly seditious and tried to set up a parallel administration, levying its own taxes and setting up its own courts to punish, with fines and flogging, breaches of its own law. Its leaders were Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib, formerly a medical officer of the Guides. In 1930 the Redshirts were responsible for savage rioting in Peshawar city, during which an armoured car and its occupants were incinerated. The movement never really caught on in the Tribal Territory, because it was incongruously affiliated to the Hindu dominated Congress, but there were Congress propagandists among the tribes, and hostile lashkars occasionally sported Congress flags. The Afridis and Mamunds…took advantage of the situation to come down to the outskirts of Peshawar, invade the Government Supply Depot and mine roads.[224]

The Afridis and the Mohmands did in fact create tribal lashkars and raided government outposts around Peshawar but their main impetus was to protest the treatment of the KK at the hands of colonial authorities and done in solidarity with them rather than to take advantage of the unrest, as Trench imputes. The tropological figure of the Pathan is the framework of interpretation here, once again, in which the tribesmen are lawless opportunists and KK protestors "savage" rioters. Disclosing the shapes of colonial categorizations rather than phenomenological truths is also the

[224] Trench, Charles Chenevix: *The Frontier Scouts.* London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1985, (129-30)

assumption that because the KK were affiliated with the AICC, classified as a "Hindu" political party, the organization's ideology could not spread to the tribal territories. Because Pathans are steadfastly categorized within a narrow and reductive view of Islam, they are understood as zealous and even extremist religious practitioners, without any possibility of holding syncretic perspectives. Despite the fact, as Trench states, that a Congress presence was visible in some tribal localities. What is particularly relevant in the above passage, however, is the admission that the KK had set up an alternate system of communal organization, one that did not accept colonial laws or pay taxes; a form of resistance that would have been extremely obstructive to the smooth functioning of the state while violating one of its most sacrosanct frameworks.

That the movement represented a systemic deconstruction of colonial state structures—or in Walter Mignolo's terms, a potent form of "decolonization"—is validated by the fact that in trying to curtail the KKs the government used excessively repressive measures compared to other Provinces where the Congress Committee was most active. M.K. Gandhi's youngest son, Devdas Gandhi was sent by the AICC to investigate the conditions in the cordoned off Province after the year-long riots and wrote the report, "Cases of Official Tyranny." In this report the younger Gandhi writes, "the authorities did not scruple to employ foul means in order to combat the growing enthusiasm of the people for the movement." Not only, as he states, "[m]urders and assaults are said to be committed at the instigation of government officials" but some of the loyalist Khans were also "involved in this campaign to terrorize the people." Furthermore, even Maliks from the tribal territories were arrested for the crime of organizing meetings addressed by Ghaffar Khan, and were promised firearms to shoot him or KK members upon their release.[225] Section 144 of the Indian Penal Code, which prohibited mass gatherings in the name of curtailing

[225] Gandhi: AICC (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 6-7 (175-6)

violence, but which in effect could arrest and imprison anyone without due process, was routinely in effect in the Province and; Muslim and Hindu lawyers reported (from Bannu) that collaborators were coaxed to state that public gatherings were inciting violence so that demonstrators could be arrested that much more easily under the stipulations of this law.[226] That the government had to manufacture charges of inciting violence was necessary because, as Gandhi elaborates, "nearly every village" in the Peshawar District had "its army of Khudai Khidmatgars," with "the fullest emphasis laid on nonviolence."[227]

Most unusually, these repressive measures also included the physical or verbal abuse of women. Devdas Gandhi lists accounts of a number of "purdah-nashin women" who were "summoned by revenue officers in the presence of a large number of men and subjected to indignities because they were not able to pay the land revenue due from them." One woman, as Gandhi recounts, "wept bitterly" in telling Ghaffar Khan her humiliation and torture at the hands of the authorities: she, along with her small daughter, were made to stand in the hot sun, from morning till evening, for two or three days during which time they were not allowed any water. As Gandhi states: "This seems to be a favorite form of torture applied by revenue agents in cases of women defaulters."[228] While Elwin describes a KK, or "Red-shirt" meeting in Peshawar City that took place in January 1932 in his report:[229]

> the Police and the Military arrived and ordered the meeting to disperse. The people refused and there was a heavy lathi [baton] charge. Many women watched the scene from the balconies of houses that overlooked the market. This was followed by stone throwing from the balconies and a police officer had his cheek cut open. Then the Military went into the houses, climbed upstairs and not only beat the women but actually threw two of them down from the balcony to the

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[226] Gandhi: AICC (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 9 (181)
[227] Gandhi: AICC (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 12 (187)
[228] Gandhi: AICC (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 3 (169)
[229] Devadas Gandhi wrote the preface for Elwin's report, and although both of their trips to the Province overlapped their clandestine investigations were carried out separately.

> ground. One of these had her leg broken and the other's arm was broken in three places."[230]

That authorities violated the sanctity of zenana quarters, manhandling them and even threatening "wholesale outrage on the women folk of a village," as another Congress report states,[231] is perhaps not just unusual but also substantiates the fact that quite a number of women were either actively participating in the movement, or overtly supporting the KKs to warrant such measures against them. As this report goes on to state "women picketeers by the score obstructed the voters" at polling booths in the village of Charsadda, the stronghold of the KK. Elaborating further:

> The strict censorship of news from the N.W.F.P. is responsible for the almost total absence of tidings from there. The A.P.I. message regarding the picketting [sic] of Polling Booths made no mention of women picketeers, while on going there one finds that they did play a very prominent [sic] part.[232]

It is interesting to note that the participation of women becomes doubly censored: once because of conditions on the ground and the strict martial laws imposed upon the Province, but secondly, and more pertinently, by the representational framework of the Pathans in which women are always silent, docile figures cloistered in their "zenana" quarters.

Much more frequently, however, the "generously inhuman"[233] measures were aimed at the masculinity of KK workers in order to target their sense of the honor and shame. Publicly disrobing KK workers, exposing male genitalia and even emasculation became a regular "disciplinary" measure. Thus, this widespread form of punishment, or abuse, meted out to the

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[230] Elwin: AICC Report (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 14 (150)
[231] Titled "A Note on the N.W.F.P.", it is unclear who the author of this report is, but it begins by stating: "since submitting my last report in March after my visit there no first-hand information about the affairs in the N.W.F. P. has been available." AICC Report (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 1 (101)
[232] AICC Report (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 4 (105)
[233] AICC Report (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 1 (101)

male members of the movement was not only unusually sadistic but seemed to express frustrated homo-erotic desires that the KK had disrupted between colonial officer and the figure of the Pathan. As this Congress report continues to illustrate:

> Then there was the incident of the faces of Red Shirt picketers being blackened and sticks inserted in their private parts. I am sorry to have to say that this part of the statement has been confirmed with such alterations as to go to show that the state of affairs has been much worse than mentioned previously. I have been told that it is not the faces but the buttocks that were blackened and in some cases persons so treated were ordered to march through populated locations. In some other cases they were taken to house tops and exposed to public gaze and in still other cases womenfolk have been forced to be witness to these demonstrations.[234]

The writer laments that in humiliating the KK, especially in front of their women—which was paramount to a deadly insult in Pashtun culture—such obscenities had become general practice in the NWFP by "the custodians of Law and Order in India."[235] Because these abusive measures had become so common some KKs who went on marches or pickets discarded their clothes even before they were ordered to do so, to preempt the humiliation on their own terms, with the report concluding: "it just shows the callousness that the degrading methods of the oppressed has engendered."[236]

Banerjee also points out that incidents of sexual abuse and castration were so pervasive in the NWFP to suggest that the British were acting upon another set of presumptions about the Pathans: homosexuality was an accepted norm rather than a perverse exception. This, as she argues, reflected their own homoerotic fantasies rather than anthropological facts:[237]

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[234] AICC Report (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 2 (102)

[235] There is a curious incident of a KK, Haji Shahnawaz Khan Salar, who committed suicide in August 1930 whose photograph was published on the front matter of the *Pukhtun* journal in the August 1931 issue. The reasons why he committed suicide are strangely absent and one wonders if it was because he was subjected to such sexual humiliation so that mentioning it—which most people in the movement were probably already aware of—would have been tantamount to shaming his memory. His photograph is published alongside with the first three youths who joined the KK movement.

[236] AICC (1st) P-16/1932 (pg. 2/102), NMML

[237] Colonial writing that heavily influenced the homoerotic imagery of the NWF was the manuscript by Captain Kenneth Searight titled "The Furnace: an autobiography in which is set forth the secret diversions of a paiderast."

> Given the homosocial dynamics in the Frontier, the use of the tent peg in this way seems to express the colonialists' mixed feelings of cultural contempt and physical desire, their homosexual instincts and homophobic rules. More symbolically, the tent peg was an old Persian punishment used particularly against men who had violated the sanctity of the ruler's harem. Its use by the authorities against political activists thus seems to be a warning to them to remove themselves from the sacred realm of the political, whose enjoyment must be the sole pleasure of the ruler. [238]

However, even if homoerotic desire as well as homophobia—or what Banerjee calls "the homosocial dynamics in the Frontier"—intertwine to play a role in devising the sexual forms of torture, I contend that this was not aimed at clearing the sacred space of the political so much as it was intended to symbolize that the practice of nonviolence had turned the once virile Pathan effeminate. The torture was directed against those who had violated the representational sanctity of the figure of the Pathan, because the tropes of masculinity producing that figure also, at the same time, produced the virile colonial warrior. Therefore, donning the mantle of nonviolence had undermined the representational masculinity of both. Furthermore, according to this colonial

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This was an extended poem in rhymed couplets called "Paidikion" filled with erotic details about his sexual encounters with, mainly, young Indian boys. His encounters start in Bengal but dramatically increase in volume and intensity when he is posted to Peshawar in 1911. And interestingly, the Bengali and Pathan are compared with each other even in descriptions of sexual proclivity. It is probably the ease and the large number of Pathan boys who met his sexual needs that gave credence to the images of Pathans as naturally disposed to homosexuality and his poems also create enduring tropes:

> And now the scene shifted and I passed
> From sensuous Bengal to fierce Peshawar
> An Asiatic stronghold where each flower
> Of boyhood planted in its restless soil
> Is—*ipso facto*—ready to despoil
> (Or be despoiled by) someone else, the yarn,
> Indeed so has it that the young Pathan
> This it peculiar if you would pass
> Him by without some reference to his arse.
> Each boy of certain age will let on hire
> His charms to indiscriminate desire,
> To wholesale Buggery and perverse letches…
> To get a boy was easier than to pick
> The flowers by the wayside, for as quick
> As one went out another one came in

Hyam, Ronald: *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience*. Manchester University Press, 1990, 130-31

[238] Banerjee, 119

logic, Gandhi's influence had not only effeminized a martial race, but unlike nationalists from the "non-martial races," who were not dealt with as harshly, this nonviolent transformation was also, in a sense, a betrayal of the conflicted esteem with which the figure of the Pathan was held in the British imaginary. More than a frustration of homoerotic desire or a disruption of homophobic values, adopting the ideology of nonviolence was (and remains) inexplicable within the established frameworks of representation.

Unlike the Bengalis against whom they were often compared, the Pashtuns had more at stake in perpetuating these tropes of masculinity if, in the first place, such categorizations represented an indigenous reality, and, secondly, if they had breached this essential quality by embodying nonviolence. Moreover, unlike M.K. Gandhi's conscious appropriation of the feminine and valorization of the godlike state of androgyny that Ashish Nandy and Revathi Krishnaswamy describe,[239] Ghaffar Khan and the KK neither evoke a mythic imaginary that harnesses the power of the feminine nor are there any signs of a controversy in their literature that nonviolence was rendering the Pashtuns effeminate—such categorizations are generally from without.[240] However, KK literature does constantly position nonviolence as an aspect of honour or "*nang*"—a value not necessarily of manhood but one that is associated with the manly virtues of courage and valor; and even though it is sometimes used to denote the acts of extraordinary women, nevertheless, even by characterizing them as such it bestows these male qualities as an honorific upon their acts. And when associated with notions of honor-bound retribution it particularly gets wrapped up with indigenous notions of masculinity. However, in

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[239] Nandy, Ashish: *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983 (2nd edition: 2009) & Revathi Krishnaswamy: *Effeminism: The Economy of Colonial Desire*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998.

[240] AIML literature, especially the Frontier branch of the Muslim League is rife with comments about how the Pashtuns have been effeminized by Ghaffar Khan and his ideology—see Rittenberg. See also my argument below on Shamsie's characterization of this question in, *A God in Every Stone.*

appropriating the language of honor but shifting its orientation from violence to nonviolence, the KK harness a compulsory code of Pashtunwali and tether its telos to different ends, without, at the same time, rendering it impotent or effeminate. And even though, the potency associated with the code of *nang* shifts from a purely masculine domain, and one of violence, to that which is now gender neutral—or a form of resistance that women can practice just as well[241] —nevertheless, it is not evaluated as an emasculation of a virile race. The fact that the KK were able to harness and also subtly shift the meaning of such a potent trope cannot simply be attributed to their new progressive orientation or Ghaffar Khan's influence, although those are without a doubt major factors. Instead the lack of justificatory rhetoric implies they were tapping into existing yet alternate practices of the code as well as alternate tropes of gender—especially those of masculinity—which was why the embodiment of nonviolence was accomplished with the relative ease and in the large numbers that it did. This would not have been possible if the practice was considered either effeminate or emasculating; furthermore, and much more crucially, it implies that indigenous notions of masculinity were not tethered to the virility that violence denotes and which the figure of the Pathan personifies.

However, instead of destroying the movement as the colonial government was attempting it instead managed to give added impetus and fame to the ostensibly novel concept of a nonviolent Pashtun. Even though the categorization of the Pathans as an inherently martial race was both brought to the fore and starkly undermined during this time the representational framework was never correspondingly deconstructed in ethnographic accounts. So that even Elwin's sympathetic report is, perhaps not too surprisingly, steeped squarely within this

[241] That the ideology of nonviolence subverted what are considered normative gender roles is denoted by Syeda Bushra Begum's famous *shir* that became a banner for the movement, and which calls upon women's *nang* to come out upon the battlefield instead—see my analysis of it in the following chapter.

prevalent tropological framework. In explaining the phenomenon of the nonviolent Pashtun, Elwin repeatedly describes it as a superficial transformation wrought by the saint-like character of Ghaffar Khan, who cultivated "the flower of non-violence" in such "unpromising a soil."[242] However he, in turn, is denoted as simply a follower of Mahatma Gandhi. As Elwin writes:

> In fact, he made a point of taking no important step without consulting Mahatma Gandhi. His supreme achievement during this period was to drive home the message of non-violence. The magnitude of this achievement has not been fully recognized. The Pathan is naturally violent and revengeful; he possesses arms; and for thousands of years he has lived by the law of retaliation. There is no greater insult than to be beaten in front of women. To bear such an insult without retaliation, to fight with the strange, clean weapon of Satyagraha was the new ideal set before the Frontier by Abdul Ghaffar Khan.[243]

The fact that the KKs did not retaliate with violence despite being beaten before women, while their woman also suffered harassment at the hands of government officials in front of them, was never fully accepted as an authentic expression of nonviolence but, at most, a precarious imitation of the original which was Gandhian Satyagraha. Even Ghaffar Khan's speeches were said to incite violence in their fiery rhetoric because they did not imitate Gandhi's tone, modulation or subject matter.[244] Elwin submits further examples of the inadequacy of Pashtun nonviolence as he categorically states: "not all the Red-shirts are saints," reporting that some villagers were helping the Afridi tribesmen fight the British through armed resistance.[245] Further,

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[242]Elwin: AICC (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 12-13 (148-9)
[243]Elwin: AICC (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 6 (142)
[244] Elwin: AICC (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 4 (140)
[245] Hearing about the unarmed KK and others killed in the Qissa Khwani Bazaar riots the Afridi tribesmen came in a lashkar to support the Peshawar city dwellers and aid them in their resistance against the British. The KKs did not accept their help but neither did they reject the methods with which the Afridis normally resisted the British. And it was not uncommon that many in the KK would help their fellow tribesmen, and vice, versa, without necessarily adopting their methods of resistance. However, Elwin's categorical distinctions further denotes that the "Afridis despise the Red-shirts for the very reason that they are non-violent." Although he gets solemn oaths from various groups of people about their absolute belief in nonviolence, he depicts patronizingly likens the phenomenon of children being schooled in a completely novel method for "the last two years" by AGK. And Gandhi's "teachings" have had the effect that "the people have made great progress in the understanding of non-violent warfare." Elwin: 11 (147)

there "has been one instance of women pelting police with stones." Foreclosing the possibility that there may be indigenous methods of nonviolent resistance, mediation or modes of being that are different, even reports about Pashtun nonviolence were located within the familiar tropology of a "warlike race." Instead of disrupting normative frameworks of representation to understand Pashtun nonviolence on its own terms, it was treated as an exception that proved the rule to further ossify the racial representations of the Pathans into truths.

However, the most illuminating comparison between Pashtun nonviolence and the nationalist/Gandhian one is drawn by Devdas Gandhi in his report, who, while acknowledging the difference of KK nonviolence, and thus somewhat blurring the borders of this hegemonic framework, nevertheless, also points to the inadequacy of their practice in comparison with the original:

> The Pathan, when he has once made up his mind, seems to be capable of a lot of self-suffering without retaliating. Here probably I should draw a distinction between non-violence and peacefulness. The Khudai Khidmatgars are not all very peaceful although they maybe non-violent. I do not think *peacefulness in the Congress sense* had yet a place in the average Khudai Khidmatgar's conception of non-violence.[246] (my italics)

The distinction between peacefulness and nonviolence perhaps points to the crucial difference in the conceptions of nonviolence that the KK practiced and one that was more widely understood by nationalist ideology. So that the anarchic and indigenous nonviolence of the Pashtuns could never be understood or reconciled within the framework of peaceful civil disobedience associated with Congress practice. Even though the Pashtuns, as Gandhi states, are capable of tremendous amounts of forbearance in the face of suffering, and can choose not to retaliate violently, yet nevertheless, this is not a completely authentic expression of the ideology of nonviolence because it is not an exact imitation of the original. As it does not fully accept or

[246] Gandhi: AICC (1st Installment) P-16/1932, NMML, 12 (187)

understand the ground upon which Gandhian Satyagraha was founded it cannot claim the same stature as the original. And according to the same logic that translates tropological frameworks into truths, nonviolence is represented as an exceptional condition that only particular kinds of peoples or religions can authentically practice, generally Hindus or Buddhists but hardly ever Muslims. Peoples who practice nonviolence outside these religious traditions are depicted as merely mimics of the original: Gandhi (or Buddha) actually practice nonviolence but Ghaffar Khan, the Pathans, or Muslims more generally, can only mimic it; but the mimicry also can only be practiced to a certain degree as they do not have the requisite qualities to understand its spirit completely.

Rightful Dissent, Violent Revolt and the Silenced Subaltern: Guha, Fanon and Spivak

Pointed out earlier, the figure of the Pathan has become such an authoritative interpretative framework that even representations counter to it are mediated and read through its tropological lens. Because a nonviolent Pashtun introduces a contradictory representation, the discourse of mimicry resolves the contradiction without the need for deconstructing the authoritative framework itself. Mimicry, as Homi Bhabha points out, "is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as *a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite*." Mimicry, as a discursive process, "does not merely 'rupture' the discourse, but becomes transformed into an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a 'partial' presence. By 'partial' I mean both 'incomplete' and 'virtual.' It is as if the very emergence of the 'colonial' is dependent for its representation upon some strategic limitation or prohibition within the authoritative discourse itself." In other words, the "partial" presence in itself constitutes the shape of the "original" and becomes a pointer towards its fullness against which the replica is denoted as a lack. Although

Bhabha is describing how the colonial discourse of mimicry, as a process of otherness—or the sameness that is not quite the same—produces a particular kind of colonized subjectivity, I am pointing out that a similar logic structures other representational discourses that have become hegemonic, including indigenous nationalist discourse; it even extends to postcolonial critiques of such authoritative discourses. So that, not only does indigenous nationalist discourse conceive of Pashtun nonviolence as a mimicry of the original, Gandhian version—while at the same time defining the original and its parameters—but also, postcolonial critiques, such as Ranajit Guha's formulation of Gandhian nonviolence as an articulation of Western concepts of resistance through Indianized—or more specifically "Hindu"—vocabularies, advances a "partial" presence: it mimics and is merely a virtual aspect of Enlightenment thought. Thus, the discourse of mimicry disallows a deconstruction of the very frameworks of interpretation that refuses recognition to difference.

The subaltern studies historian, Ranajit Guha creates a dialectical framework between the colonial language of law and order and indigenous modes of resistance in *Dominance without Hegemony*. Using this framework Guha concludes that the nonviolence practiced by Congress was an offshoot of the Western idiomatic concept of "Resistance," and his explanation subsumes nationalist resistance into the Western rubric of "Rightful Dissent." As Guha explains, this rubric informs and propels "a wide variety of protest in forms unknown to our politics of the precolonial period,"[247] and the nationalist politics of the Congress, with its subaltern mobilizations, were "instances of this idiom at work." These dissents operated within "legal and constitutional limits imposed by the colonial authorities,"[248] so that nonviolent resistance was

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[247] Guha, Ranajit: *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India*. (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997), 55
[248] Guha, 56

mandated more by the constraints of colonial law rather than indigenous political forms. As Guha categorically states: "This idiom owes nothing to any Indian tradition. In its concept it derives directly from the important current of English liberalism which, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, relied on the example of the Revolution of 1688 and…the idea of natural rights based on an original contract as propounded by John Locke."[249] Whereas, the "purely Indian idiom" of "Dharmic Protest," and of *dhurna* or sit-in,[250] which is a righteous protest against *adharma*—or wrongful, unethical governance—does not contain the idea of rights but rather of duty.[251] Therefore, according to Guha, Gandhi's *Satyagraha* is derived from the "Hindu ideology of Dharma," now renamed 'satya,' and grafts it onto "the Western liberal notions of liberty and citizenship,"[252] to create the ostensibly novel concept of nonviolent resistance.

However, as Guha continues to argue, because nationalists, including Gandhi, "took fright" at every protest that turned violent nonviolent resistance was a means to control, and "a design to impose one kind of order on another." It was thus a "strategy of undermining the immediacy of subaltern mobilization and dealing with its consequences in such a way so as to enable the bourgeoisie to power its drive to hegemony by the energies of the surging nationalism."[253] Guha's extremely strong implication being, that subaltern mobilizations, if left to its own devices, could only be violent ones and only Gandhi's imposition of the bourgeoisie ordering system of "Rightful Dissent" upon the surging masses instrumentally channeled those chaotic forces to achieve a nationalist agenda for the benefit of an elite class.

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[249] Guha, 56
[250] Or the mode of resistance of sitting down in protest, becoming an obstacle and pledging not to move till the conditions of the protest are met.
[251] Guha, 59
[252] Guha, 60
[253] Guha: 142

If, as Guha iterates, within bourgeois politics in general "Order" is always enforced by the "coercive apparatus of the state," then his formulation that nonviolent resistance itself was also a form of "Rightful Dissent" within this British liberal tradition seems to position both the national resistance movement and the state's countermeasures against it within an all-pervasive domain of Western manufacture, and grants to the colonial rubric of "law and order" the omniscience it was always seeking. The formulation that all of India's politics of resistance was produced within a framework fashioned by colonial epistemological systems—forms of knowledge squarely rooted in Enlightenment philosophy—seems to grant to colonial authority the hegemony that Guha is arguing against. Even though he formulates both colonial governance and national resistance through synonymous English and "Hindu" idioms[254] —there does not seem to be any other tradition of India in Guha's purview: Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh, Dalit etc.,—to create an ostensibly dialectical framework of analysis, nevertheless, both rule and resistance function through, and are founded by, the Western liberal tradition rather than through the indigenous history which the Indian terms denote. Guha's functionalist framework, therefore, simply gives Indian terminology to already understood concepts of colonial (or liberal bourgeoisie) order while never for a moment questioning the very Orientalist formulations of India that they entail, especially a reliance on Hindu laws, or the Laws of Manu, created by colonial and Brahmanical scholarship in denoting the idiomatic terms he uses. Furthermore, he describes the dialectic of the idiomatic formulations as an "interaction between dynamic modernity and an inert tradition,"[255] thus reproducing an extremely problematic Orientalist binary essentializing what is Indian through his vocabulary. Although he challenges the validity of those "metaphors"—of dynamism and modernity on the Western side of the equation and

[254] Outlined in a table (Guha: 61)
[255] Guha, 61

inertia and (timeless) tradition on the Indian side—nevertheless, he situates his own framework of analysis within those very same reductive, categorical binaries.

In Guha's account, therefore, the ideology of nonviolence certainly did not constitute as a form of decolonization, in fact his assertions imply a very Fanonian argument: because the Indian nationalist movement was reared under colonialism it could not help but speak the language of its rulers, replicating liberal aspirations and bourgeoisie ordering systems even in its forms of resistance and nationalism.[256] As such—because nationalists do not actually speak to the subaltern in their own language, or allow the subaltern to speak in its own voice—neither the nationalists nor the Raj achieves hegemony over the subaltern "subject population;"[257] thus the resistance never manages to produce the bourgeoisie ideal in which "Persuasion" outweighs "Coercion."[258]

Far from being the anarchic form of protest and mobilization that the KK demonstrated, the nonviolent resistance of Guha's formulation is, instead, a means of controlling the subaltern within the constitutional structures of colonial law. Which would imply that, because nonviolence was better suited to colonial rule and its mechanisms of discipline, it was not taken too seriously by colonial power because it was a familiar and easily controllable form of resistance. However, it is hard to locate the KK within this framework for a number of reasons: firstly, there was an open admission by colonial authorities that the KK movement needed to be destroyed and not just curtailed, because it was more of threat to the state than the recurrent armed resistances of the NWF; secondly, the kinds of physical torture to which the KK were subjected, especially in its overtly sexual sadism, expressed a virulent desire to reinstate the

[256] Guha, 101
[257] Guha, 100
[258] Guha, 103

figure of the Pathan which the ideology of nonviolence emasculated in the colonial imaginary—which also implies that the framework of violence was part of the purview of colonial understanding; thirdly, even though Ghaffar Khan founded the movement and was its major driving force, the KK were largely a subaltern organization and did not serve elite nationalists ends; finally, and much more critically, this voluntary organization also had a loud, local voice especially through its literary articulations. In other words, the latter fact also disrupts the figure of the silent subaltern made popular by the Subaltern Studies historians; even if, as they argue, the colonial-capitalist epistemological frameworks in place renders the subaltern silent at the imperial (and nationalist) centers, it does not follow that the subaltern cannot speak.

KK nonviolent resistance especially cannot simply be reduced to Guha's "Rightful Dissent," or even Fanon's conception of nonviolence as a "new notion" which is "in actual fact a creation of the colonial situation" by the "colonialist bourgeoisie." Guha's formulation of nonviolence, as well as the formulation of subaltern resistance as always violent ones, quite obviously has strong Fanonian roots and uses strikingly similar arguments. In Fanon's view violence is intrinsic to all subaltern revolts because it is an unmediated form of resistance, "a cleansing force"[259] that equalizes and unifies the people into a nation, in contrast with the violence of colonialism separates and fragments.[260] Whereas, Fanon states, the colonized bourgeoisie, who have become habituated to the law and want to emulate colonial rule, can only make compromises with the given system. As such, nonviolence is intended to pacify the unruly mobs by "an attempt to settle the colonial problem around the negotiating table before the irreparable is done, before any bloodshed or regrettable act is committed." In Fanon's view,

[259] Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Trans. Richard Philcox. (New York: Grove Press, 2004, 52
[260] Fanon, 51

therefore, violent opposition is not only an authentic expression of a subaltern revolutionary impulse but the only effective form of decolonization:

> it is obvious that in colonial countries only the peasantry is revolutionary. It has nothing to lose and everything to gain. The underprivileged and starving peasant is the exploited who very soon discovers that only violence pays. For him there is no compromise, no possibility of concession. Colonization or decolonization: it is simply a power struggle. The exploited realize that their liberation implies using every means available, and force is the first…colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body endowed reason. It is naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater violence. [261]

Although this is a psychological account of why the oppressed resort to violence, rather than a call to action, nevertheless, in Fanon's view, decolonization can only be achieved by forms of violence more powerful than the violence of colonialism. And because nonviolence is conceived as part of the colonial order it, in effect, becomes a form of collaboration rather than a deconstructive force undermining it systemically. The starving peasant knows no other way to "intuitively"[262] react to the "primary violence of the colonizer" but by "the radical overthrow of the system."[263] Fanon speaks of a "confrontation between two protagonists,"[264] bound to each other through this common language of violence, with each, in effect, becoming the inverted mirror image of the other. However, as he also acknowledges, the common language of violence is entrenched within the narrative framework of colonial representations:

> The existence of an armed struggle is indicative that the people are determined to put their faith only in violent methods. The very same people who had it constantly drummed into them that the only language they understood was that of force, now decide to express themselves with force. In fact, the colonist has always shown them the path they should follow to liberation. The argument chosen by the colonized was conveyed to them by the colonist, and by an ironic twist of fate it is now the colonized who state that it is the colonizer who only understands the language of force.[265]

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[261] Fanon: 23
[262] Fanon: 33
[263] Fanon: 22
[264] Fanon: 3
[265] Fanon: 42

Fanon is elaborating a profound reality here: that representation affects the object of representation and the colonized, having internalized the roles assigned to them, take on and make the language of the colonizers systems of categorization their own. However, what Fanon does not critique as cogently is that by inverting and turning the categorizations against the colonizers, the colonized may take ownership of the system but they also reproduce the Manichaean world intrinsic to imperial domination. A binary system which endlessly perpetuates the logics of colonialism. As Fanon acknowledges, "the Manicheanism of the colonist produces a Manicheanism of the colonized."[266] Therefore, even according to Fanon's own reasoning, violent revolt is part of the epistemological framework of colonialism: a familiar scene in the colonial narrative; one that is always feared and vigilantly guarded against, but which is not, essentially, outside the logics of its worldview. In using the same logics and language of colonialism violent revolt is part of the lingua franca of that world.[267]

As Fanon elaborates much more cogently in *White Skin, Black Masks*, the effects of colonization penetrated into the very being of the colonized, reshaping them into embodiments of the representations about them; the psychological scarring and trauma of this insidious form of colonial violence affects the thoughts, emotions and ways of being of the colonized through daily

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[266] Fanon: 50

[267] The Manichaean world that Fanon both decried and wanted to emulate cannot, in effect, be decolonized while remaining caught within its epistemological framework.
Decolonization necessitates that the foundations upon which colonialism basis its categorization of the colonized be deconstructed so that the imposition of those myths—the myths about the colonized—as Albert Memmi cogently points out in *The Colonizer and The Colonized*, should not just be opposed with counter-myths about the colonizers or the colonized, but the whole Manichaean world ought to be overturned and replaced. In order to "cease defining himself through the categories of the colonizers" (Memmi: 152) the colonized, though not free to choose being colonized, can give recognition to the process of dehumanization undertaken relentlessly against them by refusing to participate in their own objectification. Because of the "colonizer's supreme ambition," that the colonized "should exist only as a function of the needs of the colonizer, i.e., be transformed into a pure colonized" (Memmi: 86) the objectification should not be enabled by those so categorized. As Memmi points out, more harmful than the effort of the colonialist to objectify the colonial subject in order to dehumanize them, is the "echo that it excites in the colonized" themselves. (Memmi, Albert, *The Colonizer and The Colonized*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1991, pg. 87)

mundane acts; the colonized reshape their own subjectivity an inadvertent form of mimicry and validate colonial narratives.

As such, violent revolt reproduces and validates the colonial narrative and perpetuates its Manichean world view and does not break free from its epistemological framework to create an alternative narrative. Fanon's "endeavor to create a new man" outside the borders of European humanism, which, as he points out, has committed crimes "at the very heart of man,"[268] necessarily also entails a new language, a new epistemological framework, a new world far different from the colonial one; one in which—most crucially—violence does not constantly oil its mechanisms. He does not offer a path of decolonization that is also a liberation from this ontological space or from the epistemological categories of colonialism. It stands to reason that the process of decolonization would need to go beyond the closed borders of this reductively Manichaean world and produce narratives counter to its reductive binaries. Decolonization would necessarily entail what Walter Mignolo calls "an other thinking,"[269] or, explicating the thought of the Moroccan philosopher Abdel Kebir Khatibi, "a third way."[270] This other thinking or third way needs to not only deconstruct the colonial epistemological framework and its dichotomies,[271] but furthermore, it must bring to the fore knowledges subalternized by "Occidentalism."[272] As an ontologically oppositional space, Mignolo calls this third way "border thinking"[273] because, although shaped by modernity and the "colonial difference," it is also situated at its "conflictive intersections;" an outside space in which subaltern epistemologies can

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[268] Fanon: 238-9
[269] See also Mignolo 66-67 on Khatibi's explanation of "une pensée autre"
[270] Mignolo: 74
[271] Mignolo: 73
[272] Mignolo describes "Occidentalism" as "a powerful machine for subalternizing knowledge…and the setting up of a planetary epistemological standard." (59)
[273] Mignolo also deliberately denotes oppositional frameworks of knowledge produced outside of the "cultures of scholarship" as "gnosis;" one that, as he puts it, changes the terms and "not just the content of the conversation." (70)

also be recognized.[274] As Mignolo explains: "it is one thing to deconstruct Western metaphysics while inhabiting it, and it is quite another to work on decolonization as a form of deconstruction from the historical exteriority of Western metaphysics; that is, from those places that western metaphysics transformed into 'silenced societies' or 'silenced knowledges.'"[275]

Heeding both Khatibi's warning, and recalling Gayatri Spivak's essay, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," the desire to retrieve and reclaim the silenced subaltern through colonial archives, or European intellectuals acting as interlocuters transmitting silenced narratives, not only disregards the hegemonic epistemological frameworks that silenced them in the first place, but in producing idealized representations of subaltern consciousness, reinforces the same global-capitalist circuits of power that continue to perpetuate the inequalities.[276] However, Spivak also creates an absolutist framework of silencing in her own endeavor to delineate "that the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative of imperialism be recognized as 'subjugated knowledge'" which European intellectuals such as Foucault (and Deleuze) do not take into account. Although she does cogently argue that the epistemic violence of subjugation—of particular societies and knowledges—is "a vast two-handed engine" which can never fully be recognized (or deconstructed) until the relationship between colonial center and colony is foregrounded, the fact that it endlessly reproduces itself in present day global capitalism not only points to economic subjugation but also racial and, especially, gendered ones. But she presents these modes of subjugation and silencing as all–encompassing mechanisms of hegemony with no possibility of an outside space, and with no means to oppose its pervasive epistemic violence. In

[274] Mignolo: 9, 11
[275] Mignolo 73
[276] Mignolo 71 & Gayatri Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" from *Reflections on the History of an Idea: Can the Subaltern Speak*, edited by Rosalind C. Morris. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

Spivak's terms, there are no alternate mediums through which the subaltern can speak or, more correctly, through which they can be heard. Thereby, she too creates a transcendent object of knowledge, one that is furthermore, rendered mute in the framework through which it is objectified.

However, in lambasting Foucault for the naively arrogant assumption of speaking on behalf of the subaltern she, nevertheless, borrows freely from his description of subjugated knowledges without, however, acknowledging the possibility that, as Foucault argues, the "insurrection" of such knowledges may also be a potent space of resistance. Spivak in fact disavows his conclusion that the "insurrection of subjugated knowledges" (19) becomes the space of deconstruction, or in Mignolo's terms, the space of border thinking. Although Foucault is often accused of creating a totalizing perspective through his concept of "epistemes," Mignolo quotes from Foucault's inaugural lecture at the College of France in 1976 in which an oppositional space, outside of the totalizing mechanisms of epistemic violences, is in fact posited:

> I believe that by subjugated knowledges one should understand something else, something which in a sense is altogether different, namely, a whole set of knowledge that has been disqualified as inadequate to its tasks or insufficiently elaborated: *naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity.* I also believe that it is through the re-emergence of these low-ranking knowledges, these unqualified knowledges…which involve what I would call a popular knowledge [le savoir des gens] though it is far from being a general common sense knowledge, but on the contrary a particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its forces only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it—that is through the reappearance of these local popular knowledges, these disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs its work. [277] (my italics)[278]

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[277] Mignolo 19-20

[278] Spivak, Gayatri: "Can the Subaltern Speak?" My italics highlight the words Spivak also quotes in her essay, 35.

In never pointing to the essential role colonialism played in creating the differential mechanisms of subjugation, Spivak's critique of Foucault (and Deleuze) is extremely relevant, an applicable to a wide number of European intellectuals, yet she does not give local and regional knowledges—subjugated knowledges—any potency for deconstructive critique in and of themselves either. In fact, she disallows, absolutely, the possibility of the subaltern being heard. In that sense then, even as an idealized concept, Foucault's insurrection seems a far more open-ended space of possibility. Especially if the insurrection is located outside the space of Western metaphysics and in a different epistemological framework as Mignolo's "border thinking" or "border gnosis" calls for. As a discursive, analytical category the insurrection of subjugated knowledges may have the potency to destabilize historical narratives created through the lenses of the very same global circuits of power that has silenced them—at least until they have not been subsumed by the homogenizing mechanisms of capitalism—however, and much more crucially, they can still think the future in a different way and posit alternate narratives.

The history of the KK, and its ideology of nonviolence, is, I contend, one of these subjugated yet insurrectionary knowledges; by creating an alternative form of communal organization at the regional level they were offering an alternative narrative to the imperial state model; and, furthermore, this narrative has the potential to dislocate the normative political at the global level. In the following section I attempt to outline this future oriented, alternate political, which, far from being merely a utopian ideal, was a real possibility for a short moment in time.

An Archeology of Nonviolence: The Khudai Khidmatgar Organization

In his memoirs, the Khudai Khidmatgar Waris Khan points to the new forms of social organization that they had created, and I quote a lengthy passage from it to illustrate how this

was also a subaltern reorganization of the socio-political. It was this grass roots organizational structure which enabled the ranks of the KK to swell as quickly they did, or what Banerjee calls their methods of vertical and horizontal enlistment.[279] While the seemingly random connection Waris Khan draws between this altered organizational form, and the sense of valor and pride elicited by the practice of nonviolence, expresses the nascent stages of a transformed habitus; one which, in turn, dialectically affected subject formation.

> But unity and organization of the people is what true power is made of. When someone spread…propaganda, people called them "toadie child". People would hate them. The government would always give the authority of the post of *thanedar* to a man of the village that they trusted, and he would recruit his own people for the local police. We used to call these recruiters "manure stackers". They tried their hardest, but the floodwater of the masses was surging in the direction of freedom to such a degree that no dam could hold it back. The unity was so powerful that in our village, a loyalist man opposed the movement. One day it was his *ashar.* All the people working at the *ashar* were men from his own neighborhood. We sent uniformed volunteer workers to tell them to get up out of that man's field. When he did this, they all got up. Due to the blessing of this unity, and discipline, everyone respected our decisions and judgments. If any sort of dispute arose in the village, we would judge it in our office. *The courts came to be nearly empty.* We urged everyone toward concord, unity, justice, and forbearance; and to boycott foreign goods. People acted on our words too. Once a volunteer worker left the house in uniform and went to a parade. In a lane, a dog started coming after him. It attacked him and injured him pretty badly. Someone asked him, "Hey kid, you have a stick, but you didn't beat the dog with it?" He replied, "I took an oath that I will not use violence. I have put on my uniform and I was heading to a parade. If I had struck the dog, that would have been violence." All fear of the English left the common people's hearts too. Bacha Khan spoke in a very simple and easy style."[280]

It was especially the appropriation of the "law" in many parts of the province that aroused colonial ire against the KKs as strongly as it did because that, specifically, invalidated imperial

[279] Banerjee points out that enlistment into the KK was not only carried out vertically through Ghaffar Khan's leadership and how reverence for him galvanized the people, but also, through horizontal recruitment: through peer pressure and kinship bonds. Therefore, the massive popularity, in a relatively short span of time, can only be explained by the fact that both affiliative and filial relationships were enlisted. Banerjee, 66-67.

[280] Waris Khan, *də āzadəy ẗəhrik.* (Peshawar, 1988), 100 (NB: Where I have translated from the original Pashto, I use Waris Khan's pagination. When using James Caron partial, unpublished translation I use his pagination and denote it with his initials "JC."

rule on ontological grounds. As I elaborate in my introduction, the law was the foundation upon which the British Raj constructed its own legitimacy, both in the metropole and the colony, and the means by which it maintained its hegemony on a daily basis. As Upamanyu Mukherjee also argues, "the rule of law becomes central to the construction of authority in British society."[281] Colonialism was justified by the moral argument that it was bringing law and order to "an essentially anarchic and criminal country."[282] Therefore, the fact that the law courts of the Raj were replaced by local forms of jurisprudence undermined the ground upon which colonialism had erected its authority. What is even more significant in Waris Khan's description of popular sovereignty is that it usurped class distinctions as well. However, this also implies that the horizontal forms of enlistment included intimidation and coercion via threats of social ostracism and moral judgement, as the passage illustrates the KKs had the power to socially ostracize a landlord because he was a colonial collaborator—and thus probably also an upper-class Khan—which speaks to the power they commanded to affect class relations.

The reorientation of the political through the ideology of nonviolence relies heavily upon moral self-policing at a quotidian level, so that social egalitarianism becomes an expression of self-sovereignty, in contrast with the normative political in which external state structures impose "law and order" from the top-down or the outside-in. The political becomes subordinate to, or a direct expression of the social; what Chatterjee calls the Gandhian political ideal, "is when politics is directly subordinated to a communal morality that the minority of exploiters in society can be resisted by the people and inequalities and divisions removed. As a political ideal, therefore Gandhi counterposes, against the system of representative government, an undivided

[281] Mukherjee, Upamanyu. *Crime and Empire*. (Oxford University Press, 2003), (vi)
[282] Mukherjee, (vi)

concept of popular sovereignty: where the community is self-regulating and political power is dissolved into the collective moral will."[283]

There is, however, an *a priori* presumptive framework operative here that does not envision this as "mob" rule which is the fear entrenched at the heart of the normative political, largely derived from Plato's mistrust of an unenlightened socius, and that is Gandhi's understanding of "*swaraj.*" Often translated as "Home-Rule," this does not capture the essence which "self-rule" points towards: an inner, self-transformation as the crucial pre-requisite that self-governance demands. As such, when each individual uses "truth," or nonviolence, as the fulcrum for transforming themselves then the need for external mechanisms of control and pacification would become redundant. In Gandhi's own words:

> Political power, in my opinion, cannot be our ultimate aim. It is one of the means used by men for their all-round advancement. The power to control national life through national representatives is called political power. Representatives will become unnecessary if the national life becomes so perfect as to be self-controlled. It will then be a state of *enlightened anarchy* in which each person will become his own ruler. He will conduct himself in such a way that his behaviour will not hamper the well-being of his neighbours. In an ideal State there will be no political institution and therefore no political power. That is why Thoreau has said in his classic statement that that government is best which governs the least.[284] (my italics)

In a state of enlightened anarchy— 'state' implying both an individual psychic condition as well as the organizing mechanisms of a nation—the concept of the political would not only be subordinated to the social but it would be rendered superfluous. As a socius, each individual would organize the social through the prior act of self-regulation and it is from this state that the moral behavior of society is organically derived. It is an inner self-transformation that not only enlightens subjectivity but is also the prerequisite for an enlightened socio-political as well.

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[283] Chatterjee, Partha, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 92

[284] Gandhi: "Enlightened Anarchy—A Political Ideal," *Sarvodya*, Jan. 1939. In *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, ed., Raghavan Iyer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. Vol III, 602.

Similar to the Kantian categorical imperative, in which moral principles are derived from maxims through our *a priori* rational faculty—in opposition to experiential, or *a posteriori* knowledge—enlightened self-rule (or real *swaraj*) would be the faculty capable of generating laws that are universally applicable to all people in all times. Although maxims are subjective principles, such as "I should not lie," they generate a categorical imperative that, in turn, generates an objective principle or a universal moral law, such as "lying is immoral, therefore, neither I nor anyone else should lie." The rational faculty of the individual determines what is right, and because this rational faculty is a universally shared condition, it can judge whether the maxim ought to generate moral laws. The first formulation of the categorical imperative is: "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law."[285] Furthermore, because this rational faculty is free to choose, it follows that the subject is autonomous and, therefore, morality is autonomous too; it is self-generated, and external authorities, such as governments or religion, cannot be the ground for the ethical.

However, even though Kant's metaphysics of morals has intrinsic implications for political autonomy he does not translate this capacity for self-generation into self-regulation at the state level. Even his formulation of "perpetual peace" is reliant upon the nation-state system to impose "lawful coercion" to curtail the "malevolence of human nature" and as such is not grounded upon Gandhi's premise of enlightened anarchy, in which self-transformation would render political institutions and state coercion obsolete; with the prior assumption that human nature is intrinsically good and not violent.

Although for Kant there is no conflict between the moral and the political there is also no concept of egalitarianism in the political domain, and as such, "a superior (legislating)" body has

[285] Kant, Immanuel, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4:421

the right to impose its writ upon "an inferior (obeying, namely the people)."[286] In fact the kind of self-sovereignty Gandhi was envisioning as an utopian ideal, and which the KK were effectively embodying, would in Kantian terms be considered "the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom," to be regarded with "contempt, as barbarous, crude and brutishly degrading to humanity."[287] Even if the self-regulating capacity that the ideology of nonviolence aims to generate can be likened to Kant's "rational freedom"—one that eventually leads to mastery of "the evil principle within"—in contrast with his idea of "mad freedom," (such as that enjoyed by "American savages" who eat their enemies), the KK manifestation of a nascent state of enlightened anarchy was much more than this formulation and in fact negates Kant's binary distinction. Not only was the KK formulation grounded upon, and even, in many ways, generated from their indigenous codes—one which Kant would categorize as lawless freedom—but, as such, it also surpassed Gandhi's utopian ideal of enlightened anarchy because it was an experiential embodiment, or at least a nascent manifestation of it. One that was both particular to its locality but also, as KK literature articulates, a global exemplar as well.

Additionally, Islamic mystical interpretations of nonviolence, local modes of governance, as well as their particular geographical imaginary produced a unique amalgam that cannot be reduced to a single source. Although Gandhi's influence was certainly present, the KK articulation of nonviolence was due precisely to this unique, local synthesis. Banerjee suggests that such syntheses often takes place in frontier zones much more organically.

> While the KK ideology was certainly grounded in *Pukhtunwali* and Islam, it was also an extraordinary *bricolage* of ideological influences, bearing traces of Christianity, Gandhist (sic) Hinduism, European militarism, and even Gandharan Buddhism. Such processes of influence, synthesis and cooption take place in

[286] Kant, Immanuel, "Toward Perpetual Peace," 1795. 8:370
[287] Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace," 8:355

> every culture, but it seems to me unarguable that they take place with particular rapidity, clarity and general panache in frontier settings.[288]

More than the direct influence of colonial rule, Ghaffar Khan acknowledges that his teachers at the missionary school he attended exemplified the true spirit of Christian selflessness. The tireless zeal with which they applied themselves for a greater cause had a lasting impact on his ideas about the nature of social service.[289] While Gandhi's influence is directly noticeable through the methods of civil disobedience that the KKs adopted, such as picketing English cloth and liquor stores, the sanitation of local communities, the adoption of the *charkha* or the spinning wheel as the symbol of resistance, especially after they became a part of the Frontier Congress Committee. What is less noticeable is the dialectical relationship that Gandhi's *ahimsa* and Ghaffar Khan's *'ədm-e-ïushdəd*, or nonviolence, shared and its effect on the other, however, there is little evidence that the KK interpreted nonviolence through the lens of Hindu tropology that Gandhi strenuously undertook. Nevertheless, the fact that Pashto is an ancient Indo-Aryan language derived from Sanskrit, and that Hinduism—or local forms of worship that would now be labelled as such—was part of the culture of the land for many thousands of years must have left its imprint upon the people, and synthesized with local practices and beliefs; while the Islam practiced there—as in the rest of South Asia—is an amalgamation of many local belief systems, so closely intertwined that they cannot be unraveled into discrete elements that qualify as a "pure" strain. The fact that Buddhist iconography proliferates the land, and Charsadda, Ghaffar Khan's village, was once the capital city of the Gandharan civilization, must also have

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[288] Banerjee, 16

[289] Eknath Easwaran states that Ghaffar Khan's spirit of selfless service to his people was influenced by his High school teachers, the missionaries, Reverend Wigram and his younger brother who headed the Edwardes Memorial High School. In *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan, A Man to Match his Mountains*. Tomales, California: Nilgiri Press, 1999, 55-56. Ghaffar Khan admits this in his Pashto autobiography as well and I detail that further in the last chapter.

entrenched Buddhist world views quite deeply into the culture; the Sufi mystical traditions practiced there are heavily imbued with such perspectives. The poetry of Rahman Baba, the seventeenth century Pashtun poet famous for his unique mysticism, are laden with injunctions of nonviolence that are hard to reductively classify. As such it becomes especially problematic to classify a place or a people through the vocabulary of singular, homogenous belief systems labeled, "Muslim," "Buddhist," "Christian," or "Hindu," even in attempts to postulate synthesis. So that, although Banerjee makes a cogent point about frontiers as organic zones of cross-fertilization, the question of "influence" can never be unraveled directly, especially in this case where there are so many ancient and rich layers of history embedded in the land and in the imaginary of its people.

Using more than the lens of "synthesis," Kamila Shamsie's novel, *A God in Every Stone*, embeds the movement within a wide historical context, effectively situating its practice of nonviolence within its soil; rather than an exception or an ahistorical anomaly, as is often posited, her novel illustrates it as an indigenous, organic outgrowth of its own rich history. And in utilizing the frame of archeology, Shamsie contextualizes the Khudai Khidmatgars within a layered, material genealogy. However, in tracing this particular archeological genealogy, the novel perhaps veers towards the other extreme of contextualization: it draws far too wide a historical circumference—both real and fictional—to illustrate that the ground that germinated KK nonviolence was a local one. The novel begins with the figure of Scylax, as an officer in the imperial Persian army who led an exploratory expedition to the Indus and, later, became a staunch resistance fighter against Darius the Great in 6th century BCE, and positions this history as an analog to Pashtun resistance against British imperialism in the 20th century. The narrative then detours to the Ottoman Empire at the start of the First World War, viewed through the lens

of two fictional archeologists; one an older Turkish man who acts as mentor to the female protagonist of the novel, an Englishwoman who later travels to Peshawar at the behest of her mentor to search for the legendary circlet of Scylax. Vivian Rose Spencer is also the first female British archeologists and it is through her historical knowledge that the many sedimentary layers of one the most ancient living cities, and the various names of Peshawar, are unpacked in the novel to reveal deep and multifaceted roots. As readers, we are informed both of the imprint of emperor Ashoka's decrees as well as the proliferation of Buddhist relics upon the land, and how the latter especially were amassed by the British Raj, making the Peshawar (and Taxila) museums one the richest collections of Gandhara figurines in the world. The interwoven history of British colonialism with Buddhist iconography, as well as the story of Scylax, forms the narrative frame explaining the indigenous roots of KK nonviolence.

The archeological genealogy serves two implicit but rather obvious purposes: firstly, that resistance to empires and the ideology of nonviolence are embedded in the soil; and consequently, this long historical lineage shapes the cosmology of the Pashtuns, even if on a subterranean level.[290] And because this cosmology is generated from the soil—(as opposed to being imposed from outside)—it proliferates like rhizomes and sprouts in ever new assemblages, to use Deleuze and Guattari's metaphoric language, making the Khudai Khidmatgars its most recent, flourishing outgrowth.

Although the novel makes a few problematic assumptions and is, at times, difficult to read because of its stylistically fractured structure—one which does, however, quite cogently point to the fragmentary nature of historical reconstructions—nevertheless, it is the only fictional

[290] This is reminiscent of the facetious quip Ghani Khan's makes to explain the normative violence condoned by Pashtun culture: he states that the "great ferocity of the Pathan might well be a reaction to a rather long dose of Buddhist non-violence." *The Pathans*, 2

account focusing on the KK and the Qissa Khwani Bazaar event, and one which contextualizes the movement within its own milieu. However, one of the problematic assumptions that Shamsie does make is that the sense of fraternity in the KK army was a derivative of the camaraderie and brotherhood that existed in the Indian Army.[291] Arguably, there are parallels in the subaltern and (somewhat) egalitarian makeup of both, and KK rankings can be directly attributed to the structures of the colonial army, but Shamsie either misreads Pashtunwali through the problematic ethnographic lens of the figure of the Pathan or does not take the importance given to local concepts of egalitarianism into account. Instead she also primarily focuses on the code of *badal* and situates it as the essential aspect of the Pashtuns ethos.[292]

Zarina, one of the leading female characters in the novel urges her husband, who is a member of the KK, to take revenge for his sister's death. She even taunts him on his lack of manliness because he does not decisively take *badal* and is pulled towards the injunctions of nonviolence even when his sister, Diwa has apparently been killed during the Qissa Khwani Bazar riots. Earlier in the novel Zarina vocalizes the parallels often drawn between gender and (non)violence when she speaks to the male protagonist of the novel, Qayyum, who is also a KK, about the mysterious disappearance of her sister-in-law who had gone out into the street right before the shootings began in the Bazar:

> When men become women and approach an enemy armed with nothing but chants then it falls to a woman to take the role of Malala of Maiwand and walk onto the battlefield to show you what a warrior looks like. She was down with the men, and there was more of a man's fire in her than in all of you.[293]

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[291] Shamsie, 196. This is a letter that Qayyum writes to his brother Najeeb in which he states that Ghaffar Khan was inspired to create the Khudai Khidmatgars in "the great spirit of brotherhood and discipline in the Army" because he, as a former soldier, described it as such. However, this letter also illuminates another fact not often depicted: that many in the AICC did not believe that the Pashtuns could actually be nonviolent, while also trying to explain the nuances of the KK through this medium.

[292] The character Zarina is also depicted as a warrior woman who tries to dissuade and shame her husband from becoming a KK and, dagger in hand, goes out to fight the British in his stead. See 294. Also see the elaboration of the concept of *badal* as a matter of course on 136-137.

[293] Shamsie: 221

As I also describe in chapter one, Malala of Maiwand, known more commonly by her diminutive "Malalai," is a legendary figure in Pashtun lore known for her courage in rousing the flailing spirits of Afghan fighters during the Battle of Maiwand in the second Anglo-Afghan war. Her father and fiancée were part of Ayub Khan's army fighting the British and, according to lore, when she saw the morale of the fighters flailing, especially after the flag bearer was shot by British troops, Malalai rushed into the midst of battle and used her veil as a flag, or in some accounts she picked up the fallen flag. She is said to have roused the troops with a *tapâā*, or short distinctively constructed couplet, and although there are is no definitive records of what she said, one version ascribed to her states: "If you do not become a martyr in Maiwand/By God, Laila will keep your honour." In other words, if the men do not fight she, as Laila or the feminine figure of the sacred beloved, will fight instead. Malalai was subsequently struck down by bullets and the Afghans galvanized by her fearless act and taunting words rallied to win the decisive battle. Since then, Malalai has turned into a symbol of Pashtun women's courage while disrupting gendered tropes about Pashtun masculinity and its association with the honor bound warrior. Therefore, Zarina's taunt evokes both this legendary warrior spirit but it also presupposes, or, more accurately, Shamsie assumes, that the normative construction of such a figure in the imaginary would perceive the practice of nonviolence as an emasculation of Pashtun virility.

It is noteworthy that a female character in the novel is enforcing normative gender roles and evoking the code of *badal*—in its narrow meaning of revenge—more forcefully then any of the male characters, and despite the fact that Diwa, Zarina's sister-in-law, assumes the role of Malalai in turn: she both gives water to the protestors and goes courageously into the midst of the rioting unveiled. In many ways, Shamsie reiterates the prescriptive anthropological tropes

about the Pathans but she especially disregards the many female KK voices that were part of the movement. A fervent KK activist and a prolific contributor to the *Pukhtun* journal, Syeda Bushra Begum wrote a poem the first couplet of which not only evokes Malalai's *tapâā* but which, in its own right, has since gained a similar stature in the Pashto literature. The famous *shir,* often cited as though it were a *tapâā,* says: "If honor bound young men step back / Fəkhray Āfğānâ, the girls will win [this fight]." I analyze this *shir* in some detail in the next chapter to argue how nonviolence disrupted normative gender roles but for now I want to point out that Bushra Begum also appropriates the concept of honor from within the codes of Pashtunwali as well as the trope-laden imaginary of the warrior spirit. The fight, in this instance, is the fight against colonial rule and, because it is being fought through the weapons of nonviolence, women have as much power, if not more, than men in winning this war.

Moreover, the male protagonist of the novel, Qayyum Gul, a former soldier in the imperial army who becomes a staunch KK activist and a teacher at one of the Azad schools, discourages his younger sister from learning to read.[294] Although a minor scene in the novel, it reinforces ascribed gender roles: Pathan men, even enlightened KK activists, dissuade girls from getting an education and women accept that status with docility. In both the instances I have illustrated, Shamsie shunts Pashtunwali outside the boundaries of the framework she has tried to formulate throughout the novel: that KK nonviolence was an expression of a unique genealogy embedded in the land; so that, only Buddhist iconography becomes the rhizome generating indigenous nonviolence and traditional Pashtun ways of being are positioned as intrinsically oppositional to the ideology even in this novel.

[294] Shamsie, 169

A handbook titled "Da-Khudai Khimatgaro da-Parade Kitab," or "The Khudai Khidmatgar's Parade Booklet" details their military organization and the codes of ethical conduct they were supposed to follow. It defines the various rankings of the KK, which essentially emulates the Indian Army hierarchy as Shamsie observed, but in contrast with the British military, it points to the egalitarian nature of those occupying such positions. The handbook declares that "promotions are given and appointments made on the bais [sic] of efficiency, sacrifice and service and no regard will be paid to whether the man is a Khan, a poor man, Mian or Mulla."[295] Subalterns did, in fact, occupy the ranks of colonels and generals in the KK army, unlike the British Army in which higher ranking officers were generally from the elite classes—although in the colonies such clear class divides often got blurred. However, in the KKs case they were also pushing indigenous norms to their logical even if socially unpracticed ends: a peasant could sit with a person belonging to a higher class on an equal footing in social gatherings—especially in a *jirga*—even if, in practice, they often deferred decisions to the Khan in their midst.

Also, the oath that every KK member had to pledge upon joining the army addressed Pashtun customs quite directly, especially its sanction of violence. In two of the vows they forswore not to create oppositional filial factions and enmities within the ranks of the KK; [296] the last vow specifically addresses this: *zâ bâ čāsrâ prâjenbâ dūšməni ẗūrbgni nâ kwm; da zālm məqābəlâ kəy bâ da məzlūm məlgəray yim;* which translates into: I will not create factions or enmity with anyone. In confronting the oppressor I will be the friend of the oppressed.

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[295] A translation of the original booklet commissioned by the Chief Commissioner North-West Frontier Province, Lieut-Col. Sir Ralph Griffith sent to the Foreign Secretary, Foreign and Political Department and the Secretary, Home Department, dated 25th January 1932. From National Archives of India, File No 192-F. 1932, Foreign and Political Department. (p. 5)

[296] There were several alternate versions of the pledge, some merely oral. The version of the pledge I am referring to is "The Khudai Khidmatgar Pledge" in Waris Khan's Pashto memoirs: *də āzadəy ẗəhrik.* (Peshawar, 1988), pg. 97. See Appendix for my translation

This vow is addressing the concept of "*prâjenbâ"* or filial factions and "*tūrbur*," which is the word for both male paternal first cousins and one's worst enemy, or, in other words, one's own kin as the most feared rival, generally because of land inheritance issues. These familial enmities are often deadly and last generations with reoccurring cycles of violence, retaliation and revenge. Foreswearing the factionalism that fosters violence and *badal*, the KK handbook also specifically addresses and reinterprets these normative values. As it states: "Moreover if anybody tries to create 'Para-Janba' [sic] (party-feeling) among you, mark him also. He might be a "Mukhbir" of the Firangis and might have been sent by them to destroy our house, because the Englishmen do not wish that out house should be built, as what will they do when our house is built up." Instead of considering "*prâjenbâ"* an intrinsic part of Pashtun traditions and norms, or a mark valor and honor, it becomes a signifier in the KK handbook of collaboration with colonial oppression. So that now, instead of considering violence an honorable way of acting, it becomes a signifier upholding colonial representations of the figure of the Pathan. As such it serves imperial ends and produces the requisite Pashtun disunity that allows for physical domination as well as epistemological hegemony.

Thus, any form of violence represented a collaboration with colonial frameworks of knowledge, its social systems and political structures, which the ideology of nonviolence was systemically opposing. The KKs, therefore, reinterpret these values through not just a reformist lens but a very modern deconstructive one as well as, altering the meaning of normative values in a very foundational sense.[297]

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[297] Which is not to say that there was no internal doubt, questioning and even critique of nonviolence as a creed befitting Pashtuns. Waris Khan himself expresses those doubts in his book: he recounts a time when the local police officer's servant physically abused some KK youths who did not retaliate because of their pledge to uphold nonviolence:

> It is a Pashtun custom that unless your hands are tied behind your back, you cannot fail to return a slap…This was unbearable to me. I went back to the village right away. Along the way, I thought

In the June 1940 issue of the *Pukhtun* journal Ghaffar Khan writes an editorial entitled "My Friendship." He begins this article by saying he has begun a new field of experience and understanding, one which his "brothers" must have realized by now from reading his writings in the journal or listening to his speeches at rallies. Because, as he explains, "I have realized that we cannot reach our goal through the old ways." However, he adds that "this new experiment of mine" is in fact not new at all because this same "khudai khidmatgari", or service to God, was started in 1929, yet the impetus and meaning that started the movement has been forgotten. Therefore, calling it "this new friendship," he redraws its contours:

> You know that my friendship (*malgərthyā*) with sorrow, grief and difficulties is steadfast. My path is a path full of thorns. Only those people can become my friends who are ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the nation and the people. On this path there is no ruler, no general, no district board or assembly members. Nor is there kingship but here there is Karbala. Difficulties and disasters have to be borne. There is only giving but no receiving. Until that time till our unfortunate nation is liberated and the powers of governance are in our hands. So that's why, oh my people! You need to pay attention and give a great deal of thought to understanding this new concept of friendship of mine. And I will also give this my attention, thought and consideration…[298]

The path of nonviolence, which leads to this new friendship, is not only depicted as full of tribulation, without any recompense in the shape of political power at its end, but further, it is a path of martyrdom and sacrifice likened to Karbala: a reference to the battle in which the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, Hussain ibn Ali, and most of his followers, including his

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> to myself that non-violence had really removed the intoxication of Pukhtun honour from us. The *thanedar*'s servant had beaten four innocent teenagers along the road. They didn't raise a hand.

That Pashtuns could no longer be intoxicated by their sense of honour, or *nang*, because the creed of nonviolence disallowed normative practices associated with fostering *nang* was a huge charge to lay upon this self-transformative process. Even though a constant refrain voiced in KK and Ghaffar Khan's speeches was that nonviolence was, in fact, a new form of Pashtun honour that required greater courage to uphold than violence. However, it was obviously not wholly accepted as this case illustrates. In order for nonviolence to become an integral part of *Pashtunwali* it had to also constitute honour or *nang,* and thus affect subjectivity, otherwise it would have been considered a foreign element and shunned. However, neither Waris Khan nor other KK literature articulates doubts about the foreignness of the ideology but only about its absolute practice. (Waris Khan, Pashto 168; James Caron translation, 129)

[298] *Pukhtun* journal, 1st June 1940, 19 (My translation from the original Pashto)

six-month old son, were killed after a prolonged siege. It has come to represent one of the most tragic events in Muslim historiography symbolizing the martyrdom of innocents at the hands of oppressive tyranny. Yet Ghaffar Khan deliberately urges the Khudai Khidmatgars onto this martyr's path, which, just as surprisingly, many willingly embrace for the sake of his friendship and to liberate the nation—the two aspirations, thus, became synonymous for the movement.

In order to create a nation, Ghaffar Khan promulgates, "you have to first cultivate good character," good habits, piety and integrity and "forsake power, cruelty and injustice"; especially forsaking the tradition of "*prâjenbâ"* or kinship factionalism that lead to rivalries and agnatic violence. Even though, "no other nation has rallied up and become as aware and conscious like the Pashtuns have become in so short a time, and neither can they…our suffering and difficulties" will be wasted without changing our character and "the nation's character." Therefore, as he argues, only by understanding the true meaning of khudai khidmatgari, or service to god, will the particular kind of friendship that he is endorsing be understood and created.

> I tell you clearly, that just for appearance sake or in words I cannot offer my friendship**.** Anyone who wants my friendship must change their thoughts alongside with mine and make themselves understand the reality and purpose of *khudai khidmatgari* (service to God). If they can adhere to my conditions and practice *khudai khidmatgari* in the true sense in which I regard *khudai khidmatgari* then they should start practicing it. But even then, I will only offer my friendship when I ask their brothers and cousins if, by their hands, no one has been harmed. And that he has served everyone and has remained steadfast to all the principles of *khudai khidmatgari*. After this I will make that person my friend."[299]

Therefore, in Ghaffar Khan's conception *khudai khidmatgari* was the ground of this new friendship; not just predicated upon an adoption of nonviolence as a political strategy but instead

[299] *Pukhtun* journal, 1st June 1940, 21

it entailed a transformation of the practitioner's inner being, which, in turn, was the prerequisite for transforming the outer social and political world. In other words, the boundary between private and public not only had to be transcended but, in doing so, the latter would be a true reflection of the inner reality. However, this friendship was not just a political practice to be adopted but, much more than that, a direct relationship with Ghaffar Khan himself—in fact it is this relationship that instigated many to adopt a changed relationship with themselves and, consequently, with the social that, in turn, altered the political. The changed relationship was aimed not just at the Pashtun habitus and its traditions of violence, such as *prâjenbâ* and *badal,* but at the normative values upon which such traditions were grounded that cultivated the characteristics to make such practices an accepted (and expected) norm. As Ghaffar Khan, and other sources in KK literature, articulate, this new form of friendship became the keystone upholding the ideology of nonviolence and, as I will argue in the rest of this chapter, it was the change wrought through this concept that also denoted the new political that the KK were producing.

Khudai Khidmatgar Self-Imaginaries

The concept of "friendship" that Ghaffar Khan voices and which pervades the discourse of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, situates the practice of nonviolence within, to use Judith Butler's phrase, an altered constellation of "thinking about normativity."[300] This, in turn, implied that these altered set of normativities would refashion subjectivity, one that, for example, considered nonviolence more valorous than violence. And this would produce the ground generating a new political, one that was envisioned in contra-distinction to that which structured the state, both

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[300] I elaborate on this further in the chapter on the KK women, 17. Butler, Judith. 2010. *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable*? "The Claim of Non-Violence." New York: Verso, 145

colonial and the postcolonial nation-state derivative of it. In short, the altered constellation of thinking about normativity affected the inner realm of subjectivity, and that would produce the outer sphere of the political not just as consequence but dialectically. As I explained briefly at the beginning of this chapter, "*malgəray,*" "friend," and "*malgərthyā,*" "friendship," are common colloquial terms but Ghaffar Khan uses them to point to a radical form of the political that was the utopian telos of the ideology of nonviolence. This not only disrupted traditional kinship relations with new, affiliative social systems, but this new political, as I will further argue, strongly envisioned, and tentatively embodied, what Jacques Derrida's describes as a new "politics of friendship."[301]

"Mal" the root of "*malgərthyā"* in itself denotes a concomitant with another word, and is used in many different contexts to express a relationship with another word or concept: *armal* is a real friend; *dadmal* is a friend of justice; *zyarmal* is a friend of diligence; *sangarmal* is a friend of entrenchment or of a fort; *karanmal*, a friend of agriculture; and *karmal* the friend of work.[302] That *malgərthyā* denotes a term of affiliation rather than of filiation is also illustrated by the final vow of the KK pledge that I examined earlier in the context of *badal,* by examining the terms "*prâjenbâ"* and *"ẗūrbgni."* To restate the pledge: "I will not create factions or enmity with anyone; in confronting the oppressor I will be the friend of the oppressed."[303] Especially hard to translate from the Pashto is the first part of the sentence denoting factional enmities This phrase resonates with meanings attached to generational familial enmities and agnatic rivalries. *ẗarbūr*

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[301] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*. 28

[302] Sultan Hussein, the Chairman of the Afghan communist party and the Soviet backed (and later ousted) leader of the country during the late 1970's, deliberately adopted the name Babrak Karmal as a title to mean the friend of the worker.

[303] The Pashto reads: "*zâ bâ čāsrâ prâjenbâ dūšməni ẗūrbgni nâ kwm; da zālm məqābəlâ kəy bâ da məzlūm məlgəray yim*, in Waris Khan, pg. 97. See the appendix for a copy of the pledge in its entirety.

is the Pashto word for paternal male first cousins, who, as your closest kin, is also liable to become your most deadly rival because of inheritance issues. These familial enmities last generations with reoccurring cycles of violence, retaliation and revenge. So that "*dūšməni ẗūrbgni,"* or *"*the enmity of the *"ẗarbūr,"* is the kind of bitter enmity which, once began, is difficult to halt, while "*prâjenbâ*" denotes any kind of factional antagonism but is more widely used for the factionalism that splinters families apart into definitive enemy camps for generations; the KK foreswear engaging in this type of traditional and normative enmity or *badál*.

Although the second part of the pledge does not logically follow the first part dealing with familial enmities and agnatic rivalries, nevertheless, there is a contrapuntal correlation, to use Said's terminology once again, between it and the one about friendship that follows: "In confronting the oppressor I will be the friend of the oppressed." Firstly, "*zālm*" which I have translated as oppressor, but which also means tyrant, or a cruel and merciless person in general, is referencing an unjust being with some kind of authority or power but in the abstract rather than in the particular—unlike the kinship enmity referred to in the first part. And the support offered by the KK pledge of friendship to the oppressed and the weak, or the "*məzlūm"* is given in the name of justice: an ethical and affiliative social relationship in place of blood ties. The second part of the pledge thus deliberately repositions these new affiliative social relations, implicitly grounded upon universal principles of justice and rights, in the place of traditional kinship bonds.

The KK pledge itself was a contractual, and often a written bond, in stark contradistinction to traditional oral agreements and one's word of honor. As Waris Khan relates, the pledge was duly signed or thumb printed by all new members of the KK in the local mosque, and it reflected, as he puts it, the "awakened consciousness" that had "spread amongst the youth

and the elderly, and among women too."[304] The bureaucracy of the colonial state obviously plays a significant influential role in the contractual oath but, in contrast to legal colonial documents, there are several versions of the oath and no definitive written version in Pashto; generally, the oath continues to be recalled orally by older members of the KK. As Mukulika Banerjee states in her book: "That there is no single, standardized version appropriately reflects, I think, the nature of the movement, which never fetishised orthodoxy—everyone had the essential gist and that was considered the most important thing…the oath is more of a philosophical framework and moral undertaking than a narrowly political one, and at its heart is a commitment to principles of service, self-sacrifice and non-violence."[305] It was the staunch commitment to these principles—a commitment and solidarity that cut across caste and class lines—that could be called "a great social innovation,"[306] as Banerjee terms the military organization of the KKs. The adoption of a colonial style military ranking system not only accomplished the purpose of drawing "a veil over earlier sources of identity and hierarchy" in order to create new forms of social organization and solidarity, but in ignoring and overcoming the ties of clan and kinship, as well as the Pashtun's "prickly individualism," it created in its stead a movement that fostered pan-Pashtun networks and alliances that transcended yet incorporated those former ties. As two former KK members, Mohammed Pir and Sher Khan, recall in their interview with Banerjee:

> Badshah Khan's message created a sense of solidarity among us. Earlier in the village we all used to know each other. But later we began to love each other. Even strained relations became friendly thanks to Badshah Khan's message of brotherhood and love. He told us to get over our tribal loyalties…It took time…but it happened. We made an effort to befriend the other tribes and so on.[307]

[304] Waris Khan, (James Caron unpublished translation), 96
[305] Banerjee, 74
[306] Banerjee, 138
[307] Banerjee, 83-84.

For inter-marriages to take place amongst different tribes suggests that traditional norms were altered to the degree that it was seen as a radical new act even in the minds of those bringing about the change. Yet, nevertheless, they were also willingly embraced as a better alternative to traditional models of enmity, and "love" becomes the new lingua franca. The language of "friendship" and an affiliative brotherhood is again used to describe these new social relations that transcend tribal and clan loyalties. As Ghaffar Khan describes in one of his speeches, Pashtuns can now form "a brotherhood of their own" like other nations and the KKs signify, in microcosm, the spirit of this new nationalism: "What for have you worn Red clothes? What do these clothes signify? The Red Shirts that you see are a new 'brotherhood', a new 'Pashto' we have formed."[308]

That the KKs, referred to as the *sūrkh-posḥ* or the Red Shirts even in Pashto occasionally, (because of their brick-red uniforms), signify a "new Pashto" is an especially pregnant trope for Ghaffar Khan to use. To *do* Pashto signified an action, thought or belief system appropriate for a Pashtun to follow or express, in keeping with the unwritten injunctions of Pashtunwali. In using such a meaning-laden trope Ghaffar Khan was quite strongly reiterating that although this new form of brotherhood or nationhood transcended traditional filial bonds it was nevertheless also squarely situated in the imaginary of the Pashtuns; even if it was a radical change in orientation the radicality was not outside the bounds of what was acceptable to a Pashtun's way of being. Therefore, the call for friendship, love and brotherhood, while calling for a reformulation of entrenched Pashtun traditions, was also re-situating itself squarely within the framework of tradition, or at least a reinterpretation of Pashtunwali and of "doing Pashto."[309] This double situatedness—both within the modern and the traditional—was what made the ideology of

[308] Banerjee, 84.
[309] To *do* "Pashto" signifies the simultaneous melding of language, action and belief in a particular act or utterance in keeping with the unwritten but widely understood normative codes.

nonviolence an acceptable framework through which new normativities could be fashioned, and which, in turn, became the galvanizing force reimagining the socio-political landscape.

In the new Congress constitution ratified at Nagpur in 1920 the untethering of the provinces from the center was established when provincial Congress committees were made semi-autonomous from the AINCC, but especially when the vernacular was prioritized.[310] This empowered the Pashto speaking majority, living largely in the rural areas in the Frontier Province, to enter the political arena for the first time, and as such, the centers of political power shifted from the cities to the villages. The linguistic reorientation had a profound economic impact upon the Province as well: by shifting power from the urban centers to the rural ones it also shifted economic and class hierarchies from the city merchant classes and elite landowners to middle class land owning Khans and rural peasants.[311] And it is this crucial vernacular reorientation of provincial politics that allowed the Khudai Khidmatgars to gain ascendance by rooting both their anti-colonial rhetoric, and their call to change repressive customs, in the literary traditions of pan-Pashtun nationalism. In fact, by some accounts, this instigated the renaissance of modern Pashto literature as well.[312] Although the reinscription of AICC constitution gave the impetus to the Provinces to turn to the vernacular, in this instance, the *Pukhtun* journal became the vehicle that manifested the turn at the grassroots level.

Originally launched in 1928, the *Pukhtun* journal was constantly shut down by colonial authorities with charges of publishing seditious material but it also constantly resumed publication whenever it could. Banned as seditious for five years during the war, both the KK

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[310] Alongside with his secular objections, this was also Jinnah's objection to the new Congress constitution that Gandhi initiated and the Motilal Nehru report.
[311] Ray, Barren: "A Unique Leader of a Unique Movement: Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Pakhtun National Struggle," in *Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan: A Centennial Tribute*. 1995 Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 54
[312] Shaheen, Salma: Modern Poems (Nazm) in Pashto. (University of Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 2013), 75.

movement and the journal officially restarted in 1938 once again. The journal intimately reflected the life of the organization not just as its mouthpiece but as an expression of its innermost essence. Broadly, its contents were centered upon the social and political reformation of the inhabitants of the North West Frontier—including the Tribal Territories—and its targeted audience was largely the same subaltern population that it intended to transform. Aimed at this largely illiterate audience it nevertheless gained great popularity and stature because it was often read out by the handful of literate people in community gatherings. The self-declared purpose of the *Pukhtun* was not just to be the voice of the nation, or "qəwmi āwāz," but to tell the Truth, "həquq" and warn of danger, or "nəqsān," and to situate this new truth within a global emancipatory context.

From its inception the journal was considered a revered medium of transmission, not so much as a modern vehicle of disseminating information but rather as a hallowed, oracular voice. Perhaps precisely because of its modern and novel means of imparting knowledge it was deemed a revered, anthropomorphic figure rather than simply an object composed of paper and ink that imprinted news through technological means. In fact, the journal is inundated with reverent odes to its visionary voice, but especially, to its ability to transmit the truth on par with mystical revelation; a transmission that endowed it, in the eyes of its audience with the power to liberate its people from bondage. As such it also became analogous with the trope of the sacred beloved.

In the first issue after the resumption of the journal in 1938, Abdul Malik Fida, who often published his nationalist poetry in it, wrote a short poem titled "Pukhtun Steṛəy Meshəy" or "*Pukhtun* may you never be tired"—the title of the poem is the traditional utterance that welcomes the arrival of a visitor.

pâ rəng Mahmoud ūw pa khwəey Āyazâ; khudāəy-i hafiz shâ, de ğhəir ğhamāzâ, batil peṭiyǵəe stālâ āwazâ
muwnǵâ dę khlas kṛuw la dranâ yarâ; har kalâ raša Pukhtun axbārâ khudaəy de wruk mekṛâ źumunǵ ğmxwārâ
de qəwm žwenduwnâ de ğəyrow mergâ; dušman prâh kṛâ bəya warthâ ğabergâ; bəykhəy auwbāsâ sarâ de bargâ
watan āzad kṛâ zer la ghadārâ; har kalâ raša Pukhtun axbārâ, khudaəy de wruk mekṛâ źumunǵ ğmxwārâ

Mahmoud in colour, in character Ayaz; become God's keeper, the heraldic voice from which the enemy hides
You have liberated us from the friendly enemy; come whenever you desire *Pukhtun* paper, may God never banish you, our caring companion
The nation's lifeblood, the foreigner's deathbed; cut down the enemy with this unified force—uproot them from under your roof
Free the country quickly from traitors; come whenever you desire *Pukhtun* paper, may God never banish you, our caring companion [313]

In this poem Fida likens the *Pukhtun* journal to the legendary lovers Mahmoud and Ayaz: the former a King who falls in love with his slave. The pair of lovers become a trope in Sufi poetry representing the relationship of god with man, or of the divine beloved and the humble worshipper. As a servant the humble Ayaz arouses the King's respect, and subsequently his love because of his noble and upright character, so that not only does the subaltern KK movement become synonymous with the worldly status of Ayaz, but its ethical ideology (of love) elevates it to an unprecedented position of power and respect despite its proletarian ground. While the power which the *Pukhtun* journal wields over the people bestows it with the status and authority of King Mahmoud; the pair of lovers, therefore, symbolize this combined force and elevates the journal on par with the sanctified position of the (divine) beloved of the literary imaginary. Making the journal synonymous with this poetic trope signified both the egalitarianism of love and the blind rapture of passion: a love that equalizes by humbling royalty and ennobling a slave, and a rapture that transcends worldly status.

[313] Abdul Malik Fida: "Pukhtun Steṛəy Meshəy" in *Pukhtun* journal 5th April 1938 issue, pg. 17

As the voice of the Pashtun nation, the journal also represented the unique unification which the KK had wrought, a unification that was perceived to herald the vanquishment of the "enemy." Upon its resumption, therefore, it is welcomed like an old friend with the traditional greeting of "may you never be tired." Not only the title of the poem but also the refrain of "may God never banish you"—which inverts the colloquial "get lost"—plays upon traditional vernacular phrases in order to reestablish the familiarity of an intimate friendship. Thus, the journal occupies a particularly significant stature and symbolism in the ethos of the movement; an anthropomorphic signification as guide, teacher, beloved, herald, as well as the means and the voice of a unified Pashtun nation.

This anthropomorphic representation is especially elicited by the play of the journal's name with that of the Pashtun people. Several of Fida's poems evoke this implicit relationship, in particular his poem "De Həq Āwāz," or "The Voice of Truth,"[314] in which the attributes of the journal become the ideal characteristics which the people ought to embody: acknowledging *həqiqəẗ* or truth, restoring justice and granting *həq* or (ones) rights. As "həq" denotes not just "Truth" (with a capital "T") but also "rights" and "justice," it pervades KK discourse. However, in this poem (and others in the journal) it is often deliberately ambiguous whether the poet is addressing the paper or the Pashtun person/people. The fourteenth and second to last *shir* reiterates the journal as a synonym for the Pashtuns and it voices the interconnectedness between the personal, the literary and the national that is a constant in KK literature. And Fida also states, without the literary there would be no hope of revival and or the resurgence of either the *Pukhtun* or the Pashtuns; thereby, the flourishing of the Pashtuns is directly corelated with the continued existence of the journal:

kā de "pukhtūn" axbār žwndey kṛo stā žwndūn de pəkā

[314] Malik, Fida Abdul. *Diwan-I Abd al-Malik Fida*. (Manzur Alam, Peshawar, 1st pub: 1957, 2nd pub: 1972), 108-9

dā "pukhtūn" mərg srā xpəl ŵošmārâ ẗiyār pukhtūnâ

if the *Pukhtun* newspaper is alive (again) you're alive within it too
with the death of the *Pukhtun* be ready to count your own, Pukhtuns

The ambiguity between the person, the journal and the nation is of course deployed as a poetic device, but it points beyond that to the conflation—or rather the inseparability—of the personal and the national imaginary. It is important to point out that throughout the journal poetry is neither relegated to a discrete category, nor is the aesthetic considered distinct from the political—the binary of the ideal versus the material is never a consideration here, or in South Asian poetry more broadly. In fact, literature, and the poet as its voice, are the conduit for the new political and validates the KK reformation onto its ethnic roots; the Pashtun's love of literature, therefore, becomes the hallmark of their Pashtun-ness and the nation being forged. As the medium through which this "truth" was voiced, the *Pukhtun* journal cultivated the critical mass necessary for the change to become a transformed habitus.

Abdul Malik Fida was born around 1895 to a lower middle-class family in Prang, a district of Charsadda—the same district to which Ghaffar Khan also belonged. He grew up illiterate and taught himself to read and write Pashto after he became a political activist and became an accomplished poet to such a degree that his poems were recited at many KK rallies and published in the *Pukhtun*. Alongside with Ghaffar Khan, Fida was part of the founding of the *Ānjuman-i-Islâ-ul-Afğāniâ*, and it is through this organization that the emphasis on literacy and education was widely disseminated, and later included in the aspirations of the KK movement. Transforming his own impoverished background into that of a model KK worker, Fida is emblematic of the subaltern aspirations and accomplishments the movement heralded. He personified, and his poetry gives voice to the transformative possibilities the organization

promised and what the figure of Ayaz symbolized. Through the medium of their unique ideology the subaltern became the voice of its times, with the added recognition that the transformative ideology they were espousing was, necessarily, making universal claims.

Nonviolence and the Politics of Friendship

The universal principles that grounded the call for transforming the normative not only included concepts such as "*həq,*" or rights and justice—which pervaded most nationalist discourse of the time as well—but the ideology of nonviolence explicitly introduced the moral into the language of the political. However, it was mainly through the concept of friendship that this new political gets defined, not just in Ghaffar Khan's speeches and the KK pledge discussed earlier in this chapter, but also through the medium of literature. I look at another of Fida's poems, the *nazm* "de khudāi khədmətgār 'əqiydâ," or "The Tenets of the Khudai Khidmatgars,"[315] to more closely analyze the concept of friendship and how it signified the new political they were aspiring towards. Fida's elaboration of KK nonviolence, and the new political they were producing, has uncanny parallels with Derrida's elucidation of a new kind of politics in *The Politics of Friendship,*[316] and I point to a number of similar terms that both use, but more than that, the terms also delineate radically alternate concepts that also have much in common.

I begin with the third to last *shir* of Fida's very long poem:

> *mūngâ malgəray yū de həq har čāṫâ həq wāyū*
> *ṭowlay dunya ṫâ de 'məl 'məl səbq wāyū*
>
> we are the friends of truth, we speak the truth to everyone
> we teach the whole world the practice of right action

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[315] Fida, *Diwan* 154-7, and also published in the 1st September 1940 issue of the *Pukhtun* journal

[316] Derrida (1997) 43

The conjoining of friendship with truth is particularly evocative here; as I elaborated earlier in the chapter the conjunction of *mal*, or *malgəray* in this case, with another noun describes the relationship between the two terms not just discursively but as a praxis expressed by its locution. By speaking truth to everyone, and thus introducing the moral into the political, the friends of *həq* initiate a transformation. A transformation, or a right practice, which according to Fida, is not just limited to the local and the particular but expresses the universal principles that the ideology of nonviolence was teaching the world.

Fida also gives voice to the reasoning that because ideological truth is often dogmatic it is as culpable as brute force, and he equates knowledge systems with physical oppression. Therefore, according to Fida, the "truth" of nonviolence must also overcome the hegemony of ideological systems alongside with physical domination. However, how the "truth" of nonviolence is different from other ideological truths is not yet clear except that it is inscribed upon the human body quite tangibly. Fida writes in the nineteenth and twentieth *shirs* of the poem:

> *mūngâ spāyān yū da ṭol qūm da həkūmaï da pārâ*
> *nâ da yow ṫən nəĥ da yow xyəl da səlṭənaïe da pārâ*
>
> we are sepoys for the rule of the whole nation
> not for the rule of one person nor for one ideology
>
> *zəlm zəml dey zəmūnǵ kār pâ bəl sẗm nâ kwū*
> *bəd de hičā srâ pâ žəbâ pâ qəlm nâ kwū*
>
> to endure oppression not to oppress another is our burden
> neither to harm another through speech nor by writing

That speech and writing, or discursive truth, has as much power as physical force is a surprisingly perceptive yet befitting observation not only for a KK but especially for someone who became literate late in life. Even more so is the equivalence of ideological certainty with

imperial domination—or the autocratic rule of one person—and its contrast with democratic rule which the KK were shepherding. While the violence generated by inegalitarian systems of thought or governance is being borne upon the bodies of nonviolent practitioners rather than allowing it to oppress others. Analogously, the practice of nonviolence lays bare the brutality of the system with the intention of transmuting its violence through the receptacle of the body. Instead of a bearer of injustice, one that has to be avenged, the body (of the nonviolent resister) restores justice through its offering as (potential) sacrifice. By resisting and transcending oppression without retaliation, and not participating in systems that inflict it, the body becomes a signifier for a different kind of justice than that of vengeance, or an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

Interpreting Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of friendship as a pointer to a new kind of political, Derrida states that a reoriented politics of friendship also calls for "*another justice*…a new *justice*."[317] As Derrida elaborates, inadvertently yet remarkably similar to Fida's sentiments, the new thinkers or the "new philosophers…of a new world," would oppose the justice of "sheer equivalence…of right and vengeance…and the law of eye for eye," or the justice of proportionality, and instead, this new justice would be "a species of love"—a love without the desire to possess, without possession or property.[318]

That Fida articulates a similar concept of justice as the grounds of a new politics of nonviolence uncannily echoes the Nietzschean-Derridean formulation of a new justice, quite obviously independent of any influence from the earlier philosopher. However, Derrida's later Levnisian turn may be a factor contributing to the similarities between the new politics he is formulating and the new political of nonviolence. That this new political is grounded upon

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[317] Derrida, 64

[318] And not a Christian love or a Greek friendship Derrida continues to explain on pg. 65

“love” instead of vengeance also gets iterated by Fida in the third and fourth *shirs* of “The Tenets of the Khudai Khidmatgars:”

> *klkâ ‘ədm-e-t̆ushdəd kay ‘qidâ dâ zmūnǵ*
> *kâ sər-o-mal prədū āṛâ wrkṛū ẖəm fāhdâ dâ zmūnǵ*
>
> staunch is our belief in nonviolence
> we profit even if we leave all our self and our belongings
>
> *maidān tâ wat̆ey yū da meynay məhəbəẗ da pārâ*
> *da khudāi məxlūq ẗa wasŷaẗ kṛu da ūlfaẗ da pārâ*
>
> we’ve come out onto the (battle) field for the sake of love and affection
> counseling god’s creatures for the sake of loving friendship[319]

Most strikingly, Fida points to the new economies that nonviolence is also fostering: one that is not based on material profit but, in fact, the material is readily sacrificed to promote a new kind of wealth. But a battle must first be waged in order to overcome the old order for the sake of fostering revolutionary, new communities of the future. Not a battlefield upon which killing and death are waged but upon which love and friendship can flourish: a nonviolent battle to reorient the social from the norm of violence to a new kind of economy. Therefore, the new political would not be grounded upon empires, kingdoms or singular ideologies but rather, through a sense of egalitarianism, it would found as yet unchartered methods of harmonious communal organization. This would then also produce an alternate economics with different connotations given to the terms “profit” and “self-interest.” [320]

Derrida’s formulation of a politics of friendship also opposes the old order on ontological grounds and calls for a revolution of the dominant political, grounded as it is upon an “imposing

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[319] Fida, Abdul Malik, “de khudāi khədmətgār ‘əqiydâ,” *Diwan-e-Abdul Malik Fida.* Peshawar: Manzur Alam, (First published 1957; 2nd pub: 1972), pg., 154. My translation from the original Pashto as “The Tenets of the Khudai Khidmatgars.”

[320] And Fida mentions all nations and religions in the poem (which I have not quoted) as part of a global call to transcend the nationalist boundaries of the normative political—or to transcend the “friend-enemy” binary.

corpus of Western philosophical literature."[321] In contrast, Derrida wants to ground the revolutionary politics of friendship upon an alternate philosophical lineage articulated by Nietzsche's declaration: "foes, there are no foes."[322] Nietzsche's radical declaration not only displaces the Socratic injunction of "friends, there are no friends,"[323] but more crucially, it disrupts the centrality of the "enemy" in normative political theory, one which Carl Schmitt explicates in the *Concept of the Political.* [324] In deconstructing normative political theory, as articulated by Schmitt, Derrida wants to disengage the "friend" from the "enemy," or the Self from the Other, so that it would make "friendship a question of the political" in a radically new way.[325]

What is especially noteworthy, but which Derrida does not address, is the fact that embedded in the lineage of this imposing theoretical corpus, one that Schmitt traces from Hobbes and Machiavelli,[326] is the anthropological presupposition that human nature is intrinsically violent.[327] This, in turn, legitimates the coercive mechanisms and disciplinary apparatus of the state. With the central presumption that humans inevitably destroy all difference and otherness, Schmitt formulates the "friend/enemy" binary as the keystone of the normative political and, especially, as the organizing principle of state foreign policy. For Schmitt "a pacified globe" without the friend-enemy distinction would, in fact, mean the end of the

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[321] Derrida, 2005, 27

[322] Nietzsche states in *Human All too Human*: "And so, since we can endure ourself, let us also endure other people, and perhaps to each of us will come the more joyful hour when we exclaim:

> 'Friend, there are no friends!' this said the dying sage;
>
> 'Foes, there are no foes!' say I, the living fool.

[323] Derrida, 2005: 29

[324] Derrida 2005: 27-28

[325] Derrida, 2005: 28

[326] Derrida, 2005: 113

[327] Schmitt 1996: 64

political.[328] Egalitarianism or democracy, especially liberal democracy, according to Schmitt, intermingles the concept of the state with the "concept of human-society," whereas political science, since Hegel's formulation of the State, maintains "that the state is qualitatively different from society and higher than it" and, therefore, the state, or the political, must be kept distinct from, and not subsumed by the social.[329]

As Derrida infers, war and the threat of death are the necessary horizon constituting Schmitt's political; even the "friend," as Derrida points out, cannot exist without the real possibility of being put "to death unequivocally." Disclosing, thereby, that violence is "the essence, the center and the heart of things"—or the norm rather than the state of exception.[330] Therefore, Derrida muses, can one not imagine another possibility for the political once the friend is unshackled from its mirror-image other: rather than the end of the political perhaps something "even more sublime" can manifest, one which "calls friendship back to the irreducible precedence of the other."[331] By accepting alterity instead of the constant "deadly drive"[332] to obliterate otherness, a nonviolent, Levinasian relation with the other could produce instead the "new *justice*" that displaces the justice of proportionality and "the law of eye for eye." In stark contrast, this new politics of friendship could be a "species of love."[333]

> A hypothesis, then: and what if another lovence (in friendship or in love) were bound to an affirmation of life, to the endless repetition of this affirmation, only in seeking its way (in loving its way, and this would be *phileîn* itself) in the step beyond the political, or beyond *that* political as the horizon of finitude, putting to death and putting of death? The *phileîn* beyond the political or another politics of

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[328] Derrida, 2005:130

[329] Schmitt, 1996: 24. Also for Schmitt the concept of the State presupposes the political, or the political is always tautologically defined in relation to the state, because, as Derrida points out, only "the state can bestow status on the political." (Derrida, PF 120)

[330] Derrida, 2005:123

[331] Derrida, 2005: 63

[332] Derrida, 2005:124

[333] Derrida, 2005 64

> loving, another politics to love, for love (*à aimer*)? Must one dissociate or associate altogether differently *pólis, politeía, philía, Érõs*, and so forth? [334]

A political grounded upon love would be a revolutionary shift from the present political, one that affirms life, with policies grounded upon such an affirmation rather than the constant manufacture of otherness, the threat of death, or of killing as the norm and the heart of its disciplinary justice.

Nonviolence, as Fida points out in his *nazm* is a political propelled by "love and affection" and fights against the system that makes oppression, injustice and violence a norm. Not to seamlessly read Fida with Derrida, nevertheless, it is quite striking that the aspirations and attributes of both are so similar: the grounds of producing a new political are the conjunction of love, even of passion, with politics and its expression in the polis. And it is only through this reorientation that a politics which cannot function without enmity and violence can be dislocated, or perhaps even rendered obsolete. In other words, the dislocation (or obsoleteness) would necessarily take place once a politics in which the unequivocal identification of an "enemy," either within the state or without, is constantly mitigated by interpreting the context in which such an identity can even become coherent; alternate possibilities of interpretation that would render incoherent the use of violence against it.

The theory of the enemy which is the condition of the present political also obfuscates "the aporia of the perhaps" through its "decisionism." Not only does "the opening of an absolutely undetermined possible" mark "the radical abeyance" of the *perhaps*, which lies at the heart of any decision-making process, but "addressing oneself to the possible" in a different way can translate into an alternate political language. It would speak the language of the "thought to

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[334] Derrida, 2005:123

come;" thought that is not defined as "philosophy," "ontology," "theology" or "representation," but instead "would be another *experience* of the *perhaps*."[335] Although Derrida does not elaborate on the experiential aspect of this new way of thinking in any great depth, nevertheless, in pointing to it as an embodiment he implicitly counter-poses it to the "Platonic ideal" that generates both Schmitt's political and the philosophical traditions that legitimate the normative politics of the present. This new form of thinking, therefore, is also a new way of embodying a multitude of hitherto unrecognized (or unacknowledged) possibilities, and in its altered relationality with the other that "Schmittian decisionism" forecloses at the outset, the *perhaps* introduces an altered mode of decision-making as well.

Without signifying a "regime of opinion," "haziness" or "the confusion preceding knowledge" the *perhaps* instead negates "the padlocked security of a dogma," by a different relationality with truth—"truth" now with a small "t." Critiquing absolutist understandings of "*the* Truth," on the many registers of meaning that Nietzsche often deployed, Derrida elucidates how Western philosophical conceptions present it as clear and absolute, as an objective presence that can be possessed. This desire to possess Truth with certainty translates into the politics of decisionism, in which the figure of the enemy is portrayed with complete exactitude and the unequivocal means of dealing with it with a resolute "deadly drive;" as such, as Derrida points out, violence reveals itself to be the "irreducible core" of the normative political.[336] Moreover, this regime of Truth also does violence to the *perhaps*, whereas the "friends of the perhaps" also create a new relationality with, and become "the friends of truth" to herald the new politics of friendship by "the thinkers to come."[337]

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[335] Derrida, 2005: 67
[336] Derrida, 2005:124
[337] Derrida (1997) 43

Echoing Fida's last *shir* in which "the friends of truth" speak a different kind of truth and become exemplars of "right action" for the whole world to follow, the KK, according to the poet, also battle ideological, dogmatic and imperial truths through love and affection to foster new kinds of harmonious societies. Even though Nietzsche would never consider using a term such as nonviolence, especially in place of "justice" yet, in making such a discursive substitution, Fida's articulation of the new political that the KK were heralding reads uncannily analogous to the "new justice" that lies at the core of the politics of friendship. Although the language of "the perhaps" and its "aporia" does not feature in either Fida's poetry or in KK literature more broadly, the philosophical significance that Derrida ascribes to it as a noun, and an experiential embodiment that calls for the opening up of different possibilities, can be likened to the alternate possibilities—and different kinds of acts—that nonviolence also demanded.

However, Ghaffar Khan's conception of nonviolence was also articulated in absolutist terms which, in practice, was neither easy to implement nor did it produce the new political that it was aspiring towards. And although the absolutism he called for, and which the KK tried to embody, never produced a dogma of truth, largely because it never achieved hegemony in the short time they came to power, nevertheless, the question of whether it would have done so remains. Especially since, despite its global aspirations, KK language spoke quite narrowly to the Pashtuns of the Province and ignored other linguistic groups dominant in the NWFP, much to their own political detriment as well. While the desire to create the conditions for an "enlightened anarchy," which in Schmittean terms would subsume the political into the social and thereby destroy the former, were put aside by the Frontier Congress Ministry when they were elected into power, also raises questions about the pragmatics of a politics of nonviolence. It remains unclear, therefore, whether in uncoupling the friend from the enemy, and the self from

the other, an alternate politics of friendship can be produced, and one that can be embodied in the terms Derrida annunciates and the KK vocalized? Or, on the contrary, would it produce the depoliticized world that Schmitt envisions, one which would create even greater violence than the pacifist intentions that this new politics were trying to mitigate? In other words, is the friend-enemy binary the inevitable functional mode of *realpolitiks*, because, once the political branch of the KK, or the Frontier Congress Committee, formed the government in the Province they also had to resort to coercive violence and policing in order to administer the Province? In setting aside the ideals of absolute nonviolence did the Frontier Congress government demonstrate that the politics of friendship can never really be established? Or was it the apparatus through which they were trying to bring about an alternate political the problem, given the fact that colonial authorities still ruled in all substantial matters, and even the Congress ministries functioned within the its frameworks of governance? Would it then be fair to charge the KK with impractical aspirations, or to substantiate the Schmittean worldview, when the deck was so heavily stacked against them?

The Frontier Congress Government and Violence in the North-West Frontier

The colonial government had been trying to steer the Province "to a moderate brand of constitutional politics" since 1932, [338] according to Rittenberg, and away from the anti-government and seditious politics of the KK.[339] And although the Frontier Congress remained a banned organization from 1934 to 1936 they created a formidable grassroots political network by working on social transformation,[340] especially in the rural areas. Despite their pariah status, with

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[338] The KKs, because they were not allowed to participate in the 1932 elections picket at and try to blockade the ballot boxes in the Province. Rittenberg, 194.
[339] Rittenberg, 194. The KKs try to blockade the 1932 elections in the Province which they were not allowed to participate in.
[340] Rittenberg, 208

both Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib in prison, the older brother had won the Provincial by-elections in 1935. According to colonial reports, they started their campaigns mildly to test whether colonial rhetoric was sincere in allowing them to participate in legislative politics but, because they were soon making fiery and "fanatical" statements, Section 144 of the Indian Penal Code was instituted throughout the Province again. However, despite colonial reasons justifying the law that banned all public gatherings the main reason to institute the law was to curtail the rising popularity of the KK. So that, even within the colonial constitutional framework, the KK were able to gain a legitimate presence. With Ghaffar Khan's release from prison imminent in the summer of 1936, the Chief Secretary issued the following memorandum:

> Abdul Ghaffar Khan's appeal has ever been not to reason but rather…the fanatical element in his audience's makeup. A noticeable feature of the period of his last brief spell of liberty was the tendency to emphasize his role of saintship…it blinds reason and gives free rein to superstition, fanaticism, intimidation and violence, and this fusion of politics with pulpit in a countryside where arms are readily available make real the danger of a quasi-Fascist movement with a politician turned Pope at its head.[341]

What the Chief Secretary suspiciously calls the "fusion of politics with pulpit" articulates the colonial government's mistrust of having a grassroots, political organization participating in the electoral process, especially one that had the power to appeal to popular sentiment—or what colonial rhetoric calls religious "fanaticism." No mention is made of Ghaffar Khan's practice of nonviolence which is rendered invisible within the tropological framework of the figure of the Pathan. Instead his widespread popularity is conjoined, in the colonial imaginary, with both fanaticism and a ready supply of weapons always at hand in the Province to produce a formidable anarchic threat. The authorities seem quite certain they were dealing with such a

[341] Rittenberg, 212-13

violent, disruptive force, one that was steadily gaining more power in arousing the populace against them.

The political environment had changed quite dramatically in the NWF (as well as more broadly for the nationalist movement in India) after the Government of India Act of 1935 which allowed nationalists to participate in local elections. The KKs went from a nascent but pariah resistance movement, which the colonial authorities had wanted to "smash" after the Peshawar Riots, to evolve into the Frontier Congress Ministry which heading the first indigenous Provincial government in September 1937. Even though the organization had remained illegal from 1934 to 1936, despite the fact that the ban was lifted from the Congress party in the rest of India, they had produced formidable grassroots social networks in the rural areas which then became their electoral base.[342] The AICC, however, opposed the formation of a Frontier Congress ministry after they initially won the elections in February, because the NWFP Governor retained veto power over any legislative bills or amendments. But the FC did eventually form a ministry in the fall of that year despite Governor George Cunningham's energetic efforts to create a non-Congress coalition during the interim. This weak coalition (headed by Sir Abdul Qaiyum Khan) was ousted with a no-confidence vote paving the way for a Congress ministry headed by Ghaffar Khan's elder brother, Dr. Khan Sahib.[343] Ghaffar Khan also finally returned to the Province after being banned from the NWFP for five years even though he had been released from prison in August 1934. Although he controlled the purse strings of both organizations, neither members of the KK nor Ghaffar Khan assumed office in the newly formed Congress ministries. He deliberately wanted the KK to be segregated from the daily workings of the Provincial Ministry and to maintain their autonomy from the purely

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[342] Rittenberg, 208
[343] Rittenberg, 233-235

political faction of their party. The idealistic aspirations of Ghaffar Khan and the servants of God, at least nominally, therefore, remained untarnished by a political base that necessarily had to compromise with colonial legislative forms in order to pragmatically carry out the day to day administration of the Province.

Although Rittenberg claims that the FC were more concerned with their own internal politics rather than challenging existing imperial laws in any fundamental way, with the Khan Sahib ministry's fairly cordial relations with colonial authorities given as evidence of their epistemological collaboration,[344] nevertheless, there were three significant legislative bills that they enacted which undermine such a claim. Firstly, the FC Ministry abolished the Honorary Magistrate system, whereby the bigger (landlord) Khans were divested of the judicial powers that the colonial government had granted them, and which was very much part of "the imperial apparatus," as Rittenberg himself states.[345] Secondly, the Agricultural Debtors Relief Bill of 1938 which cancelled money lending debts and landholding rental arrears was not just aimed at undermining the power of the elite Khans but it also redistributed wealth and channeled it in favor of smaller farmers, thus upsetting the economic status quo of the landlord system that maintained colonial rule. Thirdly, the FC government granted land revenue remissions in the Peshawar Valley in 1938. Further, as Rittenberg describes:

> Khan Sahib's government also struck at the economic benefits the British had given their Khani supporters. Besides the zaildari fees, it wiped out all but seventy-five of the province's 700 zamindari 'inams,' revenue remissions given in return for a variety of services. It also suspended the practice of nominating sons and relations of influential Khans to administrative jobs and discriminated against the major Khans in allocating 'taccavi' (agricultural improvement) loans.[346]

[344] Rittenberg 237
[345] Rittenberg 238
[346] Rittenberg 240s

The FC government also tried to abolish the *lambardar* system of revenue collection but were opposed by Cunningham as that was aimed at the heart of the colonial economic system of revenue generation. Furthermore, some members proposed radical land redistribution schemes and even though this idea was never tabled as legislation the Ministry generally favored tenants as opposed to the big landlords, despite the fact that most of the ministers were themselves land owning Khans.[347] Therefore, it would seem that the FC government continued the KK ideology of structurally dismantling imperial hegemony but now constrained within the colonial constitutional framework and the pragmatic workings of administrating a Province, although the attempts and results were not as dramatic as their earlier unconstitutional means and rhetoric had been. The fact that the ideals of the KK were constrained and subsumed within the colonial political framework would also explain why the Khan Sahib ministry was treated more warmly by the colonial authorities as well. However, the attempts to curtail KK popularity and reach by the colonial authorities had been underway since the Peshawar riots, so that when they did come to power the many avenues through which they could have been a much more formidable opposition had already been closed off.

A 1930 Home Department Report is not only one of the first, and very rare, statements describing the KK movement as nonviolent, but it also lists the large number of demands they were making despite the fact that they were being brutally suppressed at this time. As such the report demonstrates that the KK were in a position of strength to call for such reforms in the Province despite their lack of legislative power at that time as well as the harsh repressive measures being instigated against them.

> About 60 Red shirts reported in Kot Totail area, Peshawar District, Charsadda Subdivision…Assistant Commissioner interviewed gathering of Darbari title-holders, honorary magistrates, and pensioned Indian officers, who recorded what

[347] Rittenberg 240-243

> they alleged to be demands of leaders of so called non-violence movement (Red shirts) in Charsadda. These demands are extensive and begin with the release of political prisoners and cessation of further arrests, and demands include repeal of Sarda Act and annulment of new settlement, remission of all arrears of land revenue and water rate reduction, court fees and stamps, abolition of Frontier Regulations (3) and (7) of 1901, introduction to full-fledged reform as in Punjab and rest of India and various minor concessions. Per contra, these notables had no suggestion to make as to how Red shirts could be persuaded to stop holding unlawful demonstrations, making anti-Government speeches, shouting revolutionary slogans, damaging telegraph lines and trafficking with Haji Turangzai and other declared enemies of the Government. [348]

That the KK specifically asked to abolish part of the Frontier Crimes Regulations is significant not only for the Province but especially for the Tribal Territories, while the report further reveals that there were close alliances across the tribal-settled divide between the Haji of Turangzai and the KK; a relationship and close ties which are often excised from colonial documentation. The report further parallels how the revolutionary intent of both groups was also the same and categorizes them both under the rubric of "enemies" of the state. It was precisely these pan-Pashtun forms of resistance that posed a significant enough threat to the colonial government, especially since they were situated upon the crucial north-western borders, to become the target of the state's disciplinary actions with both overt and covert policies aimed at rupturing these networks.

The solidarity that the tribes had shown the KK during the Peshawar Riots of 1930, especially the Afridis and Mohmands who had come down to Peshawar in *lashkars* to aid the city dwellers during the riots, was deliberately and effectively ruptured by the Second World War. The border had been quite porous between the Province and the Tribal Territories even a few years after the riots, and, as some of the KKs that Banerjee interviewed stated, many of them crossed this border quite fluidly to live and proselytize there. They also relate that the Faqir of Ipi

[348] L/PJ/6/2003 (INDIA OFFICE PRIVATE PAPERS) Home department Report, 1646-S FIRST OF THREE PARTS, Simla 22nd May 1930.

and Ghaffar Khan had strong personal-political alliances across this divide; as one KK recalls, "'Badshah Khan used to encourage us to go to the Faqir and help him. We used to supply food and provisions to him in the hills. Once we were caught…But Dr. Khan Sahib got us released.'"[349] Although the tribal people never took on the mantle of nonviolence, and the KKs did not forsake their ideology in their alliances with armed resistance fighters either, yet the solidarity between violent and nonviolent resistance was quite comfortable, with each group keeping to their own modes of resistance while supporting each other, without a sense of compromise; it also demonstrated that Ghaffar Khan and KK nonviolence was held out as an absolute for others to embody but only for themselves. It was the recognition that such a solidarity was crucially important to decolonize the NWF that threatened colonial rule so strongly, and it was this common aim and these alliances that were corrupted and ruptured by the colonial government quite deliberately. In addition, these alliances also undermined imperial designs for creating an impermeable, "scientific" frontier between India and Afghanistan as well.

Even two years after the Qissa Khwani Bazar shootings colonial reports express concern about this solidarity and Congress influence in the tribal territories. A memorandum dated the 26th January 1932, from the Political Agent, South Waziristan, to the Resident in Dera Ismail Khan, states: "[t]he present situation in South Waziristan is giving cause for some anxiety," because of, among other factors, "[t]he ebullition of congress activity in the Tank sub-division." He elaborates further:

> Since the 4th January, I have been paying out the Mahsud allowances in Tank. The Maliks and those aspiring to become Maliks have seen picquetting going on in Tank, the picquetters beaten and arrested, and have heard the usual parrot cries of Inquilab etc. They have also undoubtedly been approached secretly by Congress sympathisers in Tank who have lost no opportunity of disseminating their lying propaganda and pointing out the hardships which Muslims are undergoing at the

349 Banerjee, 183

> hands of the Satanic Government. Some effect is bound to have been obtained on the untutored Mahsud 'Kasharan' and minor Maliks.[350]

Picketing, picketers being beaten and arrested and cries of "inquilab," or revolution—without the suggestion that the demonstrators were being violent—would strongly suggest the presence of the KKs or, at the very least, that nonviolent strategies of resistance were actively being practiced in South Waziristan at this time. The memorandum also clearly suspects that "Congress sympathisers" were actively disseminating "their lying propaganda" against the colonial government with the added danger of arousing "young Mahsuds" whose "fancy naturally turns to thoughts of fighting" with the "approach of Spring." Furthermore, this report also mentions, quite concernedly, the return of two prominent Congress workers to South Waziristan, presumably from their self-exile from the city and the harsh disciplinary measures imposed upon the Province in the wake of the 1930 riots. One of them, Mullah Kundalai, the memorandum states, "was prominent in the "Congress" disturbances in South Waziristan in 1930." Furthermore, the Political Agent suspects "that this man is secretly trying to raise trouble again and that he has approached several Mahsuds recently enquiring as to their attitude towards another "Congress lashkar." It would seem that an earlier "Congress lashkar" led by Ramzan, also a Mahsud who had recently returned home to South Waziristan, had been formed to defend the KK in 1930, so that the colonial administration was wary of another such formation especially by the tribal Mahsuds who were not only notoriously restive against colonial rule but

[350] Memorandum No. 144-S. dated the 26th January 1932, from the Political Agent, South Waziristan, to the Resident in Waziristan, Dera Ismail Khan, titled "Civil disorders—Congress propaganda." IOR: L/PS/12/3122

who also resided on either side of the Durand Line. Therefore, as the report concludes, "[t]he situation requires very careful watching."[351]

Even more interestingly, another Minute reports two "Hindus" from the Dera Ismail Khan Congress Committee were arrested in South Waziristan for "agitation" and sentenced by the local "jirgah" to three year's rigorous imprisonment. Three other individuals, "one Hindu and two Mohamedans [sic]" were arrested in June 1931 for "preaching Congress propaganda" in North Waziristan, and sentenced under the Frontier Crimes Regulations from six months to a year of rigorous imprisonment. Yet another secret Political Department Minute of December 1930 states:

> This is an interesting report on the causes underlying recent disturbances in South Waziristan…. The report suggests that primary responsibility for the disturbances rests with Congress agents, skillfully playing on the ignorance and cupidity of the local tribes. Intrigue directed from Afghanistan was not unimportant.[352]

What these reports clearly reveal are the cross-border alliances and seamless interactions between the Province, the tribal territories and Afghanistan, and, as noteworthy, is the fact that there was a significant lack of communal divide either in the ranks of the KK or in the tribal areas where, obviously it would seem, "Hindu" KK were having as much influence as the Muslim ones. They were both deemed threatening enough by the colonial authorities to be given harsh prison sentences and charged with causing "agitation." However, this state of affairs was soon to change, and cross border solidarities fractured while communal differences starkly foregrounded.

As the North-West Frontier was one of the major recruiting grounds for the Indian Army,

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[351] Another Secret Minute titled "Waziristan. Congress Propaganda. Activities of Ramzan and Mullah Kundalai" from the Political Department also corroborates that these two KKs were particularly under surveillance. IOR: L/PS/12/3122

[352] IOR: L/PS/12/3122

the British Raj made concerted efforts to counter the anti-war stand of Congress during the Second World War by framing the war as a fight to save Islam from Bolshevik Russia and the German *kaffirs.* This was especially evident from Governor Cunningham's clandestine "Mullah programme,"[353] in which religious leaders were enlisted on the pro-war side and by 1941 many influential Mullahs and Pirs were participating in this "secret, government-run network" operating on both sides of the settled-tribal divide.[354] Launched to sway the region against the FCC and Ghaffar Khan's staunch opposition to the war, the program also ideologically bolstered the Frontier Muslim League who endorsed India's allegiance with the allied forces during the war—and in opposition to the Congress pacifist stand. As it was also meant to do, the clandestine Mullah program became one of the wedges cleaving apart the solidarity between provincial and tribal territories that had strengthened after the 1930 Peshawar Riots; a solidarity consciously cultivated by Khudai Khidmatgar trans-border nationalism as illustrated above. What gave the strongest spark to igniting the communal difference, however, was the Islam Bibi affair and the kidnappings specifically targeting Hindu girls and even young boys. Furthermore, by imperiling the imperial forward policy these incidents provided a justification not only to inflict harsh disciplinary measures upon the tribes but the bombing of Waziristan, which occurred repeatedly over the years, became particularly acute at this time. The peak period of the fighting instigated by these events in the tribal areas was 1936-37 but continued well into 1939, and the more the British Army and Airforce tried to "pacify" the area though aerial bombardment the more the Faqir of Ipi's "lashkars" attacked the settled districts, especially the town of Bannu. The raids and kidnappings were aimed principally at religious minorities—the Hindu and Sikh communities—who were also, as merchants and traders, the more wealthier members of those

[353] Ray 1995, 61
[354] Rittenberg, 1977, 287

communities after the big Pashtun landowning Khans.[355]

After eloping with her Muslim lover in March 1936, a young Hindu girl named Musammat Ram Kaur changed her name to Noor Jehan, but because of her (apparently voluntary) conversion to Islam she became renowned in the North West Frontier as Islam Bibi. Her husband/lover, Syed Amir Noor Ali Shah, who was a school teacher in Banu, was later arrested for kidnapping because Islam Bibi was a minor. However, her parents were only able to regain custody of her with the help of the Judicial Commissioner during the time that the court was still deliberating the case. No evidence had been produced during the trail that Islam Bibi had not left home of her own volition or, to substantiate her parents charge, that Noor Ali Shah had kidnapped their daughter. Because she was forcibly returned to her parent's home through the intervention of a British official strong feelings were aroused not just in Bannu but throughout the Province and the Tribal territories. Once the court sentenced Noor Ali for two years on the charge of abduction a major communal conflict was sparked. The epicenter of the uprisings was Waziristan, where Mirza Ali Khan, known more popularly as the Faqir of Ipi, fervently took up the cause and added the salvation of Islam to his anti-colonial rhetoric. Angered by the authorities intervention and subsequent alliance with the "Hindu" parents/relatives at the cost of the young couple's choice, this incident amplified the Faqir's renown as a staunch enemy of the British as well as a defender of Islam.[356] The incident not only sparked a series of tribal uprisings, but with the kidnapping of several young Hindu girls in retaliation for Islam Bibi's fate, it also paved the way for religious clashes and generated an

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[355] See Rittenberg 269-70, who also argues that the Hindu and Sikh communities were no longer protected by powerful Pashtun patrons to whom they had declared themselves vassals or neighbors, or the "naik-hamsaya" relationship had been disrupted. Rittenberg states that economic changes and growing communal sentiments had broken down this age-old allegiance-protection system.

[356] See Warren, Alan: *Waziristan, The Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army: The North West Frontier Revolt of 1936-37*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000 and Rittenberg, 267-269.

acute rhetoric of communal difference. It also made manifest the ideological divide that now differentiated the tribal territories from the Province by pitting the KK's ideological universalism and the Frontier Congress government's cosmopolitan ethos against the communal particularism that was becoming more loudly voiced by the day. A difference that the colonial government had also deliberately fanned during the war period towards their own ends, became a discourse that would play a crucial role in the fate of the Province at the time of Partition.

Amongst the several letters Gandhi received from "Hindu" residents of the NWF listing their grievances about the kidnappings and violence in Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, with repeated complaints about the FC govt "not acting upon the congress principles and programme,"[357] is an affidavit by L. Kotu Ram Gulati, a "Pleader" from Bannu, that is most illuminating and strikingly different in its analysis and tone.[358] Submitted to Gandhi when he visited Bannu in October 25th 1938, Gulati states that the successful kidnappings and dacoities carried out from the trans-border region—Waziristan in the case of Bannu—were, as he states, "under the strict control and influence of the British Political Agencies," and "have been taking place every now and then ever since the settled districts were made into a separate Province." However, as he reasons, such acts would not take place if the villages were guarded vigilantly, or if the prior neighborly relations and goodwill that had existed between the Pashtuns and the Hindus were still being cultivated rather than being deliberately "uprooted" both by communalists and especially by 'the imperial game at the back."

> Every Hindu here will testify to the fact that some 15 to 30 years back, a Pathan in the villages considered it his duty and honour to protect the life, property, and honour of his Hindu neighbor. He (the Pathan) preferred death to seeing his Hindu neighbor being slighted in any way. But this now is a dream of the past. (86)

[357] Letter by Jamna Dass in "MK Gandhi (Pyarelal)" Papers XV sub-file no. 264, 176. NMML
[358] L. Kotu Ram Gulati statement, Ibid 86-90

Although he holds imperial political maneuvering responsible for the recent "dacoities," which "justify the wreckless Military expenditure" and separate the two communities from relying on one other, (87) he also blames his own community for losing the goodwill of "the Pathan brethren." The Hindu community, he iterates, have not only played into "the hands of the communalists and reactionaries," at the expense of Provincial welfare, but they have also come to identify their personal economic interests with their religion, so that any threat to the former are deemed as insult to the latter. Furthermore, he adds, the "money lending business has robbed the Hindu of all his national virtue of uprightness." (87) The solution is, as he argues, that like the "Pathan," who is "Congress minded," the Hindus should also become part of the nationalist movement instead of resenting the fact that Congress has "awakened the Pathans from their slumber," and reestablish communal goodwill. But he unequivocally demands that imperialist "games" be exposed as the "root cause" of people's suffering and the British Government, the Governor of the Province and Governor General of India, who are directly responsible for the volatile situation in Waziristan, "be told in plain words: NO MORE OF THESE DACOTIES."[359]

A year earlier, Jawaharlal Nehru had written a report for the AICC titled "Bombing and Kidnapping on the Frontier," dated June 22nd, 1937. It was written as a protest against the Indian Airforce's indiscriminate bombing of Waziristan justified, by the imperial government, as disciplinary action in response to the kidnappings of adolescent Hindu girls by tribesmen in wake of the "Islam Bibi" affair. According to Nehru, the bombing clearly expressed "the true nature and hypocrisy of modern imperialism," because the British government had recently protested, quite vociferously, against the Spanish government's indiscriminate bombing of Guernica that had killed over "800 civilians" and destroyed much of the city's infrastructure. Although, as

[359] L. Kotu Ram Gulati statement, Ibid 90

Nehru passionately points out, people all over the world "raise their voices against this new barbarism of bombing civilians from the air," the British Government inflicts the same kind of horror and destruction upon the people of the North-West Frontier of India on a regular basis with impunity, revealing, thereby, that "fascism and imperialism" are in fact "twin-brothers." However, Nehru explains that the real motive behind these bombings is the expansion of imperial borders through "the so-called forward policy at the frontier," with the Islam Bibi affair merely creating one of the many moral justifications for harshly policing these regions in the name of "law and order."[360]

That the situation in Waziristan was dire enough to warrant such ongoing protests speaks to the complex state of affairs that existed in the North-West Frontier at the time, one that gets glossed over by uncontextualized reports about tribal violence, but which, nevertheless, was at that time a part of nationalist consciousness. In the Province the protests were, of course, much louder, especially by the KKs and there are several articles and poems in the *Pukhtun* journal decrying this state of affairs. In the December 1939 issue, Syeda Bushra Begum wrote a particularly evocative poem decrying the violence erupting in the wake of these events titled, "Lament for Waziristan."

dā čay winay wrnâ cācy dəğâ zḍâ pərhar zəmā de
pâ qəsūr də 'šhq hay xālkâ praykṛo sər zmā de

These drops of blood dripping from my wounded heart
For the crime of my passion people want to cut off my head

yəẗəmān kūnḍay may žāṛi ḍāḍgirnâ bâ cūk wərkṛi
pās ẗr'r čâ poray xežay dā də āh āsr zmā de

Orphans, widows are crying, who will console them
the East will affect me so until eternity

[360] AICC (1st), P-16 (i) /1937, NMML (p. 1)

hā'y polanḍ ġərib məzlūm de xəlk źəkâ hey imdād kṛey
wəlay hāl ẗâ zmā gorəy lâ polanḍ bədẗr zmā de

Oh, poor oppressed Poland—how people are helping it!
But no one looks here where my condition is worse than Poland

Dā səngin may də xəpl qūm de čay də zḍâ pâ sər may ẋəx šūw
čay pâ səṭ hey zmūńģ rāẋkâ dā də ror xənjr zmā de

My nation's civility has buried its heart's desire
The knife scraping our throat is my brother's

lâ dey dāsey zəndgəy nâ pâ maidān kay mərg bəhẗr de
də ğulām hind də nəqšay nâ məźkey hāl āzhər zmā de

It is better to die upon the battlefield than a life such as this
the inverted figure of a subjugated India is my future condition

dərs də qūm də miney ow āxlâ pâ ẗâlā bāġ čay zeh' žāṛm
sẗərgey pūrẗâ kṛâ ğâfəlâ dəğâ soz səhr zmā de

The lesson of loving the nation: I am crying for your gardens
Raise your eyes, negligent ones, this flaming morning is mine[361]

As Bushra Begum cogently points out, Waziristan has become the gaping wound of the NWF and, in a comparison between East and West, it is clearly marked by a stark lack of response other nations of the World were giving to the oppression and injustice occurring there. While Nazi Germany's attack on Poland instigated massive world-wide protests leading to the second World War, the continued attacks on the tribal territories of India remained an invisible, non-issue in global awareness, largely due to the orientalist framework through which the Pathan was represented. Even more cogently, Bushra Begum draws the same parallels between colonialism and fascism that Nehru had decried earlier in his protest. Although the fourth *shir* is ambiguous, its second *misra* points to the crucial factor of native collaboration with the colonial government

[361] Shah, Wiqar Ali: *Pəkhẗənay Khəźay āw de Qūm Khədmẗ*, (*Pashtun Women Serving the Nation*), Bacha Khan Research Center, Peshawar: 2012, 181

that enables this deadly subjugation, one which, as the first *misra* expresses, renders impotent the long-held aspirations for Pashtun solidarity and autonomy. So that, as SBB says in the next *misra* of the fifth *shir*, resistance in any form is preferable to a life of subjugation or collaboration, even violent resistance is better than no resistance at all. But whether the reversal of subjugation in a future liberated India points to national autonomy is unclear, nevertheless, in her imaginary such liberation lies within the borders of a sovereign and unpartitioned postcolonial nation. The last *shir* does not end on an optimistic note either but rather it points, presciently, to the ongoing destruction of Waziristan that has no visible end in sight.[362]

The poem discloses how any chance of pan-Pashtun nationalism that had been envisioned in the early years had been cleft asunder and the autonomy of the Tribal Territories effectively destroyed rather than allowing KK politics a chance to flourish unobstructed. However, in resorting to the pragmatics of r*ealpolitiks*, the Frontier Congress ministry perhaps dealt the first blow to the bedrock of their own politics of friendship when they resorted to heavy-handed coercive policing during the Islam Bibi affair. Dr. Khan Sahib even tried to enforce a law that would allow for police arrests without due process—in other words he wanted to restore a version of Section 144 that had so oppressed the KK over the years—but the resolution was never passed by the legislature. Therefore, this "law and order" situation made the FC government compromise their ideology of nonviolence even though the KK and Ghaffar Khan continued to rhetorically uphold it in absolute terms. Although not publicly disclosed, the

[362] The destruction of Waziristan continues until today with the latest incursion by the Pakistan Army which has devastated the area and left countless homeless in its wake: "Operation Zarb-e-Azb" was launched in June 2014 ostensibly to oust terrorists inhabiting the area. This was followed close on its heels by "Operation Rudd-ul-Fasaad" in February 2017, which is ongoing till today. See also Fatima Bhutto's novel, one of the few that is set in Mirali, Waziristan, describing the ongoing efforts of the Pakistan government to suppress any indigenous resistance movements that might arise there with implicit references to historical resistance movements— (she is most likely evoking the resistance of the Faqir of Ipi's both to colonial rule and also against Pakistan: *The Shadow of the Crescent Moon*, Penguin Books: 2014.

rhetoric emanating from Ghaffar Khan during this time was noticeably in contrast with the public policies of the FC government. As he later confesses in his autobiography: "The truth is, that our movement was greatly harmed by our gaining political authority," not only because many joined its folds merely for the sake of gaining political power but mainly because the FC government lacked real authority and was constantly giving in to, or being overruled by, the colonial government. Moreover, as Ghaffar Khan states, "Dr. Sahib was a strange person" and would constantly cooperate with and agree to British demands. Especially tendentious was the fact that the FC government overturned the repeal of the Frontier Crimes Regulations at the behest of the colonial authorities. In Ghaffar Khan's words:

> Our government also committed the grave blunder that it repealed the brutal law which we had opposed all our lives, and under the provisions of which the British had jailed me all my life. Our government had repealed this law but it was reinforced later by the British through our government. Let alone conferring with the *Khudai Khidmatgar,* the Ministry did not even consult me before doing so. This should not have been done. The party should also have been consulted and, if it did not agree, then the Ministers had no right to re-enact this black law. For one, the authority of the British increased with this law, because the people flocked to them in the hope of being appointed as members of the *jirga* and, secondly, many of our people were jailed under this Frontier Crimes Regulation; and then we could not do anything about it, because we had, through our own Ministry, re-enacted it. And I had been jailed all my life, by the British, under this law![363]

What Ghaffar Khan is confessing is not only the disjunction between the KK desires and the FC government policies but also between ideals, and *realpolitiks*, or the pragmatics of implementing ideology. Often posited in political theory as the impracticality of nonviolence in real life situations this rare historical instance, in which a government was founded upon such an ideology, serves as an example validating theorists. However, what is also necessary to factor into the judgement alongside with the pragmatics of a politics of nonviolence are the crucial

[363] Ghaffar Khan Autobiography, Imtiaz Sahibzada unpublished trans., 298

contextual components in this case, firstly, that the FC government did not have full control of governing the Province, and secondly, the colonial government, far from being allied with its goals, did all in its power to thwart the anarchic elements of the movement, its ideology and its popular reach. In fact, it seems that it subsumed the KK ideology through the apparatus of the FC government within the orbit of, what Guha describes as, the Western idiomatic concept of "Resistance." In other words, the colonial government incorporated KK ideology into its bourgeois ordering systems by allowing it political power within the frameworks of the colonial state. This then cannot become an example of the failure of, or the impracticality of the politics of nonviolence, but rather/instead, it is a failure of attempting to bring about foundational change from within a system grounded upon an oppositional ontology; in allowing the anarchic element of nonviolence to be subsumed by the colonial order negated it as a force for producing an alternate political. It is this realization that leads Ghaffar Khan to decry the inclusion of the KK into the very same political system that they were founded to oppose, overcome and change.

Nevertheless, the KK embodiment of nonviolence did not produce the depoliticized world that Schmitt predicts, if anything the normative political was sharply foregrounded by the KKs attempt to transform it while, at the same time, making manifest that change was almost impossible from within its given apparatus. Even if absolute nonviolence was an unsustainable ideal, the mediation of violence through the interpretive framework of *a'dm-i-ẗushadud* could indeed produce an altered political which, perhaps, if it had been allowed to root and flourish, would have transmuted the normative political—or made it redundant—through its alternate constellation of normativity. The fact that these tenuous alterations were deliberately violated destroyed and reversed cannot be grounds for dismissing nonviolence as ineffective or unpragmatic. Instead, it expresses a failure to recognize its radical, foundational difference and

the language to express this significance, one that continues to be lost in translation and misunderstood when interpreted through the racial lens of the Pathans. Furthermore, with women's participation and expression completely unrecognized, Syeda Bushra Begum's poem, which reverberates with contemporary relevance with its heartfelt outcry against imperial violence in a global context, remains in the realm of the silent and invisible even till today, despite the revival of KK history. As such, it foregrounds the paucity of alternate constellations of normativity within the imperial systems of knowledge that have since become overarchingly hegemonic, with the silenced subaltern—and especially the doubly silenced subaltern woman—a signifier of this global state of affairs.

Chapter Three

'The Mothers Lap is the First Madrassah': The Khudai Khidmatgar Women Embodying Nonviolence

kâ nəngyāli zalmi pâ shā shū
Fəkhray Āfğānâ, jiynəkəy bâ dəy gaṭinâ

If honor bound young men step back
Fəkhray Āfğānâ, the girls will win [the fight][364]

"what political possibilities are the consequence of a radical critique of the categories of identity?"[365]

The *Pukhtun* journal*,* which had been launched in 1928, a year before the formation of the movement, became the public platform of the Khudai Khidmatgars and created the space for a discursive resistance alongside with the physical one, but it especially allowed the KK women to participate while remaining semi-veiled. Even though they occasionally participated in public rallies it was still an exception but voicing their opinions through their pens allowed them to boldly state their views while remaining in purdah yet demand their emancipation from such oppressive customs. They contributed their writings from the seclusion of their homes often anonymously or using pen names because it was considered shameful for women to be named and revealed in public. Majida Begum, one of the first women contributors who signed her writings in the *Pukhtun*, laments that she was ridiculed by other women for publicly disclosing her name in the journal.[366] Ghaffar Khan replies to her lament in the same issue of the journal by rhetorically asking if anyone is free from ridicule when they take up a public platform. In effect, the *Pukhtun* journal gave

[364] Syeda Bushra Begum first *shir* of a long poem titled "a few verses," published in the *Pukhtun* Jan 1940, 33
[365] Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble : Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge, 1999, xi
[366] The *Pukhtun*, Jan 1929, 45

women a unique public platform to voice the conditions of their own oppression to a large audience as well as the means to change it; the journal, thereby, produced a forum that both upheld and violated the sanctity of their segregated domestic spaces.

In defense of this radically new forum, and the public exposure of Pashtun women, Ghaffar Khan evoked the sanction of an authentic and historical Islam. He engenders this interpretation of Islam with an emancipatory entelechy and points to its reformative spirit, one that, he repeatedly declares, bestowed women with rights on par with men to constitute them as equal members of the human community. In contrast, he castigates Pashtuns for being either willfully ignorant of this history or of deliberately distorting its protocols. Making the women in the Prophet Mohammed's household exemplars of such emancipatory human rights, Ghaffar Khan argues that because they did not shy away from being named in public this was not a shameful act, otherwise it would not have been permitted. Instead it denotes, as Ghaffar Khan passionately explains, that Islam wrested the emancipation of women from the age of "*jəhāləyâ,"*[367] or the dark age of ignorance that preceded the advent of Islam.[368] The "*jəhāləẗ*" of the pre-Islamic Arabs, who, according to Muslim historiography, denied women their intrinsic rights and practiced widespread female infanticide, was thus made analogous to oppressive Pashtun customs.

By evoking an original and authentic Islam as the standard bearer of normativity, Ghaffar Khan attempted to institute change to longstanding Pashtun norms that would have been impervious to any other form of critique. The discourse on women's emancipation, therefore, initiated the rhetoric of progressive change in which religion gains prescriptive potency against

[367] I am transliterating the Pashto spelling, but it is often spelt as "Jahiliyyah" in English.
[368] Shah, Wiqar Ali: *Pukhtunay Khezay aw de Quwm Khidmat*, Bacha Khan Research Center, Peshawar: 2012, 84-86

"*rəwāj*," or traditional customs. However, it is the women's own voices that pit religion against *rəwāj* the loudest, because Ghaffar Khan and other KK voices also ambivalently position themselves on both sides of the divide: within the imaginary of Pashtunwali as well as in the framework of a reformatory Islam. With the private, previously veiled domain of women's physical condition becoming part of public discourse the sanctity of Pashtun traditions was now laid bare for questioning and critique. In fact, the reformation of the habitus, which was the raison d'etre for the formation of the Khudai Khidmatgars, would have been moot without reinterpreting the norms that govern the private domain. Women's bodies not only become markers of this progressive reformation, similar to other nationalist discourses of the time, but further, the insertion of the female body (and its oppression) as a particular kind of signifier—in this case of making nonviolence a norm—blurred the segregated boundaries erected by local patriarchy between the private and the political domains. Equating KK ideology with Islamic reformation to denote it as an akin form of enlightenment, and, analogously, pre-Islamic patriarchal violence with archaic Pashtun customs, created a discourse that both challenged traditional norms while, at the same time, remained embedded within its ethos. This embeddedness was reinforced by the fact that the loudest critiques were emanating from the core of the nation: the hallowed ground of the zenana or women's quarters; a ground that was neither open to public scrutiny nor had a public voice prior to this but which now became a marker both of an authentic Pashtun ethos and of its progressive reformation.

With their contributions to the *Pukhtun* journal, therefore, the KK women discursively inserted their physical plight into the public domain, revealing the inner sanctum of the women's world and its daily norms into the political arena. By making their material condition the marker of meaningful social transformation, the women's writings in the journal aspired to alter the

normative categories of representation. Although, women's bodies have historically been the measure of the modern nation-state, especially in the liberatory nationalist discourses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,[369] as well as the civilizing mission of the colonial state, the profusion of the KK women's writings in the *Pukhtun* journal had different ends even if they shared common means.

Moreover, the prerequisite for bringing about this change in both the private and the political domains, for which "education" became the crucial signifier, was an inner, subjective transformation. Without discernible influence from Gandhian ideology, it was quite widely understood that self-transformation was the necessary pre-requisite for producing nonviolence as a norm and to fashion the new community of the future. According to the implicit logic embedded in the philosophy of nonviolence, lasting change in the outer world can only be caused by an inner, subjective change, and the KK readily understood this but in terms of Muslim mystical traditions—which I elaborate further in the next chapter—and through its tropes of self-transformation and enlightenment. However, and most interestingly, both the women's discourse, as well as the early issues of the *Pukhtun* journal more generally, do not discuss or elaborate on the concept of nonviolence per se. Instead education is voiced as the ameliorative means to transform the normative subject, with women as the keystone structuring the ends of an alternate, new Pashtun society. The lack of discourse on nonviolence, however, would suggest either, or both, of the following reasons: firstly, that the idea of nonviolence had not yet been disseminated widely enough to warrant discussion and debate, or secondly, that this idea was perhaps not as novel as one would think and, therefore, did not require an extensive justificatory discourse. The latter

[369] There are a number of postcolonial texts that deal with this topic including the ones I reference in this chapter: *Recasting Women*, edited by Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid; *Real and Imagined Women* by Rajeswari Sunder Rajan; *Women Writing in India*, (Vol II) by Susie Tharu and K. Lalita. Also, *Allegories of Empire: The Figure of Woman in the Colonial Text*, by Jenny Sharpe, amongst others.

argument becomes stronger once later issues of the journal are examined in which discussion on the concept of nonviolence is also strangely minimal. In-depth analysis of Pashtun nonviolence, in fact, occurs largely by non-Pashtun writers, such as the three-part series by Khalida Adib Khanum explaining the strange phenomenon of KK nonviolence to a larger Indian audience.[370] On the other hand the women performatively yet implicitly addressed the ground of nonviolent transformation, namely, the iteration of an alternate normative subject.

I substantiate this argument by focusing in this chapter on the women's writings published in the *Pukhtun* journal; an archive that has not, heretofore, been critically examined in any notable way. Even indigenous knowledge remains largely unaware of the significance of women's participation in the KK movement, and although some of the better-known figures may be locally recognizable names, the content of their literary productions, their interventions to change normative traditions, and the scope of their discourse that elucidates how nonviolence was embodied languishes unrecognized. The only scholarship that deals specifically with this archive is, as I mentioned in the Introduction, Wiqar Ali Shah's Pashto compendium of the women's articles and poems published originally in the *Pukhtun*, and which, alongside with the original journals that I have accessed, form the vernacular archive that informs my own analysis and translations. I have narrowed my focus to a few of the more prolific contributors to the journal and, rather than tracing the women's discourse chronologically, I classify their poems under the sometimes startling yet repetitive motifs and tropes they deploy: Noor Jehan Begum, whose poetry powerfully depicts the chained and shackled woman's body; Syeda Bushra Begum, who discursively intervenes into Pashtun traditions through the rhetoric of prescriptive gender roles and of a progressive Islam; Nangina, who calls upon women to recognize themselves as

[370] Shah, 174

human and overcome their subhuman treatment by Pashtun patriarchy; and Alif Jan Khattak, who makes Pashtun women culpable for their own shackled and dehumanized condition and fervently calls upon them to liberate themselves from their self-wrought yokes.

Although the conceptual categories through which I frame each writer are not bounded ones, I choose to classify them through these interrelated concepts because they were considered the crucial elements for change, and these tropes and motifs permeate across the spectrum of the women's writings. These conceptual classifications also help to clarify my broader argument that the KK women's discourse, in particular, gave voice to how nonviolence was embodied. By repetitively and loudly calling for a reinscription of normative values, or a reinterpretation of traditional and religious norms, they solicit the subject of a new nonviolent community of the future. However, in segregating the KK women to their own chapter I do not want their articulations to represent what Joan Scott calls "women in history": a separate sphere of analysis without substantive affect upon the master narrative, whose stories become merely "supplements to history" rather than raising critical new analytical or political questions.[371] Not only does such a reclamation project, as Scott continues to assert, miss the chance to challenge the binary distinctions between public/private but reasserts the politics of a history written in such terms. The "radical potential of women's history comes in the writing of narratives that focus on women's experience *and* analyse the ways in which politics constructs gender and gender constructs politics."[372] Therefore, this chapter is not only "the recovery of the female subject"[373] but gives voice to a doubly silenced history—to recall Spivak's formulation—and, thereby, to highlight the centrality of women's discourse to KK nonviolence. Moreover, in reinscribing

[371] Scott, Joan Wallach. "Women in History. The Modern Period." *Past & Present*, no. 101 (1983): 141-57. (149-50)
[372] Scott, "Women in History," 156
[373] Scott, "Women in History," 152

normativity, the women's disruption of prescriptive gender roles also foregrounds how gender constructs politics, and politics gender.

The New Normative Subject Disrupting Gender Norms

The poet Syeda Bushra Begum, who prolifically and zealously contributed to the pre-war period of the *Pukhtun*, published a fairly lengthy poem in the January issue of the journal, the first *shir* of which has since become a banner for the movement, and I use as the epigraph for this chapter. Although not a traditional *tapâā*, or a couplet with a distinctive meter—one that is generally deployed by women quite spontaneously to articulate often transgressive opinions, laments or longings—its rhythmic structure in Pashto resonates as one. As such it has turned the *shir* into an aphorism denoting the radical change the movement had brought about and, in the KK literary canons, it especially signifies the keen spirit with which women participated in this resistance. What is especially noteworthy is that it denotes how the philosophy of nonviolence had gained enough social stature to both disrupt culturally prescribed roles of masculinity and femininity and it had the power to iterate alternate normative concepts.

> *kâ nəngyāli zalmi pâ shā shū*
> *Fəkhray Āfğānâ, jiynəkəy bâ dəy gaṭinâ*
>
> If honor bound young men step back
> Fəkhray Āfğānâ, the girls will win [the fight][374]

The "win" is obviously a reference to the fight against colonial domination, but also, the more intrinsic battle against normative Pashtun codes that may conceive of the laying down of weapons as dishonorable conduct, especially for men to engage in. At the same time, the *shir* taunts young men to demonstrate their honor-bound masculinity by engaging in this battle, which, if women

[374] Syeda Bushra Begum first *shir* of a long poem titled "a few verses," published in the *Pukhtun* Jan 1940, 33

were to come out on the battlefield instead, would prove their lack of manliness. Although traditionally women are not expected to go to war they may do so to protect their honor or if there are no men to fight on their behalf. With a reference to Ghaffar Khan's other title, "Fəkhray Āfğānâ,," or "Pride of the Afghans," a third tacit meaning of this *shir* is also posited: because girls are now able to win this fight just as well as men, nonviolence has changed the terrain of the battlefield and the rules of engagement from a public event, in which only honor-bound notions of masculinity are enlisted, to the blurring of boundaries between public and private and between masculine and feminine. Not only was the fashioning of inner, normative subjectivity the new terrain upon which the fight for change was taking place, one that would then win the outer, social and political battle, but culturally prescriptive gender roles in the public sphere were being reformulated with the rejection of particular notions of masculinity, especially the conjoining of virility with violence. Gendered as effeminate and passive in colonial representations, the ideology of nonviolence initiated the disruption of normative gender roles when Pashtuns embraced it in the first place, but the fact that they embraced it so readily further invalidated the tropological framework of the "Pathan," especially its construct of a primal, masculine figure. But with women's voices pointing to the systemic violence also embedded in Pashtun patriarchy, culturally established concepts of gender were destabilized to the point that such articulations were not considered transgressive but in fact became a banner for new norms. In this changed imaginary it becomes unsurprising that girls, and not just honor-bound young men, can fight and win the battle.

More pertinently, this discourse also situates nonviolence, and the change it had instilled, within the ethos both of Pashtunwali and Islam. It is this embeddedness in the local that allowed the women to vociferously demand their liberation from violent and oppressive customs without eliciting strong public censure in response to their demands. However, because of the quotidian

yet ubiquitous presence of nonviolence in most cultures—ones that are not generally recognized or labelled as such—it now had to be self-consciously foregrounded and articulated through a different language, or through new interpretations of the ethos, in order to become transformed into a widespread political norm. Although nonviolence is never directly mentioned its embodiment and wide-spread dissemination were made possible through such reinterpretations and reinscriptions.

Syeda Bushra Begum more readily recognized by her nom de plume and her initials, "Sīn Bey Bey," (س ب ب) with the latter two consonants denoting an honorific title generally bestowed on older women in Pashto, was the daughter of Maulana Azad Gul, also a committed Pashtun nationalist and the publisher of another vernacular journal. Coming from a literate and a nationalist family she was, most unusually for her time, an educated woman and a celebrated poet in her own right. Highly praised on numerous occasions in the *Pukhtun* journal by Ghaffar Khan, who cites "her priceless passion"[375] as exemplary for other Pashtun women to emulate, she zealously devoted her life to the KK cause, never marrying and entreating others through her poetry to also sacrifice themselves for the love of the nation. She articulates this passion in one of her poems: "A person should make themselves like Farhad, Majnun for the love of their country/ annihilate the body for this passion so that life can become eternal."[376] The reference to the iconic legendary lovers Farhad, (who loved Shirin), and Majnun (who loved Laila) are poetic tropes pointing to a mystical passion that desires self-annihilation in order to unite with the (sacred) beloved. These Sufi metaphors are often deployed in KK literature to represents the ecstatic state that a nonviolent battle calls for; a battle fought for the sake of love, in which the lover is prepared to die to order attain the object of desire. However, it is interesting to note that

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[375] *Pukhtun* August 1940, 14
[376] Shah, 180 (from the *Pukhtun*, December 1939, 8)

Bushra Begum associates her passion with the legendary male lovers rather than the female ones— in fact, she does not mention the female pair throughout her poem. Although both are commonly used poetic tropes, nevertheless, the feminine pair has its own significations, especially the feminine "Laila" more so than "Shirin." The feminine other of the tragic lovers is often the symbol of yearning and the object of unfulfilled desire, whereas the masculine other is the one actively in pursuit of the elusive beloved. SBB identifies herself with the active, seeking and desiring aspect of the lovers and the focus of her poetic utterances is on the subject of desire, or how the subject must transform and constitute itself in order to become worthy of attaining its object of desire. The mark of this new constituted subjectivity, one that is now worthy of its object of passion, is its willingness to sacrifice, or annihilate, itself; SBB is willing to sacrifice her body in order to attain her sacred beloved: the new and autonomous nation. It is through the radical transformation of the spirit of the subject that the object of desire can then be attained.

Although Saba Mahmood makes the cogent observation in *Politics of Piety* that liberal feminism's equation of human agency with only resistance does not take into account how "agency" also upholds and establishes norms. Yet in the case of the KK women, their writings show them both resisting and upholding particular norms in a manner that reveals the insidious quality of how norms are established. Mahmood also argues that the "subject" of "liberal-secular" assumptions is grounded in a binary narrative of "subversion and reinscription of norms" to explain how its agency is constituted,[377] and, quite surprisingly, she includes such thinkers as Butler and Bourdieu under this rubric. Instead, by illustrating how (pious) Muslim women "lived and inhabited, aspired to, reached for, and consummated" norms that disrupt the binary model "of

[377] Mahmood, Saba. *Politics of Piety : The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, 9.

doing and undoing," she wants to posit a different, Foucauldian concept of subjectivity.[378] According to Mahmood, Foucault does not conceive of subjectivity "as a private space of self-cultivation" but as an effect of power; in Mahmood's case, or in her analysis of why Muslim women uphold religious injunctions quite freely and not, as liberal-feminism would like to posit, under duress, moral codes wield the power "that summon a subject to constitute herself in accord with its precepts."[379] Rather than the Kantian model of the sovereign subject who chooses to follow universal moral imperatives, Mahmood points out that Foucault's concept of "agency" also implies the capacity for moral action but within a cultural and historical context. Therefore, Mahmood declares, local and particular ethical practices, not norms, constitute the subject, and argues that:

> The self is socially and discursively produced, an effect of operations of power rather than the progenitor of these operations. As such, an inquiry into the constitution of the self does not take the personal preferences and proclivities of the individual to be the object of study, but instead analyzes the historically contingent arrangements of power though which the normative subject is produced. [380]

Although her critique of the naturalized and universal "normative subject of liberal feminist theory" is certainly valid, nevertheless, like Foucault's totalizing conception of power, Mahmood's "agency" grants cultural and ethical mores a similar hegemony, which, not to discount the formative power of local norms, cannot also be conceived as both totalizing—or unchangeable—and a form of agency. Resistance, particularly grassroots forms of resistance and subversion of culturally prescriptive norms occurs constantly in people's ways of living—especially in minority groups and women—who are often subjugated by the very norms that Mahmood seems to also be valorizing. However, my objection could, according to Mahmood's logic, be construed as

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[378] Mahmood, 23
[379] Mahmood, 28
[380] Mahmood, 33

upholding the binary feminist model of resistance-compliance that she sets out to disrupt. Yet her formulation positions resistance (if there is any) to top-down models not to bottom-up ones: only (culturally hegemonic) power can change, impinge upon, and fashion subjectivity, and in this theoretical framework there does not seem to be room for any possibility of refashioning or resistance outside of such a totalizing frame. In other words, self-transformation through self-chosen moral or ideological beliefs is precluded from such a conception of subject-agency.

In contrast, I would argue that Butler's definition of the "normative production of the subject,"[381] which delimits Mahmood's framework to a degree, is a much more compelling explanation in describing how the KK embodied nonviolence, especially the women's emphasis on the "mother" as the site of tangible change. Butler states that if the "subject" is understood not as constant and fixed, but instead, as a vacillating being whose subject-ness is a constantly alterable—or an "iterable," process—because it is open to affect at the perceptual and pre-conceptual levels, then a crucial space for change opens up which disallows deterministic conceptions of the future. This is also why, "[t]he idea of iterability is crucial for understanding why norms do not act in deterministic ways. And it may also be the reason why performativity is finally a more useful term that "construction."[382] Through performance and affect, therefore, nonviolence becomes a constant, ethical choice in the practice of daily living, and it is an ongoing struggle against both norms and the possibility of violence. Crucially, as Butler sums up: "Violence and non-violence are not only strategies and tactics, but form the subject and become its constitutive possibilities and, so, an ongoing struggle." Which means that even if a subject is habitually (and even unwittingly) produced, or iterated, through frameworks of violence, and seems permeated by its violent origins, this would not necessarily determine its

[381] Butler 2010, 168
[382] Butler 2010, 168

future trajectory. Thus, the mother's lap, in performatively addressing children's subject formation, is imbued with the potency to produce alternate futures than the ones that culturally prescriptive norms, or moral injunctions, would fashion.

The space for such performative iterations was provided by the *Pukhtun* journal as well as the KK movement more broadly, and as "construction" suggests coherent, rational systems, which cannot be ascribed to their ideology or its dissemination, "performativity" would in this case also be a more useful descriptive. The effect that the writings in the journal had upon most Pashto speakers cannot be underestimated, even though its impact will be hard to appreciate in today's age of information overload. As one of the first, and only, vernacular journals of its kind, one that had a wide audience including a large subscription in the diaspora and, more crucially, a large readership of women, its effect as a performative space was quite dramatic. That it instilled and changed norms is evident from the fact that the movement was a grassroot and immensely popular organization,[383] which would not have been possible without it. Although the participation of women in the public sphere, especially unveiled, remained marginal, nevertheless, the insertion of their inegalitarian treatment into public debate became a highly charged issue in a society that placed high value on the concept of egalitarianism. While, at the same time, notions of honor conjoined with the chastity and segregation of women also came to the fore. Therefore, the women's discourse addressed the systemic differentials embedded within their patriarchal traditions, and further, as some of the writings illustrate, they parallel this oppression with colonial subjugation. They point to the shared systemic framework that underlies both forms of oppression and, in that sense, they tacitly broaden the definitions of

[383] Mukulika Banerjee's book, *The Pathan Unarmed,* provides evidence for how the KK workers conceived of their movement and their testimonies validate that they willingly embraced these new norms. Moreover, once accepted and adopted, these new norms were considered lifelong ways of being so that even in old age, and without hope of achieving their utopian community, the KK continued to uphold them.

patriarchy and its multifaceted manifestations of violence far ahead of their times. Therefore, the women call upon the opposite, and opposing, parallel to redress their condition, that between the concept of egalitarianism and nonviolence. Butler clarifies these conceptual parallels, one which can be applied to the KK women's discursive thrust to explain why they reframe their signification in terms of parity and deploy that as an oppositional position:

> For the injunction to non-violence to make sense, it is first necessary to overcome the presumption of this very differential—a schematic and non-theorized inegalitarianism—that operates throughout perceptual life. If the injunction to non-violence is to avoid becoming meaningless, it must be allied with a critical intervention apropos the norms that differentiate between those lives that count as livable and…those that do not.[384]

The Human as Universal and Local Category

In one of the first KK women's rallies in (Bayezid) NWFP in July of 1931, Ghaffar Khan tells the large crowd of women who turned out to hear him speak: "Today we are traditionalists, and we oppress you, but at least it is God's blessing that we have become aware of this and we understand that your loss and ours will be the same." Ghaffar Khan's rhetoric about women's emancipation situates itself in the powerful space the KK had opened up and utilized it both to harness and oppose traditional norms, all while using the Islamic discourse on human rights. As he promises the women in the same speech, "you will receive all your rights" according to Quranic decree "because you are our faith and our body," and as the deeds of the KK have gained respect for the Pashtuns throughout the world this will soon come to pass. Therefore, he goes on to say, "I congratulate every sister and mother that your brothers or your children have dedicated themselves to the service of their nation and country and have worn red clothes," because "you husband our strength."[385] It is telling that Ghaffar Khan tried to overcome traditionalist conceptions of women

[384] Butler 2010, "Nonviolence" 180
[385] "Fəkhray Āfğān Sahib's Speech" in the *Pukhtun*, August 1931, 20-21

through reference to the shared and universal material condition of spirit and body and, in a sense, constructed it as a bridge between the radical difference that tradition instantiated through the conceptual category of "men" and "women." In an endeavor to disrupt these historically entrenched categories of identity he often states, "you are not separate from us and we are not separate from you," and utilizes the modern discourse of human rights to iterate a common material condition. To recall Butler's claim about the violence of inegalitarianism, the question of "women's" normative identities points to the differentials of power and are the presuppositions that establish gender norms as natural ones. Ghaffar Khan also, in many respects, reestablishes these power differentials precisely by championing women's rights in the name of the future progressive nation. Women remain a conceptually segregated category in his speeches despite his attempts to overcome entrenched representations of identity and the oppression stemming from it. Although he often blurs these segregated boundaries by pointing to the shared material condition of men and women, he remains, quite obviously even if unwittingly, bounded by those representations and his own historical milieu. Nevertheless, he also initiates a disruption, or a pivotal turn allowing for a critical examination of the established categories of gender predicated on difference.

In an article written in one of the first issues of the *Pukhtun* Ghaffar Khan articulates his means of overcoming these entrenched notions by an appeal to a materially shared human condition, as well as the concept of friendship that pervades KK discourse. Making the argument again that there is no essential difference between men and women, he states:

> In fact, the Quran says: 'you are their garments and they are yours' and this is a truth. Women and men were (both) created to run this world's system. Just like a woman needs a man the same way men need women too. They are (like) two friends in the world." [386]

[386] *Pukhtun* Jan 1929, 20

The concept of friendship in Khudai Khidmatgar discourse, as I argue in detail in Chapter Two, becomes the framework for the alternate social and political that they were attempting to create. However, Ghaffar Khan articulates the vague contours of a politics of friendship here for the first time, and as such, it was generated by the utopian vision to iterate a radically alternate set of normativities; even more noteworthy, is the fact that this first articulation of a new political framework takes place in an attempt to reformulate traditional gender roles. The pivotal access point, therefore, in disrupting the difference instilled by tradition was the insertion of "woman" and her universal rights (sanctioned by Islam) into the discourse of the human.

KK discourse is peppered with notions of the human, although not defined or rooted in any particular humanistic genealogy or conceptual framework, yet it was discursively understood as the keystone of the social transformation they were constructing. As in other humanistic frameworks, either Western, Islamic or indigenous, the human was conceived as a social construct: it was a condition produced through certain ameliorative socio-political circumstances, most commonly the nation, community or the state. A prescriptive socio-political is usually formulated as the prerequisite for fashioning the human, however, in this case, and more broadly in the philosophy of the nonviolence the reverse is the case: the fashioning of the human becomes, first and foremost, the means towards transforming the outer world. Even further, it is a particular kind of subjectivity or self-transformation that is construed as the cause of producing particular kinds of worlds as effects. In other words, the inner gives rise to the outer.

Although colonial discourse also legitimated its civilizing mission in the name of producing a particular kind of human, which becomes incorporated into nationalist agendas as a derivative discourse, to use Partha Chatterjee's phrase, however, the genealogy of KK humanism cannot be clearly traced to the same sources. Instead, the KK concept of the human seems more

an amalgamation of several genealogical frameworks, including Islam, and its own enlightenment tradition which ground the poetic meditations of Khushal Khan Khattak, Rahman Baba and particularly the Pashtun reformist, Bayazid Ansari, or Pir Rohan who founded the Rowshinyia movement—quite literally the "enlightenment" movement. As I mentioned in the Introduction, Pir Rohan was a theologian, and although not ethnically a Pashtun, he was one of the first indigenous figures whose writings have had a profound and lasting influence on all subsequent reformation and resistance movements in the region, both nationalist and Islamic. Bayazid waged a prolonged resistance against Mughal domination and founded the sixteenth century Rohaniya or Rowshanyia movement. His title of "Rohan" (also spelled "Rowshan") also means "the one who brings light" or "the enlightened one." Conceptually, Bayazid's text, *khəyr-al-bəyān,* and the Rohaniya movement itself, were grounded upon the Islamic mystical tradition of *waḥdut-al-wujūd,* or the concept of divine immanence—in contrast to the concept of divine transcendence. This distinctive Sufi framework imbues the material with the sacred; or rather, the sacred is seen as immanent to its creation. In pointing to the unity of all Being it follows—by the logic of its hypothesis—that there is a dialectical relationship between the material and the spiritual and that both must be taken into account when pointing to the sacred. In making all of creation divine and giving reverence to the material as an aspect of this sacred unity, this Islamic framework also gives rise to a strong, humanist tradition.

KK humanism was also founded as a challenge to traditional and normative epistemological frameworks and, although tempered by colonial thought, it was not merely a derivative discourse; what must also be considered is that its reformulation of the human was undertaken through the framework of nonviolence and its distinctive ontology of the human. And, I would further argue, for that reason it may well be an example of "anti-imperialist"

notions of the human/humanism (and human rights) that Judith Butler suggests in her article, "Women and Social Transformation." Not only does she propose a reformulation of international human rights in keeping with "local conceptions of what is human," because basic entitlements are culturally and historically mediated,[387] but also, in keeping with what Butler describes as the "anxiety" of such a challenge and the destabilization of one's normative anchors, the ethical task in the face of difference is, "in the name of the human to allow the human to become something other than what it is traditionally assumed to be…The nonviolent response lives with its not knowing in the face of the Other."[388]

The KK construction of the human transcended or negotiated multiple aspects of othering: Pashtun patriarchal representations of gender; colonial representations of the "Pathan;" and the ideology of nonviolence in face of systemic colonial violence against it at the epistemological and ontological levels. However, this other "human" was also ambivalently mediated through embedding themselves both within the ethos of Pashtunwali—by situating their ideology as its more progressive interpretation—and in indigenous humanistic traditions while, at the same time, opposing several of its entrenched customs: the subjugation, segregation and veiling of women being a particular case in point. The discourse of the human, however, created the space in which to mediate culturally entrenched customs through universal principles and modernist reforms. It was this skillful mediation of tradition with modernity that allowed them to meet with such popular success, but it specifically allowed the women to take up this discourse and demand recognition in its name.

The poet Nangina, another constant contributor to the *Pukhtun*, specifically appeals to the concept of the human, often in contrast to the animal, when addressing the reformation of

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[387] Butler: 2001, 22
[388] Butler: 2001, 17 (The Question of Social Transformation).

Pashtun women's lives. In the November 1938 issue of the *Pukhtun* she writes the poem, "A Sisters Complaint," that illustrates this contrast. Much more pointedly, she parallels colonial subjugation with the subjugation of Pashtun women, and rhetorically asks KK men how they can demand their autonomy while denying the women theirs.

zənāwer hum dāsəy nəšẗā pâ dunyā kəy
čəy jūṛ šəwəy wərlâ dāsəy saxẗ qānūn dəy

There aren't even such animals in the world
Who have such harsh laws imposed upon them

čəy pəxpəlâ āzādi ğwāḍəy pukhẗūnâ
xərāb kəṛəy dəy zəmūġ wələy žwəndūn dəy

While you want your own freedom, Pashtun men
For what reason do you destroy our lives then?

kâlâ mūnġ qəwmy xədməẗ pukhẗūnâ ğwāḍəy
ẗ'liməy pəhlū zəmūġ wələy zəbūn dəy

Sometimes, Pashtuns, you want us to serve the nation
Then why does our education bring such shame upon us?[389]

Nangina specifically uses the figure of the human as a utopian aspiration and an undefined, yet universally given, benchmark against which the subhuman degradation of Pashtun women's lives was being measured. More cogently, she parallels the systemic violence of colonial rule with local patriarchy and points to the shared systems of domination that undergirds them both, dependent as they were on constructs of othering and inegalitarian difference. Nangina, unequivocally translates Pashtun cultural codes and its subhuman treatment of women with colonial laws to point out that both produce the differentials of power that subjugate the other. According to her logic, the KK demand for autonomy from colonial rule becomes hollow in face of the dehumanizing mechanisms of subjugation they were upholding for their own women.

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[389] *Pukhtun*, November 1938, 4

As I have been arguing, the space that nonviolence opened up especially through the *Pukhtun*, allowed the KK women to articulate their voices to cut through the “double bind” of their condition. Gayatri Spivak uses that phrase to describes the condition of “third world” subaltern women who remain silent both within the dominant epistemological frameworks of the West and the hegemonic structures of local patriarchies.[390]

> Within the effaced itinerary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual difference is doubly effaced. The question is not of female participation in insurgency, or the ground rules of the sexual division of labor, for both of which there is ‘evidence’. It is, rather, that, both as object of colonialist historiography and as subject of insurgency, the ideological construction of gender keeps the male dominant. If, in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern female is even more deeply in shadow.[391]

As Spivak notes, it is not that subaltern women did not participate in either insurgencies or in the production of colonial economies, yet their roles are never acknowledged either in histories written at the center or, as she adds in another section, in the peripheries. Although the KK women did initiate an unraveling of the double bind of their particular condition and were loudly heard within their own circles at the time, nevertheless, they have been forgotten even locally and remain in the shadows of that retrieval of history. But as the voices of the KK remain largely effaced to this day in global narratives of nonviolence and resistance Spivak’s explanation continues to ring true: “the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge’, ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated.”[392]

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[390] Spivak also describes a third and fourth layer to this silencing by intellectuals in their desire to represent the voiceless subaltern. Both European intellectuals, who ignore, and thus perpetuate, the structures of silencing that colonialism established globally, but also, the Subaltern Studies group of historians who, even while reading the colonial archive against the grain, create an idealized, objective “subaltern” figure and consciousness.

[391] Spivak, Gayatri. *Can the Subaltern Speak?: Reflections on the History of an idea.* Edited by Rosalind Morris. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, 82-83

[392] Spivak, 82

To heed Spivak's warning further, however, the attempt to recognize this subjugated knowledge and to give voice to the subaltern can also produce idealized figures, or "an ideological construction of gender" produced by the intellectual endeavor of reclamation. So that the intellectual must also recognize that reclamation also coheres with "the work of imperialist subject-constitution" and is situated within its epistemological frameworks which mingles "epistemic violence with the advancement of learning and civilization," at the end of which "the subaltern woman will be as mute as ever."[393] Even though the endeavor of this chapter is to give voice to the KK women, both at the margins and at the center, the hope remains, perhaps somewhat futile, that in giving space to and translating their own words this project of reclamation does not collaborate with the epistemic violences that silenced them in the first place.

"The Women's Question" in nationalist rhetoric: the inner and the outer

Unlike the feminist movements in the rest of India that were also transforming the normative categories of womanhood as part of nationalist resistance to colonial hegemony, the KK women were opposing not colonial categories of identity as such, which had little formative affect in the NWF, but the identities of womanhood produced by their own patriarchal culture. However, instead of "women" becoming signifiers of an authentic cultural tradition that mainstream Indian nationalist discourse was voicing in answer to "the women's question," the KK, on the contrary, made the caged and chained woman's body a signifier of the regressive Pashtun norms that had to be transcended. A transcendence that would then signify the successful transformation of the social that they were calling for through the ideology of nonviolence. Whereas, in opposition to the colonial construct that had posited "the women's question" as "a problem of Indian tradition,"

[393] Spivak, 90

Indian nationalist discourse, as Partha Chatterjee argues, separated culture into two spheres: the material and the spiritual. Nationalists conceptualized the latter category as the domain of an unpolluted tradition, untouched by colonial categories, with women as its essence and marker. They used "traditional culture" as a distanciating discursive space to colonial categories to stake the claim that in "the spiritual domain the East was superior to the West." This fortified inner sanctum was created as oppositional space, according to Chatterjee, because in the material sphere Indian nationalism had to concede superiority to the West's technical and organizational prowess. Science, technology and rational forms of state organization, including economic and bureaucratic infrastructures, had to necessarily be incorporated into the structures of the postcolonial nation-state.[394] Whereas the spiritual domain was conceived as autonomous from hegemonic colonial categories. The material/spiritual distinction produces, Chatterjee argues, "an analogous, but ideologically far more powerful, dichotomy: that between the outer and the inner." This ideological framework bifurcates, the material/spiritual and outer/inner dichotomy further into, on the one hand, state mechanisms, the public and patriarchal sphere and the home, the inner, private domain of women on the other, with the latter symbolizing the essential core of the nation. So that, as Chatterjee concludes the thrust of his argument: "one gets an identification of social roles by gender to correspond with the separation of the social space into *ghar* and *bahir*," or the home and the world.[395]

However, Rabindranath Tagore's construction of the dichotomy of Indian nationalist discourse in his novel of the same name that Chatterjee's argument formulates, *The Home and the World* neither constructs such clearly segregated discursive domains nor such distinctive and

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[394] Chatterjee, Partha: "Colonialism, Nationalism, and Colonized Women: The Contest in India" in American Ethnologist, Vol 16, No. 4 (Nov., 1989), pp. 622-633, 623.
[395] Chatterjee: 1989, 624

coherent conceptual categories. Bimala, the female protagonist in Tagore's novel is a traditional Bengali wife/woman who is refashioned into the iconic new woman that Indian nationalism wanted to produce. She personifies the birth of the modern new nation, a nation that is, as she states, "a woman like myself," and one who is also "drawn forth from her home corner,"[396] to become the Swadeshi movement's symbol of the ideal feminine. Yet, in effectively being turned into an icon, she realizes that not only does this objectification rob her of humanity, but it also unleashes the forces of violence in the name of nationalist ideals; a destructive force that fatally wounds her husband, Nikhilesh. He, in turn, wanted Bimala to embody universalist and cosmopolitan principles of humanism in contrast with nationalist bigotry. A humanism, as Tagore ironically points out, that gave Bimala the agency to change from her traditional role as a submissive wife, living in the cloistered and veiled inner sanctum of the home, to a self-actualizing individual who is able to take a stand in the world. As such, in coming out of the home and in transforming herself into a modern woman, Bimala in effect destroys the clear demarcation between home and the world, but also, at the end of the novel, between her signification as an icon and her emancipation through universal humanist principles. In a sense, the humanism which Nikhilesh represented, and that introduced her to Sandip, the leader of the Swadeshi movement, lets loose the forces of its own destruction to allow, in the name of freedom of choice, another set of normative values to fashion subjectivity. In this case, nationalist patriarchal values determine the shape of the ideal future woman-nation. Thus, the nationalist political agenda also represents woman-nation statically and does not allow her a voice outside the domain of her signification.

[396] Tagore, Rabindranath: *The Home and the World*. Penguin Classics, Revised edition (2005), 93

It is unclear in Tagore's novel (as well as Tagore's complex yet also, in a different way, patriarchal representation of the new woman) whether the clear segregation between home and the world that Chatterjee ascribes to nationalist discourse was ever embodied in reality despite the desire for such clearly demarcated boundaries. As Michael Sprinker points out in his essay, the domestic space itself is divided between "the purdah quarters of the women" and men's spaces in which the public-world intersects. Nikhilesh's insistence that Bimala come out of purdah and into the men's space in order to become emancipated from the traditional role of women, which she tries at first to resist, "suggests that 'the world' is not just the domain of political action, but equally the site in the home." Moreover, as Sprinker states: "Later on, Nikhilesh himself presents a further complication of the home-world dichotomy when he explicitly opposes the domestic realm, where commerce occurs, to the inner life, where he believes truth and authenticity properly reside."[397] Nikhil, in other words, upholds the necessity of inserting the ethical, inner, self-reflective subject into the political, whereas, Bimala and Sandip want the political realm to be shorn of idealism in the name of pragmatics which, according to their world-view, the outer world realistically demands. Furthermore, even though Bimala personifies the new nation-state, she becomes, as Sprinker puts it, an "ideologeme"[398] of nationalism that Tagore mobilizes to express his critique about nationalism. It is precisely the disjunction between the ethical, inner domain that has the potential to produce a more humanistic world, and a politics focused solely on the pragmatics of the outer world, which, shorn of a moral world-view, can stoop to any means, including stealing and lying, to justify its often-violent ends.

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[397] Sprinker, Michael, "Homeboys: Nationalism, Colonialism and Gender in *The Home and the World*," in *Rabindranath Tagore's Home and the World: A Critical Companion*, edited by Pradip Kumar Datta. London: Anthem Press, 2005. (114)

[398] Sprinker, 116

Although Tagore is ambivalent about the role of women in the anti-colonial struggle, as Tanika Sarkar points out in her essay on the novel, and Bimala's freedom "disrupts the moral and social order fatally," nevertheless, it is one of the first Bengali novels that has "the self-representing woman" speaking not only on her own behalf but also for the male characters of the novel.[399] Furthermore, Tagore utilizes the "unprecedented new capability" of women's writing, which proliferated at the turn of the twentieth century, to create a female protagonist who inserts herself through her writing and education into this hitherto patriarchal public sphere that had been denied to them.[400] That Bimala is called forth from the home by her erotic desire, by her "unfathomable yearning," for the new envisioned nation expresses, according to Sarkar, Tagore's "particular understanding of the condition of modernity."[401] And even though Bimala reverts to the traditional site of the Hindu marriage as an act of atonement and a symbol of purity, what Sarkar cogently calls the "spatial claustrophobia" and "domestic incarceration" of the home,[402] does not signify a culturally superior spiritual domain disconnected from the world, but in fact quite the opposite. Chatterjee's formulation of the inner-outer dichotomy, therefore, cannot be reduced to the home-world binary; instead Tagore constructs a more fruitful dialectic between the process of subjective change and its related outer expression in the world, and a different kind of binary: between an ethical political, one that remains an unrealized ideal, and the politics of nationalism that was bursting violently forth at that time through the Swadeshi movement.

Furthermore, Chatterjee's model separates the nationalist discourse about women from women's movements as such—or an objectification of "woman" as signifier is disconnected from

[399] Sarkar, Tanika, "Many Faces of Love: Country, Woman and God in The Home and the World," in *Rabindranath Tagore's Home and the World: A Critical Companion*, 29.
[400] Sarkar, 30
[401] Sarkar, 31
[402] Sarkar, 35

women's own voices; in fact, he goes so far as to claim there was a "seeming absence" of women's struggle for equality and freedom, which relegates the various Indian women's movements to inconsequence. As Suruchi Thapar outlines in her article, "Women as Activists, Women as Symbols," there were significant contributions by women to the Independence movement and not just from their homes but also in the public sphere; some took active part in *satyagraha* rallies and picketing and consequently were imprisoned and brutalized by the colonial authorities, including during the salt march.[403] M.K. Gandhi rallied many women who then actively participated in the Independence struggle both from their homes, with the spinning and weaving of khadi, and after the 1930's, they entered the public sphere as well.[404] As a 1931 report of the AICC corroborates: "In the year 1929, hardly one or two ladies used to attend public meetings but the year 1930 opened very differently."[405] Thousands of women, as the report states, started participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement and were seen at rallies, breaking the salt laws, picketing shops selling foreign cloth and liquor and in the process getting arrested for breaking colonial laws, especially section 144 forbidding public gatherings. The 6th of May 1930, as the report emphasizes, was especially memorable when "no less than a lakh people—including five thousand ladies" protested the arrest of Gandhi and the head of the AICC women's movement, Shrimati Sayavati, "demanded the courts be closed."[406] The procession in Delhi was met with a "Lathi charge" and firing by the authorities, injuring many, but it had the galvanizing effect upon other women who subsequently swelled the ranks of the resistance and would shame the men if they wanted to disburse from a meeting in the face of colonial threats:

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403 Thapar, Suruchi. "Women as Activists, Women as Symbols: A Study of the Indian Nationalist Movement." *Feminist Review,* No. 44, Summer 1993, 81-96, pg. 81, 89
404 Thapar, 86
405 Untitled report of the AICC (1st Instalment), G-1/1931, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library archival holdings, pg. 1.
406 AICC report G-1/1931, 4

> when the male audience showed [an] inclination to melt away, a hundred ladies formed a cordon round the meeting and not a single soul dared leave the meeting. Thus, from day to day section 144 was openly defied, under the very nose of Queen Victoria's statue. This open defiance of law by ladies become intolerable for the authorities and they decided to arrest Shrimati Sayavati, the Commander of the ladies.[407]

That the report verifies a large number of women participated in the nationalist struggle in the public domain, while also stating that some of the organizers "sent [the] gospel of nationalism behind the purdah" as well,[408] does not of course discount the fact that patriarchal structures were being reconstituted by the women themselves. The fact that some women, as Thapar also points out, who were disenchanted with the ideology of nonviolence also resorted to acts of terrorism only corroborates that.[409] Much like Bimala's role in the novel, women coming out into the public sphere were ambivalent markers but ones that, nevertheless, to recall Derrida's definition of "deconstruction" that I outline in the introduction, were deconstructing—even if inadvertently—the patriarchal structures that were subjugating them but from within the same field—there was no outside space from which the unravelling or resistance was possible; the new site of emancipation had to be created from within the given domains.

However, the construction of Indian femininity was largely produced through male discourse: both the "new woman," who was both modern yet modeled on the mythical figures of Sita and Savitri—thus still upholding (traditional) ideals of Indian womanhood[410]—and as *Bharat Mata*, depicted as either shackled, "weeping 'tears of blood,'" or as a warrior figure leading her children to battle and freedom.[411] While not underestimating, as Mrinalina Sinha cautions, "the

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[407] AICC report G-1/1931, 6
[408] Such as Mrs. Asaf Ali, who was subsequently also arrested for it and imprisoned for a year and was also dealt with by the colonial authorities on a public/outer footing. AICC report G-1/1931, 9
[409] Thapar, 90
[410] Thapar, 84
[411] Thapar, 88

emergence of a new discourse of Indian feminism," instigated by the three major women's organizations, the Women's Indian Association (WIA), the All-India Women's Conference (AIWC), and the National Council of Women in India (NCWI), it was closely intertwined with, and often upheld, "the gendered logic of Indian nationalism" that Chatterjee outlines.[412] Reinforcing, or even producing, traditional gender roles, Indian feminism offered no threat to the constructions of masculinity and patriarchal family structures, especially since a lack of Indian masculinity had become a pertinently touchy issue for nationalist discourse after the publication of *Mother India*: a thinly veiled colonial diatribe against Indian self-rule written by Katherine Mayo in 1927. Mayo not only questioned the requisite virility of Indian men to govern themselves,[413] but also, as Sinha describes, the book's depiction "of women as victims of an inherently pernicious Hindu culture, and of Indian nationalism as an irredeemably backward and retrogressive force" compelled the nationalists, including Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and M.A. Jinnah[414] "to rehabilitate Indian nationalism" in the terms and the language of modernity.[415] The campaign to pass the Sarda Act against child marriages by the women's organization, with the strong support of the nationalists, squarely situated the nationalist rhetoric in these terms. The Bill was passed in 1929 by the Central Legislative Assembly despite the "obstructionist role of the colonial state," who staunchly upheld tradition and were wary of reforms for women, which became quite embarrassing for the government in the wake of the Mother India controversy which had declared Indians would never reform themselves according to modern, Western standards.

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[412] Chatterjee: 1989, 624

[413] Thapar, 83

[414] Sinha, Mrinalini: "Refashioning Mother India: Feminism and Nationalism in Late-Colonial India," Feminist Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, Points of Departure: India and the South Asian Diaspora (Autumn, 2000), pp. 623-644 Although Sinha does not include Jinnah in this description directly she does later state that he was sympathetic to the women's movements, especially in their campaign to pass the Sarda Bill, 631

[415] Sinha, 628

Arguing that "the battle for the new idea of womanhood in the era of nationalism was waged in the home" and thus not in the outer, material and political domain, as Chatterjee does, effectively reinforces the boundaries between private and public and does not take into account the change of norms, specifically of gender, that elide such boundaries. Despite the fact that Indian nationalism was largely a male discourse reinforcing particular kinds of patriarchy,[416] even in the name of modernity and women's emancipation, the inner/outer and the home/world distinction cannot be other than porous in reality. Not only because of the significant interventions by indigenous women's movements, which both disrupted and upheld those boundaries, but projects to refashion normative subjectivity necessarily disregard such discursive demarcations.[417] However, even Sangari and Vaid in their Introduction to *Recasting Women* uphold Chatterjee's formulation that the "private sphere" was part of the "differential process of the "nineteenth century" and its binary oppositionals, such as "male vs female, inner vs outer, public vs private, material vs spiritual," were incorporated and upheld by nationalist discourse. In fact, they also state that the "recovery of tradition throughout the proto-nationalist and nationalist period was always a recovery of the 'traditional' woman," and that religion was "the medium" for this reform. Although they are specifically pointing to religious narratives which "Hindu" nationalist were deploying, in opposition to both colonialism and Islam, nevertheless, they reiterate that a dichotomy lay at the core of nation formation: "The formation of desired notions of spirituality and womanhood is thus part of the formation of the middle class itself, wherein hierarchies and

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[416] See *Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History*, edited by Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1990.

[417] As Sinha mentions, the "Women's Charter" formulated by women's organizations and passed at a joint conference of the Indian National Congress, the Indian National Social Reform Conference and the Theosophical Society of India on December 29th, 1927, which attempted to sever the women's question from the nationalist agenda. It demanded equal rights for women on a variety of fronts including, equal pay for equal work, equal rights to divorce and maternity benefits for factory workers. These demands, as Sinha explains, remained controversial even within the women's movements but it especially "provoked an orthodox nationalist backlash." (633)

patriarchies are sought to be maintained on both material and spiritual grounds."[418] However, their question about how deeply colonial reforms, such as sati, widow and child marriages or female education, effected the "lower strata" in Calcutta is not followed through or addressed but simply explained by stating that, "[p]erhaps negotiating these areas itself becomes a way of being inscribed culturally into the middle class."[419]

Both Sangari-Vaid and Chatterjee's formulation would seem to be confined to a "Hindu" and largely urban middle class based in Calcutta, which is not to disregard the effect of its rhetoric on other groups in India, but to point to its specificity. Like the broader Indian nationalist movement, the KK's also called for "new norms,"[420] but because the women's rhetoric in particular did not situate these norms, or the call for them, in a discursively anti-colonial space but rather as the means of self-reformation, the inner/outer dichotomy had a different resonance here. The transformation of the inner—both women's roles and normative subjectivity—was conceived as the necessary prerequisite for producing the desired nation. But, for the KK, it was precisely the freeing up of this bound and segregated inner domain, especially once women came out into the public sphere unveiled, that would become the marker of political freedom and an altered Pashtun habitus. Moreover, because legal incursions into Indian culture through the "women's question," as in the case of Sati prohibitions or widow remarriages, did not have the same salience in the NWF or for Pashtun culture, colonial reforms had very limited penetration into the secluded women's quarters. Even if legislation around polygamy, child marriage and the education of women were salient concerns these colonial laws never established enough cultural hegemony that they were perceived as threats to a sanctified inner domain. Additionally, there was no Cartesian

[418] Sangari and Vaid, 10
[419] Sangari and Vaid, 15
[420] Chatterjee: 1989, 626

duality between the material and the spiritual in the KK literature broadly, and the women's discourse more narrowly; in fact, the body represents the spirit and vice versa, or, the chained woman's body signified the subjugated spirit of the Pashtun nation and not a culturally superior domain, but in fact its opposite. Their chained bodies became a marker of the oppression of tradition and, like Tagore's conception of nationalism, they base their rhetoric of emancipation upon universal humanistic principles. As such, "education" becomes the broad rubric for emancipation in their discourse.

Women, Education and Altered Subjectivities

The ideology of nonviolence was not just the catalyst for Pashtun nationalism, but in contrast with Indian nationalism more broadly,[421] it was the space that allowed for a radical transformation of both the inner and the outer: of normative subjectivity and the social habitus in conjunction with one another. Furthermore, nonviolence was conceived not just as a maneuver or a tactic but the very ground fashioning a new kind of a political altogether, as I have explained in more detail in the previous chapter. And although nonviolence as ideology is not mentioned in the women's writings, this surprising lack while taking the premises of nonviolence for granted, allows me to argue that it was not, at its core, an exceptional ideology—as is often portrayed through the framework of the "figure of the Pathan." But, it was never articulated in these terms or as a coherent ideology before this. However, the discursive understanding that an altered subjectivity was the prerequisite for creating the new socio-political substantiates this argument. Instead they utilize

[421] See Chatterjee's analysis where he outlines how "Gandhism" was the "maneuver" that rallied the masses to the nationalist cause, but it never altered the material structure of the postcolonial state which essentially followed the colonial state model. In *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, University of Minnesota Press, (Minneapolis: 1986)

the modern concept of "education" to signify how this change would be produced and, in pointing to its stark lack in Pashtun society, validate their argument that this was the core of both the problem and its solution. As such, the KK equated education with the "*tarəkəy,"* or the success of the nation and, consequently, its "*āzādi,"* or freedom, and it was bestowed with the generative power to bring about the prerequisite inner transformation to transform the ethos. Thus "education" was not just a modernist discourse but, more than that, it was a signifier for how the ideology of nonviolence would become an embodied norm.

This was also the founding rationale for the formation of the *Ānjuman-i-Islâ-ul-Afğāniâ* in 1921, the organization which preceded the KK, as I described in the previous chapter. The Society for the Reformation of the Afghans was created specifically to rehabilitate Pashtun society through vernacular education. The Azad madrassas[422] that Ghaffar Khan later established, and which became famously associated with the KK social reformation, were a revival of this earlier system. But this new school system was limited to the Province and although a few schools were opened up in the Tribal Territories the colonial authorities would soon shut them down. This vernacular school system was seen by Ghaffar Khan as the foundation for the social transformation he was seeking, and it preceded his formulation of a coherent ideology of nonviolence and the overtly anticolonial stance the KKs took after the Peshawar riots of 1930. Further, the school system—and the turn to the vernacular in general including the launch of the *Pukhtun* journal—was one of the main factors that created the strong grass roots social system that allowed the KKs to win the provincial elections, despite being a

[422] These schools have presently been revived by the Awami National Party, which claims its heritage from the KK movement. This political party came to power in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (the NWF Province was renamed in 2010) when democratic national elections took place in the country in 2008.

banned organization; moreover, it enabled the women to participate in the movement through the platform of the journal despite widespread illiteracy.

In the women's discourse, education was seen not only as the means for emancipating them from their "domestic incarceration" but also, by extension, the key to creating a successful community, or "qəwm." In one of the first issues of the *Pukhtun* there was an article written on a theme that would be repeatedly voiced in the journal: "The Mother's Lap is the First Madrassah." Published in the May 1929 issue and signed by the initials "Meem Jeem," or مج, the writer states that the systemic violence in Pashtun society, especially the practice of *badal* or violent retribution, is so prevalent because women are uneducated and, therefore, mothers teach their children these destructive norms at an early age. It is common for today's mothers, the writer goes on to explain, to instruct their children to fight back violently if they are hit, and these norms are replicated in the wider, public arena once the children grow up. At the end of the article, Meem Jeem appeals to her "brothers" to educate women so that their children do not spend a life of ignominy but one of honor serving the nation instead.[423] The mother's lap thus becomes the primary educational system through which normative subjectivity was to be reinscribed. And although nonviolence as an ideology is not discussed, the obvious pointer to the concept of "badal,"[424] which sanctions violence as a norm in Pashtun society, makes the education of women the means of altering this entrenched custom. Nonviolence, therefore, was seen as an obvious consequence of enlightened and educated individuals—the conjunction of enlightenment with education, and with nonviolence, is always tacitly present in these arguments—and a way of organizing a community along modern, progressive principles. The KK discourse, therefore, never refers to nonviolence as merely a political tactic or an ideological exception.

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[423] Shah, 95

[424] Referring, most generally, to a cycle of retribution that, once begun, can last for generations.

In an article written by Syed Ghulam Haider Shah, simply titled "Women's Education," a similar justification is posited for the importance of women's education. Published the following month in the *Pukhtun,* the article states the reason why Pashtuns are *"ğəlāms,"* or vassals of foreign rulers rather than an autonomous community, is because of a lack of women's education. The first five years of a child's life are crucially formative, Haider Shah argues, because the "child spends them in the mother's lap and is nurtured by her and not the father who is out all day and returns home late in the evening once the child is sleeping. The child, therefore, is influenced by the mother's thoughts and mannerisms rather than the father's." Because the mother molds the subjectivity of the child, as Haider Shah continues to explain, there is a stark difference between a child reared by an educated mother who enables her children to join the ranks of humanity, and a mother ignorant of humanistic values, living an animal-like existence. Cultivating the human and liberating its spirit would allow, the article implies in almost Hegelian fashion, the nation to achieve its rightful telos.[425]

What is interesting to note in this discourse is not just the materiality of the mother's body that is proffered as the essential incubator for change, but also, the obvious link that is highlighted between the private veiled domain of the Pashtun habitus and its larger social or public (and thus unveiled) manifestation. The veiled or the private domain is neither secluded from public affect, as traditional patriarchy would like to maintain, nor does it lack the power to affect the public domain in turn, as these articles clearly imply. It is the woman's body, however, or the transformative potency of the mother's lap, that creates the dialectical relationship between private and public. Thus, it is this materially affective domain that is imbued with the power to produce the transformed outer ethos.

[425] *Pukhtun,* June 1929, 25

Another poem by Nangina, titled "An Address to Pashtun Women" published in December 1938, uses tropes of incarceration as a signifier for women's dehumanization once again, but as in most of the post-war discourse in the journal there are direct appeals to the women, (and not just to men as in the pre-war period of the journal), to change normative conditions through their own initiatives. The first three shirs of the poem state:

> *kâ mūnġ xâ nâ kṛū pâ xəplâ xəpl hāləẗ*
> *zəndəgi bâ ẗəyrwū də zəlāləẗ*
>
> If we don't make our condition good ourselves
> We will live a life of degradation
>
> *huməyšâ bâ mū malgəray bədâ wrź wəy*
> *pâ pənjrâ kəy bâ bəndəy yū ẗər qəyāməẗ*
>
> We will always be [the] friends of misfortune
> We will be locked up in a birdcage till judgement day
>
> *sṛəy hum mənəy zəmūnġâ hərâ xəbrâ*
> *zəndəgi zəmūnġâ dâ də šərākəẗ*
>
> Men also listen to everything we have to say
> Our lives are ours to [live] together [426]

The metaphor of incarceration has shifted in this period of the discourse: the critique is no longer directed at tradition or at patriarchy as much but, quite pointedly, at women's agency. If changing the social and political rests upon an altered subjectivity then, the logic of this argument would entail that changing the inner condition would be the prerogative and choice of each subject/person. The responsibility for the formation of the subject has also, in this period, shifted from the conception that it is a naturally occurring given, or constructed through traditional systems and imposed from without, to the modern conception of individuals constructing their own personhood and generating norms from that space of (self) actualization.

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[426] *Pukhtun*, December 1938, 25

So that, unlike the earlier discourse, women are not just caged and shackled by Pashtun culture but collaborate with their own incarceration, both by conceiving of norms as unchangeable, and thus deterministic, as well as repetitively iterating the normative subject of tradition. In other words, the KK women's discourse now reveals a new, more modern conception of subjectivity, personhood and agency, with the journal becoming the platform upon which this new modern subject is established, or, at least, conceptualized and sketched out.

However, as Rajeswari Sundar Rajan cautions, the ascription of "agency" to "performative intentionality" has the danger of establishing "the romantic fiction of 'resistance'," and of ascribing that to the power of the individual (or the sovereign subject once again) rather than, as Rajan wants to formulate, a "social function." Instead she wants to locate "'resistances' within the scene of cultural production itself," and to point out that resistance may not always be a positive act but also "a negative agency, an absence of acquiescence in one's oppression."[427] As a postcolonial category of analysis, "culture" also, as Sundar argues, cannot be conceived as a separate, bounded domain, or a superstructure, but "an envelope that wraps us around and constructs our very 'reality'." Although similar to Mahmood's argument in many ways, about how the (pious) subject is formed as a consequence of its contextual power relations, Sundar's formulation also wants to circumscribe agency (and desires) as contingent upon its cultural context, nevertheless, she posits a way out of the tautology that such a formulation ascribes to agency, or its lack thereof. The problematization of the "subject" that feminist theory has undertaken in order to, quite rightly, displace the bourgeois white male "subject of western humanism," one that has "elided questions of class, gender and racial difference," has also created the problem, and an awareness of the fact that "without an ontologically grounded

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[427] Sunder Rajan, Rajeswari. *Real and Imagined Women : Gender, Culture, and Postcolonialism*. London: Routledge, 1993, 12

feminist subject there can be no politics."[428] As such, Sundar creates the space, or recognizes, that in order to even acknowledge the historical "evidence" for many resistances, especially unrecorded, subaltern contestations, there must be a space, even within hegemonic frameworks, in which the agency of a subject can reinterpret and refashion norms.

> Culture then, viewed as the product of the beliefs and conceptual models of society and as the destination where the trajectory of its desires take shape, as well as the everyday practices, the contingent realities, and the complex process by which these are structured, is the constitutive realm of the subject. As a result, culture appears as the chief matter and consequence of dominant ideological investment, powerfully coercive in shaping the subject, but since it is also heterogenous, changing and open to interpretation, it can become a site of contestation and consequently of the reinscription of subjectivities.

The KK women's injunction to change norms was articulated in the discursive space that the journal created, but the fact that it was even possible to articulate such resistance, one that was also heeded by the majority of the community, denotes that culture is open to reinterpretation, contestation and reinscription to those living within it (rather than imposed from without). So that, to recall Butler's formulation, if the "subject" is understood not as stable and fixed but a constantly alterable process then not only does it explain how "resistance" and change take place, but it also disallows deterministic conceptions of the future. The KK women create, in Butler's terms, an altered constellation of "thinking about normativity."[429] As Butler explains, our concept of violence "has built into it certain pre-conceptions about what culture ought to be, about how community is to be understood, about how the state is formed, and about who might count as a recognizable subject,"[430] so that an alternate normativity—produced by an ethical politics of nonviolence—must also address these cultural pre-conceptions and the

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[428] This is a quote that Rajan uses from Butler and Scott's Introduction to *Feminists Theorize the Political,* 10
[429] Butler, Judith, "The Claim of Non-Violence" in *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable*? New York: Verso, 2010. 145
[430] Butler 2010, 156

epistemological frameworks that represent violence as a norm. The ethical choice to disengage form violence, or cultural practices of oppression, therefore, is a daily, quotidian yet agentic practice.

As in the case of the KK more broadly, their literary articulations were largely oral, performative modes of transmission so that, semantically, “performativity” and “iteration” allow for a more cogent set of terms in explaining how this social change was transmitted across such a wide expanse of the, largely illiterate, population that included various strata of class, caste and religious communities of the NWF. While the discourse of education, which became the overall rubric for change, continued unchanged from the pre-war to the post-war periods of the journal, in the later writings there was the added conception of *bildung,* or the cultivation of the (human) self through education. Some of Nangina’s other *shirs* in the above poem, “An Address to Pashtun Women,” highlights how the human, and consequently the envisioned brave new world, could be produced affectively rather than structurally. The sixth to tenth couplets of the poem state:

čəy jūwhr də ẗ’lim nâ wəy ēnsān kəy
nâ həywān dəy nâ ēnsān dəy səlāməẗ

If there are no rays of education in a human
They are neither wholly animal nor human

pâ səṛəy āw ẋəźəâ yuw šān ‘lm fərz dəy
həm prəy fərz dəy yuw šān qəwmi khədməẗ

An equal duty compels men and women to learn
Like the compelling duty to serve your nation

hərâ ẋəźəâ dəy xəpl rūr āw plār məjbūr kṛəy
həm xāwənd dəy pâ xâ šān kṛəy məlāməẗ

Every woman should compel her brother and father
And she should gently make her husband remorseful

čəy zəmūnġâ də ẗ'lim ēnẗəzām dəy wkṛəy
āw pâ mūnġâ kəy šəy pəydā ēnsānyəẗ

So that they make arrangements for our education
And we discover humanity within us

də sərhəd nəymā dənyā bâ šəy wdānâ
pâ kūhəy kəy dâ pərẗâ də jəhāləẗ

Half the world of the Frontier will become alive
Cast out ignorance upon a high mountain[431]

The production of the human is now seen as an individual endeavor, with women having the power to bring about this change if they so desire: she can "compel" and influence the men in her immediate circle if she so chooses; if, that is, she sees the value of this self-fashioning and of education as the means to creating this new normative human-society. That education is conceived as a utilitarian means of achieving this end once again situates this discourse in the context of its times and loudly voices the modernist presumptions about fashioning subjectivity in order to construct ideal new communities in terms assumed to be universal. This discourse can of course be termed a derivative one, but in order not to ascribe absolute powers of social and political fashioning to only the colonial civilizing mission and its particular brand of humanism, it would be more accurate to ascribe such an impetus to the episteme of modernity itself, of which (European) imperialism and industrialization was a large inter-relational part, but not its only aspect. Because the word she uses for "duty," one that both compels humans to educate themselves and to serve the nation, is "*fərz*" or an obligatory injunction that Islam imposes upon individuals within its humanist matrix, one that is also construed as a universal injunction. While the casting out of "ignorance" or "*jəhāləẗ*" can also be read as part of the Islamic narrative which

431 Sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth *shirs* of "An Address to Pashtun Women," Pukhtun, December 1938, 25

constructs itself as the harbinger of enlightenment. So that, if the borders of modernity are expanded beyond the horizons of 18,th 19th and 20th century colonial domination, and includes, amongst other frameworks, Islam as the most modern expression of Judeo-Christian monotheism, then several strands of modernity can be seen to be woven into in the KK discourse of reformation as well. However, as European imperial domination, and specifically British colonization of India, self-consciously propounded education as a tool for particular kinds of colonized subjectivity, the degree to which that influences KK discourse has to analyzed more closely as well, even if Pashtun women seem far too deeply cloistered within their zenana quarters to be shaped by it.

Education: Fashioning the New Normative Subject

It is also the language of utility that Thomas Babington Macaulay uses to justify changing the educational system of India. In Macaulay's by now famous, or infamous, "Minute on Indian Education," that he wrote in 1835 for Lord Bentinck, the then Governor-General of India, education is positioned as the progressive, rational, modern underpinning of a radical new political philosophy whose end is to civilize all of humanity. He begins his argument favoring a change in the Indian educational system from, as he terms it, the more obscure and useless languages of Arabic and Sanskrit that were the mediums of education then, to English; this, he predicts, will be the global language of humanity in the near future. Macaulay's rationale behind the change is given as a pragmatic, cost-benefit calculation: the usefulness of learning English is not only that it is the most pre-imminent of languages, in comparison with arcane and useless oriental languages, but that it would especially benefit "our native subjects" to gain knowledge of science, the law and prepare them to live in the modern world. However, he posits a more

pivotal reason and a more germane framework about the utility of modern education itself: teaching in English would "alter" a new generation "before they reach manhood," and create "a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect;" a class of natives who would be "interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern." Not only is education acknowledged as the means of fashioning subjectivity towards specific ends, but language itself is seen as the medium through which the world-view of a whole population can be altered. Thus, the normative colonial subject can be fashioned into translators that would bridge the gap of incommensurability between Western colonizer and Eastern subjects. Obviously, Macaulay's reformist zeal to civilize the "natives" also served the ends of empire but there is an additional humanist motivation here also, one that is conceived as both universal and utilitarian, which would serve to birth a brave new, modern world. In short, the reform on education postulates a temporal and, therefore, a quintessentially modernist framework within which normative subjectivity was seen to now be synthetically (and even technologically) fashioned for particular ideological ends.

Although Macaulay's educational reform bill was met with considerable opposition and instigated a vigorous debate between the Anglicists and the Orientalists in England,[432] nevertheless it was adopted by Governor Bentinck shortly afterwards and English did become the medium of education in India. This was motivated not only by the colonial civilizing impetus, as Gauri Viswanathan points out in *Masks of Conquest*, but much more crucially, India was to become the experimental laboratory for the shape of future education in England.[433] The secular education system adopted in India was an experiment in the means of social control,

[432] See: Zastoupil, Lynn, and Martin Moir. 1999. *The Great Indian Education Debate : Documents Relating to the Orientalist-Anglicist Controversy, 1781-1843*. London Studies on South Asia, No. 18. Richmond: Curzon.
[433] Viswanathan, Gauri. *Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India*. (Oxford University Press: 1998), 8

discipline and ways of increasing productivity that was later replicated in England to produce the new bourgeois citizen-subjects of the state. If the civilizing mission, as Viswanthan argues, was seen as a "humanization of man through various influences," and as an "ameliorative project," this implicitly assumed the existence of a binary between actual and ideal selves at the core of human nature. Which, as she further points out, was an "intensely Calvinistic" formulation that assumed "a condition of inner depravity," or a natural sinful self that had to be redeemed through cultivation and transformation over time.[434] However, as this ameliorative project was not just confined to the colonies, it suggests that the conception of inner depravity, and consequently the civilizing mission itself, was also not directed only to the colonies but was considered a universal project of human redemption. Conjoining an evangelical zeal with utilitarian endeavor was seen as the telos of modernity both for the colonies as well as the colonial center. Education, with language as the key medium of transmission, was believed to be the means of producing the new humans that would, in turn, allow the evolving and redemptive unfolding of history to manifest its rightful telos.

With an acute awareness that the colonial school system created subjects in the service of imperial interests, Ghaffar Khan states in an editorial in the July 1929 issue of the *Pukhtun*, "government schools do not really educate or make us humans but in fact create tools to run the machinery of the state." And because government education was conducted in English and Urdu it also produced alienated self-identities, so that he posits the local and vernacular education system as an oppositional space and the means to fashioning an autonomous people. In the same article, Ghaffar Khan goes on to laud, as he does tirelessly on many other occasions, the merits of a vernacular educational system and, in comparing government educational systems with local,

[434] Viswanathan, 18

vernacular ones, he clearly categorizes the former as a method of colonial hegemony and the latter as a mode of resistance. Although he clarifies that he also does not favor present-day local schools either, as they were religious seminaries that neither taught the true spirit of religion nor service to the nation, but instead were focused upon "logic" and "grammar," or abstruse argument and semantics. On the contrary, "*āsli t'lim*", or real education, as he declares, should not only include religious teachings but also modern topics about the world, both of which, he emphasizes, must be taught in the mother-tongue—as the local religious schools taught in Arabic as well. Ghaffar Khan passionately continues to expound, that children learn much more quickly if they are taught in their mother tongue, and the reason why the Pashtuns have not joined the ranks of successful nations of the world is that they are taught in Urdu and English and do not have a vernacular education system. His emphasis, therefore, is not only on language but also on particular kinds of curriculum, and unlike Macaulay's universalizing, global thrust, Ghaffar Khan envisioned this as a locally rooted system while situated in the global context of its times. With the curricula and administration completely self-determined, he concludes that the emphasis will be on the education of girls, which is much more important than educating boys because, "the mother's lap is the first madrassah."[435]

However, even in the early issues of the *Pukhtun* journal the question of education was being formulated in terms similar to the colonial endeavor: a refashioning of subjectivity to create particular kinds of humans in the service of the nation. It would seem that what Ghaffar Khan was advocating was not far from Macaulay's aspiration: the deliberate fashioning of a particular kind of modern subject that then becomes the building block for an imagined new community. In either case, education was depicted as a utilitarian means-ends endeavor, despite the fact that each was

[435] *Pukhtun*, July 1929, 25

desiring different kinds of ends. The obvious question that arises is whether one kind of discourse has any ethical advantage over the pragmatism of the other? Or, in other words, how different is the colonial endeavor from the indigenous one? Does the ethical end of self-determination, and the social transformation of one's own community, absolve the utilitarian means through which such an aspiration is realized? In short, does the refashioning of ones' own community make the ends of education moral even if the means are conceived in utilitarian terms? Or is this a false dichotomy embedded in the philosophical ground that engenders the modern, and which the ideology of nonviolence attempted to transcend by incorporating utility into the framework of the moral?

Instead, could one define the KK call for education as part of the matrix of modernity without collapsing this call only into a derivative discourse of colonialism? If the telos of modernity is conceived not merely as the civilizing process of colonialism but rather is broadened beyond this narrow perspective—and perhaps even beyond merely a temporal unfolding—then other discourses can be said to overlap, parallel or have different ends yet still be part of the episteme of modernity, or what Johannes Fabian posits as the "co-evalness" of different modernities.[436] Other modernities that have been silenced by the hegemonic discourse of Occidentalism because they surpass its epistemological framework, whilst, nevertheless, impelled by it also. As such, the global call for education could be situated within the episteme of modernity, or what Norbert Elias' describes as its "civilizing process" rather than being defined as derivative colonial discourse. Alternatively, it would be more accurate to situate this discourse at the intersections of colonial epistemology and indigenous cosmologies or what Walter Mignolo calls "border thinking."

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[436] Fabian, Johannes. *Time and the Other : How Anthropology Makes Its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

Elias describes the civilizing process as an undirected, individual self-regulation that increasingly takes place as societies become more complex and a "great formative pressure on the psychic habitus of 'civilized' people" occurs because vast networks of differentiated functions now become far more interdependent than in simpler societies. The "monopolization of physical force" allows for this pacified civilizing process to unfold while the "necessities of this network"[437] further inhibit instinctive drives and spontaneous desires. Elias states that not only are economic forces responsible for creating the pressures of transforming human subjectivity but those propulsions working in conjunction with the political create the environment for the civilizing, yet violent, processes to unfold. As he states:

> When a monopoly of force is formed, pacified social spaces are created which are normally free from acts of violence. The pressures acting on individual people within them are of a different kind than previously. Forms of non-physical violence that always existed, but hitherto had always been mingled or fused with physical force, are now separated from the latter; they persist in a changed form internally within the more pacified societies. They are visible so far as the standard thinking of our time is concerned as types of economic violence.[438]

In Elias's definition, instead of constant expressions of physical violence, systemic violence through economic means now becomes the hallmark of modernity. These systems create the pressure not only to self-regulate but to form particular kinds of subjects. However, Elias' formulation of how these man-made forces impinge upon peoples and produce particular kinds of "modern" societies seems like a teleological unfolding of time also, or a natural evolutionary process. As he insists, the civilizational process is an unconscious yet inevitable process, not directed by an individual or an ideological rational process aimed at particular ends. While Elias' formulation of this inevitable thrust of time, or of social forces structured over time, is a

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[437] Elias, Norbert. *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*. (Blackwell Publishing:1994), 368

[438] Elias, 369

progressive, linear and inexorable model, the propulsion of which has more in common with the Hegelian Spirit as the telos of History. While "violence" is also conceived as a natural condition that is embedded into or is an innate aspect of life which are now reorganized and controlled through social means. However, even though he states that the thrust of modernity and its universal civilizing mission "is everywhere the same,"[439] yet somehow also, it only impinges upon more "complex societies" or, in other words, this unconscious force of history is limited only to the telos of the West. While "simple" societies remain outside the perimeters of this modern impingement, making it hard to see how these are universal descriptive principles of modernity unless one relegates great swathes of societies outside the episteme of modernity itself.

As Dipesh Chakrabarty argues in *Provincializing Europe*, if modernity presupposes the traditional then the modern is not the sole hallmark of colonialism or of Europe but a particular epistemic framework within which many discourses also have to be recognized. As Chakrabarty points out, "historicism as a mode of thought" was not only the central aspect of the "ideology of progress" but it enabled the "European domination of the world." By positioning itself as the originator of a universal modernity, Europe was then burdened with the task of spreading it globally which legitimated its civilizing mission in its colonies. Chakrabarty defines "historicism" as, "the theory that social and cultural phenomenon are historically determined and that each period in history has its own values that are not directly applicable to other epochs."[440] As such, although Elias defines modernity through certain parameters posited as universal and inevitable, nevertheless, his historicist conception of modernity is derived in large part from the same

[439] Elias, 380

[440] This is a quote from Ian Hacking in, Chakrabarty, Dipesh. *Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton Studies in Culture/power/history. Princeton, N.J. 6-7, 23.

epistemological framework as colonial discourse with its central conception of civilization as an inevitable unfolding of history.

Walter Mignolo explains that Western expansion since the sixteenth century has not just been an economic and religious one, but more crucially, an "expansion of hegemonic forms of knowledge." [441] And even though "Western cosmology is the historically unavoidable reference point," as Mignolo states, "border thinking" or "border gnosis" offers "new critical horizons" to these "hegemonic cosmologies."[442] Shaped by, what Mignolo terms, the encounter with "colonial difference," border thinking and subaltern epistemologies arise out of this encounter yet are oppositional to it and outside its framework of knowledge. Mignolo deliberately uses the word "gnosis" to denote subaltern knowledges produced outside of the epistemological framework of existent "cultures of scholarship" yet, nevertheless, at its "conflictive intersections."[443] So that border gnosis, or border thinking, are ways of knowing that take place at the borders of the colonial difference, and, more crucially, even though they are alternate knowledges that have been subjugated or rendered invisible by hegemonic frameworks, they nevertheless are situated "within the imaginary of the modern world system."[444]

If within the imaginary of "the modern world system" there are other "coeval" narratives that have to be recognized, including subaltern knowledges at the intersections and margins of dominant narratives, then the space of the "modern" is far broader than has hitherto been categorized. Included within this framework would have to be the reformatory Muslim discourse of rights, subjugated and silenced narratives, but also narratives of resistance against this

[441] Mignolo, Walter. *Local Histories/Global Designs*: *Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking.* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), ix
[442] Mignolo, x
[443] Mignolo, 9, 11
[444] Mignolo, 23

hegemonic framework, including or especially, patriarchal structures of organizing ways of being in the world. Foremost, would be subaltern and seemingly inconsequential modes of local resistance, such as KK women and their resistance against local mechanisms of oppression, amongst others. Which is not to argue for an incorporative definition of the modern—or of incorporation into existing definitions and understandings of the modern largely formulated by the temporal exceptionalism of the Occident—but rather to broaden the horizons of what is included within the category of the "modern." It stands to reason, that all historically coeval events and narratives would be located within the same episteme (co-habiting and not necessarily homogenous) once an essentializing temporal imaginary or a linear, (social) evolutionary conception is discarded. Especially once the racist contours of a, linear temporal model of modernity are recognized, with its categories of "backward," "exotic," "primitive," "barbaric," "traditional" etc., that are used as comparative markers of otherness, yet which also define the "modern." In contrast, by expanding the unique complexity of the imaginary of the "modern," other frameworks of interpretation and ways of being are disclosed that may yet alter the understanding and definition of what it is, even if they have been tangentially produced, or foregrounded, by an encounter with colonial difference.

Perhaps the *poiesis* of modernity is largely to fashion subjectivity for particular ideological ends with the humanization (or civilization) of the human given as its justificatory ideal. However, it would be reductive to collapse the colonial civilizing mission with the nationalist calls for reformation and anti-colonial autonomy, despite the fact that "education" was one of the prime cogs in both systems of fashioning new, modern humans. While it would be accurate to say that the impetus for such ideological—and even technological—fashioning that replaced more organic and indigenous modes of cultivating subjectivity was provided by the

colonial encounter, the ends of appropriation versus the aspiration for self-sovereignty does, in the end, differentiate imperial mechanisms from anti-colonial nationalisms. Even if the latter is, in many cases, a "derivative discourse" and adopts the epistemological and ontological structures of the colonial state in its postcolonial nation-state incarnations. However, in some cases, like the KK initiative and its ideology of nonviolence it also posits a "third way" and a decolonizing methodology as well. It would, therefore, be more productive to describe initiatives, such as their call for universal education, as "border thinking" located at the intersections of colonial difference and subaltern knowledge systems. Furthermore, and quite crucially, the epistemic frameworks from within which these discourses are generated, the languages through which they are articulated, and the alternate future trajectories they aspire towards differentiates them from the discourses generated from within the "coloniality of power."

The Chained and Shackled Body: Islam and Pashtun Jəhāləyâ

Much like the broader nationalist movements globally, women's body and spirit becomes the signifier of the modern nation, but unlike the formulation of the inner/outer dichotomy in which the inner, and by extension the women's domain, was a marker of an essential Indian spirit, in the KK women's discourse it was this very inner domain that was the site of contestation. Although they also posit that the inner domain reflects the essential core of the nation, however, it is precisely this space that needs to be reformulated and opened out into the public sphere; in transcending, or transmuting, the violence perpetrated in this inner domain by the norms of local patriarchy that it becomes a signifier for an authentic embodiment of nonviolence in the public sphere. In other words, despite the physical segregation of male and female bodies the material intersects the spiritual in this discourse: the material body, specifically women's bodies, signify either an

emancipated or a shackled national spirit. In an almost inverse notion of the Hegelian State, which is the necessary (pre) condition for the perfection of the Human Spirit and the unfolding telos of History, in the KK women's discourse it is the human spirit encased within the (female) body that will generate a progressive, modern community of people; the material realm has to be reconstituted first in order to fashion the spirit of the nation or community. In the women's discourse, it is precisely the degradation and segregation of the material that deprives the nation of its spirit, disallowing the Pashtun community to take its rightful place amongst the global league of nations and the unfolding telos of modernity.

The metaphors for this material-spiritual subjugation that repetitively reoccur in the women's literature are the chained, shackled and imprisoned woman's body. In the January 1939 issue of the *Pukhtun*, Noor Jehan Begum, writes a poem titled, "A sister's tears," which makes the chained and imprisoned body the central marker of the Pashtun habitus. As she states in the first and second *shirs* of this *nazm*:

lâ qəwmi dərd kâ zṛgəy həmeyš dəlgyr dəy zmā
wkṛmâ câ də kūr pâ jəyl kəy ẗən āsyr dəy zmā

My pain for my nation is my heart's constant companion
What can I achieve in the prison of my home where my body is confined

də zənānū bəy'lmi zmūnġ də qəwm səfəẗ dəy
źəkā čāpəyr lâ lāsū pxū jəhl zənźəyr dəy zmā

Women's ignorance is a tribute to our nation
And why chains of ignorance are wrapped around my hands and feet

Noor Jehan points to the reoccurring motif of partitioned Pashtun homes as the site of women's physical incarceration, where the zenana or women's quarters are completely segregated from the outer public, male space, or the *hujra*. So that here, the private/public is not only represented by the home and the world, but the home itself is divided into the inner, segregated women's

quarters and the outer, male quarters in which the public sphere intersects. Expressed through the architecture of private spaces, women's bodies are further imprisoned in this inner sanctum alongside with Pashtun traditions, so that even in the home women are relegated to a sphere in which their acts or voices do not resonate beyond the four walls of their quarters. Noor Jehan further imputes that such partitioning of the private from the public disenfranchises the means by which women can affect their own emancipation but also, this confinement subjugates not just their body and spirit but that of the nation as well.

In the second *shir* Noor Jehan challenges the notion that the KK want, on the one hand, to create a modern nation as part of a global community, while on the other, continue to foster such traditions of oppression. With a word play on "jail" and "*jəhl*," or ignorance, the lack of women's education signifies this oppression that shackle hands and feet with the fetters of ignorance; or the fetters of tradition deliberately forged to keep woman in that condition. Noor Jehan continues with these metaphors in the sixth and eighth shirs of the poem:

> *də həkūməẗ məjrəmān həm āxr də jəyl nā xlās šəy*
> *pâ žwənd məy nəšẗâ dəy xlāsəy čəy câ ẗəqsəyr dəy zmā*
>
> Even government convicts are finally set free from jail
> I wonder what my crime is that there is no freedom in my lifetime
>
> *pâ pāk qurān kəy pābəndəy pâ ẋəźū dāsəy nəšẗâ*
> *dəğâ də lās nâ də zāləm jəhl ẗūwqəyr dəy zmā*
>
> There are no such restraints upon women in the holy Quran
> Around my hands are the fetters of this cruel ignorance[445]

The reference to government imprisonment is an obvious allusion to the ongoing and constant imprisonment of KK members, especially of Ghaffar Khan. Noor Jehan declares, that even this

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[445] Shah, 163-164

constant and unjust incarceration finally comes to an end, whereas, women's confinement is a culturally sanctioned life-long sentence. What is even more telling, and is a theme that constantly reoccurs in the women's writings also, is how these cultural norms are equated with the pre-Islamic cultures of Arabia. References to "*jəhl,*" or ignorance, point to the pre-Islamic period referred to, in Islamic historiography, as the age of ignorance or "*jəhāləyâ*." As mentioned earlier, the ideology of nonviolence is formulated as an enlightenment that is powerfully affecting reform in Pashtun culture analogous to how Islam reformed an ignorant and oppressive Arab culture. But it is the focus on the body—the fetters around hands and feet—that evokes a suffocating physical sense of life-long internment—or what Sarkar called a sense of "spatial claustrophobia" in reference to Tagore's depiction of women's segregation in *Home and the World*. The female body thus becomes not only the marker of such suffocatingly oppressive traditions but also of its enlightenment and reformation. Furthermore, the poetic metaphors of chains, shackles and fetters are in themselves deployed as affects bringing about such change.

Even male discourse deploys the metaphors of chaining and imprisonment when arguing in defense of women's emancipation. In an editorial written in the October 1940 issue of the journal titled, "Pashtun women and their service to the nation," the anonymous author states that, "around the feet [of women] are wrapped chains of mistaken honor" which imprisons them in their homes. Until the time, as the author continues to argue, that women "stand shoulder to shoulder" with men in the public sphere, and men in turn "befriend women," the political condition of the nation can never improve. Blaming traditional norms upon a process steeped in ignorance, the author states that Pashtun women are not considered humans but rather a kind of animal that is kept inside a cage; "she cannot step outside her house, cannot talk loudly, cannot publish her writings" so that, the author asks, "one has to wonder whether this is the decree of

religion, and if this is just, or even if this is humane?" While ignorant notions of honor disallow them to come out in public even though "it is considered obligatory for a rich woman to go for Haj, to get an education, to say her Friday prayers," then why, the author asks rhetorically, "is it considered a sin for her to step outside her house? Why is it either the house or then the grave for women?"[446]

The claustrophobic sense of the interred woman's body that is serving a life-sentence in the prison of the segregated zenana quarters is directed against the fundamental tenets of (male) honor in Pashtun culture, and their idealized notions of the chaste, veiled and cloistered female body. It is these conceptual notions of honor and chastity that were being affectively questioned through depictions of fetters, shackles and prisons, equated not with notions of honorable norms but with unenlightened and oppressive ignorance. The logic of this affective argument suggested that in order for a community to flourish and have the moral strength to become autonomous, a new set of enlightened norms had to be adopted with women's physical condition serving as a marker of its successful or failed adoption. As Butler points out, norms act as an "implicit standard of normalization" and as such they have a double nature that can be deployed in opposition or to maintain the status quo: by compelling a "respect for life" nonviolence opposes and undermines normative violence, but also, on the other hand, "normativity refers to the process of normalization, the way that certain norms, ideas, and ideals hold sway over embodied life and provide coercive criteria for normal "men" and "women.""[447] It is precisely the norms that hold sway over customary life that were being foregrounded, questioned and affectively opposed by the poetic metaphors of bondage and articulations of inegalitarianism.

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[446] *Pukhtun,* October 1940, 11-13
[447] Butler: "The Question of Social Transformation" Counterpoints, Vol 242, women & social transformation (2001), pp. 1-28, pg. 18 and 3

If the normative values and the inegalitarian spirit of Pashtun traditions were burying women alive then reformation was aimed at norms that sanctioned such customs. They particularly questioned norms that essentialized gender roles; the critique of cultural practices that denoted appropriate and "natural" behaviors for women implies such an interrogation. Moreover, although they do not discuss KK ideology overtly, it, nevertheless, allowed them to critique and displace *rəwāj* or tradition, with the new norms that it was generating. The analogical comparison with Islam further imbued these new norms with the requisite gravitas to affect change, especially entrenched traditions that devalued the feminine. In this narrative, Islam is posited as a progressive, modernizing force, one that originally transformed the medieval and backward Quraysh—or the tribe to which the Prophet Mohammed belonged—into a radically new form of communal organization that bestowed rights and liberties upon women that had been denied them prior to it. And, as the women argue, because their lives are similar to the pre-Islamic age of ignorance or *jəhāləyâ*, in which female infants were regularly buried alive, the KK had to reform Pashtun culture and change its moral compass in the same way. That the ideology of nonviolence was imbued with a similar moral authority as Islam was never questioned, and the fact that it was accepted as such becomes evident that the practice of nonviolence through a Muslim framework was not considered a radically controversial idea. As such, critique situated in this framework could successfully question and reformulate long held traditions without arousing large-scale ire, and it was able to persuade people to adopt the new norms that were being solicited. Therefore, the analogy between Pashtun traditions and the dark age of pre-Islamic Arabia became a potently effective framework of critique.

An anonymously written article published in one of the first issues the *Pukhtun*, titled, "A sister's lament," states that the Pashtuns are far worse than the *kāfirs* of Arabia, and praises the

Quyrash for killing their daughters as soon as they were born—a praise that reoccurs with disturbing regularity in the KK women's writings. Because, according to this writer, this was a merciful act in comparison with the constant suffering that a Pashtun woman had to undergo each and every day of her life. This suffering is attributed, once again, to Pashtun customs, but with the added onerousness that any means or methods that could liberate women from this life of misery, such as education, are also deemed shameful. The writer goes on to lament, that women are neither allowed an education nor are they given their rightful inheritance, and rhetorically asks her readers that if the former is considered shameful why is the latter right also denied them when it carries no stigma of shame.[448] Thus, the writer concludes, any means that make women independent from the male members of their families, either economic or intellectual, are considered dishonorable, because men want to remain their guardians and benefactors for life.

However, in pitting religion against *rəwāj* there is a particular kind of modern, reformist Islam and concept of agency that these writers are tacitly calling upon. The oft citied exemplars of such progressive Muslim practices, and the emancipation of women within an Islamic framework, were Afghanistan under King Amanullah and Queen Soraya and Ataturk's modernist reforms in Turkey. From the start of the journal there were several articles explaining and defending the secular and modern nation that King Amanullah was creating in Afghanistan, for which he was condemned both by religious zealots as well as many in the tribal areas. He was especially stigmatized for his liberal views on women and religion, which, quite interestingly, gets included with criticism against his attempts to impose a uniform national tax. An article titled "Afghanistan," published in the December 1928 issue, reports that the Shinwaris, (a tribe largely residing in the TT), were opposing King Amanullah because, they were saying, he

[448] *Pukhtun*, April 1929, 31

"destroys mosques" and "has unveiled women." However, the article explains, the tribals were not only accusing him falsely but were doing so to hide the real reasons for their opposition: Amanullah was demanding that they pay many years-worth of back-taxes. In order to dispel popular misconceptions about the monarch to the readers of the *Pukhtun* journal the writer quotes from Amanullah's speeches. In one of the quotes, Amanullah professes his faith as a Muslim, followed by the caveat that he will not impose his own faith on anyone else and that everyone was free to practice their beliefs, or their *'əqiydâ*, as they chose; in defense of women's education, the King states: "it is our duty to educate boys as well as girls—even though they are different, like the fingers on a hand. All of us have grown up in their laps, so how is it right that we (men) now leave them behind? We have to take care of them and think about schools for girls. My government is ready to do this at all times. It is important to do what God and the Prophet have said."[449]

Thus, in deploying the rhetoric of an authentic Islam, and in making the Afghan monarch an exemplar of such practice, the author in fact interprets religion not only through a modernist lens but one that ascribes individual agency to the practitioner 's choices. By pointing out that religious zealots and archaic tribal practices cannot grasp the progressive nature of Islam, or remain willfully ignorant of it because it serves their hypocritical and utilitarian ends, the article wants to make the case for adopting norms counter to this interpretive lens. But the important shift that this discourse is tacitly positing is that religious belief is not a given imbibed unthinkingly through one's cultural context, but rather it is a matter of choice. The writer maintains that how religion is interpreted is a matter of individual and ideological choice, and, therefore, a socially determined construct.

[449] Mian Ahmed Shah: "Afghanistan" in the *Pukhtun* December 1928, pp. 5-16, 14

In the name of defending Islam, the tribes were instigated to rise up against Amanullah who was eventually dethroned and the pro-British ruler King Habibullah was installed in his place. The uprising and much of the propaganda against the King were largely believed to have been instigated by British imperial interests not only to counter Amanullah's modernist reforms but especially against his attempts to establish an independent foreign policy that was steering Afghanistan out of the British sphere of influence. This was further exacerbated after Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed a "Treaty of Friendship" in 1921 and, in the name of unifying the Afghan nation, Amanullah attempted to establish his influence over the tribal territories on the British side of the Durand Line. However, it was the King's secular notions of religion, and the unveiled figure of Queen Soraya—who not only wore Western dress but actively championed women's education and emancipation from Pashtun traditions—that were used as reasons to incite the overthrow of his monarchy.

Turkey under Ataturk, as well as Egypt, Iran and Iraq, became the other exemplars in the *Pukhtun* journal of nations that had undergone the necessary modernizing reformation through a modern, emancipatory framework of Islam. Nations in which women had been given their due rights in accord with Islamic law were held up as signifiers of these progressive new modes of constructing the socio-political, and which the Pashtuns ought to emulate. Syeda Bushra Begum's writings especially crafted Islam not only into a reformatory weapon against tradition but she this formulation is grounded upon the implicit assumption that individual agency determines what kind of interpretations—both of Islam and tradition—one adopts. As she states in another famous poem of hers published in the Nov 1938 issue of the *Pukhtun*: "I do not see in Iran, Egypt, Iraq or Turkey/The veil that chains my hands and feet today." Fiercely defending the liberties being demanded by Pashtun women as within the purview of the Shariah and not, as

they were being accused of by religious bigots, outside its framework or merely an imitation of Western feminism, she also throws down the gauntlet against those who were passing *fatwas* against King Amanullah, Ataturk, Ghaffar Khan and the women writing against women's *purdah*. She declares: "I am telling you clearly…we are ready (to accept)" the decree declaring us nonbelievers practicing *kufur* because, "Kamal Ataturk and [the] others are very dear to us."[450]

She scathingly criticizes Pashtun culture in the poem, "a few verses," the first shir of which I use as the epigraph for this chapter. Published in the January 1940 issue of the *Pukhtun,* the poem, once again, pits religion against *rəwāj* but with the tacit presumption that it is open to change if there is a recognition that it was a matter of choice and, as such, a social construct. In the last shir of the poem she declares: "By the great commands in the Quran/I announce that traditions should be banished." However, she calls upon a particularly modern reformist religiosity, one that is suffused with puritanical zeal that can interpret the "true" spirit of Islam through a "hermeneutics of suspicion." An Islam, SBB declares, that was originally practiced by the Prophet Mohammad, and not one that was in the service of substantiating archaic traditions or those articulated from the Mullah's pulpit. This true spirit, according to her poems, (as well as other KK writings—notably Ghaffar Khan himself), would emancipate women from a religion that was merely in the service of upholding brutal cultural traditions. As she states in the seventh and eighth shirs of the same poem:

> *də ẗurkūw ṭuwl źəlmən biydār dəy*
> *čay həy biydāry məyndəy ğəyġ kəy lūyūynâ*
>
> All the sons of Turkey have become enlightened
> Because they grow up in enlightened mother's laps
>
> *ẗurk də məzhəb pābəndâ nâ dəy*

[450] Shah, 148 (from the *Pukhtun,* Nov 1938, 34)

mūnġ pukhṫānâ pâ dəyn məzhub kṛū ğayrəṫūnâ

The Turks are not bound by religion
We Pashtuns make religion and faith a matter of honor.[451]

Although the last shir seems ambivalent and almost critical of religion in general, the earlier shirs in this poem, as well as her other poetry, make such a reading unsustainable. Instead the critique is directed at the honor-bound notions of Pashtun culture, specifically those that make religiosity a matter of public display and tie it with notions of masculine honor. An authentic belief and an "enlightened" understanding of Islam, SBB is tacitly positing, would affect inner subjectivity.

Women liberating themselves

The colonial authorities banned the *Pukhtun* from 1940 to 1945 because of the KK (and the AICC's) pacifist stand against India's inclusion in World War II. When the journal was relaunched, one of the most prolific post-war contributors was Alif Jan Khattak, who continued the earlier discourse on incarcerated bodies and the metaphors for being buried alive, only this time the rhetoric was directed against women who reiterate patriarchal traditions themselves.[452] Born in a village in Kohat, NWFP in 1931, she won several accolades well as personal visits from Ghaffar Khan who praised both her poetry and rebellious spirit, she twice won the competition that the journal held on the best *məzmūn* against women's *purdah*, or veiling in 1945 and again the following year. Forced to go into *purdah* in her teens, nevertheless, Alif Jan made herself into an example of the change she was constantly urging other women to undertake and

[451] *Pukhtun,* January 1940, 33
[452] In comparison with prior articles which laid the blame for women's condition solely on men such as an article, "Our women's condition," by Majida Begum in one of the first issues of the *Pukhtun* journal. In this article she states that it is the men's responsibility to give women their rights because they ultimately control women's lives and, therefore, education is also a prerogative that they have to bestow. (*Pukhtun* December 1928, 40)

educated herself at home, earning a double Masters in Pashto and Urdu. Although she was married she soon left her husband and returned back to her home to teach at the local schools. She retired from formal teaching in her mid-sixties but continues till today to teach girls in her family and community. The village and area to which she belongs has one of the highest literacy rates, both for boys and girls, in the Province. However, when I visited her in May 2017 and asked her whether all her literary resistance against the veil had any tangible effect on her life she responded that even after she was an independent, older woman, the habit of *purdah* was so deeply entrenched in and around her that she could not in fact give up wearing the veil. And although all the younger generation of girls in her family were educated, and some were employed in outside jobs, they also continue to maintain *purdah*.[453]

Alif Jan's poetry speaks to how normative values had not shifted enough to make the altered subject the norm rather than an exception. In the first three *shirs* of a very long poem titled "An Appeal to Pashtun Girls", Alif Jan writes:

rāšâ rāšâ də sərhad pukhtanəy jələy
čay də ğəm xəbərəy wkṛū yuw ťər bələy

Come, come young Pashtun girls of the Frontier
Let's talk about our sorrows one with the other

pâ ēimān wāyâ pâ kūm ḍəyrān ūwdâ wəy
də āzəl pâ wrəź čay bərxəy wəyšəydləy

On which rubbish-heap are you sleeping, say truthfully
On judgement day when blame is apportioned

də eūrəp xəźəy pâ šišmāhəl kəy awəsəy
ťâ nāzəyġəy də ğwāyiānū pâ ğuwjələy

The women of Europe are living in grand palaces
Yet you feel pride about the cows in your stables[454]

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[453] In a personal interview with Alif Jan Khattak at her home in the village of Ahmadi Banda in Kohat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 7th May 2017

[454] Shah, 220 (From *Pukhtun* Feb 1946, 2)

The address is specifically directed at the young girls of the Province who as readers, or, if they were illiterate, as listeners to the oral recitation of the journal, would be invested in the KK movement in some fashion and, therefore, form a community aspiring towards progressive change. However, the call to "talk about our sorrows one with the other" is not just addressed to a community of women sharing past and present sorrows but is especially directed towards to a future condition emancipated from such norms. The past and present consist of the humiliating subjugation of tradition, one that relegates Pashtun women to the detritus of their society or to an inhuman existence, but the future is envisioned as a collective form of *bildung*. It is interesting that the non-human abodes which women generally tended, rubbish heaps and cow pens, are contrasted with the seeming ease and splendor of European women's lives, even though quite often the women's poetry deliberately distances itself from Western feminist concepts. Nevertheless, this *misra* testifies to an awareness of European feminism's influence as does the conscious desire to differentiate themselves from it. As their writings further testify, they were very much aware of their global context and consider their own plight a part of it—and nonviolence a global solution—not only through their colonial context, but more so through Ghaffar Khan and other KK discourse in the journal. This discourse, in turn, must have been effected by the robust movements throughout the rest of India impelled by "the women's question," and particularly the reforms that Afghanistan, Turkey and Egypt were undertaking on behalf of women's emancipation.[455]

[455] As Ghaffar Khan mentions in his Pashto Autobiography, he along with other KK members were deeply affected by the number of "Hindu" women participating in an AICC rally they attended in Lahore, 1929. This, he states, was the catalyst for the formation of the KK movement, and as such, the participation of women in nationalist parity was central to its formation at the outset. See *zmā žwand āw jdow-jeẖd,* 354.

The future oriented emancipation and change which the young girls potentially signify was, as Alif Jan articulates, in the hands of the present generation of women; in the ninth and tenth *shirs* of the same poem she declares:

> *də duwzəẋ žwəndūn xuw ť̈â pâ źān qəbūl kṛū*
> *xpələy lūṇā jəhənəm ť̈â biyā həy wələy?*
>
> You have accepted the life of hell
> Why send your daughters there also?
>
> *khudāy də pārâ də t'lim zəyrmâ həy wkṛâ*
> *kâ pâ lūr də žwəndānâ məzâ āxləy*
>
> For god's sake take care of their education
> If you want your daughters to have a taste of life

Even though by 1940's the KK had achieved the minor victory of establishing schools and getting Pashtuns to send both their girls as well as their boys for a formal education—the problem was more about education in general and not limited to girls, because boys also would not be sent to schools after a certain age but put to work on the farms. The problem now was to make education an acceptable and mainstream part of society, foregrounded as it is, once again, as the means for change.[456]

In this poem the trope of the women's body as chained, shackled and buried alive reoccurs more strongly and repetitively than in the earlier poems, as the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth *shirs* articulate. However, the eighteenth *shir* is a clarion call directed to the future; a future wrested from resisting the norms of Pashtun culture. In contrast with the dehumanizing degradation that Alif Jan depicts in the earlier *shirs,* the desired future condition is equated with living an honorable life, and therefore, one that is worthy of a human being.

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[456] Mehr Sultan, who was amongst the first girls to be educated in Ghaffar Khan's Azad Schools, declares that the problem now was that there were not enough secondary schools for girls and that those who had completed their elementary education had no options to continue at a higher level. The only available choices were the government run schools, and those too were located in the major cities with hardly any in villages. *Pukhtun,* Nov 1938, 25-26.

tūq bəyṛəy āw həẗkəṛəy dəy wrlâ sāz kṛl
khudāy xbər pâ kūm qəsūr kəy dəy nəywələy

You've made necklaces shackles and handcuffs their music
God only knows what crime they are being caged for

də qərəyšū jəynəkəy lâ ẗâ nâ ẋəy wəy
pâ žwəndūnəy bâ plārānū ẋəxūwləy

The Quraysh girls were better off than yours
their father's would bury them while alive

pâ wāṛâ ʻmr kâ ẗâ wəy xūwrū lāndəy
pâ źwānəy kəy bâ čâ wələy xrčwuləy

you've been half under the earth since childhood
(and) sold in your youth at someone else's whim

rāšâ wušlwâ də ġāṛəy zənźəyrūnâ
kâ dənyā kəy də ʻzẗ bərxâ āxləy

Come and tear the chains from around your neck
If you want to spread the rays of honor in the world[457]

The signature hallmark of femininity in South Asia is a woman's jewelry, one that often jingles and creates its own resonant sound, but in this poem it is turned into the marks and sounds of bondage, and one which women choose to adorn themselves with quite proudly. Not only does Alif Jan rhetorically ask, why they do so and whether they have committed a crime to be so bound, but also why they choose to represent such bondage as adornment. Although she is pointing an accusing finger at traditional values that equates modesty, silence and the invisibility of women with the ideal female figure, to make the trope of bondage a scathing attack upon normative tradition, nevertheless, the fact that women choose to wear such marks of servitude quite proudly and collaborate with their own subjugation makes each woman not a helpless

[457] *Pukhtun*, February 1946, 2 (223W)

victim of tradition but one who now has agency. The thirteenth and fourteenth *shirs* refer again to the age of *jəhāləyâ*, and the Quraysh become a synonym for Pashtun patriarchy once more, but this time mothers are being accused of burying their young girls alive, both by example and by choice, when they uphold patriarchal norms.

In summation, the chained woman's body specifies both a material condition and becomes a marker for the subjugated Pashtun nation to make the implicit presumption that outer reality is a manifestation of an inner, subjective constitution. This dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal is also a presumption that grounds the ideology of nonviolence more broadly, but the women utilize the relationship to point out that because the veiled, private domain describes the Pashtun habitus much more tangibly, it is the necessary prerequisite for the change the ideology is seeking. In short, the inner becomes the conduit to an altered public sphere. However, constantly foregrounded in these writings, the subjective domain is never conceived as an intangible form of self-transformation, but rather a constant and performative inscription that material bodies have to undergo, which is why the "mother's lap" becomes the central site for these reinscriptions. With the rubric of "education" as the means for bringing about this dialectical inner-outer reorientation, or of enlightenment, its widespread adoption and acceptance especially for women, became the marker for the success of the radical change that was being pursued.

Moreover, in questioning the categories of identity, especially of normative gender roles, the KK women's discourse inserts their unveiled bodies into patriarchal traditions to loudly ask how, in denigrating and incarcerating women, an honorable, liberated and just new society can be created. Thus, the parallels they draw between the violence of colonial subjugation and patriarchy are not only cogent and ahead of its time but also illustrates that, although nonviolence

was hardly ever discussed, its premises, arguments, conclusions and applications seem to have been almost intuitively or tacitly understood. That the women's writings strikingly reveal this leads me to conclude, firstly, that nonviolence was already understood as an aspect of the local ethos—both of Pashtunwali and of Islam—even if it was never articulated in the exact terms of Gandhian *ahimsa*. Further, the women's discourse addresses the grounds of nonviolent transformation, namely the transformation of the subject. And finally, in having such an understanding, both of the philosophy of nonviolence and how to embody it, the women demonstrate its essentially quotidian character, one that is so prevalent in the everyday habitus of most societies that it is never recognized as such or granted the power that it exercises.

Chapter Four

Telling Tales of Another Kind: Ghani Khan and The Imaginary of Nonviolence

də bābā pukhtənū sẗrgow
wrtâ ūkṛəy qisəy nūrəy
Baba's Pukhtun eyes
told them tales of another kind[458]

In his dealings with the tribesmen the Englishman has always started with the 'Sermon on the Mount' and ended up with the high explosive bomb.[459]

Once elected to the Indian Legislative Assembly in February 1946 as its youngest member, and the sole representative of the North–West Frontier Province, Ghani Khan assumed a pedagogic role. His speeches in the Assembly denote a desire to demystify pervasive representations about the "Pathans" to the Parliamentarians that included a number of British members but were mainly other Indians at this stage in time. In other words, despite the fact that the KK were part of the AICC, "Pathans" continued to be represented as foreign and different even within the broader Indian nationalist context, so that he was addressing both the indigenous as well as the colonial frameworks of representation. These representations were, in many instances, deliberately cultivated and the suspicion, exoticism and essentialism with which the "Pathan" was denoted were considered natural and real—or racial givens—rather than pointers to a particular kind of socio-historical construct. As such, he assumed the role of interlocutor and translator in order to contextualize a reality that was unfamiliar to the members of the Assembly, who continued to regard the Pashtuns and their existent conditions with a great deal of suspicion.

[458] Ghani Khan, "*'ədm-e-ẗushdəd,"* or "nonviolence," *Latūn,* Peshawar: University Book Agency, 2005, 687. My translation from the original Pashto and the full poem, without transliteration, is included in the appendix.
[459] Imtiaz Ahmad Sahibzada, ed., *A Breath of Fresh Air: Speeches and Interventions of Abdul Ghani Khan in the Debates of the Central Legislative Assembly of India 1946-48*, (Islamabad: The Army Press), 10.

His desire to deconstruct the epistemological framework of "the figure of the Pathan" both drove this oppositional tongue-in-cheek critique whilst the same (colonial) framework also largely shaped him. Ghani Khan's confidence to take on the role of interlocutor between cultures—Indian, English and Pashtun—stemmed precisely from his colonial and cosmopolitan upbringing. Spending most of his childhood without any consistent parental guidance, as his mother had died when he was around five years old and his father was either tirelessly reforming his people or imprisoned by the colonial authorities because of it, Ghani Khan grew up quite eclectically in many places. He was initially educated in the vernacular Azad school system in his village, Charsadda, and as he was also well versed in Arabic and Islamic philosophy he considered becoming a theologian, influenced also by his father keenness on it as well. As such he enrolled in the Jamia Millia University at Delhi in 1927, but after spending a year studying Islamic theology his father sent for him to serve as a medic in the Afghan civil war of 1928.[460] At one point his British Aunt—Dr. Khan Sahib's wife—adopted him after she was appalled by the neglect with which Ghani Khan, and his siblings, were growing up. At fifteen Ghani Khan was then sent to England and, along with his formal education, he studied Christian theology while living in the home of an English priest for about a year and half. Later, he went to America to study chemical engineering at South Louisiana University, but his education was cut short yet again when his father was imprisoned in 1931 and the family assets were frozen. Temporarily adopted by Jawaharlal Nehru upon his return to India in a destitute condition, Ghani Khan lived with the family for about eight months and was sent, along with his "close friend" Indira

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[460] Shazia, Babar. *Strains of Romanticism in Abdul Ghani Khan & John Keats Poetry: A Comparative Study*. (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar, 2005), 41-2.

Priyadarshini, to Visva-Bharati University.[461] It was at Rabindranath Tagore's famous university at Shantiniketan in West Bengal that Ghani Khan trained as an artist while also learning about Eastern philosophies, histories and cosmologies alternate to the metaphysics of the West. Recalling his short but memorable time at the Academy, Ghani Khan states: "My stay in the West left many imprints on my psyche. I was deeply impressed by their society, culture and politics. When I came back I had an inferiority complex about the backwardness of my country and people. It was in the Shanti Niketan [sic] that I discovered myself and the past greatness of my own culture and civilisation, which has produced several men of versatile genius, who have been appreciated by the historians and scholars of the West."[462] Although Ghani Khan showed great promise as both a sculptor and a painter his education was cut short yet again by his father, who, upon visiting Shantiniketan told him to return home and serve his people "usefully" instead of wasting time by throwing various [paint] colors on paper.[463]

Although Ghani Khan had a somewhat contentious relationship with Ghaffar Khan throughout his life, he nevertheless followed his father's wishes more often than not, resulting in a fragmentary and inconsistent formal education, yet one which was also richly multifaceted. Thus, Ghani Khan was in the rather rare position of having the ability to translate idiosyncratic Pashtuns customs, linguistically and culturally, to a global audience and he could also point to how representations about them corresponded to, or were (starkly) different from, lived ways of being. Familiar with Western epistemologies he could also articulate his thoughts comfortably through that register and grasp the ideological lens through which they were interpreting the

[461] Indira Priyadarshini, later Mrs.Indira Gandhi, mentions "Ghani" quite conversationally in quite a few letters she writes to her father while at Shantineketan: *Freedom's Daughter: Letters between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 1922-39*. Edited by Sonia Gandhi, (London: Hodder & Stoughton,1989).
[462] Babar, *Strains of Romanticism in Abdul Ghani Khan & John Keats Poetry,* 48
[463] Ghani Khan interview for PTV, Part 2 (4:39) : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smDkGwrmIdA

East. However, except for his book *The Pathans,* written largely for a Western audience, and his Legislative Assembly speeches he hardly ever uses the language to express his deepest thoughts and wrote all his poetry in Pashto. Nevertheless, when he does use the language it is with deliberate irony and wit and foregrounds the very ideological representations and tropes whose hegemony he is contesting. His maiden speech to the Assembly gives voice to this and how he tried to deconstruct the tropology of the figure of the Pathan through this inimitable style:

> Just try and imagine our Province. We have a long stretch of area that is called the Settled Area. It is not usually very settled. It has a few towns and a moderate sort of business. After that you have the Political Agencies where the brown man is taught to worship the white god. His word is law, his pleasure heaven and his displeasure hell. Here the white man can play god in peace and comfort. Technically and legally these agency Pathans are supposed to be semi-free but literally they are the most terrible slaves in India…Between the districts and the Afghan territory there is that romantic belt called the Tribal Territory, a land of wild men and wild stories, a land which is in the habit of throwing up vicious *faqirs*, but usually at the right time and the right place. You find these gentlemen coming to the tribesmen and asking them in the name of Allah and for the sake of heaven to attack the British. At the end of the show the British always somehow or other mange to get a strategic pass or mountain and most of the poor Pathans get Heaven: they are killed. The tribal territory people are very nice except that they come and burn our villages, they murder us, they kidnap us, they burn our bazaars and carry away our brethren ever since the English have become masters of the Frontier and not before.[464]

It is telling (for a poet and artist) to enlist the power of the imagination in the desire to contextualize his people to the present and future lawmakers of India. This desire to deconstruct frameworks of othering was especially pressing both in the wake of the Bannu Riots, (that I detail in Chapter Two), in which the Hindu-Muslim discourse of difference was exaggerated in the North-West Frontier, and the ever-intensifying politics of partition was playing out nationally. Firstly, in foregrounding the invisible yet impregnable border between the "Settled"

[464] Sahibzada, *Speeches and Interventions of Abdul Ghani Khan,* 7-8.

and "Tribal" territories, Ghani Khan draws attention not only to the misnomers by which the areas were designated, but further he starkly highlights the romantically fictitious yet widely held picture of the Tribals as an autonomous people constantly and fiercely battling British domination.

By utilizing the trope of lawlessness he draws attention to the underlying causes that drove the tribesmen to constantly attack the "Settled" areas; due not just to physical privation but also instigated by the colonial government to create conditions of "structured chaos,"[465] this crucially served the ends of imperial governance. Moreover, he also undermines the trope of the "vicious *faqirs,*" who—to recall Kipling and Churchill's depictions of this tropological figure in Chapter One—appear, fortuitously, to serve colonial interests, especially the expansion of an ever-elastic frontier. Rather than popular depictions of the tribals as recalcitrant resistance fighters, Ghani Khan points out how heavily their lives are orchestrated by the Political Agent and the Frontier Crimes Regulations. And that these romantic depictions of independence occludes the reality of their oppression through the colonial juridical system and its enforcement by these particular officers who were accountable only to the Viceroy directly, a handful of senior colonial officials in the central government and not the provincial one. As Ghani Khan elucidates, the colonial government had "machine-gunned them, burnt their crops with phosphorous bombs, mowed down their cattle and confiscated thousands of acres of their good land." However, as he ironically points out, this would logically lead one to believe that the tribesmen would exact vengeance upon the British yet the frequent raids into the settled areas

[465] This phrase is used by Eyal Weizman in his book *Hollow Land*, about the Palestinian Occupied Territories. It is a description that can easily be used to describe the present day conditions in the Tribal Territories of Pakistan. In the book Weizman states: "The spatial organization of the Occupied Territories is a reflection not only of an ordered process of planning and implementation, but, and increasingly so, of 'structured chaos', in which the—often deliberate—selective absence of government intervention promotes an unregulated process of violent dispossession. The actors operating within this frontier…with the differences and contradictions of their aims, all play their part in the diffused and anarchic, albeit collective authorship of its spaces." (Verso, 2007, 5)

target the locals residents and not the British who “is surely worth his weight in gold” on that side of the border. Implying, once again, that these dacoities were orchestrated by the colonial government to foster the desired conditions of “structured chaos.”

However, Ghani Khan was not merely engaging in a diatribe against colonial rule as such, but rather this speech as well as others I will look at in this chapter, are formulating a deeper critique: the fact that the law, especially colonial law, stands in opposition to justice (and freedom), signals a more fundamental problem with the “law” than its establishment through violent organizational systems; rather, the institutional system is structured precisely by utilizing this fundamental flaw. The unceasing surveillance and policing of the Tribal Territories by the juridical institutions of the colonial government, with the Political Agent as its representative, illustrates the state of exception to which the tribal people were constantly relegated. In other words, the law was used to relegate a people outside the bounds of the law.

In another Legislative Assembly speech Ghani Khan gives voice to the opposition between freedom and the law: “any kind of law is an interference in individual freedom” and, moreover, “law is a surrender of liberty, a really free man is a man without any law.” And he points to the ground which makes the outlaw a Romantic trope because it represents a figure free from the unnatural constraints of society, and although the tribal people are represented as an independent people, free to follow their own “lawless” ways of life, Ghani khan keeps highlighting how that is in fact not the case. This also foregrounds the rift between the polis and life which modern society has constructed; a rift between human nature as a biological given one the one hand, and socio-political constructs of the law that produce violence at the heart of

modern state structures, on the other: "Brutality is the very core of modern society," as Ghani Khan sums up.[466]

Homo Sacer and the State of Exception

Carl Schmitt's definition of a state of exception, as Giorgio Agamben's elucidates, is a subject or a space that is sanctioned by the law to lie outside the bounds of the law; an exclusion that allows the Sovereign to police and even kill those in a state of exception with impunity. However, according to Agamben, Schmitt's "friend/enemy" binary is not the categorical pair defining Western politics, instead, it is "bare life/political existence" or the bifurcation between "*zoē/bios*, exclusion/inclusion." Tracing the Greek exclusion of bare life or "*zoē*" from the realm of the political, or from "bios," Agamben points out that this exclusion veils the fact that the human being—in the state of nature—is already part of the political by the very structure of the exclusion. The (political) human defines itself by the exclusion of its (animal) life and politics comes into being when the human "separates and opposes himself to his own bare life." This separation, exclusion and opposition becomes the ontological ground of Western metaphysics.[467] Extending Schmitt's formulation of the state of exception to the individual subject, Agamben formulates the "*homo sacer:*" an originary sacred man who is excluded from the political and the laws of the state through the sovereign ban; or a citizen-subject stripped of rights and protections and relegated to the status of "bare-life." Excluded from the polis and dehumanized to the status of *zoē, homo sacer* is the figure of the outlaw whose murder/killing does not constitute a crime.

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[466] Sahibzada, *Speeches and Interventions of Abdul Ghani Khan*, 184 & 121.
[467] Agamben, Giorgio, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford University Press, 1998, 8.

Yet, as Agamben also argues, *homo sacer* may also be an "autonomous figure" that points to "an originary political structure that is located in a zone prior to this binary framework in which the political transcended life, and was defined against it, and there was not the distinction between the sacred and the profane, religious and juridical."[468] Or put another way, as an autonomous figure, the figure of the outlaw may be evocative and romantic precisely because it discloses this prior structure and foregrounds the contradiction at the heart of the political (and of the law) structured as it is in opposition to life. As Agamben continues to explain, because the outlaw is relegated back to the state of nature outside the bounds of the polis, it also, thereby, presents itself as the "limit sphere of human action" and of the law. Additionally, as the sovereign can declare this limit at any time and in any place, the state of exception further discloses that the threat of violence at the heart of the political is not merely an exception but the rule.[469]

> Let us now observe the life of *homo sacer*…his entire existence is reduced to a bare life stripped of every right by virtue of the fact that anyone can kill him without committing homicide; he can save himself by perpetual flight or in a foreign land. And yet he is in continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death. He is pure *zoē*, but his *zoē* is as such caught in the sovereign ban and must reckon with it at every moment finding the best way to elude or deceive it. In this sense, no life, as exiles and bandits know well, is more "political" than his.[470]

Through this very exclusion, therefore, the figure of the outlaw is more politicized than the citizen-subject of the state and, as such, reveals the essential structures of the political. As a

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[468] Agamben, 74

[469] Derrida makes the same argument in reference to Schmitt in *The Politics of Friendship*. He further argues that the state of exception is not just the rule but that it also discloses the essence of the political, 127-28.

[470] Agamben, 183-84.

liminal figure on the threshold, the outlaw or *homo sacer,* also exposes the limits of state laws, and, like all border zones, it is subject to the harshest of policing.

Agamben illustrates his definition of a state of exception with the specifically modern phenomenon of the concentration camp, not only to trace the parallels between democracy and totalitarianism, but to point out how the specificity of the land, namely the nation, superimposed by the ordering mechanisms of the State, exemplifies "the political space of modernity itself."[471] However, he does not attribute the antecedents of this modern spatial ordering to global European colonialism but mentions it only in passing, and that also in the context of the English herding the Boers into concentration camps at the beginning of the century.[472] Apart from this brief pointer, there is no reference to a phenomenon that ushered in the age of modernity and which continues to order the contemporary world. A fact which even Hannah Arendt, whom he constantly references, acknowledges in great detail in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Arendt also, much more cogently, points out that one of the permanent functions of the nation-state, as a derivative of the colonial state, becomes the constant expansion of capitalistic power and the power to rationally organize space, both of which have antecedents in imperialist expansion and domination.[473] Moreover, the colonial state structure and its spatial ordering was produced by "the state's instruments of violence, the police and the army."[474] Rather than being subservient tools of the state, these instruments of violence represent in the colonies, as Arendt declares, the enactment of a new kind of imperialist political philosophy in which the novel feature "is not the predominate place it gave to violence," but that "violence administered for power's (and not for law's) sake turns into a destructive principle that will not stop until there is nothing left to

[471] Agamben, 174
[472] Agamben, 166
[473] Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism.* A Harcourt Book, 1994,135-38.
[474] Arendt, 136.

violate."[475] However, the distinction Arendt draws between law and power—with the implication that the former is bulwark against the indiscriminate use of the latter—is precisely what Agamben's *home sacer* and the state of exception collapse.

That the colonial state's spatial ordering was the antecedent for the logics of the concentration camp is an argument that Aimé Césaire made much earlier in *Discourse on Colonialism*. As Césaire unsettlingly states, Nazism merely perpetuated the racial logics of colonialism but applied it to the European instead of the Negro or the Oriental by replicating the spatial ordering of the colony. Hitler's crime, as Césaire states, was not "*the crime against man*, it is not *the humiliation of man as such*, it is the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures."[476] Although, colonial spaces were not industrially equipped extermination centers like the Nazi concentration camps, nevertheless, both were validated through the discourse of the law by rendering its occupants *homo sacer,* this time on the grounds of race. Agamben takes great care in tracing the historical, etymological, religious and philosophical roots of "homo sacer" and "the politicization of life" from its pre-Socratic origins, yet the gaping lack of discourse on colonialism as part of this modern trajectory, one that precedes the concentration camp as a juridical state of exception, seems even more perplexing given the critique Foucault received for this glaring oversight in his work.

In *Nomos of the Earth,* Schmitt declares, "the great primeval acts of law remained terrestrial orientations: appropriating land, founding cities, and establishing colonies." Land appropriation specifically founds the law,[477] therefore, "the first partition and classification of

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[475] Arendt, 137
[476] Césaire, Aimé, *Discourse on Colonialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000, 36.
[477] Schmitt, Carl, *Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2006. 44-45.

space"[478] not only makes spatial ordering the first measure of things or, according to Schmitt, as *nomos*, but the essence of political power "is jurisdiction over the land."[479] Despite Schmitt's mytho-historical narrative of origins, law is not ascribed a mythic or divine origin and the terminology of the earth as "mother of law" instead establishes the appropriation of the earth as a natural human propensity. With characteristically disquieting certitude, his implicit presumption is that the "law" is an organic process that expresses the natural human desire to dominate and appropriate. In this account, that is also conceived mytho-historical terms as always present and at hand, the "law" takes on a bureaucratic role: it orders, regulates and partitions the land for functional purposes.[480] Not only does Schmitt call upon Giambattista Vico's narrative of primeval socio-political origins to validate his account but also upon the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and John Locke. He refers to the former philosopher's conceptual framework of "territorial sovereignty" and "supreme proprietorship of the soil," while eliciting the latter's presumption that human beings have natural "jurisdiction over the land."[481] Because these concepts are given as definitive explanations about the "constitutive process" generating the Law, this, in turn, becomes the essence of political power:

> Thus, in some form, the constitutive process of a land-appropriation is found at the beginning of the history of every settled people, every commonwealth, every empire. This is true as well for the beginning of every historical epoch. Not only logically, but also historically, land appropriation precedes the order that follows from it. It constitutes the original spatial order, the source of all further concrete order and all further law. It is the reproductive root in the normative order of history.[482]

[478] Schmitt, Nomos, 67
[479] Schmitt, Nomos, 47
[480] Schmitt, Nomos, 42
[481] Schmitt, Nomos, 47
[482] Schmitt, Nomos, 48

If spatial ordering through appropriation—no other form of spatial ordering seems to have valence in these accounts—is the primeval event generating law, then this would translate imperial domination also into a natural order of things, one that even mother earth sanctions in Schmitt's formulation of the law. By using the language of fecundity, nature and the earth these thinkers validate "territorial sovereignty" and "supreme proprietorship of the soil" as an organic process, thereby occluding the culpability of imperialism/colonialism as human aggression, the desire for power or the machinery driving capitalist economies. Instead, as "the reproductive root" of the "normative order" which generates the Law, land appropriation is transmuted from a social construct into a natural, consecrated "spatial order." Such a theory of origins also positions the violence of imperialism—or of appropriation in general—outside the realm of culpability or critique. Which, on the one hand, illuminates, quite cogently, why the discourse of the law (and order) is so closely tied to the bureaucratic functions of imperial rule, while on the other, it unwittingly points to how such an ostensibly innocent genealogy—innocent because it is "naturalized"—validates all manner of state terrorism and brutality in the name of spatial appropriation, ordering systems, boundaries and of the law.

In such a discourse that renders appropriation into a natural human right, the land is always imagined as empty space or *terra nullius*. Deliberately occluding, as Schmitt clearly does, the prior condition of the land: the possibility that it was inhabited by indigenous peoples.. If the law, as Schmitt declares, is founded upon spatial appropriation then it commits an injustice against those living off the land even at its founding. While alternate forms of relating to the land, ones that do not entail ownership or appropriation, such as gaining subsistence from it, having sacred ties to it, a sense of belonging to it, are never considered in this mytho-historical discourse of the origins founding human society (through the law).

Acutely aware of imposing the framework of the "natural" upon a social construct, Schmitt, perhaps somewhat defensively, states: "we must not think of land-appropriation as a purely intellectual construct, but must consider it to be a legal fact, to be a great historical event." This historical event, as he clarifies, is not merely the private appropriation of land but a "fundamental process" that preceded the distinction of public and private.[483] It is interesting to note that both Schmitt and Agamben point to a nebulous prior process that transcends the normative binaries of the present political, although, apart from its non-dualistic structure, little can be clearly surmised about these antecedents except that the state of exception is perhaps a remnant pointing towards this silenced mythic history.

If the nomos of the earth, or the primeval processes founding the law, translates into a legitimation of spatial ordering and domination, then the law, although tethered to the land, is superimposed upon it: the law and the political become distinct from life and have power over it. However, the state of exception delineates not only the threshold or the borders of this ordering but it also signifies the gap or fissure between a prior (although not necessarily primordial) condition, wherein life or the state of nature are not differentiated from the political. And this prior space, that is autonomous from this ordering system, also reveals the violence not only of the differentiation but of the constant need to maintain this difference as a norm. As such, permanent states of exception—concentration camps, prisons or garrisoned zones such as Gaza (and other Palestinian territories in Israel), as well as the Tribal Territories act as these revelatory fissures. These zones not only disclose the violence embedded at the core of the state's ordering mechanisms but also, as Agamben so decisively argues, states of exception sanctions acts of brutality through the language of the law while also effectively rendering the law impotent in

[483] Schmitt, Nomos, 46

addressing such acts as crimes, even within the borders of state territory. Hence the futility of resorting to the law in addressing the violence against the *homo sacer* as possible crimes against humanity. Rendered as inhuman, the *homo sacer* and the state of exception in effect create legalized zones of inhumanity.[484] Although by no means the only example, the structural logic of the state of exception is revealed quite clearly at the borders of the colonial state and the tribal territories of the North-West Frontier. As a garrisoned space in a constant state of exception, and with the tribal people relegated to the category of *homo sacer*—whose collective punishment or death is never considered a crime—it produces a particular zone of inhumanity, one that starkly discloses both the violence and the impotence at the heart of the law.

The Tribal Territories as a State of Exception

After the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 divided the tribal territories on either side of the Afghan-Indian border, it retained a *de jure* status as autonomous nonstate space, to be governed by their own tribal codes of conduct. However, as the second layer of the strategic Indian border it was in fact always governed through extremely strict martial laws. As Schmitt points out, English "martial law" was effectively a declaration of "a state of exception," and is "analogous to the idea of a designated zone of free and empty space."[485] The designation of *terra nullius* legitimated, therefore, the Frontier Crimes Regulations of 1901—which, although preceded by a few other similar laws, was extended to the North-West Frontier Province as well but was mainly reserved for policing the Tribal Territories. What was especially distinctive about it, as I detail in the Introduction, was that it allowed for collective punishment at the sole discretion of the

[484] The only redress for such violence, or indignation against such acts of state sanctioned terror, would be through the discourse of the moral—a discourse that has effectively been removed both from the realm of the political and the juridical as Schmitt elucidates in *The Concept of the Political.*
[485] Schmitt, Nomos, 98

Political Agent governing each of the tribal districts.[486] Random aerial bombardment became a common policing mechanism, and making a whole clan or village responsible for the acts of its individual members was the norm rather than the exception; houses and even entire villages would be demolished, their crops burned and livestock confiscated, if the "criminal" in question was not produced or punished.

However, as Hunt and Harrison's book, *The District Officer in India 1930-1947*, reveals, this proved more difficult to put into practice than the law demanded. Tribal units were not as clearly delineated as ethnographic denotation described and they often intermingled and coexisted in the same village without clear boundaries. As plaint chieftains or Maliks were appointed to enforce the will of the Political Agent via the *jirga* system, this preserved the appearance of tribal mediation and legislative customs being followed but, once again, it was effective only in the more feudal areas, such as parts of Baluchistan and Swat, and not in the more democratic clans that lacked clearly recognizable leaders, such as the Mahsuds and the Wazirs.[487] Thus the belief that the Political Officer could influence the tribes through collaborative leaders proved less than uniform in practice. As an extensive collections of writings by the district officers and political agents who served in British India, the first-hand accounts in this book are quite telling: they describe the day-to-day complications encountered in administrating the Frontier Crimes Regulations, and often, inadvertently, invalidate the broader ideological narratives of imperial control.

An interesting illustration is an account by the Political Agent, South Waziristan, G.C.S. Curtis, who describes how the collaborative control desired by imperial governance was so

[486] The Political Agent was appointed as the diplomatic liaison officer of the British Raj ostensibly to negotiate with the local people but who in fact exercised sole administrative power over the area. His word, in effect, was law.
[487] This is also why Roland Barthes many ethnographic accounts of the Swat Pashtuns cannot be applied to descriptions of all the Pashtuns indiscriminately.

difficult to enforce in Waziristan, and some other parts of the N.W.F.P., where there were no specific rulers or chiefs. He describes how, when the whole tribe was involved in the decision making process, it was: "the dictatorship of the proletariat expressed, not in the tyranny of the few, but in the license of the many. It was not anarchy, but it was nearer to it than any European could comfortably go."

> These Jirgas were not the Council of Elders which I had known in Loralai (Baluchistan), but a collection of an entire tribe, sitting on the ground in a semi-circle many rows deep and tending all to talk at once. At the centre point of the semi-circle would sit the Political Agent, the Assistant Political Officer and/or myself, trying to make ourselves heard. The handing over of offenders would be demanded, failing which tribal responsibility would be enforced, hostages would be taken or rifles deposited as security.[488]

Despite their ostensible position of power seated at the center of the circle, the voices of the Political Agents were not heard on many levels and their demands drowned out as one amongst many voices. While taking hostages or rifles would imply that offenders were not produced without some alternate threat or pressure. Not only were "tribal allowances" often stopped as a punitive measure, but infrastructure (such as agricultural water channels) as well as crops and farm animals were destroyed during bombing raids that served as local means of policing recalcitrant tribes.[489] However, economic pressure seems to have been the more effective measure, and perhaps even the more profitable recourse, as another PA of South Waziristan Agency, G.H. Emerson, describes:

> Being a transborder territory, the laws of British India did not, in general, apply to the Mahsuds, and a system of tribal and territorial responsibility was enforced by the Government and accepted by the tribesmen. Offences occurring beyond the occupied forts and roads, between tribesmen, were not regarded as our concern, but if a crime was committed in our enclaves or on the roads, the tribe in whose

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[488] Hunt, Roland and Harrison, John, *The District Officer in India 1930-1947*. London: Scolar Press, 1980. 150-51. Curtis served in the Political Service from 1929 to 1947, however the book does not clarify when he served in Waziristan and what specific time he is referencing here.

[489] Hunt and Harrison, 154.

> territory the crime had taken place was expected either to produce the offender or be punished themselves, As it was contrary to the Pathan code of honour, to hand over anyone, except in very special circumstances, the tribe usually paid up.[490]

Because tribal custom was being followed in letter (even if not in spirit), holding the collective responsible for the actions of one of its members did produce some economic benefit. Although likely to be of token benefit to the coffers of the Raj, even if a heavy burden on the tribes, this economic pressure alongside with the military one symbolically situated the colonial government in a position of power despite its lack of physical control or ability to pacify and enforce its laws through state mechanisms. Knowing that offenders would not be produced easily, despite utilizing the discourse of the law and criminalizing "the offender" through both tribal and state regulations, the exclusionary means did generate symbolic power. The production of zones in which exceptional policing measures could be carried out with impunity achieved precisely the symbolic power of sovereignty. In this case the zones of exception were also cartographically produced through the creation of an imperial frontier, in effect, exponentially exaggerating the exclusionary stature of the people and the place. Border regions are not just liminal spaces between state powers but as the frayed edges of the state, in which complete incorporation of the land is always tenuous, they are also intrinsic spaces of exception.[491]

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[490] Hunt and Harrison, 152.

[491] Set in the present day tribal territories, Fatima Bhutto's novel, *The Shadow of the Crescent Moon*, brings to life the effect of the Frontier Crimes Regulations upon the people living there. All the protagonists in the novel are incriminated by a set of arbitrary laws that defy logical explanation, but most importantly, state law is positioned converse to precepts of justice. Even though the novel is purportedly set in the fictitious town of Mir Ali, the parallels with the real Mirali of North Waziristan are unmistakable, especially the manner in which that area is policed by the Pakistan Army today. Described as the "enchanting un-kingdom" which is "stunted by an unmovable injustice," it is home to all manner of "discarded populations on the periphery" in which the fight for justice is portrayed as hopeless. Therefore, the armed uprisings and violent resistance of these tribal people—whom Bhutto depicts refreshingly, though perhaps also a bit exaggeratedly, as very much part of the modern world rather than an archaic, savage or "uncivilized" people—are all caught in the throes not just of state violence but of another imperial power nexus, the present day incarnation of the Great Game. Although it is unfortunate that Bhutto never explicitly draws parallels between US and British imperialism, she does portray the similarity in the logics of representation underlying the treatment of the Pashtun tribal people by the Pakistani nation-state and by the US led war on terror. However, that this is enabled by the fact that the colonial legal framework remains in effect is not pointed out and that the people are designated in an ongoing and constant state of exception.

The "very knotty problem of the Tribal Territory," as Ghani Khan declares in another Legislative Assembly debate, was neither political nor religious but economic: "merely a problem of bread."[492] Ghani Khan passionately argued that it was necessary to find an alternative to the policy currently enforced by "the cleverest rogues in the British Empire" and "the most autocratic service" not just in India but in the world: the Political Department bought its influence, both spiritual and social, through the priest and the Malik with Indian gold. They bought "the weakest and the most greedy in the tribes and subsidize them to collect influence." Appealing to the interim government to change this hundred-year old imperial system because it was the actions of the Indian government and not the reaction of the tribesmen that were the real problem, Ghani Khan declares: "the Political Department is the tribal problem. Sir, the tribal problem lives in New Delhi and not in the Khyber Pass."[493]

> Change the Political Agent today and send in a different type of man and you will find a change in the tribes tomorrow. Teach the tribesmen other ways of making money and he will cease to kidnap and murder for it. You must teach them before you can blame them. You must give a man a chance of being good before you can condemn him for being bad. That ought to be the core of justice."[494]

As in most of his speeches, Ghani Khan is soliciting the Legislative Assembly to uphold the idea of justice, and is pointing to its crucial lack in the colonial framework of the law. Although not identified as a disparate discourse, the address to justice, and by extension to moral rightness, lies at the heart of the ideology of nonviolence in opposition to the normative legal framework. Ghani Khan points to this opposition when he states that the core of justice ought to assume that human nature is inherently good rather than intrinsically bad or, in the case of the tribal people and the "Pathans" generally, racially criminal. This assumption is a moral rather than a juridical

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[492] This was part of the debate on the "Indian Finance Bill," 25th March, 1947: Ghani Khan, Speeches, 187-88
[493] Ghani Khan, Speeches, 191-92
[494] Ghani Khan, Speeches, 189

one but one that would alter the law were it to be included: if human goodness were assumed as a given it would alter how guilt is determined and the law enforced—in effect it would alter how normative jurisprudence is posited and conducted.[495] It is the insertion of the moral into both the legal and the political that was the necessary reorientation which the ideology of nonviolence was proposing.

Ghani Khan narrates one of several attempts the KK made "to solve this tribal problem."[496] When the KK were first formed in 1928, Ghaffar Khan wanted to expand his school system into the tribal territories but instead he was arrested and exiled from the Province for trying to do so. However, in 1942 "when the British Empire was at its weakest and tottering," as Ghani Khan recounts, the KK were allowed to send "peace missions" and a few of its workers, "ordinary poor Pathans and half educated," spent three years in Waziristan.

> These people risked their lives. They were abused in the name of religion, they were called the hired servants of the Hindus and *Kafirs* and some of the old hands used against Amanullah were re-employed again. But in spite of all that they achieved a measure of success. We found that in our contact with those people they would listen to us.[497]

In recounting this largely unknown history of KK attempts to export their ideology of nonviolence to the tribal territories, and the colonial government's deliberate policy to thwart those attempts, illustrated that "a unique experiment" had been carried which "proved beyond any doubt that the job can be done." An alternate way of dealing with the tribal people had been

[495] Jane Bennet draws a distinction between the moral and the ethical, and holds the present political accountable for practicing a "moralized politics of good and evil" which, she says, is unethical because it "legitimates vengeance and elevates violence to the tool of first resort." Instead, she advocates that a plurality of agents—human and nonhuman, animate and inanimate—are responsible for any act taking place; multivalent agents give rise to particular events or acts through forming interconnected networks, which are currently ascribed to singular causes and individual responsibility. In effect, she widens the contexts which are ascribed as causes of actions and events. By understanding "distributed agency," Bennet states, the ethical can be detached from the moral. (*Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2010, 38.

[496] Ghani Khan Speeches, 11
[497] Ghani Khan, Speeches, 12

tenuously established which made the norm of violent policing redundant. However, as Ghani Khan points out, the Government did not really desire "a solution to the tribal problem."[498] This short lived experiment was soon disrupted by a return to "disciplining" the tribal people, as I detail in chapter two, with the bombing of Waziristan in the wake of the Islam Bibi affair and the Faqir of Ipi's intransigent resistance against it; thus a state of exception was re-established in which any measures could be carried out with impunity.

It is telling to note, however, that in most of Ghani Khan's analysis he unwittingly describes the tribals quite objectively, and distinct from the settled area Pashtuns. The meta-narrative is that "they" (and not "us") needed to be redeemed through understanding and reclaimed through the process of unification, implying that even at this relatively early stage of the tribal-settled divide representational difference had been established even in the imaginary of the Pashtuns. Which also illustrates that even acts of resistance are unwittingly situated in the frameworks of (colonial) power, which leads to the following abstract questions: why does representation, as a mechanism of power, have such profound affect upon the psyche and even a people's ethos? And further, how do these mechanisms of power gain such hegemony to determine how people think and act in daily, mundane ways? It is not as if each subject consciously collaborates with such power, then how are individual acts of resistance imbued with the capacity to overturn it? The Gramscian concept of hegemony (in conjunction with Foucault's "episteme"), is relevant here, which Judith Butler in her essay, "Restaging the Universal" articulates quite cogently:

> hegemony emphasizes the ways in which power operates to form our everyday understanding of social relations, and to orchestrate the ways in which we consent to (and reproduce) those tacit and covert relations of power. Power is not stable or static, but is remade at various junctures within everyday life; it constitutes our tenuous sense of common sense, and is ensconced as the prevailing epistemes of a

[498] Ghani Khan, Speeches, 12-13

> culture. Moreover, social transformation occurs not merely by rallying mass numbers in favour of a cause, but precisely through the ways in which daily social relations are rearticulated, and new conceptual horizons opened up by anomalous or subversive practices.[499]

The prevailing episteme of culture—or in Butler's notion there are a plurality of epistemes—are "ensconced" through repetitive and performative "iterations" of what is termed "common sense." In other words, power and mechanisms of establishing and maintaining power, such as frameworks of representations, are produced as a norm through repetitive quotidian acts, thoughts and the taken-for-granted minutia which makes them meaningful and relevant within those particular contexts. As such, Ghani Khan's perspective both illustrates the hegemony of power but also its subversion. In articulating the tacit representational borders between tribal/settled he reiterates the discursive constructions of power that produce and uphold those divisions; in positing alternate interpretations of those representations he is creating new conceptual horizons to subvert the same structures of power that have become insidious norms. To extend Butler's argument to this historical context: it was not just the mass numbers of the KK that produced resistance to colonial power, but the fact that they articulated new horizons of representation (both discursive as well as political). Despite unwittingly reestablishing matrices of power, this is the key to understanding the KKs, or any resistance movements, successful social transformation.

Justice versus the Law

Using Kafka's parable "Before the Law," both Agamben and Derrida illustrate how the edifice of the law appears institutionally substantive and universal yet excludes those standing on its

[499] Butler, Judith, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek: *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left*, Verso, 2000, 13-14.

thresholds. Like the man from the country in the parable—who both Agamben and Derrida make analogous to man in a state of nature—the inhabitants outside the borders of the civilized state stand at the threshold of its laws, unable (and unwilling) to enter into its edifice or challenge its protocols. In Kafka's story, the man from the country obeys the injunctions of the gatekeeper despite the fact that the gate stands wide open, so that even those standing outside the law, or the "outlaw," self-polices and obeys its injunctions not because of any external physical force but the terrifying threat he imagines lurks within it.

> At the moment the gate to the law stands open, as always, and the gatekeeper walks to the side, so the man bends over in order to see through the gate into the inside. When the gatekeeper notices that, he laughs and says: "If it tempts you so much, try it in spite of my prohibition. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the most-lowly gatekeeper. But from room to room stand gatekeepers, each more powerful than the other. I can't endure even one glimpse of the third." The man from the country has not expected such difficulties: *the law should always be accessible for everyone*, he thinks, but as he now looks more closely at the gatekeeper in his fur coat, at his large pointed nose and his long, thin, black Tartar's beard, he decides that it would be better to wait until he gets permission to go inside.[500]

What deters the man from the country from entering the wide open gates is the tacit threat of the gatekeeper's persona, despite the fact that no weapons bolster that threat; a power that is heightened by the gatekeeper's peculiarly racial appearance. With the more ominous gatekeepers mysteriously embedded at each higher level inside the edifice, it is their perceived power in the mind of the man from the country that bars his entry; the conceptual power of the law and its bureaucracy wields this hegemonic power in the imaginary so that the man from the country self-polices himself and collaborates with his own exclusion from the institution. At the end of his life, not only is the man perplexed that it was so difficult to

[500] Kafka, Franz. "Before the Law," translation by Ian Johnston: http://www.kafka-online.info/before-the-law.html (Accessed July, 2015)

gain entry to an institution that is supposed to serve the public equitably, but the enigma deepens, as does the paradoxical structure of the law, when he learns that this particular gate was specifically held open for him all these many years. And, upon his deathbed, he learns the reason why he has not seen anyone else seeking entry into the ostensibly universal edifice of the law during his long years of vigil on its threshold.

According to Agamben, the fact that the law itself does not overtly proscribe anything reveals that it is in force without signifying anything—in effect, it is an empty signifier that is affirmed and given meaning by its structure. More significantly, life under a law that signifies nothing "resembles life in the state of exception, in which the most innocent gesture or the smallest forgetfulness can have most extreme consequences."[501] In other words, the outward signification is exaggerated in order to express the (inner) lack of substance. However, according to Derrida, and more relevant for my argument (in which I am making the tribal people analogous to Kafka's man from the country), the inaccessibility of the law creates a particular kind of subject of the state. The uncivilized man, as Derrida explains, always stands before the law, upon its boundaries, but he is a subject who is also always outside the law: "He is both a subject of the law and an outlaw."[502] The outlaw is always more harshly subjected to the law while being excluded from entering its edifice. In fact, the argument could be stretched further: the outlaw is necessary to define both the threshold or limits of the law and also, in contrast with Agamben's argument, precisely to give significance to the law which does not signify on its own terms; it is both the practices of obeying the law as well as breaking it that establishes its edifice.

[501] Agamben, 52
[502] Derrida, Jacques: "Before the Law" in Acts of Literature. (New York: Routledge, 1992), 204

Although a much critiqued position, Agamben argues that because Western politics is grounded upon the rift between *zoē and bios* it must continuously reinforce this fracture.[503] By relegating "bare life" outside the borders of the law this fracture produces violence as a political norm through, and at the same time as, producing the state of exception. A completely new kind of political, Agamben muses, would recognize not only that politics already exists at the heart of *zoē* but it would also (first) heal the rift and transmute the opposition created between life and the politicized human. Although Agamben does not directly formulate an opposition between justice and the law, it is implicit in the parallel he draws between democracy and totalitarianism, as well as the fact that the concentration camp as a state of exception can be validated by both juridically.

A new political, therefore, would have to address justice instead of grounding itself upon the institution of the law. Recalling Derrida's politics of friendship, it would heed Nietzsche's call for "*another justice*…a new *justice*," one that transcends the justice of "sheer equivalence…of right and vengeance…and the law of eye for eye." Instead of a justice of vengeance, of equivalence, of calculation, a new justice would "carry itself beyond proportion, beyond appropriation" and shift to a different ground as "a species of love."[504] Whether the KK ideology of nonviolence would have realized this new kind of political is conjectural at this point, but one which I have been arguing for. A pointer validating this conjecture is Ghani Khan's critique of colonial policy that relegated the Tribal Territories to a state of exception, in which the formulation of the critique sets the law in opposition to justice, (ironically, or fittingly, to an assembly of lawmakers). One that was carried out with the intent of postulating a different kind of relationality between life and justice and between justice and the political. In other

[503] Agamben, 11
[504] Derrida, PoF, 64

words, by critiquing the rhetoric of the law he was proposing a new normative framework for the law in which justice and morality were not relegated outside its structures; a framework of justice that is intrinsic to the philosophy of nonviolence and the new political it wanted to posit.

Nonviolence, the Outlaw and Justice

The Pathans is Ghani Khan's only prose text in English written specifically to depict, explain and represent the Pashtuns to a global anglophone audience in the face of stereotypical representations about them. Intended to describe the "complicated simplicity" of his people, the book is an act of conceptual translation from vernacular terms into English. Although Ghani Khan is also prone to reiterating some of the tropes and racial qualities he was attempting to invalidate, the stylistically bombastic contradictions reveal more about the author's humanistic world-view rather than validating an essential portrait of "the Pathan." By deploying satire and irony he heightens the paradoxes without completely negating the predominate tropes to foreground the inanity of some popular representations. Given that he was also an artist he paints a vivid, chiaroscuro sketch of his beloved land and its people in keeping with his idiosyncratic character.

An anecdotal rather than a historical account, the book says little about the KK but tells a tale which illustrates how the ideology was conceived in the local imaginary. It also, quite tellingly, uses the lens of the "outlaw" as the most appropriate one in understanding nonviolence. The tale is related by a friend of Ghani Khan, one who was a former KK but has since become a famed dacoit or bandit.

> This thin lipped friend of mine was a myth. He was a notorious outlaw and he was a Red Shirt. "Non-violence," I asked, "how was it, how could it ever be your creed?" He looked up. "You see, I was a little saint for those four years. I made an effort, I tried to live up to my dreams instead of my desires. It was great, it was a

> miracle. I refused fortunes for a hope and spared lovely girls because they trusted me and looked up to me. You cannot help loving those that love you and you cannot hurt those that trust you. I tried to live up to what the people thought I was. Then the moment ended. I dropped down from the clouds into my own world of desire and envy and lust, and have wallowed in it ever since.
>
> "It is hard to be a saint and a Khan at the same time. I became a good Khan. It was easier and more natural, for men are evil and must be punished. Saints forfeit the power of punishing. *Law is the essence of life and a saint is a lawbreaker as much as a dacoit.* Only it is harder to be a saint. I chose the easier path and settled down to be a man, bad and selfish. I found my blood warmer than my brain, and customs harder to break than hearts, and ideals harder to live up to than life...The dove is lovely to look at and coos soothingly, but the hawk and his claws are more alive. I chose to be a hawk because I was born one. And if the doves do not like it, they can lump it. For the world is not full of butterflies, and the golden eagle is respected more than the humming bird." I looked at his thin lips and agreed. Murtaza had been a hunted outlaw too long to understand doves and sunsets and rainbows.[505] (my italics)

The dialogue between Ghani Khan and Murtaza, the former practitioner of nonviolence, is telling on multiple levels: it illuminates the hold normative traditions have upon behavior, the paradoxes of embodying nonviolence, and both the saint and the sinner as outlaws. In categorizing the Pashtun practice of nonviolence as "a myth," Ghani Khan points to the resonant power the ideology exercised upon the imaginary (rather than implying that it was merely a false fable). In conjoining the figure of the outlaw with that of the "Red Shirt," Ghani Khan also imputes that the lawbreaker, in rupturing given social norms, potentially clears the space for the production of new possibilities. Murtaza recognizes and names the lawbreaking or anarchic ground of nonviolence when he states that the practitioners of nonviolence, or "saints," have more in common with the outlaw than with the Khan—the Khan, in this case, signifying normative tradition. If law is the essence of life, as Murtaza unequivocally states, then the only way to alter the status quo or the *habitus* is to break, shun or overcome laws accepted as (naturally)

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[505] Khan, Ghani. *The Pathans*. Peshawar: University Book Agency, 2010, 19-20

irrevocable, sacrosanct, and regulatory. He points to multiple kinds of laws to further explain that the anarchic quality of nonviolence had the deconstructive power to undermine colonial laws, traditional Pashtun codes of conduct—and the subjectivity produced by those normative codes—and even laws of (human) nature.

The ideology of nonviolence, therefore, aimed at transcending the given and the natural: the "saint," who Murtaza classifies as "unnatural" and whose practice is a "miracle," is a cultivated form of subjectivity that transcends "natural" human propensities. Thus the saint, who lives outside the norms of everyday customs and laws, is both unworldly, or an idealist living their "dreams" rather than succumbing to worldly "desires, and an outlaw. It is more natural and worldly to be "evil" and selfish, according to Murtaza, "because the hawk and his claws are more alive," and thus the easier path to follow compared to the practice of love as an universal and political ideal. The latter is much harder because it goes against natural instincts—or modes of living cultivated over time to seem like natural instincts—while the affection and trust it fosters are also heavy burdens to constantly carry. In short, a noble soul is far harder to cultivate and sustain.[506]

Furthermore, by describing what the embodiment of nonviolence entailed, he tellingly juxtaposes what seem like paradoxical ways of being: social constructs with natural instincts; "customs" (which are harder to break than hearts) with feelings; and "ideals" with life. Implying that, on the one hand, social constructs are more formative and restrictive than nature, while on the other, that ideals (as social constructs) are far more radical and uncomfortable than perpetuating the familiar (or the familiar classified as natural). In both cases, however, he

[506] Interestingly, Murtaza never alludes that nonviolence is a foreign concept imposed upon the Pashtuns simply by an anti-colonial nationalist agenda. He never refers to it as a "Hindu" or Gandhian construct, as many Muslim League members called the KK practice. Rather, he considers it the practice of beings more enlightened than himself and accepts his reversion to violence as both a fall from grace and a more natural human condition.

inadvertently articulates what seems obvious but is rarely voiced: the normative is socially rather than naturally produced, and further, the practice of nonviolence (as a new social construct) must overcome the stranglehold of tradition which has become so naturalized as to become identified with life itself. It is the tension between the natural and the social, the human and the "saint", the pragmatic and the ideal, that Ghani Khan brings to the fore in this narrative, and the uncomfortable paradoxes entailed in embodying nonviolence.

However, Ghani Khan also subtly points to another crucial aspect constituting this embodiment: the reverence for the sacred or the sanctity of life. By ending the passage with the fact that it was much harder for Murtaza to appreciate "doves and sunsets and rainbows" since he had become a hardened criminal, Ghani Khan also implies that the embodiment of nonviolence not only involves a transcendence of the "natural," but in fact requires a particular kind of attunement to life, and, therefore, to the natural. With the beauty of life as a signifier of the sacred immanent in the world—a Romanticist concept of Beauty[507] that Ghani Khan constantly uses in his poetry as a marker of divine immanence—nonviolence also channels the sacred into the world by the injunction to affirm, protect and cultivate life. Therefore, in this passage Ghani Khan also tacitly points to the concept of *waḥdat-al-wujūd* that pervades his thinking and poetry, or the concept of divine immanence which, as he is also inferring, lay at the core of nonviolence: because all of life is a sacred expression of the divine then its affirmation, protection and cultivation also become acts of worship. Although this Muslim concept, more readily ascribed to mystical traditions, is much more explicitly articulated in some of his other works, especially the

[507] See Shazia Babar's *Strains of Romanticism in Abdul Ghani Khan and John Keats Poetry: A Comparative Study*. Pashto Academy: University of Peshawar, 2005. Babar draws parallels between the two poets rather than claiming that Ghani Khan was influenced by Keats or the European Romantic Movement. Arguably, she states that Romanticism is an inherent aspect of Pashto poetry with Ghani Khan's poetry as one of its most prominent expressions.

two poems which I look at more closely below, it is subtly present even in this tale of outlaws as ideal practitioners of nonviolence.

In his inimitable style, Ghani Khan has a somewhat facetious explanation about why violence became so prevalent amongst the Pashtuns in his book: because, he says, the people are of ancient lineage their "great ferocity…might well be a reaction to a rather long dose of Buddhist non-violence."[508] The prolificacy of Buddhist monuments, relics and sacred sites in the North-West Frontier, as Kamila Shamsie also describes in her novel *A God in Every Stone*—and which I analyze in Chapter Two—would evidently mean that the religion was widely practiced by the local population. From these obvious archeological pointers Ghani Khan imputes that, as Buddhists, the creed of nonviolence is not novel for the Pashtuns. On the contrary, the norm of violence is the relatively new practice, and a reaction to historical circumstance rather than signifying essential racial characteristics.

However, Ghani Khan's whole hearted acceptance of nonviolence was always tempered with more than a dose of skepticism and pragmatic doubt, especially at the efficacy of absolutist ideologies in the face of the violence surrounding them. His formation of the *Zalməy Pukhtūn* organization reflects this ambivalently paradoxical attitude most aptly. In the midst of the violence unleashed by the politics of partition he organized this armed militia in April 1947 to guard the unarmed KK. Created on the same patterns as the KK, it was formed to protect the unarmed army, much to the ire of his father. Although publicly Ghaffar Khan does not condemn his son's formation of this armed militia, blaming instead the violence the Muslim League were

[508] With his characteristic tongue-in-cheek humor he postulates arguments and makes observations counter to mainstream narratives. In this case, By stating that the people are an ancient race, indigenous to the land, he is tacitly countering the popular narrative that the Pashtuns are descendants of Abraham, or that they are the lost tribe of Israel. Therefore, he is postulating, quite rightly, that these indigenous peoples would have practiced the various religions predominate in the region at various historical times, including Buddhism and Hinduism. As he clearly states: the Pashtuns are "perhaps a mixture of every race that came to India from the heart of Asia—the Persian, the Greek, the Mongol and the Turk." 4-5

instigating as the catalyst for its formation, he most likely was very disheartened by the fact that his son had defied his most cherished ideal. However, in his autobiography Ghaffar Khan states that, although the *Zalməy Pukhtūn* believed in nonviolence as a creed they were prepared to use violence against the parallel Muslim League youth organization, the *Ghazi Pukhtūn*, who kept threatening the KK (with the blessings of the British, as he states), which would have catapulted the Province into civil war were it not for his son's militia.[509] As such, even Ghaffar Khan's seemingly absolute adherence to the ideology of nonviolence was also tempered by pragmatism and an acceptance of, or a mediation with, even armed forms of resistance rather than no resistance at all.[510]

Paradoxically, despite Ghani Khan's ambivalence about the efficacy of absolute, or ideological, nonviolence, it is his poem "*'ədm-e-ẗushdəd,"* or "nonviolence," that most strikingly situates the ideology of the Khudai Khidmatgars within the ethos of Pashtunwali, or the indigenous codes of conduct.[511] The poem (re) interprets normative customs to translate nonviolence into an established as the more honorable—and, therefore, the more Pashtun—code of conduct than the emblematic concept of *badal,*[512] or the endless cycle of vengeance and violence with which the people have long been identified. As the poem states in the fifth *shir*:

> *məwr ĥey 'gdi pâ sər qərān bəyā*
> *xowr ĥey sẗrgəy kṛləy ẗūrəy*
>
> mothers place Qurans on their heads, once again
> sisters have blackened their eyes

---

[509] Khan, Pashto autobiography, 687-88.
[510] This is evident from his close association with both the Haji of Turangzai and the Faqir of Ipi, who both carried out their anti-colonial resistance through violence.
[511] From Ghani Khan's collected poems, *Latūn,* Peshawar: University Book Agency, 2005, 687. My translation from the original Pashto and the full poem, without transliteration, is included in the appendix.
[512] The code of *badal* is always cited to explain Pashtun predispositions towards violence both through self-imaginaries as well as ethnographic literatures about them,. The presentation of this code as a racial characteristic, removed from any historical context, is repeatedly presented as an essential cause that it has acquired the status of a trope with which the Pashtuns are distinguished.

Part of the unwritten code of Pashtunwali contains the precept of *nanawati*, which is the obligation to reconcile with those who seek reconciliation, to forgive those who ask for forgiveness, and to give sanctuary to those who need it even if they belong to the enemy camp. Although a broad rubric for maintaining peace, it is more generally used to restore amicable relations between families engaged in long cycles of vengeful enmity. The traditional method for signaling a desire for reconciliation is for the mother of one of the feuding families to go to the house of the enemy with a Quran on her head— the Quran signifying her (and her family's) sincere desire to end hostilities. As the term "*nanawati*" literally means "to enter in," the other family is obliged to let her enter the house, thus paving the way for dialogue and an end to a long held feud. In the second *misra,* Ghani Khan adds that sisters can now blacken their eyes: they are no longer mourning the deaths of brothers and can happily prepare for their weddings—perhaps even finding suitors in the former enemy's household. In evoking the metaphors surrounding the precept of "*nanawati*" this *shir* points to a tradition which, although acknowledged as part of *Pashtunwali,* is nevertheless, less commonly cited or practiced than *badal.* Without naming the latter, more infamous Pashtun code, Ghani Khan points to the normative shift entailed by embodying the ideology of nonviolence, so that, in (re) interpreting the codes of Pashtunwali*,* the concept of forgiveness becomes the new badge and more honorable hallmark of the Pashtuns.

However, the next *shir* points to the paradoxical juxtaposition of norms which the KK and Ghaffar Khan were advancing: situating themselves within the normative codes of Pashtun tradition they were also, at the same time, envisioning an alternate and radical "new story":[513]

də bābā pukhtənū sẗrgow
wrtâ ūkṛəy qisəy nūrəy

[513] A phrase used repeatedly by Michael Nagler in describing the shift in normativities entailed by nonviolence. <https://mettacenter.org/use-new-story>

Baba’s Pukhtun eyes
told them tales of another kind

A reference to Ghaffar Khan—both as Ghani’s Khan’s father but also as an honorific title—“Baba” is at once situated within the Pashtun imaginary while also telling tales of another kind: embedded in the local he is nevertheless articulating an alternate narrative. The second *misra* thus points to the normative shift which Ghaffar Khan was bringing about, but one which was still situated in the ethos of the people. Moreover, although these “tales of another kind” are being told to the Pashtuns, the poem ends with a wider, universal address:

nən pâ nəwəy məsẗəy məsẗâ
pākâ wiynâ də pukhẗūn šwâ
wələy gowrâ kâ ləylā' biyā
ẗesh pâ miynâ də məjnūn šwâ

today a new intoxication intoxicates
the Pukhtun’s blood purified
let’s see if Laila can once again
abandon herself to Majnun for love alone

The second to last *shir* once again juxtaposes metaphors of the new with the familiar, not merely as a perspective shift, or to infuse the given with a hallowed interpretation, but much more significantly, to graft new ways of being onto existing ones. The purification of the Pashtun’s blood points to phraseology surrounding the code of *badal,* which is also considered a rite of purification restoring tainted honor. However, instead of traditional purification rites through acts of retribution, by taking an eye for an eye and the spilling of blood for blood, a new kind of purification is now intoxicating the Pashtuns: an ecstatic transmutation through union with the (sacred) beloved. Love in fact replaces the justice of equivalence; not only the love of fellow beings through the practice of nonviolence but also, in this case, Ghaffar Khan symbolizes the

figure of the sacred beloved. Because the figure of Laila is a simile for both the sacred beloved and Ghaffar Khan, the poem bestows him (and by extension, "love") with the power to transmute the Pashtuns traditional modes of purification, from violence to a new kind of intoxication.

Within mystical poetic traditions, the love of Laila and Majnun represents the annihilation of the figure of the lover in its quest for union with the sacred beloved—the sacred beloved being, essentially, the other of its self. At the same time, by evoking this Sufi tradition the last *shir* also makes nonviolence analogous to the mystical path of self-transformation and enlightenment. The interpolation of the Pashtun's blood, now purified by this ecstasy, is the new interjection that Ghani Khan makes into a traditional poetic metaphor. The equation of nonviolence with the quest of the intoxicated mystic lover makes this poem a pointedly original expression both of the Sufi and the Pashtun traditions.[514] While, more crucially, nonviolence is equated neither with passivity nor with impotence, as might be expected of an ostensibly martial race of people, but instead, it becomes an exhilaration of the spirit and a vital force with the potential power to conquer and possess its end through love alone, even if in that act it annihilates itself.

Once the concept of honor and manly valor gets disrupted from the precept of *badal,* notions of gender are also tacitly unsettled. Evoking the legacy of iconic Pashtun warriors—such as Sher Shah Suri, the sixteenth century king who took control of the Mughal empire and Khushal Khan Khattak, the "warrior-poet," who rallied and unified the Pashtuns to resist the domination of the Mughals in the 17th century—this poem is inter-textual with such honor-bound

[514] Although the seventeenth century Sufi mystic, Rahman Baba, also uses metaphors of ecstatic love of the sacred beloved and nonviolence in his Pashto poetry, he rarely conjoins the two together as Ghani Khan does, who, additionally, also inserts the warrior figure into this equation.

notions of valor, and thus, by extension, with particular understandings of masculinity in the first *shirs*:

də ğəzəb pâ niləy suwr šū
də šəyršā nmsəy bāẗūr
sẗərgəy biyā də pukhẗūn srəy šwəy
čəy niym ūwr dəy ūẘ niym ñūr

mounted upon the wrathful steed of retribution
the figure of an eagle, this valiant grandson of a king
inflaming the Pukhtun's eyes once again
half afire half radiant

By beginning the poem with the precept of just retribution*,* and using the first misra as a refrain, the poem paints the figure of Ghaffar Khan as a valiant descendent of historical warrior figures, who, like them, is rallying the honor-bound passions of the Pashtuns. Pointing to his vernacular title, "Bāchā Khan," which literally means "king of khans," the poem paints a picture of this regal figure leading, uniting and giving purpose to his people once again. Young men especially are aflame with purposeful passion, as the next *shir* makes clear, but unlike previous warriors they are also mystic mendicants who do not pay heed to the normative injunctions of the world. Instead of the usual affect which the call for battle arouses these young men are intoxicated by love of the (sacred) beloved:

źwān kṛl šnâ brəyẗūnâ ẗāẘ biyā
pâ məsẗiy čərẗâ rwān dəy
də yār məsẗəy sẗrgəy wiynəy
bəy xbərâ də jəhān dəy

the young again twirl their green whiskers
wondrously intoxicated they're going somewhere
seeing only the intoxicated eyes of the beloved
heedless, absolutely, of the world[515]

[515] See appendix for the complete poem

Therefore, the normative injunctions dictating how a battle ought to be conducted, how a warrior ought to fight, and how masculine honor ought to be validated are all subsumed by the rapture that Bāchā Khan—and by extension the ideology of nonviolence—arouses. It is at this point that Ghani Khan pivots the poem towards the new, shifted normativities that nonviolence has elicited: shifted notions of honor, valor, battles, and by extension of manhood. With the next introducing mothers and sisters disrupting the precept of *badal* and repositioning *nanawati*, or reconciliation and forgiveness, as the central, and more honorable, code of Pashtun conduct.

Not only does Ghani Khan brilliantly describe how his father and the KK were producing an alternate set of normativities by telling "tales of another kind," but the poem itself precipitates this shift by pointing to less frequently used interpretations latent within the ethos. Furthermore, in evoking the trope of Laila and Majnun, the poem widens the circumference from the local to include the Islamic mystical tradition—of which Ghani Khan was a strong adherent—while the symbolism of love represented by this trope also makes it a universal address.[516] Much more importantly, the poem's last *shir* also highlights the kind of Islam the movement was grounded upon—a rootedness in an organically syncretic Islam that was practiced in South Asia, and particularly in the region at that time;[517] one which would increasingly be replaced by a synthetic and rhetorical Islam legitimating the politics of Partition only a few years later. However, the poem does not completely avow the efficacy of absolute nonviolence but tempers it with a tinge of worldly skepticism at the end. Even though it expresses a reverent admiration for the concept

[516] However, in using metaphors so deeply embedded in the Pashtun habitus, a reading addressing a much broader audience can only be undertaken through translation; a translation both of the language and the cultural resonance of the tropes which I hope my work is contributing towards. See my translation of these, and a number of other poems, in "Ghani Khan: A Postmodern Humanist Poet-Philosopher," *SAGAR: South Asia Research Journal*, volume 24, spring 2017.
[517] See, Mujeeb, M. *The Indian Muslims*. 1st Indian ed. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985, and Amin, Shahid. *Conquest and Community : The Afterlife of Warrior Saint Ghazi Miyan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016.

of nonviolence, and a sense of exhilaration that the ideology was embodied with such fervent eagerness by so many Pashtuns, the poem ends with the question: can love make this transformation into a norm rather than an exceptional ecstatic state.

One of a handful of poems about his father and the ideology of nonviolence, “Bāchā Khan’s March on Mardan,” Ghani Khan once again situates the movement in a framework that weaves together Pashtun lore and tradition with Islamic (mystical) tropes. Using both Pashtun and Muslim warrior figures as analogy, Ghaffar Khan’s resistance and reformation are placed upon a historical continuum in which he is depicted as the new incarnation of such legendary figures. Only now the fight against injustice is fought nonviolently and the traditional warrior figure is transformed into the radical Sufi mystic Mansur al-Hallaj:

rāšâ āy khūšāl bābā
āy khālədâ wgūrâ
pāsâ ‘ali mərẗəzəy
dā ẗmāšâ wgūrâ

come oh Khushal baba!
oh Khalid come and see!
rise Ali Murtaza![518]
this spectacle come and see

jəng lā dəy mənsūr rwān
ẗūp ūẘ nâ ẗəfəng lrəy
nâ də ẗūrū pṛəq lrəy
nâ də zğrū šrəng lrəy

to the battle now goes Mansur
neither guns nor armor bearing
the sword’s spark he does not flare
the arrow’s music he does not strum

[518] Reference to famed warrior figures often evoked in Pashto literature: Khushal Khan Khattak, known as the “warrior-poet,” was a fierce opponent of the Mughal Empire and his poetry is suffused with rousing metaphors attempting to unite the Pashtun tribes in resistance to Mughal domination. Khalid bin Walid, known as the “sword of Allah” was the right hand general of the Prophet Muhammad; he united the Arab tribes and spread Islam through his many conquests. Imam Ali Murtaza, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, the fourth Caliph was also a famed warrior—his crescent sword is an especially emblematic symbol often also used as a poetic metaphor for justice and righteousness.

zuwr də dəšmən nâ winəy
dāsəy ləywnəy rəwān
dār āw rsən nâ winəy
dā də məsẗānâẘ khan

the enemy's might he will not see
like a madman he keeps on going
he sees neither noose nor gallows
this the khan of all ecstatics

dā də pəkhẗənū mələng
câ bādšāhəy rəng lrəy

this the Pukhtun's mendicant
what colours of a king he bears![519]

The tenth century Muslim mystic, Mansur al-Hallaj, was renowned for repeatedly uttering the words: "*anā al-haqq"* or "I am the Truth," for which he was accused of blasphemy and executed.[520] His figure has since become a trope symbolizing mystical enlightenment both in Sufi orders as well as in the poetry of the Middle East and South Asia. His utterance especially points to the concept of *waḥdat-al-wujūd,* or of divine immanence, and often opposed to the concept of divine transcendence, or *waḥdat-ash-shuhūd*, however, it is not in itself considered a heretical concept, especially in South Asian mystical traditions.[521] By the logic of this crucial conceptual framework, if the divine is immanent in creation then all that is manifest is infused with the sacred, pointing not only to the unity of all being but also inferring a dialectical relationship between the material and the spiritual. It is within the framework that interprets the spiritual as immanent in the material, and the material, therefore, as sacred—with the concept of

[519] See appendix for the complete translation of the poem
[520] See *Early Islamic Mysticism: Sufi, Qur'an, Mi'raj, Poetic and Theological Writings*, translated and edited by Michael Sells. New York: Paulist Press, 1996.
[521] According to Aamir Mufti, this central concept of Ibn al-Arabi's theosophical system was even equated with the concept of *advaita*, or non-dualism elaborated in the philosophy of the Upanishads. Maulana Azad goes even further to also state, as far as South Asian Sufism is concerned, "India is the oldest source of the concept of *waḥdat-al-wujūd* in the world." *Enlightenment in the Colony,* 160.

"Beauty" reflecting this dialectical relationship expressing the sanctity of the material—that Ghani Khan's poetry must be contextualized. In conceiving all of creation as divine, the material then also becomes an object of reverence and an aspect reflecting this sacred unity.[522] By articulating "I am the Truth," al-Hallaj infers that he—as an expression of this sacred unity and not merely as his ego self or *nafs*—is manifesting the essence of Truth, Reality or God. Ghani Khan uses this figure quite often in his poetry to point to a radical view of religiosity, and to incorporate the precepts of Sufi mysticism already existing in the popular imaginary into the ideology of nonviolence. Furthermore, he calls upon a materially grounded humanism within the frameworks of both Islam and the Pashtun enlightenment tradition descended from the Rohaniya or Rowshaniya movement. As in the broader Islamic framework, the concept of *waḥdat-al-wujūd* is, once again, central to the indigenous Rohaniya movement's articulation of humanism, as I discuss in more detail in the Introduction and in Chapter Three. The Rohaniya movement strongly influenced subsequent literary and philosophic culture so that Pashto aesthetics, as well as its poetics of resistance, are steeped in this strain of mysticism and humanism.

In this poem, therefore, Mansur al-Hallaj represents a figure who is uttering a radical truth and is unafraid of taking a stand on it even unto death—or, in other words, his figure is a trope for enlightened resistance. Further, this figure is also the quintessential *fakir* or unworldly wandering mendicant laden with metaphors of madness, rapture and selflessness, which all point to his state of enlightenment. It also emphasizes the double meaning embedded in Ghaffar Khan's title of "Bāchā": not only does it literally mean "king," but the more nuanced and apt

[522] This framework is often contrasted with the concept of *waḥdat-ash-shuhūd,* or the transcendence of the divine from its manifest creation, one that conceptualizes God as an abstract, Platonic ideal, transcending the material world. However, *waḥdat-al-wujūd* is not considered a heretical interpretation in many Islamic mystical traditions especially ones originating in South Asia. See, Saiyad Athar Abbas Rizvi, *A History of Sufiism in India.* Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1992.

Pashto meaning refers to an unworldly soul—or one careless of worldly possessions and desires—who also treads the mendicant or the saint's path.[523] Therefore, as Bāchā Khan incarnates al-Hallaj in the poem, the ideology of nonviolence as his sanctified truth is also worth fighting and dying for because this path too will lead to the annihilation of the ego-self and thus to true enlightenment.

The poem recounts an actual protest march that Ghaffar Khan led in the town of Mardan (close to Peshawar), in which he was quite severely injured when the Khudai Khidmatgar demonstration was violently policed by colonial authorities.[524] Although the actual date of this march is unclear, in his autobiography Ghaffar Khan places the event during the Quit India Movement, and as Mardan was one of the main strongholds of the KK and, therefore, harshly policed, Ghaffar Khan along with other KK members were mercilessly beaten with *lathis* at this rally. He was arrested and thrown into prison bruised, bleeding with two of his ribs fractured and his clothes torn. As such, this protest march acquires special significance in the annals of the movement and, because of this poem, makes Ghaffar Khan's persecution synonymous with the persecution of al-Hallaj, and even with the torture of Christ at the hands of the Romans. One misra of the poem specifically makes this analogy explicit: "upon his head a crown of thorns." While invoking legendary warriors that resonate in the popular imaginary at the beginning of the poem, Ghani Khan thus includes Ghaffar Khan into the ranks of illustrious figures who fight just wars. The nonviolent warrior is undifferentiated from these earlier historical figures as far as

[523] The fact that he is "unworldly" is not incompatible with *waḥdat-al-wujūd* as the mendicant is embodying, or is an expression of the divine, but is not invested in the social constructs of the world. The trope of the fakir as a representative of the divine occurs repeatedly in South Asian and Middle Eastern poetry.

[524] As he states in his book, the massive efforts that he undertook at this juncture to unify the Tribal Territories with the "Settled areas" was an effort to counter the escalation of colonial policing during the Second World War. This border was ever more vigilantly guarded not only from external threat but because it was one of the areas that provided a rich supply of recruits to the Indian Army. The KK strategy at the time was to get people to boycott the colonial legal system in favour of indigenous forms of dispensing justice. Consequently, KK protest rallies were policed even more harshly. (Khan, Pashto autobiography, 670-71).

courage or valor is concerned but elevated in stature because now the battle is also a form of radical enlightenment. Although the earlier warriors also fought to resist injustice and domination, often in the name of Islam, only the nonviolent fight seamlessly combines the sacred with the secular, or mystical enlightenment with the political. Characteristic of Ghani Khan's work, the paradoxical juxtapositions of the mystic sage with the heroic warrior, of the means and weapons of war with nonviolent resistance, and of (divine) enlightenment with the political makes the poem itself a refreshingly radical interpretation of how nonviolence was conceived in the imaginary.

Although the meter of this poem is unusually constrained within traditional *ghazal* form, as Ghani Khan was one of the first poets to use *āzad nazm* in Pashto, and the martial rhythm is far too cheerful than is customary for the poet, it inculcates the event into the ethos of the people through its simple rhythmic refrain, lending itself to renditions in popular song. Therefore, the poem is not just a paean to his father's heroism but also a desire to chronical and embed a historical event into the popular imaginary. It is through Ghani Khan's interpretation of nonviolence that the relationships between the resistance fighter, the figure of the outlaw, justice and the new political gets articulated in the Pashtun imaginary. Recalling Agamben's outlaw, who is an "autonomous figure" that signifies a prior political that transcends the dualism of *zoe* and *bios,* it also points towards the possibility of a new political by its disruption of the present. Similarly, as a liminal figure residing on the threshold and in opposition to—or facing—normative laws, the figure of the outlaw is central to the politics of KK nonviolence; it represents the anarchic potential at the heart of a politics of nonviolence. A potential, as I also argue in Chapter Two, that was already present in the radical forms of democracy practiced in the Tribal Territories. It is this familiarity and even a sense of ease with the anarchic—or what is termed

"anarchic" by Western politics—that allowed for the indigenous embodiment of nonviolence with such readiness and popularity.

What Ghani Khan makes explicit through his interpretation of nonviolence is that the problem with the normative political of colonialism (as well as the present one derived from the same Western philosophical grounds) is its juridical framework. One in which states of exception are the norm, as Agamben points out, and constantly exist on the other side of its borders but become visible through the "suspension" of the law.[525] Whereby "chaos" is the desired and cultivated condition and not, as Schmitt formulates, the condition that precedes the order created by the law. Moreover, by creating a divide between life and politics, as Agamben argues, Western (democratic) politics excludes particular populations and, paradoxically, discloses the politicization of life, such that, these populations can be subjected to all manner of violence legitimated by the discourse of the law. Despite the fact that Agamben does not trace the figure of *homo sacer* to colonialism, as one of the primary means of its production, the creation of "scientific" borders was one of the ongoing ways of producing legal zones of exception in which many forms of violence were/are deemed legitimate. This necessary and vital aspect of colonial rule is starkly disclosed, as I have argued in this chapter, by the *de facto* status of the Tribal Territories and the (ongoing) treatment of its people. As such, the discourse of the law is futile in transcending the injustice that states of exception inevitably create, which is why an anarchic opposition to state laws lies at the core of the philosophy of nonviolence. As Ghani Khan so brilliantly illustrates and argues, the divide between justice and the law can only be bridged through a new form of the political, one that the KK were addressing. The outlaw—now as resistance fighter—in resisting the dehumanization which states of exception create, or the

[525] Agamben, *Homo Sacer,* 18

abjection that the figure of *homo sacer* represents, became a signifier for this new political in the KK imaginary. Therefore, resistance to the injustice of the colonial juridical order and the creation of a new political made it crucial to tell tales of another kind.

Chapter Five

Planting Gardens: Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Cultivation of Nonviolence

> də zṛə pâ bağ məy ǵəlay wušwəy
> būyâ chəbəya pəsrləi raźei spəṛəy gulūnâ
>
> it has hailed upon my heart's garden
> spring flowers will become fragrant when it's spring again[526]

Ghaffar Khan's extensive Pashto autobiography reveals that the semiotics of agriculture was central to how he cultivated nonviolence. The seeds of change were sown in the imaginary and materially rooted in such a semiotics. In his autobiography and the letters, he wrote to Ghani Khan and to Gandhi, he describes how he cultivated plots of land during his reoccurring incarcerations which not only made the imprisonments that much more bearable, but it embodied his fervent belief that manual labor was the means to the transformation he was seeking. In a long letter chastising his son for being spendthrift, for ignoring his fatherly advice and for being less than forthright, Ghaffar Khan unrelatedly inserts a peculiarly short paragraph divulging how he spent his time in prison: "I do some gardening, and for [about] four to five hours I work on it myself; this [work] is the secret key to the success of the world."[527] He does not elaborate on how he conceives of gardening as the secret key to transforming the world, or what kinds of success he is pointing towards, but given the centrality of manual labor to KK army training, and the semiotics of agriculture he was steeped in, these must be taken into account when interpreting the alternate socio-political he was aspiring towards.

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[526] Ghaffar Khan's ends his Pashto autobiography with this shir. My translation. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, *zmā žwand āw jdow-jeẖd.* (Peshawar, 1983), Autobiography 740.
[527] Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Abd Allah Bakktani, *Da Khan `Abd al-Ghaffar Khan likunah* ([Kabul]: Dawlati Matba`ah, 1989), 95. (I will refer to it as *Ghaffar Khan's Letters*). This is from a letter to Ghani Khan, dated 25th October 1935 written from Bareilly District Jail. My translations from Pashto

Because the semiotics of gardening and metaphors of cultivation play such an important role in his imaginary and in his life, they are not just deployed in his public discourse as tropes but express a phenomenological situatedness; the seeds of nonviolence Ghaffar Khan was planting were rooted in the environment he was cultivating. Despite his more popularly recognized title of "Frontier Gandhi," he was not merely translating Gandhian ideology into the vernacular, but, as I have argued throughout my dissertation, KK nonviolence had marked differences and was particular to its context, even if aspects of it were derived from Gandhian ideology. In fact, in this chapter I will posit the opposite: aspects of Gandhi's ideology and utopian vision were derived from Ghaffar Khan's conceptions and practices. As such, I will point to some similarities, differences and intersectionalities.

As I have also repeatedly stated, only vernacular, indigene interpretations of nonviolence can account for the fact that KK ideology spread as rapidly and popularly as it did. However, similar to Gandhi, Ghaffar Khan's utopian vision for a future nonviolent community was not limited only to the local and the particular but was conceived as a blueprint for global transformation; the KK were to become exemplars for such a transformation. As he states, by embodying nonviolence he had accessed a universal key to transforming the world. But, unlike Gandhi, he neither articulates his utopian vision, nor do his writings clearly illustrate his conception of nonviolence in terms of ideological doctrine, analytical theory, or even the "science" of nonviolence that Gandhi was exploring as experiments with truth. Instead, a more useful access point for exploring what the telos of this aspiration signified, and the means and methods he wanted to deploy in achieving those ends, is through the rich semiotics of agriculture he so often deployed.

However, this is not to say that Ghaffar Khan's colonial context can be ignored; the fact that his conception of "work" also evokes colonial discourse about "production" and "development," with tropes about making arid, empty land productive also needs to be taken into account. By stating that he was situated in the vernacular does not imply that his ideology transcended its colonial context or modern framework, but that this indigenous semiotics of agriculture may also have been intersectional with nonindigenous sources. Nevertheless, that does not reduce these vernacular articulations merely into derivative acts, or one of translation. Instead, the more apt theoretical formulation for this intersectionality would be Walter Mignolo term, "border-thinking": an existential position dwelling upon the borders of "coloniality" that "cracks" the dominant system to disclose indigenous, subaltern knowledges. [528] It at these margins that alternate frameworks of interpretation are produced.

In his over seven hundred-page long Pashto autobiography Ghaffar Khan inserts small passages that point to the importance of gardening and land cultivation both as the broad rubric for his ideology and as a personal salve. In one passage he talks about how gardening alleviated his acute loneliness when he was transferred from Ahmadabad Jail to the Central District jail in Bareilly, which, according to the dates of his letters, would have been around July or August of 1935.[529] While in Hazaribagh Jail he says he asked the Deputy Superintendent of the prison to assign him a plot of land lying arid and adjacent to the barracks he was confined to. The superintendent agreed and assigned two other prisoners to help him, and as he states, "I went to

[528] Mignolo, Walter. *Local histories/global designs : coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking*, Princeton studies in culture/power/history, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). Mignolo also clarifies the relationship between colonialism and modernity: "Modernity cannot be understood without coloniality; coloniality cannot be understood without modernity," 202.
[529] *Ghaffar Khan's Letters*, 74. Letter to Gandhi dated August 21st, 1935, written from Bareilly District Jail.

work on that land and cultivated it" by planting an assortment of fruits and vegetables, including seeds the Superintendent had personally given him. And because Bihar is renowned for its sweet papayas, he planted some of these trees as well, despite the fact that the fruits ripened after he had left that prison.[530]

Most of his informal personal letters to kith and kin invariably have a section on his declining health and weak digestive system which prison food exacerbates. In his letters to Gandhi especially, he writes in quite some detail about his weak digestion and the general malaise resulting from it. However, it was not merely the consumption of fresh fruit and vegetables, which he direly needed, that seems to have motivated his labors because he cultivates fruits, such as the papaya, which he had little hope of actually consuming. The end, instead, was the physical labor and the desire to make the land productive rather than a pragmatic desire to feed himself wholesome food. As he mentions in a letter to Gandhi, planting gardens allowed him to go out in the fresh air but what he enjoyed most was working on the land several hours each morning and evening.[531]

Although Ghaffar Khan never clearly expressed what his labors signified, Gandhi does articulate his views in a letter written a year later. Gandhi writes to Ghaffar Khan, saying, "a nonviolent man has to keep himself engaged usefully during all waking hours and, therefore, *constructive work is for him what arms are for the violent man*."[532] In paralleling constructive work to weapons**,** Gandhi interprets manual labor as a means to achieving particular kinds of power. Instead of the Hobbesian model of political organization, it was not the surrender of

[530] GK, Autobiography, 560-62
[531] *Ghaffar Khan's Letters*, 74.
[532] This is from a fragment of a letter Gandhi wrote to Ghaffar Khan and although the actual date is missing the date ascribed to it in the Collected Works is "After September 18, 1940." Therefore, this letter is prior to Ghaffar Khan's cultivation of prison gardens, although the two must have conversed on this topic on other occasions as well. However, it is unclear as to who influenced the other's thinking, or whether thy arrived at a similar philosophy of labor independently of each other. CWMG 73/12, 35-36.

weapons to a central authority that would maintain peace but rather individual self-regulation; that, in turn, was based upon a constant and ethical process of self-cultivation; and manual labor was the foremost means to those ends. As such, manual labor was the keystone that upheld the ideal political for both leaders and, therefore, lies at the heart of the ideal—perhaps even stateless—utopian communities they were envisioning. For Ghaffar Khan, however, the desire to plant gardens and grow his own food within prisons was more than just moral cultivation but it was also a balm for his acute loneliness and longing for home; it was an attempt to recreate a familiar sense of rootedness in the land, especially since he was repeatedly subjected to lengthy solitary confinement during his long political life. Unlike Gandhi, who came from an urban background, Ghaffar Khan's ancestral relationship to the land shaped his semiotics of agriculture and must be brought to bear upon how he conceived the ideology of nonviolence.

The Village as Habitat

As the youngest son of one of the biggest land-holding Khans in his village of Uthmanzai, Charsadda, Ghaffar Khan grew up with roots in an agrarian habitus. Like for most Pashtuns living in the North-West Frontier at the time the village, the land and its agriculture were the daily norm. His father, Bahram Khan, as Ghaffar Khan relates in his autobiography, was known as the "elder Khan" of his village. Each village customarily had a titular chief, generally one with the largest land holding, which also pointed to their established lineage, but as Banerjee points out, within the given social structures of the time, his father was considered a "small khan."[533] In describing his family lineage, it is interesting to note that Ghaffar Khan implicitly accounts for his practice of nonviolence in both psychological and hereditary terms; he describes how his

[533] Banerjee, 47

father was unusual amongst the khans because he was never provoked into anger by close relatives or cunning strangers who took undue advantage of Bahram Khan's largesse and hospitality. As Ghaffar Khan states, his father "would bear it with equanimity and never harboured revenge in his heart…[and] promoted peace and amity and bore hardships with perseverance." Also, in his autobiography, Ghaffar Khan adds, that unlike other elite classes who generally sided with the rulers both his grandfather and great-grandfather were resistance fighters, the former against the British and the latter against the Sikhs. Imputing that although most landlord classes were created through collaboration, his lineage was quite honorable.[534]

In addition to imputing that his nonviolent resistance was innate, he also credits his desire to serve his people to the example set by his two high school teachers. After preliminary schooling in his village madrassah, at eleven he was sent to Edwards College in Peshawar. Admiring the selfless, missionary zeal of his teachers, he states, "I was greatly impressed by our Headmaster, Mr. Wigram, and his brother, Doctor Wigram. Their sacrifices had affected me deeply. I, too, had begun to think in terms of serving my people and my country."[535] Although fast becoming a norm, his education was unusual even for the elite classes of the time as the Pashtuns did not formally educate their children. His brother, Abdul Jabbar Khan, or Dr. Khan Sahib as he is more generally referred to, received his medical education from England, and Ghaffar was also being sent abroad for higher education—to study "agriculture," because of, as he says, his love for the land and desire to work with his hands. He describes how he also became friends with the English officer at the Agricultural Research Center in Peshawar that he would visit quite often.[536] However, he did not go abroad because his mother became quite

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[534] This is from Imtiaz Ahmad Sahibzada's translation of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Pashto autobiography. Publication forthcoming. The manuscript is titled, *My Life and Struggle*, P 23.
[535] Ghaffar Khan Autobiography, *My Life and Struggle*, Sahibzada translation, W 29
[536] Ghaffar Khan Autobiography, *My Life and Struggle*, Sahibzada translation, P 38

emotionally overwrought at the idea of losing her youngest and favourite son as well and dissuades him from leaving. He then decided to apply to the Frontier Guides which he received, much to the pride and joy of his father. But in witnessing a friend's humiliation at the hands of a British officer in the Guides he never enlisted and decided to dedicate his life to serving his own people instead.

At the beginning of his autobiography he describes the norms of daily life in his home and the description is telling in how the semiotics of agriculture were so intrinsic to his way of being. The passage also discloses how physical labor was not uncommon at this time even for the landowning elite classes:

> My mother was very fond of keeping buffaloes and, invariably, she looked after and fed them herself with grass and *butawa*, which also she prepared herself. In the afternoon she would feed me cream and milk. Women generally used to be very fond of cream and would not give it to anyone because then it would affect the production of butter. I was her darling and would get it. Whenever she tasted anything and liked it she would give it to me, and if I was not there, she would keep it for me. Whenever I ate with my father and chicken had been cooked, everyone would get one piece each but my father would give me his share too. In front of this room of our house there was a beautiful *mandao* and also a *deodai.* In this room there were large *kandwaan,* in which maize would be stored in one and wheat in the other. This room also had *khumaan,* in one of which rice was stored, in the other lentils, and in the third was *shaker* [cane sugar] and *gura* [jaggery]. Garlic and chillies would lie next to the *khumaan* and also tins of clarified butter.[537]

Working on the land and growing his own food were not unusual concepts for Ghaffar Khan but translating manual labor into a signifier of an altered world was. Although this signification was not confined to the ideology of nonviolence alone and encompassed several nationalist movements of this time—most notably the spade used as a symbol of equality and humbleness

[537] Ghaffar Khan Autobiography, *My Life and Struggle*, Sahibzada translation, W 9

by Allama Mashriqi's Khaksar movement—nevertheless, making manual labor normative, and honorable, in Pashtun culture was quite novel.

Alongside with the *charḳhā*, or the spinning wheel, manual labor came to symbolize the economics of sustainability that would, in turn, signify the decolonization of India. Although much has been written about Gandhian economics, Ghaffar Khan's largely unarticulated economics of sustainability[538] needs to be parsed out of his rhetoric but one which denotes a similar impetus: the requisite armature upon which an alternate socio-political was to be built. This was seen as the pragmatic means to establishing the envisioned, utopian, communities of nonviolence. Utopia , as Gandhi frequently argued, did not signify the impractical but rather it was a blueprint for a possible future and an ideal to aspire towards.

The ideological thrust of Gandhian nonviolence against the brutal mechanizations of modernity also made the village the natural foci to the capital driven economies of the city, despite the fact that the Indian city was not yet tethered to industrialization as overwhelmingly as European cities were at that time. However, Gandhi's view of the village was developed in dialectical relation to his experiences of large cities: London, Johannesburg, Ahmadabad, to name a few of the cities pivotally affecting his intellectual growth. For Ghaffar Khan the village was central to his vision of community, not only because it was the agrarian base of the majority of Pashtuns and part of his habitus, but as a normative model for the community of the future he

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[538] Although neither Gandhi nor Ghaffar Khan specifically refer to an "economics of sustainability" I am formulating that term based in part upon Vandana Shiva's work, especially as outlined in her book *Earth Democracy*. What she terms "earth democracy" is grounded upon "nature's economy" and "sustenance economies" in distinction with capitalist economies which, although also grounded upon the former economies, subsumes, obfuscates and utilizes them for its own ends. Capitalist economies thus do not promote what Shiva calls "living economies" but rather "death" and profit for its own sake, which, in turn, is based upon a sense of scarcity and lack. My formulation of Ghaffar Khan and Gandhi's "economics of sustainability" is grounded upon Shiva's term "sustenance economies" and "nature's economy," which, I am arguing, they were promoting through manual labor, and the symbolism of the *charḳhā*, and, much more specifically in Ghaffar Khan's case, on the practices of farming, the cultivation of one's food and, more broadly, on the semiotics of agriculture. See, Vandana Shiva, *Earth democracy : justice, sustainability, and peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 2005).

was trying to build. And the village was precisely the site in which his campaigns and conversions took place; furthermore, his constant walking from village to village and his personal interaction with each individual is what also ultimately endeared him to the populace in a much more egalitarian interchange. This counter-flaneurial engagement was also a large catalyst for the dramatic social change that occurred. As a KK recalls in Banerjee's book: "There is no village, no home in the whole of the Frontier that Badshah Khan has not been to personally." The significance of this feeling, as Banerjee points out, is not whether Ghaffar Khan had in fact "slept in every house" as was said about him, but "that the KKs believed that he had made this effort to communicate with each of them, that he had touched each of their lives, and persuaded them that their individual contribution could help achieve the improvement and independence of Pathan society."[539]

Although his walking from village to village is reminiscent of Gandhi's tireless walking as well, the memory of personal interaction with each member of the KK was markedly different from the Mahatma, which Banerjee also points out.[540] In contrast with the transcendent figure of the Mahatma that Shahid Amin portrays in his seminal essay,[541] Ghaffar Khan's personal interactions created the sense of his constant, tangible presence, although he too is referred to as a holy being and meeting him was especially recollected as an enlightening, transformative experience in the memories of the KK. As I explain in in Chapter Four, the double entendre of Ghaffar Khan's vernacular title "Bāchā"—aptly illustrated by Ghani Khan's poem "Bāchā Khan's March on Mardan"— has to be interpreted through the lens of *faqirs* or wandering mendicants, through Sufi metaphors of love, annihilation and divine unity, and in contrast with

[539] Banerjee, 132
[540] Banerjee, 131
[541] Shahid Amin, "Gandhi as Mahatma," in *Selected Subaltern studies*, ed. Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

the semiotics in which the figure of the Mahatma is steeped. However, because the semiotic contexts are not discrete but intertextual in South Asian articulations of holy figures, a stark contrast or demarcation cannot be effectively maintained either, and certainly not because one calls upon Muslim tropology and the other upon Hindu ones. The intertwined tropology of these two religions has a long and well recorded provenance in the region as well. Rather, the difference I am pointing to is phenomenological: the interaction by members of the KK and the people in the NWFP with Ghaffar Khan was much more immediate and material and, embedded as his ideology was in Pashtun culture, his personal interactions by walking from village to village accentuated this normative egalitarianism quite tangibly.

On the other hand, the cities of the NWFP at this time did not house the majority of the population, but rather it was a hub for the minority communities, ones who were largely engaged in trade, business and the bureaucracy. The more fashionable trend of having a city residence alongside with the village one was also catching up with large land-owning Khans, however, the main residence for major social interaction and engagements, such as weddings, funerals, and coming of age ceremonies, remained the villages rather than the cities—even in most cases till today. Moreover, taking this agrarian ethos into account, the cultivation of the land and the planting of gardens or orchards remains symbolic of prosperity and abundance, and the rootedness to place a marker not just of class stature but generational continuity. Furthermore, the village became central to Ghaffar Khan's endeavors not only because of the Provincial emphasis upon the vernacular—that made the agrarian based Pashtuns central to the politics of the Frontier and shifted the emphasis from the pan-nationalist or pan-Islamic and city-based Congress or *Khilafat* movements—but it was the emphasis on the subaltern that really galvanized the KK movement. As Ghaffar Khan explains in his autobiography once again:

> Love of the nation/people (*qəwm*) and service to it is not solely aroused by education. When we were starting our movement for the service and freedom of the nation/people (*qəwm* I went to the cities and sought out the educated (classes) with great enthusiasm, but I couldn't find any amongst them who were ready to the serve the nation/people (*qəwm*) in the name of God. I have honored many holy and learned men, and have served them well, and since they have thousands of acolytes I anticipated that, once they became our friends/allies (*malgaray*), then many [of their followers] would also become our friends/allies (*malgaray*) and help us. I have also praised many *mullahs* and I tirelessly sought them out but very few have befriended me—akin to a pinch of salt in flour. When I became disheartened I left the cities and went out to the villages and to the masses and within four months so many people rose up that the British got alarmed. I spent twelve years seeking out the educated classes and became disheartened, but when I went to the villages thousands befriended me.[542]

It is important to note that Ghaffar Khan attributes the arousal of the subaltern classes, in contrast with the cynicism and lack of enthusiasm of the educated city elites, as the galvanizing force that turned the KKs into a massively popular movement. As such the centrality of the village was more than a natural orientation for Ghaffar Khan, but, in fact, it became the grassroots mobilizing factor that established KK nonviolence on such a large scale in the NWFP.

Although Gandhi's arousal of the masses was as crucial to establishing the nationalist movement throughout India it was not as dependent upon the villages; his emphasis was also not a provincial or agrarian one. But, even more interestingly, Ghaffar Khan claims in his autobiography that Gandhi made the village central to nationalist mobilization in a manner similar to his own after he pointed to its conceptual centrality:

> I would constantly tell Gandhi-ji that the nation lives in the villages and he agreed with this thought of mine. That was the reason why, similar to us, they started involving people from the villages because the masses live there, and every political movement that reaches the masses becomes successful. Which is why we walked from village to village to seek Pashtuns, both young and old.[543]

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[542] Khan, *zmā žwand āw jdow-jeẖd.* , 73. My translation.

[543] Khan, *zmā žwand āw jdow-jeẖd.* , 584.My translation

The fact that the mobilization of the villages was central to the power of nonviolence is a realization shared both by Ghaffar Khan and Gandhi. As the location of the masses, the village thus became the locus for both their political mobilizations, however, for Ghaffar Khan the village was conceptually and phenomenologically significant even at the outset whereas for Gandhi the village does not gain the same kind of significance until much later; the conceptual centrality of village is clarified in Gandhi's later writings—especially as the location of his ideal society—but, quite significantly, it is missing from his early foundational text, *Hind Swaraj*. Thus, Ghaffar Khan's claim warrants a closer, comparative analysis.

The signification of the village subtly changes over time for Gandhi and it is not until his later writings that it gains the shape that one normally associates with his ideology. Moreover, Ghaffar Khan assumes an inter-relationality between his ideas and Gandhi's in this passage particularly, but as a general tenor throughout his writings more broadly; a reasonable enough assumption given their close personal and political relationship over many years. However, a comparative historical analysis of these two contemporaneous and pivotal leaders of nonviolence is glaringly lacking and preponderant narratives depict Ghaffar Khan—when they depict him at all—as merely a follower of Gandhi and never a contributor to Gandhian ideology. It seems far more reasonable, therefore, to presume that both leaders affected each other's ideology and articulations. So that the interrelatedness of the two leaders' thoughts and actions needs to be revised on many levels, the least of which, as I am pointing out, are the glaringly obvious similarities between their blueprints for future nonviolent communities. Although it may remain arguable that the conceptual centrality of the village for Gandhi was prompted, even if only in part, by Ghaffar Khan, what is more compelling are the parallels between Gandhi's vision of *Ram Rajya*—one that Gandhi describes as a state of "enlightened anarchy"—and the indigenous

ethos of radical democracy through which the KK were interpreting their ideology. Although I analyzed Gandhi's concept of "enlightened anarchy" as a political concept, especially contra Schmitt's political in Chapter Two, I quote the passage here again in its entirety in order to point out, once again, the radical and anarchic conception of utopia that Gandhi held:

> Political power, in my opinion, cannot be our ultimate aim. It is one of the means used by men for their all-round advancement. The power to control national life through national representatives is called political power. Representatives will become unnecessary if the national life becomes so perfect as to be self-controlled. It will then be a state of *enlightened anarchy* in which each person will become his own ruler. He will conduct himself in such a way that his behaviour will not hamper the well-being of his neighbours. In an ideal State there will be no political institution and therefore no political power. That is why Thoreau has said in his classic statement that that government is best which governs the least.[544] (my italics)

Despite the fact that Gandhi cites Thoreau as a reference at the end to clarify his conception of *Ram Rajya,* the aim of his utopian vision, however, is not to postulate the nature of good governance—which was Thoreau's aim—but instead to envision an alternate form of community in which political institutions are rendered redundant. In Gandhi's utopian vision people would formulate social and subjective systems that would replace governing institutions whose function it is to control and organize the populace; a form of governance that today would be called "radical democracy." At the core of Gandhi's enlightened anarchy, and by extension the concept of radical democracy, lies the empirical presumption of self-sovereignty—or in other words, self-sovereignty as an inalienable right. Using Ranciere's words, radical democracy may in fact be the seemingly paradoxical, yet egalitarian, conjunction of anarchy with governance: "Democracy

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[544] Gandhi: "Enlightened Anarchy—A Political Ideal," *Sarvodya*, Jan. 1939. In *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, ed., Raghavan Iyer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. Vol III, 602.

first of all means this: anarchic 'government', one based on nothing other than the absence of every title to govern."[545]

The parallels I am drawing between Gandhian utopia and KK formulations, via the codes of Pashtunwali, is the former's pointer towards radical democracy while, as I have argued in Chapter Four, the latter's practices that embodied it. Or at least Ranciere's definition of radical democracy as a form of anarchic government grounded upon an egalitarianism in which any, all, or none have the right to govern. Even if in Pashtun society class hierarchies continue to be upheld, the ethos of Pashtunwali includes the right of any to question and oppose wrongful governance, and thus includes, in spirit, "the absence of every title to govern." Especially, as I stated earlier, the tribal territories demonstrate forms of anarchic democracy quite often,[546] and as such, it was an ethos that the KK deliberately incorporated. However, practices of radical democracy were far more mediated in the "settled districts" than its tribal origins, so that KK interpretations were greatly modified by their provincial and colonial context. The main difference between Gandhi's vision and the KK aspiration that I want to point to was that the latter did not conceive of their future community as utopian but one that was, in messianic fashion, already at hand—once, that is, they had purified themselves to the degree that divine providence would enable their liberation from foreign domination.

The rest of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of Ghaffar Khan's aspiration and efforts to produce his ideal community, alongside with a much thinner analysis of Gandhi's conception

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[545] This is from Jacques Ranciere's, *The Hatred of Democracy*, which was quoted by Todd May in a keynote address he gave at the "Radical Democracy" conference in April 5th 2011 at Columbia University: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AsQrXmsGjcE

[546] I am specifically referring to the observation of a British Political Agent serving in South Waziristan, G.C.S. Curtis, who describes how there were no rulers or chiefs and where the whole tribe was involved in the decision-making process. He remarks on this form of jirga governance as "the dictatorship of the proletariat expressed, not in the tyranny of the few, but in the license of the many. It was not anarchy, but it was nearer to it than any European could comfortably go." Although the date of Curtis' text is not given in *The District Officer in India 1930-1947,* he served in the Political Service from 1929-47. Hunt and Harrison, 150.

of an ideal community, as well as Jinnah's rhetoric that underpins the idea of Pakistan. I also look at Ghaffar Khan's aspiration through the lens of the subaltern who cannot speak. In other words, using Spivak's formulation as a loose armature, I point to how Ghaffar Khan's voice was not heard at the center (both colonial and national) and, given that colonial frameworks of knowledge had become normative, it could never be heard within it. I argue that, nonviolence ultimately aspires to challenge and change this normative framework, and, until that shift occurs, the subaltern cannot be heard within it even while they speak.[547]

Gandhi, the village and an economy of sustainable swaraj

Analysis of Gandhi by postcolonial and the Subaltern Studies historians suggests that Gandhi's articulation of nonviolence was not only idiosyncratic, naïve or archaic—part of the bourgeois nationalist idiom fostered by colonial hegemony—but also uncontextual: pure abstract thought unique to some faculty of a mahatma. Amongst the Subaltern Studies historians only Shahid Amin and Partha Chatterjee even attempt an analysis of Gandhi, yet even these cogent accounts are concerned with, either, how the iconic figure of the "Mahatma" was produced in "peasant consciousness,"[548] or the political maneuver that "Gandhism" represented in the broader nationalist telos. Neither of them deals with how Gandhi's nonviolence arose and what it signified on its own terms, nor how it kept mutating in different times and contexts. As such Gandhi is often accused of contradicting himself or of not having a coherent and rational "system" of nonviolence.

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[547] Despite the fact that Ghaffar Khan was a landowning "Khan" and thus part of an elite class, he remained outside the dominant power structures established both by colonialism and nationalism and, therefore, I continue to refer to him as a "subaltern" in the sense that Antonio Gramsci uses the term. I am extending this definition to Maulana Azad also because, again despite the fact that he was very much at the helm of nationalist politics, at the crucial time of Partition his voice was also marginalized and not loudly heard.

[548] Amin, Shahid, "Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 1921-2," in *Selected Subaltern Studies,* edited by Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Oxford University Press, 1988, 289

Chatterjee, however, does examines Gandhi's terms, "*satyagraha,*" "*ahimsa*" and "the science of non-violence" more closely, while also declaring that "Gandhism provided for the first time in Indian politics an ideological basis for including the whole people within the political nation."[549] However, like Amin's much more functional analysis—or the function that the "Mahatma" served in peasant consciousness—Chatterjee also does not delve into how the people—especially the subalterns—interpreted, embodied or integrated nonviolence into their daily lives. Amin focuses not on how the ideology of nonviolence was interpreted, but rather how subalterns translated Gandhi into a holy figure without relationality to the man, his ideals or words. Amin's analysis is ultimately about how the iconic stature of the Mahatma was produced in the imaginary of the subalterns, and how the ideology of nonviolence was translated through local idioms to become quite different from what Gandhi intended.

By a minutely close analysis of Gandhi's 1921 visit to Gorakhpur in UP, Amin traces how the "peasant imagination" attributed thaumaturgic powers to the Mahatma and how this figuration, and the consequent political arousal of the subaltern, has to be read within the normative South Asian semiotics of the "worship of worthies."[550] Specifically within a Hindu religious idiom—(an idiom which Gandhi also deliberately cultivated to make the ideology of nonviolence incarnate, but which Amin does not explore). Instead Amin explains how the Chauri Chaura violence was caused by the figuration of the Mahatma together with a militant conception of "that polysemic word Swaraj,"[551] because "the Gandhi of its rustic protagonists was not as he really was, but as they had thought him up."[552] Although Amin's aim is not to explain Gandhi "as he really was" but rather how the subaltern interpreted him and produced the

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[549] Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought, 110
[550] Amin, 316
[551] Amin, 338
[552] Amin, 341

figure of the Mahatma far removed from any basis in reality, nevertheless the lack of materiality that nonviolence assumes in this study—as it does in most of the Subaltern Studies historians work—suggests that it is either discounted or it cannot be understood as a genuine political practice, and especially not one which the subaltern is capable of practicing. There remains a constant yet tacit suspicion about the subaltern's genuine capacity for nonviolence.

Even Chatterjee's more nuanced reading of the ideology of nonviolence, or what he refers to as "Gandhism," points towards, in Marxist terms, its rational contradictions:

> Once again, therefore, Gandhism sought to explain the defeat of its utopian quest by putting the blame on the moral failings of those who claimed to be leaders of the people. But in truth Gandhism as a political ideology had now been brought face to face with it most irreconcilable contradiction. While it insisted on the need to stay firm in the adherence to its ideal, it was no longer able to specify concretely the modalities of implementing this as a viable political practice. Now that there were powerful organized interests within the nation which clearly did not share the belief in the Gandhian ideal, there was no way in which the Gandhian ideology could identify a social force which would carry forward the struggle and overcome this opposition in the arena of politics.[553]

Although Chatterjee states that *ahimsa* provided "Gandhism" with a moral and epistemological framework within which to conceive of a new kind of political, "wholly different from all current conceptions of politics,"[554] yet this new conception is analyzed and formulated in tense comparison with politics as usual. Not only that, but its utopian ascription renders it ineffective and inadequate within the normative and pragmatic framework of its analysis. As such Chatterjee can claim that the violence of partition disclosed an "irreconcilable contradiction" at the heart of Gandhism, which implies that the new politics of nonviolence was not rational enough to replace the given political system.

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[553] Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought, 117

[554] Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought, 107

However, the question then arises, in how Chatterjee is formulating his critique, whether the appropriate lens for an analysis of an alternate politics of nonviolence—or what Chatterjee calls the new "science of nonviolence"—is through the same epistemological framework that it was aiming to displace and refashion? As Chatterjee points out that nonviolence could not create "a social force" that overcame opposition to its ideals from within the arena of politics as usual. However, what is overlooked in this analysis that it is precisely the transcendence of the given political that was the ideal yet practical aim of a politics of nonviolence. An aim that Gandhi clearly articulates it in *Hind Swaraj*: lasting and fundamental change could not be brought about from within the given but only by creating another, oppositional, method that would make the given system (of modernity/colonialism) redundant.

Gandhi's foundational text is a scathing critique of modernity; its emphasis is on decolonizing India from "Western civilization," of which colonialism was the harbinger and expression. For Gandhi, "*swaraj,*" or self-rule, is foremost the emancipation of subjectivity from the norms of Western civilization that colonialism had established. This was also the means of liberating the public sphere from foreign hegemony and restoring India "to its pristine condition" from within—the logic being that inner (personal) "truths" would be expressed in outer (public) forms. And although the village, as a signifier of an oppositional space to modern civilization would have been a logical choice here—especially one that represented an authentic Indian way of life that the text also posits in opposition—nevertheless, it has no conceptual centrality in *Hind Swaraj*. The village as the model for an alternate form of communal organization is a concept that occurs in Gandhi's later writings and not directly in *Hind Swaraj*.

Gandhi's first significant interaction with a village was the Indigo farmers of Champaran where, as he recalls in his autobiography, he was called upon to resolve a dispute between the

workers and the Planters.[555] During his fairly lengthy stay there he, along with a group of volunteers helping him, opened a number of schools, rudimentary health clinics and started a sanitation initiative. As one of the poorest of rural areas, this incident had a lasting impact upon the villagers and workers, but it also deeply affected Gandhi—the centrality of the village as an intrinsic unit of social transformation probably germinated in his thinking at this time.[556]

In *Hind Swaraj*, which preceded the Indigo farmers campaign, the focus of Gandhi's thought is solely on modernity as a paradigmatic framework, and the critique is directed against Western civilization as an expression of it. In positing a stark opposition between the West and India, Gandhi creates a somewhat Manichean framework: modern civilization is the "the Kingdom of Satan" whereas "Ancient Civilization" is the "Kingdom of God;" the one worships the "God of War" while the latter the "God of Love;"[557] the former is immoral whereas the "tendency of Indian civilisation is to elevate the moral being."[558] According to Gandhi, it is imperative that India revert back to "its pristine condition…and drive out Western civilisation,"[559] because, in accepting modernity, or in emulating the West, Indians effectively collaborate with the epistemological system that gives rise to colonialism. As such, they enable their own subjugation, or as Gandhi puts: "Those alone who have been affected by western civilisation have become enslaved."[560] He clarifies what he means by this form of—what I am calling epistemological collaboration—earlier in the text: "The English have not taken India; we

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[555] M.K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, trans. Mahadev Desai (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), 404-06.
[556] Even Gandhi's first ashram in India was located in Ahmadabad, the capital city of Gujrat, rather than a rural area, because, as he recounts in his autobiography, it received more "monetary help from its wealthy citizens" than if it was located elsewhere. However, this monetary help stopped once Gandhi allowed an "untouchable" family to take sanctuary in the Ashram. Gandhi, Autobiography, 395, 399.
[557] Hind Swaraj, 7
[558] Hind Swaraj, 71
[559] Hind Swaraj, 106
[560] Hind Swaraj, 72

have given it to them. They are not in India because of their strength, but because we keep them."[561]

Therefore, for Gandhi "swaraj" or "home-rule" is not the physical expulsion of the British from India but an ontological decolonization from—to use Foucault's term—the "episteme" of modernity; this form of decolonization can only come about through an inner self-transformation, or, as Gandhi actually translates "swaraj," through "self-rule." This inner, essential *swaraj* is not just conceived as a psychological refashioning or liberation, but much more than that, it is conceived as a refiguration of the normative subjective. Using Butler's language to explain the profound implications of Gandhian *swaraj*, "the ontology of the subject" is produced through a set of "ontological givens," such as the "differential of power" that colonialism represented; resistance, therefore, must address the grounds of subject formation foremost. Or, as Butler puts it, resistance must question the "frames" through which the normative subject "emerges" and is produced. [562] For Gandhi *ahimsa* was the frame through which *swaraj,* or the autonomous subject, could "emerge." Nonviolence would, organically, establish the possibility for the formation of such enlightened, self-sovereign beings, who, in turn, would create self-regulating, anarchic new communities of the future—one in which political institutions would be rendered redundant.

However, in recognizing or acknowledging the reality of this aspiration, or the utopia of *Ram Rajya*, it, and specifically "Gandhism," cannot be categorized as merely a "manouevre" in the unfolding telos of nationalism, one in which the Nehruvian moment is characterized as the "arrival" of the postcolonial nation-state. It is only within the epistemological frame of the given

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[561] Hind Swaraj, 39

[562] Butler, Frames of War, 138

political that Gandhi's aspirations can be categorized as either irreconcilably contradictory, and merely a stage in the unfolding telos of history, or unpragmatically utopian. Instead, if nonviolence is acknowledged as the new frame or emergence and interpretation then the contours of its formations can also be recognized as radically different.[563]

The assumption that Gandhi's anti-modern thrust, and the later centrality of the village, is archaic and "backward" overlooks its future oriented vision, one which all utopias share. In other words, despite Gandhi's rhetoric pointing towards some pristine time of Indian purity, his vision and his critique are very much situated within a modernist framework not only because of its temporal orientation but also in its critique of the given and the radical revolutionary desire to change it. Especially telling of this view are a series of letters Gandhi and Nehru exchanged about the "village" towards the end of 1945, when the concept of the village gets quite clearly articulated in conjunction with the utopian. This exchange of letters also gives a glimpse into how each of them envisioned the future organizational structure of India, and it highlights the contemporary relevance of Gandhi's critique of modernity.

Unsurprisingly, Nehru states that not only are the views expressed in *Hind Swaraj* no longer valid, but that they had never impressed him even at the outset. Even when he first read them many years ago, he states, that its perspective was completely "divorced from reality."[564] Therefore, he is surprised to learn that Gandhi has not moved away from these views with an "appreciation of modern trends."[565] Gandhi, in his reply, states that he still stands by all he had written in *Hind Swaraj* over thirty-eight years ago and, even more so, he has clarified this

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[563] Chatterjee formulates "Gandhism" as both anarchist resistance and, paradoxically, imbricated with nationalist state ideology. Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought, 155
[564] Gandhi-Nehru Letters in Supplementary writings at the end of *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*, edited by Anthony J. Parel, October 9th, 1945, 154
[565] Gandhi-Nehru Letters, October 9th, 1945, 153

position, especially regarding the "village," much more sharply since then. Truth and nonviolence, as Gandhi argues, can only be realized "in the simplicity of village life" and the *charḳhā* symbolizes this self-sufficiency. However, he clarifies that this does not mean that the model of the village he is envisioning would replicate existing Indian village conditions, instead it is a utopian vision:

> The village of my dreams is still in my mind. After all every man lives in the world of his dreams. My ideal village will contain intelligent human beings. They will not live in dirt and darkness as animals. Men and women will be free and able to hold their own against anyone in the world. There will be neither plague, nor cholera, nor smallpox; no one will be idle, no one will wallow in luxury. Everyone will have to contribute his quota of manual labour. I do not want to draw a large-scale picture in detail. It is possible to envisage railways, post and telegraph offices etc. For me it is material to obtain the real article and the rest will fit into the picture afterwards. If I let go the real thing, all else goes.[566]

The focus for Gandhi is neither a reversion to existing village materiality and customs, nor is it an opposition to modern technology for its own sake, but rather, a vision of a self-sufficient form of communal organization, loosely modeled upon the Indian village. As the symbol of an alternate form of communal organization, the village is the "real thing" because it epitomizes an economics of sustainability and, therefore, represents an autonomous political unit. What is even more interesting is that in order for this ideal to be realized the normative subject must first change or evolve from "animals" to "intelligent" human beings—with the presumption that nonviolence would catalyze this evolution.

Nehru's response, written a few days later, is telling on a number of counts about his characteristically modernist presumptions about the village: firstly, he states, the village "is backward intellectually and culturally and no progress can be made from a backward

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[566]Gandhi-Nehru Letters, October 5th, 1945, 150

environment." As such, he is befuddled that Gandhi can presume the village embodies "truth and non-violence" when "[n]arrow-minded people are much more likely to be untruthful and violent;" furthermore, because the "village" is discursively situated in the "present and the past" Nehru cannot understand how it would become a model for the future shape of the nation. The future, as Nehru articulates, must be organized towards "modern development" and "scientific growth." Towards the end of the letter, Nehru voices the widespread belief that Gandhi first elaborated upon the concept of the village in *Hind Swaraj*.[567]

In these letters, Gandhi makes it quite clear that he never outlined his vision about the village in that text although he stands "by the system of Government envisaged in *Hind Swaraj*" even after all these years.[568] It is in his later writings, as Gandhi clarifies, that he conceived of the village as a signifier of self-sufficiency and real swaraj. What Nehru cannot grasp, however, is how the ideal village is temporally situated in the future as Gandhi's utopian "dream." Not only that, but given his modernist lens, he reduces Gandhi's complex concept and its temporal circularity into a linear view that reduces the Indian village into a signifier merely of a past that must be transcended. That Gandhi conceived of it as a model for the future of the nation and an antidote to the violence at the heart of the developmental paradigm was never fully recognized or acknowledged by Nehru, situated as he was within a modernist and linear temporal framework.

The anthology *M.K. Gandhi: Village Swaraj,* attempts to fashion a coherent narrative of Gandhi's multivalent perspectives of the village, but the book confuses rather than clarifies as it stitches together snippets of Gandhi's writings without distinguishing time or context. Even more confusingly, it creates a seemingly coherent narrative about a topic that was not so seamlessly conceived in Gandhi's thoughts or articulations. So that, a text written in Gandhi's journal

[567] Gandhi-Nehru Letters, October 9th, 1945, 152-54
[568] Gandhi-Nehru Letters, October 5th, 1945, 150

Harijan is selectively patched together with another view written in the same journal years earlier or from a different source and time altogether but presented like a seamless narrative. In a revealing account—both of how the book is patched together and Gandhi's multivalent perspectives—Gandhi compares his view with Nehru's conception of industrialization, mediated through the lens of a socialist economics. According to Gandhi, who wrote this account in *Harijan* in 1940, Nehru states that industrialization via a socialist economics "would be free from the evils of capitalism." In *Village Swaraj,* this passage is followed by a statement by Gandhi, written a year earlier (1939) in the same journal, that industrialization itself needs to be opposed because it degrades human dignity. Gandhi presents Soviet Russia as a prime counter-example of socialist industrialization that also demeans the individual by turning them into mere cogs in a machine.[569] Although Gandhi's argument logically follows Nehru's thoughts, nevertheless, historically, the latter precedes the former statement and is not seamless with it as the book presents. What it does reveal, however, are Gandhi views that it is the paradigm of "development" itself that is harmful, and one that cannot be salvaged from its destructive consequences by the ideology of those who practice it.

Gandhi does state, however, in an even earlier issue of *Harijan* (1937) that he wanted to industrialize the village "in a different way." This different way essentially argues for local methods and means of production and consumption using basic kinds of machinery such as the *charḳhā*; this kind of mass production by villagers in their homes would not be the kind of industrialization he considers harmful. On the contrary, for Gandhi cottage industries created the necessary self-sufficiency he was constantly advocating as a means to decolonization. Furthermore, this kind of self-sufficient industriousness signified, and would enable, a

[569] Gandhi, M.K., *Village Swaraj*, compiled by H.M. Vyas. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1962, 16.

decentralized economy. As he states in a 1942 issue of *Harijan*: "The end to be sought is human happiness combined with full mental and moral growth. I use the adjective moral as synonymous with spiritual. This end can be achieved under decentralization. Centralization as a system is inconsistent with a non-violent structure of society."[570] For Gandhi centralization, both political and economic, signified violent societies because it destroyed egalitarian systems and took power away from the individual by imposing top-down forms of organization. Whereas, decentralization empowers not only local bodies, such as the village, but ultimately the individual, to produce self-reliant, enlightened individuals that are both the condition and result of equitable economies. But it is also interesting to note that the very modern aspiration Gandhi held for these decentralized, nonviolent societies was to create "human happiness."

Even in this chronological mélange of Gandhi's writings it becomes fairly evident that the village as a conceptual expression of *ahimsa*, and as a blueprint for the ideal society of the future, becomes clearer in his later writings rather than the early ones. Similarly, even in *The Political and Moral Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* edited by Raghavan Iyer, which is a much more coherent, comprehensive and clearly dated anthology, there seems to be no evidence of Gandhi articulating the symbolic significance of the village in his writings before the mid 1930's. Therefore, Ghaffar Khan's claim that Gandhi made the village central to the ontology of nonviolence at his bidding needs to be looked at in the context of how this important signifier developed over time.

Although it has been quoted quite often, it is worth reiterating Gandhi's description of the village as the building block of a new kind of society, a form of organizing the future nation, and its signification in his imaginary:

[570] Gandhi, *Village Swaraj*, 34

> In this structure composed of innumerable villages, there will be ever-widening, never ascending circles. Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the village, the latter ready to perish for the circle of villages, till at last the whole becomes one life composed of individuals, never aggressive in their arrogance but ever humble, sharing the majesty of the oceanic circle of which they are integral units.
> Therefore the outermost circumference will not yield power to crush the inner circle but will give strength to all within and derive its own strength from it. I may be taunted with the retort that this is all Utopian and, therefore, not worth a single thought. If Euclid's point, though incapable of being drawn by human agency, has an imperishable value, my picture has its own for mankind to live. Let India live for this true picture, though never realizable in its completeness. We must have a proper picture of what we want, before we can have something approaching it. If there ever is to be a republic of every village in India, then I claim verity for my picture in which the last is equal to the first or, in other words, no one is to be the first and none the last.[571]

The village as a unit that constructs the ideal society would not merely be the agrarian base for the economic or cultural superstructure but rather it was envisioned as a centrifugal force that impels the formation of other villages into rhizomatic networks, (to use Deleuze and Gauttari's phrase). This was not only Gandhi's vision for the shape of the nation but it signified independence or *swaraj* in its truest sense. Although this vision is utopian, as Gandhi acknowledges, he also reemphasizes the pragmatic necessity of utopias, and of ideals, as guides pointing the way to the possibilities for the real in the future. Or as requisite maps constructing reality in particular ways. Lastly, I also want to point to the pragmatic economic underpinning that the last line in this quote signals: Gandhi is expanding upon the title of John Ruskin's book, *Unto This Last*. Ruskin derived the title for his book from the bible and uses it as a pointer towards an alternate economic theory in opposition to the capitalist one that was becoming the

[571] This description is in *Panchgani*, July 21, 1946 given in answer to a question about how he conceives of independent India. In reference, the questioner points to an article Gandhi had written in *Harijan* on July 15 titled "The Real Danger," which stated that Congressmen did not clearly know the kind of independence they were seeking. In the *Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, edited by Raghavan Iyer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. Vol III, 232-33

norm. This alternate economics, in which no one would be relegated to be first and none the "last," would not reduce anyone to a position of powerlessness or poverty either economically or through social stature. Furthermore, the emphasis on "human happiness" that Gandhi constantly states as the telos of ideal social structures also harkens back to Ruskin's economic theory: sustaining life in equitable and organic ways results in true human health and happiness, in contradistinction with a capitalist theory of economics in which happiness is equated merely with profit.

At the end of *Hind Swaraj,* and in his autobiography, Gandhi acknowledges the thinkers who affected his ideas; the Western authors he cites are all self-reflexive critics of the normative values of their time—exhibiting an equally modern ethos. He gives tribute for his ideas to Leo Tolstoy, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau and John Ruskin. To Tolstoy and Thoreau, he attributes his anarchic philosophy of governance, but it is Ruskin's economic theory that particularly influenced Gandhi's economics of sustainability, yet one which he develops in his own unique way through the concept of the village. It is important to note however, that the "village," as a conceptual category or an oppositional signifier, is not central to Ruskin's economic theory or his critique of modernity.

Gandhi read Ruskin's *Unto This Last* in South Africa in its entirety on an all-night train journey and, as he acknowledges in his autobiography, it was one of the few texts that "brought about an instantaneous and practical transformation in my life." In this text, Gandhi acknowledges, "I discovered some of my deepest convictions." So enamored did he become with the book that he translated it into Gujrati in 1908—or, as he says, he "paraphrased" it—and titled it "*Sarvodya*" or "the welfare of all." He outlines what he understood as the core teachings of Ruskin's book into three main points:

> 1. That the good of the individual is contained in the good of all.
> 2. That a lawyer's work has the same value as the barber's inasmuch as all have the same right of earning their livelihood from their work.
> 3. That a life of labour, *i.e.*, the life of the tiller of the soil and the handicraftsman is the life worth living.
>
> The first of these I knew. The second I had dimly realized. The third had never occurred to me. *Unto This Last* made it as clear as daylight for me that the second and the third were contained in the first. I arose with the dawn, ready to reduce these principles to practice.[572]

While Gandhi's version abbreviates the core ideas of Ruskin's four essays, what is central to both Ruskin's text and Gandhi's translation cum paraphrase is to posit an alternate economics in place of the "mercantile" economics that was fast becoming normative. Pragmatically speaking, the principles of this alternate economics later became the armature upon which the ideology of nonviolence could be brought to life.

Originally published as four separate essays in *Cornhill Magazine* in the summer of 1860, and later as a book in 1862, Ruskin's text states that contemporary mercantile economics is erroneous. Not only because it attempts to posit a "scientific" or rational system to explain monetary affairs, without taking into account the strong role of affect in human relations, but also, much more damningly, the market must produce systemic poverty and inequality in order to sustain itself. Ruskin points to the violence inherent in systems that regard self-interest as the basis of economic theories. He specifically points to the development of economics as a science by Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill,[573] which, he states, are economic theories that conceive of the human as a mechanical being without taking into account the "influence of social affection."

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[572] Gandhi, Autobiography, 299

[573] Ruskin, John, *Unto This Last and Other Writings*. London: Penguin Books, 1997, 331

An alternate economics can never be articulated as a “rational system” because affect cannot be systematized. Ruskin does specify, however, that an alternate economics ought to be organized not for the sake of profit, or selfish motives but, instead, it would include the moral and the just in the affairs of trade and business. In fact, Ruskin argues that the “Merchant” is amongst the five great “intellectual professions that exist in every civilized society,” alongside with the Soldier, Pastor, Lawyer and Physician, because they provide the goods necessary to sustain life.[574] Counter to the prevailing views of economists, who state that “the accumulation of wealth is a sign of prosperity,” it is the poor, working like slaves, that produce wealth and thus sustain both the gains of the rich and their own impoverishment. An alternate economics, therefore, would sustain life. As Ruskin elaborates:

> Labour in the real sense of the term is that which produces useful articles. Useful articles are those which support human life, such as food, clothes, or houses and enable men to perfect the functions of their own lives to the utmost and also to exercise a helpful influence over the lives of others…Accumulated wealth which leads to the destruction of a nation is of no earthly use. The capitalists of modern times are responsible for widespread and unjust wars which originate from the covetousness of mankind.[575]

Manual labor becomes a moral signifier precisely because it sustains life; that which sustains life is precisely the source and the result of wealth. Economic systems that neither take the source nor the end result of wealth into account are devoid of morality and justice, (even if they are legitimately sanctioned); material attributes alone do not determine the real value of wealth but rather what those attributes produce: “faithful industries, progressive energies and productive ingenuities; or on the other hand, it may be indicative of mortal luxury, merciless tyranny ruinous chicanery.”[576] Money in and of itself has no value but points towards systems that either

[574] Ruskin, 21-22
[575] Ruskin, 58-60
[576] Ruskin, 42

sustain life and allow it to flourish, which Ruskin classifies as moral and just, or enslave and degrade the populace to empower and enrich a few, and which are, therefore, immoral and unjust. Instead of the accumulation of wealth for its own sake, or for power over others, a life-sustaining economics would equate wealth with the good life in a different way: it would produce "full breathed, bright-eyed and happy-hearted human beings."[577] Happiness would be the real marker of a moral and just economics.

Although the economics of sustainability that is laid out in *Unto This Last,* and that which undergirds the ideology of nonviolence, is intrinsically oppositional to the capitalist economy which colonialism had made global, neither Ruskin nor Gandhi seem to be influenced by Marxist economic theory, even if the moral presumption of both seems quite similar; instead, what is most pertinent is precisely the fact that they posit a framework in opposition to capitalism yet one which is also a socialist alternative to Marxist theory.[578] The issue of class, however, is not only lacking in Ruskin and Gandhi but they, in fact, posit a benevolent ruling patriarch in stark counter-distinction to Marx's proletarian ideal. Further, even though Gandhi translates the underlying economic causes of international, national and individual violence from Ruskin's book quite succinctly he does not dwell upon or exemplify the connection between the abstract and the material which is central to the original book, and perhaps a bridge that is also lacking in his own ideological articulations. Nevertheless, the centrality of economic systems for the creation of just and moral societies, as Ruskin's book puts forth with such brilliance, does ground the abstract principles that Gandhi initiates in *Hind Swaraj*, even if only tacitly. By

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[577] Ruskin, 46

[578] The English Romantics, especially the political views of Thomas Carlyle strongly influenced Ruskin, and both of whom, in turn, were affected by William Morris and the English socialists of the early twentieth century. See Clive Wilmer's "Introduction" of *Unto This Last*.

resonating so profoundly with his own world-view, many of the economic principles voiced in *Unto This Last* become indistinguishably intertwined with the ideology of nonviolence as a whole. However, the most interesting and quite modern aspiration that both Ruskin and Gandhi advance are the goal of producing "happy-hearted human beings."

Socialist Democracy and Pashtunistan*:* A Nebulous Imaginary

khāwəndâ ẗé wūdānâ kṛəy
zəmūńǵ də yowwālī hujra
yow źāy pəkəy də źānâ kṛəy
də pukhtūw ḍəlâ khwərâ
yow zḍâ yow sāyow shānəy kṛəy
dey bəyəl āw bəyəl pukhtūn lrâ

lord create for our survival
a *hujra* housing our unity
create a place of self-presence, togetherness
for Pukhto's scattered multitudes
one heart, one breath, one citadel create
containing the separate and separated Pukhtuns

(IV)
pukhtūw zəmūńǵâ chərẗâ yəi
wələy lé mūńǵâ beirẗâ yəi
zəmūńǵ zḍâ źeigir ẗé yəi
zəmūńǵ də qām wəzr ẗé yəi
pé mūńǵâ lār Āsānâ kṛəy
ché mūńǵâ yow shū kəl srâ

where are you our Pukhto?
why have you separated from us
you are our heart, our core
you are the wings of our nation
may you make our path easy
so we become one totality[579]

[579] Ghaffar Khan uses a fairly lengthy poem by the staunch Pashtun nationalist and poet Mahmud Makhfi as an epigraph, and to whom he also dedicates his autobiography. I have translated the first and fourth verses of the poem here reflecting the nationalist thought that strongly influenced not only Ghaffar Khan but also Ghani Khan's poetry. In Ghaffar Khan, *zmā žwand āw jdow-jeẖd.* .

For both Gandhi and Ghaffar Khan the village signified the building block in an economics of sustainability which would undergird the ideal societies they were envisioning—and with "constructive work" so central to it, the *charḳhā*, or the spinning wheel, became the principal symbol for this utopian aspiration. However, for Gandhi the signification of the village was generally articulated in conceptual terms, whereas for Ghaffar Khan it was a material embeddedness in the land—it signified the semiotics of agriculture—even if, as I argued earlier, he may have catalyzed and not just shared Gandhi's conceptual significance of the village as well. Furthermore, the importance of the village was also politically pragmatic for both leaders: in Gandhi's case, it mobilized the masses from this base who then, for the first time, participated in nationalist representation;[580] and for Ghaffar Khan the majority of his audience and followers already had strong agrarian roots so that the village was a natural model of communal organization. However, both leaders also did not envision the model as a replica of the traditional village but rather a progressive, and in many ways, modern reformation of existing systems. As such sanitation, universal education, basic healthcare and cottage industries feature so predominantly in their desire to reform the given. Furthermore, because the economic structure of villages was seen as both autonomous and interdependent with other communities, the contemporary adage of "think global, act local" was precisely what both leaders were advocating far ahead of their times.

For Ghaffar Khan in particular, the ideal, future community would also, as he states in his autobiography, establish a "socialist democracy." Unlike Gandhi, however, Ghaffar Khan's ideal

[580] However, according to Chatterjee, Gandhism was "a national framework of politics in which the peasants are mobilized but do not participate, of a nation of which they are a part, but a national state from which they are forever distanced." Nationalist Thought, 125

economic system was neither well-articulated nor materially manifested, even in truncated form, so that it remains a matter of analytical assumptions to determine what he meant. In analyzing his speeches, writings and the organization of the KK, it is logical to assume that his envisioned socialist democracy would have grafted local norms upon modern and global aspirations. In that sense it would have been far different from Nehru's "socialist democracy"[581] and its universal vision, although the phrase may have had Nehruvian origins. Ghaffar Khan uses this phrase in his autobiography when describing the events leading to Partition, ones that threatened his envisioned nation by the emerging tangibility of Pakistan.

During the formation of the Constituent Assembly, Ghaffar Khan states that he tried to persuade the Muslim League not to boycott the elections because a "socialist democracy" was being proposed on the ballot. This, he argues, would have especially benefited the Muslims of Hindustan because they were the poorer community. Furthermore, as he continues to argue, because there was a provision in the future Constitution of India that each province could have the right to secede from the Federation by a majority vote in its Provincial Assembly, then each province could have, potentially, formed its own autonomous government or chosen to form a group with other like-minded provinces. If the Muslim League had agreed, he reminisces, then "neither Punjab nor Bengal would have been partitioned."[582] But what was mainly at stake for Ghaffar Khan in the Cripps or the Cabinet Mission Plan provisions, that allowed for such provincial autonomy, but which he does not articulate in his autobiography at this point (written as it was in 1983 after he and the KK were declared traitors by the Pakistani state and constantly suspected of secessionist motives), was the tangible possibility that the Frontier Province, the

[581] Ghaffar Khan, Pashto Autobiography, 695
[582] Ghaffar Khan, Pashto Autobiography, 696

Tribal Territories and parts of (Pashtun) Baluchistan could have formed their own autonomous state—what he calls, *Pukhtunistan*.

Pukhtunistan, or what I will henceforth call "Pashtunistan," was the name given to an already existing nationalist aspiration, although it is often historically categorized as a late, desperate call by Ghaffar Khan in response to the unwilling inclusion of the North-West Frontier Province into the new nation-state of Pakistan.[583] However, even though the aspiration for Pashtunistan may have a long lineage prior to its call at the time of Partition, as Abdul Karim Khan argues in his dissertation,[584] it was, nevertheless, not a seamless imaginary but one that changed over time and circumstance. In fact, after the KK ideology of nonviolence became the new voice of Pashtun nationalism, the concept of Pashtunistan heralded the alternate (and utopian) community that Ghaffar Khan was striving towards, but which, nevertheless, included aspects of these prior aspirations.

In the remainder of this chapter I will try to sketch out Ghaffar Khan and the KK's envisioned Pashtunistan, but only as an amorphous shape. More pointedly, I compare it with Jinnah's call for Muslim nationhood which, in stark contrast with the former, was disconnected from factors that nationalist belonging had historically been invested with: a common language, ethnicity, a shared history or indigenous land. Jinnah and the AIML's immaterial conception of a nation, unrooted to either a particular place or historical context, as Faisal Devji argues, "led them to conceive of a novel and remarkably abstract form of political unity premised upon a paradoxical rejection of the past." Moreover, untethered to a particular history or geography

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[583] Amongst others, Erland Janson makes this case quite strongly in his book, *India, Pakistan or Pakhtunisan: The Nationalist Movement in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47.* Uppsala: ACTA Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1981.

[584] Karim Khan, Abdul, "The Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God)/ Red Shirt Movement in the North-West Frontier Province of British India 1927-1947," PhD diss., University of Hawaii, 1997.

"they claimed a territory of their own."[585] Devji states that the ground of this form of nationhood was the social contract model of the State, derived from Enlightenment philosophy and 17th century European models. Yet he also, paradoxically, describes the call for Pakistan as "a new kind of politics."[586] To define Jinnah's aspiration and accomplishment as a "new political" would be accurate only to the degree that the abstract principle of a common religion was historically unprecedented, except for the contemporaneous call for Israel.[587] In ascribing its ground as firmly embedded in the normative political, it cannot also be argued that this was a new political in any kind of radical sense. Therefore, as I will argue in the rest of this chapter, it could not be termed as such when compared to the new political that the Khudai Khidmatgars had produced and the utopian ideal they were aspiring towards.

As Karim Khan points out in his dissertation, the concept of a unified and autonomous Pashtun nation has a long historical lineage; however, the concept of Pashtunistan does not necessarily translate into a clearly defined nation-state, as he also argues.[588] Although the Mahmoud Makhfi poem that he uses as an epigraph to his chapter—and which I also use at the beginning of this section—voices the aspirations of Pashtun nationalism, it also illustrates that its contours were derived from the linguistic and cultural unity even of disparate Pashtuns. Despite the fact that the poem calls for a "*hujra*" and a "citadel" this geographic space, or even the desire for a unified nation, does not automatically translate into the modern incarnation of statehood: a clearly defined and bordered nation-state—an impoverished way of imagining communities that

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[585] Devji 2013, 91
[586] Devji 2013, 106
[587] As both Devji 2013, and Mufti 2007 argue; but the original comparison of Pakistan with Israel can be attributed to Maulana Azad in *India Wins Freedom,* which I look at in more detail below.
[588] See the last Chapter, "Either India or Pakistan, But No Pukhtunistan" pp. 558-628. Karim Khan states that the concept of "*Pukhtunistan*" became incipient at the formation of the KK in 1928; furthermore, he cites Dr. Fazl-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat's dissertation, *The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan, 1917-1979*, saying that Marwat traced the concept of *Pashtunistan* to Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi's "program of *Pushtaniyyah*" of 1909-10, 560 and FN 7.

has, nevertheless, become homogenous. The "nation-state," especially in its postcolonial incarnations, is derived from the colonial state model to become the modern normative model for organizing communities. This, in turn, is imagined as a secular, multi-linguistic and multi-racial spatial organization, but one which has, quite incongruous with this cosmopolitan imaginary, clearly defined and heavily policed borders.

Even though the call for Pashtunistan was largely envisioned as an extended form of the North-West Frontier and Pashtun Baluchistan at the time of Partition, and included in its imaginary the minority populations of Hazaras, Kohistanis, Hindus, Sikhs and others living in the Province, nevertheless its founding principle was self-sovereignty for the Pashtuns. It was largely this racial-linguistic basis of both the KK's founding and aspirations that not only motivated its acts and ideology, but which also became its Achilles heel. It was only when the call for Pakistan loomed as a crushing reality that Ghaffar Khan perhaps envisioned a separate nation-state along the lines that Jinnah was calling for. Prior to that, the call was for an autonomous province within united India, and the nebulous contours of Pashtunistan remained untethered to the idea of bordered nationalism even while, as I am stressing, they were agitating for a unified Pashtun nation embedded in a particular geographical space and historical context.

While Ghaffar Khan and other KK members were touring villages in Hazara and Haripur, where the borders of the NWFP and Punjab blur, he recounts that not only was he "amazed at the affection and sincerity of the common people" but that in the village of Chach—cartographically part of Punjab—he delivered the following speech to the "large *jalsa,*" or large rally, gathered on "the Sarhad side of the border":[589]

[589] Ghaffar Khan recounts that when he and the KK delegation tried to cross the border into Punjab they were accosted by the police and threatened with arrest if they held their j*alsa* there. Therefore, they crossed the border a few feet away to hold the rally in the NWFP. From Imtiaz Sahibzada's translation of Ghaffar Khan's Pashto Autobiography, *My Life and Struggle*, publication forthcoming, 381

> I told them that they, too, were Pukhtuns and so were we. We were the progeny of a common ancestor; that we desired that they, too, should enter the folds of this new *Khudai Khidmatgar* brotherhood along with us. There would be one *Jirga* for all of us which would take decisions on all national issues; and through this we would be continuously made aware of each other's problems and difficulties. We would also, then, become a nation like the other nations of the world and we and our children would prosper.[590]

The multivalent concept of nationhood had many significations in Ghaffar Khan's mind; what was common to each of the signifiers "nation" or "*qəwm,"* and the less frequently used "country" or "*mulk,"* was its spatial situatedness: it was imagined as an organic belonging to the land; a land that was linguistically bound together. It was a land in which Pashto was spoken regardless of the race or religion of its inhabitants. In Ghaffar Khan's estimation, not only did this include Hindu and Sikh Pashtuns but he even describes the Hazara as Pashto speakers who had forgotten their mother tongue, and who had to be reminded of it. On one of his tours to the Hazara district Ghaffar Khan says he was surprised at the hostile reception they received, was including black flags and violent counter-demonstrations. He addresses one of these village crowds to say:

> They are also Pukhtuns and so are you. Come let us determine the cause of all this disparate behavior. Whatever little thought I have given the matter, the reason appears to be that you have given up the use of your original mother-tongue, Pukhto. Not only have you abandoned Pukhto as a language, but have also given up Pukhto as a code of conduct. Oh Pukhtuns of Hazara! Remember what I am about to say. Those who have abandoned their language, have abandoned their national identity. And those who look down upon their mother-tongue, they have lost their status and standing."[591]

According to this rhetoric, language signified a common ethos which, in turn, was the ground of national identity; and although more inclusive than xenophobic it was, nevertheless, racially reductive. And even though the rhetoric was pointing to the belief that Pashto was an indigenous

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[590] Ghaffar Khan, *My Life and Struggle*, IS trans, 382
[591] Ghaffar Khan, *My Life and Struggle*, IS trans, 377

and ancient Indic language—(in contrast with ascriptions of Pashtuns as displaced Semites)—not to give Hindko, the language spoken in Hazara, the same recognition was a prejudice that would prove particularly costly. As such it alienated many from what they perceived as racial chauvinism wrapped up in the guise of nationalism and pacifist delusions, or simply put, as hypocrisy. These perceptions were magnified and adroitly exploited by the Frontier Muslim League and, in contrast with the rest of India, it cleaved the Province apart on racial rather than religious grounds during Partition. Ghaffar Khan recognized this linguistic/racial divide, as he comments: "we were successful in the areas that spoke Pashto; and the Muslim League were declared successful where Hindko was spoken;"[592] however, his means of addressing this problem strengthened the divide rather than bridging it.

Nevertheless, Ghaffar Khan conceived the future government of the envisioned nation as an egalitarian one where there would be no class distinctions and no heredity leaders or kings. Instead there would be elected leaders who, quite tellingly, resemble him. However, whether Ghaffar Khan was envisioning himself as the head of the new autonomous nation is not too clear, and, more likely, he was pointing to himself as an exemplary leader, or what Aamir Mufti describes as "exemplarity."[593] Mufti ascribes this term to the figure of the "'secular' nationalist" in Nehru's *Discovery of India,* one who, as he argues, is the real subject of this text and the teleological history of India is a frame through which Nehru situates this figure. This exemplary leader is much more than a political representative but someone who can "represent the nation, that is, speak for it, not because he is a representative figure…but because he exemplifies the highest form of consciousness it is possible to attain in this colonial society." Mufti compares Nehru's tacit conception of exemplarity in *Discovery of India* with Maulana Azad's *Ġhubār-e*

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[592] Khan, *zmā žwand āw jdow-jeẖd.* 515. My translation.
[593] Mufti, 133

ḳhāṭir to claim that the latter "interrupts this developmental narrative" and the linear logic of Nehru's overtly "Eurocentric imaginary"[594] to situate himself in a "vernacular modernity" instead.[595] However, I would argue, that Ghaffar Khan's articulations of "exemplarity" intersects both: his narrative is located partly in a teleological framework—but more messianic than developmental—and his exemplary leader also embodies a high form of consciousness but is situated in a "vernacular modernity" rather than a colonial one.

The situatedness of his exemplary leader in the vernacular imaginary is foregrounded by his rhetoric about the kind of governance he was envisioning for the future nation. In answer to people who wanted him to become King, Ghaffar Khan explains that their demand was counter to the new kind of leadership that he and the KKs were aiming to create. In a speech he gave in a *jalsa* to the Khalil-Mohmand tribes he states:

> We have started this movement not to gain [ruling] power nor that I become a King. Firstly, there is no kingship in Islam, and secondly, if you ever turned me into a king then you will be ruined while I will be having a good time. So, you must understand, that neither I nor anyone else should be made king. We do not want to create [a system of] kingship; we have no need of kings; we will have one leader who will listen to, be chosen by, and deliberate with the people, and he will be in service [a *khidmatgar*] to the people. There will be no distinction made between a Khan and a destitute or a Mian and a Mullah. On the contrary, it can be any person that is pious and sincere and wants to protect the nation [*qəwm*] and country [*mulk*]; someone who has undergone much hardship, sacrifice and has extensively served the nation [*qəwm]* and country [*mulk*]; one who is knowledgeable and competent to lead. Our government will be subordinate to the people; the people will not be subordinate to the government. Kingship is a bad thing and the nation [*qəwm]* and country [*mulk*] suffer for it. Even if today there is a good king then tomorrow his son will rule so who can say how good he will be? How many kings want their people to prosper? Because they think, all the time, that if the people understand they will remove me, so they always put obstacles on the path of understanding. This country belongs to all [of us] Pashtuns so we will not turn one man into a Khan; instead we will strive to make everyone into khans. And we will make a government that creates equality and all the people within [the nation] will have the same care and benefits. We will share equally in good times and in bad. There will be peace, there will be justice,

[594] Mufti points out that according to Azad, Nehru even dreams in English.
[595] Mufti, 157

> and there will be one *jirga* representing the whole nation, and they will select one head of state.[596]

The constant reference to the *jirga* system was not merely rhetoric on his part, nor was it a replication of the parliamentary system with a local name. This was demonstrated not only by the organizational structure of the KK but also by the fact that the *jirga* system was extended, at least in theory, to the formation of the Frontier Congress once they were elected into office—it was actually called the Afghan Jirga in counter-distinction with other provincial Congress branches. However, because the *jirga* system was often mediated through authority figures its egalitarianism is often questionable in letter if not in spirit. Even this, however, was dependent upon existing local forms of social organization, so that, for example, in Waziristan the egalitarianism was extreme and each individuals voice, no matter their social status, could be voiced.[597] In Swat, by contrast, the other extreme was often the case, due to the rigid class and caste hierarchies,[598] the *jirga* was often a place where the Wali or the ruling Khan demonstrated their authority or benevolence. Similar to a Mughal durbar, some of these *jirgas* were formed to hear and pass judgement upon the complaints and grievances of the local populace. Taking these local expressions of the *jirga* system into account, Ghaffar Khan's national *jirga* (as well the one the KK adopted) would have been modeled upon the norms prevalent in Hashtnagar—quite literally "eight villages." This locality includes the district of Charsadda, just outside Peshawar, in which Ghaffar Khan's home village of Uthmanzai is located. This was also the headquarters of the KK movement as well as the *Pukhtun* journal. In this area the *jirga* system falls between

[596] Ghaffar Khan, Autobiography, 527 My translation
[597] See Akbar S. Ahmed, *Pukhtun Economy and Society* (1980), Christian Tripodi, *Edge of Empire,* (2011) and Roland Hunt and John Harrison, *The District Officer in India* (1980).
[598] See the anthropological books of Charles Lindholm and Fredrik Barth. Although the latter makes the arguable case that "caste" is prevalent in Swati society, he does illustrate the more rigid class hierarchies prevalent there.

the two extremes of Waziristan and Swat, and although relatively more egalitarian within the broader scale of the Province and Tribal Territories, it is, nevertheless, often mediated by the local Khans or other honorary authority figures. However, unlike Swat, these authority figures could also belong to the subaltern classes, or figures who had earned an honorable reputation through some form of civic leadership.[599] The leadership and rankings of the KK demonstrated this local ethos quite well where, unusually, people from the working class were often promoted to high ranking officers in its "army."[600] And although the inclusion of the subaltern in higher echelons of power was revolutionary for Pashtun society, nevertheless, it was also a *reevaluation* and *reinterpretation* of the given rather than an insertion of completely new norms. Which is the why, as I am arguing, Ghaffar Khan's articulation of exemplary leadership was situated in an ethos of "vernacular modernity;" a modernity that was not just parallel to the colonial world but intersectional with its vocabularies and imaginaries.

Although Nehru's secular nationalist figure seems like a biographical pointer, Ghaffar Khan's exemplary leader perhaps was not, because, similar to Gandhi, he always shunned official roles of power when they were offered to him. Not only did he refuse to have an official title in the Frontier Congress Ministry the three times they were elected into office but, furthermore, he also refused to become President of the AINC when it was offered to him. Instead he suggested that Maulana Azad be selected in his place. Wary always of political power, he even states in his autobiography that the downfall of the KK movement started when the Frontier Congress was elected into office. Furthermore, the solicitation of key figures of power at the center also differentiated Gandhi from Ghaffar Khan. Gandhi would often meet and negotiate

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599 Although this technically included Mullahs and Pirs, the Hashtnagar area is not partial to having religious figures elevated to these ranks; these figures are often targets of derision rather than of respect as Ghani Khan's many poetic utterances denouncing the hypocrisy of the Mullah demonstrate really well.
600 See Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed.*

with the British whereas the latter constantly shunned having a dialogue with them and could only reluctantly be compelled to meet them. Gandhi writes him a letter chastising this intransigent attitude and insisted he meet with the Governor of the Province who had extended an invitation for dialogue. He replies to Gandhi, saying: "I told him that he was a Mahatma while I was a weak human being and did not wish to tread on slippery ground lest I slip and fall." While to the Governor, Ghaffar Khan replied that he would only meet if they were to discuss the problems of the Province with sincerity: "the Governor did not agree to this and informed me that in politics there is no honesty. So, I sent back the message that if there is no honesty then I do not want to meet, because my politics is [all] about sincerity."[601]

His lack of dialogue with the colonial center was also a large contributing factor to the fact that his voice was not heard at the crucial time of Partition. His disdain for power—power made normative through colonial hegemony—disallowed him to take advantage of his peculiar political position, and in not acknowledging the kind of power that he did possess, as a leader of one of the largest nonviolent army and in a Muslim majority province, he put himself at a disadvantage during the negotiations leading to Partition. Therefore, his voice and views never gained the kind of legitimacy or recognition that Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah did; the latter pragmatically engaged with the centers of powers they were both resisting and trying to replace. But, in doing so, they also reinstituted the very same mechanisms of domination they were attempting to overcome. I sketch the conceptual contours of the kind of "power" that I am referring to later on in this chapter to clarify how Ghaffar Khan embodied an alternate

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[601] Ghaffar Khan, Autobiography, 421. My translation. Ghaffar Khan is also quite scornful of his brother, Dr. Khan Sahib's close interaction and social associations with members of the colonial government, saying that, "Dr. Sahib was a strange person" and often cooperated with and agreed to British demands. (From IS translated manuscript, P 471)

interpretation of it than other nationalist figures; a form of power which Gandhi both ascribed to as an ideal but which he also mediated when he thought it was pragmatically expedient to do so.

Voices heard and unheard at the center: A question of "power"

That Jinnah assumed the role of sole spokesperson for all Indian Muslims was precisely what created the divide that Ghaffar Khan, as well as other Muslim leaders, were desperately trying to avoid, but whose voices were not heard at the imperial center, whereas, quite notably, Jinnah's voice loudly resonates till today. The question of how recognition is granted through imperial centers is not a new one, however, what is perhaps missing in the scholarship, or only tangentially addressed, is the question of epistemological collaboration, both deliberate and inadvertent. Epistemological (and ontological) collaboration obviously also becomes a question of hegemonic knowledge systems and how its representations become both the norm and normative even by those resisting the apparatuses' of domination, (or even by those representing the unheard subaltern voice as Spivak famously points out). What I have been constantly pointing to in my dissertation is the production of hegemony through the participation of its actors—both colonial and colonized—who, by engaging with it on its own terms, keep reproducing the hegemonic system in a way that (re) affirms its modes of power—whether advertently or not does not really matter to its functionality at the end. (This is, of course not a novel argument but underlies *Hind Swaraj* as well). The desire for a strong national center, as I will argue, is a signifier of such affirmation, despite an anticolonial politics that may accompany it.[602]

[602] As such, a strong central government is always sought out by the apparatus of imperial hegemony, not only European colonial ones but also by postcolonial nation-states, such as India and Pakistan, who then subjugate its wayward peripheries by replicating colonial governing structures and thereby affirming it as normative.

What is notable in Ghaffar Khan's description of the Cripps Mission of 1942 and the first Simla Conference of July 1945, in which he was one of the Congress representatives, is that the negotiations broke down because AIML wanted to be recognized by the imperial center as the only voice representing all the Muslims of India. However, Ghaffar Khan, in a very similar vein to Maulana Azad, blames Nehru for instigating the breakdown of the Cabinet Mission Plan (which was negotiated at the second Simla Round Table Conference in May 1946). After all parties had struggled to reach an agreement at that conference, Nehru issued a press statement declaring that Congress was not bound to all aspects of the Cabinet Mission Plan and could, in the future Constituent Assembly, change some aspects of it if they so choose. Jinnah pounced on the statement as evidence of Congress double-speak and the AIML launched "Direct Action" in protest. However, what is overlooked in the analysis about Nehru's ostensible arrogance and verbal blunder—which is often attributed as one of the major causes that led to Partition—is that his interjection was perhaps a tacit form of rejecting, on epistemological and ontological grounds, a colonially produced shape for Independent India. The fact that the British had designated to themselves the authority to produce the future political contours even of postcolonial India—or at least the armature upon which the future shape would be molded—with both Congress and the AIML upholding that designation and its production, was a fact that did not raise much objections. Although Gandhi did tell the British, on several occasions, to leave India even if "anarchy" resulted from it subsequently, yet this stance never became firmly implemented as an anti-colonial demand or policy. By agreeing not only to the negotiations the British organized but also to its terms, the nationalists, in effect, sanctioned and collaborated with the authority the British had assumed for themselves, and in fact reinforced its legitimacy and power. Thus Nehru's outburst that Indians had the right to change the terms of the Cabinet

Mission Plan if they so choose, and map the future shape of the nation themselves, was a form of resistance against this inadvertent collaboration.[603] Which is not to say that Nehru was never guilty of such inadvertent, and even at times quite advertent, collusions on many counts himself, but that this particular interjection seems like a gesture towards the kind of decolonization that Gandhi had outlined in *Hind Swaraj*, however small and ineffective it was in fulfilling that aim.

What reoccurs constantly in Ghaffar Khan's autobiography is the charge that the AIML were legitimated as the sole interlocuters of India's diverse and disseminated Muslim population by the colonial government, and for its own ends. Attributing the failure of the Cripps Mission to Jinnah's demand that only the AIML be allowed to nominate Muslim representatives to this round table conference, and that Congress should nominate only the "Hindu" ones,[604] Ghaffar Khan states: "It was a very astonishing phenomenon that the British staunchly insisted that Congress should succumb and declare the Muslim League as the only political party representing all the Muslims of Hindustan."[605] It was a matter of astonishment because, as Ghaffar Khan continues to explain, in the 1937 elections the AIML had won only one seat in the four Muslim majority provinces; in Sindh, the nationalist Khuda Baksh Soomro had won who was supported

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[603] Nehru objected in particular to the Plan's proposed provincial groupings, especially in the name of the Bengal and the NWFP governments who, he states, oppose such a scheme. Further Nehru objects to what he calls a "compulsion of facts;" ones which seem to serve the British Government's desires rather than being independently agreed upon by the future Constituent Assembly of India. However, Nehru was largely opposed to a federal scheme because he too favored a strong center, and not only on in the name of provincial autonomy. While Jinnah and the AIML opposed it because they could only get parity at the center if the grouping scheme was followed through. Nehru's Press Statement on 10 July 1946, in *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-47*, Vol II. Edited by Maurice Gwyer and A, Appadurai, 1957

[604] For example, as Azad recollects, "Jinnah reacted violently" when Wavell nominated Khizar Hyatt Khan, CM of Punjab, as one of the nominees for the Executive Council proposed at the Simla Round Table conference. Jinnah rejects this, as well as Congress nominated Muslim names, on the grounds that only the ML ought to nominate Muslims representatives to the Council. However, as Azad points out, if Jinnah had agreed and the conference had not broken down, there would have been seven Muslim representatives in a council of fourteen members; half the Council's members would then have represented 25% of the total Muslim population of India. Even more bizarrely, Jinnah insists that the Congress only nominate "Hindus" representatives, which, as Azad cogently points out, parallels the AIML position with the Hindu Mahasabha, who also opposed the fact that Congress nominated Muslim names and should only be focusing on Hindus. *India Wins Freedom,* 116, 119, 121

[605] Ghaffar Khan, Pashto Autobiography, 697 (my translation)

by the Congress; the Unionist government in Punjab was composed of Hindus and Sikhs alongside with the Muslims; while Maulana Fazlul Haq was running the Bengal Ministry with many non-Muslim members. The Congress had an undisputed majority in nine out of eleven Provinces. He further notes that Maulana Azad, who was president of the Congress at the time, refused to agree to such a demand and consequently both the Cripps Mission and the Simla conference failed mainly for this reason.[606]

According to Jalal, Jinnah was relying on imperial interests to force the concept of a unified Hindustan or, at the very least, a unitary defense force upon Congress, and, as such, he expected the British would stay on in India for a few more years to implement and oversee it, especially as it served their interests. Jalal argues that Jinnah's call for a partitioned Pakistan was largely rhetorical ploy forcing the hand of both the British and Congress to concede the parity at the center he was desperately seeking; a parity he actually wanted in a unified and not a divided India.[607] Jalal further asserts that it was, therefore, scheme A of the Cabinet Mission Plan which essentially gave Jinnah what he most desired: "a larger Pakistan…inside a federation with Hindustan" that would have equal voice at the center because the states would be counted and not the individuals within them. Thus, the thorny problem of Muslim minority status, and the

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[606] Ghaffar Khan, Autobiography, 518-19. However, in his autobiography the distinction between the two earlier conferences, as well as the Cabinet Mission Plan and the second Simla Conference is sometimes unclear and muddled. Which perhaps is not just the fault of this text being written many years later but also, stylistically: he writes his narrative in the present tense and in a chronologically random and circular fashion. So that it is sometimes unclear what event preceded or followed another historically without reference to other historical sources or first-hand living knowledge of this history. It is the latter position that I think he constantly presumes his readers occupy and, as such, the text is not written for a foreign audience but rather a clarification and a chronicle for those who continue to be affected by the consequences of those momentous events. Especially since this text was written well after the consolidation of Pakistan as a militarized state, one that had imprisoned him for longer terms than even the colonial government had. And in which his nationalist legacy was corrupted by constant allegations of treason to Pakistan and his allegiance instead to the governments of either India or Afghanistan (or both). His stature as one of the most influential leaders of his time was thus diminished and eventually obfuscated by the emergent nationalist narratives; narratives that upheld and glorified violence as a norm, inversely rendering nonviolence and the KK history increasingly implausible.
[607] Jalal, 183

lack of power for the AIML would be overcome. However, Jalal's assertions explaining why Jinnah did not jump at the scheme are not very convincing: she states that he did not want to reveal his plans and thus his "immaculate silence on the inner meaning of the Pakistan demand"[608] was a tactic to force Congress to concede to his real desires, one which would then seem like the lessor of two evils and more palatable in contrast. She justifies this conclusion by stating that a historian must "pounce" upon the real meaning of Jinnah's hidden plans which were "so fleetingly revealed by the intentional obfuscations" of his tactics. Further, she contends, Jinnah was trying to mollify his own followers who would not appreciate the "royal flush" that the Cabinet Mission Plan had dealt them nor the advantages of "equality in an all-India federal centre" over an autonomous but "'mutilated and moth-eaten' Pakistan."[609] However, even in Jalal's extensive analysis, it remains unclear whether Jinnah clearly understood his position or if she is ascribing such clarity to his goals in historical hindsight. If, as she claims, he had been granted his desires upon a silver platter by the Cabinet Mission Plan then he ought not to have rejected it outright at the first sign of trouble. Instead, right after Nehru became the President of AICC in place of Azad and issued his ostensibly blunderous statement about the possibility of changing the Cabinet Mission Plan in the future Constituent Assembly of India, Jinnah began, in seemingly frustrated retaliation, his Direct Action campaign and ignited the irreversible violence of Partition.[610]

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[608] Jalal, 186

[609] Jalal, 187

[610] Azad states that is was a mistake of "Himalayan dimensions" that he resigned as Congress President at the crucial time of negotiations for Independence and that he nominated Nehru in his place. Nehru's press statement especially gave Jinnah the chance to sabotage the Cabinet Mission Plan (Azad 162-164). Further, Jinnah became enraged because the British did not reopen negotiations after he rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan and he used the threat of communal violence as his "trump card;" which is why, Azad says, the British subsequently invited the AIML to join the interim government. It was this coalition government that frustrated many in the Congress, especially Sardar Patel, and swayed them in favor of Partition because the AIML held the finance portfolio and used it to thwart almost every bill that Congress introduced in the Assembly. Many in the Congress felt that this reflected the future state of India if they were to share power with the AIML (Azad 175).

That Jinnah was playing a shrewd, tactical "game," whose unpalatable outcome he further hoped would be imposed by a colonial government that would "stay on for a few more years to make it stick,"[611] seems to grant both the omniscience of historical hindsight to Jinnah's plans but also, paradoxically, reveals how reliant he was upon the colonial government in granting him the power he aspired towards. This was quite obviously not the first time that the colonial government made Jinnah's plans stick either; the fact that they repeatedly accede to Jinnah's demands—in fact his demands would not have been heard at the center without that sanction—or the constant reinforcement of his stature as the sole spokesperson of the Muslims of India, begs the question why. Even Jalal points out that "the British had helped Jinnah survive as a political force" because the AIML were supporting the war efforts, but there are further examples less easily explained or justified even in her detailed monograph. Firstly, why would Jinnah even assume that the British would "make an award" as they saw fit, and "stay on to enforce it," if Congress and AIML did not come to an agreement.[612] Or that they should offer him a sovereign state when they neither pushed for clarity on the question of Pakistan nor did Jinnah ever make clear its envisioned contours[613]—in fact even after Partition the shape of Pakistan remained fuzzily and "insufficiently imagined" for quite some time—yet Jinnah was implicitly relying on the British to produce a viable solution and outline its future shape as well. Furthermore, Jinnah kept seeking, and was granted, British help against political opponents of the AIML, especially in Bengal and the NWFP. Because the AIML had no toehold in Bengal during the Cripps Mission, and therefore Jinnah could not legitimately declare that he was the

[611] Jalal 188
[612] Jalal 188
[613] Jalal quotes Jinnah to state that after the Lahore Resolution, "'Pakistan,' with its connotations of partition, was not the League's idea but a caricature thrust upon it by the Hindu press: 'They fathered this word upon us', he complained at Delhi in 1943." Jalal, 71

sole voice of all the Muslims of India, he sought help from the Province's Governor who, most surprisingly, did intervene on his behalf. The colonial government forced Maulana Fazlul Haq to resign, despite the fact that his Ministry had a majority in the Assembly and the AIML's weak electoral position and ineffective maneuvering could only produce a coalition ministry, and that also only with the patronage of the European and Scheduled Caste members of the house.[614] While in the NWFP colonial patronage of the AIML was quite explicit: Governor Cunningham, as Jalal puts it, "made no bones about" displacing the Frontier Congress with the help of the big Khans, "his obvious choice as collaborators," whose collaboration was, furthermore, dignified by their enlistment into the AIML which became "a convenient tag" to mask their allegiance.[615]

Jalal's argument that Jinnah intransigence and lawyerly negotiating tactics were what gave him leverage to ultimately succeed in producing Pakistan is, to some extent, disingenuous in light of the fact that, as she also states, "the British helped Jinnah survive as a political force."[616] She gives ample evidence that without the colonial government granting him the power as sole negotiator on behalf of the Muslims he would, most likely, never have succeeded or even been heard at the center. While the Muslim majority provinces that were mostly opposed to the

[614] Jalal 98-101
[615] Jalal 114
[616] Even Azad states that the AIML leaders "seemed under the impression that they had the support of the Government," (Azad, 112) and, moreover, in tracing the formation of the AIML in 1906, he states that the party was grounded upon two objectives at its inception: firstly, "to strengthen and develop a feeling of loyalty to the British Government among the Muslims of India." And the other reason was "to advance the claims of the Muslims against the Hindus and other communities" in order to safeguard Muslim interests. Therefore, as Azad argues:

> The leaders of the League were therefore naturally opposed to the demand for political independence raised by the Congress. They felt that if the Muslims joined in any such demand the British would not support their claims of special treatment in education and service. In fact they described the Congress as a disloyal organisation of rebels and regarded even moderate political leaders like Gokhale and Sir Ferozeshah Mehta as extremists. During this phase the British Government always used the Muslim League as a counter to the demands of Congress. (Azad 117)

idea of Pakistan, and more concerned with their particular linguistic cultures/communities rather than with religious identities were, as Jalal states, "too weak to proclaim this publicly."[617]

What is meant by "weak" here is precisely the lack of a particular kind of political power that disallowed other Muslim nationalists a voice at the center, while Jinnah and the AIML, who lacked popular support both for the idea of a separate sovereign state or as a political party, had fostered. Even Jalal's sympathetic portrayal of Jinnah discloses that his shrewd tactics, his political worldview and his conception of power were embedded within a particular epistemological and ontological framework; a framework that I am arguing grounds the colonial system and its normative conceptions of "power"—although I am not arguing that only Jinnah is embedded in that framework, but that his position, demands and collaboration highlight that framework quite starkly.

Representation and Power

Representation, as Spivak clarifies in her essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?", are of two, interrelated kinds: political or legal and aesthetic or tropological. However, she warns that the two senses of representation that Marx distinguishes, first as "vertreten"— "speaking on behalf of" or political representation as "proxy," and the second as "darstellen—"subject-predication" or as "portrait"—are "related but irreducibly discontinuous." In castigating intellectuals who speak on behalf of the subaltern, she states, that collapsing the two forms of representation leads

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[617] Jalal's analysis extends to Bengal and Punjab here, while Sind and NWFP, she states "were more particularist and even more divided than the two majority provinces that really mattered" (Jalal, 75, FN 112). She has hardly any specifics about the internal workings of these other provinces. For example, she never analyzes the reasons for the popularity of the KK and the Frontier Congress but rather ascribes its popularity in the NWFP to the fact that AIML was badly organized there (Jalal 170). While she fails to take note of Baluchistan through most of her text or the fact that Samad Khan Achakzai was also vehemently against the formation of Pakistan and a close ally of both Congress and Ghaffar Khan as well as a nonviolent ideologue. Instead her focus is also on the center; and beyond the Jinnah papers, the archival documents she consults are largely colonial ones.

to "an essentialist, utopian politics" that thinks that beyond this divide "is where oppressed subjects speak, act, and know *for themselves.*" Much more relevantly, in pointing to intellectuals who elide Marx's distinctions between" class consciousness" and "the transformation of consciousness,"[618] she points to the power differentials of colonialism and globalization which they (specifically Foucault and Deleuze) do not address in the name of intellectually representing the subaltern. The elision, far from allowing the subalterns to represent themselves, merely restores "the sovereign subject" of Western metaphysics—one who can speak on behalf of the suppressed and be heard at the global center. Rather than address the systemic violence that oppression signifies, and which colonialism institutionalized globally in its wake, as Spivak puts it, "the relationship between global capitalism (exploitation in economics) and nation-state alliances (domination in geopolitics) is so macrological that it cannot account for the micrological texture of power."[619] Power, in other words, must be addressed (resisted and overcome) in its systemic, structural frameworks rather than on the individual level of the subject representing itself, or a heroic figure—"paternal proxies"—that represent the oppressed.[620]

Not to elide the crucially important distinction that Spivak draws between macrological and micrological power, and systemic structures that create such differentials, nevertheless, representation as tropology has significant bearing about representation as political voice. The former is perhaps even the metacondition of not just the latter but of how macrological power textures micrological ones, as well as rendering it either potent or powerless. Butler expands on the relatedness of these two forms of representation as the metaconditions of power when she

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[618] Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak, *Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea*, ed. Rosalind C. Morris (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 32.
[619] Spivak, *Subaltern,* 33
[620] Spivak, *Subaltern,* 30-33

asks, when considering "the ontology of the subject," what are the "norms that produce the idea of the human who is worthy of recognition and representation at all."

> That is to say, we cannot ask and answer the more commonly understood normative question, regarding how best to represent or to recognize such subjects, if we fail to understand the differential of power at work that distinguishes between those subjects who will be eligible for recognition and those who will not. In other words, what is the norm according to which the subject is produced and who then becomes the presumptive "ground" of normative debate? [621]

Once tropological representations become widely disseminated and established as norms, political and state representation—or its lack thereof—are also established, and some subjects become objects of representation or humans with rights while others do not. Although Butler's analysis is directed at the normative (neo) liberal framework through which norms and (selective) subjects of recognition are produced, her analysis of both t tropological norms, are as applicable to the colonial context as it is to the present condition of endless wars which she is critiquing.

Butler cogently argues that a desire for definitive judgments and "epistemological certainty"[622] produces an "ontological horizon" and, although the ontology may be false, this horizon becomes the matrix through which power arises. Reinforcing a set of "ontological givens," this established horizon of epistemological certitudes, as Butler clarifies, is the precondition of state power:

> Among those givens are precisely notions of subject, culture, identity, and religion whose versions remain uncontested and incontestable within particular normative frameworks. So when we speak about 'frameworks' in this respect, we are not simply talking about theoretical perspectives that we bring to the analysis of politics, but about modes of intelligibility that further the workings of the state and, as such, are themselves exercises of power even as they exceed the specific domain of state power.[623]

[621] Butler, *Frames* (2010), 138
[622] Butler, *Frames* (2010), 150
[623] Butler, *Frames* (2010), 149

The particular “modes of intelligibility” that produce yet exceed state power are precisely the modalities established by tropological matrices, ones that produce or obfuscate the subjects of political and legal recognition. In other words, to go back to Spivak’s terms, aesthetic or philosophical “re-presentation” and “subject-predication” enable or disable political-legal-state representation; the former does not exceed the latter, but, nevertheless, is the matrix from which state power is generated. Although the two forms of representation ought not to be collapsed into each other, the cognizance that power matrices are produced through this close interrelationship needs to be clarified—not just as the mechanics of power but as the space through which critique, activist practice and socio-political reformations can situate resistance against oppressive power.

However, Butler is not only endorsing a recognition of subjects rendered invisible through the differentials of power, be it state power or its *a priori* tropological matrices—or in her words, the “ontological givens” of “subject, culture, identity, and religion”—but, much more importantly, she is pointing to the set of social relations that produce representations through which the subject is understood or, conversely, silenced. She makes clear that it is the frameworks of understanding, or what she is calling “intelligibility,” that needs to be understood as the matrix through which power—all kinds of power, both inclusive and differentiating, peaceful or violent, individual or communal—are, in fact, generated. Therefore, if power is produced through sets of social interrelations it would logically imply that this is also the site through which change can be instigated. Ideologically, by questioning the frameworks of intelligibility that produce norms, normativities, truths or all manner of “givens,” and pragmatically, by establishing alternate frames in its place. Also, by questioning the centrality of

the "sovereign subject," a constant process of social interchange, over a period of time, can allow for these alternate frames and its constructs to become norms generating political power. It also explains why attempts to establish rights and recognition through state or legal mechanisms alone are always superficial at best, or have to be violently enforced, at worst.

To conjoin Butler's terms with my own analysis, colonial "normative frameworks," "ontological horizons" and epistemological givens were adopted unthinkingly, as I am arguing, by the nationalists and, as such, the subjects recognized at the imperial center were also the ones loudly heard within nationalist debates. In other words, the metaconditions of subject formation were never altered in any radical way from imperial epistemological givens. Even though the subject on whose behalf the nationalists had waged their resistance, especially through the ideology of nonviolence, had to be produced through a process of social interchange, and this was a largely overlooked arena. Or rather, it was neither a conscious strategy nor understood as the metaconditions of resistance and decolonization. Despite the fact, that Gandhi had very astutely pointed to these essential, decolonizing, metaconditions in *Hind Swaraj* at the onset of his resistance. However, even Gandhi, who had tactically resisted British imperialism on material and discursive grounds, through boycotts, breaking the salt laws, the spinning of cloth etc., as well as resisting the ontological horizon of modernity which colonialism had established as the norm, nevertheless, had conceded power to the colonial government by allowing them to set the terms of India's independence.

In other words, I am arguing, decolonial resistance did not establish *a priori* "new constellations of thinking about normativity,"[624] in order to dislocate deeply entrenched colonial frameworks deliberately or pragmatically. Although the KK attempted to do so, they were

[624] Butler, *Frames* (2010), 145

marginalized and silenced and did not form powerful enough alliances to affect the center in any transformative way, even though, provincially, they enacted multiple sites of dislocation. Ghaffar Khan's resistance was predicated upon establishing new normative constellations order to usher in the politics of friendship, but only provincially, and, instead, he trusted that the Gandhian ideology of nonviolence to do so at the center. As such, he was devasted to learn, once Congress agreed to the partition of India, that recognition was still being granted through the lens of "pre-established norms."[625] More cataclysmically, the founding intent of the ideology of nonviolence, which addressed how matrices of power are generated, was henceforth classified as "utopian" and scarified upon the altars of *realpolitiks*.

A voice loudly heard: Jinnah amplifying difference

Despite his reputation as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity,[626]Jinnah uses the language of communal incommensurability even before the late conception of a separate nation-state. In his Presidential address of 1937, (at the Lucknow session of the All-India Muslim League), he articulates this starkly binary framework, but even more tellingly and interestingly, he accuses the FCC of communalism instead. Inverting the accusations that the Khudai Khidmatgars constantly leveled against the Muslim League, Jinnah relegates their unclassifiable politics to a moral lack: these Muslims, according to Jinnah, had "lost faith in themselves"[627] and were collaborating with the enemy, betraying the community to which they rightfully owed allegiance. Fidelity to this communal belonging, as Jinnah's discourse articulates, was not a matter of choice, material

[625] Butler, *Frames* (2010), 141
[626] Jalal 1995, 9
[627] *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. I. edited by Jamil-Ud-Din Ahmad, 1st edition 1942, 9th edition 1960, 29-30

specificity or social production but rather an essential and categorical identity authenticating true "Muslims" from false ones, and therefore, not open to nuance or negotiation.

> I want the Musalmans to ponder over the situation and decide their own fate by having one single, definite, uniform policy which should be loyally followed throughout India. The Congressite Musalmans are making a great mistake when they preach unconditional surrender. It is the height of defeatist mentality to throw ourselves at the mercy and goodwill of others and the highest act of perfidy to the Musalman community; and if that policy is adopted, let me tell you, the community will seal its doom and will cease to play its rightful part in the national life of the country and the Government. Only one thing can save the Musalmans and energise them to regain their lost ground. They must first recapture their own souls and stand by their lofty position and principles which form the basis of their great unity and which bind them together in one body-politic. Do not be disturbed by the slogans and the taunts such as are used against the Musalmans,—*Communalists, toadies*, and *reactionaries*. The worst *toady* on earth, the most wicked communalist to-day among Muslims when he surrenders unconditionally to the Congress and abuses his own community becomes the nationalist of nationalists to-morrow! (sic) These terms and words and abuses are intended to create an inferiority complex amongst the Musalmans and to demoralize them; and are intended to sow discord in their midst and give us a bad name in the world abroad. This is the standard propaganda which can only be treated with contempt.[628]

Jinnah positions a monolithic Muslim community in opposition to the Other: Jinnah was upholding the unity of the Muslim community, whereas, "Congressite Musalmans" were fracturing it as collaborators. By warning these "toadies" of dire moral and psychological consequences if they continued to surrender to the enemy, he, in effect, discursively creates the concept of Pakistan even at this early stage: a pure and distinct Muslim identity that must, at all costs, remain uncontaminated by the enemy's way of life. Befitting a declaration of war, Jinnah tries to rally and unify the Muslims into a singular body-politic so that they can recapture "*their lost ground"*— Yet, despite the rhetoric of Just War and the moral reclamation of an exceptional people, Jinnah effectively relegates the ethical outside the realm of the political: a community cannot depend upon the "goodwill" of the Other but instead its rights must be guaranteed through a position of coercive

[628] Jinnah Speeches 1960, 31-32

power. For Jinnah, to gain the recognition he was seeking, it was necessary to have the narrative of a homogeneous Muslim community governed by "one single, definite, uniform policy." This discursive unity also produced the position of power that was. So that, the Khudai Khidmatgars were relegated to the role of traitors even before the postcolonial nation-state officially named them as such, because, as Jinnah bemoans, they simply were not playing their "rightful part." Their deviant ideology and their alliance with the "enemy" camp negated the narrative of unity and syphoned off the power that Jinnah was fervently collecting at the center.

Jinnah's narrative of incommensurability between Hindu and Muslim metaphysics only deepened and became more intransigent over the next few years. This discourse of difference becomes especially manifest in his historically significant presidential address of 1940 at the Lahore AIML session, which is denoted as the first call for Pakistan. Although Jinnah neither mentions that name nor the specific shape this separate Muslim state was to take.

> The Hindus and the Muslims belong to different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature. They neither intermarry, nor interdine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the governing of such a State.[629]

Instead of naming an alternate kind of polity, Jinnah's ground for a separate Muslim state is starkly categorical; a hierarchical, oppositional and Manichean dualism that describes the two religions as eternally immiscible metaphysical entities. The representational border that Jinnah erects between

[629] "Jinnah's Presidential Address—Lahore 1940" from Mushirul Hasan ed. *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization.* Oxford University Press, 56

Hindu and Muslim ways of being is so immutable that anything less than its physical separation would produce nothing short of chaotic anarchy. The two distinct geographical states would correlate to Hinduism and Islam's disparate imaginaries which, as he points out, their distinct literatures, mythologies, histories and philosophies express.

That Jinnah does not give any recognition to the syncretism that existed is premised upon the perspective that only homogenous sameness can produce peace, especially for minority communities. The premise being, that in order for minorities to survive and prosper alterity must be rejected at all cost, especially if it poses a threat as a "majority" community. Ignoring and even obfuscating a long history of Hindu-Muslim co-habitation in India, coexistence is not considered a sufficient solution. In fact, Jinnah credits the present "artificial unity of India" to "British conquest," maintained solely "by the British bayonet." Thus, Jinnah's call for an ahistorical, amorphous polity negated both geographical specificity and Indic history alike to transcend the materiality of the given.[630]

The Friend-Enemy Binary and the Normative Political

Jinnah's speech at the Lucknow session of the All-India Muslim League in October 1937, once again, positions the "two parties" as binary oppositionals, but this time the difference is also posited in terms of hierarchy: the weaker or subordinate Muslim minority versus the dominant Hindu majority.

> No settlement with the majority is possible, as no Hindu leader speaking with any authority shows any concern or genuine desire for it. Honourable settlement can only be achieved between equals, and unless the two parties learn to respect and *fear* each other, there is no solid ground for any settlement. Offers of peace by the

[630] See Devji 2013, 138-139, on how "Muslim nationalism was, among other things, a project of self-making premised upon the transcendence of the given." *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

> weaker party always mean confession of weakness, and an invitation to aggression. Appeals to patriotism, justice, and fair play and for goodwill fall flat. It does not require political wisdom to realize that all safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper, unless they are backed up by power. *Politics means power and not relying only on cries of justice and fair play or goodwill*. Look at the nations of the world, and look at what is happening every day.[631] (My italics)

The way Jinnah frames the communal inequality by introducing the terms of "minority" and "majority" logically leads to the conclusion that he also reached: the political weakness of Muslims can only overcome the power of the majority through a strength of force. By acquiring a state, the coercive powers of the majority can not only be replicated but, more crucially, the subordinate status of a minority community transcended. As Mufti, Devji and Jalal[632] have all pointed out, in order to safeguard the rights of the "weaker party" and enforce normative claims the call for a distinct Muslim nation transformed the status of the "minority" into a political group on par with the Hindu "majority." However, as this passage also discloses, Jinnah's tacit understanding of political power was based upon the capacity for coercion: "justice and fair play" could only be enforced through the disciplinary apparatus of the state by arousing "fear," because reliance upon "goodwill" alone signaled a position of weakness and impotency. Honor, as a signifier of parity, could only be achieved by a strength of arms and "respect" granted by a show of such force. In other words, Jinnah was articulating a norm: a community could not simply aspire to ideals but must also be able to guarantee rights through coercive power.

In this framework, Jinnah tacitly embraces the Hobbesian model of the Leviathan State as the normative form of communal organization, with its underlying, foundational assumption that, because humans are inherently violent beings, they must be coerced into peacefully co-existing with one another. As I discussed in Chapter Two, Carl Schmitt is quite direct in stating that a

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[631] Devji, Faisal. 2013, 105.
[632] See Mufti 2007, Devji 2013 & Jalal, 1985/1994.

theory of human nature underlies all expositions of political theory. Or rather, all "genuine" political thinkers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes and Hegel, according to Schmitt, "presuppose man to be evil," a "dangerous and dynamic being"[633] who, therefore, must be policed. As Schmitt elaborates, the ubiquitous ground of the modern state is this unquestioned presumption. A presumption that leads, quite logically, to an "enemy" as the ever-present horizon of the political.

Hegel's notion of the state is "political in the decisive sense,"[634] Schmitt argues, because the dialectical master-slave relationship forms the psychological heart of the political and, as such, it has a distinct "definition of the enemy."[635] Adopting the Hegelian definition of the State, Schmitt translates the master-slave relationship into the "friend-enemy" binary to make this mirror opposite pair the normative core of the political.[636] Interpreting Hegel's master-slave dialectic, Schmitt states:

> Hegel has also advanced a definition of the enemy which in general has been evaded by modern philosophers. The enemy is negated otherness. But this negation is mutual and this mutuality of negations has its own concrete existence, as a relation between enemies; this relation of two nothingnesses on both sides bears the dangers of war.[637]

It is not just the threat that alterity poses to the necessary homogeneity of the state but, even more menacingly, it is the omnipresent possibility of eradicating otherness that makes the political both possible and authentic. In Schmitt' conception, war and the "negation" of the enemy are the fundamental relations that exist not just between states but also within it. Because

[633] Schmitt, Carl. *The Concept of the Political* (University of Chicago Press, 1996), 61
[634] Schmitt, (62)
[635] According to Schmitt, Marx also posits a conception of the enemy, "the international class enemy," and for this reason Marx is catalogued as a true political theorist as well (53).
[636] Schmitt, 35
[637] Schmitt, 63

the "enemy" is the requisite aspect of the political, the constant possibility of negating alterity is even more crucial to the state's internal workings; in other words, the "dangers of war" Schmitt is describing is the norm not the state of exception. This menacing, omnipresent possibility is not only because mechanisms of othering and annihilation are established as norms, but further, because they do not arouse horror or moral condemnation sanctioned as they are by the discourse of *realpolitiks*. While, the "hatred" which is unleashed by this negated alterity becomes, as Schmitt quotes Hegel, "undifferentiated and freed from all particular personality"[638] making war with the enemy seems like a natural, and therefore, constant possibility.

Hegel's figure of "negated otherness" does not just produce an Other as the precondition for the political but, much more chillingly, it also grounds a particular kind of humanist superstructure. Despite the foundational premise of the Hegelian state as the medium through which the human will be humanized, alterity also becomes the means to selectively distinguish who are included in the category of "human." It becomes conditional upon who is defined as the "friend" or who the "enemy." The latter particularly creates clearly categorical figures, so that, as "the other, the stranger" it becomes "sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible."[639]

Building upon Enlightenment political philosophy—specifically Hobbes and Machiavelli's political theories—Schmitt explains that the moral must necessarily be excluded from the domain of the political because it dehumanizes the natural human propensity to obliterate otherness and difference. As Schmitt contends: "Each participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be

[638] Schmitt, 63
[639] Schmitt, 27

repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence."[640] In order to preserve the borders of one's imagined community, the political or the State[641] makes conditions of annihilating otherness not just logical and pragmatic but the prerequisite of the political. The inclusion of the moral would, therefore, destroy this structure of the political by pointing to its core of inhumanity.

I reiterate this conception of the normative political in order to point out that Jinnah's call for a separate state, and eventually his ideal polity, also reflected what Derrida calls Schmitt's "Platonic dream;"[642] one that unequivocally accepts violence as the necessary core of the state and had, from the outset, a prerequisite "enemy" though which its political was defined. That the normative political, as delineated by Schmitt, grounds Jinnah's ideological vision is not only disclosed by the speeches quoted above—especially his representation of Hindu-Muslim incommensurability and of coercive power as the essence of the state—but also, most significantly, one of the reasons for his resignation from the All India Congress Committee after its Nagpur session in December 1920. It was at this session that Congress constitution was officially changed to incorporate Gandhi's principles of *Satyagraha* or civil disobedience. As the preamble to the new constitution stated, Congress would renounce "voluntary association with the Government at one end" and refuse "to pay taxes at the other."[643] The change was almost unanimously accepted, except by Jinnah. He was one of the few who objected to the inclusion of a "nonviolent noncooperation scheme"[644] into the constitution through two seemingly contradictory arguments. Firstly, he objected to the declaration that Congress could attain *swaraj*

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[640] Schmitt, 1996: 27

[641] For Schmitt the concept of the State presupposes the political, or the political is always tautologically defined in relation to the state, because, as Derrida points out, only "the state can bestow status on the political." (D-PF 120) This is an ideological concept rather than a natural and organic one or even a mechanical one.

[642] Derrida, 2005, 116

[643] Tendulkar, D. G. *Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a Battle*. New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1967. 34

[644] Tendulkar, 1967, 34

only through "legitimate and peaceful means,"[645] because, he maintained, India could not attain independence without bloodshed, and secondly—and quite paradoxically—he wanted to limit nationalist resistance within a constitutional framework.[646]

Before the Nagpur session Jinnah wrote a letter to Gandhi in which he plainly critiques *Satyagraha*, saying: "your methods have already caused a split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the country not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims."[647] As such, Jinnah tells Gandhi, "your extreme measures," would create "complete disorganization and chaos." According to Jinnah, nonviolent resistance created difference not through the acceptable communal binary but some other factor which he does not, or cannot, name. Furthermore, as he damningly concludes, *satyagraha* has "struck the imagination" only of "inexperienced youth" and "the ignorant and the illiterate," or, in other words, is fit only for the ignorant masses and the easily gullible.[648]

Implicit within Jinnah's critique is the assumption that the division between those who follow the tenets of nonviolence and those who object to it on ideological grounds as he does will become much more extreme and even chaotic because it does not follow the recognizable categories of alterity. Moreover, that Jinnah wanted to conduct nationalist resistance through

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[645] Tendulkar 1967, 34

[646] Wolpert, Stanley, *Jinnah of Pakistan*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984, 69 & (Jalal 1985, 8)

[647] Wolpert 1984, 70. However, Gandhi was supported by almost all members of the religious communities including the Muslim *ulema* with whom he had developed strong ties during the Khilafat Movement. Sheikh-ul-Hind, the head of *Darul-Ulum Deoband*, actually issued a fatwa a few days after this Congress session giving Islamic sanction to the non-violent non-cooperation movement. See: *The Deoband School and The Demand for Pakistan,* by Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963, p. 64.

[648] The crowd at Nagpur, who resoundingly cheered and applauded the resolution for nonviolent resistance, howled down Jinnah's speech with cries of "shame, shame" when he addressed Gandhi as "Mister" instead of "Mahatma." In one of his most publicly humiliating moments Jinnah resigned from the Congress at this point knowing that Gandhi commanded "the majority" in this large assembly of both of Hindus and Muslims. After which Jinnah devoted all his energies to the Muslim League, of which he was also already member. Wolpert 1984, 71-72

constitutional means, while retaining the option of violent resistance is not, perhaps, as contradictory as it at first seems. If we locate his discourse within Schmitt's normative framework it becomes clear that Jinnah wanted to keep the means of resistance within the framework of the colonial state,[649] and within this purview violent resistance would be considered the norm and not an exception.

However, Jinnah was not simply objecting to the impracticality and danger of breaking "the British connection," as Wolpert argues,[650] but was, as I want to further point out, he was tacitly objecting to the Gandhian "programme" that opposed colonialism on epistemological grounds.[651] Voicing Jinnah's objection through Schmittean vocabulary, one could say, the methods and aims of *Satyagraha* depoliticized politics and blurred the borders between the social and the political by introducing the language of morality into it.[652] These breached borders would mean that the state, as representative of the political, would no longer transcend society through its institutions and laws, but rather, democracy would ultimately acquire its anti-statist edge, as Schmitt warns. Most crucially, the language of morality that the ideology of nonviolence (re) introduced would displace the "friend-enemy" core of the political by its egalitarian address to alterity. This is the chaos and disorganization that Jinnah was warning Gandhi against: not only does nonviolent resistance render the laws of the state quite powerless through the economic weapon of the strike, which even Schmitt concedes,[653] but also, the ultimate aim of Gandhi's utopian communal vision was a reconfiguration of the social to such a degree that the political

[649] Gandhi also states in his autobiography that at the Nagpur session Jinnah opposed the new Congress constitution because he wanted to limit "the goal to Swaraj within the British empire only." 501.
[650] Wolpert 1984, 71
[651] I am once again referencing Gandhi's critique of modernity and the "West," in *Hind Swaraj*, as an oppositional epistemological framework, and as the means for true decolonization.
[652] As Schmitt notes: political science since Hegel maintains "that the state is qualitatively different from society and higher than it" and, therefore, the state must be kept distinct from society. Whereas democracy (especially the liberal kind) intermingles the concept of the state with the "concept of human-society", 24.
[653] Schmitt 1932, 39

would become superfluous. As I argued earlier in the chapter, Gandhi was ultimately, or at least, ideally, aiming at "a state of enlightened anarchy,"[654] in which each self-sovereign subject would police themselves through universal moral imperatives. Jinnah, in contrast, wanted to make manifest the normative political through given institutions and power structures; he was not aiming at a revolutionary transformation.

In contradistinction with the normative political, the theory of nonviolence presumes that human beings are not inherently violent and, therefore, require only the right kinds of norms in order to organically transform the social into a self-organizing political system. Schmitt also recognizes this principle of stateless governance inherent at the heart of nonviolence when he says that theories believing in "the natural goodness of man" are anarchist at heart because they are a "radical denial of state and government."[655] He explains that this kind of theory—although he is speaking about liberal democratic theories and not nonviolence per se—would render the political impotent because the state and government would become subordinate to the social. As in the Hegelian theory of the state, the political should transcend the social to organize all within it; in other words, the state is effective only as a totalitarian organization. Schmitt warns that state and society cannot co-mingle as democratic theories desire, because such theories propose a "concept of human-society"[656] and not that of the State or the political.[657]

It is precisely the concept of governance through "human-society" that the politics of nonviolence aims at, and it is worth looking at the nascent form of communal organization that the Khudai Khidmatgars did bring into being, at least for a short time in history, to illustrate the possibility of a political which Schmitt defines as "human-society." Unlike Gandhi's utopian

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[654] Gandhi: "Enlightened Anarchy—A Political Ideal," *Sarvodya*, Jan. 1939
[655] Schmitt, 60
[656] Schmitt, 24
[657] The political and the state are tautologically defined in Schmitt's theory.

blueprint of *Ram Rajya*, the KK or Ghaffar Khan never envisioned their socio-political as unpragmatic but instead conceived of it as already at hand. Embedded in an indigenous metaphysics of presence, including the concept of *waḥdat-al-wujūd* or of divine immanence, that I outline in more detail in Chapter Four, this ideal political would become manifest once the KK were purified by an authentic practice of nonviolence and, moreover, shed both the traditions of violence and the yoke of colonial subjugation.

Embedded as it already was in an anarchic geospatial legacy, the KK's alternate form of political as "human society," did, in fact, make this parallel governing system the kind of anarchic threat to the colonial, and the future postcolonial, state that Schmitt warns against. However, I do not mean to imply that the Khudai Khidmatgars were imitating Gandhi's conception of "enlightened anarchy" but to point to it as the logical telos of the ideology nonviolence. Instead, I am using the rich and prodigious writings of Gandhi—who explicitly wrote about an "enlightened state of anarchy" as the ideal end of the political—to highlight how the Khudai Khidmatgars implicitly understood this as the end of nonviolent resistance, a potent decolonizing methodology, and a radical form of the political. Partha Chatterjee's description of Gandhian *ahimsa* can, perhaps even more appropriately, be extended to Khudai Khidmatgar ideology: "[it] lay entirely outside the thematic of post-Enlightenment thought, and hence of nationalist thought as well."[658] It was instead, as Chatterjee argues, "the organizing principle for a 'science' of politics –a science wholly different from all current conceptions of politics which had only succeeded in producing the 'sciences of violence,' but a science nevertheless—'the science of nonviolence', 'the science of love'. It was the moral framework for solving every practical problem of the organized political movement."[659]

[658] Chatterjee 1986, 100
[659] Chatterjee 1986, 107

Utopias: Imagined and Realized

In Amitav Ghosh's *The Hungry Tide* two alternate forms of communal organization are depicted in the Sundarbans or the Bay of Bengal's tide country: one, "Hamilton-abad," which was fostered by a benevolent, colonial visionary in league with native nationalists, and the other, "Morichjhapi," a subversive, subaltern community founded by "Dalit" refugees. Sir Daniel Hamilton founds his ideal community after he discovers, much to his perplexity, that no one lives in the Sundarbans and that valuable land lies fallow and unproductive. A Scotsman raised to believe that "labour conquers everything," he especially believed that these fecund lands could produce enormous amounts of rice. Although many had conquered "India's doormat," as he romantically states, the Khmer, the Dutch, the Malays, the Portuguese and the British, none had permanently inhabited these lands or made them productive. He, therefore, vowed to create a thriving, egalitarian community. On the other hand, the Morichjhapi community is produced by the refugees without any ideological vision or nationalist endorsement—in fact they are deemed "squatters"[660] and their settlement declared an illegal encroachment upon wildlife reserve property. However, the largely Muslim but indigenous community actually produce a thriving, egalitarian community.

Sir Daniel's vision was not simply founded on the desire to enrich himself, as he had already amassed his fortune as a colonial entrepreneur or "*a monopolikapitalist,*" or the desire to make the land fittingly productive. Instead, he was motivated by a utopian ideal: to create a new kind of egalitarian community in which there would be no "division and differences" of caste, class or religion.

[660] Ghosh, Amitav: *The Hungry Tide*. (New York: Marnier Books, 2006), 177

> What he wanted was to build a new kind of society, a new kind of country. It would be a country run by cooperatives, he said. Here people wouldn't exploit each other and everyone would have a share in the land. S'Daniel spoke with Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Thakur and many other *bujuwa* nationalists. The bourgeoisie all agreed with S'Daniel that this place could be a model for all of India; it could be a new kind of country.[661]

Sir Daniel's noble intentions for his ideal community included an equitable distribution of the land to all who worked upon it, where coin could be exchanged not for the monetary value of labor, but for "a more healthy and abundant LIFE," and, as such, it would be the material realization of Marx's "labor theory of value."[662] Because this was "no lonely and remote frontier," Sir Daniel imagined it as the "threshold of a teeming subcontinent" which would thrive as a self-sustaining community. Blessed by both the colonial state and the nationalists, many flocked to his call for creating a new kind of society, but especially to own a plot of land that he promised each worker. However, this utopian community was soon abandoned, and the land reclaimed by the voracious tide country to become a desolate wasteland; Sir Daniel's dream, as the novel somewhat facetiously states, died with the dreamer.

This utopian endeavor, that was produced through the industrious individualism that colonialism upheld as a humanistic model—and which, Ghosh is implying, the nationalists emulated with much fanfare—is a foil for the refugee community of Morichjhapi. The latter community in fact realize Hamilton's dream, and create a flourishing community in the Sundarbans. This alternate community, however, is not one man's dream but subaltern, Dalit refugees. In the novel this community is positioned as a pragmatic utopia. Thus, in an understated, unceremonious and even unforeseen fashion the "Morichjhapi" plot emerges as the central foci and, by extension, when the silenced narrative of its destruction is salvaged from

[661] Ghosh, HT, 42-45
[662] Ghosh, HT, 45

invisible archives, Ghosh is also chronicling a central, yet obfuscated, chapter in the history of West Bengal.

Dalit refugees fleeing from Pakistan during Partition, and later from Bangladesh after the 1971 war, create a settlement on the island of Morichjhapi in the Indian Sundarbans. Despite the communist party's promises to settle the refugees upon one of the Sundarban islands, the settlement is declared illegal once the party are elected into office—largely through the Dalit vote supporting that promise. Subsequently, the government threatens and coerces the refugees to move from West Bengal into refugee camps in Dandakaranya, Andra Pradash. Not able to adjust to that dessert environment or the confinement of the camps, the refugees flee back to the Sundarbans where they had ties of both blood and belonging. Occupying the island of Morichjhapi, the refugees industriously produce a thriving and self-sustaining community. They do so in order to survive but it organically produces an alternate model of community. Nirmal, the retired schoolteacher and idealistic Marxist, who is both witness and chronicler of this new form of social organization, remarks with wonder:

> Taking in these sights, I felt the onrush of a strange, heady excitement: suddenly it dawned on me that I was watching the birth of something new, something hitherto unseen. This, I thought, is what Daniel Hamilton must have felt when he stood upon the deck of his launch and watched the mangroves being shorn from the islands. But between what was happening at Morichjhapi and what Hamilton had done there was one vital aspect of difference: this was not one man's vision. This dream had been dreamt by the very people who were trying to make it real…an experiment, imagined not by those with learning and power, but by those without![663]

The difference between this form of community building and Hamilton's failed utopia is deliberately contrasted in the novel: a democratic, grass-roots form of self-organization—one which is also quite crucially a lower caste-class community is positioned in ontological contrast

[663] Ghosh, HT 141

to not only Hamiltonabad but, by extension, the structures of the modern nation-state. By describing the Morichjhapi community as a new kind of "Dalit nation," the novel also posits it as a pragmatic model of utopia. Ascribing the collapse of Hamiltonabad to its artificial insemination by colonial progenitors and elite nationalists, the novel implicitly critiques the central planning of the (nation) state. Most pointedly, the novel portrays how this parallel form of communal organization is viewed as an anarchic threat by the postcolonial nation-state because of its intrinsically parallel, and, therefore, oppositional, form of nation-building, even if this was not the original intent of its inhabitants. Nevertheless, as a frontier zone situated upon the porous eastern borders of India many layers of alterity are also ascribed to its inhabitants: one of caste, class, religion and nationality. Thereby, deemed especially threatening to state structures, the Morichjhapi community is ruthlessly massacred by the communist government when its inhabitants refuse to leave the island.

However, Omendra Kumar Singh's argument that the fictional Morichjhapi had to be destroyed in the novel because it presented a secessionist threat to the Indian state, and therefore, Ghosh "cannot allow the refugees to have a separate utopian nation,"[664] misses the significance of its destruction which the plot presents. Despite Ghosh's obvious anti-nationalist stance presented in a number of his texts, which point to the intrinsic violence of the modern nation-state structure derived from its colonial legacy in the Indian Subcontinent, Singh interprets the destruction of Morichjhapi, both historical and fictional, as necessity. Evoking Partition and the formation of Bangladesh as decisive secessionist traumas, Singh articulates sentiments which the communist government of West Bengal most likely also used as justification for the massacre:

[664] Singh, Omendra Kumar, "'Nation' within the Nation: Revisiting the Failed Revolution of Morichjhapi in Amitav Ghosh's *The Hungry Tide*," *South Asian Review*, 32:2, 241-257, (254)

Morichjhapi had to be destroyed because of its "menacing significance"[665] and the threat of succession it posed as a parallel "Dalit nation."[666] Additionally, the ironic dissymmetry that Ghosh portrays between the utopian desires of Sir Daniel and the pragmatic aims of the Morichjhapi community is lost upon Singh who collapses the two formations into identical signifiers of Thomas Moore's original Utopia.[667] The fact that Ghosh pointedly differentiates Hamiltonabad from Morichjhapi, by depicting the former as an essentially colonial and even a settler colonial endeavor despite its benevolent intentions, and the latter as an indigenous egalitarian society that transcends national boundaries, seems to be completely lost in this article.

By presenting alternate, hybrid ways of living, Ghosh further points out that ways of being-living cannot be reduced to the categories that nation-state narratives demand. Through the genre of historical fiction, the novel illuminates the logic of the violence embedded at the core of the Leviathan state, one which must destroy alternate ontologies of nationhood, community and ways of being that dislocate its totalizing semblance.

However, even though Morichjhapi is positioned in ontological opposition to the (post) colonial state in the novel, it is interesting to note that Ghosh shows how some of the epistemological imperatives of modern statehood are incorporated by this community as well. As Nirmal, the chronicler, voices:

> I was amazed, not just by what they had built but the care they had invested in creating organizations, institutions. They had set their own government and taken a census—there were some thirty thousand people on the island already and there was space for many more. The island had been divided into five zones and each family of settlers had been given five acres of land. Yet they had also recognized, shrewdly enough, that their enterprise could not succeed if they did not have the support of their neighbors on the surrounding islands. With this in mind they had

[665] Singh 245
[666] Singh 250
[667] Singh 247

> reserved one quarter of the island for people from other parts of the tide country. Hundreds of families had come flocking in.[668]

That this "safe haven…for the country's most oppressed"[669] used the same tools of nation building that were also the means to oppress them seems quite significant. As Bernard Cohn elaborates in great detail, the census was used by the colonial government to embed the caste system alongside with notions of racial hierarchy and purity into modern culture as "symbol systems."[670] Why this "Dalit nation" would deploy the same symbol systems remains unclear except it inserts a sense of *realpolitiks* into an apparently utopian endeavor, precisely perhaps to undermine the depiction of utopias as unpragmatic ideals. Although Ghosh uses signifiers from Thomas Moore's classic *Utopia*, including the geographical symbolism of the conch shaped island, nevertheless this literary utopia does not implode because of its totalitarian structures. By replicating the symbol systems of the modern state, Ghosh is positing ways in which utopias can become real: firstly, in order to survive, even anarchic and utopian forms of civic organization must incorporate the organizational structures of the state, however oppressive or homogenizing the original forms maybe; secondly, in order to come into being, ideal models of nationhood must mutate to form hybrid, pragmatic forms. In other words, Morichjhapi's grass roots formation, its egalitarian distribution and production systems, its novel "foreign policy" with neighboring islands had to be grafted onto given civic structures in order for it to become a feasible "nation."

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[668] Ghosh, HT 142
[669] Ghosh, HT 159
[670] Cohn, Bernard S, *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990. See "The Census and Objectification in South Asia," 225

As Ghosh acknowledges at the end of his novel, Ross Mallick's article is one of the few that recounts this forgotten history.[671] Mallick argues that "Marichjhapi" was targeted and destroyed specifically because it was a lower caste, Dalit community, because many upper-caste, middle class refugee settlements in West Bengal managed to get their communities legalized. Whereas, despite support from some intelligentsia and journalists, Mallick states, these "Untouchable refugees" did not have any influence in the establishment to get their voices heard. As a voting group, the "Namasudra" communities were historically always a swing bloc between the Hindus and Muslims but Partition made them politically powerless by turning them into minority communities in both India and Pakistan.[672] With the additional dislocation caused by the 1971 war Mallick says: "Namasudra are the rootless people. Divided in two countries, their roots are in Bangladesh and branches in India."[673] Aware of their caste disadvantage and the fact that a lot of them were Muslim converts,[674] the refugees emphasized instead their common ethnic origins as indigenous inhabitants of the land.[675]

When the Congress government evicted the Namasudras as unwelcome squatters, and relocated them to squalid refugee camps outside West Bengal, this act provided the Communist party of West Bengal an oppositional platform. As such, one of their major electoral campaigns became the resettlement of the Namasudras in the Sundarbans. Despite this long-held campaign promise, however, once the Left Front came to power they changed their position and the refugees were arrested and sent back to the camps when they tried to settle on land in the Sundarbans, which they assumed they were now entitled to.[676] Many managed to evade arrest

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[671] Mallick, Ross, "Refugee Resettlement in Forest Reserves: West Bengal Policy Reversal and the Marichjhapi Massacre." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Feb. 1999), pp. 104-125.
[672] Mallick 105
[673] Mallick 109
[674] Mallick 105
[675] Mallick 109
[676] Mallick 105

and occupied the island of *Marichjhapi*. As such the Marxist government declared the island an environmentally protected area on January 26th, 1979, part of the Sundarbans Government Reserve Forest especially for the endangered Bengal Tiger. They enforced an economic blockade against the settlers and started to violently police the community, razing homes and infrastructure.[677] Because journalists were largely sympathetic to the refugees cause the area was also declared out of bounds to the "'bourgeois' press."[678] Most tellingly, however, the highly reviled colonial law against mass assembly—often deployed against nationalist agitation and volatile tribal-border territories in British India—section 144 of the Indian Penal code, was enforced in the area to make all movement in and out of *Marichjhapi* highly restrictive and dangerous for its inhabitants. Although many died because of starvation, disease and constant police actions, the inhabitants refused to leave or capitulate to government demands so that in May of that year the West Bengal government hired a gang of Muslim thugs—because it was believed they hated the Muslims of Bangladesh more virulently—to destroy the settlement. This led to the rape of countless women, the massacre of many of its inhabitants and the arrest of the surviving young men. Mallick estimates that altogether 17000 people were killed by the various government actions, and those that survived were sent back to the refugee camps in Dandakaranya, from which they had originally fled.[679]

Subsequently, the environmental protection act was quite forgotten,[680] and with ecotourism making the wastelands of the Sundarbans suddenly profitable real estate,[681] the Left government settled its own supporters in *Marichjhapi* who utilized the infrastructure that had

[677] Mallick 108
[678] Mallick 108
[679] Mallick 114
[680] Mallick 112
[681] Mallick 118

been left behind. As both Mallick's article and Ghosh's novel decry, the preservation of tigers and the environment usurped the rights of the indigenous people;[682] indigenous people are never shown as victims of such policies but merely, like the natural environment itself, its silent beneficiaries. Preservation ideology, in other words, usurped the lives of the human inhabitants of areas declared habitats for endangered species and wildlife reserves. However, what Mallick decries even more loudly is the subsequent silence surrounding the massacre at *Marichjhapi*, not just amongst politicians, human right activists and environmentalists but even more egregiously by academics who were aware of its details[683]—including, even more damningly still, the Subaltern Studies Group of historians. Despite the fact that this silenced history exemplifies this renowned group's theoretical impetus,[684] Mallick compellingly argues: "These failed attempts at representation are significant because it indicates the problems in presenting human rights abuses from the point of view of victims rather than of intellectuals."[685]

However, it is also perhaps perilous to give voice to these silenced histories as Amitav Ghosh's attempt in this novel elucidates: by giving clarity and shape to a subterranean history the authorial intent of illuminating a mystery, and the violence of its silencing, is also the desire to inscribe clear contours and accountability; in a sense, it reiterates the functionality of the modern, epistemological framework that is being implicitly critiqued. Not just (colonial) categorizations, the scientific method, and the search for Truth, but especially as these narratives become part of the modern systems of organizing and representing life—ones that are also responsible for generating the violence that is being so heavily censured—makes the perils of representation, of "truth" and of historical reclamation (including my own) lose significance in the celebration of

[682] Mallick 116
[683] Mallick 112
[684] Mallick 121-22
[685] Mallick 120

telling an untold but crucial story. By way of Spivak—whom Mallick is most heavily censoring as one of the silent Subaltern Studies historians because she is from West Bengal (and a Marxist) yet has never spoken of this incident publicly—does the critique of intellectuals representing the subaltern, perhaps in their own image, apply even more so to the novelist? Does it objectify those unheard narratives and transform them into histories and stories only for market consumption and incorporation, or does it affect alternative, subversive narratives in and of itself?

Fortifying my own argument, however, Ghosh's fictional revelation also foregrounds that the unbounded spaces on the margins of the state have the potential to destabilize nation-state structures quite incisively, which is why the state imposes its writ even more forcefully upon its frayed borders; but these spaces are also the horizons upon which alternate possibilities can be enacted. Although presented as utopian models, both Hamiltonabad and Morichjhapi reveal the perils and possibilities of creating new communities. The novel points out that top-down, centrally planned, ideological models are especially precarious and dangerous in comparison to forms of nation building that are more organically created from a sense of belonging to the land. Although the latter forms of community predate that of the modern nation-state they have now become radical and alternate models to it, tacitly critiquing the violent core of a failed political superstructure—failed because it often deploys violence against those within its own borders that is its patent purpose to protect. As such these pre-post-modern models of community have the potential to posit alternate politicals without necessarily formulating clear shapes or ideological blueprints for them.

Drawing a parallel between the attempts at utopian nation building that Ghosh illustrates, and my own research, I want to highlight the ideological construct that produced the postcolonial nation-state of Pakistan—which also came into being with the blessings of the nationalists and

the colonizers—to contrast it with the nascent yet alternate possibility the KK were trying to produce; one which was also destroyed because it was seen as an anarchic and secessionist threat. Keeping the contrast of Hamiltonabad and Morichjhapi in view, and its ideological and subaltern aspirations respectively, in the last section of this chapter I try to paint what the shape of Pashtunistan might have been had its subaltern aspirations come into being, and how it was different to the ideological desires that gave birth to Pakistan. Moreover, because of how the Pakistani state was birthed, I point out why the destruction of Pashtunistan—of its adherents, aspirations and significance—became a logical necessity as well.

The Third Way: Neither Pakistan nor Hindustan but Pashtunistan

> A palimpsest obscures what lies beneath. To build Pakistan it was necessary to cover up Indian history, to deny that Indian creatures lay just beneath the surface of Pakistani Standard Time. The past was rewritten; there was nothing else to be done…It is possible to see the subsequent history of Pakistan as a duel between two layers of time, the obscured world forcing its way back through what-had-been-imposed. It is the true desire of every artist to impose his or her vision on the world; and Pakistan, the peeling, fragmenting palimpsest, increasingly at war with itself, may be described as a failure of the dreaming mind. Perhaps the pigment used were the wrong ones, impermanent, like Leonardo's; or perhaps the place was just *insufficiently imagined,* a picture full of irreconcilable elements…a miracle that went wrong.[686]

It was a shocked Ghaffar Khan who proposed the idea of a third state upon learning that Congress had agreed to partition India. In his autobiography he recounts the devastating grief, or "*afsus"* and "*gila"* he felt at Congress betrayal, especially from "Jawaharlal Nehru and Gandhi-ji," because, as he says, "even they agreed to this state of affairs" and to holding the decisive referendum in the NWFP without consulting him.

[686] Salman Rushdie, *Shame* (London: Picador, 1983), 87.

> We joined Congress with the promise of becoming their friends in this fight for freedom so that together we would liberate our country from foreign rule. But when the time came for the enemy to feed on us no thought was given (to us); we were not consulted about this astounding future (fate) of ours. Rather, the referendum for (joining either) Pakistan or Hindustan was forced upon us and we were in fact the big selling point. We were the ones that had made great sacrifices; our blood had flown; our properties and wealth had been destroyed yet others reaped the profits. Congress leaders would always ask my opinion on most affairs; they would not act without my advice or council. Yet on this most crucial matter, not only did they not ask for my advice, but they never even informed me. I am most grieved by the fact that the Congress Working Committee also did not aid us or have concern for us…We won the election from the Muslim League then why the need for another election? If they wanted a new referendum then, for our sakes, they should have done it on the question of Pakistan or Pukhtunistan. This referendum, however, was (on the question) of Pakistan or Hindustan, and because of Congress betrayal we did not want to be with Hindustan. That is why we did not participate in the referendum and boycotted it. The British used to tell us not to be friends with Congress and that they would give us much more than they give Hindustan. But we did not betray Congress, instead they betrayed us. The most upsetting part is that we did so much for them and this is what they did (in return) to us.[687]

Much more precisely, it is the politics of friendship that Ghaffar Khan accuses Congress of betraying; a politics which he and the KK had not only painstakingly inscribed as normative in the Province but one which he believed Congress, and especially Gandhi and Nehru, were taking care of at the center and preparing to make normative throughout Independent India. He accuses them of succumbing to the politics in which "the enemy" is reinstated to its position of power by allowing it to "feed" upon them. He even despairs of all his efforts to cultivate a politics of friendship, and wonders if, by currying British favor he, like Jinnah and the Muslim League, could have gained his nationalist objectives more pragmatically as well. What most astonishes and deeply wounds him—even though this narrative was written many years after the event his words continue to resonate with his grief and indignation—is the fact that his opinion, which was always held in such high esteem by the Congress Working Committee prior to this, was never

[687] Khan 1983, 737-738. My translation

consulted on a matter of such tremendous personal and political consequence. Instead, he further accuses Congress of imposing a referendum upon the Province without his consent. It is this act of betrayal that leads Ghaffar Khan to call for the third option of Pashtunistan, or what he calls "Pukhtunistan."

Unlike Azad's mounting dread and anticipation of Congress and "Gandhiji's conversion to the Mountbatten Plan," he recounts that Ghaffar Khan, who was completely unprepared and unforewarned of this decision, "was completely stunned and for several minutes he could not utter a word."[688]According to Azad, Ghaffar Khan had put all his faith into the ideology of nonviolence, in contrast with Nehru and his own utilitarian use of the strategy. The most important thing for Congress was India's independence, as Azad explains, and not the ideology of nonviolence per se; it was for them a policy not a creed. In the early stages of the movement. As Azad recounts, Ghaffar Khan had also used nonviolence as a strategy but he became a staunch adherent of it over time and did not compromise its ideals for utilitarian or pragmatic reasons.[689]

Ghaffar Khan ends his autobiography by reiterating the fact that nonviolence had been an ideology, a firm belief system, and never merely the strategic policy that Congress now demonstrated it had been for them. He contrasts the catastrophic consequences of utilizing nonviolence as a policy versus practicing it with sincere conviction: Congress "policy," he points

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[688] Azad, 210

[689] Azad recounts that this difference between policy and creed was brought to the forefront by the question of India joining the allies during the second World War: the colonial government made India's Independence contingent upon Indian support and participation in the war. Most members of the Congress Working Committee felt it was expedient that Congress should agree to this demand for the sake of India's independence, however Ghaffar Khan, who Azad recalls was often his staunch supporter, strongly disagreed with him on this issue. Alongside with Gandhi, and other members of the Working Committee, Ghaffar Khan would not compromise on the tenets of nonviolence. Azad, 34.

out, gave rise to the bloodshed of Partition whereas the relative peace in the NWFP at that time was because of the "love and affection" that nonviolence had engendered, whereby the KK protected their Hindu and Sikh "brothers;" this love and affection, he argues, still resonates in their hearts for each other despite living on either side of the border now. It is interesting to note that despite his constant diatribes against Jinnah and the AIML, in the end it is not them but Congress he largely holds responsible for the violence of Partition. As Ghaffar Khan points out, this violence was unleashed through Mountbatten's decree, but it was Congress compliance (at this point he especially names Sardar Patel) that made it possible. Even more condemnatory, he states that the violence was not just physical but, much more dangerously, it became systemic: despite the fact that they had liberated the country from the British, the KK became "the slaves of slaves." Ghaffar Khan ends his memoirs both on a slim glimmer of hope but largely on a note of despair; the systemic violence—or the normative political—that was reinstituted also destroyed the alternate possibility that the KK politics of friendship had created.

> I am not [even] upset by this so much, because if the Pukhtun becomes [truly] a Pukhtun then no one can enslave them; but I am upset that the Khudai Khidmatgari that the movement created with such [painstaking] effort, hardship, suffering and sacrifice was shattered to pieces. And its existing institutions were destroyed and contaminated.[690]

Most likely he did not truly foresee the extent to which the KK infrastructures and ideology would be destroyed at the time of Partition, but it more aptly reflects the historical context of his autobiography's writing when the devastation of all that he had so painstakingly cultivated was before him. He ends his memoirs with the *shir* I use as the epigraph for this chapter, which sorrowfully voices that devastation, and the grief of seeing all the fruits of his labor quite wasted:

[690] Khan 1983, 740 my translations from Pashto

"it has hailed upon my heart's garden / spring flowers will become fragrant when it's spring again."[691] Recalling the metaphors of gardening with which he began the movement he befittingly ends his text, and his hope for the future, within the semiotics of agriculture once again.

The call for Pashtunistan was an attempt to save what had so painstakingly been cultivated, but perhaps even more "insufficiently imagined" than Pakistan, to use Salman Rushdie's phrase, its contours were never fully envisioned at the time of Partition or have since been clearly articulated. However, given that the Khudai Khidmatgar mantle rested on the notion of self-sovereignty, as well as taking into account the long lineage of Pashtun nationalism, it most likely referred to an autonomous nationhood at the time of Partition. It was neither merely a bargaining strategy, as Erland Jansson conjectures,[692] nor the more befitting name for the Province, as Ghaffar Khan explained in his first address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1948,[693] but while both of those claims were likely components for the call for Pashtunistan—or the concept evolved to include these components over time—some kind of a community that would uphold the radical transformation the Khudai Khidmatgars had achieved must have been the main motivating factor in Ghaffar Khan's call for a third alternative. As such, the imaginary of Pashtunistan at the time of Partition was a space in which this alternate political could be

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[691] Ghaffar Khan's ends his Pashto autobiography with this shir. My translation. Khan, *zmā žwand āw jdow-jeẖd.* , 740.
[692] Janson, Erland. *India Pakistan or Pakhtunistan? The Nationalist Movement in the North West Frontier Province, 1937-47* (Stockhom, Uppsala University,: Almqvist & Wiksel International, 1981).
[693] After Ghaffar Khan was arrested in 1948 he addressed the Constituent Assembly on 16th December 1948 as a member of that house. When asked by Liaqat Ali Khan whether "Pathan" was a name of a country or a community Ghaffar Khan replied: "Pathan is the name of a community and we will name the country Pakhtoonistan [sic]. I may also explain that the people of India used to call us Pathans and we are called Afghans by the Persians. Our real name is Pakhtoon [sic]. We want Pakhtoonistan [sic] and we want all the Pathans on this side of the Durand Line joined and united together in Pakhtoonistan [sic]." *Debates of Baacha Khan in Constituent Assembly of Pakistan*. Peshawar: Baacha Khan Research Center.

preserved and where it would flourish beyond the domain of Muslim League's clear intent to destroy it and all that it signified, once they replaced the British as the Province's new rulers.

Described in one press report as "Badshah Khan's Utopia"[694] and in another report as an ultimatum he gives to Jinnah, *The Times of India* reported on 30th June 1947, that Ghaffar Khan, while addressing a meeting in the village of Parang in Charsadda the night before, stated: "We have decided to establish 'Pathanistan,' which will be an independent state of all Pathans. There will be no king and the land will be ruled by the entire Pathan nation jointly." Further, most likely because the KK and other Pashtuns objected to his lack of fortitude or decisiveness on the issue of Pashtunistan, Ghaffar Khan, somewhat defensively, iterates:

> It is wrong to say that he did not raise the question of a free Pathan state in the existing Constituent Assembly. But actually under a weak centre, as it is, our province was to be internally absolutely independent with the right to secede if members of the provincial Legislative Assembly elected under this new constitution did not approve and decided to opt out [sic]. My main object is to make Pathans free from domination, and doubt if any other Pathan does not want it. After that we can keep brotherly relations with the other Muslim countries. Have not Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Arabia and Egypt their own separate governments? Are they not all Muslims? But even according to the very principles of Islam charity begins at home. Will it not be dishonesty on my part to throw my Pathan brethren into the dark unknown future?[695]

Even in this somewhat incoherently translated speech it becomes clear that Pashtunistan was conceived as a sovereign state at this point in time and, deploying the justification of Muslim nationhood as well, a state not only on par with but also in competition with Jinnah's call for Pakistan. The other modern Muslim nations he points to as examples makes this even clearer, although these nation-states were also often modeled as progressive Islamic states even prior to

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[694] Saleem Ullah Khan, *The Referendum in N.W.F.P, 1947: A Documentary Record,* Cabinet Division, National Documentation Center (Islamabad: National Documentation Center, 1995), 131.

[695] "Ghaffar Khan on Pathanistan: Terms to Mr. Jinnah," reported in *Times of India*, 30th June 1947, 11.

this in the *Pukhtun* journal. However, this speech clearly falls back upon the notion that what Ghaffar Khan conceived as ideal was a state within an Indian Federation that the Cripps and Cabinet Mission Plans had proposed. He uses that as a model for the Pashtun nationhood he was articulating at this time. Furthermore, in comparison with the intangible imaginary of Pakistan, Pashtunistan was, even from the outset, embedded in a particular geographic space through a sense of belonging and language.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the concept of Pashtunistan has an ever varying but long historical lineage, which according to Karim Khan appears in print as early as 1928.[696] He further states that the idea of Pashtunistan, as the right to self-determination, was discussed even at the time of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks of 1944. Karim Khan quotes from an article written at this time by an associate of Ghaffar Khan, Amir Alam Awan, in the journal *Tarjuman-i-Sarhad*. In this article Awan states that, spatially, Pashtunistan would encompass not only the Province and the Tribal Territories but also Pashtun inhabited Baluchistan and north-western Punjab, and furthermore, politically it would be "a separate unit" on par with Pakistan. Awan justifies the need for such a separate state on the grounds that the Pashtuns were racially distinct from the rest of the inhabitants of Hindustan.[697] As early as 1940 poets were composing national anthems for "Pukhtunkhwa," or the ancient land of the Pukhtuns, including Fida Abdul Malik who envisioned it as a "garden of the Pukhtuns."[698] In Fida's "garden" the Pashtuns, including those in Afghanistan, the Deccan, and from the "hills and plains," would be united in one religious, racial and linguistic body politic. However, even in Karim Khan's translation of Fida's anthem "country" and "community" are intermingled terms, and perhaps even concepts which Karim

[696] Karim Khan, 560
[697] Karim Khan, 568-69
[698] Karim Khan, 565

Khan does not parse out; ones that would suggest that this nebulous vision may have also been imagined, much more realistically, as a part of the larger political body of Hindustan.

A poem by Alif Jan Khattak, in the April 1946 issue of the *Pukhtun* journal, makes it clearer that, although the Pashtuns distinct way of being was to be preserved by this envisioned separate nation, it was nevertheless also part of greater India, existing in cohabitation with the rest of its people and religions:

> *wrūrâ dəplār nikâh bəlélley hindūsẗān wugṭâ*
> *ẗlələy ‘zəẗ də səkâ hindū āw musəlmān wugṭâ*
>
> *də pākəsẗān pâ khyāley khbərū méh ğūleiġâ*
> *fəirəngey wubāsâ rəẋẗūney pākəsẗān wugṭâ*
>
> Brother, win back the Hindustan lost by father and forefather
> Win back the lost honor of Sikh, Hindu and Musalman
>
> Do not be fooled by the fantastical thoughts of Pakistan
> Throw out the foreigners and win back a real pak-istan[699]

The poem's play on words illustrates that a land purified from foreign rule was more "pak-istan" than the call for "Pakistan" could ever be. Winning the former kind of "pure-land" restores the honor of all of India's inhabitants regardless of religion. And even though, in the last two *shirs* she reiterates the cultural distinctions of the Pashtuns, nevertheless, Hindu and Sikh Pashtuns, living in quite large numbers in the Province and the Tribal areas at the time, were included in this call.

> *ẗéh ĥey pukhẗūn āw pukhẗānéh pâ pukhtūw khâ khəkāreiġei*
> *ṭeingâ pukhtūw kṛâ də zṛow pukhẗānuw shān wugṭâ*
>
> *də āləf jān də zṛâ ārmān dey mukamal āzādei*
> *wrūr mei shâ źâ dəkhpəley khuwr d zṛâ ārmān wugṭâ*
>
> You are Pukhtun and the Pukhtuns look good doing Pukhtow
> Be firm in (your) Pukhtow and win back the glory of Pukhtuns of yore

[699] Shah, 223

It's Alif Jan's heart's desire to have complete freedom
Become my brother, go win your sister's heart's desire

Freedom from foreign rule and self-sovereignty is the essential criteria that runs through all the various calls for Pashtunistan; religion never had the same tangible valence or appeal. As such, this determined invocation was perceived as a secessionist call by a precarious new nation-state, which then reacted with great fury against it. This perceived existential threat was further validated when Afghanistan also took up the mantle of Pashtunistan beginning in 1949; they called upon Pakistan to give the tribal territories their independence, rights and to abrogate the colonial laws still operative within it. The Durand line border especially remains a contentious issue, and its legitimacy questioned by many Afghan governments but especially by the Pashtuns divided by this colonial border. So that when the demand to change the name of "NWFP" came up again in 1952, the then Chief Minister of the Province, Abdul Qayum Khan, issued a press statement declaring that the "Pathanistan" issue was being "engineered by the ruling clique in Kabul at the instance of Bharati overlords."[700]

Qayum Khan, who was once a zealous KK and wrote a book in English titled, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier,* in which he argues why the ideology of nonviolence was so much better suited to liberating the Pashtuns than guns or gold have been, joined the AIML right before Partition to become one of its leading figures in the Province. He also became one of the most relentless persecutors of the KK movement. Yet, in his book, published in 1945 (and later banned in Pakistan), he is very critical of the Muslim League, whom he describes as

[700] *Times of India*, 9th March 1952.

"unscrupulous politicians" who cry "Islam in Danger" to deceive and exploit people for their own "vested interests." It is, as he puts it succinctly, an issue of a selfish and corrupt "exploiting class" and not really one of religion at all. Even though the KK had dealt them a "death-blow," this class, helped by the British for their own imperial interests, was on the rise again "at the expense of the masses." According to Qayum Khan, because the Province had a 95 percent Muslim majority the Muslim League and the British had to include it in the land mass of Pakistan, making it even more imperative that the Pashtuns have the "right and freedom" and determine their own political future. As such, he describes his vision of Pashtunistan, one which was also its conceptual shape at that time:

> We will be a free sovereign unit, in alliance, however, with other sovereign units of Indian sub-nationalities, voluntarily surrendering a part of our sovereignty for common ends and the greater welfare of the country, and reserving our right to walk out of the Indian Federation if we so desire. The advantage will be ours—by voluntarily joining an Indian Federation we obtain direct access to the sea; we get all the advantages that membership of a large progressive State can confer, namely, education, better communications, industrialization, a scientific development of agriculture, greater opportunity for the display of out inherent talents, a much better standard of life, and, let us hope, a free and go-ahead Government of our own choice. The Pathans have no desire to dominate, but they are equally determined not to submit to any dictation or discrimination of any kind from any quarter.[701]

Qayum Khan's vision of a progressive modern state within the Indian federation is perhaps one of the clearest sketches illustrating the contours of Pashtunistan, at the time when the Frontier Congress were in power. In 1937 Qayum Khan had succeeded Dr. Khan Sahib as the provincial representative in the Central Legislative Assembly, and he later became Deputy Leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party. However, perhaps never having wielded the kind of power he desired, his defection to the AIML was a major gain for him personally and for the Frontier

[701] Qayum Khan, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier* (Bombay: HInd Kitabs, 1945)., 72.

Muslim League politically: he won a seat in the Provincial Assembly in the 1946 elections and subsequently emerged as the leader of the Frontier Muslim League and successfully steered the Province into the Pakistan camp at the crucial time of Partition.[702] Quite ironically, therefore, his claim that the Pashtuns would not submit to "dictation or discrimination" by outside rule was overturned by his own acts when he became one of the main architects crafting a revisionist history after the formation of Pakistan, in which the KK were branded *ghadars*, or traitors in the service of Indian and/or Afghan national interests. Relentlessly erasing all archival records, literature and memories, he transmogrified Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Dr. Khan Sahib and all the members of the KK into the enemy within to be harshly dealt with by the disciplinary apparatus of the new postcolonial state.

The AIML discourse of difference eventually became the wedge that drew apart a sense of Muslim-ness from that of Pashtun-ness in the Province. What had once been a seamless part of the Pashtun ethos was now set in opposition to itself and debilitated the Khudai Khidmatgar secular nationalist platform. When the politics of Partition finally allowed the FML to gain significant legitimacy in the Province, and Jinnah's call for Direct Action unleashed the violence that logically resulted from the rhetoric of incommensurability, the normative political—or the Schmittean friend-enemy framework—was reinstituted in the Province as well. While the communal violence was nowhere near the levels that took place in Calcutta, Bihar and later in Punjab, it did destabilize the Frontier Congress government and their nonviolent ideology. Many members of the FML, according to Rittenberg, "were readily convinced of the political efficacy of violence" despite their façade of nonviolent civil disobedience. Starting, "in March 1947, they encouraged and organized sabotage, and made no effort to curb communal terrorism until Jinnah

[702] Mehra, Parshom, *The North-West Frontier Drama 1945-1947: A Re-Assessment*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998, 97.

gave them explicit orders to do so."[703] With the FCC represented as a "Hindu" party, all means were justified in toppling their government, so that "violence became integral to direct action."[704] As Karim Khan also recounts, the FML justified Direct Action by saying that Muslims do not "believe in non-violence and there can be no Pakistan without [the] sword." [705]

When the politics in the Province did not yield to the binary paradigm justifying the partition of India NWFP became, as Mountbatten describes, the "greatest danger spot in India and the bone of contention between Congress and the Muslim League."[706] In fact the largely Muslim Congress government defied the Manichean categorization, which is also part of the reasons why its legacy and its main actors had to be silenced in order for the clear demarcation between "Hindus" and "Muslims" to be upheld. They wanted to create the imaginary of, to paraphrase from Ghosh's *The Shadow Lines*, a clearly drawn line that would be painted green on one side and orange on the other. The poster announcing the NWFP Referendum highlighted this imaginary quite distinctly, with only two choices on the ballot: "a) whether they wish to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly; or b) Whether they wish to join the Indian Constituent Assembly. This, in effect, is a vote whether the North West Frontier Province is to form part of India or part of Pakistan. **There is no other alternative at issue whatsoever**." The last line was specifically highlighted in bold print, and the voters directed to drop their votes in either of the two polling booths: "RED," if they wished to join India, or "GREEN" if they wanted to be part of Pakistan.[707]

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[703] Rittenberg 1977, 370
[704] Rittenberg 1977, 371
[705] Karim Khan refers to an article in the *Pukhtun* journal's September 1946 issue calling Jinnah, "Hitler-i-Azam" because he was held responsible for the killing of Muslims in Calcutta (Karim Khan, 576, FN 42). And in the same issue of the journal, Wiqar Ali Shah summarizes a poem by Alif Jan in his book which strongly criticizes the call for Direct Action and its consequences in Calcutta. Titled "The League's Speeches," Alif Jan directly addresses Jinnah and asks him, that if he claims to value Muslim lives so much then why is he so happy at such destruction? Is it because, she continues to ask, we can now no longer hold the Hindu's hand and live together? (Wiqar, 254)
[706] Khan, *The Referendum in N.W.F.P, 1947: A Documentary Record*, 21.
[707] Khan, *The Referendum in N.W.F.P, 1947: A Documentary Record*, 282-83.

However, the outcome of the referendum was perhaps a foregone conclusion because Mountbatten also tells Jinnah that if Congress did manage to win the referendum—which, if the KK had not boycotted the vote would have been the likely outcome—"he would expect the Pakistan Constituent Assembly to pass a Resolution asking for fresh Elections." Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan responded, "with much heat" that this plan should not be mentioned beforehand, and under no circumstances to be revealed to Congress, or they would never agree to holding the referendum.[708] However, Olaf Caroe, the governor of the Province, warned that Congress would most likely also win elections if they were held again, so it should be made clear that the referendum decision would be final.[709]

That the NWFP was a major "bone of contention" between Congress and AIML and a decisive factor in deciding the shape of Partition meant that Ghaffar Khan, the Frontier Congress government and the KK did in fact hold such decisive powers at the time—power within the normative political framework—without either realizing or utilizing it. Not only that, but in deciding to boycott the Referendum instead of participating in it—which in all likelihood they would have won in their favor—Ghaffar Khan's decision remains stymied in mystery and controversy till today. That they held the fate of India, and by extension of Pakistan, in their hands, but voluntarily relinquished that power—which according to Ghaffar Khan would have only upheld the normative political and led to violence and bloodshed—illustrates how timely, or untimely, decisions at that artificially accelerated time continue to reverberate with ramifications till today. Stubbornly clinging to the idea of a third way, Ghaffar Khan never colluded with the frameworks of power he had fought and continued to oppose for the rest of his life.

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[708] Khan, *The Referendum in N.W.F.P, 1947: A Documentary Record*, 32.
[709] Khan, *The Referendum in N.W.F.P, 1947: A Documentary Record*, 33.

In an eerie echo of the Qissa Khwani Bazaar killings—which had propelled the movement to the forefront of Indian nationalism—countless Khudai Khidmatgars, including many women and children, were killed and wounded once again by state policing, however, this time it was not at the hands of the colonial state's disciplinary mechanisms but by the Pakistani armed forces. Demonstrating against the Public Security Ordinance Bill passed in 1948 by the newly formed Pakistani government—which outlawed mass gatherings and granted the government powers to arrest and hold people without charge—the Khudai Khidmatgars were gunned down by artillery fire in the village of Babra in Charsadda, (a district of NWFP).[710] As Chief Minister of the Province, Qayum Khan deliberately pursued the Khudai Khidmatgar's subaltern infrastructure and, declaring them *ghadars* after this massacre, quite ruthlessly persecuted anyone belonging to the movement. All literature and records of the movement were systematically destroyed, effacing them and the Frontier Congress government from the memory and history of the emergent postcolonial nation-state. Fida Abdul Malik laments this cataclysmic event in his poem, "Death don't come, I am coming," which tellingly positions this extermination, and themselves as a "*qəwm*," or a nation, in opposition to the Pakistani state: the politics of friendship in opposition to the logics of state violence; the logics of the latter had to necessarily obliterate this alternate political in its midst by labelling the movement the "enemy" within. I end my writing with two *shirs* from this epitaph which continues to point an accusatory finger at the willful and tragic destruction of an alternate "nation" and everything it signified.

yow khwā tâ ẗūpay mashinunah
de hukumat wadrâ fūwźunā
bel khwā tâ qām khaləy lasuwnâ

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[710] Like the *Qissah Khwani* Bazaar killings the exact number of people killed is debated on both sides. The KK claim that around 600 were shot and killed and thousands more injured, while the government records say only a handful were killed and injured. No authoritative records exist but the incident, largely forgotten now, is recounted simply orally. However, the tenor of the poem would suggest that the number killed was significant enough to warrant such a commemorative epitaph.

muqābilay tâ mey kathəl hairānədemâ
mergeyah meĥ rāźah dréemah

On one side, cannons and machines:
The government's army all spread out;
On the other, a nation, empty handed.
Looking at this opposition, I was astounded—
Death don't come, I am coming

dā pākistān ŵgey fūwźunūw
mṛaĥ zakhmeyān ŵukṛl peh zergūnuw
dweĥ-e dā khndā shawl dā qūwmunuw
yow zlm neĥ dey zeĥ baheŷ kum kum yādāŵmah
mergeyah meĥ rāźah dréemah

These hungry armies of Pakistan
Producing thousands of dead and wounded
They make a mockery of nations
It's not just this one injustice, how many shall I recount?
Death don't come, I am coming.[711]

[711] Fida 1957, *Diwan,* 29-33. These are the eighth and twenty-second verses of the poem "Death don't come, I am coming" written as an epitaph for the Khudai Khidmatgars killed by the Pakistan Armed Forces in Babra, Charsadda in 1948. My translation from the original Pashto.

Appendix

Note on Transliteration and Translation

Instead of the Library of Congress recommendations, which I do not find captures the spoken pronunciation adequately, I follow this Pashto transliteration guide:

https://www.omniglot.com/writing/pashto.htm

The modifications that I make to the above are as follows:

1. I add "ə" where there is a vowel sound (generally of "a" or "e") that is not written but needs to be articulated
2. "ẗ" instead of "t" for ټ
3. "â" for the aspirated ه at the end of a word
4. "ẋ" for ښ . However, I continue to use "kh" instead "ẋ," or "x" for ښ or خ, when it has become a commonly recognizable spelling, such as Pukhtun or Khudai.
5. All translations from Pashto are mine unless otherwise noted.

Ghani Khan poems

nonviolence

mounted upon the wrathful steed of retribution
the figure of an eagle, this valiant grandson of a king
inflaming the Pukhtun's eyes yet again
half afire half radiant

the young again twirl their green whiskers
wondrously intoxicated they're going somewhere
seeing only the intoxicated eyes of the beloved
heedless, absolutely, of the world

mothers place Qurans on their heads, yet again
sisters have blackened their eyes
Baba's Pukhtun vision
told them tales of another kind

Oh my grandfather's son!
Oh my blood brother!
Oh children of a fearless father!
Oh born to an indomitable mother!

your eyes full of radiance
your hand is empty, where's your sword?
mounted upon the wrathful steed of retribution
where is your chain-mail armor now?

today a new intoxication intoxicates
the Pukhtun's blood now purified
let's see if Laila can yet again
abandon herself to Majnun for love alone

(Original Pashto poem in *Latūn,* 687)

Bacha Khan's March on Mardan

come oh Khushal baba!
oh Khalid come and see!
rise Ali Murtaza![712]
this spectacle come and see

to the battle now goes Mansur[713]
neither guns nor armor bearing
the sword's spark he does not flare
the arrow's music he does not strum
the enemy's might he will not see
like a madman he keeps on going

[712] Reference to famed warrior figures often evoked in Pashto literature: Khushal Khan Khattak, known also as the "warrior-poet," was a fierce opponent of the Mughal Empire and his poetry is suffused with rousing metaphors attempting to unite the Pashtun tribes in resistance to Mughal domination. Khalid bin Walid, known as the "sword of Allah" was the right hand general of the Prophet Muhammad; he united the Arab tribes and conquered many lands in order to spread Islam. Imam Ali Murtaza, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, the fourth Caliph and also a famed warrior—his crescent sword is an especially emblematic symbol often used as a poetic metaphor.
[713] Mansur al-Hallaj: the 10th century Sufi mystic renowned for repeatedly uttering the words: "*anal-haqa"* or "I am the truth". Accused of blasphemy by orthodox theologians he was tortured and executed. His utterance has since become symbolic of mystical enlightenment and his figure represents a radically alternate form of religiosity, one that also rebels against all forms of narrow, literal and orthodox interpretations. Ghani Khan uses this figure often in his poetry to represent such an alternate mode of divine worship.

neither noose nor gallows does he see
this the khan of all ecstatics
this the Pukhtun's mendicant
what colours of a king he bears!

the fair face of Laila he is seeing
desolate desert he will not see
heart full of a single longing
despair and desire he will not see
red, like the eyes of the eagle
love of many colours bearing

to the battle now goes Mansur
neither guns nor armor bearing

upon his head a crown of thorns
like Majnun raptly walking
vindicating the Pukhtun's name
this son of Pukhtuns walking
the fearless Khan of the fearless
what pride and honour bearing!

to the battle now goes Mansur
neither guns nor armor bearing.

his head he placed upon the dirt
his chest he bared for death
for the Pukhtuns a sacrifice
his own blood the offering
saying: everything for my people!
by god! what this mendicant is bearing!

to the battle now goes Mansur
neither guns nor armor bearing.

oh children of Pukhtuns!
let's not forget this battleground
his grey head bleeding freely
let's not forget this khan
lying here in the dirt
let's not forget this ecstatic
rise up in honor of him
by god how he honors you

to the battle now goes Mansur
neither guns nor armor bearing

the sword's spark he does not flare
the arrow's music he does not strum

(Original Pashto poem in *Latūn,* 309)

Khudai Khidmatgar Pledge

There were several alternate version of the pledge, some merely oral. This version of "The Khudai Khidmatgar Pledge" is my translation of the pledge given in Waris Khan's Pashto memoirs: *Də Āzadəy Təhrik.* Peshawar, 1988, 97.

I consider God to be present and all-conscious, and I pledge to that most pure Entity that I will live my life by the fundamental rules listed below:

1. I present my name in all truthfulness and sincerity in the service of god

2. I willingly and sincerely sacrifice myself, my possessions, and my comfort in the service of my people and my nation's independence

3. I will not create opposing factions within the khudai khidmatgars that will harm the movement

4. I will not become a member of an opposing (political) party. And I will not forgive or bail out those I am fighting

5. I will obey my commanding officer's rightful order at all times

6. I will always staunchly uphold the tenets of nonviolence

7. I will serve all of god's creatures without discrimination. My guiding principle will be to liberate the nation and religion

8. I will always live virtuously and perform deeds with good intentions

9. I will not expect anything in return for my service

10. My whole effort will be to fulfill God's desires

11. I will not create factions or enmity with anyone; in confronting the oppressor I will be the friend of the oppressed

Name:-................................Parentage:-..............................Residence:............................

Unit:-......................District:-.........................Zilla: ....

Signature or Thumbprint of the Khudai Khidmatgar:-...

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