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**Title**

Land, Labor, and Relationality: A Critical Engagement of Marx and Indigenous Studies

**Permalink**

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/98r86679>

**Journal**

American Indian Culture and Research Journal , 47(2)

**ISSN**

0161-6463

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**Publication Date**

2024-07-10

**DOI**

10.17953/A3.1916

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# Land, Labor, and Relationality: A Critical Engagement of Marx and Indigenous Studies

*Kelsey Lindquist*

Like Western disciplinary theories and methods more broadly, the utility of Marxist thought for the development of Indigenous studies scholarship has been a source of debate. Some scholars argue that the flaws in Marxism are irreconcilable, while others maintain that Marx offers critical insights.<sup>1</sup> According to Glen Coulthard, “For Indigenous peoples to reject or ignore the insights of Marx would be a mistake, especially if this amounts to a refusal on our part to critically engage his important critique of capitalist exploitation and his extensive writings on the entangled relationship between capitalism and colonialism.”<sup>2</sup>

In this article, I place the insights of Marx and a recently developed line of inquiry within Marxist-feminist scholarship in conversation with critical Indigenous theory. This article thus constitutes an intervention in Marxist thought while also contributing to discussions about Indigenous studies’ epistemological boundaries. Through critical engagement, I develop a theoretical framework that redresses the limitations of Marx and previous attempts to reformulate Marx’s work. I undertake this critical engagement in four parts. In part one, I provide an overview of the insights of Marx, including his critique of capitalist exploitation and the entangled relationship between capitalism and colonialism. I begin part two with a discussion of the limitations of Marx. I then outline the emergence of a recent line of inquiry within Marxist-feminist scholarship, namely reconstructed historical materialisms, before conducting a critique of this theoretical approach and its constituent elements. In part three, I critically engage a previous attempt to place the insights of Marx in conversation with critical

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Indigenous theory. In part four, I reposition the insights derived through the preceding critical engagement into an alternative theoretical framework.

To prefigure my critical engagement, I begin with a brief discussion of my understanding of the nature and role of critique. I take seriously Jace Weaver's assertion that "critique . . . is not dismissal."<sup>3</sup> Rather than undertaking a wholesale rejection of Marx's writings and subsequent reformulations of Marx's work, I instead seek to retain the insights of these theoretical perspectives in the process of addressing their limitations and internal contradictions. Explaining her critique of intersectionality, Joanne Barker notes that, "as with any writing that we have thought and moved with in our own work, even as it is generative and empowering and the place from which we build political engagement, we also think with its troubles."<sup>4</sup> Likewise, I aim to demonstrate the productive potential of thinking with and through the troubles of diverse theoretical perspectives.

The productive potential of critical engagement applies not only to advancing our understanding of capitalism and colonialism but also to constructing alternatives. In *Dancing on Our Turtle's Back*, Leanne Simpson writes the following: "While theoretically, we have debated whether Audre Lordé's 'the master's tools can dismantle the master's house,' I am interested in a different question. I am not so concerned with how we dismantle the master's house, that is, which set of theories we use to critique colonialism; but I am very concerned with how we (re)build our own house, or our own houses."<sup>5</sup> While I agree with the importance of investing energy into "(re)building" our houses, I consider critique to have an important role in this process. Rather than focusing on building alternatives or conducting a critique, this article positions critique as imperative to the process of envisioning alternatives. That is, the "set of theories we use to critique colonialism" provide the theoretical tools that inform "how we (re)build our own house, or our own houses."

## PART ONE: THE INSIGHTS OF KARL MARX

### *Critique of Capitalist Exploitation*

According to Marx, human labor-power is the special commodity that sustains the entire system of capitalist accumulation. On the surface, the sale and purchase of the commodity labor-power appears as an equal transaction. The owner of money (i.e., the capitalist) buys labor-power from its possessor (i.e., the worker), who in turn receives a wage. While some wages are high and others are low, the capitalist and the worker nonetheless "contract as free persons, who are equal before the law."<sup>6</sup> Beneath the surface of commodity exchange lies the reality of capitalist exploitation.

Marx explains that the worker receives from the capitalist a wage that is equal to the value of the commodity labor-power. The capitalist, however, aims to extract surplus-value from the worker.<sup>7</sup> That is, the capitalist sets the duration and intensity of the labor process such that the worker produces more than the value of labor-power. Capitalist accumulation rests on the maximization of surplus-value. The rate of surplus-value, according to Marx, is "an exact expression for the degree of exploitation

of labor-power by capital, or of the worker by the capitalist.”<sup>8</sup> In short, capitalist accumulation necessitates the exploitation of human labor-power.

### *The Entangled Relationship between Capitalism and Colonialism*

The capital-relation, according to Marx, presupposes the complete separation of workers from the means of production.<sup>9</sup> Without direct access to the means of production, workers, while juridically free, have no possibility of independently producing their subsistence and as such they are under economic compulsion to sell their labor-power to the owners of the means of production for a wage. The polarization of the commodity market into “free workers” and the owners of the means of production therefore establishes the necessary conditions for capitalist production. As Marx notes, however, “Nature does not produce on the one hand owners of money or commodities, and on the other hand men possessing nothing but their own labor-power.”<sup>10</sup> Rather, this relation is the result of a historical development. More specifically, Marx demonstrates that the capital-relation resulted from a violent process of expropriation.

Marx’s writing on “so-called primitive accumulation” reveals the inextricable link between capital and colonialism. Marx demonstrates that primitive accumulation occurred in England through the enclosure of the commons and the forcible expropriation of the agricultural population from the land. He further demonstrates that primitive accumulation extended well beyond England through the brutal force of the colonial system.<sup>11</sup> In short, Marx explicates the importance of the colonial relation underlying the formation of the capital-relation.

## PART TWO: RECONSTRUCTED HISTORICAL MATERIALISMS

While Marx’s analysis of the capitalist mode of production is indispensable for understanding the inherently exploitative nature of capitalist relations, he undertheorizes the racialized, gendered nature of capitalist relations. Marx’s failure to address processes of racialization is a critical omission that results in the reification of race. For example, in elucidating capital as a social relation of production, Marx explains: “A Negro is a Negro. Only under certain conditions does he become a slave. A cotton-spinning machine is a machine for spinning cotton. Only under certain conditions does it become capital.”<sup>12</sup> As Anna Carastathis contends, however, “The question *Why a Negro?* does not occur to Marx. For Marx, in the absence of these conditions which make of him a slave, a ‘Negro’ appears to remain (indeed, always already was) a ‘Negro.’”<sup>13</sup> Thus, for Marx, “the conceptual cost of denaturalizing slavery is the fetishization of race.”<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, Marx fails to investigate the racialized and gendered forms of social reproduction that sustain capitalist accumulation. Although Marx recognizes that capitalism is dependent on the daily and generational renewal of labor-power that occurs outside the circuit of commodity production, he claims that “the capitalist may safely leave this to the worker’s drives for self-preservation and propagation.”<sup>15</sup> Consequently, the reproduction of the working class appears natural and the social relations and processes that sustain and reproduce the workers’ labor-power remain invisible.

Recent attempts to reconstruct historical materialism through an integration of social reproduction theory and intersectionality purportedly overcome Marx's failure to theorize the racialized, gendered nature of capitalist relations.<sup>16</sup> Specifically, scholars of reconstructed historical materialisms claim to offer a more comprehensive approach to theorizing multiple oppressions within capitalist society.<sup>17</sup> Understanding the emergence of this theoretical approach, however, first requires a brief overview of the development of its constituent elements.

### *Social Reproduction Theory*

According to social reproduction theorists, an understanding of capitalism that focuses exclusively on wage laborers and owners is incomplete.<sup>18</sup> Building from Marx, social reproduction theory asks, "If workers' labor produces all the wealth in society, who then produces the worker?"<sup>19</sup> Marx merely attributed the maintenance and reproduction of the working class to "the worker's drives for self-preservation and propagation."<sup>20</sup> In contrast, social reproduction theory "interrogates the complex network of social processes and human relations that produces the conditions of existence for [the worker]."<sup>21</sup>

The foundations of social reproduction theory emerged in the late 1960s as Marxist-feminist scholars began to interrogate the gendered relations involved in the daily and generational reproduction of labor-power.<sup>22</sup> Marxist-feminist literature of the 1960s and 1970s drew attention to the working-class family as the predominant social site for the production and reproduction of labor-power and identified women's unpaid domestic labor as the material basis for their oppression.<sup>23</sup> Addressing the limitations of this earlier work, social reproduction theorists such as Lise Vogel examined the household in relation to the reproduction of capital and instead identified the social significance of domestic labor to capital as the source of women's oppression.<sup>24</sup> The production and reproduction of labor-power, upon which the reproduction of capitalism depends, "is overwhelmingly a private, domestic affair undertaken according to the bio-physical fact that procreation and nursing require female-sexed bodies."<sup>25</sup> Capital's dependence on biological processes specific to female-sexed bodies impels capital and its state to regulate female reproduction and reinforce a male-dominant gender order.<sup>26</sup> In short, social reproduction theory locates women's oppression in the central relations of the capitalist mode of production.<sup>27</sup>

### *Intersectionality*

Writing a "brief overview" of intersectionality necessarily involves a certain degree of oversimplification. As Jennifer C. Nash explains, "Nearly everything about intersectionality is disputed: its histories and origins, its methodologies, its efficacy, its politics, its relationship to identity and identity politics, its central metaphor, its juridical orientations, its relationship to 'black woman' and to black feminism."<sup>28</sup> Black feminist legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw originally articulated intersectionality as a metaphor in 1989 and further developed the concept in 1991.<sup>29</sup> Although frequently credited for formalizing intersectionality as a theoretical approach, Crenshaw's work draws on

a long history of Black feminist thought. A truly rigorous understanding of intersectionality requires a more expansive genealogy that situates Crenshaw's work within a broader history of Black feminist intellectual and political traditions.<sup>30</sup>

In her 1989 essay, Crenshaw advances a critique of the single-axis framework that separates race and gender into mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis.<sup>31</sup> Put simply, the single-axis framework obscures analysis of the intersectional experience of racism and sexism. To help explain the intersectional experiences of Black women, Crenshaw offers two spatial metaphors: the traffic intersection metaphor and the basement metaphor. In the first metaphor, discrimination is analogous to traffic flowing through an intersection in various directions. A collision involving multiple vehicles represents Black women's experiences of discrimination. Investigators are unable to determine which vehicle (i.e., race discrimination or sex discrimination) caused a Black woman's injuries and as such "no driver is held responsible, no treatment is administered, and the involved parties simply get back in their cars and zoom away."<sup>32</sup>

In the second metaphor, Crenshaw uses a basement containing people disadvantaged based on race, sex, class, sexuality, age, and/or ability to show how anti-discrimination law reproduces social hierarchy. Antidiscrimination law uses a singular "but for" analysis that only recognizes the experiences of those who are privileged but for their race *or* sex.<sup>33</sup> Accordingly, only those disadvantaged by a singular factor can gain entry to the main floor of the house where those who are not disadvantaged in any way reside. Black women cannot definitively say "but for" their race *or* "but for" their gender they would be treated fairly and as such they remain in the metaphorical basement of the social hierarchy.

### *Integrating Social Reproduction Theory and Intersectionality*

While recognizing the important contributions of social reproduction theory and intersectionality, scholars of reconstructed historical materialisms contend that these two separate theoretical approaches fall short of "elaborating a fully integrative account of the coconstituting relations of class, gender, sexuality, and race."<sup>34</sup> Social reproduction theory predominantly focuses on class and gender to the exclusion of race. Intersectionality's more expansive framework theorizes multiple oppressions, but scholars of reconstructed historical materialisms nonetheless question the framework's theoretical coherence. Susan Ferguson argues that intersectionality "struggles to explain the social logic of the relationship between particular, interdependent oppressions and the social totality they comprise."<sup>35</sup> Likewise, David McNally challenges the "ontological atomism" of intersectionality, wherein independently constituted relations of oppression come into external contact with each other.<sup>36</sup> Reconstructed historical materialisms are an attempt to address the limitations of social reproduction theory and intersectionality theory through an integration of these two theoretical perspectives.

Building from the insights of social reproduction theory and intersectionality, scholars of reconstructed historical materialisms aim to develop an integrative theory

of a complex, diverse social whole.<sup>37</sup> For Ferguson, theorizing the integrative logic of the social totality requires a dialectical conception of determination and totality.<sup>38</sup> According to a dialectical understanding of determination, the whole is not external to its differentiated parts. Rather, the underlying logic that structures the aspects of the social is a logic that resides in the whole. Thus, the coconstitution of partial relations (of class, gender, race, among others) occurs concurrently with the reproduction of the social totality through its own logic, which exerts pressures and places limits on the constituent partial relations.<sup>39</sup>

A dialectical understanding allows for an explanation of “a unified (capitalist) whole . . . that is also differentiated and contradictory.”<sup>40</sup> Further, it recognizes that the constitution of the whole only ever occurs in and through a real, concrete history. Accordingly, Ferguson asserts that “‘capitalism’ as a simple abstraction does not *actually* exist. There is only concretely racialized, patriarchal, colonial capitalism, wherein class is conceived as a unity of the diverse relations that produce not simply profit or capital but *capitalism*.”<sup>41</sup>

Ferguson argues that social reproduction feminism offers the conceptual apparatus for understanding the dialectical relationship between the capitalist whole and its differentiated parts. Unlike Marx, who focused his analysis on productive labor for capital (i.e., value-creating labor), social reproduction theory identifies different forms of labor and examines the relation between “different forms of labor and the differentiated bodies performing that labor.”<sup>42</sup> This theorization of labor as a concrete, embodied experience is central to explaining the relation between the capitalist totality and its institutions, interactions, and relations. Capitalist logics of accumulation and dispossession invite certain gender relations and not others. Such gender relations are coconstitutive of racial and other relations, while also constituting capitalism.

Ferguson acknowledges the need to explore other oppressive relations in addition to gendered relations: “Laboring bodies, of course, are not just differently sexed and gendered. They are also differently racialized.”<sup>43</sup> Ferguson posits that explaining racialization requires attending to the differential socio-geographic spacialization of laboring bodies. The ever-expanding, uneven dynamics of capitalism reinforce, reproduce, and reshape a hierarchical ordering of nations. The specific social and geographic locations that laboring bodies occupy within this hierarchical world-system determine the degree to which they have access or entitlement to high-quality education, health care, safe workplaces, and basic rights and freedoms. The differential value accorded to laboring bodies within capitalism is thus a function of the socio-geographic location of those bodies. Racialization and racism are the mechanisms through which capitalist relations draw on and reproduce the differential value of laboring bodies. The state operationalizes and legitimizes racialized practices of inclusion and exclusion through immigration, citizenship, and other social policies.<sup>44</sup>

Ferguson argues that her dialectical approach critically extends the insights of intersectionality. Specifically, it identifies “a *capitalist* logic in and through which the parts of the whole are integrated” and as such it offers “a more systemic and concrete representation of the social.”<sup>45</sup> That is, differently constituted laboring bodies

contribute to the reproduction of the capitalist totality, while simultaneously being an expression of that totality.

According to Ferguson, a key political lesson follows from this theorization: “The building of genuinely new possibilities that better align with human freedom requires transforming the socio-material foundations on which we produce *and reproduce* the world. This means disrupting the capitalist impulse to privatise social reproduction, and (re)appropriating and (re)collectivising the means of subsistence for all.”<sup>46</sup> Any attempt to (re)appropriate and (re)collectivise the means of subsistence for all without taking into consideration Indigenous peoples’ prior and ongoing relationship to the land effectively reproduces Indigenous dispossession.<sup>47</sup> A proposed solution to capitalism that reproduces Indigenous dispossession is a predictable outcome of Ferguson’s theorization specifically and the reconstructed historical materialisms literature more broadly. That is, scholars of reconstructed historical materialisms attempt to theorize the “capitalist totality” without centering (or mentioning) the appropriation of Indigenous peoples’ lands.

### *Critique of Reconstructed Historical Materialisms*

Ferguson argues that an integrative theory is incomplete unless it moves from “capitalism” as an abstraction to “concretely racialized, patriarchal, colonial capitalism,” which requires “naming the social logic informing the relations’ actual, concrete unity.”<sup>48</sup> Ferguson’s attempt to develop such a theory identifies a capitalist logic of accumulation and production for profit over need that dominates all aspects of social reproduction. Ferguson explains that capitalist domination “results from a historical process marked by enclosures, slavery, witch-hunts, and pogroms, as well as political revolutions, whereby the labor that produces the means of production and subsistence becomes both dispossessed and organised capitalistically.”<sup>49</sup>

In patriarchal white nation-states, such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, the possession of Indigenous lands forms the proprietary anchor of the capitalist economy.<sup>50</sup> Indigenous ontological relations to land constitute an omnipresent form of resistance to the possessive claims of patriarchal white nation-states. As a consequence, these nation-states must continually deploy their possessive logics to reproduce and reaffirm the nation as a white possession.<sup>51</sup> The colonizing relationship between Indigenous peoples and the nation-state is ongoing such that Indigenous dispossession and Indigenous resistance to dispossession continue to inform the power relations that operate within these “postcolonizing” societies.<sup>52</sup> Ferguson fails to attend to this continuing history of colonization and as such her integrative theory does not move from capitalism as an abstraction to concretely racialized, patriarchal, colonial capitalism. In short, her integrative theory is incomplete.

My critique of Ferguson’s reconstructed historical materialism builds on Joanne Barker’s critique of intersectionality.<sup>53</sup> In “Confluence: Water as an Analytic of Indigenous Feminisms,” Barker examines how intersectionality conceptualizes power and discusses the implications of this conceptualization for Indigenous sovereignty. Barker demonstrates that intersectionality conceives of power in a way that does not



account for the Indigenous territories upon which systems of oppression rest. The failure to attend to Indigenous territories in conceptualizations of power naturalizes the territorial claims of the nation-state, “which, in profound ways, undermines Indigenous peoples’ experiences, concerns, and organizing work for sovereignty and self-determination.”<sup>54</sup> Barker further contends that “a genuine accounting of indigeneity requires more than a presumed inclusion within the oppressed, as a racial difference that is ultimately the same as others racialized.”<sup>55</sup> What is more important, Barker does not deny the racialization of Indigenous people, but rather asserts that those analyses presuming indigeneity is merely another racial category “[distort] the legal, economic, and social importance of location, territory, imperialism, and colonialism within processes of racialization for Indigenous people.”<sup>56</sup>

### *The Relation between Indigenous Dispossession and Systems of Oppression*

The presumption that indigeneity is merely another racial category forecloses an analysis of the relation between Indigenous dispossession, white possession, and processes of racialization, and as such it significantly undermines the explanatory potential of theorizations of multiple oppressions. As Aileen Moreton-Robinson explains, “The question of how anyone came to be white or Black in the United States is inextricably tied to the dispossession of the original owners and the assumption of white possession.”<sup>57</sup> Returning to the spatial metaphors of intersectionality, the streets on which multiple oppressions collide and the house that upholds social hierarchy are located on Indigenous land. The appropriation of Indigenous peoples’ lands and the continuing disavowal of Indigenous sovereignties is thus formative to understanding systems of oppressions in colonizing nation-states.

Unlike social reproduction theory, intersectionality, and reconstructed historical materialisms, Moreton-Robinson’s theorization of the possessive logics of patriarchal white sovereignty interrogates the relation between Indigenous dispossession, white possession, and processes of racialization. To do so, Moreton-Robinson partly draws on the work of Cheryl Harris, whom she argues is one of the few African American scholars to connect Indigenous dispossession to the formation of whiteness.<sup>58</sup> Harris’s legal history and analysis in “Whiteness as Property” demonstrates that whiteness evolved into a form of property in law through the appropriation of Native American lands and the enslavement of Black people.<sup>59</sup> Through her analysis of the parallel systems of domination of Black and Native American peoples, Harris explicates the entangled relationship between race and property, arguing that “it was not the concept of race alone that operated to oppress Blacks and Indians; rather, it was the *interaction* between conceptions of race and property that played a critical role in establishing and maintaining racial and economic subordination.”<sup>60</sup>

First, Harris examines race and property in relation to slavery. As white indentured labor declined and the reliance on African labor intensified, the racial line between white and Black began to sharpen. Racial otherness provided the justification for the subordinated status of Black people and “by the 1660s, the especially degraded status of Blacks as chattel slaves was recognized by law.”<sup>61</sup> Racial identity converged with legal

status such that “Black’ racial identity marked who was subject to enslavement,” while “white’ racial identity marked who was ‘free’ or, at minimum, not a slave.”<sup>62</sup> In short, whiteness protected a person from being the object of property. As Harris explains, “Race and property were thus conflated by establishing a form of property contingent on race—only Blacks were subjugated as slaves and treated as property.”<sup>63</sup>

Harris then examines race and property in relation to Native American land seizure. The racial and cultural otherness of Native Americans provided the justification for the denial of their rights as first possessors of the land. Indigenous peoples lacked the (white) cultural practices required to maintain “true” possession and as such the land was “the appropriate object of settlement and appropriation.”<sup>64</sup> As Harris explains: “Possession—the act necessary to lay the basis for rights in property—was defined to include only the cultural practices of whites. This definition laid the foundation for the idea that whiteness—that which whites alone possess—is valuable and is property.”<sup>65</sup> That is, racially contingent property rights “infused whiteness with significance and value because it was solely through being white that property could be acquired and secured under law.”<sup>66</sup>

Moreton-Robinson further develops the connection between the appropriation of Indigenous lands and the racial hierarchy reified in law through an explication of the nation-state’s possessive investment in patriarchal whiteness. Drawing on Harris’s work, Moreton-Robinson demonstrates how patriarchal whiteness operates proprietarily, both tangibly and intangibly, to determine the gendered and racialized distribution of wealth, status, and opportunity.<sup>67</sup> As the defining attribute of personhood and property in law, patriarchal whiteness confers dominance and privilege (in the form of asset accumulation and social appreciation) to those categorized as white. Thus, as Moreton-Robinson explains, “Patriarchal whiteness is a valuable possession warranting protection.”<sup>68</sup> By reinscribing the legitimacy of patriarchal white sovereignty through its regulatory mechanisms, the nation-state protects the property interests of patriarchal whiteness while diminishing Indigenous property rights. In short, “Patriarchal whiteness is usable property that the law protects and values.”<sup>69</sup>

### *Relations beyond the Capitalist Totality*

A critical weakness of reconstructed historical materialisms concerns the very notion of the capitalist totality. By failing to attend to the continuing sovereignty struggles within colonizing nation-states, scholars of reconstructed historical materialisms mistakenly assume that a capitalist logic structures and determines *all* relations. As Moreton-Robinson explains, however, Indigenous peoples’ ontological relationship to land “is not configured through the logic of capital.”<sup>70</sup> Indigenous peoples’ ontological relationship to land is a form of embodiment and as such it constitutes a subject position that is incommensurate with those configured through the logic of capital, including relations to land as private property and the nation-state’s sovereignty.<sup>71</sup> The interconnectedness of Indigenous people, land, ancestral beings, and all living things is the basis of an enduring Indigenous sovereignty that continually disrupts the sovereignty of the nation-state. Through colonization and its attendant social, legal,

and cultural practices, the nation-state has sought to diminish Indigenous peoples' ontological relationship to land, but colonization does not destroy this ontological relation. Rather, Indigenous subjectivity operates through a doubling of a marginality that results from colonization and a centering that results from the continuity of Indigenous ontological relations to land.<sup>72</sup> Thus, Moreton-Robinson argues that "Indigenous subjectivity is processual because it represents a dialectical unity between humans and the earth."<sup>73</sup>

### PART THREE: MARX AND CRITICAL INDIGENOUS THEORY

A previous attempt to analyze Marx's writings from the perspective of critical Indigenous theory is Coulthard's reformulation of primitive accumulation.<sup>74</sup> According to Coulthard, rendering Marx's primitive accumulation thesis relevant to an analysis of the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state requires "*contextually shifting* our investigation from an emphasis on the *capital relation* to the *colonial relation*."<sup>75</sup> Primitive accumulation, according to Marx, is a dual process involving the forceful separation of workers from the source of their livelihoods (i.e., dispossession), which results in their subsequent transformation into wage laborers (i.e., proletarianization). Marx focused on the capital relation and thus emphasized proletarianization. Coulthard argues, however, that "the history and experience of *dispossession*, not proletarianization, has been the dominant background structure shaping the character of the historical relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state."<sup>76</sup> Accordingly, Coulthard's contextual shift "takes as its analytical frame the subject position of the colonized vis-à-vis the effects of colonial dispossession."<sup>77</sup> The contextual shift from the capital relation to the colonial relation purportedly facilitates a "radical intersectional analysis" and thus overcomes Marx's economic reductionism.<sup>78</sup> That is, repositioning the colonial frame as the overarching lens of analysis explicates the ways in which "market, racist, patriarchal, and state relations *converge* to facilitate a certain power effect—in our case, the reproduction of hierarchical social relations that facilitate the dispossession of our lands and self-determining capacities."<sup>79</sup>

Moreover, whereas Marx viewed primitive accumulation as a violent process, Coulthard argues that it persists today in ways that are not overtly coercive.<sup>80</sup> In the context of economic participation, governance, and land, the reproduction of colonial relations now often occurs through mediated forms of dispossession, such as state recognition and accommodation.<sup>81</sup> Coulthard argues that "settler colonialism should not be seen as deriving its reproductive force solely from its strictly repressive or violent features, but rather from its ability to produce *forms of life* that make settler colonialism's constitutive hierarchies seem natural."<sup>82</sup> To elucidate the productive character of settler-colonial power, Coulthard draws on Frantz Fanon's critique of the colonial politics of recognition, explaining that recognition is not "a source of freedom and dignity for the colonized"; rather, it is "*the field of power through which colonial relations are produced and maintained*."<sup>83</sup> More specifically, "when delegated exchanges of recognition occur in real-world contexts of domination, the terms of accommodation

usually end up being determined in the interests of the hegemonic partner in the relationship.”<sup>84</sup>

Through critical engagement of Fanon and Marx, Coulthard derives insights that inform his conceptualization of a resurgent approach to Indigenous decolonization. In other words, Coulthard demonstrates how our critique of colonialism can inform how we “rebuild our houses.” The recognition approach that has emerged as the dominant expression of self-determination within the Aboriginal rights movement in Canada has failed to fundamentally transform the colonial relationship between the nation-state and Indigenous peoples. Accordingly, “those struggling against colonialism must ‘turn away’ from the colonial state and society and instead find in their own *decolonial praxis* the source of their liberation.”<sup>85</sup> For Coulthard, this process necessarily involves “critical individual and collective *self*-recognition on the part of Indigenous societies.”<sup>86</sup>

Central to Coulthard’s conceptualization of Indigenous resurgence is the “enactment of Indigenous law and the obligations such laws place on Indigenous peoples to uphold the relations of reciprocity that shape our engagements with the human and nonhuman world—the land.”<sup>87</sup> Capitalist accumulation necessitates the exploitation of land and labor and as such a resurgent Indigenous politics seeks a massive transformation in the colonial economy. As Coulthard explains, “without such a massive transformation in the political economy of contemporary settler colonialism, any efforts to rebuild our nations will remain parasitic on capitalism, and thus on the perpetual exploitation of our lands and labor.”<sup>88</sup>

While recognizing the generative and empowering nature of Coulthard’s theoretical formulation, in the remainder of this section I “think with its troubles.”<sup>89</sup> Coulthard argues that “any strategy geared toward authentic decolonization . . . has to account for the multifarious ways in which capitalism, patriarchy, white supremacy, and the totalizing character of state power interact with one another to form the constellation of power relations that sustain colonial patterns of behavior, structures, and relationships.”<sup>90</sup> Coulthard’s conceptualization of the “settler-colonial relationship,” however, falls short of fully accounting for the ways in which these various modalities of power operate. Specifically, Coulthard undertheorizes how the process of racialization operates to facilitate the dispossession of Indigenous peoples. According to Coulthard, “a settler-colonial relationship is one characterized by a particular form of *domination*; that is, it is a relationship where power—in this case, interrelated discursive and nondiscursive facets of economic, gendered, racial, and state power—has been structured into a relatively secure or sedimented set of hierarchical social relations that continue to facilitate the *dispossession* of Indigenous peoples of their lands and self-determining authority.”<sup>91</sup> The constitutive absence within Coulthard’s conceptualization of the settler-colonial relationship is how economic, gendered, racial, and state power operate in relation to possession. As Moreton-Robinson argues, “you cannot dominate without seeking to possess the dominated.”<sup>92</sup>

Theorizations of colonial power relations that fail to interrogate the logic of possession foreclose an analysis of how whiteness operates possessively through the process of racialization to disavow Indigenous sovereignty. The racialization of the Indigenous “other” is a white proprietary exercise that denies the epistemological and

ontological existence of the Indigenous subject and thus precludes the recognition of Indigenous people as sovereign subjects.<sup>93</sup> In short, “the possessive logics of patriarchal white sovereignty and the disavowal of Indigenous sovereignty are inextricably linked, anchored, and regulated through race.”<sup>94</sup>

A related concern is the potential of the settler-colonial analytic to reproduce Indigenous erasure. Indebted to the work of Patrick Wolfe, Coulthard uses settler colonialism’s primary motivation to differentiate it from other colonial formations. Specifically, “the primary motive [of settler colonialism] is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory.”<sup>95</sup> In Wolfe’s original formulation, the relative importance of extracting surplus value from Indigenous labor distinguishes settler colonies from franchise colonies.<sup>96</sup> That is, in settler colonies, the exploitation of Indigenous labor is subordinate to the primary objective of territorial acquisition.

Distinctions between colonial formations can be useful in understanding differences in Indigenous peoples’ dispossession and resistance across various places.<sup>97</sup> For example, Isabel Altamirano-Jiménez’s historically grounded comparative analysis examines how different types of colonial formations shape patterns of relationships between Indigenous peoples and the state, gender relationships, and political actions.<sup>98</sup> In analytically distinguishing between land-based settler colonialism and labor-based extractive colonialism, Altamirano-Jiménez shows that “different systems of domination and subjugation are crucial to understanding indigeneity articulation and how distinctive Indigenous demands, actions, and responses stem from structurally different colonial processes.”<sup>99</sup> Although land and labor are at the core of the analytical distinction between settler and extractive colonialism, Altamirano-Jiménez acknowledges that the specific modalities of either type of colonialism can involve both land and labor.<sup>100</sup> Regarding labor, Altamirano-Jiménez explains that “Indigenous labor was important to both British [settler] and Spanish [extractive] colonialism, yet it had very different functions, which structured the conditions in which Indigenous peoples labored and in which Indigenous labor became visible.”<sup>101</sup>

Less nuanced analytical distinctions, however, reduce the complex processes of colonialism into simplistic formulas (i.e., settler colonialism = land dispossession, extractive colonialism = labor exploitation). Overly rigid distinctions, in which the colonizer’s primary motivation singularly defines the colonial formation, foreclose an analysis of the full range of strategies of domination and strategies of resistance that unfold in specific colonial contexts. Scholars who conflate the argument that settler colonialism is *primarily* interested in land with the argument that settler colonialism is *only* interested in land, tend to produce analyses that conceal the state’s investment in and attempts to control Indigenous labor. Lorenzo Veracini, for instance, argues that settler colonialism “does not desire Indigenous labor; it simply wishes Indigenous people to vanish.”<sup>102</sup> Veracini’s argument not only forecloses an analysis of the myriad policies and practices through which the state conditions Indigenous laboring and selectively incorporates Indigenous peoples into the capitalist economy, but it also obscures the complex ways in which Indigenous peoples experience, negotiate, and resist wage labor.<sup>103</sup> In effect, Veracini erases Indigenous people’s complex engagements

with labor in settler-colonial societies and as such he contributes to the very process he aims to explicate: the settler-colonial imperative to make Indigenous people vanish.

Although Coulthard acknowledges that the long-term goal of disciplining Indigenous people to the cold rationality of market principles, possessive individualism, and menial wage work constituted an important feature of Canadian Indian policy, his analysis nonetheless establishes a series of related binary oppositions between land and labor, space and time, and dispossession and exploitation, which risk reproducing Indigenous erasure. In particular, Coulthard cites Peter Kulchyski's assertion that "precisely what distinguishes anticolonial struggles from the classical Marxist accounts of the working class is that oppression for the colonized is registered in the spatial dimension—as dispossession—whereas for workers, oppression is measured as exploitation, as the theft of time."<sup>104</sup> The separation of spatial and temporal dimensions, however, obscures the inextricable relation between land dispossession and labor exploitation articulated in Marx's original primitive accumulation thesis. Put differently, the distinction between spatial and temporal forms of oppression obscures the ways in which the dispossession of Indigenous land reorders Indigenous laboring. According to Marx's primitive accumulation thesis, spatial forms of oppression (i.e., land dispossession) separate workers from their means of subsistence such that they must enter the exploitative realm of the labor market (i.e., temporal oppression) in order to reproduce their existence. Analyses that focus on spatially configured oppression, to the exclusion of temporal forms of oppression, fail to explain how Indigenous peoples reproduce their existence following land dispossession.

#### PART FOUR: RETURNING TO THE INSIGHTS OF KARL MARX

In *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon argues that "a Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched when it comes to addressing the colonial issue."<sup>105</sup> Marx theorized primitive accumulation as a dual process of dispossession and proletarianization. To render Marx's formulation of primitive accumulation relevant to the "settler-colonial" context, Coulthard privileges one side of the equation over the other (i.e., dispossession over proletarianization). Such an approach, however, narrows rather than expands Marx's original formulation. That is, a narrow preoccupation with one side of the equation at the expense of the other forecloses analysis of the full range of strategies of domination and resistance. Rather than collapsing Marx's original formulation, I instead place it alongside a second process of dispossession that accounts for the gendered, racialized nature of the postcolonizing relation, namely Moreton-Robinson's theorization of the possessive logics of patriarchal white sovereignty. In doing so, I maintain the link between land dispossession and labor exploitation, while connecting it to the disavowal of Indigenous sovereignty.

Marx demonstrates that land dispossession establishes the conditions of possibility for capitalist wage labor. Moreton-Robinson, drawing on Harris, demonstrates that the appropriation of Indigenous lands contributed to the construction of whiteness as property. Indigenous peoples' ontological relationship to land, however, exists outside the logic of capital and as such it is incommensurate with a relationship to land

configured through private property.<sup>106</sup> Accordingly, Indigenous ontological relations to land continually disrupt white possession. Thus, the reproduction of colonial and capitalist social relations in patriarchal white nation-states is a multifaceted process involving the perpetual separation of workers from the means of production to force them into the exploitative realm of wage labor (i.e., ongoing primitive accumulation) and the perpetual disavowal of Indigenous sovereignty to reaffirm white possession of the Indigenous land that forms the proprietary anchor of the capitalist economy (i.e., the possessive logics of patriarchal white sovereignty).

Unmasking this multifaceted process of perpetual dispossession undermines the notion of a capitalist totality. Scholars of reconstructed historical materialisms emphasize the dialectical unity between partial relations and the capitalist totality, and as such their theorizations focus exclusively on materialist relations that exist inside the logic of capital. Ferguson, for instance, contends that her theoretical approach offers an understanding of “layered and contradictory experiences as part of a much broader, dynamic, and materialist set of social relations—relations created, contested, and reproduced by our labor inside and outside the household.”<sup>107</sup> In contrast, Indigenous subjectivities represent “the dialectical unity between humans and the earth.”<sup>108</sup> A theoretical framework that centers Indigenous peoples’ ontological relationship to land necessarily stretches the theorization beyond the capitalist totality.

Figure 1 provides a visual representation of this more expansive theoretical framework. Whereas Marx’s analysis centers on value-creating labor, reconstructed historical materialisms centers on embodied, spatially located social-reproductive labor, and in doing so extends Marx’s original theorization. Nonetheless, both Marx and reconstructed historical materialisms remain within the capitalist totality. By centering Indigenous peoples’ ontological relationship to land, which exists outside the logic of capital, critical Indigenous theory provides a more expansive theoretical framework.

Flowing from this framework are two inter-related insights: 1) the framework’s more expansive understanding of relationality resists divisions between mind-body-earth and material-immaterial; and 2) the framework allows for the conceptualization of power beyond the human production of it. Whereas Western academic thought presupposes a mind-body-earth separation, a framework that centers Indigenous ontological relations to land presupposes the body’s connectedness to our respective lands, ancestors, and all living things.<sup>109</sup> Moreton-Robinson explains that this inter-connectedness informs “Indigenous-embodied knowledges.”<sup>110</sup> Likewise, Kim TallBear explains that social relations between humans and “animals,” “energy,” “spirits,” “rocks,” and “stars” constitute Indigenous knowledge about the world.<sup>111</sup> This understanding of relationality evidences what TallBear refers to as “the coconstitutive entanglements between the material and the immaterial,” and as such it disrupts the material-immaterial binary.<sup>112</sup>

Following from this more expansive understanding of relationality is the conceptualization of power beyond the human production of it. Drawing on the work of David Delgado Shorter, Kim TallBear explains that sexuality and spirituality “are sets of relations—through which power is acquired and exchanged in reciprocal fashion among persons, not all of them human.”<sup>113</sup> Shorter uses the term “objectivating the




FIG. 1. *Visual representation of theoretical framework*

intersubjective” to describe the reification of these relational activities into things.<sup>114</sup> Within a framework that rejects “objectivating the intersubjective,” sexuality, spirituality, and nature are not things but rather sets of relations through which power circulates among humans and other-than-human persons. Such a framework allows for a more emotionally, economically, and environmentally just practice of relating.<sup>115</sup>

Unlike reconstructed historical materialisms, the political lesson that follows from this theorization does not replicate the structures of domination that it seeks to overcome. TallBear argues that extended Indigenous kinship relations are central to the process of decolonizing from oppressive sexuality and the nuclear family.<sup>116</sup> More important, however, TallBear’s articulation of Indigenous kinship networks does not overemphasize Indigenous difference at the expense of contemporary Indigenous complexity and density.<sup>117</sup> TallBear rejects a “movement *back* to something purer” and instead argues for a movement *into* a web of relations, in which reciprocal power exchange sustains the community.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, TallBear recognizes that building lives and communities of relations that make sense to Indigenous peoples requires combining “tools and technologies that we did not craft” with Indigenous cultural templates.<sup>119</sup>



## CONCLUSION

In October 2015, the faculty of Native Studies at the University of Alberta hosted a symposium on Indigenous Foucault. For the keynote address, Aileen Moreton-Robinson presented a paper titled “Aboriginal Sovereignty, Foucault, and the Limits of Power.” Prior to delivering this paper, Moreton-Robinson put in place four qualifiers, the first and fourth of which provided the inspiration for the critical engagement undertaken in this article. First, Moreton-Robinson asserted that “Indigenous people do not need Foucault,” and fourth, she indicated that she was “interpreting Foucault’s work through an entanglement and synthesis of disciplinary and Indigenous knowledges from [her] standpoint as a Quandamooka woman.”<sup>120</sup> Elsewhere, Moreton-Robinson asserts the importance of recognizing our disciplinary knowledges and academic training as part of our Indigenous standpoint, arguing that it is “the epistemological, ontological, and axiological complexity of being an Indigenous researcher that is politically challenging, intellectually creative, and rigorous.”<sup>121</sup>

Reflecting on my own disciplinary training and the formative role of Karl Marx’s work in advancing my understanding of capitalism, I considered a variant of Moreton-Robinson’s first qualifier.<sup>122</sup> Instead of asking “Do Indigenous people need Foucault?” I wondered “Do Indigenous people need Marx?” To address this question, I began this article with an overview of Marx’s insights before considering the limitations of Marx and Marxist-feminist scholarship. Through critical engagement, I repositioned insights concerning the dynamics of capitalism within a framework that recognizes that the sovereignty of Indigenous peoples “exists within and outside the logic of capital.”<sup>123</sup> The resultant theorization explicates the multifaceted process of perpetual dispossession that sustains the reproduction of colonial and capitalist relations in patriarchal white nation-states.

The critical engagement that I undertook in this article highlights the productive potential of expanding Indigenous studies’ epistemological boundaries in the analysis of Western disciplinary theory. This critical engagement is not only about intellectualizing the violent and destructive inner workings of capitalism and colonialism, but also about imagining a way out—or, rather, a way back into a web of relationality.<sup>124</sup> Borrowing TallBear’s analogy, I sought to combine “tools and technologies that we did not craft” with Indigenous cultural templates.<sup>125</sup> Marx and Marxist-feminists offer useful tools for understanding capitalism. Combining those tools with critical Indigenous theory not only redresses the erasure of Indigenous sovereignties within Marxist scholarship but it also critically extends the theorization beyond the capitalist totality (see fig. 1). Thus, returning to the question of whether Indigenous people need Marx, I agree with Coulthard: “For Indigenous peoples to reject or ignore the insights of Marx would be a mistake.”<sup>126</sup> I also agree, however, with the reverse of this statement. That is, for Marxist theorists to reject or ignore the insights of Indigenous peoples would be a mistake.

## NOTES

1. Notable points of contention in this debate include Marxism's apparent developmentalism, Eurocentrism, and economic reductionism. For further discussion, see Ward Churchill, *Marxism and Native Americans* (Boston: South End Press, 1983); Glen S. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Manitoba Press, 2014); Audra Simpson and Andrea Smith, "Introduction," in *Theorizing Native Studies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 1–30. For a more broad-ranging discussion of the intersection of Indigenous studies and Western disciplinary theories and methods, see Chris Andersen, "Critical Indigenous Studies: From Difference to Density," *Cultural Studies Review* 15, no. 2 (2009): 80–100.
2. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 8.
3. Jace Weaver, *Native American Religious Identity: Unforgotten Gods* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1998), xi–xii.
4. Joanne Barker, "Confluence: Water as an Analytic of Indigenous Feminisms," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 43, no. 3 (2019): 1–40.
5. Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, *Dancing on Our Turtle's Back: Stories of Nishnaabeg Re-creation, Resurgence and a New Emergence* (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Press, 2011), 32.
6. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1*, translated by Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, [1867] 1990), 280.
7. *Ibid.*, 274.
8. *Ibid.*, 326.
9. *Ibid.*, 874.
10. *Ibid.*, 273.
11. *Ibid.*, 915.
12. Karl Marx, *Wage Labour and Capital* (1891), 14. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/wage-labour/>
13. Anna Carastathis, "A Phenomenology of Fetishism: Alienated Production and the Appearance of 'Race,'" *International Studies in Philosophy* 39, no. 2 (2007): 17–33.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Marx, *Capital*, 718.
16. For example, see David Camfield, "Theoretical Foundations of an Anti-Racist Queer Feminist Historical Materialism," *Critical Sociology* 42, no. 2 (2016): 289–306; Susan Ferguson, "Canadian Contributions to Social Reproduction Feminism, Race, and Embodied Labor," *Race, Gender, and Class* 15, no. 1–2 (2008): 42–57; Susan Ferguson, "Intersectionality and Social-Reproduction Feminisms: Toward an Integrative Ontology," *Historical Materialism* 24, no. 2 (2016): 38–60; David McNally, "Intersections and Dialectics: Critical Reconstructions in Social Reproduction Theory," in *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*, ed. Tithi Bhattacharya (London: Pluto Press, 2017), 94–111.
17. McNally, "Intersections and Dialectics," 94.
18. Tithi Bhattacharya, "Introduction: Mapping Social Reproduction Theory," in *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression* (London: Pluto Press, 2017), 1–20.
19. Bhattacharya, "Introduction," 1.
20. Marx, *Capital*, 718.
21. Bhattacharya, "Introduction," 2.
22. McNally, "Intersections and Dialectics," 108.
23. For key contributions to this body of literature, see Margaret Benston, "The political Economy of Women's Liberation," *Monthly Review* 21, no. 4 (1969): 13–27; Mariarosa Dalla Costa, "Women and the Subversion of the Community," in *The Power of Women and the Subversion of the*

Community, ed. Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James (London: Falling Wall Press, 1971), 19–54; Peggy Morton, “A Woman’s Work Is Never Done,” in *From Feminism to Liberation*, ed. Edith Altbach (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing, 1971), 211–27.

24. Lise Vogel, *Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1983).

25. Susan Ferguson and David McNally, “Capital, Labor-Power, and Gender Relations: Introduction to the *Historical Materialism* Edition of *Marxism and the Oppression of Women*,” in *Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory* by Lise Vogel (Leiden: Brill, 2013) xcii–xl, xxv.

26. *Ibid.*, xxix.

27. *Ibid.*, xxvi.

28. Jennifer C. Nash, “Intersectionality and Its Discontents,” *American Quarterly* 69, no. 1 (2017): 117–29.

29. Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics,” *The University of Chicago Legal Forum* (1989): 139–68; Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color” *Stanford Law Review* 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241–99.

30. Vivian May, *Pursuing Intersectionality, Unsettling Dominant Imaginaries* (New York: Routledge, 2015); Nash, “Intersectionality and Its Discontents,” 120. Influential Black feminist scholar-activists include Anna Julia Cooper, Angela Davis, bell hooks, Harriet Jacobs, Audre Lorde, Sojourner Truth, and Ida B. Wells. The work and writings of the Combahee River Collective are also formative to the development of intersectionality. Combahee River Collective, “Combahee River Collective Statement” (1977); <https://combaheerivercollective.weebly.com/the-combahee-river-collective-statement.html>.

31. Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex.”

32. *Ibid.*, 149.

33. *Ibid.*, 151.

34. Ferguson and McNally, “Capital, Labor-Power, and Gender Relations,” xxxvi.

35. Ferguson, “Intersectionality and Social-Reproduction Feminisms,” 44.

36. McNally, “Intersections and Dialectic,” 96.

37. *Ibid.*, 109; Ferguson, “Intersectionality and Social-Reproduction Feminisms,” 40.

38. In this section, I focus on Ferguson, “Intersectionality and Social-Reproduction Feminisms.” For a similar approach, see McNally, “Intersections and Dialectic.” While McNally, like Ferguson, employs a dialectical approach, he engages more extensively with Hegel’s *Science of Logic*.

39. Ferguson, “Intersectionality and Social-Reproduction Feminisms,” 46–47.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*, 51.

43. *Ibid.*, 52.

44. *Ibid.* Ferguson asserts that she is not explaining the origins of racism, but rather its ongoing reproduction. Just as capitalism did not create patriarchal relations but rather creates the conditions that sustain them, capitalism did not create racism but rather creates the conditions and rationale for sustaining it.

45. *Ibid.*, 55, emphasis in original.

46. *Ibid.*, 57, emphasis in original.

47. For further discussion, see Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 12; and Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, and Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–40.
48. Ferguson, “Intersectionality and Social-Reproduction Feminisms,” 47.
49. *Ibid.*, 55.
50. Aileen Moreton-Robinson, *The White Possessive: Property, Power, and Indigenous Sovereignty* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), xix.
51. *Ibid.*, 5.
52. *Ibid.*, 196. Moreton-Robinson uses the term “postcolonizing” to signify “the active, the current, and the continuing nature of the colonizing relationship” between Indigenous peoples and the nation-state.
53. Barker, “Confluence.”
54. *Ibid.*, 13.
55. *Ibid.*, 11.
56. *Ibid.*, 8.
57. Moreton-Robinson, *The White Possessive*, 51.
58. *Ibid.*, xix.
59. Cheryl I. Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” *Harvard Law Review* 106, no. 8 (1993): 1707–91.
60. *Ibid.*, 1716, emphasis in original.
61. *Ibid.*, 1718.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*, 1716.
64. *Ibid.*, 1722.
65. *Ibid.*, 1721.
66. *Ibid.*, 1724.
67. Moreton-Robinson, *The White Possessive*, 66.
68. *Ibid.*, 67.
69. *Ibid.*, 77.
70. *Ibid.*, 55.
71. *Ibid.*, 12.
72. *Ibid.*, 14–15.
73. *Ibid.*, 17.
74. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
75. *Ibid.*, 10, emphasis in original.
76. *Ibid.*, 13, emphasis in original.
77. *Ibid.*, 11, emphasis in original.
78. *Ibid.*, 14.
79. *Ibid.*
80. Elsewhere, Coulthard clarifies his argument with an acknowledgment that hard violence, distributed asymmetrically across Indigenous bodies according to sex and gender, remains central to the colonial relationship, and that “the effects of this violence are all too clear: the premature death and disappearance of some of our community members in numbers greater than those of others.” Coulthard in Jessica Hallenbeck, Mike Krebs, Sarah Hunt, Kanishka Goonewardena, Stefan Andreas Kipfer, Shiri Pasternak, and Glen S. Coulthard, “Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition,” *The AAG Review of Books* 4, no. 2 (2016): 111–20.
81. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 15.
82. *Ibid.*, 152, emphasis in original.

83. Ibid., 17, emphasis in original.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., 48, emphasis in original.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., 170.
88. Ibid., 171.
89. Barker, "Confluence," 7.
90. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 14.
91. Ibid., 6, emphasis in original.
92. Moreton-Robinson, *The White Possessive*, xxiv.
93. Ibid., 114.
94. Ibid., 193.
95. Wolfe cited in Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 7.
96. Patrick Wolfe, "'White Man's Flour': Doctrines of Virgin Birth in Evolutionist Ethnogenetics and Australian State-Formation," *History and Anthropology* 8, no. 1–4 (1994): 165–205.
97. Isabel Altamirano-Jiménez, *Indigenous Encounters with Neoliberalism: Place, Women, and the Environment in Canada and Mexico* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013), 212.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., 28.
100. Ibid., 151.
101. Ibid., 29.
102. Lorenzo Veracini, *The Settler Colonial Present* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 94.
103. For further discussion, see Kelsey Lindquist, "Reworking Statistics: An Indigenous Quantitative Methodological Approach to Labor Market Research," master of arts thesis (Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, 2022).
104. Peter Kulchyski, *Like the Sound of a Drum: Aboriginal Cultural Politics in Denendeh and Nunavut* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2005), 88.
105. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, translated by Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, [1963] 2021), 5.
106. Moreton-Robinson, *The White Possessive*, xxi.
107. Ferguson, "Intersectionality and Social-Reproduction Feminisms," 45.
108. Moreton-Robinson, *The White Possessive*, 17.
109. Moreton-Robinson explains that Western knowledge systems presuppose a mind-body-earth split as the basis of objectivity and as such discredit Indigenous-embodied knowledge for its presumed lack of objectivity. Likewise, Brendan Hokowhitu connects the success of the colonial project to the "destruction of interwoven epistemic knowledge based on corporeal metaphysical cognition (i.e., mind-body-spirit)." Notably, Moreton-Robinson asserts that although feminist critique of patriarchal knowledge production dissolves the mind-body split, it nonetheless reaffirms a disconnection from the earth through its human-centered paradigm. Aileen Moreton-Robinson, "Towards an Australian Indigenous Women's Standpoint Theory: A Methodological Tool," *Australian Feminist Studies* 28, no. 78 (2013): 331–47; Aileen Moreton-Robinson, "Relationality: A Key Presupposition of an Indigenous Social Research Paradigm," in *Sources and Methods in Indigenous Studies*, ed. Chris Andersen and Jean M. O'Brien (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 69–77; Brendan Hokowhitu, "Monster: Post-Indigenous Studies," in *Critical Indigenous Studies: Engagements in First World Locations*, ed. Aileen Moreton-Robinson (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2016), 83–101.
110. Aileen Moreton-Robinson, "Introduction: Locations of Engagement in the First World," in *Critical Indigenous Studies: Engagements in First World Locations*, ed. Aileen Moreton-Robinson (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2016), 3–16.

111. Kim TallBear, "Beyond the Life/Not Life Binary: A Feminist-Indigenous Reading of Cryopreservation, Interspecies Thinking, and the New Materialisms," in *Cryopolitics: Frozen Life in a Melting World*, ed. Joanna Radin and Emma Kowal (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017), 179–202.
112. Ibid.
113. Kim TallBear, "Making Love and Relations beyond Settler Sex and Family," in *Making Kin Not Population*, ed. Donna J. Haraway and Adele Clarke (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2018), 145–64.
114. David Delgado Shorter, "Sexuality," in *The World of Indigenous North America*, ed. Robert Warrior (New York and London: Routledge, 2015), 487–505.
115. TallBear, "Making Love and Relations," 159.
116. Ibid., 161.
117. For a discussion of Indigenous density, see Andersen, "Critical Indigenous Studies."
118. TallBear, "Making Love and Relations," 153, emphasis in original.
119. Ibid., 164.
120. Aileen Moreton-Robinson, "Aboriginal Sovereignty, Foucault, and the Limits of Power." YouTube video, posted by Faculty of Native Studies (2015), 11:32. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nN5zwy2Y8AY>.
121. Moreton-Robinson, "Towards an Australian Indigenous Women's Standpoint Theory," 339.
122. Prior to pursuing a PhD in Indigenous studies, I completed a BA and an MA in sociology. Marx's work appeared on the reading list of the various theory courses (including both Classical Social Theory and Contemporary Social Theory) required for my undergraduate and graduate degrees.
123. Moreton-Robinson, "Towards an Australian Indigenous Women's Standpoint Theory," 336.
124. TallBear, "Making Love and Relations," 161.
125. Ibid., 164.
126. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 8.

