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VOL. I NO. I CENTER FOR INNOVATIVE DIPLOMACY

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1984

International Institution Building: The Missing Link for Peace

by Michael H. Shuman

World order has become everybody's favorite whipping boy, even the peace movement's. Recent antagonists include not only the mainstream Harvard Nuclear Study Group, but also such visionary thinkers as Freeman Dyson and Jonathan Schell. While these analysts arrive at vastly different policy prescriptions—the Harvard group urges gradual arms control plus weapons modernization, Dyson advocates arms control plus anti-nuclear defenses, and Schell seeks immediate disarmament through "weaponless deterrence"—they are all unified in their belief that we can only modify the *technical* composition of our arsenals. All of these analysts refuse to endorse a political strategy of international institution-building. But their arguments for rejecting this strategy are misguided, overstated, or irrelevant. Indeed, until we begin building stronger international institutions—no matter how much we can control weapons—we will be forever stuck with the deadly dangers of today's state of international anarchy.

A. Are stronger international institutions necessary for disarmament?

In *The Fate of the Earth*, Jonathan Schell argued that eliminating the threat of nuclear extinction will require complete disarmament, which in turn will require stronger international institutions for three reasons: to deter and redress cheating; to ensure that nuclear weapons guards, verifiers, and peacekeepers did not become an international tyrant; and to resolve the underlying causes of global conflict.

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**"TAMING THE GADGET":
An Interview With
Eric Horvitz**

Alex: How did you come to be interested in such diverse areas as medicine, artificial intelligence, international security, and arms control?

Eric: I've often found it useful to step back and view humanity's problems from the vantage point of a distant star. From such a perspective, you realize that the existence of life, let alone the evolution of human beings and human society, is the result of millions of serendipitous events. It becomes apparent that

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**"PRECISION GUIDED POLICY":
An Interview With
Hal Harvey**

Alex: Hal, I understand you are completing your Master's degree at Stanford in Civil Engineering this year. How has your training as an engineer proved useful at CID?

Hal: I've studied Civil Engineering not so much to master bridge building, foundation design, and so on, but rather to learn techniques of problem-solving. To make sound policy judgments, you need some understanding of the technical problems. Lack of technical expertise

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Editor's Note

When I first encountered CID last year, they were busily publishing a tabloid magazine insert for Bay Area campus newspapers called *Taking Off*. I remember being impressed by the novel mixture of mature professionalism and youthful idealism apparent from the assorted items in their windowless Palo Alto office: an IBM computer in the corner, stacks of *The New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal* piled against the walls and satirical posters of Andropov and Reagan hanging over the desks.

Since then, I've joined the staff of CID as the editor of this bimonthly newsletter. Unlike forthcoming issues of *The CID Report* which will contain more news and analysis, this first issue is intended as an introduction to CID's personalities and projects. I hope that you'll find the interviews with our resident doctor, engineer, and lawyer to be stimulating and informative. Their answers show that CID encompasses a healthy range of views and expertise, united by a common commitment to prevent nuclear war.

This issue also contains what will be two of our regular features. One is a condensation of CID's most recent working papers. This month we feature Michael Shuman's "International Institution Building: The Missing Link for Peace," which takes a critical look at recent books by Freeman Dyson and Jonathan Schell. Another regular feature is "Citizen Diplomacy," in which we report developments in individual and community efforts to influence foreign policy. This month's column compares American and Soviet efforts to repress their citizen diplomats.

One final aside. This newsletter is your newsletter as well. Please send us your reactions and any relevant news clippings, and we'll try to publish a sampling in our next issue.

Alex Kline

International Institution Building *cont. from cover*

In his more recent book, *The Abolition*, however, Schell recommends we pursue a policy of "weaponless deterrence," which he claims would "enable abolition to occur without our having to solve the underlying political problems." The primary deterrent against cheating or aggression would be "the knowledge that a breakdown of the agreement would be to no one's advantage." A secondary deterrent would be every nation's retention of "a state of readiness for nuclear rearmament" by possessing "dispersible" depots of bomb materials. Any cheater would then have to fear that once its illegal activities were uncovered, some nation would reconstruct its nuclear arsenal in "say, six weeks" and then launch a deadly counterattack.

This state of weaponless deterrence

would only be temporary, giving the world enough breathing space to undergo the dramatic "political changes" necessary for creating a "new, non-violent means for decision-making." Schell never elaborates on this second phase, but urges that, until then, "differences between nations ... not be taken up and resolved, but suppressed and postponed."

There are serious reasons to doubt whether weaponless deterrence ever can work. First, even weaponless deterrence presumes *some* level of global political accommodation, for nations must enjoy at least enough amity to trust that no one will cheat. But to establish this level of trust, huge political gaps must be bridged. Can we expect the two billion people of the Third World never to take up nuclear arms against their wealthy northern neighbors for food, water, energy, and technology so long as

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CENTER FOR
INNOVATIVE
DIPLOMACY

644 Emerson
Suite 32
Palo Alto, CA 94301

The Center for Innovative Diplomacy is a non-profit, non-partisan research organization which seeks to develop long-range, creative proposals for effecting global disarmament and world peace.

PROJECT DIRECTORS

Eric J. Horvitz
Hal Harvey
Michael H. Shuman

NEWSLETTER EDITOR

Alex Kline

OFFICE MANAGER

Meg Bowman

SUPPORT STAFF

Ken McClain
Laura Nelson

Cover Design

Marianne Ackerman

Graphics, Layout, & Pasteup

Community Graphics

Illustrations

Chris Hansen

**"WITH ENOUGH DIPLOMATS":
An Interview With
Michael Shuman**

Alex: In your 1981 essay "The Mouse that Roared", you argued that the best hope for disarmament rested with non-nuclear nations. You recommended that these nations demand that the superpowers disarm, and if they didn't disarm, that they repudiate their adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Have your views changed since?

Michael: In some ways, yes. I wrote that essay before a formidable disarmament movement appeared in this country and in Europe. I now have more faith that this movement might be able to reverse the arms race. At the same time, my views have not changed that non-nuclear nations can strengthen this movement. These nations actually have unique strengths for being the torch-bearers of a disarmament movement. First, disarmament raises non-nuclear nations' own military strength vis-a-vis the superpowers. Second, disarmament frees global resources for their economic development. And third, non-nuclear nations know that nuclear annihilation threatens them as much as it threatens anyone else, especially through the possibility of a superpower nuclear war triggering a global nuclear winter. What is interesting is that non-nuclear nations have just now begun to organize themselves in the way that my essay suggested. In June the leaders of Tanzania, India, Sweden, Mexico, and Argentina put the United States and Soviet Union on notice that it was time to get serious about disarmament. I think this forebodes the possibility that more and more non-aligned nations will put pressure on the superpowers. By the time of the next NPT Review Conference in 1985, it's conceivable that this force could be sufficient to put the kinds of demands on the superpowers my essay recommended. However, this scenario was presented back in 1981—and remains now—as a strategy of last resort. I prefer constructive cooperation to coercion.

A: What you're saying is that your last resort scenario of coercion may not yet be worth trying.

M: Exactly. While the arms race has gotten worse, the forces for disarmament have gotten much better. I must emphasize, however, that should there be no progress in disarmament in the next few years, should the election of Ronald Reagan lead to a whole new arms race in space, or should the election of Mondale lead to another round of rather meaningless arms control agreements, this coercive strategy will become increasingly relevant.

A: The Center for Innovative Diplomacy seems to go beyond the limited aims of the freeze movement in its proposals for global disarmament and the establishment of stronger international institutions. Did this focus evolve after a phase during which you emphasized the freeze?


M: We have never emphasized the freeze, although we've always been deeply sympathetic. We formed CID because we believed that freezing the arms race was not enough. Rather than simply focus on step one, we've worked with freeze groups to suggest what steps two through one thousand might be. One recommendation we have been making, for example, is that whenever freeze groups pass an initiative through a local town council, they should demand a small sum of money for members of the community to lobby for the freeze. Imagine each of the several hundred pro-freeze communities allocating money for, say, one to five lobbyists. Several thousand activists would then descend on Washington, D.C. to lobby for the freeze, each formally representing their communities. The impact would be incredible.

A: When you talk about lobbying, I have a picture of well-connected political pundits calling their cronies and taking them out to lunch, leaning over and telling them what they want to see happen on an upcoming bill. But what you're talking about is sort of an amateur lobbying effort by people who probably would be uncomfortable in Washington and without many connections. Might they be pretty ineffective?

M: It's possible, but then again, Congresspeople do have to walk between their office building and the Capitol building to cast votes. A number of lob-

bysts make their contacts during that period. They can also make contacts with staff aides. If enough people do it, it's going to filter back to the representative that a half dozen constituents—official representatives at that—showed up and demanded an immediate freeze. The hometown newspapers would not be very sympathetic to a representative who refused to give the town's freeze advocates an hour to hear their case.

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MICHAEL H. SHUMAN graduated from Stanford University with an A.B. in Economics and International Relations with distinction in 1979, and with a J.D. from Stanford Law School in 1982, where he won the Hilmer-Oehlmann award for Outstanding Legal Writing; he is now a member of the State Bar of California. His various employers have included the Natural Resources Defense Council, the California Energy Commission, Friends of the Earth, and the Stanford Institute for Energy Studies (SUIES). He has written numerous articles on defense and energy policy and, in 1980, he won the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' Rabinowitch Award for his essay on "How to Eliminate the Threat of Nuclear War." He has since helped found the Stanford Arms Control and Disarmament Forum and has spoken widely on "solutions to the weapons crisis." He has also served as an energy policy instructor in the Stanford Departments of Freshman English and Civil Engineering.

Hal Harvey *cont. from cover*

is one of the biggest problems in our political system. While lawyers with legislative expertise are important, it's crucial for policymakers to have technical literacy as well. For example, in arms control, you need to understand the technical aspects of weapons to criticize them effectively. People who comprehend the technical details can meet the Pentagon technocrats on their own turf and dispute their arguments credibly.

A: You've done some interesting research on precision-guided munitions, so-called PGMs, and are finishing a working paper on it. What is your principal argument?

H: PGMs are generally defined as weapons which have a greater than 50% probability of hitting their target. By definition, they are conventional weapons and do not have nuclear warheads. They're used for intercepting ships, tanks and airplanes. A classic recent example is the Argentinian use of the French Exocet missile against the British H.M.S. *Sheffield*. A weapon costing maybe thirty thousand dollars knocked out a \$100 million vessel.

A: So an Exocet missile costs less than a top-of-the-line Porsche?

H: Well, I'm not sure about the Exocet itself, but since some top-of-the-line automobiles cost \$150,000, your point is valid. Our cheapest PGMs cost between three and thirteen thousand dollars apiece, somewhere between a Honda and a Chevelle in price. The ones that are most widely deployed are the so-called TOW missiles. There are about 300,000 of these in the world today, a third of which are deployed by NATO forces. Each of these little \$10,000 beasts can reliably knock out a half million dollar tank. Consequently, conventional warfare is fast becoming defensively-dominated again. And if you eliminate the aggressor's capabilities through very cheap conventional defenses, you no longer need nuclear weapons.

A: How do PGMs work?

H: There are several ways. Some rely on heat-seeking sensors, others allow a gunner to see where the missile is going and guide it from a distance, and some

have visual sensors that compare what they're "seeing" with patterns programmed into an on-board computer.

A: Isn't a reliance on technical solutions historically naive?

H: What I'm advocating are technical solutions *plus* arms control treaties. The combination enables you to get rid of the most dangerous, most unstable weapons. Better communications and verification technologies will make better treaties possible and lower the chances of a catastrophic confrontation.

A: There are two basic views of the Reagan Administration's policies toward the Soviet Union. One is that deploying new missiles and using bellicose rhetoric (like calling the Soviet Union an "evil empire") will simply anger the Soviets beyond the point of negotiation and create an extremely dangerous atmosphere. The other view is that Reagan's demands are reasonable in the face of a wholly unreasonable Soviet system. With which of these views are you more sympathetic?

H: There's no question that the Soviets are difficult to negotiate with and that their intentions are anything but benign. There's also no question that America has its foibles. I think the way to deal with the Soviet Union is very consistently and firmly, but reasonably. The Soviets have shown that they can be reasonable if we treat them reasonably. But they have very little patience for American vacillation between accommodation and belligerence. We go through detente and feel we can "trust the Russians." Then things heat up again and people start saying "we can't trust the Russians." If we sell them grain because our farmers need the money, trust isn't even an issue, that's just a mutually beneficial situation. Arms control is the same way: it's a win-win game.

A: How would you resolve the current stalemate?

H: First I would go back to the walk-in-the-woods accord that Paul Nitze negotiated (and for which President Reagan nearly fired him) and make it a basis for a new treaty.

A: Do you think President Reagan is sincere in his desire for arms control?

H: I think the President would like to see us return to a period when America was unquestionably stronger than the Soviet Union. But that's simply not possible. The one thing that the Soviets will insist on forever—to their nuclear suicide, if necessary—is military equality with the U.S.

A: So what should the Reagan administration be doing that it isn't?

H: We should try to work with the Soviet Union seriously to secure the benefits of arms control. We could embark on a program geared toward making unilateral disarmament a reciprocal process: we eliminate two missiles with an understanding that if they follow suit we will eliminate two more, and so on. This is a way of sending signals of peaceful intentions and replacing the arms race with a peace race.

A: What if we did that and they didn't respond, wouldn't we be weakening the credibility of our deterrence?

H: No, especially since we would start the process with our strategically obsolete weapons whose destruction would have merely symbolic significance.

A: Mightn't they then dismiss the gesture as a Machiavellian ploy to get them to sacrifice significant weapons while we retire our nuclear white elephants?

H: They might, but we certainly have nothing to lose. Soviet intransigence would only bring them a greater burden of international blame for furthering the arms race. In fact, even if we started to make very significant cuts like taking the Pershing IIs out of Europe, and halting the MX and Trident II deployments, we would still maintain an enormous over-kill capacity. Keep in mind that a single Trident sub holds enough warheads to destroy almost every major Soviet city. We would have to disarm more than ninety percent of our current stockpiles before we lost the ability to launch a devastating retaliatory strike that would kill tens or hundreds of millions.

A: You have developed a proposal with Eric Horvitz for a computer network called C-NET. What exactly is C-NET and how is it going to help stem the tide of the arms race?

H: What we hope to create is a tool both to bridge the gap between academics and strategists — and to make activists and researchers more effective. In political organizing or research, everything boils down to information. You write things, you talk to people, you meet with people, and so on, but what you're really doing is developing and moving information. We now have technologies which can dramatically increase the efficiency of doing this. With C-NET, we intend to harness these technologies for the peace movement. We plan to have a computer with on-line research data bases accessible through telephone lines and through other computer networks. Users will also be able to leave electronic mail for other users, read the network's bulletin boards, and do research using the network's databases.

A: What would be a practical application of C-NET?

H: Let's say you want to arrange a meeting between several knowledgeable people in various parts of the country. Provided they each had access to a computer terminal, you could "mail" messages to them giving a date and time for a computer meeting. When the designated time came, the participants could then have a telephone conference, meet personally, or talk to each other by computer. Computer mail makes organizing such meetings far simpler.

Here's another example. Using the database, a concerned citizen could tap into a rich library of information to rebut, say, an editorial contending that the U.S. is "behind" the Russians in nuclear weapons.

A: It may come as a surprise to some that there are technically sophisticated people who are also active in the peace movement. It's worth pointing out that the two groups can go hand in hand. With groups like CPSR (Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility) and the projects you and Eric are undertaking, we see a lot of people here who are both technically sophisticated and also committed to disarmament.

H: Yes, and they are also the people who stand out in terms of effectiveness. They're the people who not only know how to debunk the myths of Administra-

tion spokesmen like Richard Perle, but also know how to get the word out to the general public.

A: Hal, you strike me as an unusual case: an engineering student of the mid-1980s who is politically dedicated and well-informed. What do you think can be done to get more young people to become more informed and active?

H: I don't think younger people are apathetic, just different in their activism. Some people seem to be sentimental for the Vietnam days when young people were marching in the streets and going to jail. Today, students are very diligent about training themselves with skills; and it's hard to expect somebody who has gone to school for twenty years to abandon that training in favor of a placard or a street sign. You find remarkable commitment from young people who are allowed to use their skills. If you expect them just to lick envelopes, they're not going to become very enthusiastic. But there are all sorts of good writers, historians, researchers, foreign language scholars, lawyers, doctors, engineers—a huge assortment of professional people—who are willing to volunteer time and perhaps even to take off a year or two.


A: I've often wondered whether you might be able to do more good, literally, by joining the organizations that are doing things you disapprove of. A friend of mine, an engineer, went to work for Pacific Gas & Electric, even though he apparently disapproved of their commitment to nuclear power. He then uncovered a significant design defect in the company's Diablo Canyon nuclear plant, which kept the plant from going on line for over two years. He felt—with obvious justification—that he did much more by working within the system than the protesters standing outside waving placards and chanting. What do you think about his point of view?

H: Well, I have occasionally thought of joining the military. If you were able to attain a position of power, you might be able to influence things positively. Despite the war-monger stereotypes, there are people in the military who are very conscientious and are working to maintain real security. In general, though, it

would be difficult not to get swept up in the prevailing rationalizations of your superiors and co-workers.

A: It brings to mind an analogy about social activism that a lawyer friend once used of chipping away at a glacier. If you're trying to reverse a glacier by chipping at it in your own small way, even though you might have a personal sense of progress, the glacier moves on inexorably.

H: Well, I don't think that that applies to the peace movement. I hope some glacier of common sense will freeze the arms race. I've always believed that individuals can achieve a great deal. There have been mass movements, but individuals have always been part of them. While leaders may attract the most public attention, it's the "unsung heroes" who have really made the difference. And in the peace movement, it will be the same way. ■



HAL HARVEY graduated with a B.S. in Engineering from Stanford University in 1982. He is on the Board of Directors of Colorado Speaks, an environmental media program broadcasting statewide, and is co-founder of the Stanford Arms Control and Disarmament Forum. In 1981, after researching the MX missile system with Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, he was selected as a delegate to the International Student Pugwash Meeting at Yale. Currently, he is serving on the Board of Directors of the New Land Foundation of New York City and is project director of the Freud Museum in London. Hal is currently completing a M.S. in Civil Engineering at Stanford University, specializing in energy planning.

Eric Horvitz *cont. from cover*

questions about the evolution of biological systems, the roots of human intelligence, the impact of technology on society, and the survival of human civilization are all crucial and inextricably bound together. The nuclear weapons problem glares out through all these questions as a central problem facing Western civilization. Humankind has come quite far in the last several tens of thousands of years. I feel very protective about modern civilization and I want to do whatever I possibly can to help solve this problem.

A: How are your interests interrelated?

E: There is great potential for using concepts, models, and problem-solving strategies from science and medicine in the field of international security and nuclear weapons policy. For example, research in human cognition showing that humans cannot manipulate more than five to nine concepts at one time illustrates the limitations of leaders managing international crises. More intelligent information systems might be able to help such leaders by, for example, displaying a range of options at any given moment during a crisis.

Artificial intelligence research and weapons policy have also become directly related. Briefly, artificial intelligence (AI) is the study of how to design computer systems to mimic human intelligence. Most AI work has been funded by the defense department, even though the intended uses have been largely non-military. But recently the Department of Defense published a "Strategic Computing Initiative," which has allocated \$600 million over five years for investigating military uses of AI such as a self-piloted land vehicle for the Army, a synthetic co-pilot for the Air Force, and a battle management program for the Navy. While AI techniques can be helpful in creating intelligent weapons and weapons control systems, their application will also mean more dependency on potentially unreliable computer hardware and software. People like myself can help alert policymakers about the problems of growing reliance on computer technology.

A: What were your various public interest activities before you became

involved in arms control?

E: For a number of years, I have been interested in environmental carcinogens and procarcinogens. As an undergraduate in New York, I worked with the the New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG), focussing on consumer protection legislation on the asbestos problem. We worked with the state legislature to require new controls on asbestos and proper labeling on the products containing it. Those years taught me a great deal about the way the state and federal governments work.

A: You seem to be quite optimistic about the future. Doesn't humanity's history of progressively more sophisticated warfare and aggression suggest that this species might be on the brink of extinguishing itself?

E: I believe humans can live together and that rationality can prevail.

A: But history indicates that peaceful periods are the exception and not the rule.

E: I disagree that war is necessary. I think we're striving to learn how to actively work for peace. An understanding of our proclivity for war makes this pursuit a very serious one. I believe there's an increasing collective awareness of the need for maintaining peace, especially when war can mean suicide.

A: But humans seem to have a nearly instinctive aggressive urge that leads us constantly back down the path of war. War has inspired some of humanity's most passionate exertions. Our culture is filled with tales of heroic struggle, from *The Song of Roland* to the B movies of the 40s depicting our boys battling fascism in Germany and Japan. What evidence is there that this urge will not culminate in Armageddon?

E: I just don't see destruction and aggression as constant human needs. They're potential feelings and behaviors which are not usually experienced with pleasure but rather with fear and apprehension. Optimism, altruism, and the desire to grow and learn are more central aspects of human character. Particular sequences of events have led to the wars that crowd our short history; given the proper circumstances these more positive traits can predominate.

A: A recent article in The New Republic trumpeted the decline of the anti-nuclear movement, saying that general elections in the United States, Great Britain, and other countries had repudiated the anti-nuclear movement. Do you think the concern about nuclear weapons is running out of gas?

E: This view oversimplifies the nature of the growing concern over nuclear weapons. Even the word "anti-nuclear" is misleading. There is an ever-increasing concern about man's ability to control the nuclear weapons technology. That concern includes the high-visibility mass protests against specific new weapons like the Pershing IIs. But the concern runs much deeper, and can't be gauged simply by who gets elected or by how many thousands of people show up at demonstrations. As with any important issue, concern ebbs and flows depending on certain circumstances. Nevertheless, the bottom line on the nuclear weapons problem is that tension has been constantly growing since the 40s.

A: Some have argued that since Hiroshima, we've avoided nuclear war for nearly 40 years. We've gone through several generations of improvements in nuclear weapons without any fatal destabilization. Why not keep going the way we've been going, which, even though it's scary, has apparently produced a world without nuclear wars?

E: I don't think anybody is justified in concluding from the few nuclear war-free seconds that have elapsed since 1945 that nuclear weapons will never be used. At various times, we've come perilously close to nuclear war. We shouldn't confuse our *bon chance* as a security blanket for the future. It's given us the time to say "let's get our act together," but nothing more. We should be using this time very wisely.

A: What motivates people who are interested in nuclear weapons and where do your motivations fit into this spectrum?

E: Some people are interested in nuclear weapons because they are fascinated with the technical aspects—they love the gadgetry. Others are enthralled with the international in-

trigue classically associated with these weapons. But there is also a great number whose interest stems from an optimism for the future, a fascination with humanity and desire to see it grow in beautiful ways. I identify with this last group. Millions of people have a sober understanding of the problems these weapons pose to the integrity of human civilization.

A: How do you account for the widespread apathy about such a universal issue?

E: Some are simply unaware of the weapons problem. This unawareness stems partly from society's built-in cloaking of the problem. Our secure American lifestyle suppresses any acknowledgement of the possibility of disaster. Most of us lead comfortable lives and have been shielded from the direct horrors of war. People will shop at Safeway or study for their next exam and go about their daily routines without considering the implications of the present weapon systems. The arms build-up is silent and hidden unless we actively focus on it.

Another group recognizes the potential problem but believes that the odds of the occurrence of full-scale nuclear warfare are so low that efforts to further decrease its probability are just wasted energy. These people often have a strong trust in our leaders and technical systems.

A third group believes that nuclear weapons are an extraordinary problem but shares the second group's belief that individual efforts to do anything about them are futile. This group is probably the largest. To motivate these people to act you must foster a sense of empowerment, a sense that they can make a difference.

All three groups, to some extent, are denying that the issue exists. Having a perpetual Sword of Damocles over their heads and a feeling that nothing can be done inevitably leads many to denial.

A: Similar to the reaction most people have to things like cancer or getting killed by a drunk driver. If they feel there's nothing they can do about it, they ignore it.

E: And since nuclear war is so far from Americans' normal daily lives,

which are relatively smooth and secure, it doesn't seem real enough to warrant consideration.

A: Isn't that just human nature, though, to deny? Books such as Ernest Becker's *Denial of Death* have suggested that people simply do not dwell on the fact that they are mortal creatures and that their very existence is threatened by numerous things at any given moment.

E: To a certain extent nuclear weapons have become like God to some people—an invisible force of unfathomable power. They're viewed as weapons beyond human control, fireballs which will strike out of the blue. Many people therefore feel it's foolish to waste time trying to do anything about them.

A: So how can you get people to realize the imminent danger they're in and to realize they don't have to live with it because these weapons are controlled by other people rather than by nature?

E: You have to paint the problem accurately, get it into the forefront of people's minds, and then outline things they can do to help alleviate the problem.

A: The current nuclear system reminds me of the phrase Justice Holmes used to describe the law: "A brooding omnipresence in the sky."

E: That metaphor fits the situation well. To compel people to act requires that they understand the mechanical nature of nuclear weapons, and perhaps some of the physics underlying their operation. It is also useful to present the history of the development and deployment of nuclear weaponry from the single spherical Gadget tested in the Alamogordo desert in 1945 to the extensive network of weapons in place today. If we can get people to see these weapons as within their comprehension and control, they can start to feel empowered to demand changes. Showing people that these are man-made devices under the control of frail and sometimes irrational humans demonstrates that the problem is based in humanity and not an ineffable deity.

I'd like to show people that a nuclear bomb is a relatively crude mechanical device that creates a big flash of energy which happens to be powerful enough

to destroy a city. These are just machines which we can control if only we have the desire to do so.

A: You have been very interested in the psychological aspects of the arms race. What developments have occurred since you and Hal organized the 1982 Stanford conference on the psychological causes and consequences of the nuclear weapons race?

E: While the study of the psychological roots of international relations still lacks the credibility that it deserves, it is becoming a very fertile area for research. Right now researchers in Stanford's psychology department are applying game theory concepts to the arms race. Anonymous questionnaires were sent to U.S. and Soviet officials asking them to rate the benefits of any of four possibilities: 1) that we increase arms and they disarm, 2) that we disarm and they increase arms, 3) that we both increase arms, or 4) that we both disarm. (The "we" and "they" referred to obviously depend on which side is responding.) Rather than assigning the highest score to the first of those choices, as one might expect, the fourth choice—that both sides disarm—was seen as most beneficial. So there does seem to be a recognition in the circles of power that disarmament benefits *both* sides. If these answers are honest ones, it indicates there's a communication problem between the two sides and neither side really wants an arms race. If that's so, then the kind of improved communication CID is advocating should help clear up these misperceptions of the other side's intent.

A: What's a concrete proposal for clearing up such misperceptions?

E: Working with the Stanford Arms Control and Disarmament Forum, CID has proposed a satellite simulcast for an academically-oriented two day conference between American and Soviet leaders. Stanford President Donald Kennedy has indicated that he would chair such a conference and Jim Hickman of the U.S.-Soviet Exchange Project is at this moment visiting academic leaders in the Soviet Academy of Sciences to make arrangements. If all goes well, leaders from each nation will discuss their misperceptions of one another.

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Eric Horvitz *cont. from p. 7*

A: You seem to lack the technophobia sometimes associated with the peace movement. How else do you see technology contributing to the disarmament movement?

E: The leaps and bounds that communication technology is making will enable non-governmental diplomacy to really take off. New satellite transmission and reception technologies will bring us one step closer to what McLuhan has called the "global village." They will enable Americans and Soviets to get to know each other much more directly than they do now, when most information is filtered through the media. The more people in both nations deal directly with each other, the more human they become and the harder it is to incite them to murder each other. ■



ERIC J. HORVITZ received his B.S. in Biophysics from the State University of New York at Binghamton with Outstanding Academic Honors. He is now in his fourth year at Stanford Medical School in the M.D./Ph.D. program focusing on Artificial Intelligence in Medicine. He was a founder of the Stanford Arms Control and Disarmament Forum and the Stanford Physicians for Social Responsibility. In 1981, he was one of the principal national organizers of UCAM and served on its founding Steering Committee. In 1983, Eric was granted a Stanford University Medical Scholar Award to apply artificial intelligence techniques to genetics problems. He has since worked with the Stanford Medical Computer Science Group.

Michael Shuman *cont. from p. 3*

A: The 1984 Disarmament Directory lists 560 groups in Northern California alone involved in disarmament activities. A good number of these are "direct action" groups that engage in sit-in demonstrations, marches, and letter writing. How is CID different from these groups?

M: CID is engaged in more direct thoughtfulness than direct action. We believe that any disarmament strategy has got to be one that lasts for several decades. A disarmament strategy that is fashionable one year and gone the next is going to be meaningless. I suspect that no more than 50 of those 560 groups will last more than 5 years. Most focus on short-term goals, like what can be achieved in Congress or who can be elected in the next election. These groups are in a hurry. While we sympathize with their sense of urgency, we also believe that the solution we're all after is not one that can take place in one, five, or ten years. It's a solution that's going to take—literally—every year of the rest of our lives. And consequently we've tried to orient ourselves to the longer-term solutions most groups have overlooked.

A: How would you distinguish CID from other groups that are oriented toward long-term thinking?

M: Most of those groups are essentially think tanks. The leftist World Policy Institute and the more centrist World Without War Council, for example, both tend to be very theoretical. What we are trying to do is create actionable short-term policies that are integrated into a coherent longer-term vision. For example, one of our projects is to build a directly-elected global assembly—a project that is long-term and yet requires some immediate action. Most groups would not touch this kind of project because it's not short-term. The think tank groups might approach it by writing treatises ruminating on what might happen in ten or twenty years. We're interested in that, but we're also interested in what organizations, cities, and states can do right now to make this possible.

A: How did CID get started?

M: In 1981, I met Eric Horvitz and Hal Harvey at Stanford University. I was a law student then, Eric a medical student, and Hal an engineering student. We were all very scared and frustrated with what the Reagan presidency meant to a burgeoning nuclear arms race, and we set out to increase campus awareness of the problem by forming a group called the Stanford Arms Control and Disarmament Forum, which is still alive and kicking. Our first accomplishment was to sponsor a week-long arms control dog-and-pony show with a dozen speakers.

Ironically, we capped off the week with a debate between Sidney Drell of SLAC and Lt. General Danny Graham on "Weapons of the 1980s: The MX and Beyond." Graham basically gave Reagan's Star Wars speech two years early. Our forum had more foresight than we had ever imagined.

Roughly a year later, in the spring of 1982, Hal and I were preparing to graduate and were undecided about whether to pursue our respective careers in engineering and law, mostly because we were so wrapped up in our arms control work. So, we decided to take a risk and form a new organization for disenfranchised young people like ourselves. The group's name was the International Disarmament Forum, or IDF.

A: What did IDF do?

M: At first, we stayed in the conference business. In early 1982, for example, we sponsored another large dog-and-pony show in San Francisco with 25 speakers, including people like physicist John Holdren, astrophysicist Phillip Morrison, and energy analysts Amory and Hunter Lovins.

Our next project was to publish a newspaper. To increase the quantity and quality of mainstream campus activism on the disarmament issue, we decided to create a newspaper called "Taking Off," which was designed to give disarmament activity a friendly face. We put out two issues, which were inserted in 100,000 campus dailies in Northern California. After each issue, we took surveys and found that one out of ten readers, or 10,000 people, were positively influenced to take a disarmament course, to read a disarmament book, or to begin working for a disarmament-oriented

candidate. The only thing that did not work well was generating enough advertising revenue to make the project self-sufficient. So we decided to begin lower overhead projects like research and computer networking. At that point, we changed our name to the Center for Innovative Diplomacy.

A: What led to the name change?

M: The "disarmament" part of IDF was misleading. People thought we believed in instantaneous disarmament. While we believe that disarmament is a reasonable goal to guide any short-term policy, we also know that disarmament cannot happen overnight. Since our short-term agenda is not to disarm the world, but rather to build better means of international politicking that can lead to disarmament, we felt that "diplomacy" was a better term.

To those who believed that disarmament was pie-in-the-sky, our old name simply suggested that we were unrealistic thinkers. We reminded ourselves that our purpose was not to preach to the converted. While most groups in the disarmament movement seem to be pitching themselves to leftists, we are aiming for the center, and we believe the name CID better suits our constituents.

A: You speak of bringing the disarmament movement more into the mainstream. There is a general perception these days that liberalism is in decline. Aren't your proposals even further left than conventional liberalism?

M: Not at all. As the Green Party says about itself, "we're neither left nor right, we're ahead." I think that describes what we're proposing, because parts of our proposals appeal to liberals and parts appeal to conservatives. To give some examples, leftists like our interest in disarmament, but dislike our skepticism toward establishing an international welfare state. Rightists like our interest in promoting democracy around the world, but dislike our interest in eroding U.S. nationalism. We refuse to be pegged in conventional leftist or rightist terms.

A: It sounds like you are detaching yourself from mainstream peace groups.

M: Not really. In fact, we're now playing a central role in forging a coalition of peace and environmental groups at a national level. In the third week of September, a large conference with 2000 people called Conference on the Fate of the Earth is scheduled to take place in Washington, D.C. We're contributing to this conference by bringing together well over a hundred groups to reach a consensus on a policy and action statement. In August I will be travelling to Washington to facilitate a series of short meetings with representatives from a number of peace, environmental, labor, and social justice groups to develop a list of key policy proposals on disarmament, resource management, conversion, international institution building, and citizen diplomacy for the conference platform. CID will also produce a book-length document backing up the conference policy and action statement. This is an example of our working constructively with these groups even though our outlook may be different from theirs.

A: President Reagan says he has made the world safer in the last three years. He stresses that his approach is one of realism, strength, and dialogue. How is what you're saying different from what Mr. Reagan is saying? Aren't you both for peace and for disarmament?

M: In President Reagan's world, dialogue apparently means a breakdown of arms control talks in both Geneva and Vienna, and no other significant summits planned in the foreseeable future. It also means embarrassing most of our western allies with our military and economic policies, and alienating most members of the United Nations through the highly vitriolic speeches of Jeanne Kirkpatrick. In CID's view, dialogue means pursuing arms control vigorously and not proposing ridiculously non-negotiable agreements. To us, dialogue also means making some positive unilateral gestures to the Soviet Union, such as having a comprehensive test ban for six months and asking the Soviets to follow our lead.

In Reagan's world, strength apparently means developing a lot of more accurate, more destabilizing weapons. But we don't make ourselves stronger by making our enemies feel weaker. Our

strength is contingent on everyone in the world feeling secure, and Reagan's policies of technological one-upmanship have increased Soviet fears of a first strike. At the same time, he's increased the chances of the Soviet Union launching a preemptive first strike on the United States, and increased the chances of the Soviets moving their arsenals to a launch-on-warning posture, which means that the moment their outdated computers accidentally confuse a misguided goose for a missile, the United States is vaporized. Reagan's policies have simultaneously weakened both the Soviet Union and the United States. In CID's view, a real policy of strength would strive to make both our enemies and our friends feel more secure by restructuring our arsenal into a minimal deterrent. That means we should possess the fewest number of nuclear weapons necessary to assure destruction of anyone who attacks our homeland—and no more. It also means we would promise never to use nuclear weapons except to retaliate against a nuclear aggressor. A minimal deterrent would probably require about one to five percent as many weapons as we now have. Ultimately, the real road to strength is to develop enough international politicking, community, and dialogue so that we can resolve our problems through political debate instead of cruise missiles.

Finally, there's the issue of realism. In Ronald Reagan's view, realism means perpetuating the assumptions and the mistakes of the past. In CID's view, realism means thinking about where we want to be in 50 to 100 years, and realizing that we need disarmament to survive and international institutions to have disarmament. Not a single President since 1945 has taken an imaginative initiative in international institution-building. What has distinguished Reagan's tenure is his unprecedented effort to destroy existing institutions. He has thwarted the International Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua, he has begun our pullout from UNESCO, his surrogates have snidely suggested that the United Nations might leave New York, and ambassador Kirkpatrick has cast a third of all the American vetoes since 1946. This is a course of institution-smashing. It is hard to imagine a less realistic policy. ■

International Institution Building *cont. from p. 2*

more than 10,000 people per day are dying of starvation? While Schell believes that political "differences between nations" should be "suppressed and postponed," these "differences" are, in fact, the very reasons nations arm up, make threats, and undertake conquests and interventions, even at the risk of humiliation.

The necessity of resolving political differences before weaponless deterrence becomes even clearer when we consider the power held by malcontents. Since weaponless deterrence gives any new nuclear nation enormous military power over other nations, it essentially cedes every nation with a veto power over global survival. This leads Schell to call abolition a "militarily equalizing measure" where "proliferation—of capacity, not of weapons—could be stabilizing." Thus, instead of resting in the hands of just Reagan, Andropov, Deng, Thatcher, Mitterand, and Gandhi, the fate of the earth would suddenly be entrusted to Khomeini, Qaddafi, Marcos, and Assad. In the face of these risks, nations will certainly demand great assurance that the world's lurking conflicts have been resolved.

Schell's weaponless deterrence also faces ominous political difficulties in the negotiation process, for his implicit vision that 150 nations will agree to a disarmament megatreaty defies history. Few treaties have ever had more than a hundred members, and two that have—the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Law of the Sea Treaty—have yet to fulfill their comparatively modest objectives.

Imagine how much our Congress could accomplish if it had to rewrite procedural rules for every new bill and could only pass legislation on which there was virtual unanimity. As long as complex international agreements are made this way, the nations of the world can hardly be expected to negotiate Schell's megatreaty. An improved United Nations or a new global legislature—reforms Schell says we do not need—would be the place to take up weaponless deterrence, not today's anarchic treaty-making environment.

Finally, Schell overlooks the requi-

sites of an effective on-site inspection regime. Such a system would require both an international legislature to define the rules (e.g., where to go and not to go) and a court to handle complaints about violations. Lest we wind up with the kind of pointless banter that now characterizes suspected treaty violations over "yellow rain," the inspection system will require broad participation, empowerment, and legitimacy.

As much as Jonathan Schell would like to avoid any taint of stronger international institutions, his weaponless deterrence proposal is neither possible nor desirable without them.

As much as Jonathan Schell would like to avoid any taint of stronger international institutions, his weaponless deterrence proposal is neither possible nor desirable without them.

B. Can we afford to live with nuclear weapons in perpetuity?

Unlike Schell, the Harvard Nuclear Study Group believes that stronger international institutions *are* necessary for disarmament. Nevertheless, Harvard believes we can afford not to pursue international institution-building because "[w]isely controlled, [nuclear weaponry] will remain unused in war and can prevent the reoccurrence of large-scale conventional conflict."

But without disarmament, Harvard's world would forever have to cope with the powerful momentum of weapons research and development. In every nation's weapons labs, scientists will be searching vigorously for technologies to bestow a dramatic military edge over the rest of the planet (all, of course, in the name of national security).

Harvard's world would also have to contend with some proliferation. One hundred and fifteen nations have signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in which non-nuclear

nations promised not to deploy nuclear weapons in exchange for a promise by nuclear nations to pursue disarmament. But the concept of non-proliferation only made sense when the superpowers seemed sincere about moving toward disarmament. As the superpowers postpone their NPT obligations and continue amassing ever more powerful weapons, many non-aligned nations will feel more insecure and move toward greater militarization, both conventional and nuclear. This movement may be slow, but without strong international institutions to impede it, the drift is inevitable.

Given the ongoing dynamics of continued weapons research and continued proliferation, it seems doubtful that Harvard's world could long remain stable. A single false move by one clumsy or deranged nuclear porcupine could incinerate the entire forest. Even friendly porcupines have occasional conflicts which could quickly renew an arms race. History is replete with sane leaders going insane; with enough porcupines, the chance that, sooner or later, one will lose its senses and fire off one, two, or all its nuclear quills is unacceptably high.

The best Harvard can hope for is that arms races would cease, most weapons be scrapped, proliferation slowed, and nuclear anarchy avoided. But suppose all of this is possible; in particular, suppose international institutions *do* arise capable of stabilizing a world of, say, a dozen nuclear weapons states. To freeze this status quo, these institutions would have to ensure that no nuclear weapons state ever gained a decisive advantage and no non-nuclear weapons state went nuclear. This would require both more intrusive inspection methods and a more heavily armed peacekeeping apparatus than would a disarmed world. The reason is simple: larger weapons stockpiles pose larger threats to any international order, which, in turn, can only be controlled through more powerful international guards, spies, and armies. Living with nuclear weapons, therefore, is not a way around international institutions. On the contrary, it is a way of ensuring that these institutions are more militarized and tyrannical. In this sense, complete disarmament offers humanity an escape not only from nuclear annihilation, but also from the

awesome tyranny of international organizations Harvard fears.

C. Will a disarmed world order mean tyranny or breakdown?

In modern times, the most celebrated effort at describing a disarmed world order has been Grenville Clark's and Louis B. Sohn's *World Peace through World Law*, which sought to bring about disarmament through phased weapons reductions overseen by a strong global police force, court system, and legislature. The Clark-Sohn plan assumed that nations would have the political will to disarm but never articulated a coherent vision of how this will might evolve. Consequently, critics feared that if the world's leaders were ever to adopt Clark-Sohn, its political infrastructure would be brittle. And without widespread popular support, the Clark-Sohn structure seemed destined to disintegrate into either global civil war or global tyranny.

Worries about the weak political infrastructure of the Clark-Sohn plan account for nearly all the Harvard Study Group's, Dyson's, and Schell's cynicism about world order approaches to weapons control. Fears of breakdown and tyranny may be legitimate reactions to the Clark-Sohn proposal, but they are wholly unjustified reactions to a broader range of possible reforms. The risks of breakdown and tyranny inhere in all governments, but is anyone arguing that we therefore should abolish all governments? Relinquishing our national sovereignty might require, as Jonathan Schell fears, lots of "meddling," but then again, it might not. Whether an additional, international layer of "meddling" would ruin Schell's and others' lives depends a great deal on what the layer looks like.

Noted economist Kenneth Boulding echoes a common view that world order means tyranny when he states that a disarmed world order "would be so fantastically heterogeneous, particularly at the present low level of the sense of world community, that it would almost inevitably ... degenerate." But long stretches of peace within "melting pot" nations like the United States and among the culturally diverse nations in Europe suggest that, under the right circumstances, peace can survive both heterogeneity and nationalism. The challenge—which Boulding and other critics decline—is to learn from history

what the right circumstances might be.

In fact, today's world has experienced not only an explosion of heterogeneous nationalist movements, but also an explosion of internationalist movements. By almost every index—communication, visits, meetings, trade, and political cooperation—international activity is on the upswing. All nations, large and small, are seeking better ways to cooperate in an increasingly complex international environment. Had Boulding and the other cynics examined this latter process, they might have discovered at least three strategies for breeding international cooperation among highly heterogeneous participants—world federalism, international patriotism, and cross-cutting allegiances.

"World federalism" envisions international organizations having power only in those few, special areas in which they are explicitly ceded power. Its conceptual attractiveness is that it allows different people to retain their differences, except in those areas (like weapons control) where great interdependence makes national independence inefficient or unfair.

Rejecting blind nationalism is the only way to banish nuclearism.

International law professor Inis Claude, Jr., notes that our own history provides two additional insights regarding how to breed peaceful cooperation among heterogeneous groups:

"The pluralism [of American society] has become so complex, that no clean-cut divisions of loyalty and interest can be found Thus, Texans cannot pose the threat of civil war because there is no one who is wholly a Texan, and labor unions cannot launch a revolution because there is no one who is fully a unionist. The second consideration is that individual loyalties have not only been scattered among a variety of groups, but that some of them have been detached from smaller entities and lodged in the national community itself. Texas cannot revolt against the United States because its people are more fundamentally Americans than they are Texans. These are perhaps the basic conditions which make the maintenance of order possible in the United

States, and which must be reproduced in the international community if stable world order is to become a reality."

The heterogeneity of the world means that we need to foster among subnational groups both stronger international loyalties and stronger cross-cutting allegiances.

Resistance to a stronger world order, therefore, derives not from the unavailability of tools for forging it, but rather from the absence of will to begin using these tools. Harvard, Dyson, and Schell lack this will because they cannot even conceive of international values intermingling with American values, even in a small number of policy areas. Jonathan Schell is horrified page after page by the risks of extinction, yet apparently cannot cope with any international meddling in his activities that have global externalities, even when this meddling stems from our *willingly* surrendering a little sovereignty after much international communication and compromise. We must recognize that *this* is what the arms race is all about, and that rejecting blind nationalism is the only way to banish nuclearism.

D. Is building stronger international institutions possible?

Left without any further substantive arguments against establishing a world order, critics simply insist that a stronger world order is so different from today's world that it must be impossible. Dyson, for example, explains: "The reason I reject World Government as a concept to guide our policies is that it violates [George] Kennan's requirement that a concept should be modest, and devoid of utopian and universalistic pretensions." Yet Dyson is apparently unaware that Kennan himself has come to embrace the concept.

Note Dyson's use of the words "world government." As Schell concedes, the words "world government" are "so thoroughly out of fashion that merely uttering them seems guaranteed to sink in political oblivion any plan connected with them." Schell and Dyson's repeated use of the words, therefore, seems deliberately calculated to cut off any serious thought about international political reform. It is revealing that when Schell himself promotes "world government" as the step *after* weaponless deterrence, he drops the dreaded words

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International Institution Building *cont. from p. 11*

and uses the more charitable term "international institutions." The Harvard study falls into the same trap when it asserts that "a world government is a dream for the distant future, not a practical goal for real policymakers." This confuses a long-term, idealistic, and probably undesirable *goal* of a Clark-Sohn world government with a short-term, pragmatic *policy* of strengthening international norms, laws, and institutions.

Had the Harvard scholars, Dyson, and Schell really begun looking at some possible policies for dedicating U.S. foreign policy to international institution building, they might have highlighted two general directions: policies to strengthen existing international institutions; and, policies to encourage greater activism of non-state actors in foreign affairs.

(1) Strengthening Today's International Institutions

Many vital international organizations already exist, which, through careful nurturance, could grow into the institutions necessary to oversee nuclear disarmament. Of particular importance are the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the United Nations (UN), which have always held the promise of developing, respectively, into the interpreter and promulgator of international law. Because both institutions are relatively weak and ineffective, their reform must be an integral part of any disarmament strategy.

To pull the ICJ out of its tailspin, the United States could make at least two important unilateral gestures. First, we might, as the World Policy Institute's Robert C. Johansen recommends, "accept without reservation compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court in all disputes with other states similarly accepting this provision." Second, we might begin to use the ICJ more frequently *before* acting in foreign affairs, especially when we contemplate using military force. Thus, before invading Grenada, we might have sought a declaration of the alleged illegality of the Grenadan government. Every time the United States uses the court, it sets an important precedent that helps strength-

en international morality and law. Likewise, everytime the U.S. defies the court, as it did in withdrawing the court's jurisdiction to hear Nicaragua's complaints about our mining of its harbors, we are making the world safe for anarchy.

The United Nations is another place in need of reform. The conventional laundry list includes: abolishing the Security Council veto, incorporating more due process in General Assembly deliberations, and enlarging the organization's financial base. In each of these reform areas, a strong initiative by American leaders could have profound impact.

The issue is not a technical one of how to control weapons, but rather a political one of how to control people; bombs cannot push the button, only people can.

But perhaps the most important reform for the UN would be to find a way of developing a people-to-people politics that helps build international loyalties. For example, representatives might be elected instead of appointed to ensure that they were no longer simply taking orders from national leaders.

Even within the existing framework of the UN, the United States could lobby for three important steps in creating a global disarmament regime:

- First, it could support the creation of an international verification system, administered and funded by the United Nations. Such an open and reliable central information bank on troop movements and weapons deployments not only would make treaties easier to verify, but also would reduce much of the mistrust that engenders international conflict.
- Second, the United States might support the establishment of a permanent global peace-keeping force to provide effective collective security.
- Finally, the United States might insist on using the Security Council as

the setting for all future arms control negotiations.

As in the case of the ICJ, if an American consensus ever emerges that the United Nations is beyond minor repairs, then it is incumbent on our foreign policy to propose and build a better institution.

(2) Encouraging Greater International Activity by Nonstate Actors

A second important direction for a world-order orientation in American foreign policy would be the fostering of international loyalties and cross-cutting allegiances by helping nonstate actors like individuals, churches, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) become more active in foreign affairs. Throughout the planet, these actors are becoming increasingly aggressive and influential. Prominent examples include Jesse Jackson's release of flier Robert Goodman from Syria and of several dozen American citizens held in Cuban prisons, and John Mroz's secret negotiations with Yassir Arafat. Some of the most exciting developments, however, are less overtly political and involve America's mainstream citizenry. Live satellite transmissions, for example, have enabled a college audience in Moscow to observe the "US" music festival in San Bernardino, California, while the "US" audience watched a jazz combo perform to the Moscow students.

Our government could undertake four different initiatives to expand the quantity and quality of these activities:

- First, it could sponsor national plebiscites on foreign affairs issues. If held in several nations at once, such plebiscites could provide an important impetus for non-state actors to work across government borders.
- A second direction is to encourage the growth of ties between different nations' political parties. By either establishing alliances among existing national parties (like the conservative International Democrat Union) or joining new endeavors (like the Greens), American leaders can help help orchestrate transnational strategies for pushing parallel legislation. For example, a transnational effort to deal with the problem of low-wage imports might strive simultaneously to reduce trade barriers at home and to raise wages abroad.

- Third, U.S. policy-makers should take policy and legal initiatives to remove the barriers to transnational travel, communication, and commerce. For example, political restrictions on passports and visas used to keep out, among others, Nobel Prize-winning author Gabriel Garcia Marquez should be eliminated.

- Fourth, policy-makers should consider new, ambitious exchange programs. A one-time expenditure of a billion dollars, less than one percent of the defense budget, spent to support the exchange of 100,000 Americans for 100,000 Soviets for three to six months could probably buy at least as much long-term national security for *both* sides as an equivalently priced aircraft carrier.

All of these participatory mechanisms offer a chance for the peoples of the world to share their wisdom, to realign their loyalties with like-minded constituents in other nations, and to recast foreign policy debates in new, popular terms. By developing global political alliances that transcend geographic and national identities, these mechanisms could begin to develop an international politics that simultaneously reduces the

power of the state and enhances the power of a participatory world order.

Both strengthening existing international organizations and encouraging greater participation of nonstate actors in foreign affairs hold the prospect of creating the global norms, laws, and institutions that can make disarmament possible. Whether the ultimate institutional scheme for disarmament is Clark-Sohn or some other plan is irrelevant. No matter what the end point, the initial moves outlined above will be necessary.

E. A call for new realism

The Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Freeman Dyson, and Jonathan Schell all refuse to treat disarmament and world order seriously and instead propose esoteric, Rube Goldberg plans for controlling weapons. The issue is not a technical one of how to control weapons, but rather a political one of how to control people; bombs cannot push the button, only people can.

What is critical for disarmament, therefore, are international political shifts all these analysts *assume* are impossible. But modern human history

is replete with variegated international political developments. Several hundred years ago, as strategic analyst Herman Kahn once pointed out, the nation-state was as politically unthinkable as new international institutions seem today. The challenge confronting policy-makers is to define the appropriate directions and strategies for political shifts and not to pronounce all international politics dead.

By remaining mute on global norms, laws, and institutions, the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Freeman Dyson, and Jonathan Schell have deflected critical attention from the fundamental need for international political integration. The reasons for this deflection are uniformly weak. We may disagree over the appropriate means for establishing a stronger world order, but if we can at least agree that the goal is worthy, then the real debate and experimentation can begin. Today, when, as Richard Barnett of the Institute for Policy Studies comments, we march toward annihilation under the banner of realism, any effort at international institution-building could not be too much, too soon. ■

CHRIS HANSEN



Citizen Diplomacy

BY MICHAEL H. SHUMAN

Citizen Diplomacy is a regular column describing recent, innovative efforts by individuals, communities, and states to influence foreign affairs.

MUTUALLY ASSURED REPRESSION


About the only thing the American and Soviet governments can agree on these days is the need to keep their citizens apart.

In March, a group of women anti-nuclear protesters from Greenham Common, England travelled to the Soviet Union and met with the government's official Peace Committee. The exchange all went as the Soviet government had hoped until one of the Greenham Common women inquired about the nature of the Soviets' independent peace movement. The Soviets present denied that any such movement existed, until one Soviet woman, Olga Medvedkova, stepped forward and identified herself as a member. Enraged, officials later arrested her. With a flurry of protest telegrams from peace activists throughout Europe, the Soviets only meted out a light, suspended sentence.


The Medvedkova affair is but one example of a growing Soviet crackdown on its citizen diplomats. Effective July 1st was a new, vaguely-worded law that punishes any citizen who gives shelter, transportation, or other "services" to a foreigner without official permission. Another law just passed makes it illegal to accept "money or other material value from foreign organizations or persons acting in the interest of those organizations." This new ordinance would not only prohibit the receipt of food and clothing (which the Solzhenitsyn Fund sends to citizens deprived of their livelihood for political reasons), but would also apply, some analysts fear, to Soviet teenagers collecting Levis.

While we think of our own government as being comparatively liberal in allowing us to intermingle with foreign-

Americans visiting Soviet Union
(in thousands)



Soviet citizens visiting the U.S.
(in thousands)



Sources: U.S. State Department; General Tours Inc.

ers, a recent Supreme Court opinion reinstated President Reagan's curbs on tourist and business travel to Cuba. The Reagan regulations, issued in 1982, ended nearly five years of unimpeded travel by Americans to Cuba. The U.S. government has also severely restricted the ability of foreigners to visit us. As an editorial in *The Nation* put it: "Either America is an open society or it isn't. If it is, the country has nothing to fear from such political and literary luminaries as Nobel Prize-winner Gabriel Garcia Marquez, playwright Dario Fo, Salvadoran insurgent leader Guillermo Ungo and Chile's widowed First Lady Hortensia Allende. But the Reagan Administration has refused to grant to all of the above—and dozens more—the entry privileges customarily accorded other figures of their stature."

All of these moves by both the United States and Soviet Union run counter to the 1975 Helsinki accords, in which both superpowers, along with more than thirty other nations, pledged to "facilitate freer and broader dissemination of all forms of information, cooperation in the field of information, and exchange of information with other countries."

MOSCOW IS NOT ON THE HUDSON

In denying ourselves access to the Soviet Union, according to Yale Richmond, a retired Foreign Service officer who headed the State Department's office on U.S.-Soviet exchanges during the 1970s, "we hurt ourselves. I think if people knew more about these [exchan-

ges], they would not be tempted to cut them off."

Exchange programs are valuable because they help break myths. One example emerges from a recent trip by a 270 member delegation of the National Council of Churches to 14 Soviet cities. Contradicting the prevailing wisdom that Soviets have no religious freedom, the delegation's leader, Rev. John B. Lindner of New York, stated, "We have discovered vital religious communities wherever we went, from Tallinn to Tashkent." The group's conclusions were strikingly similar to those of evangelist Billy Graham, who, according to the *Los Angeles Times*, "during a controversial visit to Moscow in 1982, said he saw no evidence of religious repression in the Soviet Union and that the churches he visited were as full as those in his hometown of Charlotte, N.C."

Another example of myth-breaking comes from Julie Barnard, a recent Stanford graduate in Russian Studies. After returning from the Soviet Union, she wrote about the film *Moscow on the Hudson*: "The film serves [the Soviets] up in a manner that appears to be sensitive and objective, yet creates a contradictory and confusing portrait. The film's predominant images of life in Moscow veer far from reality. Impossibly long lines of grim, silent figures waiting in the snow to buy toilet paper are reminiscent of those I imagine stretched along the walls outside Stalin's prisons, a far cry from the boisterous, jostling crowds I've encountered there ... The cluttered Soviet apartment and the obvious parallel with the overcrowded conditions of the family in Harlem again misrepresent

Soviet life Fortunately for the Soviet Union, Moscow is on the Moskva, Muscovites are not New Yorkers, and the Hudson is the United States' problem."


LINGERING RAYS OF HOPE

Despite ongoing harassment, citizen diplomats in both superpowers have managed to continue a trickle of relations. Here are two encouraging examples:

- The Olympics might be dead, but less visible sports exchanges are not. Despite the Soviet decision not to participate in the Los Angeles games, leaders of both Olympic committees have agreed in principle to an exchange program of athletes, coaches, and sports-medicine personnel.

- In March, the sixth Soviet and American Writers Conference took place in Malibu, California. The participants issued a decree urging "our Governments to re-establish cultural contacts

and exchanges on the widest possible scale." Izabella Zorina, a Soviet Literary critic, read at the meeting a letter from an American friend who attended an earlier meeting—a letter she felt expressed her own sentiments: "My experiences here were memorable. I met Soviet writers and they met me. It evoked memories of a time when both our countries were allied against a common foe. Now the common foe is misunderstanding."



'A MR. JACKSON HERE TO FREE SAKHAROV!'

Working Papers Available from CID

Each of the following CID Working Papers is available for \$4.00 (\$2.00 for members).

1. "LIVING WITHOUT HARVARD: A CRITIQUE OF THE HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP," by Michael H. Shuman, November 1983.

In their highly publicized study *Living with Nuclear Weapons*, five professors and a graduate student from Harvard University argue that disarmament is a "fictional utopia" and that our only recourse is to continue modernizing our nuclear arsenals and negotiating modest arms control treaties. This paper criticizes Harvard's analysis on four points. First, Harvard refuses to face up to the ultimate need for disarmament for human survival. Second, it caricatures disarmament as requiring a tyrannical "world government," when, in fact, it really requires a concerted policy of international institution building. Third, Harvard places too much reliance on balance-of-forces arms control agreements, which have failed to sustain the kind of long-term public movement necessary for real arms control. Finally, Harvard pays inadequate attention to the concept of minimal deterrence, by which we could strengthen our national security with perhaps five percent as many weapons.

2. "INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION BUILDING: THE MISSING LINK FOR PEACE," by Michael H. Shuman, August 1984. Summarized in this issue.

3. "COMPUTERS, INFORMATION AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT: A PRELIMINARY REVIEW," by Hal Harvey and Eric Horvitz, forthcoming.

Not all computers are necessarily calculating missile trajectories and laminar flows around ICBMs. This paper explains how computer communication can help the peace movement through electronic bulletin boards, mail systems, discussion trees, research databases, and office automation. It also gives an overview of existing resources such as USENET, ARPANET, and the ACCN (Arms Control and Computer Network). Finally, the paper describes a prototype arms control communications network now being assembled in Northern California.

4. "PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS AND THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE," by Hal Harvey, forthcoming.

This paper suggests how the "Defense Department," formerly "War Department," might finally be able to live up to its newer title. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) are nonnuclear munitions which home in on their targets either through remote control or advanced internal sensors. Small, inexpensive PGMs can reliably destroy tanks, ships, and airplanes costing hundreds or even thousands of times more than the PGM. The paper describes recent developments in PGM technology, which may soon enable the U.S. and its NATO allies to abandon nuclear weapons altogether and adopt a truly defensive defense with conventional weapons.

The logo for the Center for Innovative Diplomacy (CID) features the letters "CID" in a large, bold, serif font. Above the letters is a solid black horizontal bar.

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