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A Theory of Direct Discourse: Its Semantics and Pragmatics

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

by

Youichi Matsusaka

2013

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2013

Abstract of the Dissertation

A Theory of Direct Discourse: Its Semantics and Pragmatics

by

Youichi Matsusaka

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

University of California, Los Angeles, 2013

Professor David B Kaplan, Chair

The dissertation presents a new account of how direct discourse works in natural language. After presenting preliminary discussions of the views of quotation given by Tarski, Quine, and Davidson in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 is devoted to historical investigations into Frege's theory of quotation and direct discourse. Although Frege's theory is often summarized as a theory of "autonomous" use of expressions, Frege's actual views are more complex, in part due to his nominalistic stance toward the ontology of linguistic expressions. The principal claim of the dissertation, put forward in Chapter 3, is that direct discourse is a form for reporting the content of an utterance. A defense of this claim is given, as well as criticisms of a widely accepted view that direct discourse is a form for reporting the exact words used in speech. Finally, in Chapter 4, this claim is compared with Maier's account of direct discourse.

The dissertation of Youichi Matsusaka is approved.

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2013

To my parents

Yoshio and Kazué Matsusaka

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 The Purpose

The purpose of this dissertation is to present an account of how direct discourse works in natural language. Although my positive proposals will almost exclusively be concerned with direct discourse, since it is usually discussed in relation to quotations, this dissertation will also be concerned with quotations and how they relate to direct discourse. By a "quotation", we understand an expression formed by enclosing an item or items within a pair of quotation marks.[1] There is a vast literature on quotation today, and most of the authors more or less assume that a single principle or convention, semantic or pragmatic, can be employed to explain the major uses of quotations. The notable feature of the account to be presented below lies in its emphasis on the motley nature of quotations. It is usually assumed that the paradigmatic uses of quotations are ones for referring to linguistic expressions, but people have already been aware that quotations have also other uses that are not easily explainable by their paradigmatic uses. Quotations are used to mention the title of an article, and it seems also difficult how to reconcile paradigmatic uses with so-called "scare quotes". Thus the claim that quotations have motley uses itself is nothing new. I wish to claim, however, that even what are usually regarded as paradigmatic uses show this motley character. In particular, I wish to challenge the widely accepted view that one can find a single principle that accounts for paradigmatic uses of quotations.

Let us consider some paradigmatic uses of quotations:

[1]Items that are flanked by quotation marks are usually linguistic expressions themselves. But I will leave open what kinds of entities are quotable so as not to prejudice the matter.

(1) a. “Tiger” has five letters.

b. “Brethren” is a nearly obsolete word.

Intuitively speaking, (1a) and (1b) are most naturally taken as statements about certain linguistic expressions. I know of no well-established term for quotations employed in sentences like (1a) and (1b). In this dissertation we shall refer to them as *referring uses* of quotation.[2]

Direct discourse is also regarded as paradigmatic. In direct discourse, a quotation occupies the object position of a verb of saying. It is often compared with *indirect discourse*, in which a verb of saying is followed, not by a quotation, but by a ‘that’-clause:

(2) a. John said, “A tiger is a large animal”. (Direct Discourse)

b. John said that a tiger is a large animal. (Indirect Discourse)

Often a quotation employed in a sentence like (2a) and a sentence like (2a) itself are both called a direct discourse.[3] The term *direct discourse* is thus ambiguous, but we will follow this terminology where no confusion is likely to arise. The *semantic* difference between direct and indirect discourse is often explained in terms of what they report: direct discourse is said to be used for reporting a person’s exact words when he utters something, and indirect discourse the *content* of the utterance. One of the aims of this dissertation is to challenge this view. I believe it is fair to say that there still remains much to be understood both about direct and indirect discourse, and the present study is an attempt to clarify the nature of the former. Whether quotations in direct discourse behave in the same way as those in referring uses is a matter of theoretical investigation. In fact, I wish to suggest that they have important differences, which must be dealt with by any account of quotation.

1.2 On the Use of Quotation Marks in Quotations

In the following, I will confine my attention to quotations in our sense, i.e., expressions formed by enclosing items within quotation marks. However, I should note that there is

[2]Cappelen and LePore ([CL07]) called them “pure quotations”.

[3]It is also called *direct speech*, a *direct quotation*, or *oratio recta*.

a danger in doing so, i.e., a danger of placing too much emphasis on the role of quotation marks in the phenomena we are interested in. I wish to present two reasons for being cautious about the role of quotation marks.

First, quotation marks themselves are relatively new to natural language. My limited investigation into the history of quotation suggests that they originated in the German printing industry, where they started to use a pair of double commas („ „) as quotation marks in the 18c,[4] and that more or less similar conventions had gradually spread over other European languages. Given that quotation marks are a recent invention, one might wonder whether direct discourse is also new to natural language. It is not. We know from various sources that direct discourse, understood as a form of speech for reporting others' utterances, existed well before the invention of quotation marks. For instance, *The Oxford Companion to the English Language* points out that in English quotation marks "were not common before the 19c". It says that "traditional texts of the Bible do not use them" and claims that they "do not suffer from the omission".[5] In fact, some authors report that direct discourse is universal in the sense that every known language has a form for it.[6] If this is correct, there is every reason to believe that direct discourse is a form of speech that is possible without the help of quotation marks. Even today, in spoken language we make and understand direct discourse reports without appealing to quotation marks. As for referring uses of quotations, the need for speaking of linguistic expressions themselves must have arisen as soon as human beings became aware of language. Before the invention of quotation marks, they should have inscribed a sentence like (1a), but without quotation marks:

(3) Tiger has five letters.

It is well known that medieval logicians had the notion of material supposition for a term like "tiger" in (3): a term, which I believe was generally taken as an expression-token, with a material supposition was supposed to denote itself, or expression-tokens with the

[4] *Deutsches Wörterbuch* von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm ([GG78]). See the entry of "Gänseauge", which means "goose's eye". I would like to thank Tomoo Ueda for this reference.

[5] [McA96], p. 755.

[6] See Charles Li's "Direct Speech and Indirect Speech" ([Li86]), p. 39. Interestingly enough, Li claims that some languages are known to lack a form for indirect discourse at all. Li cites Paez, Navajo and Amharic.

same shape.[7] Whether this is a correct account of their practice or not, medieval logicians managed to achieve what we do by appealing to quotation marks today. Again even today, we may have to take pains to convey what we mean by uttering a sentence like (1a) orally. Thus in the case of referring uses too, what such a use is served to achieve is somehow possible without quotation marks.

Secondly, even if we confine ourselves to written language, there are other respectable ways of quoting expressions, e.g., by italicizing, or boldfacing them. In most linguistic contexts, italicizing or boldfacing an expression can serve the same purpose as a quotation does. Instead of writing " "tiger" ",[8] we could either write, "*tiger*" or "**tiger**". One might well wonder if there are fundamental differences between quotation marks and italicizing or boldfacing. In some contexts, the use of italics or boldfaces do not seem to be as adequate as the use of quotation marks. For instance, there seems a difficulty in expressing, just by using italics or boldfaces, what one would express by (4):

(4) " "Tiger" " is not a name of an animal.

The source of the problem, of course, is that the syntactic operation for forming a quotation, i.e., the operation of enclosing an item by quotation marks, is repeatable at any number of times, whereas the process of italicizing or boldfacing an expression does not seem repeatable in such a way. We have no doubly, or triply italicized expressions of "tiger", for instance.[9] This problem with italicizing or boldfacing may suggest that quotation marks are superior to other devices in some contexts, but it by no means shows that quotation marks are the only tools that makes quotation possible. Quotation marks are best viewed as a device for making explicit something already there in old, or spoken, forms of language, and there are

[7] "A term was said to have "Material supposition" when it stood for itself or its equiforms, as in "Man is a noun". Material supposition took the place of twentieth-century quotation devices, and gave rise to the same sorts of problems". (Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol 5* ([Cra98]), p. 753.)

[8] In this dissertation, if I need to enclose a quotation within another pair of quotation marks, I will simply keep using double quotes rather than changing it to single quotes.

[9] This problem is a special case of a more general problem with italics: not every item can be italicized. Even if we confine ourselves to written symbols, any sequence of written symbols can be enclosed by quotation marks, but some symbols (e.g., hieroglyphs, and periods) have no italics. This provides another limitation of italicization as a device for quotation.

other means of attaining the same effects, though perhaps in a more or less limited fashion. Quotation marks are just more effective and systematic than their rivals.

1.3 Why Do Quotations Matter to Philosophy?

In this section I wish to consider briefy why quotation matters to philosophy. There is indeed a vast literature on quotation, and different authors may have different reasons why they think work on quotation is worthwhile. In this section, I wish to consider just three cases from the recent history of philosophy of language.

1.3.1 Referential Opacity

Since Frege's "On Sense and Reference",[10] the analysis of indirect contexts or referentially opaque contexts has been a matter of great concern both in logic and in philosophy. In order to understand in any reasonable depth what referential opacity is and why it matters to logic and philosophy, we need to go into the principle of compositionality, sometimes called "Frege's principles of interchangeability" as well.[11] Even a minimal discussion of the principle calls for its own preliminaries, so we prefer to begin by taking the validity of a certain logical law for granted. By the *substitution principle of singular terms*, let us refer to a logical principle that allows one to substitute a singular term (an expression denoting an individual, e.g., a proper name) for an occurrence of another, co-referential singular term in a sentence. Thus, the following inference is licensed by the principle:

Cicero = Tully.

Cicero was bold.

∴ Tully was bold.

However, in natural language, there are inferences which seem to constitute counter

[10] Translated in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* ([GB80]). The original German title is "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" ([Fre92]), reprinted in [Pat69].

[11] See Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity* ([Car69]), pp. 121-2. See also Kaplan's *Foundations of Intensional Logic* ([Kap64]), p.6.

examples to the substitution principle of singular terms. For instance, consider the following inference involving indirect discourse:

Hesperus = Phosphorus

The ancient Babylonians said that Hesperus is visible in the evening.

∴ The ancient Babylonians said that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

"Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are co-referential names denoting Venus. Since they are names designating the same thing, it seems that the substitution principle of singular terms should sanction the inference above. A number of philosophers including Frege, however, think of an inference like this as invalid, and it was one of Frege's aims in "On Sense and Reference" to give an analysis of why it fails. In that connection, Frege treated indirect discourse on a par with direct discourse so that he could give a uniform account of why the substitution principle appears to fail both in direct and indirect discourse. Indeed, it seems likewise impermissible to substitute an occurrence of a name within direct discourse for another co-referential term. Consider:

Hesperus = Phosphorus

The ancient Babylonians said, "Hesperus is visible in the evening".

∴ The ancient Babylonians said, "Phosphorus is visible in the evening".

The Babylonians may have made an utterance that makes the second premise true, whereas they may not have made an utterance that makes the conclusion true.[12]

Frege tried to dissolve these alleged counterexamples to the substitution principle by regarding the occurrences of the singular terms in question as functioning in an anomalous way. Frege says:

> If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their reference [Bedeutung]. It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk

[12] As we will see, though, it is never a simple matter what kind of utterance would make the conclusion true.

> about the words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance, when the words of another are quoted. One's own words then first designate [bedeuten] words of the other speaker, and only the latter have their usual reference. We then have signs of signs. In writing, the word-images [Wortbilder] are in this case enclosed in quotation marks. Accordingly, a word-image [Wortbild] standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary reference. . . . In indirect speech one talks about the sense, e.g., of another person's remarks. It is quite clear that in this way of speaking words do not have their customary reference but designate what is usually their sense.[13]

According to Frege, words in direct or indirect speech refer to something different from what they ordinarily designate.[14] Note that, on this view, words within direct discourse are *used* rather than just *mentioned*. They just refer to expressions rather than their usual referents. Frege holds that quotation marks are not part of what denotes expressions. Words within quotation marks do the job; quotation marks just indicate the beginning and the end of a special context in which words designate expressions. This view exhibits a striking contrast to a view usually associated with Tarski and Quine: quotations form unbreakable, syntactically simple unities. Tarski says:

> Quotation-mark names may be treated like single words of a language, and thus like syntactically simple expressions. The single constituents of these names—the quotation marks and the expressions standing between them—fulfill the same function as the letters and complexes of letters in single words. Hence, they can possess no independent meaning. Every quotation name is then a constant individual name of a definite expression (the expression enclosed by quotation

[13] "On Sense and Reference" ([GB80]), pp. 58-9. When quoting Frege's text, I will occasionally insert the original German words in square brackets where I think they may be important. In the third edition of *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, Geach and Black translate "Bedeutung" as"meaning" rather than as "reference", which they chose as the translation in the earlier editions of the book. I follow their earlier decision. I translated "Wortbild" as "word-image" where Geach and Black simply translate it as "word". I will discuss what Frege means by "Wortbild" in section 2.1 of Chapter 2 (2.2.1).

[14] When discussing Frege's writings, I will use the terms "refer to", "designate" and "denote" in the same sense, i.e., as the translations of his "bedeuten".

> marks) and in fact a name of the same nature as the proper name of a man . . .. (Alfred Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" ([Tar56a]), in his *Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics* ([Tar56b]), p. 159.)

Tarski is thus quite explicit that what lies inside quotation marks has no semantic properties, contrary to Frege.

Quine is also famous for holding essentially the same view. He says:

> Quotation is the more graphic and convenient method, but it has a certain anomalous feature which calls for special caution: from the standpoint of logical analysis each whole quotation must be regarded as a single word or sign, whose parts count for no more than serifs or syllables. (*Mathematical Logic* ([Qui40]), p. 26.)

I wish to note, however, that Quine is not so consistent as Tarski in holding this view of quotations as *syntactic primitives.* He claims in a number of places that a quotation provides a *referentially opaque* context. He says, for instance, that the occurrence (or in Quine's term, the *position*) of the *personal name* "Tully" in " "Tully was a Roman" " is non-referential.[15] This claim would hardly make sense unless he holds the view that names such as "Tully" can enjoy a grammatical occurrence in a quotation. This, however, seems to be incompatible with his official view of the syntactic structures of quotation names, for he would not claim that the word "cattle" contains another *word* "cat" (or a position for it). Perhaps, we should conclude that Quine is somewhat confused about the syntactic nature of quotation, or we should interpret him as holding the view that the quotation " "Tully" " does contain the *name* "Tully" as a constituent but "from the standpoint of logical analysis" alone we should treat the name *as if* it were part of the spelling of the quotation. In this dissertation, however, I will not go into the interpretation of Quine any further.

In Chapter 2 I will discuss Frege's view in some detail. At this stage, I just wish to note that in Frege's hands the problem of the semantic analysis of quotations is made part

[15] *Word and Object* ([Qui60]), p. 143. See also [Qui40], p. 26 and "Three Grades of Modal Involvement", in *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays* ([Qui76]),pp. 160-161.

of the larger issue of analyzing referentially opaque contexts including indirect discourse. Indirect discourse, or more generally propositional attitudes reports, have been a matter of great concern among philosophers. The idea that direct discourse and indirect discourse share certain general structures has attracted a number of philosophers. In particular, since linguistic expressions seem to be more tractable than Fregean senses, it has been hoped that findings about quotational contexts may lead to findings about contexts created by propositional attitude verbs. Indeed, some authors have conducted their research on direct discourse explicitly from this Fregean perspective.[16]

It is plausible to regard indirect discourse as originating from direct discourse: the former has evolved from the latter, and is therefore more sophisticated and involved somehow.[17] (Recall that some languages are reported to lack a form for indirect discourse at all.) Thus the way direct discourse works may indeed shed light on how words function under propositional attitude verbs.

I will argue, however, that Frege's fundamental assumption that direct discourse is a form for reporting someone's words needs to be reconsidered. I will try to show in Chapter 3 that the primary purpose of direct discourse is to report the *content* of someone's utterance, rather than the exact words thereof.

1.3.2 Learnability of Language

Donald Davidson's "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages"[18] is presumably the first paper which explicitly pointed out the non-triviality of the task of explaining how one can learn a language containing quotations. Before Davidson, syntacticians asked how a speaker of a language can form, or recognize, a potentially infinite number of sentences in the language.[19] Given that we are creatures with only finite memory, it would be impossible

[16]David Kaplan, *The Foundations of Intensional Logic* ([Kap64]); Terence Parsons, "What Do Quotation Marks Name? Frege's Theories of Quotations and That-Clauses" ([Par82]). For a contrasting view, see, for example, Arthur Prior, *Objects of Thoughts* ([Pri71]).

[17]For a linguist who supports this view, see [Li86], pp. 39-40.

[18][Dav65], reprinted in his *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* ([Dav84]). All page references are to the reprinted version.

[19]See, for example, Noam Chomsky, *Syntactic Structures* ([Cho57]).

to just memorize all sentences of a given language. There would have to be certain finite mechanisms, or rules, by means of which a speaker of a language can generate its sentences recursively on the basis of a finite vocabulary. Having the ability to form or recognize sentences of a language, then, would somehow involve internalizing these mechanisms or rules necessary to generate the sentences of the language.

In place of the syntacticians' question, Davidson raised a semantic question of how one manages to understand infinitely many sentences. Not only can we recognize as grammatical sentences we have never encountered before, we also seem to be able to understand what they say. Moreover, a sentence we have never heard or seen before usually carries a content we have never grasped before. Given the potential infinity of the number of sentences of a natural language, it seems as if we need to appeal to some patterns or structures of its sentences again in order to explain this remarkable ability of a speaker of the language. A natural hypothesis would be that a speaker of a language can interpret a novel sentence both because he can interpret its parts, which are not necessarily sentences themselves, and because he has the ability to construct the interpretation of the whole sentence from the interpretations of its parts and the way they are structured. If the parts themselves are something novel to the speaker, the mechanisms by means of which the speaker interpret them would also involve interpretations of their parts and structures. Thus the interpretation of sentences of a given language would be given recursively in terms of their structures on the basis of interpretations of their simple ingredients, which would be finite in number. Davidson claims that any learnable language has to have this feature:

> When we can regard the meaning of each sentence as a function of a finite number of features of the sentence, we have an insight not only into what there is to be learned; we also understand how an infinite aptitude can be encompassed by finite accomplishments. For suppose that a language lacks this feature; then no matter how many sentences a would-be speaker learns to produce and understand, there will remain others whose meanings are not given by the rules already mastered. It is natural to say such a language is *unlearnable* . . .. Let us call an expression a *semantical primitive* provided the rules which give the meaning for the sentences

> in which it does not appear do not suffice to determine the meaning of the sentences in which it does appear. Then we may state the condition under discussion by saying: a learnable language has a finite number of semantical primitives.[20]

At this point, what is important for our purposes is the question whether quotations are semantical primitives in Davidson's sense. Davidson claims that Tarski's account presented above cannot but regard them as semantical primitives. Tarski treats (at least for his semantic purposes) quotations as simple words lacking syntactic structures. This view would make it difficult to give something like a semantic rule according to which the denotation of a quotation is to be systematically decided, for quotations would lack structures with respect to which one could give such a rule for evaluation. It is understandable, then, that Tarski should have assimilated quotation names to ordinary proper names: the way they get their denotations would seem to somehow fall outside of the scope of semantic rules.

On the other hand, however, Tarski gave something like a semantic rule for quotations: a quotation denotes ("is a name of") the expression standing between the outermost pair of quotation marks in the quotation. Let us call this the *Tarski Rule.* According to the Tarski Rule, then, the quotation " "cat" " denotes the expression "cat", and the quotation " "I am tired" " denotes the expression "I am tired", and so on. We should note that the Tarski Rule seems to work fairy well, at least well enough for most cases of ordinary quotations. Indeed, some authors claim that the Tarski Rule correctly captures our use of quotations, and that any semantic account of quotation must appeal to it.[21]

Davidson claims, though, that Tarski's account faces a serious difficulty. In "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages", Davidson does not seem to be claiming that the Tarski Rule as such is something defective. Rather, his point is that since Tarski holds that quotations have no structures other than those of spellings, he is in no way justified in making use of any semantic rule exploiting the structures of quotations. According to Davidson,

[20] [Dav84], pp. 8-9. Italics original.

[21] Mark Richard, "Quotation, Grammar, and Opacity" ([Ric86]); Mario Gómez Torrente, "Quotation Revisited" ([Tor01])

Tarski is forced to regard quotations as semantical primitives; since there are infinitely many quotations, a language containing quotations would be unlearnable on Tarski's account:

> The function of letters in words, like the function of "cat" in "cattle", is purely adventitious . . . : we could substitute a novel piece of typography everywhere in the language for "cattle" and nothing in the semantical structure of the language would be changed. Not only does "cat" in "cattle" not have a "separate meaning"; the fact that the same letters occur together in the same order elsewhere is irrelevant to questions of meaning. *If an analogous remark is true of quotations*, then there is no justification in theory for the classification (it is only an accident that quotations share a common feature in their spelling), and there is no significance in the fact that a quotation names "its interior". Finally, every quotation is a semantical primitive, and, since there are infinitely many different quotations, a language containing quotations is unlearnable. (Davidson, op.cit., p. 10. Italics added.)

Davidson claims quotations have structure other than that of spelling, and hence there must be semantic rules exploiting it:

> There is no problem in framing a general rule for identifying quotations on the basis of form (any expression framed by quotation marks), and no problem in giving an informal rule for producing a wanted quotation . . .. Since these rules imply that quotations have significant structure, it is hard to deny that there must be a semantical theory that exploits it. (Ibid.)

In "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages", however, Davidson says nothing more about what that structure is or how a semantic theory that makes use of it might go. When he returned to the topic later, the very notion of quotation as a syntactic unity was jettisoned.[22] Instead, he opted for a theory according to which quotation marks themselves function as a demonstrative and do the job of referring in a quotation, and the rest of the quotation, i.e.,

[22] "Quotation" ([Dav79]).

a sequence of expressions enclosed by the marks, is not even part of the sentence in which the quotation marks appear.

I would like to briefly consider here whether Davidson really succeeds in giving a sound objection to Tarski's account. Davidson's argument proceeds from the assumption that no semantic rule can make use of the spelling structures of ordinary, simple words like "cattle" to the conclusion that the same can be said of quotations. It simply assumes that the spelling of an ordinary word and that of a quotation must be semantically on a par, but this appears to be the weakest part of the argument.[23] The defender of Tarski may grant that no semantic rule exploits the spelling structure of an ordinary word, but he might bite the bullet and insist that quotations are special precisely in this respect: the spelling of a quotation is *not* semantically adventitious. After all, we agree that something must be special or anomalous about quotations. Why not just think that quotations are special singular terms whose semantics rests on their spelling, and hence it is not an accident that quotations have the spellings they do? According to this view, there are just different *senses* in which an expression counts as a syntactic atom: Quotations would count as syntactically simple expressions in the sense that they are not formed from any other words, but they would count as syntactically complex expressions in that their interpretation is systematically based on their structure—their spelling. Thus one need not learn the denotations of quotations one by one. Once one learns the Tarski Rule, one can compute the denotation of a given quotation no matter whether one has ever seen it. Quotations, then, would not be semantical primitives in Davidson's sense.[24]

This view, whether or not this is actually Tarski's, seems coherent at least. No doubt, one could design a formal language in such a way that the semantics of quotation is based on the Tarski Rule or its close analogue.[25] Thus it seems that Davidson's argument falls short of establishing that no learnable language could possibly work as this view describes.

[23]Davidson himself appears to have been aware of the weakness. See the italicized part of the quotation (If an analogous remark is true of quotations . . .).

[24]See Torrente's remarks in [Tor01], pp. 140-2.

[25]Although, if the language allows embedding of quotations within quotations, there might be subtle problems to be overcome concerning their parsing. See George Boolos, "Quotational Ambiguity" ([Boo95]).

To say this, however, is not to say that a natural language, e.g., English, does follow the Tarski Rule. In Chapter 4, I will present an alternative way of understanding how quotations work in referring uses. At this stage I would just like to note that even if Davidson was not quite successful in showing that Tarski's account makes quotations unlearnable, he certainly succeeded in raising an important issue about the learnability of quotation. Especially important in this connection is the question about the syntactic structure of quotation. Any account of quotation has to be explicit about the structure of quotation, and has to explain how one manages to understand what a given quotation stands for even when one has not seen it before. I will argue that understanding a quotation is by no means a simple task, and in fact may sometimes involve a great deal of creative work of the mind.

1.3.3 The Interface between Semantics and Pragmatics

The traditional conception of the relation between semantics and pragmatics has it that the former precedes the latter. Given a syntactic parsing of a sentence, one can compute the truth condition of the sentence using the semantic values associated with lexical items in the sentence and the general semantic rules corresponding to the syntactic constructions employed in the sentence. Pragmatic inference can only take place after the truth condition of the sentence is computed. This seems to be the picture Grice had in mind when he introduced the notion of *conversational implicature*.[26] For Grice, the conversational implicature of an utterance is something that is to be computed by appealing to the semantic, truth conditional content of the sentence used in the utterance.[27]

[26]Paul Grice, "Logic and Conversation", in his *Studies in the Ways of Words* ([Gri91]).

[27]This seems to be the case even with what Grice terms *generalized conversational implicature*. Grice tries to explain why one tends to infer, when hearing a sentence like "John is meeting a woman this evening", that the woman in question would not be his wife, by saying that:

> When someone, by using the form of an expression *an X*, implicates that X does not belong to or is not otherwise closely connected with some identifiable person, the implicature is present because the speaker has failed to be specific in the way in which he might have been expected to be specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position to be specific. This is a familiar implicature situation and is classifiable as a failure, for one reason or another, to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity. ([Gri91], p. 38.)

Grice's first maxim of Quantity says: "Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the purpose of the current exchange)". In order for this explanation to work, the hearer must compute, first, the semantic content of the sentence as that of a pure existential generalization with respect to a woman,

This traditional picture of the relation between semantics and pragmatics, however, has recently been attacked from a number of corners. There are examples that seem to be hard to explain on this picture. Particularly relevant for our purposes here is the interpretation of *possessive descriptions* such as "Paul's car" or "John's book".

(5) a. I saw Paul's car yesterday.

b. John's book is on the shelf.

The problem with these sentences is that it is as if semantics alone could never determine their truth conditions. Given an appropriate context, the description "Paul's car" could mean a number of things: "the car Paul owns", "the car Paul designed", "the car Paul crushed", and so on; and it is simply impossible to specify the range of possible interpretations of this phrase in advance. One could, of course, insist that possessive descriptions are just ambiguous in an indefinite number of ways, but it would make the learnability of such phrases totally mysterious. A natural hypothesis, then, would be that the truth condition of a sentence like (5a) or (5b) is determined only after the interpretation of the possessive description in it is *pragmatically* resolved.

Much of the recent literature on the interface between semantics and pragmatics has been devoted to the discussion of this phenomenon, sometimes called *pragmatic intrusion* into semantics.[28] Pragmatic intrusion itself is an issue which is so vast in its scope that I cannot deal with it in any reasonable depth here, but at this stage, I would like to point out that quotations present interesting cases for the study of the interface between semantics and pragmatics. In referring use, one and the same quotation appears to be used to designate different entities:

(6) a. "Color" is a word coined in the 13c.

b. "Color" consists of five occurrences of letters.

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and then infer that the woman in question would not be "some identifiable person", i.e. John's wife in this case.

[28] See Stephen Levinson's [Lev00], p. 189.

The quotations used in (6a) and (6b) are arguably the same, but (6a) is most naturally taken as a statement about the word "color", and (6b) about the string of letters "c-o-l-o-r". I take words and strings of letters to be distinct entities. If this is correct, the question arises of what makes the difference in the interpretation possible. In Chapter 3 and 4, I will argue that some sort of pragmatic consideration is essential in the interpretation of direct discourse as well. Although the data concerning quotations might be considered too marginal to be taken seriously, I believe the ways we interpret quotations provide a good illustrations of how flexibly an utterance interpretation proceeds in natural language.

Before ending this section I wish to say a few more words about the ontological distinction between words and letters. As I said, I regard words and letters as distinct kinds of entity. This position is nothing new and original. For example, one can take Grice to have expressed such a view:

> It is perhaps natural to assume that in the case of words the fundamental entities are particular shapes and sounds (word tokens) and that words, in the sense of word types are properly regarded as classes or sets of mutually resembling word tokens. But I think that such a view can be seen to be in conflict with common sense (to whatever extent that is a drawback). John's rendering of a word "soot" may be indistinguishable from James's rendering of the word "suit"; but it does not follow from this that when they produce these renderings, they are uttering the same word, or producing different tokens of the same word-type. Indeed there is something tempting about the idea that, in order to allow for all admissible vagaries of rendering, what are to count for a given person as renderings of particular words can only be determined by reference to more or less extended segments of his discourse; and this in turn perhaps prompts the idea that particular audible or visible renderings of words are only established as such by being conceived by the speaker or writer as realizations of just those words. One might say perhaps the words come first and only later come their realizations. ([Gri91], p. 366.)

Here Grice at least hints at the idea of words as ontologically distinct from shapes or sounds. More or less similar views are explicitly argued for by David Kaplan, and more recently, by Linda Wetzel.[29] Note that Grice mentions shapes and sounds as an alternative to his conception of words. Indeed, to the question of what words are, one can find an impressive contrast between the types of answers given by philosophers and those by linguists, and Grice's choice can be seen as reflecting the tendencies of philosophers and linguists. Philosophers are initiated into the study of language through the study of formal logic, so he tends to regard words as a string of letters. Kaplan identifies this tendency of philosophers as the "orthographic conception of words", according to which "expressions of the language consist of strings of atoms called "letters", certain strings form words".[30] On the other hand, linguists are interested in language as a human activity, so they tend to regard words as sounds. For example, one successful textbook of linguistics says:

> What are words? To begin to answer this question, we note that the word *brother* is a complex pattern of sounds associated with a certain meaning ("male sibling").[31]

I do not wish to maintain that these tendencies are ubiquitous in philosophy and linguistics, but I think it safe to say that when discussing words or other linguistics expressions, philosophers tend to concentrate on their *written* forms whereas linguists take *spoken* forms to be central. If philosophers are, either consciously or unconsciously, attracted to the orthographic conception of words, one might be able to say that linguists tend to be attracted to the *phonetic (or phonological) conception of words*, so to speak.

The problem pointed out by Grice concerning the phonetic conception of words is that different words may share the virtually identical pronunciation. Kaplan, on the other hand, stresses that a word may have different spellings (hence different shapes, for that matter) or pronunciations. He gives "color" and "colour" as examples of different spellings of the same word, and Wetzel points out that, historically speaking, there had been as many as eighteen

[29] David Kaplan, "Words" ([Kap90]); Linda Wetzel, *Types and Tokens: On Abstract Objects* ([Wet09]).
[30] Kaplan, op.cit., p. 98.
[31] Adrian Akmajian et al., [ADF01], p. 15.

earlier spellings for this word. If we accept the orthographic conception, we will have to say that English has had twenty different words for the same meaning instead of one word that has changed its spellings in the history.

These considerations might not be regarded as a knockdown argument against the orthographic conception or the phonetic conception. But I believe that our ordinary conception of words is one that allows us to say that the same words can both be spoken and written, that the same word can change its spellings, that the same word can change its pronunciations, etc.. The most natural thing to assume about the ontology of words, then, is that they are neither spellings nor pronunciations: words are higher abstract entities than spellings and phonemes, and cannot be reduced to either of those latter entities.

1.4 Two Types of Account: Representational vs. Nonrepresentational

We have thus far viewed two accounts of quotation, i.e., Frege's and Tarski's. They differ in a number of points, but perhaps the biggest difference lies in the roles they put on what is enclosed by quotation marks. Frege says that, in direct discourse, expressions within quotation marks do refer, whereas Tarski says part of a quotation is merely part of its spelling. Let us call what lies within the outermost quotation marks of a given quotation, its "interior". The interior of a quotation may itself contain another quotation, which has its own interior. Then Frege and Tarski differ in whether or not the interior of a quotation should be viewed as a representation of some sort, i.e., whether it has semantical values. We will call an account like Frege's, i.e., a view according to which the interior of a quotation itself is representing something, a *representational account*, and an account like Tarski's, i.e., a view according to which the interior of a quotation need not be representing something, a *non-representational account*. Of course, a nonrepresentational account will have to assign some role to a quotation's interior: we saw that Tarski made essential use of it in his semantic rule for quotation. And representational accounts may differ in what and how the interior of a quotation represents. I believe versions of representational accounts have been offered by

Frege (concerning direct discourse), Clark and Gerrig ([CG90]), Washington ([Was92]), and Saka ([Sak98]), and those of nonrepresentational accounts by Frege (concerning referring uses),[32] Tarski, Quine, Davidson ([Dav79]), Partee ([Par73]), Richard ([Ric86]), Cappelen and Lepore ([CL07]), and Torrente ([Tor01]).

Before moving on, in order to get a clearer picture of the distinction between a representational and non-representational account, I wish to say a bit more about what I mean by an interior's being representational or non-representational. I believe when Tarski claimed that the constituents of a quotation are no more than letters in a single word, he meant that the interior of a quotation simply does not represent anything. His view is thus a clear case of a non-representational account. A non-representationalist, however, need not be so strict on the status of an interior. He could accept a case in which the interior of a quotation happens to represent something, or even claim that an interior is always some sort of representation. What I take to be the defining feature of a non-representational account is not that it regards a quotation's interior as non-representational in itself, but that it regards the interior's representing something as irrelevant to the way in which the quotation represents something. Thus Davidson, who claims that the interior of a quotation works as a sample of what is quoted, and who gladly admits that a sample may have its own meaning, still counts as a non-representationalist, since—on his view, I think—the interior's having meaning plays no role at all in its serving as a sample. Likewise, a representationalist need not deny the possibility that the interior of a quotation represents something other than the representation relevant to the working of the quotation. Thus, although this would not be his actual view, Frege, who holds that words within quotation marks refer to others' words, could also hold that they refer to what they ordinarily do. Words' ordinary reference would be just irrelevant to what a quotation denotes, but it might be relevant to something else.

In Chapter 3, I wish to propose a representational account of direct discourse. I have no knockdown argument against nonrepresentational accounts, but there are phenomena which I believe would be harder to explain within a non-representationalist framework. Thus I wish to concentrate mainly on representational approaches, although I will occasionally mention

[32] I will argue, in Chapter 2, that Frege offers different explanations for direct discourse and referring uses.

and discuss nonrepresentational accounts as well to the extent that doing so is expected to further the discussion in point.

Here is the plan of what follows. In the next Chapter, I am going to critically examine Frege's accounts of quotations. In Chapter 3, I will present my own account of direct discourse. In Chapter 4, I will present Emar Maier's account of direct discourse and compare it with my own.

CHAPTER 2

Frege's Accounts of Quotations

2.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1, we briefly viewed what Frege said about direct discourse. In this chapter I wish to examine in a more depth his account of quotations in general.

The literature on quotation often talks of "Frege's theory of quotation", and his views on quotations are also referred to as the "identity" theory or the "autonomous" theory.[1] However, as we will see shortly, what he actually says about how quotations work is much more nuanced and scatted throughout his writings, and it is not easy to attribute to him any unified theory of quotations in general. In fact, one cannot but suspect that Frege was not much interested in quotation itself. He believed that in direct discourse quotation marks prompt words therein to change their reference, and he used it as an illustration of his views on indirect discourse. Frege, however, appears to have regarded quotation itself as a rather straightforward phenomenon which merits no further scrutiny. He would have said more on quotation had he been seriously interested in it. Nonetheless, Frege had intriguing ideas about how quotations work in natural language. If I understand him right, Frege is naturally taken as offering two separate accounts. One is his account of direct discourse, and the other is his account of referring uses. I have to note that on Frege's accounts, quotations do refer both in direct discourse and referring uses. Thus there is a sense in which on his accounts direct discourse is a special case of referring uses. However, there is a considerable difference in his explanations of how quotations refer in these two cases.

I do not know who was the first who attributed the "autonomous view" to Frege, but

[1] Corey Washington, "The Identity Theory of Quotation" ([Was92]).

the following remarks of Church's should belong to the earliest discussions of Frege's ideas.

> Frequently found in practice is the use of English words *autonomously* (to adopt a terminology due to Carnap), i.e., as names of those same words. Examples are such statements as "The second letter of man is a vowel," "Man is monosyllabic," "Man is a noun with an irregular plural.". Of course it is equivocal to use the same word, man, both as a proper name of the English word which is spelled by the thirteenth, first, fourteenth letters of the alphabet in that order, and as a common name ... of featherless plantigrade biped mammals—but an equivocacy which, like many others in the natural languages, is often both convenient and harmless. Whenever there would otherwise be real doubt of the meaning, it many be removed by the use of added words in the sentence, or by the use of quotation marks, or of italics, as in: "The word man is monosyllabic"; " 'Man' is monosyllabic"; "*Man* is monosyllabic."
>
> Following the convenient and natural phraseology of Quine, we may distinguish between *use* and *mention* of a word or symbol. In "Man is a rational animal" the word "man" is used but not mentioned. In "The English translation of the French word *homme* has three letters" the word "man" is mentioned but not used. In "Man is monosyllabic" the word "man" is both mentioned and used, though used in an anomalous manner, namely autonomously.
>
> Frege introduced the device of systematically indicating autonomy by quotation marks, and in his later publications (though not in the *Begriffsschrift*) words and symbols used autonomously are enclosed in single quotation marks in all cases. This has the effect that a word enclosed in single quotation marks is to be treated as a different word from that without the quotation marks—as if the quotation marks were two additional letters in the spelling of the word—and equivocacy is thus removed by providing the two different words to correspond to different meanings.[2]

[2]Alonzo Church, *Introduction to Mathematical Logic* ([Chu56]), pp. 61-2.

Since Church does not give explicit reference to Frege's texts, it is not clear on what basis Church ascribes the above view to Frege. Church's mention of "autonomy' might indicate that he had in mind the aforementioned passage in "On Sense and Reference", but nowhere in the quoted passage does Church mention direct discourse. Moreover, the general tone of the text seems to suggest that Church is talking of Frege's own *practice* of using quotation marks rather than Frege's *views* on how quotation marks are, or should be, used in natural language.

In any event, Church seems to attribute to Frege the view that at least one can have a coherent picture of how quotations work by supposing that words within quotation marks are used "autonomously". We will see shortly whether or not this correctly represents Frege's position. Davidson, however, famously attacked Church's exposition of Frege's position as not even making sense. Citing the last paragraph of the above quotation from Church, he says:

> Unless I am mistaken, this passage exhibits a common confusion. For what expression is it, according to the view Church attributes to Frege, that refers to the word a token of which appears inside the quotation marks? Is it that word itself (given the context), or the quotation as a whole? Church says both, though they cannot be identical. The word itself, since an expression in quotation marks has a meaning distinct from its usual meaning; it is 'treated as a different word' which is used 'autonomously'. The quotation as a whole, since the quotation marks are part of the spelling. (Davidson, "Quotation" ([Dav79]), reprinted in [Dav84], p.82. All page references to this article are to the reprinted version)

Thus Davidson accuses Church of ascribing to Frege an inconsistent view that what does the job of referring in a quotation is both the words inside the quotation marks and the quotation as a whole. For the reasons to be explained shortly, I am skeptical of Davidson's conclusion that Church's Frege is indeed inconsistent in this way, but Davidson may be right in pointing out that there is an ambiguity in the position Church attributes to Frege. The ambiguity is concerned with the *syntax* of a quotation. On one interpretation of Church's

Frege, the quotation marks only provide a context for the word inside, which does all the referring. Let us call this the *context view* of quotation marks. On the other interpretation, the quotation marks are like a prefix and suffix to the string inside and it is this new word (or at least a word with this new spelling) that does the referring. Let us call this the *affix view* of quotation marks.

In addition to this ambiguity with respect to syntax, one might think that there is also an ambiguity with respect to *semantics* in Church's Frege. In one place, Church attributed to Frege the view that a word within quotation marks is used "autonomously". If this means, as it is usually taken to mean, that a word-type within quotation marks refers to *itself*, then the word that does the job of referring in a given quotation and the word referred to must be the *same* word. Let us call this the *autonomy* view. On the other hand, Church also says that this has "the effect" that they are to be treated as *different* words: "[E]quivocacy is thus removed by providing the two different words to correspond to different meanings". If we take this remark seriously, then the word that refers and the word referred to in a given quotation must be *different*. Let us call this the *heteronomy* view. Then, at least *prima facie*, it seems that we have *four* possible ways of interpreting Church's Frege, namely, (i) the context view (with respect to quotation marks) plus the autonomy view (with respect to reference), (ii) the affix view (with respect to quotation marks) plus the autonomy view, (iii) the context view plus the heteronomy view (with respect to reference), and (iv) the affix view plus the heteronomy view. It will be worth while to look at all four combinations and consider if any combination fares better than the others.

Before moving on to examine each pair, I wish to consider what Church's text naturally suggests. I think that, as the interpretation of Church's text, the combination (i) of the *context view* with the *autonomy view* is the most likely interpretation. As for the ambiguity with respect to the syntactic role of quotation marks, the reason why I think that the context view is the more likely candidate for what Church had in mind is that, *pace* Davidson, Church never says that quotation marks *are* part of the spelling of the referring part in a quotation. He merely says, "a word enclosed in single quotation marks is to be treated as a different word from that without the quotation marks—*as if* the quotation marks *were* two additional

letters in the spelling of the word" (italics mine). Church's use of the phrase "as if" suggests that, according to Church's Frege, the quotation marks are *not* really part of the spelling of the word. Furthermore, the affix view with respect to quotational syntax is virtually identical with the view advance by Tarski and Quine. In the very passage he discusses Frege's view of quotation, Church refers to Quine's distinction of *use* and *mention*. This suggests that not only was Church familiar with Quine's theory of quotation, but he was also actively conscious of Quine's view in his discussion of Frege's view. Church gives no hint, however, that Frege's view can be assimilated to Quine's (with respect to the syntactic role of quotation marks).

As for the semantic ambiguity, it seems to me more natural to interpret Church as consistently ascribing the autonomy view to Frege. He explicitly uses the term "autonomous", and he makes clear what he means by it: in an autonomous use, the *same* word is both used and mentioned, as in "Man is monosyllabic". Although Church says that, on Frege's view, the use of quotation marks has the *effect* that a word enclosed within the quotation marks is treated as a different word from that without the quotation marks, I think we should interpret it only as an "as if" effect. Although one can treat them *as if* they were different words, Church's Frege would still have it, I believe, that they are in fact the same word. Anyway, this is the view that I think Curch's text naturally suggests, but we need to look at all four combinations and see if any other interpretation should be preferred to this one in spite of the *prima facie* textual evidence.

Let us start with (iii) the affix view plus the heteronomy view. This is basically the view held by Tarski and Quine. As I suggested in Chapter 1, I think this is a coherent theory of quotation; in view of simplicity, perhaps this is even the best theory among the four combinations. Furthermore, as I will explain in section 3 of this chapter, this is close to Frege's own account of some use of quotation. However, I still think it is unlikely that Church attributes this view to Frege. If he did, it would be rather mysterious why he never hinted that Frege anticipated the accounts of Tarski and of Quine, which, I assume, must have been widely known among logicians at that time.

As for the combination (ii) of the affix view with the autonomy view, I think this combination fails on two accounts. First, for the reason presented above, I believe that the affix

view of quotation marks is hardly attributable to Church's Frege. Secondly, this combination seems to form a rather strange theory of quotation. Since the affix view holds that quotation marks are part of the spelling of a word enclosed within them, the word "tiger" and the word " "tiger" " have different spellings. Since we know that the latter refers to the former, and this is an "autonomous" theory, this view holds that these are the same words with just different spellings. However, since quotation marks can be iterated and each one of the following sentences is true, this view has to claim that the single word "tiger" has all these spellings:

(7) a. The word " "tiger" " designates the word "tiger" .

b. The word " " "tiger" " " designates the word " "tiger" ".

If this is true, then the following sentences must be true too, but this seems to be contrary to the fact. In fact, this theory seems to completely obscure the role of quotation marks:

(8) a. The word "tiger" designates the word " "tiger" ".

b. The word " "tiger" " designates the word " " "tiger" " ".

Thus I believe that the candidates involving the affix view have little chance of being what Church had in mind when he introduced Frege's view. But how about the combinations involving the context view? As for the combination (i) of the context view with the autonomy view, I already suggested that this is the most natural interpretation of Church's text. But does this combination provide us with a viable theory of quotation? According to this version, a word within quotation marks refers to itself. Since a word usually has some other, normal meaning, this view holds that a word is systematically *ambiguous*: the quotation marks surrounding the word indicate that it is used in the autonomous sense. This theory seems to work well insofar as the types of examples Church actually appeals to are concerned:

(9) a. A tiger is a feline animal.

b. The word "tiger" designates a feline animal.

The occurrence of "tiger" in (9a), which is not enclosed in quotation marks, is used in the normal way and thus designates a natural kind. The occurrence of "tiger" in (9b), which is enclosed in quotation marks, is used in the autonomous sense, and thus it designates itself. However, this theory seems to have a difficulty in accounting for iterated quotation marks. Take, as an example, (7a) above. The first occurrence of the word "tiger" in it is enclosed within two pairs of quotation marks. Church does not mention this type of example in his discussion of Frege's view, but let us suppose that Church's Frege would also regard it as being used autonomously. (Otherwise it would not be a purely "autonomous" theory.) However, if it is used autonomously it has to refer to itself, namely the word "tiger" itself, as when it is enclosed within a single pair of quotation marks. So we can substitute the word enclosed in single quotes for the word enclosed in iterated quotes without affecting the referent. Then, given that (7a) is true, this theory would have to regard (10a) as true too; and from the truth of (9b) the truth of (10b) seems to follow on this theory:

(10) a. The word "tiger" designates the word "tiger" .

b. The word " "tiger" " designates a feline animal.

Again, this position seems to have a difficulty in giving a coherent description of our use of iterated quotation marks.

Let us turn to the final combination (iv) of the context view with the heteronomy view, namely, the view according to which a word within (a single pair of) quotation marks, which does not contain the quotation marks in its spelling, is regarded as a different word from the original word, and it is this new word that refers to the original word. Although the two words *share* the same spelling, they are in fact different words, and as Church suggests, ambiguity will be removed by providing the two different words. On this theory quotation marks are used not to indicate autonomy, but to indicate which word is being used in a given context.

This theory seems to be able to account for iterations of quotation marks, with the help of an infinite hierarchy of words with the same spelling. A word enclosed within two pairs

of quotation marks would be regarded as different from a word with same spelling that is enclosed within a single pairs of quotation marks. Thus it can secure the truth of (7a) without making (8a) or (8b) true. In general, a word within $n+1$ pairs of quotation marks is different from a word with the same spelling that is enclosed within m pairs of quotation marks, for any $m \leq n$: although these words have exactly the same spelling, one should treat them *as if* they had required pairs of quotation marks in their spellings. These words may be identified with those given in the theory of Tarski and Quine, but they need not be so identified. At least in the language Church's Frege considers, they are all written the same.

This hierarchy of words is clearly reminiscent of the hierarchies of indirect senses usually attributed to Frege concerning what sense an expression expresses in a multiply embedded propositional attitude context. Since Frege's notion of indirect senses has been thought of as being problematic by a number of authors, it may be worthwhile to make an excursion to the notion of indirect senses and see whether the hierarchy of words we are attributing to Church's Frege would be thought to be problematic on the same grounds.

To see what indirect senses are and why Frege needed them, let us see what Frege says about *in*direct discourse in "On Sense and Reference".

> In order to speak of the sense of an expression 'A' one may simply use the phrase 'the sense of the expression "A" '. In indirect speech one talks about the sense, e.g., of another person's remarks. It is quite clear that in this way of speaking words do not have their customary reference but designate what is usually their sense. In order to have a short expression, we will say: In indirect speech, words are used *indirectly* or have their *indirect* reference. We distinguish accordingly the *customary* from the *indirect* reference of a word; and its *customary* sense from its *indirect* sense. The indirect reference of a word is accordingly its customary sense.[3]

According to the claim Frege makes concerning the semantic function of a word appearing in a *that*-clause in indirect discourse, the sentence "Kyoto is pretty" that appears in (11)

[3][GB80], p. 59. Again, I replaced "meaning" with "reference" as the translation of "Bedeutung".

is to be regarded as designating not its "customary reference", i.e., a truth-value, but its "customary sense", i.e., the *thought* that Kyoto is pretty.

(11) Taro said that Kyoto is pretty.

Frege thus holds that (11) is a sentence that relates a person with a thought, not with a truth value, and avoids an absurd conclusion that someone who said a truth has thereby said every other truth. Frege explicitly distinguishes the customary reference of a word from its indirect reference, and its customary sense from its indirect sense. Moreover, he was explicit on the identification of the indirect reference of a word with its customary sense. What is not explicitly stated in the above passage, however, is what role the indirect *sense* of a word is supposed to play in an indirect-discourse report. Given that the customary sense of a word is what the word *expresses* in an ordinary context, and that its indirect reference is what it refers to in a *that*-clause of an indirect-discourse, one natural suggestion is that the indirect sense of a word is something it *expresses* in a *that*-clause. I think that this is actually what Frege had in mind when he introduced the term "indirect sense", but know no direct textual evidence to support this conclusion.

The importance of the question of what roles indirect senses play in Frege's ontology manifests itself when we turn to the question of what an expression designates in Frege's theory when it appears in a *that*-clause which is *doubly* embeded in indirect discourse.

(12) Hanako said that Taro said that Kyoto is pretty.

The question is whether Frege would still assume that the occurrence of "Kyoto is pretty" in (12) designates the indirect reference of the sentence, i.e., its customary sense, or whether he would be ready to provide a further entity that serves as the referent there. What Frege wrote to Russell in 1902 as a response to a paradox of Russell concerning classes of propositions indicates that the answer to the question is the latter: there Frege calls the kind of sense the occurrence of "Kyoto is pretty" would express in (12) as its "indirect reference of the second degree" and distinguishes it from its "indirect reference of the first degree",

i.e., its customary sense.[4] Given his identification of an expression's indirect reference with its customary sense, i.e., the sense it expresses in an ordinary context, it seems natural to suppose that Frege identified the *indirect reference of the second degree* of an expression with its indirect sense, provided that the indirect sense of an expression is indeed what it expresses in a singly embeded *that*-clause.

Since one can embed any sentence in direct discourse, if the interpretation of Frege's text is on the right track, it seems that he would need an expression's indirect reference of the nth degree for an arbitrary positive integer n, and the indirect reference of the nth degree of an expression would be identified with its indirect sense of the $(n-1)$th degree, for $n > 1$. For instance, the reference of "Kyoto is pretty" in (13) would be its indirect reference of the third degree, and it would be identified with its indirect sense of the second degree:

(13) Ichiro said that Hanoko said that Taro said that Kyoto is pretty.

Following Terence Parsons, let us call this theory of indirect senses "the orthodox theory".[5] It has been a matter of dispute whether one can, or should, really ascribe to Frege the ontology of infinite hierarchies of indirect senses, but a detailed discussion of the dispute would take us too far astray from the central concern of this chapter.[6] What matters to our present purposes is that a number of authors have attributed the orthodox theory to Frege, and some have expressed misgivings about the very idea of the hierarchies of indirect senses. Among them one of the most influential is Davidson's criticism from the learnability of language. In Chapter 1 we saw that Davidson tried to attack the Tarski-Quine theory of quotations on the ground that it would make quotations unlearnable. He tries to do the same for the orthodox theory of indirect discourse.

[4] *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence* ([McG80]), pp. 153-4. In this translation too, I replaced "meaning" with "reference". Strictly speaking, the sentence Frege was concerned with is not an indirect discourse report, but a sentence of the form "The thought that the thought that all thoughts belonging to class M are true does not belong to class M". I ignore potential questions to which the difference between the two types of grammatical construction might give rise.

[5] Terence Parsons, "Frege's Hierarchies of Indirect Sense and the Paradox of Analysis" ([Par81]).

[6] For discussions of whether such hierarchies should be attributed to Frege, see Michael Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language* ([Dum81]), p. 267ff; Terence Parsons, op.cit.; Tyler Burge, "Frege and the Hierarchy" ([Bur79]) , and his "Postscript to 'Frege and the Hierarchy' " in his [Bur05].

> Even supposing we made good sense of the idea that certain words create a context in which other words take on new meanings (an idea that only makes them sound like functors), there would remain the task of reducing to theory the determination of those meanings—an infinite number each for at least some words. The problem is not how the individual expressions that make up a sentence governed by 'believes', given the meanings they have in such a context, combine to denote a proposition; the problem is rather to state the rule that gives each the meaning it does have.[7]

Davidson's criticism, then, is that the orthodox theory does not provide a rule according to which the series of infinite senses a given expression is supposed to have is to be determined; unless such a rule is given, a language which follows the idea of the orthodox theory is not learnable. If this is right, and if natural language involving indirect discourse *is* learnable, which seems to be the case intuitively speaking, then this will show that the orthodox theory is wrong as a theory of indirect discourse in natural language. Again, however, a detailed discussion of the question of whether Davidson's challenge can be met by Frege will take us too afield.[8]

Our question was whether the infinite hierarchies of *words*, the version of Church's Frege under consideration, should be viewed as giving rise to problems similar to ones that were pointed out concerning the hierarchies of Fregean senses. In particular, given Davidson's

[7] [Dav65], pp. 14-15.

[8] I wish to note, however, that the system of infinite arabic numerals *is* learnable. For any given numeral starting from "0", we know the general rule to form the next arabic numeral. This enables us to tell exactly where each numeral falls in the hierarchy, and use them, for instance, to count things. In a similar vein, Tyler Burge argues that the mere infinity of a word's senses does not constitute an obstacle to the learning of the word. The problem is whether each of the indirect senses of a given expression is something that requires *separate* acquisition. Burge claims that someone who knows the ordinary sense of a word has thereby already mastered its indirect senses, and thus that a language that follows the orthodox theory is learnable. (See his "Postscript to 'Frege and the Hierarchy' " in [Bur05], p. 176.) Burge, then, claims in effect that there is a way of determining the indirect sense of a word from its customary sense, whereas Russell denied there is a "backward road" from denotations to meanings. (See Russell, "On Denoting" ([Rus05]), p. 487.)

I think that Burge's position is technically feasible. I am inclined to think, though, that it will give rise to the question of whether indirect senses are really Fregean senses; the indirect sense of an expression of the $(n+1)$th degree would no longer be a "mode of presentation" of its indirect sense of the nth degree, for the way of determination is now the other way round. As I said, however, I cannot go into the question of whether one can make a plausible case for the orthodox theory.

strictures on the latter in connection with the learnability of language, a natural question that suggests itself is whether the presence of such hierarchies of words makes language unlearnable.

According to the version of Church's Frege we are considering, there corresponds to each conventional word infinitely many other words that have different referents (and thus different meanings) but share the same spelling.[9] Following Frege's nomenclature as to indirect senses, let us call a conventional word a *customary word*, and, say, the "tiger" that refers to the customary "tiger" "the indirect "tiger" of the first degree". Likewise, the indirect "tiger" of the nth degree designates the indirect "tiger" of the $(n-1)$th degree, for $n > 1$. Since all those indirect words share the same spelling with the corresponding customary word, there is a sense in which learning those words is easy; someone who knows how to spell a customary word already knows how to spell its indirect cousins, and what each indirect word refers to is also given by the above rule. Moreover, it seems that the *practical* clue to how to distinguish them is not very hard to learn as well. The indirect "tiger" of the first degree, for instance, cannot be recognized as such purely in virtue of its spelling, but Church's Frege recommends us to enclose it within a pair of quotation marks so that one can easily recognize its true identity. Likewise, the indirect "tiger" of the nth degree would be enclosed within n pairs of quotation marks. There seems no obstacle in principle, then, in learning a language that contains infinite hierarchies of indirect words.

So far I have illustrated this interpretation of Church's Frege using simple examples of quotations containing only one word. Before concluding this section, I wish to briefly consider how this version of Church's Frege would deal with cases where a given quotation contains more than one word. Such cases are typical with direct discourse:

(14) a. Taro said, "John smiles".

b. Hanako said, "Taro said, "John smiles" ".

[9] Since some words have more than one spelling, this is certainly an oversimplification. To be more precise, we would have to relativize a hierarchy to each spelling a given word has. Let us forget for the sake of discussion, however, any complications that will arise in the case of words having more than one spelling.

Since the occurrences of "John" and "smiles" in (14a) are enclosed within a single pair of quotation marks, the version of Church's Frege would dictate that the former refers to a person's name and the latter to a verb standing for a facial expression. So far, so good. However, the question remains as to how these referring expressions are combined together to denote a *sentence*, for the verb "say" requires only one noun phrase as its object, but it is as if we had just two nouns in the object position of (14a). As far as I know, neither Church, at least in his discussion of Frege's view, nor Frege himself, addresses this question. Presumably, the simplest way to deal with this problem is to think that a quotation containing more than one word has hidden concatenation signs.[10] Let us assume, then, that the logical forms of (14a) and (14b) are (15a) and (15b), respectively:

(15) a. Taro said "John" $\frown$ "smiles".

b. Hanako said "Taro" $\frown$ "said" $\frown$ " "John" " $\frown$ " "smiles" ".

Thus, as for the sentence reported in (15b) as having been said by Hanako, the hierarchical version of Church's Frege would analyze it as the following:

> The customary "Taro" $\frown$ the customary "said" $\frown$ the indirect "John" of the first degree $\frown$ the indirect "smiles" of the first degree

I think that the version of Church's Frege under consideration would have the same explanatory power as the Tarski-Rule has: whereas Tarski regards quotation marks as part of the spelling of a given quotation, this theory would claim that quotation marks are just practical aid to make easier to recognize which degree of an indirect word is being relevant in a given context.

[10] Another way would be to follow the strategy adopted by Parsons: think of a concept word itself as a *function*. ([Par82], p. 323. See also, [Kap64], p. 48.) On a Fregean semantics the predicate "smiles" is a concept word that designates a function that maps each smiling object to the truth-value *True* and every other things to the truth-value *False*, but we can think of the predicate "smiles" itself as a function which maps each singular term to a sentence. (See [Par82] for details.) Although this strategy works for direct discourse, it will have a problem when dealing with cases like:

"Tokyo Kyoto" is not a sentence,

where a quotation contains no concept word. (I wish to add that Parsons only considers direct discourse, so he need not face cases like this. I think, however, Church's Frege would have to face such cases.)

If I am not mistaken, then, among the four possible interpretations of Church's Frege, only the combination (iii) of the affix view (with respect to quotation marks) with the heteronomy view (with respect to reference) and the combination (iv) of the context view with the heteronomy view can be viewed as forming a coherent theory of quotation. If I had to chose between them, I would go for the position (iv) because it seems to be more Fregean in spirit. However, I am reluctant to conclude that this *is* the position Church had in mind when he discussed Frege's view. For one thing, this does not fit well with Church's use of the term "autonomous"; for another thing, no direct, textual evidence seems to suggest that Church admits of infinite hierarchies of words with the same spelling. Perhaps Church simply did not have iterations of quotation marks in mind when he introduced Frege's view. However, whether or not this correctly captures Church's exposition of Frege's position, I will argue that the interpretations we have examined so far significantly differ from what Frege actually says about quotations, especially about direct discourse. In the next section, I wish to discuss what Frege says about direct discourse, and present a new interpretation thereof.

2.2 Frege's Account of Direct Discourse

Let us begin by giving another look at the relevant passage of "On Sense and Reference":

> (a) If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their reference. (b) It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their sense. (c) This happens, for instance, when the words of another are quoted. (d) One's own words then first designate words of the other speaker, and only the latter have their usual reference. (e) We then have signs of signs. (f) In writing, the word-images are in this case enclosed in quotation marks. (g) Accordingly, a word-image standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary reference. [Lettering added]

We have already noted one feature of Frege's account: words within quotation marks do refer [(d)]. This feature of Frege's account makes it representational, and naturally leads one to the question of what they represent. As Terence Parsons points out, however, what Frege offers as the answers to this question appears to be inconsistent.[11] At one place [(b)], Frege says that in some cases one wishes to talk about the words themselves. This suggests, Parsons says, that Frege believes words in quotes refer to themselves, and thus provides a reason for calling his view an "autonomous theory" or an "identity theory". At the other place [(d)], though, Frege claims that they designate "words of the other speaker", namely, words of the person whose speech is being reported.[12] Had Frege meant by "word" something we nowadays call *word-type*, we might be able to conclude that Frege regarded the former and the latter as the same words, since words of the reportee might be of the same types as words in quotes are. If this were the case, the apparent inconsistency in Frege's answers might be resolved as only apparent. This line of thought may favorably dispose one toward the "autonomous theory" interpretation: what Frege meant by "word" is word-type and he regarded words in quotes as referring to themselves. Indeed, Parsons himself opts for this interpretation, although his reasons are different from the one given above.[13]

2.2.1 What is a word-image (Wortbild)?

I am going to argue that—contra some interpretation of Church' Frege—the textual evidence supporting the "autonomous theory" interpretation is rather thin, especially in view of Frege's general view of linguistic signs, and that one has reasons to take Frege's remark in (d) seriously. Before doing so, however, I wish to consider another, somewhat unusual, remark of Frege's. In (f) and (g), Frege says that what are framed by quotation marks are "word-images [Wortbilder]". Immediate questions to be asked would be, naturally, what Frege means by "word-image" and why he does not simply say "word [Wort]". Answering these questions may not be absolutely necessary for our present purposes, but I believe it

[11] [Par82], p. 316.

[12] Let us call someone a *reportee* of a direct discourse report if the report is meant to be a report of his (or her) utterance. The maker of the report will be called a *reporter*.

[13] [Par82], p. 317. Parsons's own argument is discussed below.

will help us to better understand the full picture of Frege's views on linguistic expressions.

To my knowledge, Frege's original German word "Wortbild" is not a word ordinarily used in German. Frege used it as some sort of technical term. Thus the question of what he meant by this term seems to be a matter to be decided by undertaking a bit of investigation into Freges writings. A suggestion that immediately occurs to one's mind might be that for Frege it was just a stylistic variant of "word" with no significant difference in meaning. (Recall that the translators of *Philosophical Writings* simply translated it as "word".) If this were right, then we could safely identify a word-image with a word. Indeed, in (d) Frege simply calls the interior of a quotation *words*. This appears to support the above suggestion. I believe, however, that Frege's intention is more complicated, even though this identification would be harmless in most contexts.

In order to understand Frege's intention, we have to look at his general view of the relation of written language to spoken language. Frege believed, in natural language like German, what primarily expresses a sense or a thought in his technical sense is a spoken sentence—sequences of sounds, according to him—and that a sentence in written language works as a "direction for forming a spoken sentence" in the first place:

> A sentence which an author writes down is primarily a direction for forming a spoken sentence in a language whose sequences of sounds serve as signs for expressing a sense. So at first there is only a mediated connection set up between written signs and a sense that is expressed. ("Logical Generality", in *Posthumous Writings of Gottlob Frege* ([Fre91]), p. 260.)

Like Aristotle,[14] then, Frege regarded written words as not having sense directly, but expressing sense only mediately by playing the role of a direction for forming a spoken word, which is a primary bearer of sense. There is a sense, then, in which written words are not *real* words for Frege: they are merely *images* of spoken words. I believe Frege takes this viewpoint when he uses "word-image" instead of "word". Indeed, in a place not distant from

[14] "Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words", *De Interpretatione.*, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle* ([McK01]), p. 40.

the above quoted passage, he uses the term "word-image" in a way that seems to confirm this hypothesis:

> It contains two different constituents: the word-images and the individual letters. The former correspond to words in spoken language . . .. [15]

Thus for Frege, a word in written language is not a bearer of sense in itself. However, Frege admits that once the connection between a spoken word and a written word is secured, one can talk as if the latter had the sense the former has, i.e., one can regard a written word as a genuine word with its own sense:

> But once this connection is established, we may also regard the written or printed sentence as an immediate expression of a thought, and so as a sentence in the strict sense of the word. (Ibid..)

All of this having been said, I believe we are now in a position to understand why Frege just uses "word" in (d), but "word-image" in (f) and (g). In (d), Frege is talking of general cases in which one wants to talk about expressions. Presumably, spoken words are what he has in mind here, since they are the primary bearers of sense. This is why he uses "word". In (f) and (g), however, he explicitly restricts his consideration to written language. The consistent use of "word-image" in (f) and (g) can thus be explained. However, in a context in which one can take it for granted that the required connection between a written expression to a spoken expression has already been in place,[16] to talk of a written expression as a "word" or a "sentence" is harmless, and Frege does so in some places.

To sum up, what Frege means by "word-images" can be taken as "words in written language" understood as mere transcriptions of words in spoken language, but Frege used it

[15]Frege, op.cit.. Frege's original German sentence goes: "Sie enthält zwei verschiedene Bestandteile: die Wortbilder und die einzelnen Buchstaben. Jene entsprechen Wörterrn der Lautsprache . . . . ." ([Fre69], p. 280.) The translator of *Posthumous Writings* translates "Woltbilder" as "form of words". The anaphoric pronoun "it [sie]" in the quotation stands for what Frege calls a "help-language [Hilfssprache]". What a help-language is, we will consider below, but need not bother with here.

[16]However, given that a single spoken word may have different transcriptions—e.g., "color" and "colour"—and a single written word may be a transcription of different pronunciations—e.g., "advertisement"—it is not a simple matter to set up the sort of connection between spoken words and written words Frege requires.

with negative connotations. With this background in place, let us turn to Freges account of direct discourse.

2.2.2 The view that words in quotes designate a reportee's words

In order to understand why Frege held that words within quotation marks employed in a direct discourse report refer to a reportee's words, we have to examine his general ontology of linguistic expressions. We have seen that Frege is sensitive to the distinction between written words and spoken words. So far it has been unclear, though, whether Frege means by "words" word-types or word tokens. Perhaps one might think that for Frege there are really two word-types—a spoken word-type and a written word-type—for what we nowadays regard as a single word type, and that Frege thinks that the latter works as a direction for forming the former. This was not Frege's view. In fact, Frege was severely critical of the very idea of words as abstract objects. Although Frege says almost nothing about the ontology of linguistic expressions in "On Sense and Reference", later in *Grundgesetze* ([Fre03]), in the course of criticizing the formalist conception of mathematics, Frege exposes in detail his own view of what signs are. Here is what he says about signs:

> Signs would hardly be useful if they did not serve the purpose of signifying the same thing repeatedly and in different contexts, while making evident that the same thing was meant [gemeint]. This is done by using signs as similar as possible for these different occasions. It is true that it is nearly impossible to reproduce the same shape exactly; and if it were done our eyes are too inaccurate to recognize it with certainty. But it is unnecessary; for if the signs serve only for communication between men (including the case of self-communication, during reflection) only similar signs needs be written, sufficient for the reader to recognize the intention. In what follows we shall understand by signs of similar shape those intended by the writer to have similar shapes in order that they may designate [bezeichnen] the same thing. Common usage inaccurately calls signs of similar shape one and the same sign, although every time I write an equality sign I produce a different

> object. These structures differ in their positions, times of origin, and probably in shape. It may perhaps be said that abstraction is made from these differences, so that these figures may be regarded as the same sign. What a lot abstraction is supposed to make possible! Different things cannot be made to coincide by abstraction, and to regard them as the same is simply to make a mistake. If, abstracting from the difference between my house and my neighbour's, I were to regard both houses as the same and disposed of my neighbour's house as if it were mine, the defect of my abstraction would soon be made clear. It may be possible to obtain a concept by means of abstraction, and if we call the extension of a concept "class" for short, we may reckon all similarly shaped signs to the same class. But this class is not the sign; I cannot produce *it* by writing—I always produce only individual objects belonging to it. Speaking of "the same sign" in spite of this is a shift from coincidence of reference [Bedeutung] to coincidence of signs. ([GB80], p. 174. Italics in original.)

Although Frege talks of signs throughout—obviously he has written signs in mind—we may conclude that he would take the same stance toward spoken words too. Note that Frege's negative attitude toward sign-types is not due to his view of the status of written language relative to spoken language. In the passage quoted above, Frege is mainly talking of the language of mathematics, where the primary bearers of sense are mostly written signs rather than spoken words.

This view of Frege's may seem strange or ill-motivated to the modern reader, who is so used to thinking of signs in terms of the Peircean distinction of types and tokens. Why is Frege so quick to dismiss the idea of signs as abstract objects? The reason cannot be that he is skeptical about abstract objects in general, for he is usually the staunchest defender of abstract objects when other issues are concerned. Or, one might even wonder whether this conception of signs is really consistent with Frege's actual practice in *Begriffsschrift* ([Fre79]), or with his doctrine of sense and reference.[17]

[17] Frege seems to think that the similarity of different (tokens of) signs is just a practical clue to recognizing the speaker's intention to designate the same thing by these signs. Suppose that he would say the same

I will not attempt to answer these questions, but I wish to give reasons why Frege's token-oriented ontology of expressions should not be dismissed as implausible immediately, especially in connection with his account of direct discourse. If we take a quotation in a direct discourse to stand for an expression type, we will make the reporter of the direct discourse ontologically committed to an abstract object. Even if one is already convinced that we need the ontology of expression-types for some purposes, it is not clear in advance whether one is required to give a semantic account of direct discourse in such a way.

Frege had a conception of linguistic expressions according to which expressions are, roughly speaking, what we would nowadays call expression-tokens, and given this conception we can understand why it was natural for Frege to think that words in quotes used in direct discourse refer to the reportee's words. Consider:

(16) Mary said, "Damn".[18]

Let us make a simplifying assumption that the verb "say" in (16) receives an interpretation like "emits from one's mouth . . .". Then, if the "Damn" in (16) refers to itself, and if it is simply a word-token, then (16) as a whole will report that Mary stands in a relation denoted by "said" to a word-token produced by the reporter of (16), not by Mary herself, i.e., (16) will be true only if Mary emitted the word-token just produced by the reporter himself. This would not be what (16) says, for sure. If, on the other hand, one assumes that the occurrence of "Damn" in (16) refers to Mary's actual utterance, (16) appears to receive a far more natural truth condition. I believe this must be a major reason why Frege said, when he was discussing direct discourse, that a word within quotation marks designates someone else's word.

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thing about spoken words or names. Then the difference between "Hesperus = Hesperus" and "Hesperus = Phosphorus" will not really be a difference between a sentence containing one name and a sentence containing two. Both of these contain two names, but since the first contains two very similar names, we can readily recognize that the same thing is referred to by these names. Although I tend to believe that this will be consistent with Frege's doctrine of sense and reference after all, the official, full explanation of the distinction based on this conception of signs would be much more complicated than that based on the usual notion of word-types.

[18] I borrowed this example from [Par82].

2.2.3 Parsons's Objection

But is this a tenable account? As I said, Terence Parsons notices there is tension in Frege's remarks in "On Sense and Reference", but he opts in favor of the "autonomous theory" interpretation rather than the interpretation we are pursuing. His reason, in a nutshell, is that it simply does not work:

> I don't see how [this interpretation] can mesh with Frege's other views to form a neat account of quotation. The difficulty is this: according to [this] interpretation, the word "damn" in [(16)] refers to the word (-token) which Mary uttered. This is fine if [(16)] were true, but what if [(16)] were false? To keep things simple, suppose Mary said nothing at all. Then the word "damn" in [(16)] would lack a reference. But according to Frege, if a word lacks a reference in a sentence then the sentence lacks truth-value—so if Mary said nothing, then the latter interpretation seems to entail that [(16)] is not false, but rather lacks truth-value. This is wrong. ([Par82], p. 316.)

This objection to Frege's view is well-taken. According to the view, in direct discourse the expression-token enclosed within quotation marks must refer to some expression-token emitted by the person whose speech is being reported. As Parsons points out, this requirement simply cannot be fulfilled if the reportee of a direct discourse report said nothing at all. In fact, one can show the inadequacy of Frege's account, using intuitively true reports as well. Consider:

(17) Mary said "Damn" three times today.

This theory cannot both interpret this sentence literally and make it true, for the occurrence of "damn" above can refer to only one such token. Thus if one wishes to say on Frege's theory what one wanted to say by the above sentence, one would have to say something like:

(18) Mary said "Damn", "Damn" and "Damn" today.

But then again, Frege will have a trouble with expressing what is expressed by:

(19) Mary said "Damn" more than three times today.

Similarly, there seems no way for Frege's account under consideration to make true the following sentence, uttered in a circumstance where more than one student is in the domain of quantification.

(20) Every student said, "Damn".

2.3 Frege's Remarks on Referring Uses of Quotations

Let us now turn to Frege's views on referring uses of quotation. In fact, there are not many places where Frege talks of referring uses of quotations, and remarks he made thereof are all brief. The following is from *Grundgesetze* ([Fre03]):

> To be sure, it happens in exceptional cases that we desire to speak of the sign itself—as will occur in our examination of formal arithmetic. In order that no uncertainty shall arise, we must distinguish these two cases by an external mark. The most appropriate procedure is to place the signs, in the latter case, within quotation marks.[19] ([GB80], p. 173.)

Frege also says, in a context where he discusses the need to talk of expressions:

> The language we have just indicated, which I will call the *help-language* [*Hilfssprache*], is to serve for us as a bridge from the perceptible to the imperceptible. It contains two different constituents: the word-images and the individual letters. The former correspond to words in spoken language, the latter have an indefinitely indicating role. This help-language is to be distinguished from the language in which I conduct my train of thought. That is the usual written

[19] I replaced "inverted commas" in the translation with "quotation marks". Both are translations of "Anführungszeichen" in German, but the former tends to be used only in British English.

> or printed German, my *explanation-language* [*Darlegungssprache*]. But the sentences of the help-language are the objects to be talked about in my explanation-language. And so I must be able to designate them in my explanation-language, just as in an article on astronomy the planets are designated by their proper names 'Venus', 'Mars', etc. *As such proper names of the help-language I use these very sentences, but enclosed in quotation marks.* ([Fre91], pp. 260-261. Italics original.)

Some remarks are in order on Frege's use of the terms "help-language [Hilfssprache]" and "explanation-language [Darlegungssprache]".[20] Frege's purpose in this passage is to explain the role of auxiliary expressions used for expressing logical generality; e.g., the sign 'a' in,

(21) If a is a man, a is mortal.

According to Frege, a sentence like this makes logical generality at the level of thoughts visible at the level of written signs. Frege calls a language that contains such auxiliary expressions a "help-language", which is considered to be different from an ordinary language like German. And a language that is used to talk about a sentence in a help-language is called an "explanation language".

Frege thinks that we should be able to refer to such a sentence as (21) just as an astronomer can talk about his objects of study using proper names like "Mars" or "Venus". For this purpose, Frege declares that "[a]s such proper names of the help-language I use these very sentences, but enclosed in quotation marks". This is an instance of what we call referring uses of quotation. Note that Frege is not trying to give a theory of such uses here. He is just explaining his use. And even as an explanation of his use, this seems to leave a lot to be explained. For instance, although Frege says one can form a proper name of a sentence by enclosing the sentence in quotation marks, it is not clear whether what functions as a name is the sentence itself, or the sentence plus quotation marks—a distinction Davidson criticized Church for failing to make. Presumably, a subtle distinction like this was not

[20] In the English translation of *Posthumous Writings*, these are translated as "object-language" and "meta-language", respectively.

important for Frege's purpose, for the reader would not have a difficulty in understanding his text even though such a question was unsettled.

Although Frege's remarks above fall far short of giving his general views of referring uses of quotation, we can still see the difference in his attitudes toward referring uses and direct discourse in these remarks. Most importantly, Frege does not hint that individual words in a quoted sentence denote something. Frege's explanation of quotation here seems to be more like that by Tarski than his explanation of direct discourse. At least, all Frege says here seems to be compatible with the Tarski rule.

However, given Frege's views on signs, the assessment of Frege's account of referring uses becomes more complicated than it seems. If we take seriously Frege's view that there are no word-types, we have to regard the quotation in (22) as referring to the token enclosed by quotation marks:

(22) Philosophers often use "Hesperus" to talk of Venus.

Construed as such, an utterance of (22) would be false, whereas our ordinary understanding of (22) should make it true. Likewise, Frege's view would have a difficulty in explaining our seemingly straightforward talk of word-types like (1b) in Ch.1, reproduced here as (23):

(23) "Brethren" is a nearly obsolete word.

Perhaps Frege can give token-based analogues of these examples. For instance, (22) might be analyzed as:

(24) Philosophers often use tokens that same-shape "Hesperus" to talk of Venus.

However, it is not obvious whether one can always find such a token-based analogue for any given type-based example.

Furthermore, it is not obvious how Frege would explain the *validity* of an inference involving a quotation. Consider an instance of the rule of repetition:

(25) a. "Hesperus" is a name of a planet.

b. $\therefore$ "Hesperus" is a name of a planet.

If Frege wanted to give a token-based analysis of this inference, the result would be something like the following:

(26) a. Every token that same-shapes "Hesperus" is a name of a planet.

b. $\therefore$ Every token that same-shapes "Hesperus" is a name of a planet.

However, this is not a valid argument, since (26a) and (26b) make reference to *different* tokens. Note that the mere fact that these tokens are same-shaped is not enough to make the argument valid. Perhaps in this particular case, one could save the validity by supplying some additional premises. It is not obvious, though, how one could get around this type of difficulty in full generality.

CHAPTER 3

A Theory of Direct Discourse

3.1 Introduction

As we saw in Chapter 1, direct discourse is often compared with indirect discourse, in which a verb of saying is followed by a 'that'-clause instead of a quotation:

(27) John said, "I was making a fool of myself".

(28) John said that I was making a fool of myself.

Direct discourse is said to be used for reporting the *words* a person used in making an utterance, and indirect discourse the *proposition* the utterance expresses. We saw that Frege may be regarded as holding this view in "On Sense and Reference", and I believe this is the view accepted by many who have ever made remarks on the semantics of direct and indirect discourse.

The aim of this chapter is to cast doubt on this view. In particular, I wish to reject the claim that direct discourse is a form for reporting one's words, and put forward the view that both direct and indirect discourse are used for reporting the *content* of an utterance: Their difference lies not in *what* they report, but in *how* they make a report. Direct discourse is no less a form of speech for reporting what some other person has said than indirect discourse is. I believe that this account itself is compatible with a number of conceptions of what contents, or propositions are. For definiteness, let us assume that the proposition that a sentence expresses is a set of possible worlds, or time points in possible worlds, in which the sentence is true. This conception of propositions is known to have a number of drawbacks,

e.g, it cannot discriminate between mathematical truths, it lacks internal structures, etc., but still might be enough for outlining the kind of position I wish to defend.

I wish to claim that a reporter of direct discourse tries to convey what is said by the reportee by *mimicking* his speech.[1]

In direct discourse, words that appear within quotation marks, or in spoken language, words that follow a verb of saying, are used in a special way: they are used, as it were, in such a way that the reporter lets the reportee speak through his mouth. The reporter tries to let the hearer understand what is said by the reportee by *reproducing* the utterance of the reportee so that the hearer can figure out the content of the utterance for himself. On this view, words within quotation marks used for making a direct discourse report will somehow resemble the original words of the reportee, but the resemblance is just a *means*, not the *purpose*, of making a direct discourse report.

Davidson pointed out that if quotation marks are used within a *that*-clause in an *in*direct discourse report, words within quotes should be regarded as being used for expressing meanings:[2]

(29) Quine said that quotation ". . . has a certain anomalous feature".

Some authors are convinced that in such a form of report—sometimes called "mixed quotation" or "hybrid quotation"—words within quotation marks are used for making a contribution to expressing a proposition. According to the view I wish to put forward, this already happens in direct discourse and should not be considered a special feature of mixed uses of direct and indirect discourse.

In what follows, I will first try to defend the simplest form of my thesis: direct discourse is a form for reporting content, and what is usually regarded as the semantic effect of direct discourse, i.e., report of exact words, is no part of the *semantic* content of a direct discourse

[1]The idea that direct discourse involves mimicking has been put forward by a number of authors in linguistics. See, for instance, Anna Wierzbicka, "The Semantics of Direct and Indirect Discourse" ([Wie74]); [Li86]. The present study may be understood as an attempt to locate the idea in the tradition of formal semantics and pragmatics.

[2][Dav79]. See also [CL97] and [Sim99] for recent development of Davidson's account.

report. I will then consider ways in which a direct discourse report *pragmatically* conveys an aspect of the original speech. In an *aspect* of a speech, I include the exact words used in the the speech, but it includes a number of other things as well, e.g., accent, tone of voice, idiosyncratic manner of speech. I believe any of these features can be conveyed by a direct discourse report, but will claim that many of them can be regarded as a pragmatic, rather than a semantic, import of the report. Finally I will consider the possibility that such a pragmatic way of conveying an aspect of an utterance, especially the exact words used in the utterance, has somehow been *conventionalized* in some use of direct discourse. I suspect that one can indeed find such uses in natural language. If this is correct, then after all at least some uses of direct discourse does *semantically* express that the original utterance was made in such and such words, but I will argue that the existence of such uses need not be taken as showing that other uses of direct discourse in which an aspect of an utterance other than its content is not semantically conveyed are anomalous or mistaken.

The course of argument sketched above somehow reflects what I believe to be a possible way in which direct discourse has historically developed. As we saw in Chapter 1, it is believed that no natural language lacks a form for direct discourse but some have no form for indirect discourse. Together with the observation that indirect discourse usually involves more complex grammatical constructions than direct discourse, this seems to suggest that direct discourse historically precedes indirect discourse, and that in many languages the latter has somehow evolved from the former. Charles Li, for instance, makes the following remark concerning the relation between them:

> [I]ndirect speech is a more complex communicative strategy than direct speech. Direct speech involves reproducing or mimicking the speech of the reported speaker, whereas indirect speech involves rephrasing or paraphrasing the speech of the reported speaker. Clearly, mimicking is a simpler undertaking than paraphrasing. Hence, it is not surprising that for reported speech the mimicking strategy occurs in all languages, whereas the paraphrasing strategy does not. After all, mimicking is employed from the outset of first language acquisition. It is an innate ability in human beings, pongid and many simian species. ([Li86],

p. 40.)

If this speculation is on the right truck, it may well be the case that languages such as English or German that now have both forms for direct and indirect discourse had, at some historical point, only a form for direct discourse. If the traditional view about direct discourse is correct, then those languages had a special form for reporting what expressions are used in someone's utterance but no form for reporting its content. However, I am inclined to find such a state of language mildly counterintuitive, if not inconsistent. I would imagine that on a majority of occasions where people are interested in someone's utterance, their interest lies the information it conveys rather than in the linguistic expressions employed in it, and that the interest in the latter, if any, usually comes only after the interest in the former. Admittedly, there are cases where one is just interested in what expressions, say honorifics or ethnic slur terms, are used in an utterance, but they seem to be relatively rare and exceptional. Then, it is natural to conceive of a language that has only a form for reporting contents rather than expressions, but not the other way round. I suspect that in most languages direct discourse was originally a form for reporting contents only, and gradually has come to be used for reporting expressions as well.[3]

3.2 The Ambiguity of *Say*

Before moving on, I wish to make what I mean by "direct discourse" a bit clearer, for I believe that there is confusion on this point in the literature. At the beginning of the chapter, I tried to characterize direct discourse by saying that in it a verb of saying is followed by a sentence enclosed within quotation marks. This characterization would only apply for written language and not for spoken language, for in the latter we do not use quotation marks for making a direct discourse report. Even if we set this point aside, there is still a problem with this characterization. The verb "say" is ambiguous between a number of

[3]Presumably, the emergence of indirect discourse has had a role to play in the process, for the existence of speech form that serves essentially the same purpose but is intrinsically difficult to use for reporting what expressions were employed in the original utterance would somehow highlight direct discourse's utility as a means of reporting expressions.

different senses. It can be used just for expressing the meaning "emit such and such words from one's mouth" or "write such and such words with one's pen" etc., but what I mean by "direct discourse" is a form of speech in which the occurrence of "say" preceding a quotation is used in the sense of "assert", "claim", or "inform". Let us call the latter sense of "say" an "assertive sense". That there is such a sense of "say" is well attested by our practice. Suppose that John uttered with the assertive force a sentence in which "I was making a fool of myself" appears in the antecedent of a conditional, or in the scope of negation, then usually we will not use (27) for reporting John's utterance. We can easily imagine a case in which someone reports John's utterance by using (27) and the hearer regards the report as false without hesitation. But of course, John certainly uttered the sentence "I was making a fool of myself" in the sense that he emitted these words, and if the verb "say" is understood just in this sense, (27) can be judged true. I think we do use the word "say" in this latter sense too, but in discussing the semantics of direct discourse we just have to be careful not to confuse the assertive sense with this sense.

Although I will confine my attention to the cases where "say" is used in the assertive sense, I wish to point out that the verb "say" can be used for reporting someone's issuing an order or asking a question as well.

(30) John said, "Make a fool of yourself".

(31) John said, "Was I making a fool of myself?"

Just as one cannot legitimately make the direct discourse report (27) on the ground that John uttered the sentence "I was making a fool of myself" as part of a larger sentence, one cannot make the report (30) simply because John uttered the words "make a fool of yourself" as part of some larger sentence, say, "If you make a fool of yourself again, I will never speak with you", and similarly for (31). In (30) and (31), the verb 'say' is used still in different senses, and we sometimes make the sense clearer by using different verbs:

(32) a. John *ordered*, "Make a fool of yourself".

b. John *asked*, “Was I making a fool of myself?”

Although I will not deal with these sentences, I believe that in these cases too, what is reported is not the exact words of the reportee but the *order* he issued or the *question* he asked, and orders and questions are entities no less intensional than propositions. One can ask the same question in different words, and in different languages.

I believe the ambiguity of “say” is worth stressing at this point, for the lack of attention to it may have prejudiced many authors against the sort of view I am defending. For instance, Recanati says:

> In closed quotation the quoted words are semantically inert, or so it seems. There is ample evidence of that semantic inertia. First, it does not matter whether or not the quoted material makes sense on its own. In the metalinguistic frame ‘John said “____” ’ I can insert a meaningless string without thereby rendering the sentence meaningless. The inserted material can even be ungrammatical—indeed it need not be linguistic material at all. Another feature which provides evidence for the semantic inertia of quoted words is the irrelevance of the (intrinsic) grammatical function of the inserted material to the function of the quotation within the sentence. Thus even if what is inserted is itself a sentence, as in ‘John said “It’s late” ’, or a predicate, as in ‘John said “bald” ’ the quotation functions as a singular term within the global sentence.[4]

What Recanati calls “closed quotation” both includes quotations employed in direct discourse and referring uses, and he simply assumes that quotations in both kinds of use work in the same way. However, this assumption is not innocuous. We can certainly insert a meaningless string in “John said “____” ” without making the resultant sentence meaningless, but in such a case, the most natural interpretation of the sentence would be by way of giving the verb “say” the meaning “emitting such and such sounds” or some such. It is far less obvious whether we can interpret the occurrence of “say” in the assertive sense and still make sense of the sentence:

[4]François Recanati, *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation* ([Rec00]), p. 183.

(33) a. ?John said, ",dlk;l,csa:@".

b. ?John claimed, ",dlk;l,csa:@".

I am inclined to think that direct discourse reports such as (33a) and (33b) are, if possible, at best anomalous, and the verb "say" or "claim" here should be regarded as having a sense somehow derivative of the non-commital, non-assertive sense of "say": (33a) may be construed as "John emitted with the assertive force the sounds corresponding to such and such strings of letters" or some such. I will come back to the question of whether one can use a sentence one does not understand in making a direct discourse report in section 4.2 of this chapter (3.4.2), after I present cases in favor of my view.

3.3 Cases for the Content-Ascription View

In this section, I wish to give some reasons why one should think of direct discourse as ascribing the contents rather than the forms of utterances.

3.3.1 Argument from Translation

The most obvious, and the strongest reason is that when we translate a direct discourse report, we do translate the material enclosed within quotation marks. In an overwhelming majority of the cases where direct discourse reports are translated from a foreign language, the material within quotation marks is translated rather than left untouched. Thus the typical translation of (34a) into English is not (34b) but (34c).

(34) a. Frege sagt: „Es kann aber auch vorkommen, dass man von den Worten selbst oder von ihrem Sinne reden will".

b. Frege said, "Es kann aber auch vorkommen, dass man von den Worten selbst oder von ihrem Sinne reden will"

c. Frege said, "It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about words themselves or their sense".

This common practice of translation would be hard to understand or to justify if a quotation used in a direct discourse report were really about the words used by the reportee. In (34c) the original German sentence of Frege has simply disappeared during the process of translation. Admittedly, especially in academic writings, we sometimes use translations like (34b) in which the source speaker's original words are preserved. But this can easily be squared with the content-ascription view. If the reporter understands the source language the reportee used, and can assume that his readers also understand it, he can safely use the original sentence in the source language to convey what is said by the reportee. The strategy of leaving the original sentence intact may even have the advantage of conveying the exact meanings of the original utterance. This seems to nicely explain why one finds translations of the type (34b) almost only in academic writings, and seldom in daily newspapers.

Note also that whereas we usually do translate expressions inside quotation marks in direct discourse, we seldom translate expressions in quotation marks in referring use. This, I believe, is no accident, and lends support to the kind of view we are putting forward.

3.3.2 Argument from Anaphora

One can refer back to an entity that is mentioned in a *that*-clause of an indirect discourse report.

(35) Fred said that Susan might come to the party, but she will be too busy.

The occurrence of "she" in (35) is an anaphoric pronoun that refers back to the entity referred to by the proper name "Susan" appearing in the *that*-clause. This should not be very surprising if one assumes that the occurrence of "Susan" in (35) is used, and it is widely accepted that words within a *that*-clause is used.

Singular terms within quotation marks used in a direct discourse report are no less eligible as an antecedent of an anaphoric pronoun.

(36) The sign says, "George Washington slept here", but I don't believe he really ever did.[5]

[5] [Par73], example 26.

If we assume that the occurrence of "George Washington" in (36) is used to mention George Washington rather than a linguistic entity, we seem to be able to explain the function of the anaphoric pronoun "he" in a straightforward way, but the adherent of the traditional view, according to which George Washington himself has no role to play in the truth condition of the direct discourse in (36), will have to posit an intricate mechanism to explain how the occurrence of "he" in (36) ends up referring to George Washington.

I wish to note that this feature of eligibility as an antecedent of a pronoun does not seem to be shared by expressions within quotations used referentially.

(37) a. ? "Tokyo" is a name, and *it* is a large city.

b. ? "Tokyo is pretty" is my favorite sentence, and *it* is a large city.

Both in (37a) and (37b), it seems simply impossible to interpret the occurrence of "it" as anaphoric to the occurrence of "Tokyo". This suggests, I believe, the fundamental difference between direct discourse and referring uses of quotation as to how expressions within quotation marks function semantically.[6]

3.3.3 Omissions, Insertions and Corrections in Direct Discourse

According to the traditional view, a direct discourse report is true only if the reportee said (in one sense or another) the sentence that exactly appear within quotation marks. Following

[6]How about the following example?

The sign on the bus says "Tokyo", but I don't believe *that*'s where it is going.

The occurrence of "that" in this example is anaphoric to the occurrence of "Tokyo", and one might think that this is a case where an expression that appears in a referring use of quotation is used rather than mentioned. I am inclined to think, however, that the first subsentence in this example should really be regarded as an instance of direct discourse, and hence that this is not an exception to the observation above. What is special with the example is that the original utterance reported upon is that of a *one-word sentence*, and this is what gives the impression that the quotation in it is an instance of referring use. It seems to be obvious that one may use a one-word sentence for making an assertion and a direct discourse report of such an utterance can preserve the one-word-ness of the original utterance. Consider the following exchange:

(A to B): Excuse us. Where is the bus going?
(B to A): Tokyo.
(C to A): What did he say?
(A to C): He said "Tokyo", but I am not sure whether that's really where it is going.

Clark and Gerrig, let us call this requiredment the *verbatim assumption*.[7] As we saw from the case of translated reports, the verbatim assumption is doubtful. In fact, it is doubtful even if we set the case of translation aside. According to Clark and Gerrig, the verbatim assumption is nothing but a reflection of what they call the *written language bias*: the tendency among academics to place too much weight on written language and ignore spoken language. They say:

> In scholarly writing, . . . the Western convention at least is to quote other written work verbatim. That is possible only because there are permanent artifacts writers can consult. The preoccupation with verbatim reproduction, hence with plagiarism, has only been around since the invention of printing and the availability of written documents. . . . It was impossible to apply the same standard to written quotations of spoken language until the invention of the audio recorder. Even today the standard is hardly clear when newspapers expunge speech errors, clean up grammar, standardize dialect. ([CG90], p. 800.)

I wish to point out that even in quotation from written documents in written language, our actual practices are far from ideal from the viewpoint of the verbatim assumption. Omissions, insertions, and change of letters are quite common even in academic writings. If direct discourse is a form for reporting one's exact words and phrases, it will be rather mysterious why the reporter makes such changes to the source speaker's expressions. If we take, on the other hand, the reporter as trying to convey the content of an utterance, all such changes are understandable. If the reporter just mimics the original utterance of a reportee for the purpose of telling the hearer the content of the utterance, and if he judges for some reason that some of the expressions employed in the utterance is unsuitable for that purpose, he will replace them with more suitable ones.

[7] [CG90], p. 795.

3.4 Contextual Displacement and Relocation

According to the view I am defending, direct discourse is a form of speech by means of which a reporter conveys the content of an utterance of some other person by mimicking the utterance itself. On this account, words within quotation marks in a direct discourse report, which I will sometimes refer to as the *mimicking part* of the report, are all used. On this view, for instance, the occurrence of "I was making a fool of myself" in my utterance of (27) [=" John said, "I was making a fool of myself" "] manages to express a content, but the content is the proposition that John had been making a fool of himself, rather than the one that I was making a fool of myself. In other words, the interpretation of (27) proceeds by way of *displacing* "I was making a fool of myself" in (27) from the actual context of its utterance and *relocating* it in some other context, i.e., the context in which the utterance of John's reported in (27) is supposed to take place.[8]

It is not immediately clear how one should incorporate the above idea into a semantic theory. In particular, it is not clear how one should give a formal expression to the contexts in which utterances being reported are assumed to take place, for such contexts are not explicitly mentioned in the sentences used for making direct discourse reports. The idea I wish to adopt makes use of Davidson's idea that the logical form of an action sentence involves quantification over events.[9] According to the idea I wish to persue here, the logical form of (27), for instance, would involve existential quantification over speech-events, and the occurrence of "I was making a fool of myself" in (27) would be interpreted with respect to the context that is somehow recoverable from John's speech event being quantified over. Thus the logical form of (27) should take something like the following form:

(38) $\exists e(e < \text{now} \wedge \text{Say}(\text{John}, [\uparrow (\lambda x(\text{made-fool-of}(x,x))(\text{I}))]_{C(e)}, e))$

[8]This might be taken as suggesting that direct discourse creates a "monstrous" syntactic context in Kaplan's sense. (See pages 510-512 of David Kaplan's "Demonstratives" ([Kap77]).) Indeed, some authors have claimed that mixed or hybrid quotation creates a monstrous context. See Geurts and Maier, "Quotation in Context" ([GM03]), and Cumming, "Two Accounts of Indexicals in Mixed Quotation" ([Cum03]). I am inclined to think, however, that whereas Kaplan's notion of a monster is purely semantic, contextual displacement and relocation in direct discourse involves more pragmatic elements. See 4.1 below.

[9]Donald Davidson, "The Logical Form of Action Sentences" ([Dav67]). See also Terence Parsons, *Events in the Semantics of English: A Study in Subatomic Semantics.* ([Par94]).

The subscript associated with the brackets indicates that the expressions enclosed in them must be evaluated as if it were used in the context denoted by the subscript.[10] I use the upward arrow "$\uparrow$" for Montague's "hat" or "upper" operator: $\ulcorner\uparrow \delta\urcorner$ is to stand for the intension of δ, i.e., that function which maps each possible world w to the extension of δ in w. In this case, since the occurrence of "I" is to be evaluated with respect to the context of John's utterance, and hence to be evaluated as denoting John himself, (27) is true, roughly, just in case there is a past event e in which John says (in the assertive sense) the proposition that the sentence "I was making a fool of myself" would express if it were used in the context of e, i.e., the proposition that John had been making a fool of himself.

3.4.1 Pre-Logical Form

So far I have considered a case in which the sentence that appears in quotation marks in a direct discourse report belongs to the same language as other expressions in the report do. This cannot be assumed in general, however, for one can make a direct discourse report where the utterance reproduced does not belong to the same language as the report itself is couched. Moreover, as we shall see, even if a reported utterance does belong, in a rough, ordinary sense, to the same language as that of the report itself, there are cases where some unconventional expressions are used in the utterance or some expressions in it cannot be assumed to have the conventional meanings of those expressions. Given that there are such cases, the interpretation of a direct discourse report should be taken as proceeding in at least two stages. The utterance of (27), for instance, would first be interpreted as making a claim that there is a past speech event by John whose object is the proposition that the sentence "I was making a fool of myself" would express in the language John employed in making the speech event. Let us call the expression of this stage of interpretation of a direct discourse report its *pre-logical form*. Then the pre-logical form of (27) would be as follows.

(39) $\exists e(e < \text{now} \wedge \text{Say}($John, the proposition John would express by "I was making a fool of myself" in $C(e), e))$

[10] As for the treatment of indexical expressions I follow Kaplan's. See [Kap77].

Provided that some pragmatic considerations lead one to assume that the language John employed in the context is English, one can regard (38) as (27)'s logical form, but according to the view put forward here, the logical form of a direct discourse report such as (38) will always involve pragmatic decisions as to which language, or semantic principles, are to be relevant in interpreting the quoted part of the report.

It will be instructive take a look at how this account deals with cases in which a direct discourse report is embedded in another direct discourse report:

(40) a. John said, "Mary said, "I was making a fool of myself" ".

b. $\exists e(e <$ now $\wedge$ Say(John, the proposition John would express by "Mary said, "I was making a fool of myself" " in $C(e), e)$

c. $\exists e(e <$ now $\wedge$ Say(John, $[\uparrow \exists e'(e' <$ now $\wedge$ Say(Mary, the proposition Mary would express by "I was making a fool of myself" in $C(e'), e')]_{C(e)}, e)$

d. $\exists e(e <$ now $\wedge$ Say(John, $[\uparrow \exists e'(e' <$ now $\wedge$
Say(Mary, $[\uparrow (\lambda x(\text{made-fool-of}(x, x))(\text{I}))]_{C(e')}, e')]_{C(e)}, e)$

Given the utterance of (40a), one forms (40b), which is one of its pre-logical forms. If there is sufficient reason to suppose that the mimicking of John's utterance in (40a) is to be understood as an utterance in English, and hence that it is to be understood as another direct discourse report, one proceeds to (40c), which is still a pre-logical form. If, again, one can assume that the mimicking in Mary's utterance in (40c) is to be interpreted as belonging to English, one forms (40d), which is its logical form. Note that the second occurrence of "now" in (40d), being an indexical, is evaluated with respect to the context of John's utterance and the occurrence of "I" with respect to the context of Mary's. The former feature seems to nicely capture our intuition that if (40a) is true, Mary's utterance must *precede* John's utterance.

3.4.2 The Cases of *Bushism*

Contextual displacement in direct discourse can affect not only the interpretation of indexicals, but also the interpretation of other expressions as well. In making a direct discourse report, the reporter mimics the source speaker's utterance, so there is a sense in which the reporter does not take full responsibility for the expressions used in the mimicking part of the report. This explains why we sometimes use words in a foreign language, words that we otherwise would not use, or expressions that are not conventional words. Consider:

(41) George W. Bush said, "Childrens do learn when standards are high".

The expression "childrens" is not a word in English, but it may be a word in Bush's idiolect and we can imagine that someone uses (41) for making a serious direct discourse report. The pre-logical form of (41) will be (42).

(42) $\exists e(e <$ now $\wedge$ Say(Bush, the proposition Bush expresses by "Childrens do learn when standards are high" in $C(e), e)$

Given that Bush's idiolect differs from English only in lexical items, one can proceed to the logical form of (42) by adding to the already given list of semantic rules for primitive expressions an extra rule that allows one to interpret Bush's use of "childrens". In this case this can be done easily, for it is evident that what Bush means by his non-conventional expression is nothing different from *children*.

I believe that in most cases, a non-conventional expression is used in direct discourse with the expectation that the hearer will manage to figure out what would be meant by the expression were it used in the context of the reported utterance. However, it is possible for a reporter to give a direct discourse report when he cannot assume that the hearer will understand the proposition expressed by the mimicking part of the report, or even when he himself has no idea what proposition is expressed by it. In order to understand what is involved in such cases, let us consider examples that contain indexicals and demonstratives first, and then come back to the cases of non-conventional expressions. Suppose that the quotation in direct discourse contains an indexical "here".

(43) John said, “Santa Monica is not far from here”.

Given the standard assumption that “here” is an expression that directly refers to the location of the context in which the utterance is made, one can grasp the proposition expressed by “Santa Monica is not far from here” in (43) only when one knows the location of its utterance. Even if the reporter does not know, or he knows but cannot expect the hearer to know, the location of John’s utterance, it is still possible to make the report with (43). If this is true, it will be a case where a direct discourse report is made even though the reporter or the hearer does not know, in at least one sense, what proposition is expressed by the mimicking part of the report. One might be inclined to regard this as supporting the traditional view of direct discourse.

However, it is too rash to conclude from the existence of such examples that the content ascription view of direct discourse defended here is untenable. I think a distinction drawn by Russell is relevant here. In “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” ([Rus10]), Russell introduces a distinction between *knowing, or being acquainted with, a proposition* and *being able to describe a proposition*.

> [W]hen we say anything about Bismark, we should like, if we could, to make the judgment which Bismark alone can make, namely, the judgment of which Bismark himself is a constituent. In this we are necessarily defeated, since the actual Bismark is unknown to us. But we know that there is an object B called Bismark, and that B was an astute diplomatist. We can thus *describe* the proposition we should like to affirm, namely, “B was an astute diplomatist”, where B is the object which was Bismark. What enables us to communicate in spite of varying descriptions we employ is that we know there is a true proposition concerning the actual Bismark, and that however we may vary the description (so long as the description is correct), the proposition described is still the same. This proposition, which is described and is known to be true, is what interests us; but we are not acquainted with the proposition itself, and do not know *it*, though we

know it is true.[11]

Russell's argument here is not particularly concerned with indexicals. Moreover, it is based on his epistemology (at that time) as to what we can be acquainted with, a view to which we are not committed. Russell's point is still instructive in our case, though, for it seems to show that being unable to *entertain* a proposition itself is not an obstacle to being *concerned with* the proposition in communication. Grated that a reporter or a hearer may not know what proposition is expressed by the mimicking part of the report, they may still be able to communicate various kinds of information about it. In our example, even though one does not know the location of John's utterance, one is able to infer that if (43) is true, there is a location L such that Jone made an utterance in L whose content is that Santa Monica is not far from L.

Similar things can be said about the use of demonstratives in the mimicking part of direct discourse. Consider:

(44) John said, "This is pretty expensive".

If the reporter or the hearer does not know what John referred to by his use of the demonstrative "this" in (44), he is not in a position to know what proposition is expressed by the mimicking part of (44). And in this case, the situation is worse than in the case of indexical "here", for what John referred to by "this" is something that can only be decided by consulting John's intention and cannot be automatically recoverable from the context of the utterance. What one can know in a case like this is only that if (44) is true, John referred to a certain object o by his use of "this" and his utterance expressed the proposition that o was pretty expensive.

I believe that the use of an expression one does not understand in direct discourse is analogous to the use of a demonstrative whose referent one does not know. Suppose that a child reports to her parents:

(45) The weather forecast said, "A frontal system is approaching".

[11] Page 116 of [Rus10].

The child may not know what "frontal system" means; in that case, she just made the report in the faith that "frontal system" expresses some meaning. However, provided that she knows the syntactic category of the expression, she can know the type of semantic contribution made by the expression; and if she knows the meanings of the other expressions in the mimicking part of the report, she can narrow the range of propositions that it could express. She can know the forecast said that something called a "frontal system" was approaching, whatever it is. There remains, however, meta-linguistic elements in her (partial) understanding of what is said by the mimicking part.

I wish to claim that although reports like (45) are not rare, they are somewhat anomalous and should not be regarded as the norm. In fact, in making an assertion, we sometimes do use a sentence containing expressions we do not understand, especially when we know from some independent source that the sentence expresses a truth. But there is a sense in which such assertions are anomalous and should not be taken too seriously. Keith Donnellan describes one of such cases, and dismisses it as a case of "mouthpiece syndrome" in Gareth Evans's sense.[12]

> [H]aving read in an authoritative article in *Scientific American*, "The oblateness of Mars is .003", I may be said to know that that sentence expresses a truth, but if I have not the foggiest idea of what is meant by "oblateness", I do not think I can be said to know that the oblateness of Mars is .003. Yet if I subsequently happen to be in a group discussing the properties of the planets and someone asks what the oblateness of Mars is, I might answer "It is .003". But I think I act here, to use an apt expression of Gareth Evans, as a mere mouthpiece, passing on a statement about matters of which *I* am ignorant.[13]

Given that one can *assert* a proposition without knowing what it is, it is no wonder that one can *report* it without understanding it, if one has sufficient reason to be convinced that the mimicking part of the report does express a proposition. In a similar vein, a speaker

[12]Gareth Evans, "The Causal Theory of Names" ([Eva73]).

[13]Keith Donnellan, "The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators" ([Don77]), reprinted in his *Essays on Reference, Language, and Mind* ([Don12]), p. 160. The page reference is to the reprinted version.

might make a report like (45), whether or not she herself understands every expression used in the mimicking part, to someone who she cannot expect to know the meanings of every expression in it, perhaps in the hope that the hearer will come to learn the meanings currently unknown to him, or that he will subsequently act as a "mouthpiece".

3.5 The Status of Verbatim Reproduction

If our account of direct discourse is on the right track, then in making a direct discourse report the reporter need not reproduce the original speaker's words verbatim. However, when we hear a direct discourse report, we are inclined to assume that the reporter must have reproduced it, at least to a large extent. In this section I wish to consider what status this assumption has.

According to our present account, direct discourse is a form for reporting what someone said, i.e., reporting the content of that person's utterance, by mimicking the utterance the source speaker made. But mimicking is always a matter of degree and performed within limitations. For instance, when one mimics in written language a spoken utterance, one usually has to shave off those aspects of the utterance which are idiosyncratic to spoken language, e.g., tones and other prosodic features of the utterance, and add those features that are idiosyncratic to written language, e.g., quotation marks and signs for punctuation. We accept those changes to the original utterance usually without even noticing them. Such changes are changes made with good reason. After all, written language lacks tones and spoken language has no quotation marks or punctuation. We have seen above that we usually translate someone's utterance when we make a direct discourse report in a language different from his. In such a case, we mimic his utterance in our own language, not in his language, and the change of languages is understandable given that the hearer will understand the content of the utterance better if the reporter expresses it in his own language. These considerations suggest that we accept changes to the original utterance if we can find *good pragmatic reasons* for the changes. When we can find no such reasons, we are reluctant to accept changes.

According to the present account, direct discourse has two elements. One is the mimicking of the original speaker's utterance. Direct discourse is a form of speech report in which the reporter lends his mouth to the reportee; thus mimicking is part of the *point* of using direct discourse, so to speak. Because of this element a reporter who makes unmotivated changes to the original utterance will be considered to violate the convention governing direct discourse. However, direct discourse has another element, which is to convey the content of the original utterance to the hearer. These two elements are usually in harmony; for in most cases simply to reproduce the utterance of the source speaker will help the hearer to understand its content. However, for various reasons they may be in conflict: trying to be loyal to the original utterance may hinder understanding on the part of the hearer. What the reporter needs to do is to balance both elements in working out how best to get the hearer to understand the content. Let us put it in a form of pragmatic principle:

The Principle of Fidelity The reporter of a direct discourse report is expected to choose, in mimicking an utterance of the source speaker, those expressions and wordings that are most faithful to the original utterance which are compatible with his abilities and communicative purposes.

This principle, although rough and ready, seems to explain why we find some reports inadequate. For instance, we will not usually regard (46) as an adequate report of Mary's utterance, if it is based on her utterance of "You should see an eye doctor":

(46) Mary said, "You should see an oculist".

Presumably, "eye doctor" and "oculist" are synonymous expressions, and on most theories of propositions, including the one we adopt in this dissertation, "You should see an eye doctor" and "You should see an oculist" will express the same proposition. Even if we grant this, we can still reject (46) as inadequate, for it violates the Principle of Fidelity.

The Principle of Fidelity may affect not only the individual expressions employed in a direct discourse report, but also the *form* of the sentence used in it. If we want to report in

English Marx's utterance of "Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch", (47) seems to be an adequate report.

(47) Marx said, "Workers of the world, unite".

As Ori Simchen points out, (47) sounds adequate not just because "Workers of the world, unite" has the same meaning as Marx's original German sentence does, but also because (47) somehow reflects the way the last line of *Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei* was *worded*.[14] The Principle of Fidelity seems to explain this intuition. In this case, the reporter's communicative purpose requires that Marx's original inscription be translated. Mimicking in English Marx's original utterance in German involves, I presume, figuring out what Marx should have said, given what he actually said, were he in need of speaking English instead of German. Among all possible candidates of the mimicking, those that preserve Marx's wording should be preferred if no good reason is found for not doing so. In this case, presumably we cannot find any such reason, and this can be why we regard (47) as an adequate direct discourse report.

3.6 Does Direct Discourse Report Expressions?

Thus far I have argued against the traditional view that direct discourse exclusively reports the expressions used in the original utterance, and argued for the view that it reports contents alone. However, the position I have defended might have seemed to many readers too extreme. It seems to be undeniable that we sometimes do hear a report in direct discourse as telling us what expressions are used by the source speaker. Indeed, if our account is right that direct discourse involves the *reproduction*, though in a mild sense, of a source

[14][Sim99], p. 329. He uses it for arguing against Paul Saka's proposal in [Sak98] that quotations sometimes refer to intensions rather expressions. Although Saka's proposal, which I have no space to discuss here, is rather different from mine, his proposal and mine are agreed that (at least sometimes) a direct discourse report relates a person with an intentional entity. Simchen claims that in an example like (47) what is attributed to a person is not an intension, but a slogan—"a particular way of putting things into words which has recognizable versions in many languages"([Sim99], p. 329.). Since Simchen does not develop his ontology of slogans any further, I am not quite sure why he thinks that slogans are not intensional entities. I am inclined to think that what is attributed to Marx in (47) is an *order*, which I believe is no less intensional than a proposition.

speaker's utterance, then the hearer should be able to make an, at least defeasible, inference to the expressions employed in the original utterance. For instance, the hearer of (27) would naturally infer, if he believes that John is a speaker of English, that John's original utterance was couched in a sentence that is pretty similar to "I was making a fool of myself".

(27) John said, "I was making a fool of myself".

In this section I wish to examine the nature of this type of inference.

There are varieties of ways in which one can make an inference from an utterance someone makes, but here we are particularly interested in cases where the inference is made, not from the *content* of the utterance, but from the *manner* it is made. For instance, if someone hears me speak English with a certain type of accent, he may infer that I am Japanese. This is a defeasible inference, since there is no necessary connection between speaking with such and such accent and being Japanese. Moreover, in speaking with such and such accent there is no *communicative intention* on my part to inform someone that I am Japanese. I just cannot help speaking that way, and people may take advantage of it. Let us call this type of inference a *mere meta-linguistic inference.*

The very same kind of inference, however, may become a *conversational implicature* in Grice's sense. An example devised by Searle may be taken as one of such cases:

> Suppose that I am an American soldier in the Second World War and that I am captured by Italian troops. And suppose also that I wish to get these troops to believe that I am a German officer in order to get them to release me. What I would like to do is to tell them in German or Italian that I am a German officer. But let us suppose I don't know enough German or Italian to do that. So I, as it were, attempt to put on a show of telling them that I am a German officer by reciting those few bits of German that I know, trusting that they don't know enough German to see through my plan. Let us suppose that I only know one line of German, which I remember from a poem I had to memorize in a high-school

German course. Therefore I, a captured American, address my Italian captors with the following sentence: "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?".[15]

Searle originally used this example to criticize Grice's seminal analysis of *non-natural meaning*.[16] Searle believes that his utterance in the described situation does not mean that he is German, whereas he thinks Grice's theory has it that it does. I will not go into the question of whether Searle is successful in his attempt, but I think that in making the utterance he clearly *implicates* that he is German. He believes that his utterance of a sentence in German will invite the Italian captors to make an inference to the conclusion that he is German, and he also makes his intention open to trigger the inference by making the utterance. That there is a sense in which he has the intention to *cause* the Italian soldiers to believe that he is German is somehow evident from the fact that we would want to describe the case as one where he is trying to *deceive* them. This type of inference is also defeasible, but it differs from a mere meta-linguistic inference in that the speaker has a communicative intention to convey something.

Another type of implicature, sometimes referred to as *generalized conversational implicature*, might also be relevant here. Consider:

(48) The corner's of Sue's lips turned slightly upward.

(48) seems to implicate that Sue did not exactly smile. Levinson summarizes what is behind the generation of this implicature as the *M-heuristic*: "What is said in an abnormal way, isn't normal".[17] The idea is that if one just wants to say that Sue smiled, there is a commonplace, and an easier to digest, way of saying it, but the fact that the speaker took the trouble to find an unfamiliar expression and ask the hearer to process it requires an explanation. In this case, it would be reasonable for the hearer to conclude that what the reporter wanted to describe is not something that can be straightforwardly expressed by "Sue smiled". This

[15] John Searle, "What is a Speech Act?" ([Sea65]), reprinted in *The Philosophy of Language* ([Sea71]), pp. 45-6. The page reference is to the reprinted version.

[16] Paul Grice, "Meaning" ([Gri57]).

[17] [Lev00], p.33.

type of inference is also meta-linguistic in its nature, for what triggers it is the use of an unusual or an abnormal expression in place of a usual or a normal one.

Finally, there are cases of *conventional implicature*. I am not sure whether one can find a clear case of conventional implicature where a meta-linguistic inference is involved. However, for our present purposes we may appeal to a sentence containing a *nominal appositive*, which is a certain *grammatical construction* that is assumed to generate a conventional implicature:

(49) a. Bertrand Russell, the inventor of the theory of descriptions, was born in 1872.

b. Bertrand Russell was born in 1872.

c. Bertrand Russell is the inventor of the theory of descriptions.

Usually it is assumed that (49a) literally means (49b) but it *conventionally* implicates (49c), namely, that (49c) is no part of the literal semantic content of (49a), but its utterance will implicate (49c) as a matter of the *semantic* function of nominal appositives.[18] That the kind of implicature involved in (49a) is not conversational but conventional is shown by the fact that it is not *cancelable*:

(50) Bertrand Russell, the inventor of the theory of descriptions, was born in 1872, but he is not the inventor of the theory of descriptions.

(50) is evidently counterintuitive, and someone who claims (50) will be accused of being somehow self-contradictory. Thus the inference from (49a) to (49c) is not defeasible; one who accepts (49a) is thereby committed to the truth of (49c).

With this background in place, let us return to direct discourse. According to the account put forward in the previous sections, the semantic content of (27) is (51a), but our problem was how we should understand the nature of the inference we often make from (27) to (51b).

(27) John said, "I was making a fool of myself".

[18]See Christopher Potts, *The Logic of Conventional Implicatures* ([Pot05]), p. 32.

(51) a. John said that he had been making a fool of himself.

b. John uttered the sentence “I was making a fool of myself”.

I am inclined to believe that, depending on cases, an instance of the inference from (27) to (51b) can be an instance of any one of those three cases, namely a mere meta-linguistic inference, a (generalized) conversational implicature, and a conventional implicature. Note that this inference is cancelable, for one can say:

(52) John said, “I was making a fool of myself”, but he said it in German.

Given that (52) is possible, (51b) can not always be considered to be (27)’s conventional implicature, or part of its semantic of content, for that matter. Then, depending on whether the reporter has the intention to implicate (51b), it can either be a mere meta-linguistic inference the hearer makes at his own risk, or a conversation implicature of (27) and part of its message in a broad sense.

I wish to note that, in the case of a direct discourse report in written language, the presumption of verbatim reproduction is particularly attractive when expressions deviant from the standard written forms but reminiscent of particular pronunciations are used in the mimicking part of the report.

(53) Vern said, “You *hafta* see ’em”.

(53) strongly suggests that Vern pronounced the sentence “You have to see them” in a particular way, and it would be judged inadequate if it turned out that Vern actually did not speak that way. Likewise, cases of Bushism also trigger the presumption of verbatim reproduction.

(41) George W. Bush said, “Childrens do learn when standards are high”.

I believe two explanations are available of this phenomenon from our standpoint. One is to regard this as a sort of *conversational* implicature. The other is to regard this as a sort of

conventional implicature. According to both types of explanation, although it is no part of the literal semantic content of (53) that Vern uttered the sentence in such and such way, it implicates that by way of a certain pragmatic mechanism. They just differ in how one should understand the nature of the pragmatic mechanism involved.

One way in which such an implicature might be regarded as conversational is as follows. For one thing, the presumption of verbatim reproduction may be strengthened, in a language such as English which has a clear grammatical distinction between direct and indirect discourse, by the very use of direct discourse in making a report. If the reporter's interest simply lies in conveying what proposition was expressed by the source speaker's utterance, he could have used *in*direct discourse for that purpose. Thus the very use of direct discourse may be taken by the hearer as showing the interest on the reporter's part in implicating something about the expressions used in the original utterance. Secondly, according to our account of direct discourse, the utterance of (53) and that of (54) would have exactly the same semantic content:

(54) Vern said, “You have to see them”.

Moreover, (54) is more standard than (53) in that it contains only those written forms you can find in a dictionary, and is expected to be easier to recognize. Thus the fact the reporter took the trouble to choose the anomalous expressions in the mimicking part requires an explanation. In this case, given that those expressions are reminiscent of certain ways of pronouncing the words, it would be reasonable for the reader to conclude that the reporter wanted to convey that that's the way Vern made the utterance. In a similar vein, the use of non-conventional expression “childrens” in the mimicking part might be understood as generating the implicature that that's the expression Bush himself used.

Or, we might simply regard this type of implicature as *conventional*. The use of (53) implicates, by way of a semantical function of direct discourse, that Vern spoke in the way suggested in the mimicking part. If this is right, and if our observation above that some uses of direct discourse do not have such an implicature is right, then the uses of direct discourse must be *ambiguous*, not in the level of their literal semantic content, but in whether they

conventionally implicate the exact words, or the way of pronunciations, etc. employed in the source speaker's utterance. Perhaps we adopt, in at least some uses of direct discourse, the convention to implicate that the mimicking part exactly reproduces the original expressions of the source speaker. To assume that there is such a convention is particularly attractive when we consider the use of direct discourse in academic writings, for today quoting other's works in academic writings is rather severely regulated.

I believe both these types of explanations to be live options in our case, but as for the examples such as (41) and (53), the explanation in terms of conversational implicature seems to be more natural. A consideration that might provide one reason for being favorably disposed toward this type of explanation is that the use of anomalous expressions in the mimicking part seems to be crucial in the generation of the implicature. We are less inclined to regard a report like (54) as inadequate when the mimicking part does not reflect the exact way in which the original utterance was made. Even if Vern uttered the sentence "You have to see them" with a very strong accent, (54) would not be judged inadequate. Likewise, it seems that (55) is acceptable as a report of Bush's original utterance that involved 'childrens', whereas (41) would not be if Bush's utterance does not involve the anomalous expression.

(55) Bush said, "Children do learn when standards are high".

Before concluding this chapter, I wish to address myself to the question of whether a report that makes unmotivated changes to the original utterance can still be regarded as *true*. We have seen that (46), if used to report Mary's utterance of "You should see an eye doctor", would be judged infelicitous.

(46) Mary said, "You should see an oculist".

However, according to our account, (46) and (56) have the same literal semantic content, hence there is a sense in which if the latter is true then the former should be true as well.

(56) Mary said, "You should see an eye doctor".

This might sound counterintuitive, and might be taken by some as showing that our account is misguided. However, I wish to stress that the notion of truth we are dealing with here is a technical one and may differ from our ordinary notion of truth. Indeed, here we might be dealing with a realm where our intuitions about truth are not very helpful in guiding our theory. If what we have seen in this section is on the right truck, then a report in direct discourse often comes with an extra message about the expressions in the reported utterance besides its literal semantic content. Then our intuitions about the truth of a report may very well be affected by its extra message. This is especially the case when the extra message is registered as its *conventional* implicature. Recall our example of nominal appositives.

(49a) Bertrand Russell, the inventor of the theory of descriptions, was born in 1872.

I doubt that we have a clear-cut intuition about whether (49a) as a whole would be true if Russell, although he was indeed born in 1872, had not discovered the theory of descriptions.

On the other hand, I think we have much firmer intuitions about what the reporter is *committed to* in making a direct discourse report.

(27) John said, "I was making a fool of myself".

(51) a. John said that he had been making a fool of himself.

b. John uttered the sentence "I was making a fool of myself".

The reporter of (27) is committed to its literal semantic content, namely (51a), and often he would be committed to (51b) as well, either as what he conversationally implicates, or as what the use of (27) conventionally implicates, depending on cases. If the hearer of a direct discourse report discovers that part of what he takes to be the reporter's commitments fails, he will find the report defective in that respect, and he may call it *false*. But this ordinary notion of *falsity* may well be compatible with our technical notion of truth of its literal semantic content.

CHAPTER 4

Comparison with Maier's Account

In the last chapter I have presented an account of direct discourse according to which direct discourse is not, at least primarily, a form for reporting expressions, but a form for reporting a content. This account is markedly different from the accounts that have been given in Frege's tradition, according to which a report in direct discourse is exclusively devoted to reporting what expressions are used in someone's utterance. As we saw in Chapter 2, Frege's own nominalistic view of what linguistic expressions are, and his own account of *how* a quotation in a direct discourse report manages to refer, are rather idiosyncratic and may not be popular, but I think it is safe to say that his basic position on direct discourse has been widely accepted. Indeed, the traditional view of direct discourse is so popular in the semantically oriented literature that it is not easy to find an account even remotely similar to the account given in the last chapter. However, Emar Maier, in a series of papers which forms a notable exception to the mainstream account,[1] gave an account of direct discourse that claims that the truth condition of a report in direct discourse partially involves report of content. I believe a comparison of my account with his will clarify the nature of my account, and hence wish to devote this chapter to that task.

4.1 Maier's Account

Maier's account of direct discourse, in short, is that direct discourse is merely a limiting case of *mixed quotation*.[2] Since Maier bases his account of direct discourse on the account

[1] Emar Maier, "Breaking Quotations" ([Mai08]); "Japanese Reported Speech: Against a Direct-Indirect Distinction" ([Mai09]).

[2] [Mai09], p. 141.

of mixed quotation he gives with Geurts, I wish to go over their account first.[3]

4.1.1 Geurts and Maier's Account of Mixed Quotation

Mixed quotation is a form of report in which one uses quotations in an indirect discourse report.

(57) Quine said that quotation "has a certain anomalous feature".

Davidson was the first, I believe, to point out that there is such a use of quotation, and also that in such a use the expressions within quotation marks should be regarded as being used as well as being referred to.

> Are the quoted words used or mentioned? Obviously mentioned, since the words are Quine's own, and I want to mark the fact. But equally obvious is the fact that the words are used; if they were not, what follows the word 'quotation' would be a singular term, and this cannot be if I have produced a grammatical sentence.[4]

If words within quotation marks are used in an example such as (57), they make some contribution to the proposition denoted by the *that*-clause in it. But how do they do that? Some authors claim that the proposition denoted by a *that*-clause in a mixed quotation is exactly the same as one that would be expressed by the sentence formed by removing the relevant quotation marks from the complement sentence. Recanati says, for instance:

> On the present account . . . the proposition expressed by the complement sentence is the same with or without the quotation marks.[5]

Thus according to Recanati, a report in mixed quotation has exactly the same truth condition as the corresponding report in indirect discourse. For instance, (57) has the same truth condition as (58) does.

[3] I came to know Maier's account only after I substantially completed mine. I would like to thank Koji Mineshima for calling my attention to his account.

[4] [Dav79], p. 81.

[5] François Recanati, "Open Quotation" ([Rec01]), p. 660.

(58) Quine said that quotation has a certain anomalous feature.

Recanati thus regards quotation marks in mixed quotation as semantically superfluous, and on his view, mixed quotation is simply a stylistic variant of indirect discourse with some extra pragmatic implication, namely, certain expressions are used in the reported utterance. However, as some authors emphasize,[6] this view simply cannot be borne out, for there is an obvious difference between the way we interpret an indexical in mixed quotation and the way we interpret it in indirect discourse:

(59) a. Bush also said his administration would "achieve our objectives" in Iraq.[7]

b. Bush also said his administration would achieve our objectives in Iraq.

The occurrence of "our" in (59a) is to be understood as designating Bush and his political friends, rather than, as in (59b), the reporter of (59a) and his allies. Thus quotation marks in (59a) are not semantically superfluous and we need an account of how an expression within them semantically functions.

Geurts and Maier give an account of mixed quotation according to which a quotation that appears in a mixed quoted report is a *presuppositional* device.[8] Since Frege and Strawson on, Philosophers and linguists have regarded a wide variety of expressions as "presuppositional", but they are not quite agreed about what presupposition is and how it is to be treated. Since Geurts and Maier basically follow van der Sandt[9] in their treatment of presuppositions, I wish to briefly take a look at van der Sandt's theory first, and then explain in what sense they regard a quotation used in a mixed quoted report as presuppositional.

4.1.1.1 Binding Theory of Presupposition

Van der Sandt's idea about presupposition is that presuppositional expressions are *anaphoric* expressions, and he uses a version of Discourse Representation Theory (or *DRT*) to imple-

[6]See, for instance, [CL97], p. 429 and [Cum03], p.78.

[7]New York Times, November 4, 2004. This example is taken from [Cum03], p. 78.

[8]Bart Geurts and Emar Maier, "Quotation in Context", *Belgian Journal of Linguistics*, 17: 109–128, 2003.

[9]Van der Sandt, R., "Presupposition Projection as Anaphora Resolution" ([San92]).

ment this idea. The exact mechanism of his theory is rather involved, and trying to do full justice to the details of his account would take us too far afield. Instead, in what follows, I will try to give a minimal, albeit a rough, introduction to his theory.

It has been widely recognized that a presupposition of a certain sentence may be "canceled" by reference to a proceeding discourse element. For instance, (60a) is usually assumed to presuppose that Cris has a brother, but (60b) and (60c) as a whole have no presupposition about Cris's having a brother.

(60) a. Cris hates his bother.

b. If Cris has a brother, he hates his bother.

c. Cris has a brother and he hates his brother.

When and how a presuppositional expression *projects* over a compound sentence in which it occurs is called the *projection problem*, and van der Sandt tries to answer this problem by assuming that a presuppositional expression needs to be *bound* by a preceding discourse element. In order to see how his account in terms of DRT proceeds, let us consider the following discourse.

(61) a. Cris borrowed a book.

b. Gordie returned the book.

In van der Sandt's "bottom up" version of DRT, the interpretation of a discourse proceeds by constructing a preliminary Discourse Representation Structure (a *preliminary DRS*, for short) for each component sentence of the discourse, and then the resulting preliminary DRSs are *merged* into a whole DRS. For the exposition's sake, let us assume that proper names are not presuppositional expressions, but definite descriptions are. Then, (61a), for instance, is interpreted by setting up two Discourse Referents (*DR*s, for short) for the two noun phrases in (61a) and listing the conditions that those DRs are to satisfy:

u v
u = Chris
Book(v)
Borrowed(u,v)

In this case, "u" is the DR for "Chris"[10] and "v" is for "a book". And this DRS has the same truth condition as the following first order sentence:[11]

$$\exists v(\text{Book}(v) \wedge \text{Borrowed}(\text{Chris}, v))$$

Now let us see how the preliminary DRS for (61b) is constructed. As in (61a), a DR for "Gordie" has to be set up, but "the book", being presuppositional, requires a special treatment:

s $\underline{t}$
s = Gordie
$\underline{\text{Book}(\text{t})}$
Returned(s,$\underline{\text{t}}$)

Note that the DR "t" and its condition "Book(t)" are underlined.[12] This shows that the DR "t" has to be bound to a DR that satisfies the condition "Book", when this preliminary DRS is merged with a preceding one. In this case, "t" can be bound to "v" in the preliminary DRS for (61a), thus what we get by combining these two preliminary DRSs is as follows.

[10]Unlike Geurts and Maier, I represent proper names in English as individual constants rather than as predicates. Nothing important for our purposes depends on this choice.

[11]Here I simply give the results. For the exact details of how a DRS is constructed from a given sentence, and how a DRS is interpreted model theoretically, see, for instance, van der Sandt, op.cit.; Hans Kamp and Uwe Reyle, *From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic, and Discourse Representation Theory* ([KR93]); Hans Kamp, Josef van Genabith, and Uwe Reyle, "Discourse Representation Theory" ([KGR92]).

[12]This is not the way van der Sandt originally marked presuppositional elements in DRSs. I basically follow Geurts and Maier in adopting this notation.

u v s
u = Chris Book(v) Borrowed(u,v) s = Gordie Returned(s,v)

This is true if and only if there is a book Chris borrowed and Gordie returned, and seems to capture the content of (61) well enough.

However, one is not always lucky enough to be able to find a preceding DR to which a DR for a given presuppositional expression is to be bound. Consider:

(62) I did not see the king of Bhutan.

Given that "the king of Bhutan" is a presuppositional expression, one gets the following preliminary DRS for (62).

<table><tr><td>u v</td></tr><tr><td>u = I
v = Bhutan
¬ <table><tr><td>$\underline{s}$</td></tr><tr><td>King-of($\underline{s}$,v)</td></tr><tr><td>Saw(u,$\underline{s}$)</td></tr></table></td></tr></table>

If (62) is uttered out of blue, there is no preceding DR to which the DR "s" is to be bound. In such a case, van der Sandt's account appeals to the process of *accommodation*. When confronted with an utterance of (6), even if one is not told in advance that Bhutan has a king, one often simply *accommodates* the utterance by supplying the missing information

for oneself. By adopting an often preferred strategy, *global accommodation*, one adds the information that Bhutan has a king to the top level of the DRS.

$$\begin{array}{|c|}\hline u\ v\ t \\ \hline \text{u} = \text{I} \\ \text{v} = \text{Bhutan} \\ \text{King-of(t,v)} \\ \neg \begin{array}{|c|}\hline \underline{s} \\ \hline \underline{\text{King-of(}\underline{\text{s}}\text{,v)}} \\ \text{Saw(u,}\underline{\text{s}}\text{)} \\ \hline \end{array} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

Then by binding "*s*" to "*t*", one gets the following, which is true if and only if Bhutan has a king whom I did not see, and is arguably a correct representation of one reading of (62).[13]

$$\begin{array}{|c|}\hline u\ v\ t \\ \hline \text{u} = \text{I} \\ \text{v} = \text{Bhutan} \\ \text{King-of(t,v)} \\ \neg \begin{array}{|c|}\hline \text{Saw(u,t)} \\ \hline \end{array} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

Or, one can also opt for *local accommodation*, in which case one adds the relevant information in the DRS where the presuppositional expression immediately appears. In this case, the result would be as follows:

[13]One might be worried about the *uniqueness* of the king of Bhutan. Suppose that Bhutan had two kings and I saw only one of them. In such a situation, one may well be inclined to think that (62) is false or infelicitous, whereas this representation would make it true. However, one can simply add the uniqueness condition to the DRS when one accommodates (62), in which case the resulting DRS would be true if and only if Bhutan has a unique king, whom I did not see. Since the question of whether definite descriptions are systematically accompanied by uniqueness implications is tangential to our present concern, I ignore this question in the main body of the text.



This is true if and only if there is no king of Bhutan I saw, and hence is true if and only if either Bhutan has no king, or else I did not see him. It depends on the context which of these two options for accommodation, i.e., global or local, is preferred, but Geurts and Maier notes, following Heim, that global accommodation is generally preferred.[14]

4.1.1.2 Geurs and Maier on Quotation as Presuppositional Device

Geurts and Maier claim that a quotation used in a mixed report is also a presuppositional expression. In this section I will sketch their view presented in [GM03], [Mai08], and [Mai09]. Let us consider:

(57) Quine said that quotation "has a certain anomalous feature".

Geurts and Maier regard the occurrence of " "has a certain anomalous feature" " as presupposing that Quine expressed a certain property by the quoted phrase. Let us assume that "Refer" stands for a three-place relation between a person, an expression, and an entity that serves as the meaning of the expression, and that "Say" stands for a two-place relation between a person and a proposition. Then, according to Geurts and Maier, (57) gives rise to the following preliminary DRS:[15]

[14] [GM03], p. 117. See also Irene Heim, "On the Projection Problem for Presuppositions" ([Hei83]). Some authors claim that there are other varieties of accommodation, usually called *intermediate accommodations* (see Heim's article mentioned above for this notion), but I will not go in the questions of what they are and whether they have applications in utterance interpretations.

[15] See [Mai09].



Now, it seems that in order to resolve the presuppositional elements in this DRS by binding, one needs to be told in the previous discourse that Quine used the phrase "has a certain anomalous feature" to express such and such property, but a use of mixed quotation is rarely preceded by such an explicit remark about the meaning of the quoted phrase. Thus, it seems that accommodation is almost inevitably called for. Since Geurts and Maier believe that global accommodation is generally preferred, what one gets as the result is the following:



This has the same truth condition as (64):

(64) There is some property Quine referred to by the phrase "has a certain anomalous feature", and he said that quotation has *that* property.

Note that in this representation, exactly what property Quine expressed by the phrase is left unspecified. This may seem to be short of what we ordinarily understand when we interpret

an utterance of (57). Maier claims, however, there is reason to believe that the *semantics* of mixed quotation should stop here:

> [W]e may be able to *infer* what property it was that [Quine] intended . . . . In cases of well-formed English expressions we already said there may be an automatic default implication that P denotes the property we, or the dictionary, associate with the quoted expression. . . . However, this should be seen only as a defeasible strengthening of the basic, semantic interpretation represented in [(63)]. ([Mai08], p. 194. Italics his)

Maier goes on to claim that direct discourse is simply a limiting case of mixed quotation, namely, a case where a whole sentence is mixed quoted:

> The analysis suggests an extension to direct discourse, analyzing it as mixed quotation of an entire sentence . . . . This would effectively blur the line between direct and indirect discourse. The following picture emerges: to report another's speech there is only indirect discourse, within which the device of mixed quotation can be used to mimic a particular phrase of the reported speech act verbatim. . . . Direct discourse, in this picture, is merely a limiting case of mixed quotation. ([Mai09], p.141.)

4.1.2 Is Direct Discourse Presuppositional?

If Maier is right, then the quotation in (27) is a presuppositional expression, and the *semantic* import of (27) in most contexts will be summarized as in (65).

(27) John said, "I was making a fool of myself".

(65) There is some proposition John referred to by the sentence "I was making a fool of myself", and he said *that* proposition.

Maier would admit that we often go further and identify the proposition John expressed by the sentence, but he would regard it as merely a post-semantic strengthening of (65) and no part of its semantic content. In this section, I wish to examine to what extent these claims of Maier's can be sustained.

Before doing so, though, I wish to briefly compare my own account of direct discourse with Maier's. Both my account and Maier's hold that direct discourse is used, at least in part, for reporting the content of a source speaker's utterance, and they are agreed that the interpretation of a direct discourse report has to proceed in reference to the expressions inside the quotation marks employed in the report. They disagree, however, both in their treatments of the content report and in their attitudes toward the question of whether the presumption of verbatim reproduction is part of the semantic content of a direct discourse report. Whereas Maier believes, as we saw, that the content of (27), at least in the typical cases, stays at the level of a certain metalinguistic description, I regard (27) as simply having the same content as its indirect discourse counterpart has:

(66) John said that he had been making a fool of himself.

Moreover, whereas I believe that what expressions are used in the source speaker's utterance is no part of the literal semantic content of a direct discourse report, Maier thinks that (27) ascribes a use of the sentence "I was making a fool of myself" to John. I wish to discuss this latter question of verbatim report first.

Note, first, that what I presented as the *pre-logical form* of (27) has a rather similar content as Maier's (65).

(67) $\exists e(e < \text{now} \wedge \text{Say}(\text{John, the proposition John would express by "I was making a fool of myself" in } C(e), e))$

On this ground, one might be tempted to think that my account of direct discourse is no less committed to the ascription of expressions than Maier's; after all, both contain an explicit reference to the sentence "I was making a fool of myself", and both claim that John stands

in the "saying" relation to the proposition that sentence would express. However, this is a simple misunderstanding of the role of pre-logical forms in my account. In my account, the expressions inside quotation marks are always treated as being used by the *reporter* rather than by the reportee; they just need to be separated from the rest because they belong, not to the utterance of the source speaker, but to the *mimicking* of it. Quotation marks are used in a pre-logical form not because we wish to ascribe the very sentence to the source speaker, but because the expressions inside them may belong to some other language than the language in which the report itself is couched. In this sense, there is nothing more special with the use of quotation marks in pre-logical forms than that in usual semantics; after all, semantic cannot be done without referring to the expressions in the object language. What *is* special with a report in direct discourse, on my account, is that they contain (at least) two segmented parts, each of which may need a separate semantic treatment. Pre-logical forms are needed because I propose to construct the interpretation of such a report in (at least) two steps. The reference to the sentence "I was making a fool of myself" disappears in the final truth condition my account gives to (27).

Since Maier regards a direct discourse report as partially involving an ascription of expressions, it seems that his account simply cannot deal with cases where translation is involved:

(68) Galileo said, "The earth moves".

Maier's account would have it that (68) has the same truth condition as (69), but the latter cannot be true, given that Galileo was not a speaker of English.

(69) There is some proposition Galileo referred to by the sentence "the earth moves", and he said *that* proposition.

Now, I wish to turn to the status of what Maier assigns as the *semantic* content of a direct discourse report. I have two misgivings about his position on this. The first is that the line he seems to be drawing between semantics and pragmatics is arbitrary, and the second is concerned with the very claim that quotations are presuppositional expressions. Let me start with the first.

As we saw, Maier believes that the semantic content of (27) should be given by (65) rather then by (66), even if (66) is often what we ordinarily understand when we hear (27).

(27) John said, "I was making a fool of myself".

(65) There is some proposition John referred to by the sentence "I was making a fool of myself", and he said *that* proposition.

(66) John said that he had been making a fool of himself.

His reason for holding this view, I presume, would be that (66) could only be gained from (65) through a defeasible, pragmatic inference about the nature of John's language, and hence should not be regarded as the semantic content of (27). This seems to be a rather curious position, however, for (65) itself involves a number of processes in its generation which we would usually call *pragmatic*. The process of *global accommodation*, which was to be applied in order to generate a content like (65), seems to be no less defeasible than the presumption about the language John speaks, and certainly is regarded as belonging to pragmatics. Moreover, Geurts and Maier themselves are quite explicit about the pragmatic nature of presupposition resolution: "We regard presupposition projection as a pragmatic process, and assume that [preliminary DRSs] are delivered by the grammar further to be processed by the pragmatic component".[16] Given the already pragmatic nature of (65), it is somewhat mysterious why Maier is so confident that the line between semantics and something else should be drawn in such a way as to separate (65) from (66). Maier's demarcation between what belongs to the semantics of direct discourse and what belongs to mere post-semantic augmentation seems to be less than fully motivated.

I agree with Maier that the process through which we reach the interpretation (66) may involve a number of inferences which we would call "pragmatic", but I believe the interpretation of a direct discourse report needs to involve some elements that are not usually considered to be part of "pure" semantics. Direct discourse is partly an *iconic* way of

[16][GM03], p. 116.

communication, and in order to understand what is said by a direct discourse report, one has to mingle semantic rules and types of considerations that are traditionally classified as pragmatic together.

Far more important, however, is the question whether a quotation in direct discourse, or in mixed discourse in general, is really a presuppositional expression. According to to Geurts and Maier, the occurrence of " 'has a certain anomalous feature" " in (57) is presuppositional:

(57) Quine said that quotation "has a certain anomalous feature".

Moreover, since they adhere to van der Sandt's theory of presupposition as anaphora, their claim amounts to the claim that the quotation in (57) is an anaphoric expression with a certain *descriptive content*, namely, being the property Quine referred to by "has a certain anomalous feature". This is really important for their purpose, for terms with no descriptive content such as pronouns are usually assumed to lack the capacity to receive accommodation.[17] That is to say, we may accommodate the use of "his wife" in (70a) and interpret (70a) as (70b) when we are not told of John's wife in advance, but we do not accommodate the use of "it" in (71a) if we have no clue as to what the speaker refers to by "it", even though we may take it for granted that the speaker's use of "it" refers to something:

(70) a. John has to pick up his wife.

b. John has a wife and he has to pick her up.

(71) a. John hates it.

b. The speaker refers to something by his use of "it" and John hates that something.

(71b) is more like a half way state toward the full understanding of (71a), and we would not rest content with such a state.[18] Note, however, that what Geurts and Maier present as

[17] See, for instance [San92], p. 359.

[18] However, this does not mean that no effort will be paid to understanding what is said by an utterance involving such a use of pronouns. According to Kai von Fintel, Barbara Partee suggested that *some* kind of accommodation may take place:

the interpretation of (57) is pretty much like (71b), and what allows them to do so is their assumption that the quotation in (57) is an anaphoric expression with a certain descriptive content.

However, this is dubious on two grounds. First, given that there are cases of mixed reports involving translation, the alleged descriptive contents of quotations cannot be satisfied for such cases:

(72) Galileo said that the earth "moves".

Unless one of the relevant speakers had made the false claim about Galileo's use of the English word, the occurrence of " "moves" " cannot be bound to any antecedent, and we would not be happy to accommodate it either.

Secondly, and more importantly, although Geurts and Maier try to convince us that a quotation in a mixed report shows a presuppositional behavior, their mechanism does not seem to have succeeded in giving an adequate explanation of the very phenomenon of whose existence they are trying to convince us. Remember that van der Sandt's theory explains presupposition projection in terms of anaphoric linking. Thus, his theory predicts that (73) as a whole does not presuppose that John has a dog, for the occurrence of "his dog" in it is internally bound:

(73) Even if John had a dog, I had never seen his dog.

This can be seen as offering an acceptable explanation of our intuition that the presuppostion of "his dog" has somehow been "canceled" in (73). However, the same thing cannot be said about the examples in (74).

> Barbara Partee (pc) points out to me that there is a type of accommodation that can occur even with such [uses of pronouns]. If a hearer joins an ongoing conversation, she may not challenge the speaker but try to reconstruct the previous discourse to establish an appropriate antecedent. This same strategy is also triggered by *in medias res* openings of fictional discourses, for reasons of "vividness" and reader-involvement. (Kai von Fintel, [Fin94], p. 71.)

This is an interesting suggestion, but I believe that the kind of accommodation Partee suggests is not the same kind of accommodation we are discussing in the main text.

(74) a. If Bush used "childrens" to stand for children, he said that "childrens" learn when we set high standards.

b. If Bush used "misunderestimate me" to stand for some property, he said that his enemies "misunderestimate me".

Note that (74a) is a case where what Bush meant by the quotation is explicitly stated in the antecedent, and (74b) is a case where the property Bush meant by the quotation is existentially quantified in the antecedent. In both cases, anaphoric binding is possible, so one might expect that they should be as natural as (73), and also that the alleged presuppositions of those quotations are both "canceled" or "filtered out" in these examples. Namely, these sentences should be straightforwardly understood as telling the same things as the following:

(75) a. If Bush used "childrens" to stand for children, he said that children learn when we set high standards.

b. If Bush used "misunderestimate me" to stand for some property, he said that his enemies had that property.

On the contrary, both (74a) and (74b) are extremely unnatural things to say, and it is far from obvious that they mean the same as (75a) and (75b). I believe the force of mixed quotation, presuppositional or not, is still alive in (74a) and (74b).

Thus I think that Geurts and Maier's view of mixed quotation as presuppositional discourse is poorly motivated. Note that Geurts and Maier make almost no use of Davidson's suggestion that in mixed quotation words within quotation marks are *used.* They regard a quotation *as whole* in a mixed report as being presuppositional, but it does not matter to their view whether or not the words within quotation marks are *used by the reporter.* All that matters to Geurts and Maier's account is whether those words are used by *the reportee*, and if they are, whether the use is mentioned in the preceding discourse. But if Davidson's remark is to be taken seriously, the person who is responsible for the use of words within quotes is not the reportee but the reporter. (Remember that Frege, who also held

that expressions within quotation marks employed in direct discourse are used, was quite explicit that the user of those expressions is the reporter.) And once we keep in mind that expressions within quotation marks in a mixed report are used by the reporter, all those detours *via* presupposition resolution seem unnecessary. Since they are used, one needs to interpret them. And their interpretation can proceed quite in the same way as that of other normal expressions in the sentence, except that they, being used for mimicking some external utterance, may have to be interpreted by separate semantic principles.

4.2 An Account of Mixed Quotation

Before concluding this chapter, I wish to briefly present my own view of mixed quotation. As is suggested at the end of the previous section, I believe that a mixed quotation report is best viewed as an indirect discourse report in which the method of direct discourse is partially adopted. In a mixed quoted report, the reporter basically presents by his own words the proposition the reportee allegedly asserted, but he adopts the reportee's viewpoint from place to place and uses the expressions as if they were used by the the reportee himself. The way we interpret a mixed report can be conceived of in parallel with the way we interpret a direct discourse report. For instance, the utterance of (76a) would give rise to the pre-logical form (76b), which, in turn, would lead to (76c) after a few pragmatic decisions.

(76) a. Bush said that "childrens" learn.

b. $\exists e(e < \text{now} \wedge \text{Say}(\text{Bush}, \uparrow \forall x(x \text{ is a thing Bush would refer to by "childrens" in } C(e) \rightarrow Learn(x)), e))$

c. $\exists e(e < \text{now} \wedge \text{Say}(\text{Bush}, \uparrow \forall x(Child(x) \rightarrow Learn(x)), e))$

Note that this account, although it requires that the expressions inside quotation marks break into meaningful parts, does not require that a quotation *as a whole* in a mixed report has a meaning. Geurts and Maier claim that it presupposes that it does, and hence have

been criticized by some authors on the ground that one can mixed-quote a syntactic *non-constituent*.[19] Consider the following example by Abott ([Abb05]):

(77) She said the dog ate "strange things, when left to its own devices".

Since the quotation in (77) does not form a meaningful unit, its presupposition cannot be satisfied.[20] My account, on the other hand, does not have this requirement.

I have to hasten to add that, on my account, (76a)'s apparent implication that Bush used the word "childrens" is still not part of its literal semantic content. However, as I said in Chapter 3, in a case of mixed quotation we are strongly inclined to think that the implication is part of the message. We might be able to explain this as a sort of *conversational* implicature, for the use of quotation marks in indirect discourse may well be taken as signaling the reporter's special intention. Or, we might be able to regard this as a *conventional* implicature. If the latter is the case for some uses of mixed quotation, then one cannot *translate* them without disturbing their conventionally implicated meaning. Indeed, it might be really the case that (78) cannot be translated into Japanese in such a way as to preserve *both* its literal semantic content and its implicature:

(78) Bush said that "childrens" learn when we set high standards.

However, whether there is really such a *convention* concerning the use of mixed quotation is partially an *empirical* question, and I would like to leave the problem of how best one could describe the kind of implication in question for future research.

[19] See [Cum03] and Barbara Abbott, "Some Notes on Quotation" ([Abb05]).

[20] Maier (in [Mai08]) tries to dodge this criticism by adopting the mechanism of what he calls *quote-breaking*. The idea is that one just regards (77) as involving not one quotation but *two separate quotations*:

She said the dog ate "strange things", "when left to its own devices".

I am inclined to think that this maneuver, although it might be effective for dodging the criticism from non-constituents, will complicate Geurts and Maier's mechanism of presupposition resolution a great deal.

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