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Indigenous Mobilizations of the 21st Century and Tactical Choice in Ecuador

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by

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I would first and foremost like to acknowledge that the entirety of this research, although remote from Ecuador, was conducted while on Indigenous lands, specifically on land traditionally stewarded by the Chumash peoples. I would like to express my gratitude and respect towards the Chumash Elders, past, present, and future, along with the Indigenous peoples who are the traditional stewards of lands now considered within Ecuador's borders.

ABSTRACT

Indigenous Mobilizations of the 21st Century and Tactical Choice in Ecuador

by

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The study of social movements has been a prominent topic of focus in the social sciences for a century, so much so that social movement theory arose as its own interdisciplinary study. A major facet of social movements and specific instances of mobilization is tactical repertoires/decision-making. Tactical choice does not exist in a vacuum; protestors do not suddenly decide to occupy government buildings or organize marches indiscriminately. The puzzle of why certain tactics are utilized at certain times is complex, and in order to fully understand the underlying implications of tactical choice we must incorporate/recognize the importance of resources/opportunities, socio-political structures, grievances, targets, collective identity, etc.

While all movements face drivers and dilemmas of tactical choice, Indigenous movements have added factors based on their contexts and conditions. The purpose of this research is; to analyze tactical repertoires adopted by Indigenous resistance movements in Ecuador from 2000-2017 and investigate why tactical repertoires vary at different points in time. The goal is to understand what accounts for the adoption of different tactics; what

contexts and circumstances lead to the adoption of certain tactics over others or certain specific repertoires and tactical combinations

As my main question of inquiry focuses on tactics as the main point of analysis, my method for surveying what tactics were used during specific time periods was to utilize primary news sources and press releases that reported on current events in Ecuador over time. Tactical repertoires were then analyzed using models and theories developed by social movement theorists, focusing on identifying factors that affect tactical decision-making. With a cross-period analysis, I am also able to compare and contrast how factors/conditions have changed and remained the same and what impact this has on tactical choice. Examples include how changes in political regimes, economic systems, and state power affect tactical repertoires that Indigenous mobilizations utilize. Each case examines the ways in which Indigenous communities resist the violation of their livelihoods and reaffirm their cultural identity during three time periods; Pre-Correa (2000-2006), Early Correa (2006-2011), and Late Correa (2011-2017). With this research, we hope to learn more about what factors influence Indigenous mobilization and the specific impacts they have on tactical choice, especially the role of political opportunity structures and public perceptions of targets.

Using the progression of Indigenous resistance over the three time periods within 2000-2017, two major observations become clear regarding tactical choice. Specifically, decisions regarding what tactics to utilize and more generally what tactics are available are heavily impacted by the (1) political opportunity structure Indigenous movements are mobilizing within and (2) the public opinion or perception of the targets of Indigenous grievances.

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I. Introduction

The study of social movements has been a prominent topic of focus in the social sciences for a century, so much so that social movement theory arose as its own interdisciplinary study. Questions of why and how social mobilizations occur along with their impacts and consequences have led to the creation of a multitude of models and theories attempting to provide explanations. A major facet of social movements and specific instances of mobilization is tactical repertoires/decision-making. For example, even in just the 21st century alone there have been numerous Indigenous uprisings in Ecuador, none of which utilized the same exact set of tactics. Questions then arise as to why these mobilizations used different tactics, or what accounts for tactical choice in these situations?

Tactical choice does not exist in a vacuum; protestors do not suddenly decide to occupy government buildings or organize marches indiscriminately. The decision to partake in these actions is deliberate and tactical choice in general is affected and altered depending on certain conditions and contexts such as what resources and opportunities are available to protestors. Not all tactics are feasible to utilize or available at any given time, and much research has developed around investigating why certain tactics are adopted in some instances and not in others. The puzzle of why certain tactics are utilized at certain times is complex, and in order to fully understand the underlying implications of tactical choice we must incorporate/recognize the importance of resources/opportunities, socio-political structures, grievances, targets, collective identity, etc. We can particularly complicate tactical decision-making by questioning how identity and culture comes into play. Communities of different backgrounds and identities interact with systems of oppression in

various ways, and similarly resist systems of oppression in different ways and utilize different tactics. In an era of rising indigenous movements and growing protest against globalization, I will specifically study how and why these movements choose their tactics in order to understand what factors affect tactical choice in these contexts.

Both historically and in more contemporary eras, predominant systems of oppression have enacted violence on Indigenous peoples. From colonization and neoliberalism to more generally authoritative states and the pursuit of resource extraction, Indigenous cultural values and livelihoods have been threatened. In response, Indigenous social movements and mobilizations have actively protested. These struggles have also notably continued even under leftist/'progressive' regimes that have at times presented as allies to Indigenous peoples, as "states have been unilaterally successful in displacing, absorbing, incorporating, assimilating, or destroying Indigenous peoples" for as long as the 'state' as a concept has existed (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 2). At the same time, it is important to resist essentializing Indigeneity and presenting it as a monolith. Indigenous peoples' lived experiences and specific struggles vary across time and space and cannot be reduced to a singular. With this diversity in mind, they also share common realities as subjects of colonization which makes it possible to some degree to "generalize an Indigenous methodology while recognizing specific, localized conditions," as most Indigenous scholars recognize (Gilio-Whitaker 2019, 26). Indigenous experiences vary but share a unique positionality to certain hegemonic systems such as colonization, the nation-state, and capitalism as Indigenous peoples' claims to sovereignty threaten settler colonial conceptions of 'state' and capitalist structures. In addition, Indigenous mobilizations differ from other resistance movements "in their historical depth, their community bases, their decision-making processes, their direct and

spiritual ties to the land and sea, their traditional economic distribution networks (which are generally more oriented toward egalitarian sharing), and their group characteristics" (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 142).

While all movements face drivers and dilemmas of tactical choice, Indigenous movements have added factors based on their contexts and conditions. These movements are also often overlooked, not only because Indigenous peoples have quite often been perceived as "people without history" or a relic of the past, but also because many forms of Indigenous resistance are "far from obvious and have changed form over millennia, centuries, and even decades" (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 147). In the following pages I will offer insights on tactical choice in regard to Indigenous mobilizations and particularly how certain socio-political conditions affect tactical repertoires, focusing on political opportunities and public perceptions of targets of Indigenous grievances.

A. Research Question

The purpose of this research is; to analyze tactical repertoires adopted by Indigenous resistance movements in Ecuador from 2000-2017 and investigate why tactical repertoires vary at different points in time. In this thesis, I examine what factors affect tactical repertoires and decision-making within Indigenous resistance movements in Ecuador. The goal is to understand what accounts for the adoption of different tactics; what contexts and circumstances lead to the adoption of certain tactics over others or certain specific repertoires and tactical combinations. By analyzing the progression of Indigenous resistance in Ecuador, a state with a rich history of Indigenous mobilization and contemporary

activism, we will be able to see factors that affect tactical choice develop over time and throughout different socio-political contexts. With this direction I hope to contribute a specific focus on the tactical repertoires and decision-making of Indigenous peoples to the existing literature on tactical choice in social movements. More attention to this specific mobilization of resistance, Indigenous resistance, would be a welcome addition to existing literature and potentially provide new insights. Specific hypotheses that will be explored include;

-If political opportunities are not available domestically, then more international tactics will be utilized.

-If opportunities to establish dialogue with the state are unavailable, then more non-institutional tactics will be utilized.

-If the state is unstable or in a period of transition, then more novel tactics will be utilized.

-If Indigenous grievances/targets are more unilaterally shared by the public, then they will utilize tactics that are more population-intensive.

-If targets are more international in nature, then international coalitions will be utilized.

-If targets are more sympathetic to/viewed positively by the general public, then more non-institutional tactics will be utilized.

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B. Literature Review

I situate my own research within the literature on social movement theory because Indigenous mobilizations are underexamined in scholarship surrounding tactical choices within social movements. I begin by highlighting broader discussions on social movements within social movement theory in order to show how tactics and decision-making processes

are crucial tools in successful Indigenous mobilizations amidst growing protests against globalization. Through looking at the constraints that social movements face and the insight that other academics provide, I create an analytical lens that I can then utilize for my own case studies in the context of Indigenous peoples in Ecuador. Also important to note is that many of the factors that are discussed below do not have a rigid relationship to tactical repertoires–depending on the situation, factors such as resources, collective identity, grievances, and framing can function as tactics themselves or as driving factors of tactics. The following presents a survey of social movement literature, including major models and contributions from notable scholars, organized by conceptual patterns.

Adoption of Tactics

Generally discussing the process of tactical choice, Tarrow (2010) mentions that according to Tilly, existing repertoires and tactics grow out of three factors: a population's daily routines and internal organization, the prevailing standards of rights and justice, and the population's accumulated experience of collective action. These are broad, general categories that reference more contextual or historical dimensions, whereas some of the following discussion will discuss literature that focuses on more specific, immediate factors such as resources, opportunities, collective identity, etc. Specifically focusing on why tactical repertoires change across regimes/political contexts, Tarrow and Tilly emphasize accumulated history and properties of regimes as important factors.

Many of the authors establish certain tactical dichotomies that help to categorize certain tactics into groups, some examples include;

-Insider vs. outsider tactics

-Institutional vs. non-institutional

-Contentious vs. non-contentious

-Violent vs. nonviolent

These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, there are tactics that exist within more than one distinction, but these categories are helpful in conceptualizing choices that must be made regarding tactical repertoires.

Table 1. Sample Tactics by Tactical Category

Verbal Statements	*Political*	*Juridical*	*Lifestyle/ Culture*	*Business*
announce	campaign	audit	kayak	boycott
claim	donate	enforce	harvest	brand
communicate	elect	inspect	trek	downsize
declare	endorse	represent	cycle	export
explain	regulate	testify	cook	subsidize
portray	amend	prosecute	beekeep	purchase
quote	debate	summon	appreciate	sponsor
respond	ratify	ban	backpack	certify
support	repeal	fine	garden	assess

Nondisruptive Protest	*Disruptive Protest*	*Education/ Raising Awareness*	*Direct Environmental Protection*
chant	blockade	editorial	build
demonstrate	chain	outreach	improve
organize	prevent	publish	preserve
petition	damage	report	protect
protest	sabotage	tweet	recycle
challenge	naked	teach	pollinate
rally	obstruct	distribute	retrofit
march	rappel	study	volunteer
parade	videotape	write	weed

(Figure 1. Example of tactical categories sampled by Nelson and Kin, Nelson and King 2020)

In social movement literature, other authors offer a multitude of alternative ways to categorize tactics. Nelson and King (2020) identify other general tactical categories including verbal statements, political, juridical, lifestyle/culture, business, nondisruptive protests, disruptive protests, and education/awareness raising. Somma and Medel (2017) identify five types of tactics; pacific such as marches or demonstrations, artistic such as music or theatrical performances, disruptive non-violent including strikes, blockings roads, or occupying buildings, self-destructive such as hunger strikes, and violent including damaging public or private property, setting things on fire, engaging in lootings, or attacking police forces. Cunningham (2017) specifies some tactics that fall under the category of

nonviolent, including economic noncooperation, protest and demonstrations, nonviolent intervention, social noncooperation, and political noncooperation. Since a main point of analysis for this thesis is the state and changes within state structure, institutional and non-institutional tactical categories will be utilized as access to institutions heavily affect tactical choice.

The general choice of tactics seems to develop a spectrum which consists of choosing between tactical options (trade-offs), implementing multiple tactics simultaneously, and the adoption of novel tactics or recombination. Also when considering tactical repertoires and decision making, questions to keep in mind include *who* is doing *what*, *when* and *where*, and to *whom*.

Context

Regarding the question of why repertoires and tactics change, leading theorists Tilly and Tarrow emphasize two major kinds of processes related to context; the effects of periods of rapid political change and the outcomes of incrementally changing structural factors. Major causes of incremental change include connections between claim making and everyday social organization, cumulative creation of a signaling system by contention itself, and the operation of regimes as such. There is a range of catalysts for tactical decision-making, from major systemic factors to small, incremental factors. These contextual shifts are often caused by changes in resource and opportunity structures (Tilly and Tarrow 2015).

Also related to context, Della Porta mentions an important distinction between movements of affluence (opportunities) vs. movements of crisis (threats). They observe that movements of affluence are typically stronger, larger, long lasting, pragmatic, optimistic and more often successful, while movements of crisis are expected to be weaker, smaller, shorter, radical, pessimistic, and more often unsuccessful (Della Porta 2015). As movements of crisis are typically more reactionary, due to limited resources and organizing power they are not as effective as movements of affluence.

Thomas et al (2013) discuss the importance of context in gaining the support of sympathizers while utilizing certain tactics. While in general they find that protest violence is less supported than non-violent protest, they also find that in the context of a corrupt governing system "non-violent protest made the issue seem more illegitimate, which paradoxically flowed onto higher support for extreme action" (Thomas et al 2013). In the context of a corrupt government, violent actions tend to have more sympathizers than in the context of perceived non-corrupt institutions as the perceived illegitimacy of state power corresponds with the perceived legitimacy of more 'radical' tactics. This dynamic is especially relevant to the shifting political structures that Indigenous protestors mobilize within and how these shifts affect access to certain tactics.

Resources

Tactical choice is often constrained by the availability of resources, mainly social, economic, and political resources. Some of these specific types of resources will be

discussed in more depth in the following pages, but all these resources share some common characteristics such as varying degrees of accessibility. In general, most movements mobilize in situations where there is competition for shared, and usually limited, resources and the availability of these resources directly affect tactical decisions.

Cunningham emphasizes that “some organizations are better placed to capture the market for population-intensive tactics (e.g., protest or electoral boycotts), whereas others excel at low-resource tactics (e.g., blockades or hunger strikes),” and in addition there are also incentives to diversify tactics to increase resiliency of movements (Cunningham et al. 2017). White et al focus specifically on how general resource availability directly affects the decision to adopt violent vs. nonviolent tactics. They find that groups are “more likely to engage in nonviolent direct action when they anticipate being able to mobilize large numbers of supporters” and are “more likely to engage in violent rebellion if they perceive focused military capacity for direct or indirect attacks as their best bet given their resources" (White et al 2015). These observations reflect the experiences of Indigenous protestors and the tactics they utilize given available resources. I review how resources are mobilized according to the following categories: political and social.

Political Resources

Examples of political resources include voting, access to media, protest bodies/mobilization (quantity), disruption capacity, etc. Regarding political resources, Wui (2010) focuses specifically on the role of the state and domestic contexts in creating

opportunities, specifying that openness or closedness of domestic and even international institutions affect transnational political mobilization. Depending on the political opportunities available in domestic arenas, there might be the tactical decision to then bypass national governments (such as dictatorships) or institutions and directly engage with international institutions and transnational coalitions instead. Keck and Skink's boomerang effect clearly illustrates this phenomenon, where states that initially resist international pressure risk greater pressure in the future as domestic activists engage in transnational alliances and is referenced by many authors (Keck and Skink 2014).

Regarding political resources and how they affect tactical decisions, Sidney Tarrow's Political Opportunity Structure clearly lays out which properties within a regime should be taken into consideration, including (1) the multiplicity of independent centers of power within it, (2) its openness to new actors, (3) the instability of current political alignments, (4) the availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers, (5) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making, and (6) decisive changes in items 1 to 5. Marks and McAdam using Tarrow's model identify some specific dimensions of political opportunity, including (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, (2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity, (3) the presence or absence of elite allies, and; (4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression. All of these dimensions influence tactical decision making. Considering the political opportunity approach and surveying their own work, Della Porta generally concludes that protest, and therefore tactics, is "by and large, more frequent and less radical when stable and/or contingent channels of access to institutions by outsiders are open" (Della Porta 2015). There are different opportunities present at different

institutional/political levels, and the three major avenues include the state, international institutions, and transnational organizations/corporations.

The concept of legal opportunity structures introduced by Gianluca De Fazio, refers to "the features of the legal system which facilitate or hinder a social movements' chances to have their grievances redressed through the judiciary" (De Fazio 2012). Three specific features De Fazio identifies include the accessibility of courts, availability of justiciable rights, and judiciary receptivity. In general, when there is less access to legal opportunity structures movements are more likely to engage in contentious politics. An institutional Indigenous tactic that is discussed is the incorporation of Indigenous rights into national constitutions. Lupien (2011) specifically discusses the success of Indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Bolivia in codifying their demands in new constitutions, something that has been a primary goal for decades.

Somma and Medel (2017) also highlight the complicated relationship between social movements and institutional politics. They challenge the generalized notion that movements are more likely to flourish when they establish meaningful ties and alliances with institutional parties, and specifically note that "the limitations that sometimes accompany newly restored democracies (i.e. scarcely proportional electoral systems, encapsulated political parties, and authoritarian enclaves) can drive a wedge between institutional politics and organized social actors" (Somma and Medel 2017). They argue that movements that are detached from institutional politics can be influential as long as they manage to utilize visible protest tactics that are powerful enough to press the government to address movement demands. Although, as grievances and targets take on increasingly transnational

dimensions there is the general assertion that tactics and alliances must also take on transnational dimensions to actually be combative, and this largely manifests through utilizing international institutions.

Social Resources

Social resources are often based in trust and connections. Some examples of social resources include social capital, networks, frames, and mobilization potential. Major networks that are prevalent in the literature include social movements and their connections with unions, churches, mutual aid organizations, women's groups, and cultural associations. A major part of social resources available and their influence on tactical decisions relates to framing and the ability to mobilize sympathizers and supporters. Framing is important in signaling to the public, constructing collective identity, and establishing leverage (especially transnationally).

Indigenous coalition building, both with other Indigenous groups and outside allies, is crucial because the size and scale of Indigenous groups often requires that they build coalitions and intersections with other organizations. Pieck (2012), among other scholars, emphasizes the strong coalitions that are built between Indigenous movements and environmental organizations. This specific coalition is especially fruitful because non-Indigenous organizations benefit from local knowledge and moral legitimacy that is gained from working with Indigenous groups, and Indigenous groups are often able to easily increase their media coverage, along with access to other tactical information and networks

provided by outside organizations (Pieck 2012). Becker and Koda (2016) illustrate the utilization of intergovernmental organizations by Indigenous communities, namely the World Social Forum. Although the World Social Forum is still utilized, lack of accessibility and equal representation has led to the creation of Indigenous-specific forums like the Indigenous Peoples Summit.

The way in which observers or outsiders might view the tactics that are being implemented are extremely important when making tactical decisions, especially if there are tactics that could potentially cause reluctance among the public to give their support. Hanna et al (2016) discuss the importance of media especially in this regard and public perception. In the case study of Indigenous mobilizations in Brazil, local and national media conducted smear campaigns against the protestors that intended to uproot their support base. Taking this into account, the Indigenous protestors then started utilizing mass social media campaigns that they were able to control to cut through the propaganda that mainstream media was forcing.

Collective Identity

Collective identity is often directly related to tactical coalition building and is particularly important in Indigenous mobilizations, where concepts of Indigenous tribal relations form a core conception of collective belonging, especially in the face of settler colonial state repression. Collaboration can be contentious at times, but many of these tensions are mediated by collective identity. Pieck discusses the importance of collective

identity in coalition building and focuses specifically on the importance of emotional attachment to either a collective cause, grievance, or target in coalition building. Fominaya also emphasizes the importance of emotion and affective ties in collective identity making, and in addition notes that boundary-work in collective identity (Fominaya 2010). In producing a collective identity, the question of 'what we are' is just as important as the question of 'what we are not.' In this boundary work, unity is established through both shared causes and conditions and also who is considered the opposition. Collective identity is also instrumental in facilitating symbolic and performance-based tactics, which also depend largely on a sense of collective unity and emotional engagement.

Collective identity is especially important in cases where Indigenous grievances center around sovereignty or self-determination. Collective Indigenous identity and how that identity is related to land is a major source of contention in many instances. Chrimes discusses how many land disputes arise between Indigenous people and other state or corporate institutions due to their different conceptions of their relationship with land, and the way that access and use of land by communities is acknowledged as valid (Chrimes 2015). Hanna (2016) mentions that Indigenous communities often invoke images such as the 'noble savage' or 'ecological Indian' as a negotiation strategy and way to attract the attention of the broader society to their struggles. We can also see the importance of collective identity in the construction of demands for collective rights.

Grievances and Targets

Tactics are also adopted with consideration to what claims are being made. Chrimes discusses the variety of grievance claims and identifies two main types of grievances; contestational grievances and immanent concerns (grievances) (Chrimes 2015). Contestational grievances directly challenge core tenets of social systems. More immediate, immanent grievances focus on implementation and participation, not structural foundations, such as calling for more green technology or nationalized resource extraction as opposed to completely rejecting the extraction of resources for capital gains. Depending on the type of grievance that develops, different tactics will be adopted that best fit the direction and intention of the grievance. With contestational grievances, as the name implies, more disruptive tactics will usually be adopted whereas immanent grievances are more often brought through institutional means or mediated tactics. In general, different tactical repertoires are also adopted depending on whether short-term or long-term grievances are being pursued.

Regarding Indigenous grievances, there are general themes that are broadly identified. Brysk notes that “Indigenous resistance to the threats of states, markets, and modernity shaped the movement's trio of core demands: self-determination, land rights, and cultural survival” (Brysk 2000, 59). In a broader sense, Lupien identifies a common demand of sovereignty under the banner of ‘plurinationality’ in the Indigenous peoples they had studied (Lupien 2011). They note that this notion of plurinationality is based on certain principles including participatory democracy, local decision-making, communal ownership of land and the capacity to exercise full citizenship without abandoning cultural practices. Lupien also identifies more specific trends that include demands for cultural rights, land rights, natural resource rights, economic rights, and political and legal rights, and all of these

specific demands fall under the umbrella of plurinationality. Becker and Koda also note that Indigenous grievances tend to be unique in that they are often directly contentious with dominant Western, capitalist values (Becker and Koda 2016). They emphasize that “native cosmologies do not align well with capitalist expansion” and that because of this different value system “Indigenous peoples are often relegated to the margins or ignored completely when economic expansion occurs within their territories" (Smythe 2015). Grievances related to policies of neoliberal globalization are usually associated with land, trade, labor, prices, and social services/support.

B. Methodology

I want to study the contexts and conditions in which Indigenous mobilizations have occurred in order to understand why certain tactical repertoires were adopted by these movements, and the first step to do so requires collecting data on tactical repertoires. As my main question of inquiry focuses on tactics as the main point of analysis, my method for surveying what tactics were used during specific time periods was to utilize primary news sources and press releases that reported on current events in Ecuador over time. International and national news sources were used along with Indigenous-led publications and press releases from Indigenous groups that detail social movements as they occurred, accessed via online databases and in the case of established organizations their affiliated websites. News publications are also only utilized if they explicitly mention Indigenous participation in the events in order to avoid attributing mobilizations and tactical repertoires to Indigenous groups incorrectly. Alongside these primary sources, existing literature on Indigenous

uprisings in Ecuador were also utilized, specifically literature that detailed instances of mobilization and tactics that were used during these mobilizations. While the descriptions of and reports on Indigenous mobilizations were used holistically, special attention was given to mentions of tactics that were utilized during these mobilizations. Within these reports and press releases on protest events that occurred, references to specific tactics that were reported at these mobilizations (marches, strikes, roadblocks, etc.) were noted, along with their relative frequency during a specific time period.

The occurrences of specific tactics during these time periods were then compiled and organized using categories prevalent in prominent social movement theoretical models, with institutional vs. non-institutional tactical descriptors emerging as the most relevant. One of the major factors that affects tactical choice that will be discussed later relates to political opportunities and the state, and variations in these two factors especially affect whether/what institutional tactics are utilized. The time periods of focus are limited to the recent century to ensure ease of access to primary source publications and maintain a more contemporary focus. Three specific time periods in the 21st century are established for analytical comparison; 2000-2006, 2006-2011, 2011-2017. These divisions are defined by distinct socio-political contexts that limit and enable access to certain tactics.

Ecuador was chosen as a geographical focus for this research due to its significant and diverse Indigenous population. According to official estimates, in 2019 there were about 1.1 million Indigenous peoples in Ecuador with the population consisting of "14 Indigenous nationalities, joined together in a series of local, regional and national organizations" (Berger 2019).



(Figure 2. Distribution of Indigenous populations in Ecuador, Radcliffe et al 2002)

Other than the sheer magnitude of the Indigenous population in Ecuador, these Indigenous communities have also been extremely active in mobilizing against challenges to their "ability to maintain traditional lifeways and ancestral places," including "sustainability of homelands, subsistence lifestyles, cultural and ancestral (sacred) sites, and environment-related health-care issues, including reproductive health and food insecurity (Gilio-Whitaker 2019, 38). Indigenous communities in Ecuador have a long history of establishing organized Indigenous associations, and "hosts half a dozen national-level" Indigenous rights organizations that "form a microcosm of movement types," including CONAIE, FEINE, FENOC, FEI, among other groups (Brysk 2000, 73). CONAIE especially has been impactful

at local, national, and even international levels by organizing mobilizations and uprisings, and remains a powerful force even today. In confronting various forms of structural and historical oppression over time, Indigenous peoples in Ecuador have responded “with different forms of struggle and resistance including rebellions, mobilizations, uprisings" and have affirmed their “culture and identity in relation to languages, customs, beliefs, and traditions” (Ortiz-T 1997).

My intent is to gather sufficient data to create a general overview of tactics repertoires. The goal is not to chronicle tactics utilized in every single instance of Indigenous mobilizations in Ecuador over the specified time periods. Once an overview of tactical repertoires during certain time periods was established, they were then contextualized within the socio-political realities of their time frame. Tactical repertoires were then analyzed using models and theories developed by social movement theorists, focusing on identifying factors that affect tactical decision-making. With a cross-period analysis, I am also able to compare and contrast how factors/conditions have changed and remained the same and what impact this has on tactical choice. Examples include how changes in political regimes, economic systems, and state power affect tactical repertoires that Indigenous mobilizations utilize.

The following chapter, Chapter 2, will provide a brief historical overview of Indigenous peoples in Ecuador and challenges they have faced over time. Chapter 3 will focus on the three case studies that cover different time periods, along with analysis specific to those time periods. Chapter 4 will summarize the findings of the analyzed case studies and suggest further possible directions for this research.

The following discussion is not an exhaustive survey of all Indigenous movements throughout the history of Ecuador, but instead offers a glimpse of tactical patterns that have developed under different geo-political contexts that are mapped out in the chosen time periods organized around the critical national administration of Rafael Correa. Each case examines the ways in which Indigenous communities resist the violation of their livelihoods and reaffirm their cultural identity during three time periods; Pre-Correa (2000-2006), Early Correa (2006-2011), and Late Correa (2011-2017). Each period analysis features a survey of tactical patterns observed within the given time period, grouped by whether the tactics adopted were institutional or non-institutional (whether the tactics operated within existing institutions like political campaigns or judicial systems or not) for ease of organization. The overview of tactical repertoires is followed by discussion that revisits the main question of why different Indigenous mobilizations articulate resistance in the ways they do, focusing on different contextual factors that might contribute to tactical choice such as targets, coalitions, and resources (political and social).

With this research, we hope to learn more about what factors influence Indigenous mobilization and the specific impacts they have on tactical choice, especially the role of political opportunity structures and public perceptions of targets. The final chapter will discuss the implications of this case study for Indigenous social movements in other contexts, both different times and different places.

II. Historical Overview

The story of Indigenous peoples in Ecuador is one that is not only long but diverse in the histories they occupy in the context of struggle against "500 years of 'exploitation and oppression' and expropriation of their land" (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, 138). While the 1990s have been the main focus of most literature surrounding Indigenous uprisings in Ecuador, and the twenty-first century will be the focus of this paper, it is important to recognize that these movements did not appear overnight. Indigenous communities have engaged in resistance movements since their first interaction with colonization, when Indigenous people were first "declared subjects of the state, property of landlords, and members of churches that displaced them from their lands, limited their freedom of movement and cultural expression, and curtailed their autonomy" (Yashar 2005, 86).

The following presents a brief overview of Indigenous subjugation and consequent uprisings/mobilizations throughout the history of Ecuador, focusing on the early beginnings of Indigenous uprisings, shifting movements under transitions from corporativist structures to neoliberalism and struggles of the current century.

Early years

Resistance and uprisings have been a staple feature of Indigenous peoples' presence in Ecuador since the beginning of their subjugation under colonial rule. Marc Becker specifically outlines early trends of Indigenous uprisings, featuring sixteenth century Indigenous revolts in an attempt to expel European invaders, seventeenth century uprisings

in response to the confiscation of lands and other colonial abuses, and eighteenth century shifts to more organized revolts as opposed to individual acts or resistance. Even with the establishment of Ecuadorian independence in 1822, Indigenous peoples in the region were still subjugated in the newly freed state. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the majority of Indigenous subordination took place "in the economic realm on large, landed estates (called haciendas or latifundios), with estate owners (the hacendado or latifundista) using legal maneuvers, natural disasters, and other tactics to take their land" (Becker 2008, 8).

This hacienda system of semi-feudal relations overtook the majority of the Ecuadorian countryside and Andes, and by the early twentieth century most Indigenous peoples in the region were forced to work on plots under the tutelage of landlords. With this new form of social and economic organization, new challenges arose for Indigenous organizing. Whereas previous unrest was often the result of "localized reactions to specific injustices with a limited goal of removing a particularly abusive hacienda employee" protests now increasingly "played out in the public arena with Indigenous activists forming organizations to press for policy reforms" (Becker 2008, 42). In the 1930s there was a noticeable shift to larger uprisings that were not as localized or private, and featured demands for institutional change.

One especially significant event during this time was the Pesillo Strike of 1930-31, in which Indigenous laborers on the Pesillo hacienda refused to work and presented the government with a list of demands including " higher salaries, a forty-hour work week, return of huasipungo plots, an end to the Church's abusive practice of charging diezmos and primicias, compensation for women's labor, and an end to the huasicama practice of demanding personal service in a hacendado's house" (Becker 2008, 51-52). While initially

the landowners granted concessions to the Indigenous laborers nearly a week after the initial strike, they just as quickly refused to adhere to the agreements they signed and further repressed Indigenous laborers on the land as punishment for their rebellion (especially targeting those deemed to be leaders of the unrest). As a result, the strike resumed and gained enough traction to gain the attention of major national media, and later escalated to an organized march on the capital city of Quito. Several similar strikes followed in various haciendas and these various uprisings eventually led to several pieces of land reform legislation in the later years of the decade. These strike actions in the 1930s were significant in that they marked a turning point in which "first time, broad-based actions sought to shift political balances" and "Indigenous activists unified isolated local struggles and brought people into contact with their counterparts across Ecuador" (Becker 2008, 64).

In 1944, Ecuador's "first ethnic rights organization", the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI), was founded with the help of the Communist party (Brysk 2000, 208). This organization marked a notable departure from the paternalistic nature of previous organizations focused on primarily Indigenous issues. Previous organizations also focused mainly on coalitions between various haciendas, while FEI organized beyond those boundaries around a combination of class, ethnicity, and nationality and especially significant was " the desire to expand its focus out of the highlands to make the federation a truly national organization operating within the context of an international struggle" (Becker 2008, 90). Due to its notable ties to the Communist Party in Ecuador and Marxist traditions, the organizing base of FEI was more focused on class than promoting Indigeneity as an identity, a reflection of their origins focusing on campesinos and land reform. FEI was dealt a massive blow following the 1963 military coup, in which major Indigenous leaders were

imprisoned, resources such as Indigenous schools were closed or cut off and organizing itself was strongly suppressed.

Mid-20th Century: Corporatism and the Formation of Indigenous Organizations

The second half of the twentieth century featured a shifting relationship between the state and Indigenous communities, specifically through the "implementation and the erosion of the corporatist citizenship regime" that later culminated in the "implementation of a neoliberal citizenship regime in the 1980s" and major organization building including local, regional, and national Indigenous organizations (Yashar 2005, 112). Following the military coup of 1963, several major pieces of legislation focused on agrarian reform were passed with the intention of modernizing the Ecuadorian economy, most notably the 1964 and 1973 land reform laws. Although these new laws altered the economy to deconstruct the semi-feudal hacienda system, positive gains for Indigenous populations were limited as the laws specifically "favored modernization, development, and efficiency rather than the redistribution of land" (Becker 2008, 143). Social and economic injustices and land distribution were largely ignored by the new legislation, and the laws were mainly designed to "incorporate Indians into a corporativist form of citizenship" (Yashar 2005, 88). These land reforms primarily targeted the Andes, but also marked the beginning of the 'opening up' of the Amazon that was previously disregarded by the state.

These new corporativist circumstances opened some opportunities for Indigenous organizing, as under the new land reform laws it was the state, instead of individual landlords, that was now responsible for unfulfilled needs of the public. Indigenous peoples

also enjoyed relative autonomy under this system and were able to set up their own schools and resources which aided in the creation of a true 'Indigenous' identity and later formal Indigenous organizations which "emerged to contest the ways in which state reforms challenged local autonomy in the 1960s and 1970s" (Yashar 2005, 148). Many Indigenous organizations that emerged during this time did so via the assistance of other non-Indigenous but parallel allies. Many organizations emerged through coalitions with peasants or other labor organizations due to Indigenous peoples' proximity to waged laborers. Another extremely important ally in identity-building and organizing was the Catholic church, which was responsible for establishing three-quarters of all rural Indigenous organizations (Brysk 2000, 63).

Despite the lack of legislative gains, there were other points of progress for Indigenous communities during this time, mainly the rise of new Indigenous organizations. Notable is the establishment of the Shuar Federation in 1964, which organized Indigenous peoples in Ecuador's southeastern Amazon. While the Shuar Federation is considered one of the first truly 'authentic' Indigenous ethnic organizations, "international volunteers, local nongovernmental organizations, governmental officials, and in particular foreign Catholic Salesian missionaries attended assemblies and played a significant role in its formation" (Becker 2008, 11). The Shuar Federation was largely locally focused, similar to organizations like OPIP (Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza) and FOIN (Federation of Indian Organizations of Napo) and served as a response to increasing encroachment of the state onto Indigenous land in the Amazon in the pursuit of resource extraction. As one of the first Indigenous federations, the Shuar Federation served as an

“organizational model for an increasing number of highland and lowland Indians” (Sawyer 2004, 42).

Two other organizations emerged in 1972, FENOC (National Federation of Peasant Organizations) and Ecuarunari, both mainly identifying as peasant-Indigenous alliances. Ecuarunari primarily functioned as a regional organization centered around the concerns of Indigenous peoples in the Andean highlands, and like other organizations first gained organizing power with the help of religious allies although later began to assert “the need for more autonomy from the church” (Yashar 2005, 107). Other regional organizations that emerged around the same time include CONFENIAE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon) in the Ecuadorian Amazon and COICE (Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Coast of Ecuador) on the Ecuadorian coast.

These regional organizations are significant in that they highlight the differences of both experiences and histories of Indigenous peoples in the Amazon and Andes. Indigenous peoples in the Andean regions of Ecuador have long been incorporated into the state beginning with colonial times, meanwhile there was “no parallel and sustained effort in the Amazon" and Indigenous peoples in the region enjoyed relative autonomy, that is until the discovery of oil in the region (Yashar 2005, 109). The Amazon was less of a focus for the Ecuadorian state until the discovery of oil in the late 1960s which made developing the region and incorporating Indigenous peoples of the Amazon into the state, extremely profitable. As has been the typical outcome of unregulated oil extraction, this petrol rush resulted in the destruction of surrounding forests, wildlife, water systems, and in general, the destruction of Indigenous livelihoods.

One of the most important (if not *the* most important) organizations to emerge during this time was CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador). CONAIE's predecessor CONACNIE (National Coordinating Council of the Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) first emerged in 1980 in an effort to "mitigate differences between highland and lowland Indigenous activists" (Laurie et al 2009, 28). Six years later CONACNIE was transformed into CONAIE as a full-fledged, national indigenous confederation. The issues CONAIE organized around consisted of a culmination of past grievances and new, revolutionary demands influenced by its ascension coinciding with the Ecuadorian state's shift "away from a corporatism and towards neoliberalism" which saw a more hands-off state and unregulated industry (Yashar 2005, 134). Agrarian reform, although not necessarily at the forefront, was still an issue. CONAIE also critiqued larger systemic issues such as industrialization, imperialism, unemployment, housing, education, health, racial discrimination, and political representation. Particularly revolutionary was the demand that Ecuador be recognized as a plurinational state. First formally presented to congress in 1988, CONAIE "argued that the government must recognize Indigenous territoriality, organization, education, culture, medicine, and judicial systems" (Becker 2008, 172). This was not a demand for secession from the state of Ecuador, but instead a demand that the government recognize different national cultures and ensure social, political, and economic equality. These demands directly countered the claims made by previous leaders that forced assimilation will rid Ecuador of the 'Indian problem' and create a homogenized society, and also served as a new threat to dominant groups. Recognition of Indigenous peoples is one thing, but the implication of autonomy, self-determination, and territorial rights brought new

challenges as many elites denounced the campaign for plurinationalism as “threatening the unity of state structures” (Becker 2011, 15).

1980s-2000: The Ascent of Neoliberalism and Indigenous Responses

The decades featuring the shift from corporativist structures to the embracing of neoliberalism brought new challenges and opportunities for Indigenous peoples in Ecuador, especially related to Indigenous identity itself. Specifically, the politicization of Indigeneity increased in potency through the 1980s and 1990s, right at the moment when “ flows of transnational power and capital integration infused Ecuador's political economy with a neoliberal zeal” (Sawyer 2004, 220). As Indigenous peoples and their identity became increasingly politicized since the end of the hacienda system, political mobilizations began to center around not only previous issues of economic and social inequality but new issues surrounding Indigenous culture. Specifically, Indigenous peoples began to publicly demand protection of their native cultures and languages, with a renewed focus on bilingual education and general human rights. New opportunities afforded by the shift to corporativist regimes included educational and economic resources that “provided Indigenous peoples with less incentive to discard their ethnic identities” and even further encouraged them to embrace Indigenous identities (Becker 2008, 145).

While the oil boom of the 1970s provided financing for social services, Ecuador quickly started to experience a drying up of oil reserves as a result of unsustainable growth. The economic growth of the 1970s came to a halt, as “hyperinflation, spiraling unemployment, and a crushing debt crisis unraveled elite dreams of joining the

industrialized first world" (Becker 2011, 25). Costs had to be cut and as a result, and with the outpouring support of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, austerity measures started to be embraced as the solution. What followed was a period of deregulation and lifting of price controls along with decreased funding of social services. While substantial portions of Ecuador's most vulnerable populations suffered under these measures as they quickly lost access to state resources and experienced increasing poverty, Indigenous communities were especially hit hard. Land security specifically was increasingly at risk for Indigenous peoples, and with it their "entire way of life" (Yashar 2005, 139).

In the wake of this socio-economic crisis, Indigenous uprisings of a scale never before seen emerged. The year 1990 featured a nationwide Indigenous uprising that largely paralyzed the state for a week and functioned as the "public christening of the [Indigenous] movement" (Yashar 2005, 114). As a result of the refusal by President Rodrigo Borja and his government to formally meet with Indigenous peoples and hear their grievances, CONAIE helped plan an Indigenous uprising as a response. In what came to be the first true national mobilization of Indigenous peoples in Ecuador, Indigenous protestors and allies blocked streets to disrupt transportation and commerce along with participating in boycotts, occupations of local government offices, and the repossession of land (Yashar 2004, 46). Along with these protest actions, CONAIE was able to provide a forum for Indigenous peoples to articulate their grievances and demands in a national setting. CONAIE was joined by other organizations including FEI and FENOC in presenting their government with a list of sixteen 'points' or demands that related to cultural issues, economic concerns, and political representation. A week after the uprising was initiated, President Borja was forced

to the negotiating table. The next decade or so featured a rotation of negotiations and public actions when negotiations broke down.

These uprisings of the 1990s were made possible by opportunities granted by Borja's more centrist government, which featured much less suppression of protest and civil action. The 1990s were also especially turbulent due to what can be described as an almost 'Polanyian double movement' in which both "neoliberal reforms and protests targeting neoliberalism picked up pace" (Riofrancos 2020, 41). While there is debate over what substantial gains were made following the 1990 uprising, one visible outcome was an extreme shift in consciousness and diversified grievances including land ownership, neoliberal policies, resource extraction, etc. Over the next decade protests and demonstrations continued the momentum started by the 1990 uprising, including various marches led by the local Indigenous organization OPIP focusing mainly on demanding control of Indigenous lands in the Amazon. In 1992 OPIP took on the challenge of directly negotiating with Arco against oil extraction on their lands and was successful in securing "ample territorial concessions" of more than a million hectares (Brysk 2000, 75). In addition, OPIP also marched on the capital city of Quito to voice their demands for legal recognition of Indigenous territory.

In 1995, Indigenous organizers embarked on a brand-new challenge; campaigning for political office. The decision to get involved in electoral politics was not without debate and questions regarding the role of Indigenous peoples in state institutions. Since gaining the right to vote in 1979, Indigenous peoples typically backed leftist or progressive candidates, but new conversations about formal endorsements from Indigenous organizations or even running their own candidates emerged. Many expressed their dissatisfaction with

establishment candidates who sought the support of an Indigenous electorate but once elected failed to fulfill their campaign promises made to their Indigenous supporters. While previously Indigenous peoples were occasionally elected to office with other parties (usually leftist parties), they had no unified Indigenous political front. Soon enough, Indigenous activists decided that "it was time not only for them to make their own politics but also to make good politics that would benefit everyone" (Becker 2008, 184). Structured less as a political party and more as a political movement based on horizontal democratic participation and inclusion, the Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational Unity, commonly referred to as just 'Pachakutik,' emerged as an extension of CONAIE focused on electoral politics and determined to directly insert Indigenous people into debates and decisions made within state institutions. In its early years Pachakutik experienced moderate success on both local and national levels, gaining some seats in congress and securing mayoral positions. In the first year that the Pachakutik party ran candidates they were able to win "eight seats in the eighty-two-seat national legislature, making it the 4th largest bloc" (Rice 2012, 56). A few years after the establishment of the political movement, discussions started around whether Pachakutik should run their own presidential candidate and in the 1996 election, the decision was made to ally with Freddy Ehlers, a journalist who emphasized social and environmental reforms. This decision was not without criticism, as many disagreed with this alliance on the basis that it would split votes between Ehlers and other candidates sympathetic to Indigenous and peasant issues. Ehlers ended up placing third in the first round of elections, a "significant showing, but not one strong enough to enter the runoff election" that Bucaram later claimed success in (Becker 2011, 53).

A main theme of Indigenous uprisings in the latter half of the twentieth century focused on the impact of resource extraction on Indigenous communities. With the 1967 discovery of large oil reserves in the Amazon and the 1982 changes to hydrocarbon law, foreign oil companies started to return to the Amazon as a part of state-sanctioned development plans which "sparked significant waves of agricultural colonization and oil exploration, both of which resulted in nonindigenous claims to lands that had previously been used by Indigenous communities" (Yashar 2005, 116). In 1993, further changes to the hydrocarbon law deregulated resource extraction and opened up Ecuadorian land to foreign companies. That same year, a landmark class action lawsuit was brought against Texaco in the United States by environmental organizations on behalf of Indigenous peoples in the affected areas, seeking compensation and restoration of contaminated waters caused by the oil company (Yashar 2005, 115). A main reason foreign countries such as Ecuador were attractive locations for resource extraction was not just the quantity of resources available, but also the cost-effective fact that foreign companies were able to bypass regulations and safety measures present in other regions. As a result, foreign oil companies tended to cause not only mass deforestation and oil spills along with other environmental damage and pollution. Since the start of the oil boom in the mid-1970's, "at least 30 major oil spills have dumped 50 percent more effluent into Ecuador's rivers than Exxon Valdez spilled in Alaska's Prince William Sound", which was around eleven million gallons (Brysk 2000, 167). Although the case against Texaco was dismissed in 2001, it still made international headlines and brought attention to Indigenous grievances that were previously unknown to the international community, along with further politicizing Indigenous peoples in the Amazon who sought to defend their communities and broker better relationships with the

state. The lawsuit itself served as a "pathbreaking attempt at international environmental litigation and accountability" (Brysk 2000, 168). In 1994, Indigenous groups joined by peasants participated in "The Mobilization for Life", in which they blocked roads and paralyzed the country for ten days (similar in form to the 1990 protest) in protest of a new law that would allow "communally held land to be sold or mortgaged, turning it into a commodity that could be taken away from rural communities" (Becker 2011, 36). A major fear with this new law was that it allowed the privatization of water rights, auctioning of state-owned land, and intensification of agricultural commodity exports.

2000-2017: The Fall of Neoliberalism and the Rise of the 'Citizens Revolution'

The 21st century marked a notable shift in Indigenous movements. Whereas previously Indigenous movements focused on localized, small-scale demands like land reform, the new millennium features larger grievances that targeted institutional structures themselves such as "political claims of territoriality and issuing calls to reform the constitution to reflect the country's plurinational and multicultural reality" (Becker 2008, 188). At the same time, since the mid-2000s Indigenous groups have largely been back on the defensive.

The new millennium started off with a bang in Ecuador; specifically, with the overthrow of another president. On January 21, 2000, Jamil Mahuad was evicted from power via an alliance made between military officials and Indigenous leaders. Mahuad, already unpopular due to the soaring inflation and failing economy, continued to push for implementing austerity measures and engage in borrowing from predatory foreign lenders.

The last straw was his proposal to replace the Ecuadorian currency sucre with the US dollar, which many saw as a sacrifice of national sovereignty and further exacerbation of the already troubled economy. Indigenous organizers and labor leaders with the aid of military officials occupied the legislative building, forcing Mahuad to resign and creating a coalition government with representatives from the different factions of the coup. Just as quick as the coup was carried out, it just as soon was dissolved. This successful overthrow was short-lived as the defense minister Carlos Mendoza quickly pulled rank, promptly resigned and collapsed the provisional government, and handed power over to Vice President Gustavo Noboa at the behest of the United States. Noboa quickly continued with the very policies that led Indigenous peoples to protest in the first place, including the dollarization of the economy.

Not only was the coup largely unsuccessful, in addition to being betrayed by believed allies and intensified infighting within CONAIE public opinion of Indigenous uprisings took a big hit. Large factions of sympathizers who saw Indigenous participation in a military coup (although the coup was bloodless) as unjustified violence and radical action withdrew their support. Regardless, Indigenous movements continued on and the following year CONAIE was back into the streets, this time with other peasant-Indigenous groups including FEINE (Federation of Indigenous Evangelists of Ecuador) and FENOCIN (National Federation of Indigenous Afro-Ecuadorians and Peasants), to protest increased prices in fuel, bus fare, and cooking gas and ended with an agreement signed between Noboa and activists that “rolled back some of the most onerous neoliberal economic policies” (Becker 2011, 73).

The next presidential election in 2002 saw the ascension of Lucio Gutiérrez, one of the former coup plotters. Gutiérrez owed a large part of his win to his supporter base in rural Indigenous communities as he had “no political base” and relied largely on the “support given by CONAIE as a social movement ad Pachakutik as an electoral apparatus” (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, 149). Although he named prominent CONAIE leaders to ministerial positions, the majority of promises he made to his Indigenous followers went unfulfilled. Gutiérrez further implemented neoliberal policies and engaged in agreements with the IMF (only four days into his presidency) at the disappointment of many of his supporters, and in addition sought to actively integrate Ecuador into the FTAA and maintained the dollarization of the nation’s currency. Gradually, Indigenous organizations began to break with Gutiérrez government, Ecuarunari being the first with FENOCIN soon following and CONAIE being the last to hold their ministerial positions but following suit later the same year. Indigenous leaders had come to the conclusion that they “had been used, if not manipulated” and that, “in effect Gutiérrez had ‘betrayed’ the popular movement” (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, 151). Gutiérrez soon fell out of favor enough that massive street demonstrations pushed him out of office in 2005, protests that Indigenous movements notably played a small role in, and power was transferred to Vice President Lafredo Palacio.

The 2006 election and beginning of Rafael Correa’s presidency marked both a sharp divergence from previous governments and in other ways a continuation of old business. Initially Correa’s success in the election was celebrated by many Indigenous people who saw his ascension as a “ blow against neoliberalism” and an opening of “possibilities for a more participatory democracy” (Becker 2011, 112). Correa vocally denounced ‘neoliberal globalization’ and actively refused to engage with international institutions such as the IMF.

Other popular actions that Correa took was defaulting on foreign debt, posturing the debt as an illegitimate tool of imperialism, and the refusal to renew contracts with US military bases in Manta. He also drastically increased social spending on welfare programs along with promoting redistributive policies and by 2011 Ecuador's poverty rate decreased to 29 percent, a notable difference from the 37 percent poverty rate in 2006 before Correa took office (Lewis 2016, 166).

Three months after Correa took office, a referendum was passed in the government to rewrite the constitution. Many Indigenous peoples saw this as an opportunity to codify Indigenous rights to land and sovereignty, with a major focus being on resource extraction on Indigenous lands and ensuring that legal protections were put in place to protect Indigenous livelihoods. The constitution features many articles and protected rights that were considered especially progressive at the time, with some notable inclusions being constitutional rights for nature, the right to *buen vivir*, and recognition of Indigenous languages and collective rights. A major gain in the drafting of the new constitution was the actualization of the long sought-after goal of declaring Ecuador a plurinational state. Although considered mostly symbolic in nature, others say its codification became " an effective tool to pry open spaces in Ecuador's historically exclusionary state structures" and enabled the enforcement of Indigenous cultural rights (Becker 2011, 146).

In response to pressure from environmental activists and Indigenous communities, during the first year of his term Correa attempted to end oil exploration in Yasuni National Park via a 'debt-for-nature' swap. Under the Yasuni-ITT initiative, President Correa proposed to leave untapped oil reserves in the region 'in the soil' "if the international community would contribute fifty percent of the revenues that Ecuador could have earned

from twenty years of extraction into a trust fund for the country," roughly estimated to be $3.6 billion (Lewis 2016, 1). Although six years later, only around $13 million was raised and Correa ended the initiative, resuming oil exploration in the National Park that many Indigenous Ecuadorians called home (including two uncontacted groups). In response, Indigenous groups allied with environmentalists and other social activists tried to prevent the drilling of new oil in the region by attempting to force a referendum, although the signatures they collected were considered invalid by the state. The group then attempted to reach out for transnational help via the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, along with also participating in online activism and a march on the capital.

A major source of disappointment among many of Correa's supporters (including Indigenous supporters) was his approval of massive increases in mining and refusal to "lead the country away from the extractivist development model" (Lewis 2016, 168). Although Correa spoke openly about embracing a "socialism for the twenty-first century" he made no real moves to nationalize industries and instead, following Chávez's lead, "sought to build his popularity on the basis of "petro populism," in which he used income from oil exports to fund social programs" (Becker 2011, 203). Through this, Correa was able to massively decrease poverty rates and expand social services which acted to maintain general positive public support of their regime. Indigenous peoples, as has been par for the course, were not only largely excluded from these benefits but faced continued subjugation in the name of progress for the masses. Multiple Indigenous uprisings formed around Correa's new 2009 mining law, both to try and prevent it and in response to its passing. These mobilizations were especially unique in that they featured collaboration from Indigenous organizations that had previously been at odds, including CONAIE, FENOCIN, and FEINE.

Not only did Correa advance expand extractive industries, but he also cracked down on social protests against his policies. Correa, although previously championed as an ally to Indigenous peoples, quickly fell into the same patterns as previous leaders met with Indigenous opposition. Correa employed the same rhetoric as his predecessors to try and delegitimize Indigenous movements, describing Indigenous peoples as lazy and misguided or misinformed and often falsely blaming third-party agitators for Indigenous uprisings in an attempt to discredit their movements. The informal 'criminalization of protests' under Correa led to increased brutality inflicted on protestors, and those deemed dissidents were also often charged with terrorism and sabotage. Between 2008 and 2015, state forces deployed by Correa to suppress protests killed three Shuar, "either while they were protesting mining or defending their water rights" (Riofrancos 2020, 164). In March 2009, the environmental NGO Accion Ecologica, a long-term ally to Indigenous peoples and organizations, faced the threat of their disbanding due to their opposition to Correa's plans to expand the mining industry and accusations that their acts "alleged deviation from its mission, interference in public policy, and threatening national security" (Riofrancos 2020, 72). Although Correa pulled back this order after facing backlash, the organization was shut down again in 2016. For many, Correa's repressive responses to resistance were hardly different from previous right-wing and neoliberal governments.

Riofrancos points out that under the leadership of leftist governments such as Correa's there was an "inherited, and intensified, a model of accumulation based on the extraction and export of natural resources" which "enabled important forms of socioeconomic inclusion and political empowerment for the masses, while simultaneously undermining more radical transformations" with these more radical transformations often

envisioned by Indigenous communities within Ecuador (Riofrancos 2020, 167). A more radical vision of a post-extraction society is put forth by Indigenous peoples as the idea of sumak kawsay (in Quechua), or buen vivir (in Spanish), loosely translated to the 'good life.' Buen vivir serves as an alternative to traditional development that "focuses on economic wealth," and instead emphasizes the importance of "other forms of wealth, such as cultural, environmental and social," and provides another option outside of resource extraction (Lewis 2016, 179).

Another main source of contention related to resource extraction was *who* held the power to decide mining operations. This debate leads back to the creation of the new constitution, which featured contradictions that related to control over land and resource extraction. While the constitution empowered local communities in regard to control over, the state also had ultimate authority over resources and land deemed of 'national interest and security.' It granted rights to nature but also granted state control over subsoil resources. While Indigenous organizations wished to maintain control over their territory, "Correa wanted to maintain the right to decide when and where mining operations would take place" (Becker 2011, 179). Competing interpretations of the document lead to direct conflicts between the state and Indigenous peoples in areas affected by resource extraction. Specifically, a major point of contention was the interpretation of the internationally recognized right to prior consultation in the matter of resource extraction, and whether the constitution referred to the limited right of consultation (the state's view) or the right to consent (Indigenous view). Furthermore, contention surrounded what exactly constitutes consultation, *who* should be involved in these conversations and *what* constitutes

consultation. More often than not Indigenous peoples criticized the state for not fully engaging in discussions with affected communities.

Conclusion

To truly grasp Indigenous uprisings of the current century, one needs to fully understand the foundation on which Indigenous experiences in Ecuador are built. Throughout history Indigenous peoples in Ecuador have experienced a variety of economic, political, and social changes that shaped not only their grievances and experiences but also the ways in which they respond. As a result, Indigenous movements over time have reacted differently according to the conditions. While these different mobilizations are discussed individually, they cannot be truly excluded from each other as future movements are not disconnected from their predecessors despite changing conditions and contexts. Even though the remainder of this paper will focus primarily on the twenty-first century, influences and remnants of past mobilizations discussed in this chapter are not too far removed as influences and remnants of past mobilizations provided the essential conditions and laid the groundwork for campaigns in the 21st century.

III. Case Studies

Now we return to investigating the main question at hand. Specifically, how do the contexts in which Indigenous resistance movements in Ecuador emerge affect the tactics and repertoires they then adopt in their mobilizations? In the following cases I will study the contexts and conditions in which Indigenous mobilizations against political forces of dispossession have occurred in order to understand why certain tactical repertoires were adopted by these movements. Within these three separate time periods I will survey the general trends exhibited by Indigenous resistance movements, focusing on the ways in which they articulate resistance. By surveying what tactics were utilized by Indigenous protestors during different time periods with different socio-political conditions, I will identify different factors that affect tactical decision-making within Indigenous resistance movements, including targets and political/social resources.

A. Period 1: Pre-Correa (2000-2006)

Introduction

The time period of 2000-2006 is best described as a tumultuous one. While starting off with a short-lived promise of new beginnings that took the form of a coup that failed to sustain any real change, most of this period was spent battling old demons. These old demons were neoliberalism and austerity taking the form of free trade agreements and an influx of foreign corporations seeking to privatize land and expand resource extraction. Indigenous resistance against foreign corporations encroaching on their land and economic

policies that threatened Indigenous livelihoods and foodways were a trend that carried over from the 1990s into the new century. This period is unique in that, compared to the following periods, Indigenous groups were organizing within the context of a relatively weak, decentralized state that "ceded more power to the private sector– both the nonprofits and for profits" and faced multiple targets related to their grievances including their own state and foreign entities (Lewis 2016, 142).

Although a bit disillusioned due to failed revolutions and unfaithful politicians, the Indigenous movement in Ecuador still actively resisted these attempts at dispossession in various ways and by utilizing different tactical repertoires.

Political Context

The political terrain of the first half of the 2000s was rocky to say the least, characterized by a struggle to stabilize a country that was in the midst of its worst economic recession since the Great Depression while also coming out of one of the most significant political upheavals in recent history. From 2000-2006, Ecuador saw the ascension of three different presidents, one of which was removed prior to completing their term. Immediately following the coup in 2000 that ousted previous president Jamil Mahuad, after a short aside in which a "coalition of military, Indigenous and labor leaders took power", Vice President Gustavo Noboa assumed office until the 2002 presidential race (Dangl 2010, 46). Noboa's short time in office was largely a continuation of his predecessor's policies, continuing to try and solve the economic crisis with neoliberal policies and particularly pursuing the 'dollarization' that was a main reason for Mahuad's ousting (Buckley and Dudley 2000).

The 2002 elections saw the ascension of Gutiérrez as president, and while initially allying with leftist coalitions he quickly sought alliances with the country's elite and established close relationships with the IMF (Dangle 2010, 47). As his Indigenous and leftist allies started withdrawing their support, Gutiérrez "quickly turned to the right and made alliances with the Social Christians, the same traditional right-wing party he had criticized during his campaigns" and became more heavily reliant on the military to maintain his power (Becker 2010, 88). Gutiérrez continued to decline in popularity as he continued to implement neoliberal economic policies that he had campaigned against, and public outrage hit a particular high when Gutiérrez decided to dismiss high court officials in what many saw as a power grab and attempt to stack the Supreme Court. On April 20, 2005, in the wake of impassioned protests Gutiérrez "fled his presidential palace on Wednesday after the Congress, meeting in special session, voted to remove him" (Forero 2005). Vice President Alfredo Palacio was appointed following Gutiérrez's departure and served out the remainder of his term, facing a divided congress and civil unrest, until the 2006 elections.

Tactics

Institutional

Lawsuits

One of the most famous court cases that has attempted to challenge the authority of foreign corporations and enforce some semblance of responsibility for the environmental and social trauma they cause is that of ChevronTexaco. This lawsuit against ChevronTexaco is one of the most well-known cases of institutional resistance tactics by Indigenous peoples.

The suit was filed by American lawyers on behalf of communities, including Indigenous communities, affected by the oil company's operations from 1971 to 1992, during which "ChevronTexaco dumped over four million gallons a day of toxic wastewater, contaminated with oil, heavy metals and carcinogens into open pits, estuaries and rivers" (New York Times 2003). While the lawsuit was first filed in the United States in the 1990s, and "dragged on in preliminary hearings and appeals until a federal appeals court dismissed it in 2002" as it was ruled that Ecuador was better suited for the site for the trial and as "part of the dismissal, ChevronTexaco had to agree to abide by the Ecuadorian court's judgment" (Miller 2003). The return of the trial to Ecuador was a major rallying point for Indigenous communities that brought both hope and anxieties. In general, the transnational lawsuit that spanned from the US to Ecuador seemed to be an appropriate response to confront the abuses carried out by the transnational company Chevron/Texaco.

International Lobbying

Another institutional tactic that has made an appearance during this time is the utilization of intergovernmental organizations. In 2005, Indigenous groups including the Achuar tribe sought out international help as they tried to fend off exploration teams from extracting oil from their land. The region specifically affected included two areas known as Blocks 23 and 24, which were at the heart of Indigenous reserves and previously had their exploration rights sold in 1999 without consulting the tribes on the land (Voss 2005). When faced with an antagonistic government that refused to acknowledge their land rights or cooperate through legislative channels at home, the affected Indigenous groups then decided

to pursue support through the United Nations, specifically taking their case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

Electoral Politics

Initially, Indigenous participation in electoral politics as a tactic proved to be a fruitful, new endeavor. While Pachakutik as a political entity of CONAIE was established in 1996, involvement in national politics was relatively limited until the 2002 elections. After the first general election post-coup, Pachakutik candidates or their allies held “about a dozen seats in the 100-member Congress and [controlled] about 10 percent of the country's city hall” (Forero 2002) . In the presidential race Pachakutik and CONAIE allied with military colonel and co-leader of the 2000 coup, Lucio Gutiérrez. While initially Pachakutik was apprehensive about allying with Gutiérrez due to a “learned distrust of military officials”, the issues that Gutiérrez ran on coincided with Indigenous concerns, especially regarding the neoliberal policies that were typical of previous regimes, and Pachakutik agreed with his party to collaborate on a “common platform of fighting against corruption, poverty, violence, and the politicization of the judicial system, and in favor of citizen security and productivity” (Becker 2010, 79). This alliance with Indigenous peoples and Pachakutik as a political party was instrumental in Gutiérrez’s campaign and served as “vital support that catapulted him into office in one of Latin America's most politically unstable countries” (Los Angeles Times 2003). In return, Gutiérrez assigned Pachakutik leaders to ministerial positions in his administration . Quickly after taking office, Gutiérrez reversed many of his campaign promises and fell into the same trends as previous administrations that Indigenous

peoples were at odds with. He privatized public services, took loans from the IMF, and generally embraced neoliberal policies that he had campaigned against previously. Three months after Gutiérrez entered office, Pachakutik and CONAIE broke ties with him, "leaving their government posts and withdrawing support" and largely retreated from the political sphere altogether (Dangl 2010, 47).

Non-institutional

Marches

By far the most common tactic utilized during this time was organized marches, with the capital Quito as a major staging ground. In 2001, as a response to neoliberal economic policies that threatened to Indigenous livelihoods and foodways, CONAIE led an organized march featuring over six thousand Indigenous people from various communities all over the country to the state capital of Quito (Stockes 2001). Economic policies implemented by President Noboa were part of an austerity package encouraged by the International Monetary Fund, the most impactful being price increases on basic necessities like cooking gas and public transportation (Trowe and Cuzco 2001) This march featured numbers from other Indigenous organizations, including FEINE and FENOCIN, and throughout the procession was joined by non-Indigenous allies and others who had similar grievances.

While the Chevron trial was nearing a possible settlement, Indigenous Ecuadorians organized a march to the courthouse in order to maintain pressure. Members of various tribes including the Secoya, Cofan and Huaorani crowded in front of the court, wearing

traditional attire of "purple gowns and feathered tiaras and necklaces of nutshells" (New York Times 2003).

During the 2006 protests against the operations of the Canadian mining firm Ascendent Copper Corp, protestors traveled all the way from Intag (the location of the proposed mining project) to Quito via bus to participate in a two-day march. The march numbered over five hundred strong from dozens of communities including Indigenous peoples from the highlands of Cotacachi and supporters from local parishes, governments, and other organizations. As with other marches Indigenous protestors incorporated cultural performances, including "celebrations of solidarity and resistance filled with music, dancing and street theater to complement the many speeches and denouncements aimed at the junior mining company's divisive and damaging activities and intentions" (Mychalejko 2006).

From 2005-2006, various marches in response to a series of free-trade deals proposed by President Palacio occurred, with one of the first major marches being held on the 513th anniversary of the Spanish conquest. This march featured coordinated Indigenous mobilizations across the region, and also incorporated oil-related demands focused primarily on Occidental Petroleum and their encroachment on Indigenous land. Regarding the proposed free trade agreements, Indigenous communities expressed their concern that "a deal with the US would harm their economy and their culture, and would only benefit the wealthy," with the harm to their culture including land rights violations and disruption of local production (BBC 2006c). The last march before President Palacio terminated Occidental's contract, dubbed the demonstration "In defense of sovereignty, natural resources, and national dignity," featured a massive coalition including CONAIE, Accion

Ecologica, the oil workers union Fetrapec and Pachakutik who all joined in on the march (Riofrancos 2020, 49).

Roadblocks

Another commonly used disruptive tactic utilized during this time includes roadblocks. Often paired with marches and other demonstrations, road blockages are typically utilized as an escalation tactic once previous negotiations or conversations have reached a dead end/failed to progress, with the purpose of disrupting commerce and transportation to force a response from their adversary. Road blockages enacted by Indigenous protestors typically involved both the use of human bodies occupying highways and objects to obstruct traffic and the transfer of goods. Burning tires were also used as a way to obscure the area, both for the protection of the protestors and to further impede transportation (BBC 2006a). The 2001 protests featured road blockages, specifically targeting major highways leading to the capital city. The protests against the Ascendent mining company also featured road blockages, where locals "did their best to ensure, through roadblocks, that the company had a hard time even accessing the area to do survey work." Early attempts by Ascendent to establish a base camp in 2004 were impeded by roadblocks led by prominent women's groups that heavily featured Indigenous women. In early 2006 as Ascendent continued on with their project despite local opposition, Indigenous groups decided to directly impede the company's work by erecting roadblocks that were constantly upheld by groups in rotating posts. As roadblocks continued, they ended up acting as one of the final acts of protest before the Ecuadorian government finally

responded. Road blockages were also a major part of the series of protests that emerged in 2006 against President Palacio's intention to join a free trade agreement with the US.

Physical Occupations

More direct tactics such as occupations of various strategic buildings were also utilized during this period. During the 2001 march on Quito, Indigenous protestors occupied university buildings, specifically the coliseum of the Salesian Polytechnic University, when police refused to let protestors occupy local parks. When Indigenous protestors came into conflict with corporations that already had factories and other buildings established in Ecuador many protesters physically occupied buildings as an escalation tactic, and even in some instances also destroyed them. An example is the case of the Ascendent protests where Indigenous protestors burned down one of Ascendent's facilities and occupied other property under the ownership of the corporation.

Strikes

As part of the March 2006 protests against new trade deals, CONAIE allied with local workers and labor unions to sponsor a labor strike in order to try and force Palacio's government to reconsider their free trade proposals. The strike included not just Indigenous workers, but all workers whose labor would be affected by these new trade deals. Strikes were also utilized during the protests against Occidental Petroleum. As oil production picked up in 2005 Indigenous groups and allies participated in a bi-provincial strike in the

northeastern Amazonian provinces of Orellana and Sucumbíos. Strikers also occupied airports, roads, and oil wells in order to disrupt oil production.

Direct confrontations

A tactic that was utilized less frequently compared to other tactics was direct confrontation. One of the more tense articulations of resistance during this time can be seen in the protests against Ascendent's mining activities, which escalated at one point to a hostage situation. This case was a very specific response to escalating tensions, which included death threats made to anti-mining activists by Ascendent affiliates and the assault of three anti-mining residents, including a woman who led a crafts group, by bodyguards employed by Ascendant (MiningWatch 2005). During a particularly heated confrontation in December 2006 that followed the attempted forced removal of community members by Ascendant paramilitary guards, after failing to disperse protestors with tear gas and ever-increasing tensions Ascendant guards had kidnapped several activists and journalists. Indigenous community members responded by taking several Ascendant staff hostage in a local church (Patterson 2006). While occupying the church, Indigenous community leaders attempted to leverage the hostages, and in order to avoid further violence, pressured the captives to demand that the company reach an agreement with the communities they were abusing. The hostage standoff ended after a week, and hostages were returned on both sides.

Analysis

Targets

The nature of the targets Indigenous groups focused on is an important factor in tactical decision making. With the decentralization of the state under neoliberal-focused presidents like Gutiérrez and Palacio, the stage was set for foreign entities to establish dominance in Ecuador. As the state sought new sources of income to repay international debt, international finance in the form of mining concessions and other resources looked especially promising (Lewis 2016, 143). While the governments that imposed these policies were a main target, as emphasized by the popularity of marches and demonstrations that centered on the capital city of Quito, foreign entities also were a major focus of attention from Indigenous groups. With the lack of centralized state power, much of the tactical focus was on confronting foreign corporations that were the more direct dealer of dispossession and general violations. Most of these corporations had factories and other physical manifestations that could be easily targeted by occupations or roadblocks. These international targets also often necessitated the utilization of internationally focused tactics, like engaging in coalitions with protest groups or seeking legal aid in the home nation of these corporations. Targets that took on transnational dimensions needed to be combated by equally transnational solutions, with these larger-scale opportunities becoming more accessible with the expansion of intergovernmental organizations and groups during the previous decade.

Resources

Political Resources

The availability of political resources is also a major determinant in tactical choice. Especially relevant is the state of local/national politics and the position of institutions in creating/repressing opportunity. Often when national/domestic political channels are unavailable international channels of support are sought in order to bypass barriers found at home, as illustrated by the boomerang effect. An example of this can be seen with the 2005 land disputes during which affected Indigenous communities sought support and legal action through the United Nations and the Chevron lawsuit that originated in the United States courts and was represented by American lawyers.

Gains made in the new terrain of electoral politics provided new opportunities and access to political resources. Local elections were especially significant in that Indigenous peoples occupied positions of political power and could focus specifically on community concerns. The Indigenous ministers who were able to gain positions under Gutiérrez in which they could work and utilize tactics within the system faced unique challenges in that they "were forced to walk a fine line between supporting Gutiérrez's controversial economic policies and remaining accountable to their grassroots constituency" (Becker 2010, 85). Not all Indigenous peoples endorsed participation in electoral politics to the same extent, as many feared that electoral politics would lead to co-optation of their movement and suppress more 'radical' demands (a fear that will be validated in the near future). More historically radical Indigenous organizations such as Ecuarunari were quicker to break ties than CONAIE, which "was most eager to maintain relations" and compromised on some of Gutiérrez's policies such as "consenting to support IMF agreements, provided they included provisions for social programs" (Becker 2010, 86). Gutiérrez was also notably adept at "exploiting divergent interests of Indigenous communities" and particularly "exacerbating

tensions between the highlands and the Amazon … and between FEINE and CONAIE, in order to weaken civil society and retain his hold on power" (Becker 2010, 91)

Social Resources

Social resources are also extremely important in tactical choice. Indigenous movements during this time had relative abundance in social resources, and because of this were able to more easily employ tactics that needed significant 'people power' like marches, strikes, and blockades. The abundance of social resources is partly due to the popular nature of Indigenous grievances during this time. The concerns of Indigenous groups that a hemispheric agreement would give free reign to foreign oil and mining companies in the Amazon rainforest and that local food ways would be disrupted by foreign imports are concerns that were also shared by the larger Ecuadorian populace (Andrews 2002). While Indigenous communities more specifically may focus on the issue of sovereignty, identity, and culture being threatened by political forces of dispossession in the name of extraction and profit, the general concern over free-trade agreements that prioritize foreign nations and negatively affect domestic industries are shared by many. Other factions of society might have different specific concerns that relate to the larger issue of neoliberal policies, such as the effect on wages, fuel prices, etc., but the systemic source of their troubles is the same and shared by Indigenous communities. This period of neoliberalism was especially bad for Indigenous groups, but poor and rural communities were also negatively affected.

Specific coalitions that were utilized during this time were also extremely important in the availability of some tactics. A common coalition that has persevered throughout

history and remains relevant during this time is the bond between Indigenous groups and environmental organizations. Considering that many of the grievances Indigenous communities had related to land rights and resource extraction, environmental organizations both local and international became allies to their cause when concerns centered around the protection of the environment. These environmental organizations often have access to resources that Indigenous groups do not, but through these coalitions Indigenous groups gain access when their interests are closely aligned. Bonds with the labor movement in Ecuador also enabled new tactics that Indigenous groups could add to their arsenal. Coalitions with labor organizations and unions enabled more effective and wide-reaching strikes to be utilized, focusing on economic aspects of protest. Again due to the lack of political opportunities locally, a reality that will change in the near future, international coalitions were extremely important during this time in order to gain access to international systems of support. In the case of the Ascendent protests, Indigenous protestors found allies in Canadian environmental groups including Friends of the Earth Canada, MiningWatch Canada, and Rainforest Concert, who all worked to pressure the Canadian government to sanction Ascendant (and it also probably helped that these extreme actions were nowhere near one-sided).

Conclusion

As the previous discussion illustrates, this period was very much a continuation of historical struggles in which Indigenous peoples fought on multiple fronts, combatting both their own government and foreign entities. At the same time, Indigenous activists utilized new tactics that became accessible through new directions such as electoral politics. The

Majority of grievances focused on liberal trade agreements and/or the expansion of extractive practices with little to no consultation from affected Indigenous communities. A range of both institutional and non-institutional tactics were adopted within the context of a weak state and both national and international targets, including lawsuits, utilizing intergovernmental organizations, marches, road blockages, strikes, and occupations (and many of these will continue to be utilized in future time periods). The availability of these various tactics was influenced by, given the socio-political context of the time period, resources and opportunities available to Indigenous protesters along with the limitations/opportunities presented by the specific targets that these resistance movements focused on. The political instability that was a feature of this time period specifically provided certain political openings for Indigenous organizing, where “the weakness and chaos of the state cracked open a space where social movement actors could voice their grievances" (Lewis 2010, 152). Tactics that required more ‘people power’ also were more readily accessible to Indigenous groups, as the general discontent that most of the public had with multiple administrations during this time meant that any opportunity to protest the state was met with sympathy and support by many factions of society. The following cases will look more closely at Indigenous resistance under the Correa administration, and the new developments and continuing patterns we might see compared to this pre-Correa era.

B. Period 2: Early Correa (2006-2011)

Introduction

The election of President Correa marked a new era in Ecuador. A distinct change from previous administrations, Correa's ascension to many seemed to signify Ecuador's membership into the Latin American 'Pink Tide.' Correa's election brought both a new era and at the same time in some ways maintained business as usual. In the earlier years, Correa's administration embodied his imagined 'citizens revolution' in which political elites and foreign entities no longer dominated Ecuador and its people, issuing a shake up to the previous power structure at play. This new era of political transformation brought new opportunities *and* new challenges, as Indigenous peoples were not completely pacified during this period. Mobilizations occurred and notably adapted under the new conditions they organized within, needing to navigate the creation of a new constitution, state-sponsored expansion of extractive industries and other new threats to Indigenous communities.

Political Context

Generally viewed as the most recent wave in the Latin American Pink Tide, Correa's election came with big promises and apprehensive hope. Correa spent most of the first half of his tenure establishing himself as the populist leader he claimed to be on the campaign trail and kickstarting the 'citizens revolution' he preached. He adopted policies that while causing some tensions abroad were largely popular domestically such as defaulting on foreign loans, allying with other leftist leaders, and rewriting the constitution. In a staunch divergence from previous presidents who positioned themselves as strong US allies, Correa made vocal opposition to the US "empire" a defining feature of his campaign and once elected closed US military bases in the country (Kraul 2007). His proposal of the Yasuni-

ITT initiative, a debt-for-nature swap that sought international funding equivalent to a fraction of projected profit that would be made if oil was extracted and sold in exchange for keeping oil reserves untouched in the protected region, was the first of its kind and was applauded by environmentalists, Indigenous peoples, and everyday citizens alike, even receiving praise from the UN. True to his words against neoliberalism, Correa expanded social security and services (especially in healthcare) and oversaw widespread wealth redistribution. Through the early years of his administrations, Correa sought to rebuild a strong, legitimate state that had been lacking in previous administrations, both through empowering the state through the new constitution and policies and stripping the power and influence of foreign corporations/entities. As a "master of state activism," Correa focused on campaigning and directing government spending to communities that were heavily ignored under previous administrations such as rural communities and slum residents, and channeled the country's oil revenue into "new schools, health clinics and infrastructure projects, especially new highways, while cutting the poverty rate from 37 percent to 27 percent from 2007 to 2012" (Miroff 2014).

Correa was also a man of contradictions; "a child of poverty who breached the gates of Ecuador's entrenched elite" and "an economist from a bastion of conservatism who preaches '21st-century socialism" (Romero 2010). These contradictions and the tensions that arose from them became much more apparent during the latter half of his tenure, but even in the early years there are certain visible cracks. While Correa proclaimed that his government would be "a government of the Indigenous", he often found himself at odds with Indigenous peoples especially regarding resource extraction and Indigenous authority (Garrigues 2007). Correa's tendencies to ignore, invalidate, and suppress not only Indigenous peoples but all

dissenters and critics became much more overt during the latter half of his tenure., But even in the beginning of his presidency there were indications that not everyone fit into his perceived ‘citizens' revolution,’--especially not those who speak out against him or his policies.

Tactics

Institutional

Domestic Lobbying

Organizing around the rewriting of the constitution was one of the main epicenters of Indigenous activism during this time. While the Constituent Assembly was formally meeting in Quito, Indigenous leaders were simultaneously holding local meetings within their communities to discuss what they would like to see included, such as the “nationalization of Ecuador's natural resources, agrarian reform, the defense of biodiversity and sovereignty of Indigenous lands” (Garrigues 2007). CONAIE presented proposals to the assembly for policy changes, including moving beyond representative democracy to a more participatory democracy that ensured popular participation in politics and included communal rights. CONAIE and Ecuarunari also collaborated on opening an office in Montecristi, the town where the Constituent Assembly met to construct the new constitution, and “lobbied the assembly while informing their members of the nature of debates and mobilizing popular support for their positions,” generally keeping the pressure on the delegates and ensuring that their voices were heard (Becker 2011, 137).

There were also a number of specific demands that Indigenous communities advocated for regarding the new constitution. The inclusion of language establishing Ecuador as a plurinational state was a main lobbying focus. CONAIE's president Marlon Santi along with a delegation of 150 CONAIE activists delivered a "formal proposal to create a plurinational state in Ecuador" to assembly president Alberto Acosta and met personally with Vice President Lenin Moreno to advocate for plurinationality (Becker 2010, 146). The formal recognition of Indigenous languages was also an important inclusion in the new constitution for Indigenous peoples. While initially the assembly had voted against the proposal to grant Kichwa official status, after Pachakutik delegates and allies walked out of the session, activists from both Ecuanari and CONAIE met with assembly members who then amended the language proposition to include Indigenous languages Quechua and Shuar (Kearns 2008b). When it came time for last discussions on the new constitution Indigenous organizations including CONAIE, FENOCIN, and FEINE voiced their support for the new constitution and lobbied in favor of its passing, emphasizing the opportunities the constitution provides to propose projects and utilize domestic legal tactics.

Indigenous protestors also lobbied and met with legislators regarding specific laws or policies that they opposed. The 2009 Mining Law is one example in which Indigenous communities, after marching to the National Assembly, met with legislators and engaged in a series of talks with Congressional President Francisco Cordero that resulted in pushing back the vote on the law (Denvir 2009) .

Electoral politics

While Indigenous organizations were still recovering from the previous issues that Pachakutik experienced allying with political figures such as Gutiérrez and the divisions it caused among Indigenous communities, discussions emerged regarding how to (or whether to) engage with electoral politics. Specifically, Indigenous peoples debated whether Pachakutik should even run their own candidate or if they should avoid getting involved in electoral politics all together and focus solely on local community concerns. Ultimately Pachakutik nominated former CONAIE president Luis Macas as its candidate, reacting against past experiences in which the party had "paid too high a price in forming alliances with political forces outside its own movement" like Gutiérrez (Becker 2011, 107). The nomination of Macas marked the first time Pachakutik would run an Indigenous leader from within their own ranks, as previously Pachakutik's involvement with electoral politics at the highest level was limited to endorsing non-Indigenous candidates who were perceived as allies. Facing a lack of funding and internal divisions both within the Indigenous communities and larger Leftist movement, Macas obtained only 2 percent of the vote during the second round and lost seats in the congressional race, securing only six seats compared to ten seats in the previous congress. In the second round, citing the threat of Noboa's alliance with imperial and oligarchical interests, Pachakutik announced its unconditional support for Correa's candidacy. The decision was generally seen as the need to support a lesser of two evils (Denvir 2008). Outside of the initial support for Correa's election, Pachakutik made no moves to establish formal ties to the government. Correa reciprocated these feelings by largely excluding any Indigenous representatives from his government.

In the 2009 elections, Pachakutik not only did not run a presidential candidate but also along with other major Indigenous organizations refused to endorse any other

candidates. After the disappointing run of Macas in the 2006 election, Indigenous organizations became even further disillusioned with electoral politics at the highest level and instead decided to focus on local elections. In the congressional elections the party had its worst results since its founding, but still maintained representation with four seats out of 124 in the National Assembly. Pachakutik fared significantly better in local races, winning "about 26 mayoralties as well as dozens of other seats on municipal councils" (Becker 2011, 172).

Lawsuits

On March 17, 2009 CONAIE became the first Indigenous political organization to utilize the new constitution, specifically by challenging the constitutionality of Correa's new mining law in court. With the support of the water users' association and anti-mining group UNAGUA and radical environmentalist organization Accion Ecologica, the Indigenous organization brought their case to the Constitutional Court alleging that "the state was obligated to consult them prior to the passage of the law, since it was a legislative measure that affects the collective rights of Indigenous peoples" (Riofrancos 2020, 99). After an intense legal battle that lasted just over a year–during which the state simultaneously argued that they had no obligation to consult with Indigenous communities and that they had engaged in sufficient consultation with Indigenous communities–the court ultimately decided that Indigenous communities had been sufficiently consulted and maintained the constitutionality of the law (but also stated the necessity of a new law to regulate consultation) (Riofrancos 2020, 101).

Non-institutional

Marches

While Indigenous peoples spent much of their time lobbying and appealing to government officials during the process of rewriting the constitution, they also did not shy away from more disruptive tactics when the process seemed to hit blockages. During a particularly extended debate around forming a constituent assembly that seemed to stagnate, CONAIE marched on Congress along with other social movement organizations to pressure the legislature to take action and approve the assembly (Garrigues 2007). In October 2007 when discussions around the constitution turned to whether the Constituent Assembly should be imbued with 'full powers', essentially replacing the current National Congress, CONAIE took to the streets again and mobilized thousands of its members to march to the capital in support of the assembly and the disbanding of the current congress (Becker 2011, 136). As the constitution was still being worked on, in March the following year CONAIE organized another show of power to maintain pressure that featured a twenty thousand-strong march that ended with a dialogue between Indigenous peoples and AP officials in which officials were reminded of Indigenous demands and proposals regarding the new constitution (Kearns 2008a).

There were also marches organized in opposition to specific policies Correa tried to implement regarding natural resources. Significant marches were organized in opposition to Correa's new mining law proposal, which would create a "National Mining Company and increase state control over foreign corporations," reversing the previous mining mandate that ceased mining operations and revoked a significant number of concessions to foreign

corporations (Denvir 2009). While the bill was still under discussion a coalition of Indigenous protestors along with campesinos from affected towns marched to the National Assembly to meet with legislators and were successful in pushing back the vote date by a few weeks. As the vote approached (and ultimately resulted in the passing of the new mining law), CONAIE and Ecuanari jointly planned a National Day of Mobilization in opposition to the law, and on January 20, 2009, thousands of Indigenous protestors took to the streets in Quito and Cuenca (Riofrancos 2020, 54).

Another major point of contention that Indigenous communities mobilized around was Correa's new water privatization plans proposed in May 2010 that threatened local community control over their natural resources (Wall Street Journal 2010). When the new laws regarding water were still being discussed, CONAIE took to the streets with relatively few numbers. After protests against the water bill in the Amazon turned deadly, resulting in the death of Shuar schoolteacher Bosco Wisum and dozens of other injuries, CONAIE was joined by FEINE and FENOCIN along with several thousand protestors in a march on Quito to pressure the government to act. At the capital, Correa met with about 150 Indigenous leaders and agreed to reconsider the laws and work with Indigenous leaders on changes to water and mining laws (Becker 2011, 185-186). Although these talks broke down and as the legislature prepared for final discussions on both proposed water and mining legislation, Indigenous organizations joined in a progressive escalation of protests against Correa and his policies. FENOCIN, FEINE, and CONAIE joined forces again to organize the National Mobilization in Defense of Water, Life and Food Sovereignty where they marched to the Congress building.

Significant marches were also organized around the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the summit on minority rights that was held in June 2010 in Otavalo, an important Indigenous town. Delegates from all over the region, including Correa's left-wing allies were invited to discuss the declaration signed at the summit that promised to build societies that respect the rights of Indigenous peoples and those of African descent in Latin America. Notably excluded, however, were all major Indigenous Ecuadorian organizations. In response, CONAIE organized an alternative summit in which "hundreds of Indigenous people, many of them from the Amazon lowlands," marched on the main convention center where the summit was being held, themselves "holding traditional spears and even a snake," presenting themselves as unmistakable and proudly Indigenous and further emphasizing the absurdity that they were barred from the summit (Caselli 2011).

Roadblocks

As with other marches in the past, some of the marches during this time utilized multiple tactics simultaneously, often adding more disruptive tactics such as roadblocks. The initial march in response to the water privatization laws saw the utilization of road blockages using "burning tires, rocks, and logs on major highways," with Indigenous leaders declaring that escalation techniques such as these were needed in order to force a dialogue with their unresponsive government (Dangl 2010, 54). Shuar and Achuar protestors in the Amazon who were particularly affected by the laws blocked roads using barbed wire and rocks, and during the National Mobilization in Defense of Water, Life and Food Sovereignty activists staged blockades at the Congress building and roads all over the country.

On the Day of Mobilization for life in response to the new mining law, Indigenous protestors from all over the country participated in disruptive tactics including the shutting down of the Panamerican Highway along with other major highways in the eastern Amazon and southern highlands (Becker 2011, 181). When Indigenous protestors attempted to march on Quito and were stopped by security forces, they also proceeded to block the roads with rocks and logs (Al Jazeera 2010).

Analysis

Targets

While the pre-Correa era saw equal if not more attention to transnational corporations and foreign entities as targets along with the state, during this second period the main target that Indigenous communities mobilized against was the state and policies that Correa's administration implemented.

It is also important to note though, that the state we see under Correa varies quite a bit from previous administrations. Not only was Correa's state and administration different in structure, but it also differed regarding public reception. Compared to previous administrations, Correa's was perceived as both legitimate and popular. Correa came to power via democratic elections and maintained high approval ratings through most of his early tenure. Many of the grievances Indigenous communities had with Correa's administration, such as the expansion of resource extraction near Indigenous territories, were viewed by the general public as necessary to further Correa's citizens' revolution. In particular, Correa's petro-nationalist stance on oil extraction was a major source of funding

for social programs. With the socialist policies implemented by Correa's administration that aimed to decrease inequality and address pressing concerns, the state was also viewed as relatively receptive, creating specific difficulties for mobilizing protests.

With the new constitution, the target or goal was more preemptive. Instead of responding to a violation of Indigenous rights, most of the mobilizations around the new constitution focused on codifying rights and demands to prevent them from being violated or seeking systemic justice if they are violated. This new opportunity saw a renewed focus on institutional tactics as new channels for dialogue with the state were available.

Resources

Political Resources

Despite the complicated relationship between Indigenous organizations and electoral politics, involvement in the election of the Constituent Assembly proved to be fruitful in providing access to new tactics. Indigenous representation and allies within the assembly charged with constructing the Constitution meant that Indigenous delegates could advocate Indigenous concerns directly involved in the process. With this new constitution that codified Indigenous demands there were new legal channels that Indigenous organizations could take advantage of to protect their rights and "lobby for laws and development models that respond to their needs" (Dudenhoefer 2009). Even in situations where tactics were not necessarily legal in nature, such as marches, the language of the constitution was often still invoked in slogans and when articulating certain grievances such as claiming to "defend the

constitution against state policies, at once invoking and producing the text's legal authority" (Riofrancos 2020, 81).

Social Resources

Organizing under Correa's administration brought new challenges specifically regarding access to social resources. A main challenge was that Correa was generally received positively by the public, his critics were limited and highly concentrated within foreign investors and political elites. Unlike previous presidents, "the people love Correa because they have jobs, roads, schools, and healthcare" and the general population saw their living conditions improve (Lewis 2016, 182). It was more difficult for Indigenous mobilizations to gain social resources and support when the current concerns of Indigenous peoples were not necessarily universal when compared to the general public. Their main adversary, Correa and his administration, was seen as a godsend to those who suffered under previous administrations and neoliberal policies. Specifically regarding resource extraction, revenues from resource extraction while previously were concentrated mostly in the pockets of elites and corporations, under Correa's 'Citizen's Revolution' saw more equitable distribution and a concentration in funding social programs. As a result, much of the population that previously marched in opposition to resource extraction alongside Indigenous protestors now say the "benefits outweigh the costs," especially if they were geographically distant from mining sites (Lewis 2016, 193). It also did not help that Correa worked hard to delegitimize Indigenous concerns, blaming opposition to mining and water laws on a lack of understanding within Indigenous communities and falsely attributing Indigenous mobilizations to outside agitators such as foreign NGOs, telling media that "non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) are fomenting Native protests" and even "threatened to expel, or shut down organizations that influence the politics of the indigenous movement (Dudenhoefer 2010).

Without more broad-based support Indigenous protestors had to rely more exclusively on coalitions within their own communities, as we can see with the collaboration efforts of CONAIE, FENOCIN, FEINE, and other Indigenous organizations within mobilizations. While these various organizations have often found themselves at odds with each other from time to time, their relative isolation from other sources of social support forced these different organizations to depend more on each other. Other coalitions that were accessible came mostly from those directly affected by the mining and water laws Correa introduced, mainly campesinos and environmentalists who shared concerns about the impact of these laws on their own communities.

Conclusion

The beginning of Correa's administration brought significant changes to the environment Indigenous peoples organized within preceding his presidency. Indigenous mobilizations had to adapt to a changing political environment, and adapt they did. Much attention was dedicated to institutional tactics related to the new constitution, an opportunity that was not available previously and opened up new opportunities for institutional tactics after its creation. In general there was a tentatively optimistic approach to the new administration, but still utilized tactics that directly engaged with institutions such as lobbying and lawsuits. Targets shifted to a more local sphere, less focused on international

entities and specifically more centered on the state (and specifically a state that differed from previous experiences). Indigenous mobilizations adapted to confronting administrations that were positively received by the general public, an issue that they had little experience with during the pre-Correa period. This transition period contained new terrain that Indigenous mobilizations had to learn how to approach, and this is a theme that will continue into the latter half of Correa's regime.

C. Period 3: Late Correa (2011-2017)

Introduction

As we transition to the second half of President Correa's regime, important new developments arise that affect Indigenous mobilizations. On the eve of the latter half of his reign, Correa implemented new policies targeting NGOs and protest actions that created new barriers for Indigenous organizing and forced alternative paths and tactics. In addition to these limitations, the extractive industry continued to expand with state support: rights being sold to predominantly foreign corporations and legislation that restructured control of natural resources further threatened already vulnerable Indigenous livelihoods. Even with new challenges, Indigenous protestors were able to mobilize at a capacity comparable to the height of the Ecuadorian Indigenous movement in the 20th century. New alliances were made, and tactical repertoires were adjusted to address new hurdles brought about by this last time period.

Political Context

Common themes such as the suppression of protest became more institutionalized starting in 2011, when Correa altered an existing Executive degree that focused on international NGOs. The result could either be interpreted as "a state crackdown on civil society, in general, or as an attack against foreign intrusions into Ecuador" (Lewis 2016, 188). Other key legal action includes Decree 16, which outlined new procedures for registering NGOs and specifically decreed that "any non-governmental organization can be closed if the government determines that it has undermined 'public peace' or moved away from the objective for which it was created" (Miroff 2014). This decree was later used to shut down Fundación Pachamama, a group that often supported Indigenous communities in the Amazon in their defense of their territory and culture. Another prominent victim of this new law was Accion Ecologica, an outspoken opponent to Correa's extractive policies and a historically important ally to Indigenous communities in Ecuador.

The informal 'criminalization of protests' under Correa led to increased brutality inflicted on protestors, and those deemed dissidents were also often charged with terrorism and sabotage. Proposed legislation such as increasing jail time for stopping traffic also specifically targeted what were traditional forms of indigenous protest and tactics including marches and roadblocks. As cases of people accused of sabotage and terrorism rose to numbers in the hundreds, the situation became so critical that "Amnesty International issued a statement denouncing it as an attempt to silence opposition to government policies" (Picq 2011). In certain instances, Correa's interactions with Indigenous communities turned violent and even deadly, as he did not shy away from utilizing military forces to suppress Indigenous protests.

In a move that was denounced by many human rights watchdog organizations, Correa also passed laws that essentially gave him the power to censor any organization that had the audacity to criticize his administration and their actions. New media laws made it illegal for the press to report with 'political bias,' which "international media observers say mutes criticism of the government" (Schaefer Muñoz and Alvaro, 2013a). He also specifically targeted media outlets, such as newspapers and radio stations, for spreading 'misinformation' or 'incendiary material' that more often than not included critical views on Correa's policies.

Correa's ability to secure a third consecutive term as president was a significant feat. He was able to garner a high enough percentage of the vote to avoid a run-off election when many originally questioned whether he would even be able to fully complete his first term, a feat that has not been achieved by any previous Ecuadorian government in over a decade. Since Correa's reelection in 2013, there had been a notable "strong process of reopening developmentalist economic dynamics, among which the greatest drive for large-scale exploitation of natural resources and territory: gold, copper, oil, among others" (CONAIE 2015b).

Despite increased criticism and shift to a more authoritarian style, Correa was still polling high and if participating in the 2017 election, was projected to serve another term "in large part because he has brought unaccustomed stability to a country that saw three presidents overthrown in military coups over the 10-year period that ended in 2005" (Jaramillo Viteri and Kraul 2015). In a surprising turn of events, Correa ultimately decided to not run for reelection again despite the possibility of indefinite reelection now available,

potentially “influenced by a 2016 recession worsened by declining oil prices and his plunging popularity” (Jaramillo Viteri and Kraul 2017).

Tactics

Institutional

Collecting signatures for referendum

In response to Correa’s expansion of extractive industries and repression of protests, Indigenous movements sought to mobilize against both the state administration and its support for the oil industry. In August 2013, a coalition of citizen groups and nongovernmental organizations collected signatures to force a referendum on Correa’s decision to withdraw from the Yasuni-ITT initiative and resume drilling for oil in the Yasuni National Park, one of the most biodiverse regions in the world and home to many Indigenous communities, the matter. The group YasUnidos, an organization of environmentalists and Indigenous groups, led the charge collecting the half a million signatures needed to request the country's electoral council to call a national referendum that could block the drilling (Alvaro 2013). By the April 2014 deadline, over 700,000 signatures were collected and delivered to the Electoral Council for review (Vidal 2014). By May, the Electoral Council rejected the referendum citing invalid signatures. in response YasUnidos submitted an appeal and said that they planned to continue to “exhaust all legal actions at the local and national level before taking the case to international tribunals such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights” (Alvaro 2014b).

International Lobbying

While the majority of tactics utilized were more local in scope, there were some instances of Indigenous tactics that went beyond the borders of Ecuador. Specifically, in response to Correa's laws that essentially criminalized protest (disproportionately affecting Indigenous peoples), a delegation of Indigenous Ecuadorians spoke before the UN to condemn these acts. The president of CONAIE, along with "delegates from the Shuar Arutam People-PSHA, Waorani Women's Association-AMWAE and Confeniae "formed a work team that spoke to the UN about the need "for member states to review Ecuador's policy in the face of critical problems that occur in the country", including the "persecution and prosecution of social activists, violation of the right to prior consultation, violation of freedom of association, among other affected human rights" (CONAIE 2017).

Electoral Politics

During this time period, electoral politics or tactics were not a major focus compared to other tactics utilized. For Indigenous Ecuadorians who did get involved in electoral politics, the focus remained on local elections and community issues. Pachakutik performed consistently in local elections compared to previous elections, with a gradual increase in positions held. On the national level, Pachakutik's candidate Alberto Acosta only obtained around 4% of the vote in the presidential election while Correa was able to obtain 58%, enough to even avoid a run-off election (Neuman 2013).

Non-institutional

Marches

A series of marches occurred in March 2012 under the banner “For Life and Dignity of the Peoples”, prompted by the government’s decision to move forward with large-scale mining projects. and They specifically protested a recent agreement with a Chinese mining company that authorized the development of an open-cast copper mine in Zamora-Chinchipe region of southern Ecuador, which Indigenous leaders argued threatened their water supply and would force Indigenous peoples off their land (IWGIA 2012). Protestors dressed in colorful traditional clothing and waving rainbow flags began their two-week march in El Pangui and arrived in Quito on March 22nd, joined by around 500 additional Indigenous protestors who entered Quito from the North along with supporters from student and teachers’ associations (Al Jazeera 2012). According to CONAIE, specific objectives of the march included “redistribution of access to water, support for agrarian reform based on food sovereignty, change in the mining extractivist paradigm that prevents the development of a new model based on well-being, refusal of new taxes on small landholders and producers, and immediate termination of the criminalization of social protests, including dismissal of the cases against 194 indigenous leaders for sabotage and terrorism” (Murrietta 2012). Notable about this march was the utilization of aspirational language drawn from the new constitution. Specifically, the 2008 constitution was “cited in countless speeches, analyzed in side conversations, and prominently featured in the marchers demands” (Riofrancos 2020, 88).

The abandonment of the Yasuni-ITT Initiative was also a catalyst for many organized marches. As Correa announced his intent to abandon debt-for-nature swap after only approximately $13 million of the $3.6 billion dollar plan was raised and to resume drilling for oil in the region, protestors took to the streets of Quito and gathered in front of the presidential palace to voice their frustrations with the decision (Bawden 2013). YasUnidos members also marched from Quito to the National Electoral Council to deliver the collected signatures needed to force a referendum on the issue. Among the demonstrators were Indigenous people from Ñoneno, a remote Waorani community in the Amazon that were no strangers to territorial threats posed by oil development, who "traveled seven hours by canoe and more than a day by car to reach Quito" (Alvaro 2014a).

In June and July 2014 a new water bill prompted marches organized by Indigenous groups and supported by social organizations. The water bill, first debated in 2010 when it was also met with protests, raised concerns that the board which would be set up to regulate water use did not include any representation for Indigenous communities, and that therefore Indigenous communities would not have a vote on mining projects which could "negatively affect their communities living near water resources" (Alvaro 2014c). The ten-day march from Zamora Chinchipe to Quito, dubbed the 'march for water, life, and the dignity of people,' consisted of Indigenous protestors along with other supporters from leftist groups, students, and other activists and was met with police resistance as officers tried to delay the protestors arrival using roadblocks.

A number of issues brought Indigenous protestors back into the streets in August 2015. Under the banner of the 'march for life and dignity,' Indigenous peoples marched to Quito to bring attention to various demands including the right to bilingual education, the

right to manage water and land resources, and against proposed constitutional amendments that would get rid of presidential term limits. (Al Jazeera 2015b). During the march they were joined by a broad coalition of supporters who also had grievances against President Correa, with a main focus on protesting against proposed constitutional amendments and the increased repression of freedom of speech. Multiple marches numbering in the thousands occurred over the course of a couple of weeks and featured multiple instances of excessive force from police. During the march, a community-organized security team of "the Kichwa and Shuar nationalities lead the demonstration with their spears" to protect Indigenous protestors and supporters (CONAIE 2015a).

Roadblocks

During the August 2015 marches, protestors also blocked roads in "six of the country's 24 provinces, including the Pan-American highway to Peru" (Al Jazeera 2015). Indigenous peoples joined by teachers, unionists, environmentalists, and other protestors utilized large rocks, trees, and burning tires to block off access to major roads (Kozak 2015). These more disruptive tactics were met with brutal suppression in multiple areas. In Saraguro, policemen and military personnel raided the village of mostly Kichwa citizens, destroying houses and arresting and beating people in response to the blockade of the Pan-American highway. At another blockade on a highway that ran from Puyo to Macas in the Amazon, the military "moved against indigenous Shuar and Achuar protesters, beating people and throwing tear-gas bombs" in response to the peaceful blockade (Hill 2015).

In January 2016, the Ecuadorian government officially sold oil exploitation rights in the Amazon to a “consortium of Chinese state-owned oil companies” despite previous protests against the expansion of resource extraction into the region. In response, Indigenous Ecuadorians marched to Quito and gathered in protest outside wearing traditional clothing and held signs with phrases such as "Chinese firms, get off my land!" and "Don't sacrifice the Amazon to petroleum companies!" (Kaiman 2016). Once gathered, various Indigenous leaders held a press conference to announce that “ the government’s process of consultation has been illegal and illegitimate” and that they “reject the plans for oil exploration and exploitation in blocks 79 and 83 and reject plans for additional oil development in the South-Central region” (Thompson 2016).



(Figure 3. Map of Indigenous Territories and Oil Blocks and South-Central Ecuador, Thompson 2016)

Strikes

Another tactic that was utilized during the series of protests in August 2015, and garnered much domestic and international attention, was a general strike. This strike was especially significant in that it marked the first national strike against Correa during his eight years in office (Al Jazeera 2014b). Initiated by the Workers United Front, one of Ecuador's largest trade unions, in response to "new labor regulations and many proposed constitutional amendments," the strike soon took a more general Correa-critical stance and others with similar grievances such as Indigenous groups joined the general strike (Jegroo 2015). CONAIE, Ecuarunari, and NAE (Achuar Nationality of Ecuador) along with other organizations specifically announced their support and intention of joining the strike (CONAIE 2015a).

Physical Occupations

In November 2012 during the VII Annual Meeting of Oil and Energy where the Ecuadorian government announced "the opening of the XI Round, an oil auction in which 13 oil blocks went on sale covering nearly eight million acres of rainforest in the Amazonian provinces of Pastaza and Morona Santiago near the border with Peru", Indigenous protestors gathered outside the Marriott Hotel in Quito where the meeting was being held (Pachamama Alliance 2012). Led by CONAIE and CONFENAIE, the group were able to occupy the

building while being confronted by military, police, and private security forces and refused to leave until granted an audience with the officials at the meeting. Several Indigenous leaders were able to enter the meeting and confront the Minister of Non-Renewable Energy, Wilson Pastor, and share their concerns regarding the expansion of extractive industries into their territory. Later, a formal complaint was filed by the Secretary of Hydrocarbons against the Indigenous leaders calling for their imprisonment and accusing them of "making threats during protests against the oil bidding announcement" (Stiftl 2014).

As tensions arose around the expansion of resource extraction into the Amazon, and Indigenous territories, Indigenous protestors utilized more direct tactics such as physical occupations of mining sites. In August 2016, Shuar protestors occupied 90 hectares of land in the Amazon with the intent of keeping it free from proposed mining operations until they were "forcibly evicted by military troops for 'illegally occupying land' belonging to EXSA", the Chinese company that bought mining rights to the area from the Ecuadorian government (Miranda 2016). In December 2016 after mining operations commenced, Shuar protestors again sought to occupy the Chinese-owned mine and halt mining operations on Indigenous land. This occupation resulted in clashes between Indigenous protestors and private and state police and the arrests of Shuar leaders (Los Angeles Times 2016).

Analysis

Targets

The trend of targets shifting to a more domestic focus continued on in this period as the presence of foreign corporations and organizations continued to be restricted. The state

continued to be a main target, but also significantly grew in strength. During the latter half of Correa's regime state power increasingly became centralized both through new legislation and the utilization of temporary limitations on rights via emergency orders. Indigenous mobilizations in response to the violation of their rights and livelihoods by the state became increasingly complicated by the consolidation of state power, and as a result tactical repertoires had to adjust. Correa also ran a defense on many fronts, limiting the role of the public informally through the mocking of his critics (especially those against his mining plans), legislatively by making specific changes to the legal system, and directly through repressive actions taken to subdue activists (Lewis 2016, 184).

Legislative targets also transitioned during this time from a focus on organizing *for* legislation to protect rights (as was seen during mobilizations around the new constitution and its contents) to organizing *against* new legislation and amendments that threaten Indigenous livelihoods. This new approach, along with a general theme of the current administration more often than not engaging in bad faith discussions with Indigenous leaders, meant that campaigns often took a more direct approach with less of a focus on lobbying and mediation and more of a focus on disruptive tactics.

Resources

Political Resources

With the complete dissociation of Indigenous leaders from Correa's government, direct institutional channels to voice Indigenous grievances were limited. Correa's administration also went on the offense by introducing laws that effectively criminalized

protests and specifically targeted Indigenous leaders as ‘terrorists.’ While the legality of previous mobilizations has been blurred, as with any disruptive protest tactics, these new laws clearly defined a wide range of protest tactics as unlawful and those who engaged in them were subject to fines or imprisonment.

With that said, political resources were not completely barren during this period. Indigenous protestors found new avenues in utilizing the newly established constitution. Since they had rights officially codified in the 2008 constitution, such as the rights of nature and right to prior consent, they were able to use the constitution as a basis for seeking legal justice when their rights were violated. Even in instances where they did not seek out support through court cases, the language used in the constitution was utilized in other protest tactics such as marches to reinforce the fact that Indigenous rights were being violated. In some instances Indigenous peoples also sought out support that they lacked domestically in more international spheres such as advocating for the protection of their rights before the UN.

Social Resources

During this time period a restructuring of social resources available to Indigenous organizers occurred. Moving into the latter half of his presidency, Correa still maintained a large base of support due to the general economic prosperity that most of the population enjoyed under his policies and as a result certain factions of the general population that previously might have been sympathetic to Indigenous grievances dwindled. Along with the direct suppression of Indigenous protests (often at the hands of police) Correa also engaged

in media smear campaigns against Indigenous protestors to try and discourage sympathy or support for the movement. Correa attempted to delegitimize these mobilizations by claiming that Indigenous dissent was a result of foreign agitators or that Indigenous communities were uninformed and did not know what was truly best for themselves. Correa's crack downs on civil society groups and NGOs also drastically affected the social resources available to Indigenous movements and specifically targeted more institutional/organized sources of support. The forced disbanding of Pachamama and Accion Ecologica, two environmentalist organizations that often found themselves in contention with Correa and allied with Indigenous mobilizations, was an especially significant blow to the support base of Indigenous peoples.

While in many aspects this time period saw blows to the support base that Indigenous protesters could utilize during actions, that is not to say that Indigenous protestors and organizations were completely isolated. A significant ally during this period was found in unions such as the United Workers Front. Indigenous organizations and unions found common ground in criticizing proposed constitutional amendments that both groups saw as an attempt by President Correa to undemocratically extend his power and dampen dissent. Through this collaboration came the utilization of new tactics such as a national strike which garnered international media attention. Also notable was the increased collaboration among various Indigenous groups that was not seen previously. During the earlier years of Correa's presidency when various Indigenous organizations were still figuring out if/how to align themselves with the new administration, collaboration during mobilizations of resistance between the groups was often limited. By 2011, most Indigenous groups had officially cut any ties they had to Correa's administration and many

mobilizations saw collaboration between the organizations, often demonstrating as a united Indigenous front.

Conclusion

The last time period analyzed above saw conflicts that reached David and Goliath proportions. Indigenous mobilizations were forced to take new shapes as their targets became almost impenetrable from typical domestic institutional tactics. This period saw an increase in the violent suppression of protest, a revival of foreign threats sanctioned through the state in which the Ecuadorian government sold the rights to Indigenous land to Chinese extractive industries, and the violation of constitutional rights that Indigenous peoples fought to be codified only a few years prior, among others. Less frequently utilized tactics such as physical occupations of land/property and national strikes became a necessity in these instances. There were things that did not change such as the frequent use of marches as a main tactic and staple of Indigenous mobilizations.

IV. Conclusion

	Tactics	Targets	Resources (Political/Social)
Period 1: Pre-Correa (2000-2006)	Lawsuits (international), International lobbying, Electoral politics, Marches, Roadblocks, Physical occupations, Direct confrontation*	State (policies), foreign entities (corporations)	International coalitions (INGOs, foreign lawyers), broad public support, environmentalist coalitions, union coalitions
Period 2: Early Correa (2006-2011)	Domestic lobbying (Constitution), Electoral politics, Lawsuits (domestic), Marches, Roadblocks	State (policies, new constitution)	Judicial/legislative channels, congressional representation, Indigenous coalitions
Period 3: Late Correa (2011-2017)	Signature collection for referendum, International lobbying, Electoral politics*, Marches, Roadblocks, Strikes, Physical occupations	State, foreign entities (state granted extraction rights)	International coalitions, constitutional rights, union coalitions

(Figure 4. Overview of trends across time periods, *less frequently utilized)

How do the previously analyzed time periods, Pre-Correa (2000-2006), Early Correa (2006-2011) and Late Correa (2011-2017), shed light on the question of what factors affect tactical choice, and how? What does analyzing Indigenous movements in these different time periods reveal? Throughout these various periods numerous Indigenous mobilizations were surveyed with a specific focus on what tactics were utilized. It became Immediately

clear that a variety of tactics were utilized during these three time periods with many tactics being exclusive to certain periods or, if carrying on into other periods, adjusted in various ways. With clear distinctions seen between these different time periods, we return again to the question of what affects the availability or utilization of these tactics. What changes were seen between these different periods that can explain the variation in tactical choice?

Using the progression of Indigenous resistance over the three time periods within 2000-2017, two major observations become clear regarding tactical choice. Specifically, decisions regarding what tactics to utilize and more generally what tactics are available are heavily impacted by the (1) political opportunity structure Indigenous movements are mobilizing within and (2) the public opinion or perception of the targets of Indigenous grievances.

Political Opportunity

Political opportunity structures, as introduced previously, assert that social movements are heavily influenced by political opportunities, or opportunities to engage within political institutions. When political opportunities are not available in domestic settings, we see an increase in tactics that utilize international institutions. Although, as seen in the Late-Correa period in which collaboration with foreign entities was hindered by restrictive legislation that created barriers to the presence of foreign NGOs in the country, more politically 'closed' states do not always mean an easy path to international support.

The decision whether to engage with electoral politics is also an important part of political opportunities. Pachakutik went from being granted ministerial positions at certain points in the early 2000s, to running their own unsuccessful candidate then later providing

reluctant endorsements in the 2006 election, to fully refusing to run their own candidate and endorse any others. This trend illustrates the increasing disillusionment many predominant Indigenous organizations had towards electoral politics outside of local elections. Even in situations where electoral politics might not be systematically restricted as a tactic, mobilizations might still decide not to utilize it as a tactic, whether due to opinions on effectiveness as a tactic or worries about negative repercussions.

More generally, as predicted by other social movement theorists, when political opportunities were lacking in which Indigenous peoples could establish dialogue with the state, Indigenous organizations engaged in more non-institutional tactics (often in an attempt to force a dialogue). In the Pre-Correa and Late Correa eras, we see especially disruptive non-institutional tactics such as physical occupations and even armed confrontations, tactics that were utilized due to the absence of other options (such as institutional tactics).

The stability of political opportunity structures, whether they are established or exist in a period of transition, also influences tactical choice. During periods of transition where we see the remodeling of state institutions, political opportunities start to shift, and novel institutional tactics become available or utilized. This is exemplified in the utilization of new tactics that coincided with, or directly targeted, the creation of the new constitution.

Specific observations from case studies

Under administrations of the early 21st century before Correa rose to power, the state was relatively decentralized and unresponsive to Indigenous concerns let alone Indigenous participation in political structures. As a result, institutional tactics focused on more international dimensions, searching outside Ecuador's borders for support not found at

home. Indigenous communities pursued lawsuits with the help of foreign lawyers and even took cases to the UN via the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

In the second time period where we see Correa's entrance as a political leader, the state itself is in a time of transition. With the arrival of the Pink Tide in Ecuador and the political restructuring that accompanied it, new institutional tactics became available. This is especially evident with the multitude of tactics that were utilized regarding the creation of the new constitution, both institutional and non-institutional. While non-institutional tactics followed previous patterns (utilizing marches and roadblocks), there was almost an entire new arsenal of institutional tactics that were not utilized in the Pre-Correa period (2000-2006). With the introduction of the new constitution, Indigenous mobilizations had a renewed focus on institutional tactics such as lobbying and tactics that had to seek support outside of Ecuador, such as court cases, now could more easily function domestically as the new constitution provided a legal basis for addressing their grievances. Important to note also is that political opportunity structures do not only affect access to or the utilization of institutional tactics. Especially with the establishment of the new constitution in 2008, even with non-institutional tactics such as marches the language of the constitution was utilized to bring attention to the rights, protected by the new constitution, which were being violated.

As Correa and the state started to consolidate power, political opportunities shifted again to a more closed or heavily regulated context which created barriers to accessing political institutions. Protest in general was effectively criminalized due to new laws, and Indigenous protestors and leaders were especially targeted. In response, Indigenous peoples once again utilized more transnational institutional tactics, specifically lobbying international organizations in lieu of pursuing the lack of political opportunities

domestically. Similar to previous periods with a lack of channels for dialogue with the state, Indigenous mobilizations adopted more escalated tactics such as occupying mining sites and storming government buildings.

Public Opinion/Perception of Targets and Grievances

Public opinion of targets and grievances associated with Indigenous mobilizations have major implications for tactical choice, especially regarding tactics that depend on the availability of social resources. Opinions on Indigenous targets/grievances affected coalitions that were available to utilize at different times. Also tactics that needed a relatively large amount of 'people power,' such as national marches or strikes, are typically more accessible when targets and/or grievances are more sympathetic to the broader population. This is not to say that in order to utilize more people-intensive tactics such as marches and strikes Indigenous mobilizations must have popular support. When Indigenous communities mobilized in opposition to Correa's early mining and water privatization laws they were joined by campesinos who lived near affected areas, and when the United Workers Front called for a strike in response to proposed laws that affected labor regulations and presidential term limits and were joined by Indigenous protestors. Even in times of relative isolation, if certain populations are affected by the same targets of grievances as Indigenous peoples there is the opportunity for allyship and coalition building.

When Indigenous peoples mobilized against targets that were perceived in general negatively by the public, they typically had an easier time utilizing tactics that are more effective with outside support. Indigenous mobilizations that targeted unpopular actors such

as neoliberal presidents or foreign multinational corporations had a wider range of tactics at their disposal due to the additional support they had from non-Indigenous sympathizers.

Nevertheless, Indigenous peoples' perspectives on targets or grievances are not always universally shared by the rest of the population. Grievances surrounding mining were especially polarizing, especially with the introduction of more petro-nationalist stances. The tactics utilized in these mobilizations were often limited by lack of social resources, or utilized very specific coalitions of the affected parties. Aside from internal conflicts that non-Indigenous communities had with the targets/grievances of Indigenous mobilizations, state leaders throughout all the periods discussed often engaged in targeted media campaigns against Indigenous protestors in an effort to discredit their mobilizations. External attacks on the credibility of Indigenous communities, references to their lack of intelligence or accusations that foreign agitators influenced their movements, further deteriorated sympathetic support for Indigenous mobilizations.

Specific observations from case studies

During the Pre-Correa period, many Indigenous mobilizations centered around proposed austerity measures and trade deals. These targets and the grievances about them were perceived fairly uniformly by the general public, and Indigenous mobilizations were then able to utilize a diverse set of tactics and specific coalitions. Neoliberal policies especially impacted the general public negatively and as a result supporters were more inclined to participate or aid in a variety of both institutional and non-institutional tactics Indigenous peoples adopted in opposition to these policies. Foreign entities such as multinational corporations were also a common target during this period along with state

institutions and were generally viewed much in the same vein as neoliberal policies with the negative impacts they had on the masses.

With the ascent of Correa's administration, outside perceptions of Indigenous grievances and targets became more complicated. During this period, many grievances were more specific to Indigenous communities, such as new legislation that restructured control over natural resources and proposals to expand mining. Many previous sympathetic coalitions no longer shared the concerns Indigenous communities mobilized around or their qualms about certain policies were curbed by believing that the benefits of such policies like mining expansion outweigh the costs. Also Indigenous mobilizations that directly targeted Correa or policies that he enacted were met with a lack of overwhelming public support, as his administration was generally viewed positively by the public and his main critics were limited to foreign investors and elites. As a result, previous coalitions were no longer feasible as Correa served as a much more contentious target than targets from the previous period such as neoliberal policies which were nearly universally opposed. Non-institutional tactics especially were met with a lack of support due to the perception that they were an attempt to challenge what was seen as a legitimate, democratic state. Many tactics that relied on masses of people were carried out primarily by coalitions between various Indigenous organizations. It is during this time that we see a notable uptick in collaboration between different Indigenous organizations that at times in the past have found themselves at odds with each other, such as CONAIE, FEINE, and FENOCIN.

While public perception of Correa's administration remained relatively high going into the second half of his term, Indigenous mobilizations were not as starved for support outside their community as they were in the early years of Correa's presidency. His

increasingly authoritarian stance on protest and free speech started to alienate the general public, in addition to general unrest at a worsening economy. Some of the policies enacted by his administration were met with strong opposition even outside of Indigenous communities. Correa's decision to resume drilling in Yasuni National Park did not just provoke the ire of Indigenous peoples, but environmentalist organizations were also angered by the encroachment of protected lands. From this came the powerful coalition of Indigenous and environmentalist groups that formed YasUnidos, and through this coalition they were able to collect signatures in an attempt to force a referendum on the matter. Also, proposed constitutional amendments and labor regulations brought together the United Workers Front union and Indigenous groups, and through this coalition they were able to enact a national strike. Indigenous coalitions also further strengthened during this time as there was no second guessing Correa as a target, as we saw in the beginning of his presidency when Indigenous groups were still debating how to/whether they should align with his administration. As opposed to mobilizing against specific grievances or targets, many of the tactics utilized during this later period of Correa's administration were focused on a collection of related grievances such as rights to resource management *and* opposition to constitutional amendments *and* laws suppressing protest and freedom of speech which garnered more broad support. With a more grab-bag of grievances approach, Indigenous mobilizations were able to utilize a larger portion of the general public in tactics as opposed to more narrowly focused grievances. These broader coalitions not only aided in marches, but also more disruptive protests such as roadblocks.

Implications and Future Directions

The observations and analysis conducted in this work provide a deeper understanding of Indigenous protest. Specifically, Indigenous protests and how they mobilize are dependent on political opportunities available and public perception of targets of Indigenous grievances. In times where Indigenous communities were organizing in situations with lack of channels for dialogue with the state, they tended to utilize more non-institutional tactics. If their targets were international in nature under similar circumstances (such as foreign corporations), their tactics were more international in nature also (such as utilizing international coalitions). When mobilizing against unsympathetic targets, such as neoliberal policies and the administrations that enacted them, Indigenous protestors were able to use more high-capacity tactics such as marches and national strikes. In contrast, mobilizing against more generally popular targets, like Correa's early administrations, tactics were more limited and Indigenous protestors had to depend on more disruptive non-institutional tactics and specific coalitions. This work is not only useful for academics looking further into social movement theory and analysis of tactical choice, but also can prove to be a useful tool for allies to Indigenous communities. For human rights organizations, grassroots organizers, or individuals looking to support Indigenous peoples in their struggles it is important to critically understand the dynamics of Indigenous protest; why they are protesting the way they are and what constraints they are under.

Nevertheless, research remains to be done. This research remained rather localized, focusing specifically on Ecuador and Indigenous experiences within the state. Transnational dimensions were limited to tactics that utilized support from foreign NGOs or participation in international meetings. In a world in which globalization remains prominent; transnational perspectives matter in research. Less explored in the previous pages are

questions as to how the case study of Ecuador fits into more transnational cases; Can this analysis also be applied to Indigenous mobilizations in other regions? How have the transnational connections of Indigenous mobilizations in Ecuador specifically shifted over time? While there has been work done on more regional connections, as many Indigenous communities even in Ecuador span many neighboring borders, bringing these cases into a more global perspective and situating them in global trends can provide even more insight into how these movements have adjusted to address an increasingly interconnected world.

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