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Staying Alive: Regional Integration Organizations and Vulnerable Leaders

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by

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The dissertation of Christina Cottiero is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically.

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DEDICATION

To my family: For making everything possible.

EPIGRAPH

The world is a dancing masquerade. If you want to understand it, you can't remain standing in one place.

—Igbo proverb

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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There is growing recognition that many illiberal leaders cooperate as readily through regional organizations as their liberal counterparts. Particularly in Africa, illiberal heads of state cooperate through regional integration organizations to address coups d'etat, insurgencies, and other threats to regional stability. What sustains their collaboration? I present a theory of regional cooperation driven by mutual interest in regional stability and protection for heads of state. RIOs rely on member contributions to address threats to leaders, and they elicit contributions with a combination of inducements and punishments. Repressive leaders contribute to regional security initiatives to receive protection and avoid punishment. Using original security personnel deployment data for 54 member states from Africa-based RIOs, I present results of two statistical tests. First, I

find that repressive leaders who are likely to need security assistance were more likely to deploy personnel to support co-members between 1990 and 2015. In a second test at the directed dyad-RIO-year level, I find evidence for the underlying mechanism that leaders contribute because they expect to receive security assistance from RIO members if they do so. Leaders who previously contributed personnel to co-members were more likely to receive military support from co-members in the future. Non-contributors were significantly more likely to be targeted by co-members for anti-government military interventions. Turning to qualitative evidence, including under-utilized Nigerian archival documents, I assess whether theorized causal mechanisms were operative in the Economic Community of West African States' responses to 17 political and security crises. I find that in the preponderance of crises, whether a leader was in good standing with co-members weighed heavily on ECOWAS co-members' deliberations about whether to initiate pro-government or anti-government interventions. These findings shed light on dynamics sustaining illiberal international cooperation.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In the mid- to late-twentieth century, newly independent former-colonies began establishing regional integration organizations (RIOs).[1] Across Africa, there was little consensus about the purposes and eventual goals of these intergovernmental organizations. African leaders debated the desirability of alternative Pan-African proposals, most notably from Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame Nkrumah, and Julius Nyerere. These leaders and their contemporaries held divergent views on whether Africa should aspire to a Pan-African federation, sub-regional integration organizations preserving independent national governments, or more modest economic agreements.[2] At the very least, most founders agreed on the necessity of negotiating as blocs for more equitable treatment within global institutions like the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. Leaders hoped cooperating through RIOs would help their countries overcome economic dependency, underdevelopment, and neocolonialism.[3]

In 1963, discussions of Pan-Africanism and collective self-reliance culminated in the founding of the Organization of African Unity. Around the same time, heads of state founded regional integration organizations in West, East, Central, and Southern Africa. A general consensus about limiting the scope of RIO policy to preserve state sovereignty quickly emerged. Regional

[1] These RIOs are also commonly referred to as regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa.
[2] See Getachew (2019) for more on this debate.
[3] See Aniche (2020) for a historical overview of African regionalism and leaders' goals.

organizations therefore took gradual steps toward integration, largely consigning discussions of full political integration under a Pan-African government to the past.

For decades, African RIOs produced far more political declarations than actionable plans. Member states also made limited progress toward their stated goals for economic integration. Intra-regional investment, formal trade, and infrastructure connectivity lagged behind targeted levels. Implementation gaps reflected many leaders' disinterest in reducing non-tariff barriers, such as subsidies and import controls that protect domestic interest groups. In fact, several African RIOs did not survive for long; the East African Community dissolved in 1977 after only ten years of existence. Remaining organizations were understaffed and underfunded as of the 1990s. Many observers viewed African RIOs as largely under-performing or hollow development projects.[4] Jeffrey Herbst (2007), for example, argued that self-interested African leaders only see RIOs as sovereignty boosting clubs. In these "clubs," African heads of state[5] attempt to reify their fragile domestic authority, new borders, and prestige, rather than pursuing meaningful policy coordination.

However, it is difficult to reconcile the notion that African political elites view RIOs as mere symbolic forums with their post-Cold War pivot toward deeper political and security cooperation. In recent years, African leaders agreed to expand RIOs' political and security-focused programs, generating new protocols and obligations for members. Rather than allowing African RIOs to die off, leaders created or revived additional RIOs. The East African Community, for example, was revived in 2000. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) replaced an existing preferential trade area in 1994, introducing a permanent secretariat and expanded mandate. Similar processes proceeded in each sub-region. And, rather than limiting RIO authority to intervene in members' domestic politics, leaders worked with RIO staff to organize military and diplomatic interventions during member state crises. At least since the late 1990s, African regional integration organizations are the "first responders" to crises with regional implications. Heads of state increasingly cooperate through RIOs to counter terrorism, rebellions, and mutinous militaries. In several regions, RIO projects grew during waves of member state democratizations as well as

[4] Mistry (2000).

[5] I use "leader" and "head of state" interchangeably.

during subsequent reversals toward authoritarian rule. Many Africans began to question whether these RIOs actually pursue common welfare improvements or protect the interests of political elites.[6]

This dissertation focuses on explaining what objectives these RIOs actually pursue, why they matter for heads of state, and how they overcome barriers to cooperation. I address these questions with a theory of regional coordination and collective action driven by leaders' shared interest in personal protection and local stability. I argue that RIOs have important characteristics that allow them to facilitate collective security management and organize mutual aid for heads of state. RIO staff are coordinators who increase the interoperability of members' security institutions and integrate donor priorities with members' funding needs. The RIOs' protocols create common knowledge about leaders' obligations and what behaviors are acceptable. This common knowledge includes what members must contribute to RIO institutions and initiatives, such as security operations, to remain in "good standing" with co-members. Protocols also define "red lines," or unacceptable actions that threaten regional stability and will provoke backlash. I describe the types of benefits RIOs generate for cooperative members in good standing, as well as mechanisms to punish non-cooperators who cross red lines. Importantly, I explain why collectively providing inducements and punishments–or "carrots and sticks"–to cooperative and non-cooperative co-members is incentive-compatible for heads of state seeking stability. Regardless of regime type, most leaders want to select for neighbors whose actions benefit their own security and regional stability, allowing destabilizing leaders to fail. RIOs enable member state leaders to pursue these ends through an internationally recognized institution.

I test the theory's applicability to RIOs based in Africa with multiple methods, drawing on original data sources and field research. This includes new data on security personnel deployments between African RIO co-members, augmented data on biased military interventions, annual coup risk estimates for each country, interviews with West African political elites, and Nigerian archival

[6]Survey data from Afrobarometer indicates that most Africans do not view their regional organizations or the African Union as being very helpful. Of course, this varies widely across countries. Liberians are the most likely to view their regional organization as helpful (the majority do) and Moroccans are the least likely to describe their regional organization as helpful (the majority do not) (Olapade et al. 2016).

material. Interviews with regional organization staff, former government ministers, diplomats, military officials, and a former president all provide insider perspectives on the workings of African regional organizations. Archival records from former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo's administration also lend particularly candid insights into elite decision-making on regional issues. As the majority of these archival documents were "classified" and not intended for viewing beyond advisors close to the President, they are less susceptible to self-censorship. The results from cross-national, cross-regional statistical analyses, large-n qualitative analysis, and short case studies all indicate that vulnerable, illiberal leaders cooperate through RIOs to improve their chances of survival.

1.1 Can illiberal regional organizations sustain cooperation?

This dissertation places heads of state and their self-interested pursuits at the center of RIO decision-making regarding security cooperation. Heads of state are the primary actors deciding how extensive regional cooperation should become to help them address domestic and transnational threats. Though this is a simplifying assumption, African heads of state from democracies and non-democracies alike tend to have significant latitude to chart their states' foreign policies.[7] Regime type matters in part because leaders of more repressive regimes typically have more to lose when domestic safeguards and regional organizations fail to protect them. They are the most likely to face severe blow-back upon removal[8] and therefore, I argue, are also some of the most invested parties in protective RIOs.

In contrast to this dissertation, international relations scholars generally have argued that heads of state from democracies face stronger political incentives to cooperate through RIOs than their non-democratic counterparts. Leaders campaigning for re-election in democracies can tout success in negotiating international agreements beneficial to voters as part of their election

[7] See Quinn (2010) for a review of this topic.
[8] Frantz and Stein (2017); Geddes et al. (2014); Goemans (2008).

campaign platforms.[9] Co-members may also be more willing to collaborate with democracies because they are seen as more trustworthy allies.[10] Not only are decision-making processes more open to co-members' scrutiny in democracies, but citizens in democracies can punish leaders who abrogate international agreements by voting them out of office. Many scholars claim that because they are accountable to more domestic interest groups and voters, it is costlier for democrats to break commitments. By this logic, when democrats commit to RIO security cooperation they should be more likely to honor their commitments.[11] Leaders in new democracies may also want to join RIOs that apply sanctions for undemocratic behavior and even intervene militarily against human rights violators. Such RIOs could tie the hands of a leader's political successors, dissuading them from reversing democratic reforms.[12] This body of work suggests that RIOs are useful for well-established and new democracies.

Therefore, we might expect that regional cooperation increased in Africa because, as African countries democratized, their domestic institutions were more conducive to regional security cooperation. The timing of the African Union's creation in 2000–and especially its Constitutive Act centering democracy and security cooperation–might seem to lend credence to this. At the end of the "third wave of democratization" in the 1990s, rhetoric in African RIO statements and protocols increasingly linked democracy, human rights, and stability. In several notable instances, African RIOs threatened or carried out military intervention in response to attacks against elected heads of state.[13]

However, African RIOs counted a mixture of democracies and non-democracies among their members as they created security protocols, and no African RIO has ever been entirely comprised of democratic or democratizing member states. In 1990, 5 African states were electoral democracies and 48 were not. Although many states democratized in ensuing years, autocracies outnumbered

[9] Mansfield et al. (2002); Hollyer and Rosendorff (2012). Leaders can also shift blame for negative outcomes away from themselves and toward international causes (Mansfield et al. 2002).

[10] Keohane (1984); Svolik (2006). On how democracies are sometimes worse allies, see Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004). A number of authors find that regime similarity also matters (Leeds 1999; Mattes and Rodríguez 2014; Werner and Lemke 1997).

[11] For example, see Gaubatz (1996); Leeds (2003a).

[12] See Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006, 2008); Pevehouse (2002, 2005); Poast and Urpelainen (2014, 2018).

[13] Khadiagala (2018).

electoral democracies still in 2019, 29 to 26.[14] RIOs which suspend members for undemocratic practices do so only sporadically.[15] Decision-making within African RIOs also has never been very democratic, as it remains dominated by heads of states. While a number of scholars credit the importance of African RIOs' technocrats for decision-making,[16] in subsequent chapters I discuss the overwhelming evidence that leaders limit technocrats' independence when inconvenienced. Although African RIOs allow staff to formulate the content of certain policies and hold consultations with civil society groups, member state leaders retain the authority to set RIO priorities and veto policies they dislike.[17] Numerous scholars now interpret RIO protocols banning unconstitutional transfers of power and enabling co-members to overturn coups as indications of African leaders' concerns for stability and their own security, rather than genuine concern for democracy.[18] By working through RIOs to address security and governance problems on the continent, African leaders sought (in part) to undercut the heavy influence of external actors, and particularly former colonizers.[19]

In other words, the impetus for deeper regional cooperation did not originate with democratization and the need to appeal to voters. Most leaders from partially democratized states and autocracies participate fully in negotiating new political and security protocols alongside democratic members. I argue that the nature of security threats faced by heads of state and international trends matter more for explaining cooperation through RIOs. Repressive leaders concerned with domestic security threats are often the most invested in regional security initiatives. Although my argument runs counter to some international relations theory, it speaks to a body of research on authoritarian international cooperation.

Early work on regional organizations with illiberal members was often descriptive and

[14]These figures are calculated using the Varieties of Democracy Project's Electoral Democracy Index in Version 10. On the variable's 0-1 scale, I use the democratic threshold of .42, following Kasuya and Mori (2019). Regimes scoring above .42 are classified as electoral democracies.

[15]Donno (2010).

[16]E.g. Balogun (2020); Legler and Tieku (2010).

[17]International organization scholars describe these as "low pooling" organizations Borzel (2012); Hooghe and Marks (2015).

[18]Dersso (2017); Nathan (2016). Some leaders in the early 2000s did seem genuine in their embrace of democratic ideals, but their willingness to regularly enforce this among co-members was short-lived (Gyimah-Boadi 2015).

[19]Hartmann (2016).

included single or paired case studies.[20] Scholars have started to establish regularities across regions and seek generalizable theories of authoritarian international cooperation. Across RIOs, autocrats often share military technology and intelligence, target dissidents with cross-border policing and counter-terrorism initiatives, and attempt to legitimize stigmatized authoritarian policies.[21] Although these are some of the same benefits of cooperation that I discuss in subsequent chapters, I draw new conclusions about how RIOs manage collective action problems.

Recent research also examines how differences among authoritarian regime types matter for regional cooperation, rather than only distinguishing between autocracies and democracies. Some international relations scholars argue that personalist dictators more easily make and break commitments to RIO co-members without paying significant domestic political costs compared to other autocrats.[22] Co-members are therefore less likely to view personalist leaders' commitments as credible, and may choose to cooperate with other autocrats instead.[23] However, fewer agreements between states does not necessarily indicate a lack of cooperation; Carlson and Koremenos (2021) find that absolute monarchies sign fewer agreements but engage in significant informal cooperation. In contrast, this dissertation suggests there is not a straightforward relationship between regime type and leader propensity to cooperate. Regime type matters in conjunction with the security environment a leader faces. Uniformity of particular democratic or autocratic regime types within a regional organization appears to be less consequential for collective action than prior work suggested.

The literature on international cooperation has long taken as axiomatic that mutual interest in benefits from cooperation alone cannot account for states overcoming collective action problems. However, the issue of how autocrats concerned with domestic and transnational security threats overcome collective action problems has not received sufficient attention. Scholars typically either note that shirking is a major issue for illiberal RIOs or focus on how regional hegemons–particularly

[20] E.g. Allison (2008); Ambrosio (2008); Collins (2009).

[21] Debre (2020); Kneuer et al. (2018); Libman and Obydenkova (2018); Obydenkova and Libman (2019); Söderbaum (2004); Söderbaum and Tavares (2009).

[22] Chyzh (2014); Mattes and Rodríguez (2014).

[23] Mattes and Rodríguez (2014).

Russia and China–pay to sustain cooperation. There is also evidence that at least some RIOs with mostly authoritarian members are inactive "zombies."[24] Nevertheless, Haftel and Hofmann (2017) find that inclusion of a regional hegemon is not a significant predictor of which RIOs, among 28 regional economic organizations from across the world, developed deep security cooperation arrangements. This dissertation also demonstrates illiberal leaders free ride on the contributions of regional hegemons far less often than we might expect.

In general, scholars of African security politics emphasize the differences in sub-regions' security cultures. Rivalries among leaders in North and East Africa often stymie cooperation through their respective RIOs. Solidarity is typically deeper among heads of state in West and Southern Africa, though West Africa's security infrastructure remains more developed than that of Southern Africa. And in Central Africa, RIOs are more clearly focused on extracting rents from donors.[25] While cross-regional differences are certainly important and no two regional organizations operate in the same ways, drawing out generalizations about cooperation here is beneficial for our understanding of international cooperation.

1.2 Plan of dissertation

In subsequent chapters, I develop and test a theory of regional cooperation driven by leaders' interest in regional stability and mutual aid. Chapter 2 first introduces the theory and discusses its applicability for African RIOs. I argue that heads of state adapt RIOs to increase their own security, particularly when heads of state are most concerned about surviving security threats from domestic and non-state actors. RIOs are focal institutions and hubs of staff coordination, where leaders set expectations about what they each must contribute to remain entitled to protective benefits. RIOs set rules both to encourage members' contributions to regional initiatives, and to define "red line" actions that threaten regional stability. RIOs provide benefits to cooperators and deny benefits or apply punishments to leaders who take destabilizing actions. Because co-members are motivated to

[24] Regarding zombie international organizations, see Gray (2018).
[25] Hartmann (2016).

keep cooperative neighbors nearby and allow problematic neighbors to be replaced, they participate in meting out benefits and punishments. From this theory of regional cooperation, I derive testable hypotheses regarding who is most likely to contribute to RIO security initiatives, and where RIO co-members are likely to intervene in support of or against co-members in crisis.

In Chapter 3, I rely on an original data collection effort to test the first set of hypotheses regarding which leaders cooperate to remain eligible for RIO protections. I expect that leaders with the greatest need for African RIOs' protective benefits–repressive heads of state with high coup risk–will be the most motivated to remain in good standing with co-members. This set of repressive leaders faces the highest costs upon removal from office, as they are most likely to end up dead, imprisoned, or in exile. They should therefore be more likely to deploy troops and police as needed to support RIO co-members. To assess the link between repressive leaders' vulnerability to coups and willingness to cooperate, I use deployment data for 54 African and the Middle Eastern states which are members of 12 regional organizations headquartered in Africa. These 12 RIOs encompass all general-purpose regional integration organizations with permanent secretariats and staff based in Africa in the period under consideration, 1990 to 2015. I also generate annual latent coup risk estimates to characterize the vulnerability of each head of state. In statistical analyses at the RIO-state-year level of analysis, I find that repressive leaders most prone to irregular removal through coups d'etat are more likely to deploy security personnel in support of co-members in my sample.

In Chapter 4, I then assess whether leaders who contribute personnel to support RIO co-members do increase their odds of receiving protection as anticipated. I predict that RIO co-members will be more likely to carry out pro-government military interventions for leaders who previously deployed security personnel in support of co-members. Conversely, I predict that RIO co-members will be more likely to carry out anti-government military interventions against leaders who have not contributed personnel in support of co-members. Co-members condition their intervention decisions on leaders' prior actions in part because prior actions are informative signals about leaders' likely future behaviors. Members typically view keeping cooperative neighbors in place as being in their

own best interest. Uncooperative co-members are likely to continue free riding or destabilizing the region in the future based on their revealed preferences, and therefore co-members are more likely to support their replacement. In quantitative tests of these hypotheses, I again draw on original security personnel deployment data for members of Africa-based RIOs. I also build upon other scholars' datasets of biased military interventions to identify pro- and anti-government military interventions across Africa between 1990 and 2015. Quantitative tests provide evidence consistent with the theory. RIO co-members are more likely to deploy troops in support of leaders with prior records of security cooperation. They are more likely to participate in anti-government interventions against leaders who have not previously contributed to regional security operations.

Chapter 5 focuses on responses to member state crises for one organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Whereas previous chapters identified whether African RIO members behaved as expected on average, in this chapter I am able to look for evidence of theorized causal mechanisms linking leaders' prior behavior to co-members' willingness to provide support. I select 17 political and security crises which occurred in members of the Economic Community of West African States between 1990 and 2017. These are all crises where ECOWAS considered or did authorize a military intervention, or where ECOWAS was empowered to intervene based on protocols and norms at the time of crisis. For each crisis, I assess whether the leader in crisis was in good standing with co-members based on prior contributions to regional security operations, or whether they had a record of destabilizing co-members. I then assess whether their standing informed co-members' responses to the crisis in the manner anticipated by the theory. After establishing the prevalence of pro-government responses to members in good standing and anti-government responses to members not in good standing, I turn to three cases. For each case, I trace the decision-making process undertaken by ECOWAS co-members and find that leaders' prior actions weighed heavily on how co-members chose to respond.

Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the dissertation's findings. I discusses variation in decision-making across African RIOs and which results are likely generalizable beyond Africa. I also draw out implications for political scientists and policymakers. Given that the United States and

other partners in Europe provide considerable funding to African RIOs, understanding the biases built into RIO decision-making is important for US foreign policy.

Chapter 2

Theory

International relations scholars are often skeptical about the ability or inclination of illiberal leaders to cooperate. Nevertheless, illiberal leaders continue to cooperate with their democratic and non-democratic counterparts in RIOs across Africa. In this chapter I argue that RIO competencies evolve as tools for these leaders' survival. Rather than preventing cooperation, leaders' concern for political survival and personal safety can motivate collective action.

In subsequent sections, I introduce a theory of cooperation and collective action within regional integration organizations. I argue that mutual interest in regional stability and protection for heads of state drives cooperation in RIOs. Leaders in regions prone to intrastate and transnational conflicts–and particularly illiberal leaders–rely on co-members' commitments to cooperatively manage political and security crises. To make this work, RIOs also coordinate inducement and punishment mechanisms. These mechanisms encourage members who might otherwise free ride to contribute to regional security initiatives. Access to protective benefits that RIOs provide to heads of state continuously or during crises is contingent on one's record of contributions and "good standing." The threat of punishment, such as denial of security assistance, discourages leaders from destabilizing co-members. Whether a leader cooperates or undermines neighbors' security informs co-members' beliefs about whether that leader is likely to jeopardize regional stability in the future. By generating protocols and interacting through RIOs over time, members establish

common expectations about what each is obligated to contribute toward regional initiatives.

I first discuss why heads of state address threats to regime security and broader regional stability through RIOs. Particularly in the post-Cold War period, a number of African leaders saw the importance of regional cooperation for deescalating and containing civil conflicts. Subsequent sections describe how RIOs use “carrots and sticks," and why meting out benefits and punishments is incentive-compatible for many members. I conclude by discussing hypotheses drawn from the theory.

2.1 The evolution of African RIOs

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, African RIOs whose founding charters focused primarily on economic development and trade evolved to incorporate agreements on security and political institutions. Through preexisting and newly formed RIOs, heads of state shifted tactics in response to post-Cold War politics. Before, leaders seeking external military assistance had prioritized relationships with “Great Powers." The United States, Russia, and their respective allies provided funding, training, and weapons as they fought proxy wars and sought to extend their influence. But events of the 1990s demonstrated to leaders that they could not count on Great Power patrons and their ideological allies during security crises. After the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia, American policymakers expressed greater reluctance to deploy across the continent. And when African leaders asked the United States and the United Nations Security Council to deploy troops authorized for combat into Rwanda and Liberia during humanitarian catastrophes in those countries, they failed to do so. In Liberia, Nigeria pushed the Economic Community of West African States to fill the resultant security void by deploying its first ceasefire-monitoring mission (ECOMOG). Because there was generally no peace or ceasefire to maintain, ECOMOG troops fought as parties to the conflict.

After these disasters, and after observing the ECOMOG intervention, many policymakers

recognized that African RIOs could play a larger role in stemming escalating conflicts.[1] Some sub-regional organizations already had defense pacts, but protocols for RIO military interventions and conflict resolution were largely nonexistent prior to the 1990s.[2] Compared to the continent-wide Organization of African Unity, creating security protocols in sub-regional groupings with fewer members proved to be more tractable.[3] As many African states also democratized in the 1990s and 2000s, RIOs included more norms-laden language in their security protocols. Most hired additional staff and arranged new departments in their Secretariats to resemble those of the European Union.[4] Still, Figure 2.1 shows that the majority of African states remained undemocratic for most of the post-Cold War period.[5]



Figure 2.1: Counts of Democracies and Non-Democracies in Africa, 1990-2017
Data from the Varieties of Democracy Project Version 10

[1] Bah (2009); Coleman (2011); Henke (2019).

[2] Bah (2009).

[3] Haftel and Hofmann (2017, 2019).

[4] Bach (2016); Hanson and Tang (2015) provide more in-depth accounts of the evolution of African regionalisms and regional organizations.

[5] These figures are calculated using the Varieties of Democracy Project's Electoral Democracy Index in Version 10. On the variable's 0-1 scale, I use the democratic threshold of .42, following Kasuya and Mori (2019). Regimes scoring above .42 are classified as electoral democracies.

Although historical junctures provide some impetus for enhanced political and security protocols, members have to rely on each other to honor new commitments. In any regional security arrangement, temptation to free ride–enjoying collective security benefits without contributing–arises.[6] Because large regional powers like Nigeria and South Africa face serious negative externalities when local conflicts escalate, they often cannot credibly threaten to do nothing during crises. If there are no consequences for forcing these larger states to bear the costs of providing regional security, a moral hazard problem arises. Co-members who do not have to pay the costs of dealing with security crises may be less careful to avoid provoking crises in the first place. Therefore, several conditions are necessary to ensure that smaller member states do not free ride or engage in provocative behavior while allowing their larger co-members to deploy into crises alone. First, I argue that regional organizations incorporate inducements and punishments, or "carrots and sticks" to encourage cooperation and discourage risky behavior that threatens regional security. And the usage of carrots and sticks, including helping cooperators and punishing non-cooperators, must be self-enforcing. In other words, leaders must have incentives to take these actions not dependent on RIO rules alone. In the following section, I identify the connection between leader's intrinsic motivations and the application of RIO inducements and punishments.

2.2 Drivers of regional security cooperation

I assume that heads of state are motivated foremost to protect themselves, and they evaluate regional cooperation as it relates to that goal. Heads of state care not just about protecting their positions of power, but more fundamentally about guaranteeing their own safety.[7] This desire is shared by leaders of various democratic and non-democratic regimes alike. However, regime security is tied more closely to personal security in illiberal regimes, where heads of state rely heavily on repression. If repressive heads of state are removed prematurely from office, they face

[6] Lake (2009).

[7] Similar assumptions underlie David (1991)'s theory of omnibalancing among "weak and illegitimate" leaders, who make alignment decisions with the goal of ensuring their political and physical survival.

greater peril than leaders of democracies do. As Frantz and Stein (2017) note, “authoritarian leaders who fall to coups face death, imprisonment, or exile 73% of the time." State and non-state actors comprising the international community are also less likely to condemn and mobilize against actors toppling repressive leaders than they are for democratic leaders.[8] Repressive leaders therefore have strong incentives to participate in RIOs that can deter assailants and provide security assistance when their personal safety is at issue.

When RIO co-members assist leaders in crisis, including illiberal leaders, scholars often cite immediate economic, prestige, or security-related benefits as incentives causing co-members to meet their obligations.[9] However, sending security personnel to support other heads of state is not costless. Particularly in the absence of UN wages or in more dangerous locations where soldiers may deem conditions intolerable, the payoffs of contributing personnel are greatly reduced. Militarily assisting co-members in these cases actually can increase the odds of one’s own soldiers mutinying.[10] And again, in the presence of larger regional powers, temptation arises among the majority of leaders to free ride on larger states’ efforts.[11] If domestic groups are unlikely to hold repressive leaders accountable for breaking international commitments, illiberal leaders also will pay fewer costs for shirking.

Although regional powers cannot credibly threaten to ignore crises which endanger themselves and free riders, they can still pick sides when resolving crises. To punish a non-cooperative member in crisis, co-members can side with their opponents. For example, after a coup removes an incumbent, co-members can insist that putschists restore the incumbent to power, and back that demand with force. Or, co-members can choose not to speak out in favor of the deposed leader and allow the putschists to remain, at least temporarily. Therefore, leaders who anticipate that co-members may be the last line of defense against threats to their safety have good reason to

[8] Shannon et al. (2015).

[9] In Sub-Saharan Africa this is largely discussed with respect to peacekeeping i.e. Beswick (2010); Boutton and D’Orazio (2019); Bove and Elia (2011); Passmore et al. (2018); Uzonyi (2015); Ward and Dorussen (2016); Williams (2017); Williams and Nguyen (2018). Bellamy and Williams (2013) provides an overview.

[10] Scholars typically approach this question using data on peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations e.g. Dwyer (2015); Schiel et al. (2020).

[11] Lake (2009).

maintain good standing. This is most important for repressive leaders who likely face imprisonment, death, or exile upon removal from office.[12]

RIOs' rules and norms create common knowledge about what leaders must contribute to remain eligible for RIO benefits, which I refer to as remaining in "good standing." For RIOs with security competencies, members are expected to contribute troops, supplies, and mediation effort to support RIO operations and assist co-members. As member state leaders decide whether to contribute, they weigh the benefits of maintaining good standing and a good reputation against the temptation to free ride. Importantly, leaders know that they can be excluded from targeted benefits and punished if they fail to bear their share of the regional security burden.[13] Rather than taking opportunities to free ride, some illiberal leaders consistently send military and police units to support RIO co-members.

2.3 Benefits from cooperation

The benefits RIOs provide for members in good standing are the "carrots" in this system of carrots and sticks that encourages cooperation. RIOs can provide a rubber stamp of approval for flawed elections; re-frame threats to individual leaders as threats to regional stability; coordinate crisis and disaster assistance; increase interoperability of members' militaries, police forces, and intelligence services; encourage reciprocity and solidarity among heads of state;[14] establish anti-coup norms;[15] host regular summits that facilitate trust-building through face-to-face interactions; channel donors' funding toward members' priorities, including training members' soldiers and police;[16] and facilitate safe passage into exile when remaining in office is untenable and guilty

[12] Geddes et al. (2018); Goemans (2008).

[13] See Berman (2000) on club models of mutual aid.

[14] I use reciprocity here to mean both (a) specific reciprocity: responding proportionately in kind to a partner's behavior in an interaction or exchange and (b) diffuse reciprocity: conforming to generally accepted standards of behavior, as defined in Keohane (1986).

[15] Cowell (2011); Stoddard (2017).

[16] Jowell (2017); Krapohl (2017).

leaders would otherwise face arrest.[17] Perhaps most importantly for leaders concerned about survival, RIOs can legitimize and coordinate military interventions to support members facing aggression from insurgents, foreign actors, or coup plotters.[18] RIO intervention can help leaders reverse coups or repel rebels approaching the capitol. Most RIOs cannot bear the cost of reinstating deeply unpopular leaders in the midst of mass protests, but can help facilitate their safe exit.[19]

Few heads of state seem to prefer arranging the type of mutual aid system described here informally, rather than at least partly coordinating through RIOs. The wealthy Gulf monarchies are one group that has secretively produced cartel-like security pacts in the last several decades.[20] I argue that the prevalence of RIOs rather than informal pacts owes in part to benefits that are only accessible through formal, physically institutionalized RIOs. Unlike absolutist Gulf monarchs, less wealthy illiberal leaders are more reliant on these benefits. I sort the benefits leaders associate with organizing security cooperation through RIOs into several categories and illustrate each with examples from African RIOs. Although I describe the benefits of working through RIOs in African sub-regions, I expect many of these mechanisms to generalize in other regions.

2.3.1 RIO legitimacy and re-framing leaders' actions

Regional integration organizations often receive deferential treatment from international actors in trade and security policy-making–likely because they represent the interests of multiple countries on the global stage. RIOs that provide valuable global public goods–including peacekeeping–have additional clout. In some issue areas, RIOs' statements even are sufficiently authoritative to inform local public perceptions of ongoing events in the region. For example, Bush and Prather (2018) found that Tunisians were more likely to view Arab League monitoring reports about Tunisian elections as credible compared to reports from non-governmental organizations or other countries. Endorsements for a leader's actions from a regional organization are therefore

[17] On protective benefits of African RIOs see Boutton (2019a); Palmateer and Clark (2018); Söderbaum (2004, 2010); Souaré (2014); Stoddard (2017); Warner (2016).

[18] Powers (2006); Wobig (2015); Boutton (2019a).

[19] Dersso (2017); Omorogbe (2011); Williams (2007).

[20] Carlson and Koremenos (2021).

valuable.

Member states, and especially illiberal member states, sometimes try to avoid paying costs for violating international laws and norms by enlisting RIOs to “re-frame" their actions. An illiberal leader’s statement recasting the narrative around their own actions may not be convincing locally or internationally. But a confirmatory statement from the RIO may change some actors’ perceptions of contested events. Even if all actors are not convinced by a RIO’s support for the re-telling, they may not want to denounce a RIO that provides public goods. Helping leaders deflect accountability and changing observers’ perceptions of the leaders’ actions are thus two benefits RIOs can provide. Most often, leaders try to re-frame stigmatized actions taken to protect their regime as actions taken to pursue more normatively acceptable ends.

RIOs’ communiques and press statements can play important parts in the image management strategies of leaders using violence or violating their countries’ constitutions. One area in which leaders make use of RIOs for image management is around elections. RIOs with illiberal members often deploy election observation missions to member states’ elections, regardless of whether those elections were effectively rigged months before voting began.[21] Although RIOs’ staff members sometimes prefer to provide more realistic election reports, RIOs are dominated by heads of state who can easily cut funding and have particular staff members’ contracts discontinued.[22] By publishing watered-down election monitoring reports that gloss over incumbents’ abuses, RIOs become party to the incumbents’ disinformation campaigns.[23]

Regional organizations in Africa have on numerous instances deployed monitors to elections where opposition candidates were barred from participating and violence preceded the vote. The presence of regional observation missions including dignitaries and election experts provides some legitimacy to members’ elections. Refusing to send election monitors, in contrast, casts doubt over

[21] For a discussion of how African leaders have evolved their efforts to tip the balance of elections far in advance of voting day, see Cheeseman and Klaas (2018).

[22] RIOs with a plurality of authoritarian members can be described as executive-dominated institutions because heads of state and their ministers decide by consensus upon consequential rules, regulations and initiatives. Heads of state grant some autonomy to RIO bureaucrats, but bureaucrats’ decisions are subject to top-down review and can be overruled. See Ginsburg (2020).

[23] Merloe (2015); Walker (2016).

the believability of vote tabulations. RIO election monitors publish reports on the findings of their observation missions, commenting on whether the government succeeded in registering voters, distributing ballots, and maintaining order at polling stations. Despite evidence of member states failing on these dimensions, RIOs often produce positive reports on illiberal states' elections.

RIOs can also change perceptions around a leader's decision to authorize the use of force. A collection of international laws and norms define when it is generally acceptable for a head of state to authorize violence in their own country or elsewhere. There is no global, independent government to police leaders' adherence to norms and laws regulating the use of force, but leaders do bear costs for significant violations. Leaders who use force in excess or against protected groups face reputation damage and are sometimes punished by members of the international community. Other leaders and international organizations may apply economic and diplomatic sanctions, freeze armaments sales, issue arrest warrants, or authorize military interventions against violators. The United States and various governments have instituted sanctions against heads of states' close supporters when security forces shot protesters and killed activists from opposition groups, for example.

The context surrounding a government's authorization of force and the identity of their targets matters significantly for determining sanctions. Leaders are less likely to condemn a government for shooting and killing terrorists if arresting the terrorists would have proven sufficiently dangerous. Grouping illegitimate targets together with legitimate targets when explaining events may be enough to deflect some blame. Leaders might, for example, designate opposition supporters and protesters as terrorists to justify using excessive force.

Sometimes there is no room for ambiguity about whether a target is a civilian member of the opposition or whether the target is a dangerous extremist. At other times, heads of state more freely label opponents as legitimate targets. If a RIO and a state's co-members are willing to involve their own reputations by confirming the leader's claim, certain audiences may be more willing to accept that claim. For leaders in good standing, RIOs may ignore or help to justify unacceptable actions. At the very least, their tacit acceptance increases the odds that other actors reluctant to

enforce punishments will also turn a blind eye to abuses.

Across Africa, RIOs have offered leaders cover for re-framing threats to leaders' personal security as threats to regional stability on numerous instances.[24] RIOs presented military interventions designed to fight an incumbent's opponents as essential for shoring up regional security and preventing a descent into chaos. In instances where a RIO's operational goal is clearly to support an embattled government facing attacks from domestic or international actors, the term "solidarity deployment" is more appropriate than peace operation,[25] but RIOs label these deployments as peacekeeping.

For groups of leaders with common goals, empowering their RIO to intervene militarily also helps them control the narratives about peacekeepers' actions. The Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars of the 1990s involved several instances of leaders using this tactic. For example, Guinean President Lansana Conté used Guinean troops ostensibly deployed as ECOWAS peacekeepers to attack opposition politicians' supporters. Guinean peacekeepers attacked civilians believed to be supportive of Conté's political opponent Alpha Condé, and Conté claimed to know that Condé collaborated with Charles Taylor's Liberian rebels. ECOWAS remained quiet as he re-framed legitimate opponents as threats to regional stability. Jourde (2007) argues that Western states failed to apply sanctions to Guinea in this instance because Conté placed opposition actors in Guinea's forested region under the same umbrella as rebels and ECOWAS allowed him to do it. Human Rights Watch also reported that in 2002, thirty Guinean soldiers deployed with UNAMSIL misused their positions to interrogate Liberian refugees, for which they were merely reprimanded.[26] Donor states often lack the desire to punish troop contributors for opportunism when they are simply grateful to avoid sending their own troops on dangerous assignments.

[24] Söderbaum (2004, 2010); Coleman (2011); Warner (2018); Jourde (2007); Stoddard (2017); Victor (2010).

[25] Coleman (2011).

[26] The Human Rights Watch report makes no mention of further disciplinary action taken against the soldiers aside from "reprimands" (Nowrojee and Dufka 2002).

2.3.2 Manpower and managing donors

RIO staff are valuable as central resource coordinators and fundraisers in their regions. Although decision-making remains concentrated with heads of state in RIOs focused on regime survival, implementation is partly delegated to RIO staff. In anticipation of crises, RIO staff organize training exercises to improve interoperability of members' troops. And, once leaders decide whether and how to help a member in crisis, the RIO staff help them pursue their desired outcome. RIO staff apply their expertise to draw up plans, identify required resources, and help member states coordinate their deployments. During deployments, staff with technical expertise monitor and attempt to ensure smooth collaboration between member states' forces. RIOs' centralized planning structures and manpower essentially help members implement their mutual aid system. Member state leaders must determine that it is in their own best interest to fund RIO staffing and contribute personnel, but effective RIO secretariats can make the difference between fast or slow crisis response times.[27]

A significant number of staff members in African RIOs also work to identify donor priorities and negotiate for donor-funded projects. In a more extreme example, Palmateer and Clark (2018) claim that donor support for shifting regional security management to RIOs was actually one of the primary motivators for reinventing the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) as a security-focused organization in 1998. RIO staff look for overlap between what donors want to fund, how they want to fund it, and the needs identified by the RIO and its member states. This can entail funding infrastructure and workforce development or funding a large command post exercise for defense staff, for example. After projects' terms are negotiated and signed off on by heads of state, RIO staff help to allocate contracts or are directly involved in implementation. Staff find ways to parlay cooperation around donor priorities into additional funding for members' priorities. Letters and interviews from leaders and staff in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) indicate that the ECOWAS Secretariat hired staff to coordinate with donors and align

[27] Whether member state leaders can quickly reach consensus about how to respond to crises depends in part on the quality of their personal relationships and how many formal procedures they need to follow before deploying (Hardt 2014).

their priorities.

> Due to the high profile ECOWAS enjoys, there has been heightened interest in building collaborative working relationship with the organization by several donor partners...[ECOWAS needs] a focal point for the coordination of the variety of donor initiatives and activities across several programmes...To enable the Secretariat to function effectively as a focal point...in West Africa, the World Bank has agreed to fund, for a period of three years, a position of NEPAD Coordinator who will essentially operate as Donor Coordinator. The NEPAD Coordinator is to be attached to the office of the Executive Secretary to strengthen its capacity to monitor and achieve synergy in NEPAD and donor initiatives.[28]

When RIOs accept money to set up donors' preferred programs, they do not always implement those programs faithfully. At a 2004 meeting of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee focused on lending to multilateral financial institutions, including banks tied to regional integration organizations, Senator Richard Lugar expressed his frustration with the prevalence of corruption: "Bribes can influence important bank decisions on projects and contractors...Stolen money may prop up dictatorships and finance human rights abuses." Rwengabo (2018, p 133) gives the example of the East African Community Secretariat acquiring funding from Germany's Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) for its small arms and light weapons (SALW) control program and channeling that funding to member state agencies rather than spending it independently.

Nevertheless, catering to donors' priorities assures RIO members of continued access to resources. The Head of Civilian Component in ECOWAS's peacekeeping and regional security directorate claimed that his position was largely created because the German government's development agency (GIZ) and several other European partners wanted more civilian involvement in multi-dimensional peacekeeping deployments. Those donors did not only want to fund combat training for peacekeepers. According to this ECOWAS official, "The civilian positions come lastly to complement the police and military. So when we came it was like ECOWAS was just forced to create the civilian component. They didn't really know how to manage it. And if I may say they have not seen the importance of creating the civilian component before they created it."[29] The

[28] Kufuor (2003).

[29] Interview with the Head of Civilian Component from the ECOWAS Peacekeeping and Regional Security Directorate on January 24, 2020 in Abuja, Nigeria.

European donors funded the creation of a database of civilians with expertise in areas such as legal and gender affairs who could deploy alongside troops to address the roots of conflicts. They also wanted to rein in the influence of military officials from authoritarian member states.

Some senior ECOWAS staff and member state officials did not view filling the database or deploying civilians as a priority so much as a gesture to appease donors. Again, according to the Head of Civilian Component

> It's working slowly. We started in 2017 and today we only have 72 people in the roster. We are supposed to have 300. That's our target. But we have not even reached 100...[It] is not encouraging. We have been able to deploy only one person in Chad for the Multinational Joint Task Force. And we deployed that person through the African Union. We have not been able to deploy any single individual from the roster to any single ECOWAS region in our missions. We have two missions–Gambia and Guinea-Bissau–but ECOWAS hasn't allowed us to do that.[30]

When donors realized that ECOWAS was not following through with including civilians to make peacekeeping efforts multidimensional, they offered additional funding. "So when they come they can see in reality that the civilian component hasn't been taken on board on so many things. So we have been doing trainings for instance protection of civilians and gender. All of them involve civilians and they [(donors)] are the ones funding them." During interviews, researchers and military trainers affiliated with Nigeria's National Defense College also identified sensitization around gender and human rights issues as priorities promoted by donors.[31]

While leaders do not want to highlight their reliance on donors and partner states during crises, they increase their personal security using steady streams of external financial and military support. The United Nations Security Council's positive endorsements of regional organizations as organizers of local peacekeeping operations and crisis managers boosts the prestige and material resources member state leaders in good standing can access through RIOs. Although donors negotiate most of their military support for partner states on bilateral bases, RIOs open up additional funding streams. This is particularly important for illiberal regimes which democratic partner

[30] Ibid.

[31] Interviews conducted at Nigeria's National Defense College on January 22, 2020 and the National Institute for Security Studies on January 19, 2020 in Abuja, Nigeria.

states might prefer not to be seen supporting on a bilateral basis. Training for peacekeepers is also frequently organized at RIOs' regional training centers. Once a member state's troops receive training in these RIO centers, they can deploy not only for peacekeeping, but also to protect heads of state against domestic opponents. Access to resources therefore increases the incentive for leaders to house security cooperation within RIOs.

2.3.3 Solidarity and deterring threats

Heads of state sometimes invoke RIO co-membership to justify intervening in support of heads of state battling domestic opponents. Intervening in another state's domestic conflict is often seen as a legal gray area, as bilateral defense agreements typically focus on external aggression. RIOs adapted to legitimize this form of solidarity deployment by describing multilateral interventions as efforts to restore stability, rather than expressions of solidarity and reciprocal aid.

For example, SADC's security organ gave its blessings to Namibian President Sam Nujoma deploying troops alongside SADC co-members Angola and Zimbabwe into the Democratic Republic of Congo's internationalized civil war in 1998. The intervention was explicitly intended to support the embattled Congolese President Laurent Kabila. Although Namibia had economic interests in the DRC, Namibia's stakes in the outcome of the DRC's war were not nearly as high as the economic or security stakes for co-members Zimbabwe or Angola.[32] Rather, for Nujoma, prior support from the presidents of Angola (Dos Santos), the DRC (Kabila), and Zimbabwe (Mugabe) against external and internal threats was a critical motivator. Numerous sources indicated that Nujoma was returning favors and expressing solidarity when he deployed troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo.[33] He cited SADC permission to present this solidarity deployment as legally acceptable.

In particular, Nujoma's SWAPO party had relied on support from neighboring leaders to

[32] Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos needed to prevent the Angolan rebel group UNITA from continuing to use under-policed DRC territory as a base to launch attacks from and a haven for smuggling. In addition to his personal support for Kabila, Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe also had economic and strategic interests in the conflict, including mining investments. Most participants in the Second Congo War did engage in resource exploitation whenever able (Ngolet 2011).

[33] Tavares (2011).

fight for independence and repel forces supported by Apartheid South Africa. Without mutual support, Angola and Namibia's post-independence leaders could not prevent rebel and separatist organizations from launching cross-border attacks in their respective countries, threatening regime security in both states. By deploying to the DRC, Nujoma helped to prevent the removal of co-members who proved useful as then-SADCC and now SADC co-members. And he did so in spite of domestic and international backlash, including cuts to Namibia's foreign aid.[34]

RIOs also play an important part in discouraging coups by reinforcing leaders' solidarity. Many RIOs take strong positions against coups,[35] and raise barriers to coup plotters through multiple channels. The first is by establishing a clear precedent of refusing to cooperate with governments that come to power through force and sometimes even taking steps to reverse coups. Military and political elites considering staging a coup would have to contend with backlash not only from the deposed incumbent's supporters, but from all RIO co-members.[36] It is difficult for coup plotters and insurgents to profit from assuming power in a coup if members immediately cut economic ties with them, close their borders, and prevent them from participating in RIO decision-making This is the most direct channel through which RIOs convey to would-be coup plotters that coups cannot be successful in the long run.

Dynamics of cooperation among heads of state in Central Africa illustrate leaders' reliance on RIO deterrence mechanisms well. When Chadian President Idriss Déby became concerned that Chadian rebels, including soldiers defecting from the Chadian army, might overthrow him in a coup, he called an emergency summit of the Economic Community of Central African States. Déby asked his ECCAS co-members to issue statements denouncing the rebels and confirming that co-members would exclusively recognize his leadership. He hoped that these statements would remind rebels and mutinying soldiers that his RIO co-members were willing to come to his defense

[34]The United Nations condemned Namibia's intervention in the conflict and one of Namibia's main donors, Finland, cut development aid to Namibia altogether (IRIN 2001).

[35]Shannon et al. (2015) find that IOs respond to coups more often than states do post-Cold War, though the response by African organizations to coups in member states has been inconsistent. Building on this work, Thyne et al. (2017) find that those condemnations from IOs reduced the tenure duration of regimes that came to power through coups post-Cold War.

[36]In general, coup plotters stand to gain less from assuming office if they immediately inherit enemies intent on removing them (McMahon and Slantchev 2015).

in the event of a coup.[37] Co-members' statements might be taken as more credible given that Déby simultaneously underlined his usefulness to co-members by sending soldiers to assume presidential guard duties in the Central African Republic. CAR President Bozizé did not trust his own military and would be unable to ward off rebel groups without protection from soldiers sent by Déby and other co-members.[38]

RIOs also reduce the likelihood of coups by pushing for professionalization of member state militaries. Scholars have noted coups are most likely to be undertaken by officers from militaries which have factional splits and which are not characterized by high professional discipline. African RIOs organize programs that seek to instill norms of professional discipline and obedience to civilian authority among member state militaries with the help of technical support from donor states. Rather than cheering the prospect that RIO training programs would produce more professional peacekeepers, African scholars correctly predicted that leaders would deploy troops trained and equipped in these programs to quash domestic opponents.[39]

Because RIOs provide protective benefits to contributors in good standing, leaders should be more likely to contribute if they anticipate possible need for protection. In particular, leaders who face credible threats of irregular removal from office and high costs upon removal should be more motivated to cooperate through RIOs.[40] Post-1990, coups are the top cause for autocratic regimes ending (35%), and leaders removed through coups d'etat are at greater risk of ending up dead, imprisoned, or blocked out of politics.[41] Repressive leaders face particularly harsh treatment upon removal in coups and should be more invested in protective regional cooperation when they face high coup risk. Because intervening to support unpopular repressive leaders against domestic opponents generates more backlash for co-members, repressive leaders should have to make particularly costly investments in regional stability to demonstrate their usefulness to co-members and remain entitled

[37] Meyer (2009).

[38] Reddick (2008).

[39] Omach (2000) argued that leaders participated in the American-led African Crisis Response Initiative primarily to increase their capacity to tackle domestic threats, rather than as a result of any desire to improve effectiveness of their participation in peacekeeping.

[40] Irregular removal refers to removal of a head of state through unconstitutional means, such as through a coups d'etat, defeat in conflict, or forced resignation after a revolution.

[41] Geddes et al. (2018); Goemans (2008).

to assistance.

In sum, free riding is tempting, but leaders know that whether they do so impacts their access to RIO benefits, including co-members' support. Of course, defection is a concern when leaders have short time horizons, or place reduced value on future cooperation in favor of short term survival calculus. We might expect that coup risk shortens a leader's time horizon such that they could be more likely to renege on promises. However, the insecure leader's concern for their safety if they *are* deposed should actually lengthen their time horizons with respect to co-members. If they are forced to flee, leaders often get away with the help of regional allies, who may also provide them with asylum. Failing to remain in good standing could reduce the inclination of co-members to advocate and provide for their safety. One testable implication of the theory, therefore, is that leaders vulnerable to coups who have few peaceful exit options due to repressive tactics will contribute consistently to regional security cooperation. I test hypotheses corresponding to this prediction in Chapter 3.

2.4 Rewarding and sanctioning

Selectively supporting member state leaders who contribute to regional security efforts and withholding support from non-contributors reduces the temptation for leaders to free ride. Members can punish non-contributors by withholding material support when they face security threats or by supporting their opponents. Either action increases the likelihood that the non-contributor's opponents will succeed in removing them from office. Once deposed, repressive leaders are then likely to face consequences for their behavior in office.

However, to solve their original collective action problem by excluding and punishing non-contributors, RIOs have to confront another collective action problem. Leaders must also be willing to police their co-members and pay costs associated with punishing non-contributors. If members do not punish non-contributors, then even leaders who value RIO benefits will be tempted to cease contributing. Contributing leaders will want to avoid a "sucker's payoff," where they

contribute to regional security initiatives but non-contributors take advantage of them, enjoying benefits of enhanced security without paying. Therefore, if contributors observe other members benefiting free of charge, they are also likely to cease contributions.

All members benefit from avoiding spiraling defections away from cooperation, and maintaining a system where all contribute and avoid destabilizing the region. Under those conditions, each leader is less likely to bear negative security externalities. However, as is the case with providing benefits, RIO members must be willing to follow through with punishing free riders absent RIO rules.[42] It must generally be in members' best interests to pay the costs associated with punishing non-contributors and rewarding contributors. I argue that the incentive to help cooperative co-members and punish non-cooperators is tied to leaders' drive for personal security.

I propose several reasons why leaders' conceptions of self-interest make their commitments to RIO assistance and enforcement mechanisms credible. First, leaders prefer to surround themselves with neighbors they believe to be "cooperative types"–neighbors disposed to collaborate rather than undermine their stability. Although a leader's true intentions are private information, co-members rely on what they know about a leader's prior actions–their reputation–to assess whether they are a cooperative or uncooperative type. Whether a leader previously deployed security personnel to support co-members is an informative signal of whether a leader is a cooperative type who will remain useful in the future with a higher probability. Contributing security personnel is a particularly costly action, and therefore a more informative signal of a leader's type, in contexts where resolution is unlikely to be quick and casualties are likely to result. Deploying to support or remove a co-member can generate backlash against the contributing government from troops experiencing hardship and domestic groups who do not want to pay for foreign interventions.

LeVeck and Narang (2017) argue that leaders' decisions to offer new alliances are informed by whether potential allies' previous behaviors indicate they are reliable types.[43] Similarly, I expect co-members will support a leader whose previous behaviors indicate their leadership is a net positive for the co-members' security. This leader's record indicates they are likely to resume cooperation

[42] Koremenos et al. (2001).

[43] See also Crescenzi et al. (2012); Gibler (2008); Tomz (2007).

after resolving domestic issues, whereas it is harder for a leader's potential replacement to credibly promise to cooperate without a track record in the executive office.[44] In other words, the decision to support a co-member is prospective, but informed by what a leader's past actions reveal about their likely future actions.

Leaders will also choose not to intervene in support of, or will resolve conflicts against, co-members whose actions reveal that they are non-cooperative types. Leaders who free ride or deliberately destabilize neighbors are seen as likely to continue doing so in the future. By punishing them, co-members decrease the likelihood that the non-contributor will survive in office and cause problems going forward. When leaders anticipate that they will interact repeatedly over time, they have incentives to reward positive contributions made by their co-members and punish co-members who detract from regional stability.

RIOs provide opportunities for leaders to selectively support cooperative, useful neighbors and let opponents replace uncooperative neighbors. Whereas bilaterally intervening to this end would likely be condemned by the United Nations, RIOs have greater latitude to call for interventions. RIOs can authorize removing non-cooperative types under the guise of maintaining regional stability and enforcing punishments for crossing "red lines." Punishing uncooperative neighbors by allowing them to fail or siding with their opponents opens up the possibility of finding a more useful replacement.

Second, leaders know that in order for their regional organizations' defense pacts and red lines against coups to deter opponents, leaders must follow through on commitments to support cooperative types most of the time. If rebels or coup plotters observe that co-members do not provide military assistance to incumbents in good standing who are under attack, they will believe the costs of attacking to be lower than under a functioning alliance or strong anti-coup regime.[45] Opponents are less likely to be deterred from taking up arms when leaders appear vulnerable to abandonment by co-members. While regional organization co-members might be sufficiently opposed to non-

[44] This is untrue, of course, if a leader's opponent is a former head of state.

[45] On deterrence by defensive alliances, see Leeds (2003b); Johnson and Leeds (2011). Work on regional organizations' efforts to deter coups often focuses on the African Union e.g. Omorogbe (2011); Souaré (2014).

contributors to abandon them, it is in their self-interest to generally uphold intolerance for attacks on member governments.

If co-members fail to mobilize support for a cooperative type in need, leaders are likely to discount the usefulness of cooperation and may cease contributions. This also raises the risk of cooperation falling apart entirely.[46] When RIOs provide sufficiently valuable benefits to leaders, including the ability to select for cooperative neighbors, the costs of intervening are lesser than the costs of spiraling defections.[47]

Lastly, leaders support contributors in order to maintain their own good standing. This creates cycles of positive reciprocity within RIOs. A limited number of scholars take positive reciprocity seriously with respect to conflict intervention but do not empirically assess the benefits of positive reciprocity for individual leaders, rather than states.[48]

Overall, regional organizations cannot effectively deter opponents and improve regional stability unless leaders apply carrots and sticks, or inducements and punishments for co-members. The decision about whether to remain in good standing by contributing, such as by deploying troops and police or paying annual dues, occurs in this context of strategic interactions between leaders and their RIO co-members. Leaders know that co-members might not protect them if they free ride with respect to providing regional security. Vulnerable, repressive leaders who are more dependent on co-members' good will for their personal survival therefore have the strongest incentives to pay their dues by contributing security personnel. And if this explanation is plausible, we should observe that contributors benefit from co-members' support during crises and are less likely to be punished.

Therefore, in Chapter 3, I test whether African and Middle Eastern leaders at greater risk of irregular, forced removal from office through coups–and repressive leaders in particular–are more likely to try to remain in good standing with co-members by contributing security personnel to

[46] Axelrod (1984).

[47] Because RIO members generate common knowledge about how to distinguish between those members who are in good standing and those who are not, cooperative leaders will not infer that actions taken to punish bad types, such as abrogation of commitments to protect a leader from a coup, reflect how they would be treated in a similar situation.

[48] E.g. Corbetta (2013).

support co-members:

Hypothesis 1: *Leaders with high coup risk will be more likely to send security personnel to regional organization co-members.*

Hypothesis 2: *Repressive leaders with high coup risk will be more likely to send security personnel to regional organization co-members.*

In Chapter 4, I then assess whether this strategy for remaining in good standing with RIO co-members appears to pay off for contributors. I predict that co-members will reward leaders who previously deployed to support at least one of them. I test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: *Leaders who previously deployed to co-members will be more likely to receive pro-government military support from co-members.*

Hypothesis 4: *Co-members will be less likely to intervene militarily against leaders who previously deployed to co-members.*

Statistical tests provide evidence consistent with these hypotheses in the population of African RIOs under consideration between 1990 and 2015. Chapter 5 then provides evidence indicating that proposed causal mechanisms discussed in this chapter operate during crises in West Africa in roughly the same time period.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter seeks to understand how RIOs function beyond communities of well-established democracies. The conventional wisdom among international relations scholars has long been that leaders of stable democracies are more motivated or able to cooperate through international organizations than their illiberal counterparts.[49] The theory of regional cooperation for mutual aid and stability can help us understand why, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, RIOs are expanding their formal security competencies even as members become more authoritarian.[50]

[49]E.g. Gaubatz (1996); Keohane (1984); Mansfield et al. (2002); McGillivray and Smith (2000); Pevehouse (2002, 2005); Svolik (2006).

[50]Of the 54 African countries, 23 became less democratic in 2020 according to Freedom House (2021).

Increasingly, illiberal leaders exploit regional integration organizations (RIOs) to manage threats against their personal security.[51] Some African leaders consistently send military and police units to support RIO co-members.

Prior work on cooperation involving illiberal leaders emphasizes that regimes with institutions of accountability similar to those in democracies are better positioned to sustain cooperation.[52] I build on this literature, but demonstrate that variations in the threat environment illiberal leaders face account for differences in illiberal international cooperation. Contributing to regional security operations can signal a politically vulnerable leader's desire not only to stem negative externalities but also to keep RIO co-members on their side as they face existential threats. Threats to leaders' survival therefore play an important role in the development and persistence of RIOs.

On the other hand, more stable members and regional hegemons benefit from introducing incentives for co-members to participate.[53] Regional hegemons in particular seek to avoid the perception that they are unilaterally intervening.[54] The framework here therefore helps to account for the many democratic leaders who become complicit in supporting illiberal co-members so long as those co-members contribute to regional security efforts. And although several regional rivalries and conflicts persist, preventing the development of "security communities,"[55] this framework helps to explain why RIOs such as ECOWAS, SADC, and ECCAS[56] have become highly consequential for regional security. Finally, the theory also has implications for the comparative politics literature

[51] E.g. Debre (2020); Kneuer et al. (2018); Obydenkova and Libman (2019); Palmateer and Clark (2018); Russo and Stoddard (2018); Stoddard (2017); Vinokurov and Libman (2017).

[52] Chyzh (2014) and Mattes and Rodríguez (2014) find that it is largely personalist autocrats facing fewer threats to their authority who cooperate less. See also Svolik (2006). However, Carlson and Koremenos (2021) find that despite fewer formal agreements, absolute monarchs cooperate frequently.

[53] Abbott and Snidal (1998).

[54] This is evident in coalition-building behavior of Nigeria and South Africa.

[55] This refers to the definition from Deutsch (1961), who described security communities as state societies integrated to the point where resolving disputes through intrastate or interstate conflict becomes almost unthinkable. Application of the term in Africa has been criticized as unrealistic e.g. Nathan (2006).

[56] ECOWAS is the Economic Community of West African States, SADC is the Southern African Development Community, and ECCAS is the Economic Community of Central African States.

on coup-proofing and leader survival,[57] where the importance of RIOs has received less attention.[58] Regional cooperation is an important aspect of risk management for leaders concerned with coups and other threats to their safety.

[57]For example, leaders alter power-sharing and succession arrangements (Svolik 2009; Böhmelt and Pilster 2015; Frantz and Stein 2017; Konrad and Mui 2017), manipulate ethnic politics (Harkness 2018; Roessler 2016), and counterbalance against security forces (De Bruin 2018; Sudduth 2017; Escribà-Folch et al. 2019; Powell 2012; McMahon and Slantchev 2015).

[58]However, see Souaré (2014); Stoddard (2017); Dersso (2017); Boutton (2019a); Omorogbe (2011).

Chapter 3

Regional Organizations and Coup Risk

Through regional organizations, heads of state reinforce systems of mutual aid against security threats and launder their reputations. As discussed in Chapter 2, leaders must maintain good standing with co-members to remain eligible for RIO benefits, including military assistance. I argued that contributing security personnel to support RIO co-members and RIO security initiatives is an important requirement for maintaining good standing. If this is the case, we should observe that leaders with the greatest interest in receiving assistance during crises are more likely to deploy security personnel to support co-members. I define a leader's need for assistance based on their risk of forced removal and whether they will pay high costs if removed. In the sample of African RIO members under consideration, coups are the most likely cause of forced removal.[1] Whereas the incidence of coups dropped in most regions at the end of the Cold War, the incidence of coups in Africa spiked at this time.[2] And, in general, repressive leaders are the most likely to face severe punishment after coups.[3] Therefore, in this chapter I assess whether repressive leaders with high coup risk are more likely to contribute personnel in support of RIO co-members.

I first situate regional cooperation in a broader framework of coup-proofing strategies illiberal leaders rely on to increase their personal security. Domestic coup-proofing strategies often

[1] After 1990, coups were the top cause for autocratic regimes ending (35%) (Geddes et al. 2018). And after 2000, 70% of coups took place in Africa (Besaw et al. 2019).

[2] Besaw et al. (2019).

[3] Frantz and Stein (2017).

generate backlash for heads of state, but those who demonstrate their usefulness by cooperating with co-members can call on RIOs for protection. I operationalize contributions to regional cooperation as contributions of security personnel, including troops and police, to RIO co-members. From the theory of regional cooperation for mutual insurance, I derive two hypotheses. First, if leaders face high coup risk, they will be more likely to contribute security personnel to RIO co-members. Second, repressive leaders with high perceived coup risk in particular are significantly more likely to contribute security personnel to RIO co-members because they face the worst consequences upon removal.

To test these hypotheses in Africa, I introduce new data on regional security cooperation and original coup risk estimates. My regional security cooperation dataset captures consensual deployments of security personnel to RIO co-members in Africa and the Middle East between 1990 and 2015 using annual Military Balance Reports from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. My sample includes 54 African and Middle Eastern states that are members of 12 sub-regional integration organizations headquartered in Africa. This dataset allows me to capture a wide spectrum of contributions not only to peacekeeping, but also to other multilateral or bilaterally constituted security operations.

Leaders' perceived vulnerability to coup risk is also a key concept in the theory, but it is not directly measurable or observable. Therefore, I identify important contributors to coup risk and construct a latent perceived coup risk measure for each country-year. This method allows me to remain agnostic about how to weight the factors leaders can observe that contribute to coup risk each year. Using spatial logistic regression at the RIO-state-year level of analysis, I find that repressive leaders with high coup risk are more likely to contribute security personnel to African RIO co-members between 1990 and 2015. Neither coup risk or repressiveness independently are significant predictors of contributions, but the interaction between these two variables is associated with contributing above-average numbers of personnel to RIO co-members. These results are robust to several alternative mixed model specifications.

3.1 Managing coup risk

Prior to the mid-1990s coups d'etats were largely problems for autocracies, where roughly 80% of coups occurred. After the end of the Cold War this was no longer the case, and about 45% of coups took place in democracies post-2000.[4] Removal through a coup d'etat is dangerous for any leader, but repressive leaders face particularly high stakes. When a repressive head of state is removed from office, they find themself at the mercy of the military, their successors, and a public with accumulated grievances. As mentioned in prior chapters, repressive leaders are more likely to be killed, imprisoned or forced into exile upon leaving office.[5]

For example, a leader who is removed after overseeing extensive human rights violations is likely to be treated differently than a non-repressive leader who is removed after a spell of incompetent governance. The latter may have to leave the country for a period of time but, if they have not committed major crimes, they receive asylum in their choice of locations and can return to their home country in the future. The former must also leave in the short term, but faces much greater odds of prosecution should they ever attempt to return. The repressive leader needs longer term asylum but, due to rights violations, they are likely to be viewed as a pariah by much of the international community. These leaders' prior reliance on violent repression may make it impossible to seek asylum in states which now accede to warrants for the arrest of rights-abusing leaders. Leaders facing criticism for human rights abuses understand this, and we should expect them to hedge against future crises by improving their social capital with neighbors. Even if their successors promise immunity, they may renege and initiate criminal trials. The specter of punishments helps to explain the tenacity of some "sit-tight" presidents who will only leave voluntarily if they have credible guarantees of safety in exile.[6] As a result, repressive heads of state prioritize policies that reduce their susceptibility to coups.

The domestic policies leaders use to coup-proof are well-documented in the literature on

[4] Ibid. This could be attributable in part to members of the military seeing democratization as a threat to their privileges (Powell et al. 2018).

[5] Frantz and Stein (2017); Goemans (2008).

[6] Baturo (2010); Kiwuwa (2013).

civil-military relations and coups.[7] Leaders often alter power-sharing and succession arrangements,[8] manipulate the distribution of ethnic groups in the security forces,[9] purge potentially disloyal soldiers, and fracture security forces into competing groups so that they are more likely to "counterbalance" each other rather than organizing against the head of state.[10] Using these coup-proofing tactics requires leaders to face a "guardianship dilemma." The dilemma is how to strike a balance between keeping security apparatuses strong enough to deter threats but factionalized enough to prevent military interference and coordination of an officer-led coup.[11] Factionalized security forces are less willing to cooperate with unpopular orders, and therefore leaders may actually be less likely to call on them to repress civilians.[12] Because domestic coup-proofing strategies are often double-edged swords, many leaders seek outside options to hedge against domestic threats.

In addition to manipulating domestic policies, leaders rely upon foreign actors to protect themselves from forced removal. Scholarship on protective benefits of international cooperation for illiberal leaders often emphasizes links to powerful sponsor states. African leaders have used foreign aid to buy off members of the military who might otherwise stage coups.[13] In some cases, leaders know that the same partner states which provide foreign aid are also willing to intervene on their behalf to reverse coups. The Francafrique relationship between France and former African colonies typified this dynamic, where France assisted leaders of former colonies in exchange for their acquiescence to French interests.

Particularly in recent years, regional organizations and networks dominated by powerful autocracies such as China, Russia, or Saudi Arabia have been accused of helping autocrats thwart domestic opponents, including coup plotters.[14] By considering these authoritarian regional institu-

[7] E.g. Albrecht and Eibl (2018); Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2017); De Bruin (2018); Escribà-Folch et al. (2019); Frantz and Stein (2017); Geddes et al. (2018); Harkness (2018); Konrad and Mui (2017); Powell (2012); Roessler (2016); Svolik (2009).

[8] Böhmelt and Pilster (2015); Frantz and Stein (2017); Konrad and Mui (2017); Svolik (2009).

[9] Harkness (2018); Roessler (2016).

[10] Albrecht and Eibl (2018); Belkin and Schofer (2003); De Bruin (2018); Escribà-Folch et al. (2019); McMahon and Slantchev (2015); Powell (2012); Sudduth (2017).

[11] McMahon and Slantchev (2015).

[12] Hendrix and Salehyan (2017).

[13] Boutton (2019b); Turtio (2020). On the impact of foreign aid on regime survival more broadly see Licht (2010); Yuichi Kono and Montinola (2009).

[14] (Bader 2015; Obydenkova and Libman 2019; Tansey et al. 2017; Vanderhill 2013)

tions as extensions of China or Russia's foreign policy pursuits, research in this area has typically devoted less attention to collective action problems or the importance of contributions made by smaller states. Fewer scholars examine when and why less powerful illiberal leaders collaborate against their respective domestic opponents through regional organizations.[15] The literature on African RIOs promoting anti-coup norms is, however, a notable exception. Some observers credit the African Union in particular with deterring coups since 2002.[16]

3.2 RIOs and coup risk

I argue in Chapter 2 that cooperating through regional integration organizations offers a number of advantages, and this is particularly applicable for leaders concerned with coup risk. RIO coup-proofing mechanisms work through multiple channels. First, RIOs codify the refusal to recognize–and sometimes remove–governments that come to power through coups. If co-members commit to retaliating against coup plotters, conspirators must expect to take on numerous rivals.[17] As long as their commitments are seen to be credible, they decrease the expected value of staging a coup.

RIOs also coordinate with donors to provide professionalization opportunities for member state militaries. Spots in these programs are used reward loyalty and keep ambitious soldiers occupied.[18] To the extent that these training courses inadvertently enhance the capabilities of some soldiers inclined to rebel or instill values incompatible with the incumbent's policies, they are double-edged swords.[19] However, more recent training modules supported by RIOs often heavily emphasize norms of civilian control. Aside from training soldiers for peacekeeping or counter-terrorism deployments, RIOs organize regional military exercises at regional training centers of

[15] On protective autocratic linkages see Libman and Obydenkova (2018); Mattes and Rodríguez (2014); Schmotz and Tansey (2018); von Soest (2015). On protective African regional organizations see Palmateer and Clark (2018); Powell et al. (2016); Söderbaum (2004, 2010); Souaré (2014); Stoddard (2017); Warner (2016).

[16] Omorogbe (2011); Souaré (2014).

[17] On how rivals impact coup plotters' calculations, see McMahon and Slantchev (2015).

[18] Interview with retired Nigerian Major General, Abuja, Nigeria, 7 January 2020.

[19] Böhmelt et al. (2018); Savage and Caverley (2017).

excellence. Exercises increase the interoperability of member states' forces so that they are prepared to work together during crises, and also attempt to reinforce military professionalism.

Most importantly, RIOs can intervene directly in response to coups. When they intervene in members' crises, RIOs often claim their motive is simply to maintain regional stability–a framing which coincides with the stated objectives of donor states and provides cover for protecting incumbents in good standing. Leaders also support RIO interventions to stem instability and externalities. Neighbors want to avoid spillover of refugees and combatants Still, they seek to resolve crises to the benefit of co-members. When it is not tenable to reinstate deposed incumbents, RIO co-members negotiate for the incumbent's safe exit.[20] This is particularly vital for leaders who would otherwise face prosecution.

Nigerian archival documents furnish examples where African leaders sought to strengthen relations with their neighbors immediately in response to coup attempts. On July 12, 2005, Togolese intelligence officials flew to Abuja and reported to Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo that Faure Gnassingbé's administration had foiled a coup allegedly orchestrated by the Catholic Archbishop of Lomé, Fanoko Kpodzro. Months earlier, Kpodzro had led other Togolese church officials to call for a postponement of Togo's elections in conjunction with the opposition (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2005). Upon hearing about the coup plot, Obasanjo promised to call Ghana's president the same night and offered the Togolese officials advice about how to proceed. Obasanjo promised to coordinate within one week a meeting among the heads of state of several ECOWAS co-members: Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Nigeria.[21] He assured Togolese officials that the leaders would also coordinate with the Liberian president and search for linked suspects in their respective countries.[22]

[20] Dersso (2017); Omorogbe (2011); Williams (2007).

[21] Gnassingbé likely would not have received informal assistance if he had not acceded to ECOWAS demands to hold elections, rather than persisting with a coup after the death of his father, longtime Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadema. Under pressure, Gnassingbé legitimized himself internationally by holding elections. ECOWAS co-members accepted the election results that brought Gnassingbé to power despite violence, opposition boycotts, and irregularities. Gnassingbé became a legitimate RIO member entitled to protection. Reflecting back on Togo's 2005 crisis, Obasanjo stated that "[Faure] later thanked him; because of Obasanjo's insistence [Faure] could now proudly proclaim to be an "elected president" (Cable, U.S. Consulate Lagos, 5 September 2007).

[22] obj.

Following the first foiled coup plot against him, Gnassingbé remains in good standing within ECOWAS. He consistently holds elections, keeping up appearances of respectability for–and preventing greater instability in–the neighborhood. He contributes troops and police for ECOWAS operations, served as Chairman of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, and mediates in other members' internal crises. President Gnassingbé continues contributing police officers to stabilize co-member Guinea-Bissau despite years of non-repayment by ECOWAS.[23] And despite non-repayment, President Gnassingbé remits Togo's annual dues to ECOWAS's primary funding mechanism, the Community Levy. An internal report obtained from an ECOWAS accountant states that "Togo community levy proceeds channeled trough the Treasury are transferred on time to Community Levy bank account in central bank" and that as of September, 2019, Togo had no outstanding debts to the ECOWAS Community Levy.[24] ECOWAS has since overlooked many of Gnassingbé's repressive policies and crackdowns against domestic opposition, and the organization also lobbied the EU to lift its longstanding sanctions on Togo.

As discussed in Chapter 2, RIO members can exclude member state leaders who are not in good standing from some protective benefits. I argue that Gnassingbé's attempts to remain in good standing reflected his understanding that support is conditional on contributions. For non-contributors that fall out of favor with co-members, RIOs may respond to coups with passivity or neutrality. If members are strongly opposed to coup leaders remaining in power, they can negotiate for a transitional government to stabilize the country, rather than negotiating to reinstate the incumbent.

In sum, the risk of coups d'etat remains worryingly high for many African heads of state but when coups occur, RIOs can intervene on their behalf. Whether the RIO does intervene on a leader's behalf depends on whether the leader has a record of cooperating with co-members to remain in good standing. If a leader has a history of non-cooperative behavior, RIOs will be unlikely to bear the costs associated with defending them. In Africa, RIOs have largely assumed the role of managing the aftermath of coups in member states, so remaining in good standing is important for

[23] Interview with senior ECOWAS official, Abuja, Nigeria, 10 January 2020.
[24] eco (2019).

surviving coups. Therefore, the leaders who anticipate they may have the greatest need for RIO protection against coups in the future should be the most motivated to remain in good standing by contributing to RIO security initiatives. I test two hypotheses corresponding to the theory. First, it is possible that leaders with high coup risk in general are more likely to deploy to remain eligible for protection, and I test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Leaders with high coup risk will be more likely to send security personnel to regional organization co-members.*

However, coups pose a much greater existential threat to repressive leaders due to the high likelihood of putschists assassinating, imprisoning, or exiling them. Therefore I focus in particular on hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 2: *Repressive leaders with high coup risk will be more likely to send security personnel to regional organization co-members.*

3.3 Research design

To evaluate the hypotheses, I use original data on security personnel contributions from 54 African and Middle Eastern states to co-members in 12 organizations spanning 1990 to 2015 at the state-RIO-year level of analysis. For the main independent variables, I also construct a latent coup risk variable to capture leader vulnerability and use V-Dem physical violence data to measure leader repressiveness. With logistic regressions, I assess whether repressive leaders with high coup risk are significantly more likely to contribute any personnel, and whether they are likely to contribute an above-average number of personnel, to their regional organization co-members each year for each organization where their state is a member. I present results estimated with multi-way fixed effects and random effects.

Table 3.1: Major Regional Integration Organizations in Africa

RIO name	Year founded	No. of members	Avg GDP/ capita
Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD)	1998	29	1,335
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	1986	8	564
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)	1989	5	3,106
Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL)	1976	3	981
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)	1983	10	307
Mano River Union (MRU)	1973	4	795
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	1994	19	758
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)	1994	6	1,499
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	1975	15	1,235
East African Community (EAC)	2000	6	626
Southern African Development Community (SADC)	1981	16	1,715
League of Arab States (LAS)	1948	22	4,265

3.3.1 African RIO member sample

Based on the theory, we should expect to observe cooperation against coups d'etat in Africa, where coup incidence is highest and repressive former heads of state who alienated their neighbors such as Hissène Habré, Laurent Gbagbo, and Charles Taylor faced prosecution for human rights violations. Prior chapters discuss the evolution of these African RIOs or their predecessors which began post-decolonization with plans to boost economic development and express solidarity against minority rule.[25] African RIOs helped African leaders resolve local conflicts and negotiate as blocs at the UN and other global institutions, and only later sought to shape institutions within member states through governance and security protocols. Since the end of the Cold War, African RIOs such as ECOWAS, SADC, and ECCAS increasingly coordinate peacekeeping, conflict mediation, disaster response efforts, and election security missions. And though they delegate some authority to bureaucrats, African heads of state in these RIOs dominate RIO decision-making and retain veto authority. The control heads of state exert in RIOs generates the expectation that heads of state will use RIOs to advance their personal objectives.[26] African RIOs do intervene to protect leaders

[25]For example, members of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference opposed and wanted to reduce their economic reliance upon Apartheid South Africa.

[26]Herbst (2007); Palmateer and Clark (2018); Söderbaum (2004, 2010).

from the worst fates but they do not protect–and occasionally even remove–leaders such as Charles Taylor who cross red lines, fail to contribute to regional cooperation, and threaten regional stability.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for my sample of twelve Africa-based RIOs with political and security cooperation protocols. These RIOs include 54 member states from Africa and the Middle East.[27] Eleven of the RIOs only include member states located in Africa, while the twelfth, the League of Arab States, is split between African and Middle Eastern members. Because the League of Arab States has been active in peacekeeping and security cooperation in Africa, I include its Middle Eastern members in my cross-country analysis. Several of the RIOs–particularly the AMU and MRU–are largely inactive and, in general, I expect leaders have the greatest incentive to engage in security cooperation with co-members from more active RIOs. The main text includes less active regional organizations as a conservative approach that should bias against significant findings, but jack-knifed results where each RIO is removed individually are presented in the appendices. Small island states such as the Seychelles and Comoros are excluded due to limited data availability.

The concern that leaders with high coup risk might select into joining additional RIOs or that leaders with low coup risk will opt-out is mitigated by the fact that membership is largely geographically determined and coup risk is not highly correlated with number of RIO memberships. Africa-based RIOs cover states with high and low coup risk alike and the memberships of these organizations were mostly determined before most RIOs became involved in addressing coups.

3.3.2 Security contributions

To assess whether repressive leaders with high coup risk are more likely to contribute to regional co-members, I examine deployments of security personnel. I record data on security personnel deployments from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual *Military Balance* reports spanning 1990 to 2015. I include consensual deployments, whether bilateral or part of multilateral missions, as well as police for security and peacekeeping missions by the 54 states in my

[27] Eight of the organizations are recognized as regional pillars of the African Union: the AMU, COMESA, CENSAD, the EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC.

sample.[28] I exclude hostile deployments for inter-state wars and border conflicts. Binary dependent variables *personnel to co-members* and *312+ personnel to co-members* indicates whether or not a leader sent personnel to any RIO co-members, and whether they sent more than 312 personnel, the average number of troops deployed by countries in the sample. The unit of analysis is the country-RIO-year.

The choice of dichotomous dependent variables reflects the fact that states receive credit for contributing, but sending the largest number is not inherently better in every instance. Co-members understand that situational factors, including prior commitments, the geographic setting of a deployment, and levels of training all impact the number of troops a leader can commit. Regarding ECOWAS deployments, for example, former Nigerian President Obasanjo stated "we know that some people don't have much. There was a place where one contributed a company, another contributed a brigade. It's all right."[29]



Figure 3.1: Distribution of the proportion of years where African and MENA states sent troops to co-members

Figure 3.1 presents counts of states according to the proportion of years where they con-

[28]Though Military Balance reports are imperfect, there are no comprehensive alternative data sources that cover my sample.

[29]Interview with President Olusegun Obasanjo in Abeokuta, Nigeria, 13 January 2020.

tributed troops or police to within-region security or peacekeeping missions based on their RIO memberships. There is a great deal of variation; some states almost never contribute security personnel to co-members and others almost always do. Between 1990 and 2015, the average African or MENA state sent troops or police to co-members in about 34 percent of years (marked with a dashed line). The proportion of personnel contributed to peacekeeping and security missions by "neighborhood" or contiguous states has increased in the last ten years.[30]

3.3.3 Coup risk

The most common cause of irregular removal for African leaders is the military coup, and irregular removal through other means also typically depends on acquiescence from the military. Though we can observe when leaders are forcibly removed from office, each leader's perception of their underlying vulnerability is an unobservable variable. A robust literature identifies factors that most frequently motivate coups, and which warning signs leaders are therefore likely to monitor. Leaders know that soldiers are motivated to stage coups or defect when they are underfunded,[31] the incumbent threatens their power or privileges through counterbalancing,[32] when the country is unstable, and when they believe that they will have public support.[33] Widespread dissatisfaction and support for leadership turnover are more likely when average standards of living are low.[34]

While the literature on coup risk is large, it is difficult to say how much each variable affects leaders' perceptions of risk. Using an averaged, off-the-shelf coup risk variable would not allow me to account for uncertainty in measurement, and would risk inflating the estimated effect of coup risk on leader behavior. Therefore, I generate and use 3000 coup risk estimates with a Bayesian method that allows me to remain agnostic about the relative weight of each predictor. I include coup risk

[30] Williams and Nguyen (2018).

[31] Albrecht and Eibl (2018); Dwyer (2015).

[32] Counterbalancing, or the fragmentation of the military into numerous paramilitary units, is intended to reduce the military's ability to coordinate a coup and increase loyalty of military units to the head of state, but counterbalancing can generate backlash from units whose power is reduced (Böhmelt and Pilster 2015; De Bruin 2018; Escribà-Folch et al. 2019; Sudduth 2017).

[33] Johnson and Thyne (2018). Gaining acceptance during the coup then depends on coup leaders' control over information (Singh 2014).

[34] Powell (2012); Lindberg and Clark (2008); Albrecht and Eibl (2018); Londregan and Poole (1990).

predictors discussed above that have been validated in the coup forecasting literature.[35] Following the method of Sudduth (2017), I implement a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm with *Jags* to generate risk estimates for 158 countries between 1990-2015. I adapt the measurement model from Sudduth (2017) which is as follows:

$$y_{it} \sim Bernoulli(q_{it})$$

$$log_{it}(q_{it}) = dz_{it}$$

where there are i=1...n countries and t=1...m years. y_{it} is a binary *Observed coup* variable which equals 1 if a country experiences at least one coup attempt in a year and 0 otherwise.[36] The model assumes that coup risk fits a Bernoulli distribution with latent distribution q_{it} and that we observe a coup attempt with probability q_{it} each country-year. I model the logit of latent coup risk $log_{it}(q_{it})$ as a linear function of motive and capacity indicators z_{it}. The model's estimated parameters d indicate how much each variable related to the military's motive and capacity to stage a coup actually contributes to coup risk.

To capture average standards of living and economic pressure, I include standard predictors: the annual percentage change of GDP, annual percentage change in population, and infant mortality odds.[37] I include the number of anti-government demonstrations, which can signal public support for regime change.[38] Other predictors capture the military's privileges and role in a country's politics, including military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, whether there is a military dictatorship in place, the number of counterbalancing forces, and whether the military is the regime's most

[35] Besaw et al. (2019); Gassebner et al. (2016); Ward and Beger (2017).

[36] Coup data used to construct the binary coup event indicator is from Bjørnskov and Rode, who combine and verify coup data from several popular coup datasets, including those from Powell and Thyne (2011) and the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall and Marshall 2018). This dataset includes coups which were not primarily led by military actors, which are excluded by Powell and Thyne.

[37] Data on percentage change of GDP and annual percentage change in population come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2019). Data on infant mortality odds is from the World Health Organization (2019).

[38] Data on anti-government demonstrations is from Banks and Wilson (2020).

important base of support.[39] Whether the country experienced a coup in the previous ten years is also included, as countries which previously experienced coups are more likely to face additional coups.[40] Finally, I include as a predictor whether a country is in an executive election year.[41] Low-integrity executive elections exacerbate grievances, often creating a pretense for violence and unconstitutional interventions.[42]

Figure 3.2 presents the distribution of average coup risk over 1990 to 2015. As coups are rare events, a number of countries have close to zero perceptible coup risk. Across the sample, average coup risk was approximately 4 percent. This is noted with a dashed red line on Figure 3.2. The median average country risk was 2 percent, denoted by a dashed gray line on Figure 3.2. However, a significant number of countries in my sample had high coup risk based on variables observable to leaders in multiple years and experienced coups. The highest predicted coup risk in any given year is 79% for Rwanda in 1994, and a coup did occur in Rwanda in 1994. In contrast, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are two of the countries that most consistently had close to zero coup risk.

Analyses in subsequent sections use the predicted coup risk q generated in each of 3000 simulations for each country year. I exclude extreme coup risk outliers generated by the model, which are 18 observations in the top 99.9th percentile of estimated risk. Results with outliers included are in Appendix D. Fitted coefficients for coup risk predictors and a classification table are presented in Appendix A.

3.3.4 Repressive leaders

While the coup risk estimates capture the likelihood that a leader fears irregular removal, it does not necessarily indicate their likely fate upon removal. Illiberal, repressive leaders associate removal with harsher punishments commensurate to their crimes. This fear causes “sit-tight"

[39] Data on military expenditure is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2019). Data on regime type and whether the military is the most important base of support comes from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Coppedge et al. 2020). Data on counterbalancing is from Pilster and Böhmelt (2011).

[40] Belkin and Schofer (2003); Londregan and Poole (1990); Goemans (2008). I again use coup data from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020).

[41] Data on election timing is from Cruz et al. (2018).

[42] Donno et al. (2020).



Figure 3.2: Distribution of average coup risk among 54 African and Middle Eastern States, 1990-2015

presidents to cling to power, and to rely on co-members' unwillingness to extradite them.[43] These leaders should be more willing to cooperate when co-members reward cooperation with protective assistance. To measure repressiveness, I use V-Dem's physical violence index, which measures freedom from political killings and torture by the government.[44] This variable ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the highest respect for physical integrity. For ease of interpretation, I multiply this variable by -1, so that higher scores indicate greater repression.[45]

3.3.5 Control variables

In some sub-regions, incumbents have undermined neighboring governments' political stability, and co-members' baseline willingness to cooperate should be lower. I therefore control for the average level of rivalry (or non-rivalry) a state has with its RIO co-members each RIO-state-year using data from Diehl et al. (2019).[46] The "peace score" in Diehl et al. (2019) can take a value of

[43] Ani (2019).
[44] Coppedge et al. (2020).
[45] Victor (2010) expected that repressive leaders would contribute more to peacekeeping operations, but found the opposite. I expect that the negative result in Victor (2010) can be explained by omission of the interaction with leader vulnerability.
[46] Goertz et al. (2016). The version is 2.01.

0 (serious rivalry), .25 (lesser rivalry), .50 (negative peace), .75 (warm peace), and 1.0 (security community). The *non-rivalrous* variable is the annual average of rivalry scores with all of a state's RIO co-members, where higher scores indicate less rivalry.

The literature addressing why leaders contribute to regional security operations and peacekeeping most often emphasizes economic motives and concern for spillovers.[47] In the paper's main specifications I control for GDP (PPP) to capture the possibility that poor states contribute more personnel in order to profit from reimbursements.[48] GDP data measured in constant 2011 PPP comes from the World Bank. Prior studies of illiberal international cooperation find that personalist leaders are less likely to cooperate than other types of autocrats,[49] and I also control for whether a leader is personalist using data on leaders' sources of authority from the Varieties of Democracy project.

The size of a country's military and police forces, and whether they are already engaged in conflicts, may impact a leader's capacity to deploy personnel. Therefore, I control for the size of a country's military using data from the World Bank. I control for whether a state is participating in at least one war domestically or internationally using conflict data from UCDP/PRIO.[50] To account for the likelihood that states surrounded by more missions will be more concerned about spillover and, therefore, more likely to contribute, I also control for the number of ongoing peacekeeping missions in a state's co-members. This count on UN and non-UN missions comes from Jetschke and Schlipphak (2019). Relatedly, Gaibulloev et al. (2015) find that leaders take into account the number of states already contributing to close-by operations when deciding whether or not to contribute. I address this by controlling for the inverse-distance weighted sum of security personnel contributions by other states to co-members for each year.

Albrecht (2020), Lundgren (2018), and Kathman and Melin (2017) link coup risk and leaders'

[47] Bellamy and Williams (2013) highlight prestige, economic incentives, security spillovers, civil-military relations, bureaucratic or policy standpoints, and normative or cultural concerns as factors that matter to varying degrees for peacekeeper contributing states. See also Beswick (2010); Boutton and D'Orazio (2019); Bove and Elia (2011); Passmore et al. (2018); Uzonyi (2015); Ward and Dorussen (2016).

[48] Coleman and Nyblade (2018); Henke (2019).

[49] Chyzh (2014); Mattes and Rodríguez (2014).

[50] Gleditsch et al. (2002); Pettersson and Öberg (2020).

motives to contribute to peacekeeping. They argue that UN support eases leaders' guns-versus-butter trade-off and that leaders deploy soldiers, especially troublemakers, with the expectation that soldiers who are well-compensated by the UN will avoid engaging in acts of insubordination. Opposing this view, Adhikari (2020), Cunliffe (2018), Kenkel (2021), and Levin et al. (2020) argue that peacekeeping deployments empower the military at the expense of civilian oversight, particularly in autocracies and as peacekeeping becomes more heavily militarized. Mixed results from both quantitative and case study evidence leaves us without clear predictions as to whether leaders by and large deploy personnel to directly reduce coup risk or in spite of the potential to increase coup risk. "Diversionary peacekeeping" seems less likely to explain leaders sending personnel for non-UN operations, where pay is determined by the contributor and regional organization staff admit that contributors are seldom reimbursed by RIOs in a timely fashion.[51] Delays in reimbursement and contributing states' discretion over payouts often lead to delays in soldiers' pay, generating dissatisfaction. Contributing to non-UN operations can therefore exacerbate coup and mutiny potential, as soldiers are put in dangerous situations without adequate supplies and with delayed paychecks.[52] RIO officials indicate that members are still quick to pledge personnel for non-UN missions despite these risks.[53]

3.3.6 Modeling contributions to co-members

The main models are specified as follows for Hypothesis 1:

$$Y_{ikt} = \alpha + \tau R_{ikt} + \kappa C_{ikt} + \beta X_{ikt} + u_{ikt}$$

[51] Interview with ECOWAS official, Abuja, Nigeria, 30 August 2018; Interview with ECOWAS military official, Abuja, Nigeria, 10 January 2020.

[52] See Dwyer (2015) for examples.

[53] Interview with ECOWAS official, Abuja, Nigeria, 30 August 2018; Interview with ECOWAS military official, Abuja, Nigeria, 10 January 2020.

And for Hypothesis 2:

$$Y_{ikt} = \alpha + \lambda R_{ikt} * C_{ikt} + \tau R_{ikt} + \kappa C_{ikt} + \beta X_{ikt} + u_{ikt}$$

where the dependent variable Y_{ikt} is the log of the odds that state i contributes security personnel to at least one co-member state in RIO k in year t, where we observe 1 if this occurs and 0 otherwise. α is a constant, R_{ikt} is repressiveness, C_{ikt} is coup risk, $R_{ikt} * C_{ikt}$ is the interaction of coup risk and repressiveness, X_{ikt} is a vector of covariates, and u_{ikt} is the error term. The first model assesses the independent effect of coup risk on willingness to deploy personnel. The interactive explanatory variable reflects the theory that leaders contribute not only because they are currently vulnerable, but also because they fear consequences of repressive tactics.

Contributions to co-members is a binary variable and I use logistic regression.[54] I examine within-country and within-RIO variation with models controlling for country-RIO fixed effects. There is, however, greater variation across countries with generally lower or higher coup risk, as most countries don't switch frequently between these types. A number of countries in the sample also have low or zero variance in their rivalries during the time period under observation. To capture cross-country variations I present the main results with random effects, where the intercepts are allowed to vary for each country and RIO.

My data certainly violate the assumption of independence of observations, and there is good reason to believe that temporal auto-correlation is present. Once a country sends troops, those troops may remain deployed for multiple years, impacting the independence of observations over time. The proportion of troops contributed by countries in the Global South, and particularly Africa, for peacekeeping operations has also increased steadily over the course of the 1990s and 2000s. These tendencies will cause inaccurate measurement of betas and standard errors for regression coefficients. Following Carter and Signorino (2010), I model time dependence by including t, t^2

[54] Summary statistics for all covariates are presented in Appendix B.

and t^3. The fixed effects specifications include country-cluster robust standard errors.

Leaders' risk was estimated 3,000 times in 3,000 simulations per country-year, rather than being directly observed annually. Simply averaging the predicted country-year coup risk outputs from the 3,000 simulations would not adequately account for uncertainty introduced through the estimation process. Therefore, I run each model specification 3,000 times using each of the predicted risk measures separately. I subsequently average the betas and standard errors of these 3,000 logistic regression outputs. Because non-linear models with multiple fixed effects generate an incidental parameters problem, I apply the analytical bias correction derived from Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016) and Hinz et al. (2020) to attain bias corrected estimates. All coefficients are standardized due to variable measurement on different scales.

3.4 Results

Table 2 presents the results corresponding to Hypothesis 1, and Table 3 presents the results corresponding to Hypothesis 2. The first and third columns in Tables 2 and 3 present the results of logistic regressions for the two dependent variables using country and RIO fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level. The second and fourth columns presents the results using random effects, where the intercept is allowed to vary for each country and RIO.

The results presented in Table 2 do not support Hypothesis 1. There is not a significant linear, independent relationship between coup risk and the likelihood of a state deploying personnel to support co-members after controlling for relevant co-variates. Increasing coup risk is not sufficient to predict increased or decreased contributions across all types of leaders.

Turning to Hypothesis 2, results presented in Table 3 indicate that the effect of coup risk is conditional on the type of leader at risk. Repressive leaders are more likely to contribute security personnel to RIO co-members, and more likely to contribute more than the regional average number of personnel to RIO co-members, if they face higher risk of irregular removal from office. Substantively, for the least repressive leader the predicted probability of contributing is about 28%

Table 3.2: Logistic Regression Output for Hypothesis 1

	Dependent variable:			
	Personnel to co-members		312+ Personnel to co-members	
	(FE H1)	(RE H1)	(FE H1)	(RE H1)
Coup risk	−0.058	−0.076	0.017	−0.007
	(0.136)	(0.125)	(0.192)	(0.167)
Repressive	−0.115	−0.001	0.022	−0.012
	(0.248)	(0.202)	(0.343)	(0.268)
Non-rivalrous	0.197	0.221	0.174	0.145
	(0.174)	(0.151)	(0.161)	(0.129)
Armed forces size	−1.504***	−0.831***	-1.864***	−1.043***
	(0.174)	(0.281)	(0.478)	(0.319)
At war	0.074	0.072	0.122	0.135
	(0.135)	(0.123)	(0.147)	(0.129)
GDP (PPP)	1.850***	0.900***	3.308***	1.697***
	(0.612)	(0.298)	(0.796)	(0.361)
Number missions in co-members	0.101	0.118	0.391	0.388*
	(0.235)	(0.202)	(0.265)	(0.233)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	1.227***	1.137***	1.044***	0.924***
	(0.195)	(0.166)	(0.218)	(0.180)
Personalist leader	0.465**	0.246	0.800***	0.567***
	(0.200)	(0.159)	(0.233)	(0.186)
t	−0.041	−0.104	0.268	0.159
	(0.157)	(0.146)	(0.183)	(0.169)
t^2	0.017	0.021*	−0.022	−0.014
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)
t^3	−0.0005	−0.001**	0.001*	0.0004
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country, RIO fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Random intercepts: country, RIO	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,656	1,656	1,656	1,656
AIC	1,068.51	1,337.78	761.01	995.40

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.3: Logistic Regression Output for Hypothesis 2

	Dependent variable:			
	Personnel to co-members		312+ Personnel to co-members	
	(FE H1)	(RE H1)	(FE H1)	(RE H1)
Coup risk x Repressive	0.414**	0.395***	0.597**	0.537***
	(0.149)	(0.138)	(0.203)	(0.177)
Coup risk	−0.301	−0.333*	−0.240	−0.293
	(0.173)	(0.164)	(0.244)	(0.219)
Repressive	−0.014	0.086	0.174	0.134
	(0.252)	(0.206)	(0.336)	(0.268)
Non-rivalrous	0.164	0.191	0.148	0.122
	(0.168)	(0.148)	(0.140)	(0.113)
Armed forces size	−1.484***	−0.832***	-1.823***	−1.041***
	(0.404)	(0.283)	(0.474)	(0.320)
At war	0.056	0.053	0.103	0.116
	(0.135)	(0.124)	(0.149)	(0.131)
GDP (PPP)	1.830***	0.905***	3.210***	1.697***
	(0.611)	(0.300)	(0.788)	(0.364)
Number missions in co-members	0.114	0.138	0.414	0.405*
	(0.236)	(0.203)	(0.264)	(0.234)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	1.249***	1.161***	1.053***	0.940***
	(0.197)	(0.168)	(0.219)	(0.181)
Personalist leader	0.465**	0.253	0.799***	0.575***
	(0.199)	(0.159)	(0.229)	(0.185)
t	−0.028	−0.092	0.326*	−0.207
	(0.160)	(0.148)	(0.190)	(0.174)
t^2	0.015	0.020*	−0.027*	−0.018
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.013)
t^3	−0.0004	−0.001*	0.001**	0.001
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country, RIO fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Random intercepts: country, RIO	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,656	1,656	1,656	1,656
AIC	1,059.078	1,330.7	749.907	986.891

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

with low coup risk (25th percentile) and falls to 13% with high coup risk (75th percentile). For the highly repressive leader the predicted probability of contributing is 20% with low coup risk and rises to 27% with high coup risk. Repressive leaders with high risk of irregular removal from office become more motivated to cooperate with their neighbors.



Figure 3.3: Conditional Effects Plots

The substantive effect of the interaction term is easiest to see in Figure 3.3.[55] The left-hand side panel of Figure 3.3 plots the effect of coup risk on contributions to RIO co-members across different levels of repressiveness. The left panel illustrates that the effect of coup risk is negative until one reaches high levels of repressiveness. The wider confidence interval around the line where repressiveness is low reflects the fact that there are few non-repressive leaders facing significant coup risk. Coup risk is more of an issue for repressive leaders. The right-hand side plot in Figure

[55] Both plots use results from the random effects specification but look highly similar when substituting in the fixed effects model.

3.3 illustrates that the effect of repressiveness on contributions to RIO co-members is close to zero for the countries with very low levels of coup risk, but that it is positive for countries with higher coup risk.

There is also evidence of “spill in" effects, as states are more likely to contribute personnel if nearby co-members do. That leaders deploy alongside their neighbors, rather than free riding, is further suggestive evidence that they are overcoming a collective action problem. States with smaller militaries are also significantly more likely to deploy to co-members, and whether they are already at war appears not to matter significantly As Bellamy and Williams (2013) point out, several major peacekeeper contributing states maintain their external personnel contributions while managing internal conflicts. The negative association between military size and likelihood of deploying may reflect the fact that many states contribute small, sometimes “token," groups of personnel.[56]

Because there is not a significant independent relationship between coup risk and troop contributions, the results presented here are also not entirely consistent with Kathman and Melin (2017) or Lundgren (2018)’s suggestions that coup prone states deploy troops in order to reduce their ability or inclination to stage coups.

A positive coefficient on the interaction between coup risk and repressiveness could be seen as evidence for alternative explanations. One possibility is that at-risk, repressive leaders actually deploy to remain in good standing with donor states who increase aid and security sector assistance to troop contributors.[57] In Appendix D, to assess whether it is more likely that leaders are upholding a bargain with donors, I control for the amount of official development finance pledged by the United States. The main results are largely unchanged, and US aid is not significantly correlated with the decision to send troops to RIO co-members each RIO-state-year.

Leaders of former French colonies may be more likely to accept requests to deploy locally from France. As one of the few European powers still willing to put boots on the ground to protect strategic interests and allies in Africa, France exerts considerable influence over operational planning

[56]Coleman (2013).
[57]Henke (2019).

among its former colonies.[58] To capture the possibility that francophone states deploy due to side payments from France, I include a French colony dummy in Appendix D. Again, the main results remain consistent.

More generally, economic interdependence between states may increase leaders' willingness to deploy.[59] To determine whether contributions are driven by the desire to minimize economic disruption, I demonstrate that the main results are unchanged when controlling for a state's openness to regional trade in Appendix D.

Some international relations scholars expect that democracies are more likely to engage in cooperative behavior, including security cooperation. In Appendix D, I show the results are robust to controlling for the proportion of a state's contiguous neighbors that are democratic. Being surrounded by states that are democratic is not associated with higher likelihood of contributing to regional security.

3.5 Conclusion

Evidence in this chapter demonstrates that leaders most vulnerable to irregular turnover and post-tenure punishment do consistently contribute security personnel to support neighbors across Africa and parts of the Middle East in spite of many scholars' expectations to the contrary. Rather than free-riding, many of these leaders generate goodwill and demonstrate their usefulness to RIO co-members who could be "first responders" in future crises.

I have argued that these repressive, coup-prone leaders contribute in large part because regional organizations' rules and established norms set expectations for how leaders must behave and what they must contribute to remain in good standing. RIOs rely on members' contributions and adherence to norms to realize benefits for the group. In the context of regional organizations, members are expected to contribute troops, money, or mediation efforts. These contributions

[58] Interview with diplomat in Abuja, Nigeria, August 2018; Interviews with military officials in Abuja, Nigeria, January 2020.

[59] Stojek and Chacha (2015).

increase the ability of all members to enjoy insurance. In the next chapter, I test the next implication that follows from the theory. Members in good standing should be more likely to receive protection. In particular, their co-members should be more likely to support contributors through military interventions and less likely to be target contributors for anti-government interventions. Keeping up this punishment and reward system sustains cooperation and deters extreme risk-taking by leaders, leaving the collective more secure.

Chapter 4

Biased Military Interventions

Chapter 2 presented the theory of regional cooperation for mutual aid and stability, connecting leaders' personal safety concerns with their interest in collaborating through RIOs. I argued that co-members consider a leader's record with respect to regional cooperation, which I refer to as whether the leader is in good standing, as they decide whether to intervene on the leader's behalf. Prior actions provide informational cues about whether the leader is a "cooperative type" who will contribute to improving regional stability and avoid undermining neighbors. If a leader's actions reveal that they are a non-cooperative free rider, co-members may become sufficiently convinced that replacing them would leave the collective better off. RIOs can provide some legal cover to intervene for or against particular leaders, such as by authorizing interventions on the grounds of protecting democracy or human rights. As they comply with RIO obligations to assist members in good standing and punish non-contributors, leaders increase their own odds of being surrounded by helpful neighbors. Supporting cooperators is also essential for co-members seeking to maintain their own good standing in the organization. And finally, if each leader's opponents observe the RIO abandoning cooperative members, the RIO's deterrent power will weaken. This provides additional impetus for leaders concerned with discouraging their opponents to follow through on their commitments to help RIO co-members.

So far, Chapter 3 provided evidence consistent with one central hypothesis derived from the

theory. Leaders with the greatest need for RIO support and protection–those who are repressive and coup-prone–are more likely to deploy troops and police in support of African RIO co-members. Those contributors should remain eligible for several benefits of RIO membership, including military support during crises. In this chapter I focus on whether co-members' interventions reflect leaders' prior contributions. The following section first describes the prevalence of formal mechanisms that enhance African RIO member states' capacities to cooperate around military interventions. Subsequent sections test the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 2 regarding biased military interventions. As anticipated, I do observe that co-members are more likely to support leaders who previously contributed personnel, and they are more likely to oppose leaders who have not contributed. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of how these findings contribute to research on third party military interventions.

4.1 RIO support for military cooperation

Particularly since the 1990s, African RIOs have developed protocols to enhance security cooperation among member states. These protocols and associated programs largely fulfill two overarching functions. First, security cooperation protocols formalize members' commitments to pool resources and provide material support to co-members during crises. RIOs' mutual defense pacts fall into this category. These agreements stipulate that co-members will deploy personnel and equipment to protect member states facing external aggression, and sometimes allow for interventions in response to internal attacks. RIOs with and without mutual defense pacts also pool resources by establishing standby forces and conducting military exercises. Through regional standby forces, each RIO member state pledges to provide a certain number of units for peacekeeping and military interventions led by the regional organization on short notice. Pledged units are often expected to participate in RIO military exercises to ensure their readiness to deploy. Typically organized at semi-regular intervals by RIO staff, military exercises build common knowledge among member state troops around best practices and improve the interoperability of member state

militaries.

Second, RIO security protocols encourage mutual aid by establishing channels for coordination among member states' security forces. Beyond periodic military exercises, some RIOs institute routine information sharing protocols and establish shared databases. These promote collaboration among members' police, counter-terrorism, border security, naval, and other military divisions. In accordance with RIO protocols, RIO police chiefs and senior military officials meet as councils to share information about issues that threaten their respective governments. Some policing and counter-terrorism agreements in RIOs also provide for member states to extradite wanted individuals to co-members. Extradition agreements allow leaders to deny sanctuary for co-members' opponents who might otherwise attempt to establish cross-border operating bases.

Altogether, RIO security protocols increase members' capacities to intervene militarily as a coalition or bilaterally. Members are better able to deploy in biased military interventions, whether for or against a member state, because of enabling RIO security infrastructure. Whether member states choose to intervene under a RIO mandate or bilaterally will depend on what circumstances call for and will vary in accordance with regions' distinct security cultures. In fact, the extent of formal and informal security cooperation varies across African RIOs. Table 4.1 provides information on the types of formal security competencies present in each RIO. Six of the RIOs have defensive alliance pacts and seven have conducted regional military exercises.[1] All but one RIO in the sample has concluded an agreement around police cooperation.

Differences in RIO protocols underscore the importance of accounting for RIO effects when modeling intervention decisions. Nonetheless, I predict that across Africa, leaders who deployed personnel to co-members will be seen as more cooperative and useful by co-members. Contributors should, therefore, be more likely to receive military assistance from co-members operating in coalitions or bilaterally. In the subsequent section, I test the following hypotheses derived in Chapter 2:

Hypothesis 3: *Leaders who previously deployed to co-members will be more likely to receive*

[1] The AMU, CEMAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, LAS, and SADC have defense pacts. CEMAC, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, LAS, and SADC have conducted regional military exercises.

Table 4.1: Security Cooperation in African RIOs

Incidence of RIO Security Cooperation						
	Military and Police Support					
Regional Organization	Anti-terrorism	Military exercises	Ever intervene	Police co-operation	Mutual defense	Total
Arab Maghreb Union	0	0	0	0	1	1
Community of Sahel and Saharan States	1	0	1	1	0	3
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa	1	1	1	1	1	5
Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries	0	0	0	1	0	1
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa	1	0	0	1	0	2
East African Community	1	1	0	1	0	3
Economic Community of Central African States	1	1	1	1	1	5
Economic Community of West African States	1	1	1	1	1	5
Intergovernmental Authority on Development	1	0	1	1	0	3
Mano River Union	0	0	0	1	0	1
League of Arab States	1	0	1	1	1	4
Southern African Development Community	1	1	1	1	1	5
Total	9	5	7	11	6	

pro-government military support from co-members.

Hypothesis 4: *Co-members will be less likely to intervene militarily against leaders who previously deployed to co-members.*

4.2 Research design

I return to the population of RIO members described in Chapter 3 to evaluate my hypotheses regarding regional cooperation and biased military interventions. My unit of analysis is the directed RIO dyad-year, where each member state in a RIO decides if they will intervene in every other co-member state, and whether their intervention will be pro- or anti-government. Given that a

conflict occurs in State A, co-member State B can intervene on the side that is pro-government, anti-government, or neutral. State A can also choose not to intervene at all. For the main explanatory variable, I construct a dummy variable equal to one if the incumbent leader in the target state contributed military or police personnel to support at least one co-member from the dyad's shared RIO during his or her time in office. I use Heckman-style selection models that allow me to first take into account the probability that a leader receives any military intervention from the dyad co-member in a given year. Given that State B intervenes militarily in State A, I assess whether incumbent in State A's record of security cooperation increases likelihood of a pro-government intervention. I similarly assess whether an incumbent's record of contributing is associated with a lower likelihood of anti-government intervention.

My sample includes all co-member dyads in the 12 Africa-based regional integration organizations under consideration. After accounting for missing data, this amounts to 38,249 observations between 1990 and 2015. I do not exclude any RIO on the basis of activity level or depth of formal cooperation, but I control for regional organization effects. In fact, several RIOs which concluded security cooperation agreements, such as the AMU, are largely inactive at some points; including them in the analyses should present a more conservative test.

4.2.1 Biased interventions

I consider military interventions conducted individually, in informal coalitions, or in RIO-led coalitions. Events prompting third-party military interventions are diverse; co-members might intervene on the side of (or against) a government that faced a coup, is engaged in a civil war, or is engaged in an inter-state war. In addition to overt conflict-joining behavior, I include participation in peace enforcement operations if they are clearly biased in favor of the government or their opponent. Data on biased interventions is from Sousa (2015), Kisangani and Pickering (2008), UCDP/PRIO, and self-collected case material.[2] The main empirical object of inquiry here is whether a leader

[2]On UCDP/PRIO data see Gleditsch et al. (2002); Pettersson and Öberg (2020). Primary and secondary sources used to verify cases are available upon request.

joins their co-member's conflict on the co-member's side based on their relation to each other and the target state leader's record in regional cooperation.

In most years and pairs, leaders do not have cause to consider military intervention. For that reason, a model of the determinants of pro-government or anti-government conflict joining behavior must take into account sample selection issues. African and Middle Eastern countries engaged in conflicts that draw in outsiders are likely to be different from the full sample of countries, including countries at peace. And leaders' decisions to initiate conflicts are influenced by whether they believe allies will support them.[3] The states that intervene are also likely to be different from those which do not intervene with respect to their own characteristics and their relationship with the target state. Failure to account for variables that cause countries to select into interventions would bias results. To account for these dynamics, I implement two-stage Heckman selection models.

Heckman's solution is to view sample selection bias as an omitted variable problem and, after modeling an individual's propensity to select into the sample of interest, control for that "hazard" in the final outcome equation.[4] Here, in the model corresponding to Hypothesis 3, the selection outcome is intervention and the second stage outcome is pro-government intervention. In the model corresponding to Hypothesis 4, the selection outcome is again intervention, while the second stage outcome is anti-government intervention. I estimate probits for both the selection and outcome stages. The selection stage includes RIO fixed effects. For all models, I cluster standard errors by directed dyad and year to address auto-correlation Because the variables that predict one state will intervene in another are not entirely the same as the variables that predict whether the intervention will be pro- or anti-government, the exclusion restriction necessary for the two-stage model to be well-identified is satisfied in both equations.

The dependent variable in the first stage is a binary variable indicating whether co-member B sent military personnel to intervene in a conflict involving co-member A from RIO X in year t. I also record whether co-member A sent military personnel to intervene in a conflict involving co-member B for that RIO X in year t, so each existing RIO-dyad pair is observed twice per year. In the second

[3] Smith (1996).
[4] Heckman (1979).

stage, the binary dependent variable equals one if state B (A) did send military personnel to intervene in state A (B) and those personnel engaged in a pro-(anti-)government intervention. In my sample, 267 of the 360 interventions are pro-government, 58 of the interventions are anti-government, and 35 are neutral.

In the selection stage, I control for variables that affect a state's interests and potential obligations to intervene in a conflict. This includes a dyad's number of shared alliances, the S Score measuring foreign policy similarity between the pair, the number of battle-related deaths in the target state, whether at least one coup attempt or successful coup occurred in the target state in that year, and the number of trans-border ethnic groups shared by the dyad.[5] Alliances and regional organization co-membership are important predictors of conflict-joining behavior in part because they impose obligations for members to intervene.[6] Joining a regional organization or other alliance often signals shared goals and willingness to fight. A greater number of alliances and similar foreign policies between two states therefore should predict pro-government, rather than anti-government, interventions.[7] And because states with alliance ties typically engage in military exercises and share information, fighting together is less costly.[8] Leaders also may expect co-members to impose costs if they do not honor commitments, such as by ceasing cooperation, or at least refusing to enter additional agreements.[9] If states share more alliances, it is also likely that mutual allies will intervene, generating the potential for bandwagoning.[10]

Higher battle-related death counts and coups provide legal justifications for intervention. States can cite the responsibility to protect (R2P) or RIO protocols to rationalize intervening in these cases, although this is not necessarily out of concern for human rights or democracy. Many leaders prove willing to support lethal allies and African RIOs have invoked R2P and anti-coup

[5]Alliance data is from ATOP (Leeds et al. 2002). S Scores are also from the ATOP project (Chiba et al. 2015). Coup data comes from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) and includes reconciled data from several popular coup data sets, including the dataset produced by Powell and Thyne. Data on battle-related deaths is provided by UCDP/PRIO (Pettersson and Öberg 2020). Data on shared ethnic groups is from Vogt et al. (2015).

[6]Powers (2006); Siverson and Starr (1991); Corbetta (2010); Johnson (2016)

[7]Many point out that states although states often fail to honor alliances, alliances do increase the probability of intervention e.g. Johnson (2016); Morrow (1994).

[8]Morrow (1994)

[9]Gibler (2008); Crescenzi et al. (2012); LeVeck and Narang (2017)

[10]However, some find that states with divergent interests are more likely to intervene (Findley and Teo 2006).

clauses selectively as suited their needs.[11] With respect to shared ethnic groups, leaders may face domestic pressure to intervene on the side of co-ethnics fighting in a neighboring state.[12]

I also control for distance between the dyad members in the first stage, as proximity impacts a state's interest in the outcome of a conflict as well as its ability to intervene. Leaders will be more concerned with intervening to manage negative externalities from nearby co-members.[13] Relevant negative externalities include spillovers of refugees, weapons, and violence across borders or lost investment and trade revenue.[14] Many states also lack the logistical capacity to deploy in faraway conflicts.[15] The number of battle-related deaths in the potential intervener proxies for whether a state is unable to deploy abroad because of its own conflicts. Deaths in the intervener could also indicate, on the other hand, that a conflict spread across borders. I also expect more interventions to occur in poorer states–as measured by GDP per capita–which are at greater risk for unresolved conflicts.[16] Finally, studies of conflict-joining behavior reach mixed conclusions about the importance of the intervener's regime type. Some find that democracies are significantly more likely to join conflict initiators and others find that democracies are less reliable toward allies.[17] I control for the democracy score of the would-be intervener using V-Dem's Polyarchy index.[18]

In the outcome specifications, I control for variables that should predict whether–given that a military intervention occurs–the intervention is more likely to be pro-government or anti-government. While its influence may be context-dependent,[19] regime type similarity matters for leaders deciding whether to intervene in support of incumbents.[20] Generally, leaders are less likely to support dissimilar regimes, so I control for the difference between the democracy scores of the

[11] Uzonyi (2018); Zähringer and Brosig (2020).

[12] Nome (2012); Saideman (2002).

[13] They may fear externalities will destabilize their own country or other countries that are of strategic importance to them (Kathman 2011).

[14] Kathman (2010, 2011); Bove and Böhmelt (2019); Stojek and Chacha (2015); Aydin (2008).

[15] Weaker states struggle to project power independently across greater distances (Joyce and Braithwaite 2013).

[16] Data on GDP per capita is from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

[17] E.g. see Joyce et al. (2014) and Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004), respectively.

[18] Teorell et al. (2016).

[19] See Gartzke and Weisiger (2013).

[20] On dyad regime type similarity and the likelihood that states will support each other militarily see Gartzke and Weisiger (2013); Johnson (2016); Joyce et al. (2014); Werner and Lemke (1997).

dyad members using V-Dem's Polyarchy index.[21] It is also likely to be more costly to intervene in support of unpopular leaders, and less costly to intervene in opposition to unpopular leaders. To proxy for whether a leader's domestic audience favors their removal, I control for the number of anti-government protests that took place in the target state in year t.[22] I again control for the dyad's number of shared alliances and foreign policy similarity S Score, predicting that all else equal, interveners are more likely to support the incumbent if they share more alliances and similar foreign policy objectives.

The specification of the two-stage model of intervention and fighting alongside the incumbent leader are presented in Table 4.2. The results of the two-stage model of intervention and fighting against the incumbent leader are presented in Table 4.3. All coefficients presented are standardized.

4.3 Results

If leaders cooperate with RIO co-members to gain protections, we should observe not only that leaders in need of protection contribute, but also that they do subsequently receive support from co-members. The results presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are consistent with this expectation. Hypothesis 3 predicted that leaders who previously deployed security personnel to support at least one co-member in a RIO will be more likely to receive military support from other members of that RIO. As indicated in column 2 of 4.2, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between a leader's record of deploying to co-members and the likelihood that their co-member will intervene on their side, given that an intervention occurs. Substantively, the average predicted probability of experiencing a pro-government military intervention from a co-member state is approximately 27% higher for leaders who have previously contributed military or police personnel to support RIO co-members.

Hypothesis 4 predicted that leaders who have previously deployed security personnel to support at least one co-member in a RIO will be less likely to experience anti-government

[21] Teorell et al. (2016).

[22] Protest data is from Banks and Wilson (2020).

Table 4.2: Two-Stage Model of Intervention and Siding With the Government

	Dependent variable:	
	Selection Intervention	Outcome Pro-gov intervention
	(1)	(2)
Ever deploy to RIO co-members		0.156^{***} (0.059)
Number of anti-gov protests		-0.152 (0.180)
Difference in V-Dem Polyarchy scores		-0.144^{***} (0.046)
Number of alliances	-0.087 (0.076)	-0.026 (0.058)
Foreign policy similarity	0.239^{**} (0.130)	0.147 (0.099)
Battle-related deaths (target)	0.206^{***} (0.047)	
Number shared ethnic groups	0.050 (0.033)	
GDP per capita (target)	-0.475^{***} (0.193)	
Distance	-0.459^{***} (0.106)	
V-Dem Polyarchy score (intervener)	-0.024 (0.062)	
Battle-related deaths (intervener)	0.034 (0.023)	
Coup attempt (target)	0.066 (0.057)	
RIO fixed effects	Yes	No
Clustered standard errors	Yes	Yes
Observations	38,249	38,249
Log Likelihood	$-1,628.747$	$-1,628.747$
ρ	0.546^{***} (0.067)	0.546^{***} (0.067)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.3: Two-Stage Model of Intervention and Siding Against the Government

	Dependent variable:	
	Selection Intervention	Outcome Anti-gov intervention
	(1)	(2)
Ever deploy to RIO co-members		-0.076^{***} (0.027)
Number of anti-gov protests		0.050 (0.114)
Difference in V-Dem Polyarchy scores		0.038 (0.031)
Number of alliances	-0.072 (0.085)	-0.067 (0.045)
Foreign policy similarity	0.255^{***} (0.132)	-0.144^{**} (0.068)
Battle-related deaths (target)	0.199^{***} (0.031)	
Number shared ethnic groups	0.065 (0.035)	
GDP per capita (target)	-0.514^{***} (0.160)	
Distance	-0.454^{***} (0.096)	
V-Dem Polyarchy score (intervener)	-0.032 (0.061)	
Battle-related deaths (intervener)	0.028 (0.036)	
Coup attempt (target)	0.070 (0.053)	
RIO fixed effects	Yes	No
Clustered standard errors	Yes	No
Observations	38,249	38,249
Log Likelihood	$-1,527.768$	$-1,527.768$
ρ	-0.810^{***} (0.029)	-0.810^{***} (0.029)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

military interventions by other members of that RIO. The results presented in 4.3 indicate that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between a leader's record of deploying to co-members and the likelihood that their co-member will intervene against them, given that an intervention occurs. Substantively, the average predicted probability of experiencing an anti-government military intervention from a co-member state is approximately 8% lower for leaders who have previously contributed military or police personnel to support RIO co-members.

Figure 4.1a plots the predicted probabilities of pro-government military interventions calculated based on whether a leader has deployed to co-members or not. This visually represents the significantly greater likelihood that a leader will receive military support from co-members if they have a record of contributions. Figure 4.1b, in contrast, plots the predicted probabilities of anti-government military interventions calculated in the main text based on whether a leader has deployed to co-members or not. It is clear on the left hand side of 4.1b that leaders who have not previously contributed face relatively high probabilities of anti-government intervention and lower probabilities of pro-government intervention. Based on the right hand side of each plot, it is also clear that prior contributions cannot completely explain biased military interventions. Some leaders who previously contributed personnel to co-members nonetheless are relatively unlikely to receive military support from co-members.

I consider several alternative explanations for biased military interventions in robustness tests. One commonly cited explanation for third party interventions in Africa is the presence of natural resources. African leaders have intervened in resource-rich states partly to profit from smuggling.[23] However, robustness checks presented in the Appendix indicate that my findings are robust to controlling for either oil and natural gas production or mineral exports in the target state. Avoiding lost trade revenue is another often-cited motive for intervention. Trade ties may be less relevant in many African dyads because intra-regional formal trade integration in Africa lags behind most other continents. Unfortunately, data on important informal cross-border trade flows are not available and data on formal trade in the region is known to have significant inaccuracies.[24]

[23] Findley and Marineau (2015).
[24] Jerven (2014).



(a)



(b)

Figure 4.1: Predicted probabilities based on deployment record

Nonetheless, I do include robustness checks controlling for formal dyadic trade in merchandise in the Appendix. About 12% of observations are lost due to missing data, but the relationship between a leader's deployment record and the likelihood of pro-government intervention remain consistent. Anti-government interventions are rarer in the data, so losing observations is more problematic here; after controlling for dyadic trade none of the predictors of anti-government interventions retain statistical significance. Accurately measuring the importance of economic interdependence for military interventions within the region requires more reliable data.

One might suspect leaders are motivated to "bandwagon," joining the side of whoever they believe will be the likely winner in a conflict. In the Appendix, I present a model controlling for GDP per capita of the target state in the outcome equation to proxy for the amount of resources the target state can commit toward ensuring victory. Including the target state's GDP per capita does change the magnitude, but not the significance, of the coefficient for the explanatory variable of interest.

4.4 Conclusion

The theory in Chapter 2 underscored that regional organizations outside of the Global North are more central to conflict-joining behavior than international relations scholars typically acknowledge. These RIOs alter the costs and benefits associated with intervening in support of, or against, particular co-members more comprehensively than is often assumed. First, RIOs condition leaders' access to benefits on whether they cooperate with regional security initiatives. This includes whether they provide military support as needed to co-members in good standing. By intervening to fight alongside cooperative co-members, a leader maintains their own good standing and demonstrates their worth to co-members. This chapter has provided additional evidence consistent with RIOs promoting cycles of reciprocity through how they define good standing and link that to benefits.

When they intervene in domestic crises, RIOs and member states often claim to be neutral

parties interested in protecting civilians and restoring stability–a framing which provides cover for protecting incumbents in good standing. Leaders do support RIO interventions to stem instability and externalities, hoping to avoid spillover of refugees and combatants However, the military interventions conducted by RIOs to support governments under attack from within frequently are biased to support more cooperative co-members.[25]

Prior studies do not assess whether heads of state benefit from all co-members' increased support if they contribute positively to any one co-member, indicating generalized reciprocity within their RIO. However, generalized reciprocity among co-members might resemble a special "network of solidarity" around conflict-joining behavior.[26] Here, I find evidence to suggest that reciprocity does generalize within African RIOs; each dyad partner was more likely to support the target incumbent previously contributed to any member in their RIO.

Although this chapter considered whether states are more likely to intervene on behalf of co-members who previously contributed to regional security cooperation, it did not directly demonstrate why that may be the case. Future statistical tests could address whether more cooperative leaders also receive military support faster than less cooperative counterparts, and whether there is a threshold for minimum meaningful contributions. However, why and when co-membership in regional organizations with security cooperation provisions motivates some leaders to intervene for or against co-members is a difficult question to address solely through large-n analyses. The large-n statistical analyses in this chapter and the previous chapter only provide evidence that on average, African RIO members engage in security cooperation in a manner consistent with my theoretical predictions. In the next chapter, I test directly for proposed causal processes and the operation of causal mechanisms, focusing on decision-making in one regional organization.

[25]Coleman (2011).
[26]Corbetta (2013).

Chapter 5

Responding to Crises in ECOWAS

> "Indeed, West African leaders probably meet more frequently in various councils and communicate more regularly than their counterparts in Western Europe."

Former Nigerian Pres. Gowon from his PhD thesis on ECOWAS, 1984

> "Consultation, in itself, is actually not a guarantee, but merely a prerequisite, of our support. We shall also apply the principle of reciprocity, on the grounds that those who require our support must also be prepared to support us...Nigeria's obligations to the Front-line States and the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa are perhaps the singular exceptions to our new emphasis on reciprocity in our international relations."

Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister A. Bolaji Akinyemi's "Reciprocity in Nigerian Foreign Policy"

(The Akinyemi Doctrine), Nigerian Forum, May-June 1987

> "We worked together more in the area of security than in the area of economic cooperation."

Former Nigerian Pres. Obasanjo discussing ECOWAS, Interview on January 13, 2020

Previous chapters test aspects of the mutual aid and stability theory for security cooperation among African RIO co-members. In Chapter 3, I established that the combination of high coup risk and reliance on repressive tactics make leaders more likely to deploy security personnel in support of co-members. Chapter 4 demonstrated that heads of state who previously contributed security

personnel to support co-members were then more likely to experience pro-government military interventions by co-members from that organization. These contributors in good standing were also less likely to be targeted for anti-government military interventions. Together, these chapters provided evidence that leaders with the greatest need for security assistance from co-members do contribute to regional security operations, and that they are later rewarded with more pro-government interventions and fewer anti-government interventions by co-members. While Chapters 3 and 4 incorporated data for members of twelve African regional organizations, in this final empirical chapter, I focus on one organization: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

I analyze seventeen major political and security crises that were severe enough for ECOWAS to consider military intervention between 1990 and 2017. Whereas previous chapters demonstrate that evidence consistent with the theory is present on average across African organizations, those chapters do not test for the operation of theorized mechanisms. In this chapter, I test for the presence of mechanisms and causal processes described by the theory. This first entails determining whether leaders considered targeted leaders' records of cooperative or destabilizing behavior while deciding whether to intervene on their side. I expect that leaders want to support cooperative co-members, repaying favors and protecting their own interests by ensuring they have friendly neighbors. I also expect that leaders oppose military interventions in support of–and are willing to intervene against–uncooperative co-members who destabilized regional security before, and are considered likely to do so again.

I view ECOWAS as an organization where evidence of those proposed mechanisms should be present during crises if the theory has explanatory power. ECOWAS is a pioneer among African regional organizations with respect to developing protocols for crisis mediation and security interventions. Other regions see ECOWAS as a model in these respects. One of the oldest functioning organizations in Africa, ECOWAS is now also one of the most active regional organizations in general. It has undertaken more military interventions than any other African regional organization, but also sometimes decides not to intervene in cases where it could legally do so.

First, adopting a large-n qualitative (LNQA) design, I present the distribution of cases

where evidence consistent with predicted causal processes is present, and those where it is absent.[1] Focusing only on ECOWAS members allows me to hold some regional characteristics constant, such as regional protocols in particular time periods, and to generalize across cases. After providing summaries of the crises involving leaders who were in good standing and those who were not, I present three case studies. The case studies include two “typical" cases which would be described as “on the regression line."[2] The cases are typical because the combinations of independent and dependent variables present correspond well with the theorized model. One typical case illustrates why a leader in good standing received military support from ECOWAS, and the other typical cases illustrates why a disfavored leader did not receive support from ECOWAS. I also present a case which does not appear to conform with the theory, examining distinguishing circumstances of this case. All three cases allow me to describe with much more detail the sequence of decision-making and the role of leaders’ perceptions about whether co-members in crisis were cooperative.

Between 1990 and 2017, crises enter the data set if ECOWAS member states realistically could have–or did respond with–a military intervention based on established norms and protocols. The data includes crises where ECOWAS leaders intervened to support the incumbent head of state, as well as those where they turned against the incumbent; I code for the same variables of interest in all cases. This necessitates examining the causes of crises and whether member state leaders in crisis previously played constructive roles in regional security. The data also includes ECOWAS members’ responses to each crisis, and whether their responses benefited incumbents.

Case coding relies on internal government memos, diplomatic cables, news reports, interviews, and expert analyses. Classified memos from the Nigerian presidential administration of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) and leaked diplomatic cables from various American embassies include private communications between conflict participants and other public officials. Because these communications are often designated “highly classified" and were not meant to be shared widely, the commentary on actors’ motives that they contain is less likely to be distorted. The Obasanjo papers include memos sent between President Obasanjo and his ministers, classified

[1] For more on this method, see Goertz and Haggard (2020).
[2] Gerring (2008).

updates on unfolding crises, and summaries of Obasanjo's private meetings with foreign leaders, international organization leaders, diplomats, and rebels. Diplomatic cables describe meetings between US embassy staff or American politicians and ECOWAS member state officials in various countries. The memos and cables corroborate some information gathered from secondary sources and from interviews conducted in Nigeria with political and military elites from ECOWAS member states in 2018 and 2020.

In the next section, I begin by presenting relevant history of the Economic Community of West African States. I focus in particular on its evolution between the 1990s and 2010s. Evolving norms and new treaty protocols in these periods expanded the scope of ECOWAS authority in political and security affairs. Section Two summarizes ECOWAS members' understandings of security obligations and burden-sharing from the 2000s onward. It also describes how the organization benefits leaders and encourages them to prioritize regional stability. The third section links the mutual aid and stability theory to my expectations regarding how ECOWAS members should decide on military interventions. Section Four describes my coding rules for the ECOWAS crises under consideration, and Section Five describes the results. Section Six presents case studies to illustrate the processes described in the theory and borne out in the data. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings, including implications for studies of other regions.

5.1 The Economic Community of West African States

In 1975, sixteen states' leaders signed the founding charter of The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Lagos, Nigeria.[3] The organization's purpose was to advance economic development and create prosperity through integration among West African states. West African leaders believed that regional cooperation and solidarity were needed for each state to overcome dependence on former colonial powers and over-reliance on primary commodity exports. The founding of ECOWAS was not without controversy; France and several francophone states–led

[3]Mauritania left ECOWAS in 2000, reducing the number of current members to fifteen.

by Senegal–opposed the creation of ECOWAS. They believed it would be a vehicle for Nigeria to assert regional dominance. ECOWAS faced significant barriers to cooperation in the 1970s, including territorial disputes, mutual suspicions among member state leaders, and a clear anglophone versus francophone divide encouraged by France.

Acknowledging the importance of peace and security for economic development, members expanded the scope of ECOWAS agreements. They took their first formal steps toward regional security cooperation with the adoption of a Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence in 1981. All members aside from Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali signed the latter. The 1981 defense pact called for creation of a regional force structure that would draw units from all members under one force commander in the event of external aggression. From that point forward, the ministers of defense and foreign affairs of member states constituted a regional defense council, now called The Mediation and Security Council. However, throughout the 1980s, ECOWAS defense agreements appeared to be largely symbolic. West Africa became the African region most prone to coups d'etat, but ECOWAS defense agreements focused solely on addressing external sources of aggression. Members also made little progress toward economic integration. This could in part be attributed to West African leaders' varied ideologies and orientations toward the US, Russia, France, and non-aligned movements during the Cold War. The number of rivalries in the region were cause and symptom of low levels of trust, which prevented consistent cooperation through ECOWAS. Great powers exacerbated regional tensions by encouraging proxy wars.

Liberia's first civil war was a turning point for ECOWAS. Regional mediation failed to halt rebel advances on Monrovia in 1990 and Liberia's long-time patron, the United States, refused requests to intervene. Nigerian President Babangida then responded to Liberian President Samuel Doe's request for military intervention. Babangida pushed ECOWAS to create and deploy the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a force largely comprised of Nigerian troops under a Ghanaian commander. This was the first ECOWAS military intervention, though it was largely funded and staffed by Nigeria. ECOWAS protocols did not address intervention in members'

domestic conflicts at the time, and the fact that Nigeria only retroactively received approval from the United Nations Security Council casts doubts over the legality of the intervention. ECOWAS member states were also deeply divided about the Liberian deployment, with Ivorian President Félix Houphouet-Boigny and Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré aactually supporting the rebels who threatened Monrovia.[4]

Nevertheless, ECOWAS interventions in Sierra Leone in 1997 and Guinea-Bissau in 1998 followed the Liberian intervention. As was the case in Liberia, both operations began with the incumbent heads of state requesting assistance when it became necessary for their survival. The presidents of Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau–Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and Nino Vieira–trusted co-members enough to invite their military intervention and intended for ECOWAS to restore them each to power. Notably, although Nigeria again provided the bulk of forces for the intervention into Sierra Leone, francophone member states provided forces and assumed leadership for the operation in Guinea-Bissau.

Regional security cooperation increased in the 1990s partially out of necessity as Great Powers abdicated responsibility to intervene or prop up former client states. Particularly in the wake of the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident, the US had little appetite for putting American soldiers on the ground in African conflicts. This, in combination with collective trauma affected by Rwanda and Liberia's humanitarian disasters, pushed African regional organizations more broadly to shift "from non-intervention to non-indifference" toward domestic conflicts in the 2000s. The shift entailed greater policing of members' domestic politics to discourage leaders from provoking civil conflicts and intervening to prevent destabilization of entire regions, as described in Chapter 2. For ECOWAS members, ineffectiveness and lack of professionalism displayed by forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone underscored the need for additional security protocols, joint training, and institution-building. Approved in December of 1999, the ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (MCPMRPS) laid out guidance for peacekeeping interventions and directed the creation of new institutions to address

[4]Houphouet-Boigny and Compaoré had vendettas against President Doe rooted in Doe's mistreatment of the former first family, who each was tied to through marriage.

conflicts at all stages.

The subsequent Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance is the most significant document establishing ECOWAS authority to intervene in member states' affairs, including political and security crises. Signed in December of 2001, the Supplementary Protocol links the prevention of internal crises to democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. Although ECOWAS had already proclaimed its commitment to democracy and human rights in broad terms in the 1991 Declaration of Political Principles, language in the 2001 Supplementary Protocol was more concrete. It stipulates for the first time rules for domestic politics that members agree to adhere to, and the organization's authority to intervene when members violate these principles. Constitutional principles include the accession of power exclusively through "free, fair and transparent" elections, zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained through unconstitutional means, that the armed forces must be apolitical, that no serving member of the armed forces may run to seek political offices, and that former heads of state shall enjoy special status including freedom of movement and "special benefits compatible to their status." Though the fairness of elections was subject to very selective enforcement, the rest of these principles became "red lines," as discussed in the theoretical model. The Supplementary Protocol set rules around a wide range of issues including the conduct of elections, election monitoring, conduct of security forces, joint security force training between members, countering terrorism, and respect for human rights. With its reference to unconstitutional means of obtaining power the Protocol also prohibited coups d'etat. If democracy was "brought to an end" or massive human rights violations occurred in a member state, ECOWAS assumed the right to impose sanctions and intervene militarily.

After passing the Supplementary Protocol, ECOWAS followed more standardized operating procedures when responding to crises. As a crisis develops, the organization sends fact-finding teams and heads of state decide who should intercede with the conflict parties based on personal relationships and leverage. ECOWAS established a permanent mediation division and guidelines on best practices for mediators, but heads of state remain central to mediation efforts.[5] While Nigeria

[5]Interview with a program officer from the ECOWAS Mediation Facilitation Division on August 31, 2018 in Abuja.

was quicker to push for military intervention than co-members liked in the 1990s, members are now in agreement that sending diplomatic missions and exhausting peaceful options should precede calling on military forces.

If mediation fails to resolve a crisis that has the potential to cause widespread violence, ECOWAS heads of state consider military intervention. As foreign ministers and ambassadors meet, heads of state gather at emergency summits and agree on whether and how to intervene. They then authorize their ministers of defense to pledge troops, police, and logistical support to the ECOWAS intervention effort.[6] The stated and apparent objectives of ECOWAS deployments range from supporting heads of state against rebel groups, forcing reluctant heads of state to step down, and enforcing ceasefire agreements.

5.1.1 Expectations for “good standing" in ECOWAS

To understand how ECOWAS members choose whether to support an incumbent in crisis, I have argued that we need to consider prior actions of the leader in crisis and members' expectations. Co-members beliefs about whether it is in their best interest to support a leader facing a crisis are informed by whether the leader has proven useful in the past. Leaders who consistently cooperate with co-members to improve regional security and meet expectations to remain in good standing with neighbors develop reputations for being cooperative types. Co-members generally want to support cooperative types, who are more likely to improve their own odds of survival. In contrast, members want to punish non-cooperators who destabilize the region, and possibly find more cooperative replacements. The content of ECOWAS protocols reflects leaders' expectations about how cooperative members should behave and what they should contribute to remain in good standing. Cooperative types are willing to meet these expectations, and therefore we should observe that they receive assistance from co-members during crises.

The ECOWAS heads of state who signed the 1999 and 2001 protocols did not stringently adhere to many of the protocols' dictates in the spirit of liberal democracy themselves. Therefore,

[6]Interview with the Director of ECOWAS Peacekeeping and Regional Security on August 31, 2018 in Abuja.

their willingness to sign might otherwise seem puzzling. I argue that most heads of state did not sign on to liberal treaty commitments with the intention to cease harassing opponents, manipulating the judiciary, and benefiting from corruption. Nor did they expect this of co-members. But the protocols helped to establish common knowledge around red lines, or extreme actions that most leaders cannot take without expecting to face punishment from co-members. The protocols are supposed to steer leaders in unstable countries toward moderation and discourage more extreme risk-taking behaviors, such as canceling elections or killing well-known political opponents. Influential leaders such as Nigeria's President Obasanjo believed in the importance of having at least nominally democratic institutions to manage domestic conflicts, even as he and his contemporaries engaged in illiberal practices somewhat more discretely. Obasanjo and other leaders recognized that irresponsible governance had provoked mutinies and fueled insurgencies in and beyond Liberia in the 1990s, generating lasting negative externalities for co-members. Leaders hoped that encouraging moderation would help them avoid additional conflicts on the scale of the Liberian Civil Wars.

In addition to avoiding destabilizing behaviors, ECOWAS protocols describe contributions required of all members. Like most regional integration organizations, ECOWAS expects member states to remit annual dues proportional to the size of their economy. As of its 1993 revised charter, ECOWAS instituted a community levy. Members place a 0.5 percent tax on the value of goods imported from outside of the region and channel proceeds from their central banks to ECOWAS's accounts. Community levy accountants report to members annually about who is or is not remitting their shares on time or fully, as well as who is cooperating with audits. By complying with the levy on an annual basis, member state leaders can demonstrate their commitment to remain in good standing.

Contributions to regional security operations are also key to remaining in good standing. All member states pledged troops for the ECOWAS Standby Force and if crises occur, those pledged units should be available for rapid deployment by ECOWAS. When ECOWAS decides to launch a military intervention, member states' ministers of defense and foreign affairs meet in committees to indicate what troops and equipment their governments authorized them to contribute. ECOWAS

staff and political elites interviewed claim that leaders are expected to contribute as much manpower and support as they can manage. Those who contribute nothing without a compelling excuse incur reputation costs. Contributing more often–in proportion to their state's capabilities–also improves a leader's standing with co-members and the ECOWAS staff.

Other expectations for members are established as norms that evolved over time. For instance, although heads of state are formally obliged to attend summits twice per year, the number of ECOWAS summits convened each year has increased in response to persistent crises. Consistent attendance by heads of states at summits became a clearer signal of commitment as the number of summits increased, and many summits concluded with pledges of resources. Another informal norm is that of pledging emergency relief to co-members in the wake of natural or man-made disasters, such as floods, landslides, droughts, and disease outbreaks.

Finally, leading mediation efforts and shuttle diplomacy during crises also helps contribute to a leader's good standing. When a member state leader faces deadlocked conflict with actors from opposition parties, the military, or rebel groups, ECOWAS is recognized as one of the first external actors that should designate mediators to seek solutions. There is an established norm that heads of state form a delegation to intercede with the co-member in crisis or, depending on the situation, dispatch one or two leaders to represent them as a group. Staff from ECOWAS's mediation division, created in 2015, now support heads of state and their staff.[7] Though leading mediation is sometimes seen as being more self-serving and self-aggrandizing for leaders than other forms of contributions, some mediation efforts require significant time and state resources as they stretch out over years.

Overall, most obligations ascribed to members relate to maintaining regional stability. Making consistent contributions in line with regional organization dictates and norms helps to maintain a leader in "good standing" with their co-members. The more costly a leader's contribution to regional stability through the stabilization of floundering co-members, the more clear that leader's commitment and reliability for the regional organization becomes. Co-members weigh leaders' records according to both positive and negative actions.

[7]ECOWAS also has a Council of the Wise, though this institution created to convene elder statesmen as mediators and advisors is largely inactive.

5.1.2 Inducement and punishment

As discussed in Chapter 2, member state leaders are willing to cooperate and contribute to regional initiatives if the regional organization provides valuable, excludable goods to leaders in good standing. They will also be less likely to violate the “red lines" of unacceptable, destabilizing behavior if the regional organization credibly threatens punishments for violators. Threats to punish are credible if following through on enforcement is in co-members’ own interest–not just because agreements stipulate they should do so.

With respect to inducements, ECOWAS evolved to facilitate the co-production of numerous benefits that are particularly valuable to leaders concerned with survival. We can broadly sort the purposes of benefits ECOWAS provides into three categories: legitimation or reputation laundering, security, and access to resources. Leaders have, for example, used legitimacy granted to regional organizations by the international community to re-frame threats to their personal security as threats to regional stability. Some use this tactic to justify–and even receive support for–applying excessive force against legitimate political opposition groups. As mentioned in Chapter 2, when Guinean President Lansana Conté directed his troops to fight Liberian and Sierra Leonean rebels alongside ECOWAS co-members, he also claimed that some opposition groups in Guinea’s forest region were associated with the Liberian rebels. After relabeling opposition supporters as supporters of the rebels that ECOWAS was authorized to fight, Conté attacked those opponents without facing sanctions from the international community.

ECOWAS election observation missions have also been used to enhance the legitimacy of rigged elections. The presence of trained regional observers at an election may boost international and domestic audiences’ perceptions of openness and transparency.[8] ECOWAS election observers also sometimes choose to overlook procedural irregularities favoring the incumbent. If members do not want to condemn a particular leader who rigged an election then, for example, their report omits references to jailed opposition members or bribed election officials. In general, regional actors providing recognition of a leader’s authority at times when their authority is contested helps leaders

[8] Bush and Prather (2018).

remain in office.

Meanwhile, security benefits from ECOWAS operate through direct and indirect channels. ECOWAS protocols, such as the 1991 Supplementary Protocol, attempt to address the region's scourge of coups. By obligating members to sanction and refuse recognition for any military officials who remove incumbents through coups, ECOWAS reduces the expected benefits for military officials of carrying out a coup. It is hard for military leaders to benefit at the top of government for long if co-members close their borders and apply economic sanctions. If sanctions are insufficient to deter coup leaders, ECOWAS also gives members the option of responding through military intervention. The possibility of co-members invading after the military seizes control raises expected costs and risks for those planning coups and insurgencies. Wherever ECOWAS's promises to punish coup plotters are seen as credible to members of the military, they may have deterrence value. If co-members are willing to come to a leader's defense against both domestic and external threats, this provides a significant boost to their personal security in office. As I will discuss below, ECOWAS's history demonstrates that security commitments are contingent on good standing.

ECOWAS also serves as a focal point for attracting donor resources. Its secretariat engages in significant fund-raising and in attracting military assistance from partner states in the Global North. Some leaders exploit the willingness of donors to train military and police units with the expectation that they will participate in regional peacekeeping under the direction of ECOWAS or the United Nations. But once troops are newly trained, and especially if they are provided with better equipment, they can be redirected to protect the head of state or misused to more effectively attack protesters and opposition members. It is clear in the case of the civilian component of ECOWAS's peacekeeping division that ECOWAS leaders agreed to create a program donors wanted in exchange for continued access to resources. As discussed in Chapter 2, the leader of the ECOWAS peacekeeping civilian division believes that ECOWAS created his office because doing so was a precondition for receiving more money toward peacekeeping from the German development agency GIZ. But, as he said, ECOWAS has never deployed any of the civilians that the Germans paid for them to train and place on a roster.

While all members may benefit from general improvements in regional security as a public good, some important benefits from these three categories are excludable. ECOWAS can condemn a leader's election or domestic policies to harm their reputation, for example. Members may also overlook antidemocratic practices in a member state, or can cite these as justification for sanctioning a leader. Co-members can choose not to fight to reinstate leaders removed in coups, or even support their opponents. The newly established body of ECOWAS law provided members with a number of ways to justify policing each others' behaviors and applying punishments as needed.

As I argue in previous chapters, member state leaders are largely motivated to apply punishments and deny benefits for leaders who engage in conflict-provoking behavior that threatens their security. By formally linking violations to punishments, ECOWAS raised the stakes for leaders deciding whether to engage in those behaviors. However, proposed punishments will only be credible if it is in members' best interest to follow through with enforcement. Threats to punish leaders who provide significant public goods, such as leaders who deploy security personnel to dangerous operations, will be less credible if co-members value the service rendered more than they fear the potential consequences of the leader's violation. Similarly, promises to support a leader if they face threats to their safety might be more credible if that leader cooperates closely with co-members The costs of intervening on behalf of a cooperative member can be offset by anticipated benefits of continued cooperation. This is all the more true when co-members are uncertain about whether a leader's would-be replacement intends to maintain the status quo.

In contrast, members can seize the opportunity to punish uncooperative leaders when they break important rules. The ECOWAS treaty, revised in 1993, includes suspension of Community loans and assistance, suspension of funding for projects, exclusion from presenting candidates for statutory and professional posts (at the ECOWAS Commission), suspension of voting rights, and suspension from participating in Community activities as sanctions for "non-fulfillment of obligations." The 2001 Supplementary Protocols provides more potential punishments. In increasing order of severity, these include refusal to support a member state's candidates for elective posts in international organizations, refusal to allow the member to host ECOWAS meetings, and suspension

of the member state from ECOWAS decision-making bodies. Of course, the 1999 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (MCPMRPS) does not refer to military interventions as a form of sanction, but the Community has in effect used military intervention to remove heads of state no longer in good standing.

I argue that we can see the 1999 and 2001 protocols as commitments to moderation and stability backed by the threat of force, and devices to justify removing problematic heads of state. By discouraging large-scale violence, member state leaders could feel good about taking the moral high ground and benefit from a reputation boost when they punish bad behavior. They also face pressures to punish leaders for extreme rights violations from donor governments, who are eager to see benefits from funding “good governance" and “rule of law" projects. Most importantly for member state leaders in ECOWAS, they can use the organization to induce cooperative behavior or punish uncooperative behavior as needed, selecting for better neighbors over time. Actions often interpreted as pro-democracy stands by ECOWAS can be better understood as pro-stability actions. With respect to more gradual and less attention-grabbing actions that undermine democracy, such as replacing judges with cronies, intimidating local journalists, or bribing voters, leaders largely carried on as usual.

In sum, I expect to observe that ECOWAS members punish non-contributors who cross clear red lines either by not intervening in their favor or intervening against them. In contrast, when leaders in good standing require assistance from ECOWAS, co-members would be more forthcoming with military support. This decision making process is summarized in Figure 5.1.

5.2 Research design

I adopt a large-n qualitative design to test for the presence or absence of decision-making processes consistent with my theory in a set of seventeen cases. As discussed in the subsequent section, these cases cover all instances (observable to an outsider) between 19990 and 2017 where ECOWAS seriously considered responding to a crisis with military intervention or clearly had the



Figure 5.1: Decision Making Diagram

legal obligation to consider a range of responses including military intervention. By looking for the presence or absence of the theory's stipulated causal mechanisms, the large-n qualitative analysis provides within-case causal inference for each of the seventeen cases. The coding procedures and types of data used to judge cases are the same for each case.[9] This allows me to compare and make general conclusions based on the cases.

One potential difficulty with drawing inferences from observed crises is that co-members may assist leaders with domestic problems before they rise to the level of severity where military intervention would be considered. Nevertheless, coups and other crises with abrupt onsets are not entirely preventable, affecting both leaders in good standing and those who are not in good standing.

[9]I do, however, have greater data availability for cases covered by the Obasanjo papers: 1999-2007. Diplomatic cables are also only available through 2010.

5.2.1 Identifying cases

Criteria for inclusion of political and security crises in my data differ for the 1990s and 1999 onward based on prevailing treaty protocols. I only include interstate conflict or widespread civil conflict as conditions where ECOWAS could intervene in the 1990s. After 1999, coups d'etat and prolonged political crises involving violence also enter the data set as potential cases for intervention. Prior to the 1999 and 2001 protocols, ECOWAS legally could only intervene in the event of an external attack against a member state. Interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau were exceptions to the standing rules. After 1999, ECOWAS and African Union protocols obligated members to respond in instances of irregular regime turnover, including coups d'etat.

For example, I do not include the 1993 annulled election, political crisis, and military coup in Nigeria that removed one military leader, President Babangida, and his eventual replacement with another military official, General Sani Abacha. After resigning, Babangida was able to return to his home in Minna, a fairly short distance away from the capitol. Nigeria did not slide into civil war and Abacha did not back away from Nigeria's commitments to the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia. Setting aside the difficulty for ECOWAS members of punishing Nigeria's military even if they felt inclined to do so, intervention would have been illegal and considered unwarranted in 1993. I also exclude consideration of Boko Haram in Nigeria, as that crisis involved countries–Chad and Cameroon–which are not in ECOWAS, and therefore affected states created alternative security organs.

My data includes seventeen political and security crises from ten member states, with states such as Liberia and Guinea-Bissau appearing more than once. Only four of the crises are rooted in conflict between member states, and they are all tied to actors in Liberia's first civil war. In addition to the Liberian crisis, these include the crises in Sierra Leone and the crisis involving Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone's borders. The presidents of Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire supported rebel groups launching attacks against Liberia's government. And Sierra Leonean rebels received support from the rebel leader who took control in Liberia, Charles Taylor. After Taylor was elected, Guinea's President Conté continued fighting Taylor's proxies in Sierra Leone.

The other thirteen crises were intrastate conflicts. These include two insurgencies that threatened governmental control in Liberia (2003) and Cote d'Ivoire (2003), as well as an insurgency that led to a coup in Mali (2012). There are six military coups included from Cote d'Ivoire (1999), Guinea-Bissau (2003), Togo (2005), Guinea (2009), and Guinea-Bissau (2012), as well as constitutional crises that led to military coups in Niger (2010) and Burkina Faso (2014). The remaining two cases, Cote d'Ivoire (2012) and the Gambia (2017), are instances where the incumbent set off a constitutional crisis by annulling widely accepted results from presidential elections in order to keep themselves in power.

5.3 Coding rules

To evaluate support for the theory, I collect data on my central explanatory variable–prior cooperation and positive relations between incumbents in crisis and ECOWAS co-members–from Nigerian archival materials, American diplomatic cables, news reports, public statements from ECOWAS officials, interviews, self-collected security deployment data, and secondary sources. First, I record whether the incumbent in each crisis provoked military or diplomatic disputes with one or more co-members in the previous five years (if applicable). Second, I collected data on whether the incumbent deployed security personnel or was a lead mediator in initiatives to support ECOWAS co-members in the last five years. If the first condition was met, where the incumbent was an aggressor in a local dispute or caused a diplomatic crisis, I classify the incumbent as 'not in good standing.' If the second condition is met, and the incumbent participated in regional security operations or led conflict resolution efforts for a local crisis, I classify the incumbent as being 'in good standing.' If both conditions are met, and the incumbent is both an aggressor in a dispute with at least one co-member *and* cooperated to support regional security in other areas, then they are classified as 'partial.' However, if the incumbent caused a crisis which threatened to destabilize multiple neighbors or the viability of ECOWAS as an organization, then they would be classified as 'not in good standing' regardless of recent participation in mediation or security cooperation.

To code the outcomes of interest, I record whether ECOWAS chose to intervene militarily in each crisis. If ECOWAS intervened, I collect data to determine whether or not their intervention supported the incumbent head of state, including in cases where this was not the explicit goal of intervention. To determine whether co-members intended to support the incumbent through their military intervention, I rely on the same types of sources listed above. Nigerian archival materials (1999-2007) and American diplomatic cables (1989-2010) are particularly valuable for evaluating actors' opinions and intentions because they summarize private meetings and convey classified messages between government officials and their own leaders about co-members and evolving crises. In most cases, event participants' statements, news coverage, and secondary analyses from experts agree on the nature of participant relationships and whether participants intended to assist co-members. Additional information on potentially ambiguous cases is provided in footnotes below Table 1.

5.4 Results

Table 1 presents the findings of the qualitative analysis. Each row corresponds to one of the seventeen crises in the data during the year when ECOWAS members considered military intervention. After coding the independent and dependent variables, I indicate whether evidence is consistent with the theory with values of 'yes,' 'partial,' or 'no.' Support was coded as present when ECOWAS members' willingness to intervene in support of an incumbent was informed by whether the incumbent was in good standing. Support is absent if ECOWAS members either intervened against, or did not intervene to support, an incumbent in good standing. Support is 'partial' if several co-members initiated a pro-government intervention without involving ECOWAS. Results are indeterminate in cases where an incumbent's death of natural causes either created–or occurred during–the crisis.

For leaders not in good standing, support is present when ECOWAS members sided against the incumbent during their military intervention, and qualitative evidence indicates that decision was

Table 5.1: Summary of ECOWAS Crisis Observations

Case	Incumbent in good standing	Military intervention occurred	(Non)Intervention supports incumbent	Support for theory present
1. ECOMOG - Liberia (1990)	partial	yes	yes	yes
2. Sierra Leone invasion and coup (1991)	yes	yes	partial [1]	partial
3. ECOMOG - Sierra Leone (1997)	yes	yes	yes	yes
4. ECOMOG - Guinea-Bissau (1998)	yes	yes	yes	yes
5. Cote d'Ivoire coup (2000)	no	no	no	yes
6. Guinea/Liberia borders (2001)	partial	no		NA
7. ECOMIL - Liberia (2003)	no	yes	no	yes
8. ECOMICI - Cote d'Ivoire (2003)	no[2]	yes	yes	no
9. Guinea-Bissau coup (2003)	no	yes	no	yes
10. Togo succession crisis (2005)	NA	no	yes [3]	NA
11. Guinea political crisis (2007)	partial [4]	no	partial	partial
12. Niger political crisis and coup (2010)	no [5]	no	no	yes
13. Cote d'Ivoire political crisis (2010)	no	no [6]	no	yes
14. ECOWAS + AFISMA - Mali (2012)	yes	yes [7]	yes	partial
15. ECOMIB - Guinea-Bissau (2012)	no [8]	yes	no	yes
16. Burkina Faso political crisis (2014)	partial	no	no [9]	no
17. ECOMIG - Gambia (2017)	no	yes	no	yes

[1]Guinean President Conté did initially engage and send reinforcements to help Momoh, but this failed and Momoh fled to Guinea. Once Momoh left Sierra Leone, ECOWAS co-members were not willing to intervene against the military regime on his behalf. The pro-incumbent intervention was essentially incomplete.

[2]This case covers the 2000 to 2003 period, considering Gbagbo as incumbent. Gbagbo tried to rehabilitate relations with ECOWAS co-members around 2001, but he did not fully cease meddling in neighboring states. Further, ECOMICI's pressure to install a unity government could have been to his disadvantage, but Gbagbo never complied with terms that would disfavor him.

[3]President Eyadema died in office and Togo's military attempted to install his son, who did not have record of participation in politics. ECOWAS prevented this diplomatically. Eyadema's son still came to power through uncompetitive elections, increasing legitimacy.

[4]President Conté frustrated co-members by clinging to power despite failing health and advice to step aside. Coding here refers to the crisis period before Conté died in office in 2008. ECOWAS intervened diplomatically against a coup after Conté died.

[5]Tandja was arrested and cut off from communication during the coup.

[6]UN peacekeepers were already in the country, though ECOWAS leaders did threaten to send additional forces to remove Gbagbo.

[7]A coup removed Touré shortly before the end of his term; he planned to step down. Thus ECOWAS negotiated his safety, not reinstatement.

[7]ECOWAS was pushed, against the wishes of ECOWAS military leaders, into a joint operation with the African Union, AFISMA.

[8]Pereira and Gomes Junior were arrested and cut off from communication during the coup.

[9]As he was removed unconstitutionally in a coup, Compaoré is the incumbent under consideration during the crisis.

informed by the incumbent's prior "bad behavior." Support is also present when ECOWAS members did not intervene to support an incumbent and evidence indicates their decision was informed by the incumbent's bad record. If, in contrast, ECOWAS members intervened militarily to support a leader who was not in good standing, evidence supporting the theory is absent. Support is "partial" if a crisis involved two member states' territories, and intervention likely benefited one member in good standing but not the other. If the incumbent's death in office caused the crisis for which ECOWAS members considered intervention, the results are indeterminate and coded "NA."

5.4.1 Support for leaders in good standing

Overall, a combination of primary and secondary materials indicate that incumbents prior actions informed the willingness of co-members to intervene on their behalf or against them in a majority of the seventeen crises. Government memos, diplomatic cables, news reports, and expert analyses all document instances where ECOWAS members chose to support leaders who helped other members with security problems. This rationale is present to different degrees in Sierra Leone (1997) and Guinea-Bissau (1998). Sources also cite personal relationships developed through long-run military and diplomatic cooperation informing pro-government interventions in Liberia (1990), Guinea-Bissau (1998), and partly in Mali.

Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida believed that ECOWAS intervention in Liberia (case 1) was necessary in 1990 as rebels surrounded Monrovia. Some attribute his willingness to bias intervention in favor of Liberian President Samuel Doe to the two leaders' history of cooperation and good relations. Charles Taylor himself certainly thought that the ECOWAS Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) goal was to "to save the military dictatorship of Doe from collapse" (Obi 2009). That ECOWAS peacekeepers concentrated on protecting Monrovia at the expense of civilians outside the capital also indicated a bias toward protecting the government, though Doe ultimately did not survive.

The 1997 intervention in Sierra Leone and 1998 intervention in Guinea-Bissau (cases 3 and 4) were even more clearly biased in favor of incumbents in crisis. With Nigeria again leading,

ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone after a military coup removed President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah from office. President Kabbah had limited time to impress co-members, as he was in office for only a year before his removal. Nonetheless, Kabbah had continued cooperating with ECOMOG in Liberia and attempting to restore peace to the Mano River region. A Committee of Four including Nigeria (the chair), Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Guinea negotiated for the reinstatement of Kabbah's government in August of 1997 (Suzuki 2020). ECOWAS peacekeepers continued to fight on Kabbah's side against rebels after he was restored to the presidency.

In Guinea-Bissau, President Nino Vieira (case 4) came under attack from mutineers when he tried to reform the military and stop army members from supporting Senegal's Casamance rebels. When Vieira asked for help co-members reciprocated support immediately. I discuss the details of this case in section 6.

The 2012 coup in Mali (case 14) was a special case partly because it removed incumbent Amadou Touré shortly before elections in which he did not plan to participate, and ECOWAS members negotiated in part for his safety and release from capture by putschists, rather than his reinstatement.

5.4.2 Intervention against leaders not in good standing

Furthermore, evidence from qualitative case material largely supports the proposition for incumbents with negative reputations. If an incumbent caused significant military or diplomatic problems for co-members in the past and shirked on their obligations, ECOWAS member state leaders were more willing to intervene militarily against them or to refuse requests for assistance. In 2003, for example, it was generally accepted that ECOWAS should intervene in both Liberia and Guinea-Bissau (cases 7 and 9) for the sake of eventually restoring order. However, while intervening under a peacekeeping mandate and to counter a coup respectively, ECOWAS members negotiated to remove Liberia's President Charles Taylor and not to reinstate Guinea-Bissau's Kumba Yala. Diplomatic cables and government officials' memos described both as "erratic" leaders who caused

diplomatic and security problems for neighbors.[10] Based on both leaders' prior actions, co-members predicted that neither would be cooperative neighbors if they remained in office.

Analysts suggest the same was true of Gambian President Yahya Jammeh (case 17), who supported rebels in neighboring Casamance, Senegal and had become something of a regional embarrassment as of 2016.[11] The latter owed to his bizarre and paranoid proclamations about other leaders. Jammeh crossed one of the organization's "red lines" by annulling widely accepted presidential election results that he had already accepted as valid a week prior. ECOWAS members quickly mobilized against him.

Evidence is mixed with respect to non-intervention in 2007 against Guinean President Conté (case 11). By clinging to power despite ailing health, Conté created a political crisis. Though he considered the presidents of Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau to be friends, most African leaders viewed Conté as isolated old man. Given his frailty, even friendly leaders like Sierra Leonean President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah pushed Conté to hand over power. Kabbah, however, said that should Conté be uncomfortable remaining in Guinea after retiring, he would be welcome in Sierra Leone because Kabbah had "not forgotten the support Conté and Guinea provided when he and his government were in exile during the civil war".[12] Though ECOWAS members wanted Conté to step down, they did not threaten military intervention against him.

More generally, incumbents' behavioral records are less relevant where crises ensue as a result of an incumbent leader's death in office (case 10). Co-members' responses in those cases are more likely informed first by whether the country followed accepted norms and rules for succession, promoting stability. If not, or if the rightful replacement head of state is under threat, then co-members decide whether to intervene. Assuming the replacement was not previously a head of state, calculations about whether to support them cannot be based on whether they are in good standing among ECOWAS heads of state.

The 2001 crisis around the borders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone (case 6), is also

[10] Leach (2005); Balarabe Samaila (2003).
[11] Hunt and McCormick (2017).
[12] Hull (2007).

difficult to classify because it was an interstate conflict between ECOWAS members. Liberian President Charles Taylor supported rebels crossing his country's borders into Sierra Leone and Guinea. In response, Guinean President Conté supported rebels fighting Taylor in Liberia. ECOWAS leaders discussed sending additional peacekeepers to police the countries' borders, but ultimately did not do so. Aside from lack of cooperation by the conflict actors, ECOWAS resources were stretched thin.

Altogether, Table 1 includes two cases where support for the theory was absent and two where the results were indeterminate, as the theory's main explanatory variable could not be coded definitively. These instances underscore that, unsurprisingly, an incumbent's good or poor record with co-members is important but is not sufficient for determining the reactions of co-members to crises in many cases. Available resources and prevailing international norms around intervention– some of which were heavily influenced by ECOWAS members–limited ECOWAS members' choices in some years. In other instances, incumbents' records were clearly central to determining which side of a conflict co-members would choose to support.

I now turn to case studies that provide more detail on ECOWAS members' decision-making processes. The first case, Guinea-Bissau's 1998 crisis (case 4 in Table 1), appears at the outset to be a case where a leader in good standing with neighbors received support during crisis. I examine primary and secondary documents that describe co-members rationales for intervention to assess the role of the incumbent Nino Vieira's history of cooperation. Next, I analyze the cases of Cote d'Ivoire's 2000 and 2003 crises (cases 5 and 8 in Table 1). In the first Ivorian crisis, an incumbent not in good standing with co-members does not receive assistance requested of co-members after he is removed in a coup. Statements and other case materials clearly indicate that his negative reputation informed this non-intervention. The second Ivorian crisis is an extension of the first crisis in some ways, where Cote d'Ivoire's new president Laurent Gbagbo also was not in good standing with co-members. I look for evidence to explain why ECOWAS members undertook an intervention that nevertheless helped incumbent Laurent Gbagbo survive in power. Although the Guinea-Bissau crisis occurred before 1999 and 2001 ECOWAS protocols expanded the organization's authority

to intervene, there is some continuity between the three cases. Several member state leaders were involved in all three of these crises.

5.5 Guinea-Bissau - 1998

According to the theory, leaders vulnerable to coups d'etat who fear that they cannot protect themselves from the consequences of repressive tactics respond by drawing closer to regional organization co-members. This is precisely the strategy Nino Vieira pursued in Guinea-Bissau, particularly as he was forced to open his country's economy and politics to satisfy domestic demands. Vieira strengthened ties with francophone ECOWAS co-members by engaging in significant diplomatic and security cooperation. The theory predicts that because of his cooperative record, ECOWAS co-members would seek to resolve crises threatening Vieira in his favor. As expected, I find that when civil conflict erupted in 1998 and threatened Vieira's hold on power, ECOWAS and its members intervened to support him.

Among ECOWAS members, Vieira invested most heavily in relationships with Senegal's President Abdou Diouf and Guinea's President Lansana Conté. The relationship between Vieira and Conté began when the two cooperated during the early 1970s in Guinea-Bissau's war for independence from Portugal. Diouf and Vieira regularly traded favors in the early 1990s, including extraditing each others' opponents. Vieira mediated negotiations between Senegal and Casamance rebels, Diouf made concessions to compensate Guinea-Bissau when a border demarcation resolution favored Senegal, and Senegal provided material support for Guinea-Bissau's army.[13] Vieira grew close enough to the Senegalese president that President Diouf "often collected Vieira in Bissau in his presidential jet on the way to regional summits."[14]

However, corrupt members of Guinea-Bissau's military and political elites developed ties to rebels from the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance. They sold weapons to the rebels and allowed rebels to escape from Senegalese troops across Guinea-Bissau's border. When

[13] Foucher (2013).
[14] Tavares (2011).

Diouf pressed him to punish these opportunistic military and political elites, Vieira responded cooperatively. He suspended his chief of staff Ansumane Mané and disciplined implicated troops.[15] Mané responded to his dismissal by leading a rebellion against Vieira.

Although Mané's dismissal sparked civil conflict, Guinea-Bissau's domestic situation caused it to escalate quickly. Twenty-four years of misrule, corruption, and repression under one party, PAIGC, preceded the 1998 crisis. President Nino Vieira, a hero of the small country's war for independence, first came to power through an army coup in 1980. Vieira's regime was personalist and authoritarian; he drew authority in part from his status as an anti-colonial war hero. To fend off coups d'etat, Vieira gave the army special privileges. However, in 1986 Vieira alienated factions in the army by executing another war hero, Paulo Correia, after Correia attempted to lead a coup. Resentment of Vieira grew among many of Correia's co-ethnic Balante soldiers.[16]

Pressure to democratize increased in the 1990s for Vieira and other ECOWAS members. When Guinea-Bissau introduced multi-party democracy in 1991, the country's elites further politicized ethnic differences. Guinea-Bissau held contentious multi-party elections in 1994 where many Balante soldiers supported Vieira's opponent but Vieira narrowly earned a majority of votes. This election underscored Vieira's heightened vulnerability under multi-party democracy.

When soldiers loyal to Mané joined his insurrection and took to the streets calling for Vieira's removal in June of 1998, Vieira turned to his allies. Though the legality of ECOWAS or its members intervening into domestic conflicts was not yet established, Vieira immediately received support.

5.5.1 Co-members' responses to Vieira's request for help

There is a clear connection between Vieira's cooperative record and the speed with which co-members responded to his request for help. As soon as Diouf received word of the coup, he sent 1,300 troops from Senegal to Bissau that very day. The day after the coup, Conté sent 400 soldiers

[15] It later emerged that Vieira also secretly profited from the smuggling of arms, but wanted to divert suspicion away from himself (Shaw 2015).

[16] Yabi (2010).

from Guinea. ECOWAS also immediately condemned the coup and interceded diplomatically. Diouf and Conté cited bilateral defense pacts to justify rushing to Vieira's aid despite opposition from much of the population in Bissau.

Vieira's record of cooperation convinced co-members that Vieira was useful, preferable to any likely replacement, and therefore worth fighting for. As Obi (2009) writes, "Senegal was keen on ensuring that a regime friendly to the MFDC rebels did not come to power in Guinea Bissau, while Guinea's Lansana Conté was acting on the basis of "friendship" with Vieira." Conté wanted to maintain close personal relationships with other West African leaders such as Vieira who he believed would take his side in ongoing disputes with Liberia's renegade President Taylor (Tavares 2011). In other words, both Diouf and Conté rewarded Vieira for security cooperation in part due to the expectation that Vieira would continue to cooperate with them if he remained in office.

Altogether, Senegal and Guinea sent 2200 and 400 troops plus helicopters respectively to Bissau.[17] This initial support was somewhat counterproductive, as the Bissauan soldiers viewed Senegal and Guinea as invaders. The perceived invasion helped to rally more fighters to the rebelling soldiers' cause (Yabi 2010). Much of Guinea-Bissau's population also broadly sided with the military against Vieira, further reducing the prospects of success for this intervention on Vieira's behalf (Magalhaes Ferreira 2004). Beyond West Africa, opposition to Diouf and Conté personally intervening to help Vieira also arose from the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), of which Guinea-Bissau is a member.[18] When Portugal provided logistical support to Mané, ECOWAS condemned this "colonial behavior."[19]

Senegal and Guinea only retroactively received ECOWAS blessing for their intervention in July of 1998, but their intervention was not contentious for most ECOWAS members. ECOWAS affirmed members' support for Vieira and created a committee of seven leaders from Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, the Gambia, Nigeria–and later adding Togo and Cape Verde–

[17]Reported numbers for Senegalese troops deployed differ slightly across sources (Kabia 2009; Obi 2009; Yabi 2010).

[18]The CPLP claimed to be concerned about the troops of neighboring states essentially occupying Guinea-Bissau (Suzuki 2020). More likely, CPLP states worried about maintaining their influence over lusophone members. They wanted their troops to replace Senegalese and Guinean troops but ECOWAS member states blocked this initiative.

[19]International Crisis Group (2008).

to find a negotiated solution. After initial attempts to end the conflict failed, the then-President of ECOWAS and Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadema took the lead on negotiations. Togolese Foreign Minister Kokou Koffigoh negotiated a peace deal that combatants signed in Abuja on November 2, 1998.

Both sides of Guinea-Bissau's conflict agreed to participate in a unity government which would organize elections in 1999. The removal of Senegal and Guinea's troops, who would be replaced by ECOMOG peacekeepers, was a condition of the deal that rebelling soldiers insisted upon. Diouf and Conté withdrew their troops willingly. ECOWAS requested 5000 troops from member states to keep peace in Bissau, though they only initially were able to deploy 1450. These troops were tasked with protecting Vieira and other members of government. Nigeria turned command of the troops over to a Togolese general. For the time being, ECOWAS had succeeded in preventing Vieira's removal and potential harm at the hands of military factions.

In May of 1999, as ECOWAS sought additional funding to deploy more ECOMOG troops, Mane launched another coup attempt. This time, he finally succeeded in removing Vieira from power. Vieira took refuge in the Portuguese embassy in Bissau as his palace burned. Conté's helicopter came to his rescue, helping Vieira flee the country and eventually move on to Portugal. ECOWAS condemned the coup as a violation of the accord that brought ECOMOG troops into the country. Because Mane and his co-conspirators violated the agreement signed in Abuja, ECOWAS began drawing down its troops in 1999. Months later, the United Nations stepped in, establishing a peace-building office in Bissau (UNOGBIS). Vieira remained exiled in Portugal for six years, during which time Guinea-Bissau saw a series of leaders and near-constant political turmoil.

Notably, the intervention in Guinea-Bissau was the first ECOWAS military intervention initiated by a member state other than Nigeria. Nigeria assisted with mediation but contributed no troops this time. ECOMOG troops for Guinea-Bissau were instead provided by Togo, Benin, the Gambia, and Niger.

Vieira's good standing partly explains why, despite having no legal authority to do so within international law, ECOWAS was willing to accept members' biased intervention and arrange for

a peacekeeping force. ECOWAS leaders knew that supporting Vieira would be costly because General Mane had taken control of most of Guinea-Bissau's army and territory. Though members also were anxious to prevent yet another civil conflict from spiraling out of control, they could have chosen to resolve the conflict by negotiating Vieira's exit. Instead their actions resolved the initial conflict to the benefit of Vieira. Failure to secure Vieira in government for long demonstrated the need for West African leaders to strengthen their security coordination through ECOWAS, rather than a problem between ECOWAS and Vieira.

Of course, nearby leaders such as Conté and Diouf were concerned about externalities around their borders. Guinea hosted a large number of refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia at the time of the 1998 crisis in Guinea-Bissau. Diouf also saw this intervention as an opportunity to target Casamance rebels in Guinea-Bissau.[20] Nevertheless, they each could have chosen to exploit Vieira's vulnerability to his detriment and neither did so.

Within ECOWAS, however, we see variation in how particular leaders responded based on their history with Vieira. According to Tavares (2011), the Nigerian military did not lend their full weight behind the intervention in Guinea-Bissau because Vieira had not lent military support to Nigeria for ECOMOG operations in Liberia or Sierra Leone. "Nigeria, hence, used its absence as a bargaining chip or as an instrument to castigate the behavior of other member states" (Tavares 2011). Choosing not to intervene in Guinea-Bissau was also politically easier for Nigeria, where costly ECOMOG interventions had become domestically unpopular. Nevertheless, ECOWAS and Nigerian President Obasanjo later helped Vieira by paying off overdue wages to Guinea-Bissau's civil servants and soldiers.[21] Obasanjo also describes how he and other heads of state stepped in to assist with short notice:

> I stopped in Accra and I said to [President] John Kufour 'we are going to Guinea-Bissau.' He was ECOWAS chairman...I didn't give him any notice. I said 'are you available' he said 'yes' and I said 'okay, meet me at the airport' and he did.[22]

Vieira eventually returned to Guinea-Bissau with financial, logistical, and political support

[20] Suzuki (2020).
[21] Yabi (2010).
[22] Author's interview with Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo in Abeokuta, Nigeria on January 13, 2020.

from Senegal and Guinea to stand in 2005 presidential elections.[23] In fact, Vieira made a dramatic re-entry to Bissau accompanied by Conté in a Guinean military helicopter. ECOWAS, the African Union, and the UN worked to try to maintain calm before the 2005 election. Vieira was elected once again, though he required help from Senegalese President Wade to pressure opposition politicians to accept the election results. In 2006, Vieira seemingly repaid the favor by authorizing a military operation against a group of Casamance rebels near Guinea-Bissau's border with Senegal. Doing so was risky, as the operation placed Vieira one again in opposition to factions within his army. In 2007, Vieira also showed his appreciation for President Conté's help by sending troops to support Conté during anti-government strikes and protests across Guinea.[24]

ECOWAS and UN officials remained engaged in mediating disputes between Bissau's political actors in subsequent years. ECOWAS also funneled resources toward training and professionalizing Guinea-Bissau's army in the hopes of preventing future coups. However, Vieira and ECOWAS faced strong resistance to attempts to reform the military, and soldiers attempted to assassinate Vieira in November of 2008. On the same day, ECOWAS responded by condemning the assassination attempt and sending the president of the ECOWAS commission along with senior officials from other member states to Bissau. Eventually, in spite of ECOWAS efforts to prevent the overthrow of Vieira, soldiers managed to assassinate him in March of 2009.

Though they ultimately failed to overcome resistance among Guinea-Bissau's soldiers, ECOWAS demonstrated considerable willingness to assist Vieira. ECOWAS rhetorically framed its initiatives in Guinea-Bissau as efforts to protect democracy. But as they directly supported Vieira's presidential campaigns, co-members' actions belied that narrative.

5.6 Cote d'Ivoire - 2000

Henri Konan Bédié pursued a very different strategy to keep himself in power in Cote d'Ivoire compared to Nino Vieira's tactics in Guinea-Bissau. Rather than relying on support from

[23] Yabi (2010).
[24] Arieff (2009).

the military and neighboring regimes, Bédié mobilized supporters with nationalist rhetoric. Bédié's strategy alienated ECOWAS co-members and he ignored their advice to change tack. Bédié also did not play a constructive role in the ongoing security crises in nearby Liberia and Sierra Leone. In fact, continued his predecessor's policy of providing materiel and logistical support to Charles Taylor's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels.[25] The theory predicts that because of his poor standing with most co-members, ECOWAS would not seek to resolve crises threatening Bédié in his favor.[26] As expected, I find that when civil conflict erupted in late 1999, ECOWAS and its members did not attempt to resolve the conflict in his favor.

Henri Konan Bédié was the godson and chosen successor of longtime president Félix Houphouet-Boigny. Since Cote d'Ivoire became independent in 1960, Bédié served under Houphouet-Boigny in various government positions. As the Finance Minister from 1966-1977, Bédié gained a reputation for corruption. American officials stationed in Abidjan at the time noted that Bédié's corruption had earned him the nickname "Ten Percent Henry," but that Bédié had proved immune from consequences because of his closeness to Houphouet-Boigny.[27]

As speaker of the National Assembly, Bédié legally became president when Houphouet-Boigny died in 1993. Bédié inherited the reins of a newly instituted multi-party democracy[28] attempting to recover from deep economic recession. Political parties quickly became polarized along ethnic, religious, and regional divides as Bédié dismantled Houphouet-Boigny's politics of inclusion and looked for scapegoats. Bédié promoted a nationalist, exclusionary concept called 'Ivoirité.' The discourse of Ivoirité sought to define belonging within Cote d'Ivoire in reference to an individual's family roots. An individual was properly Ivorian, and worthy of full political and social rights associated with Ivorian nationality, if their parents were Ivorian citizens who belonged to an ethnic group native to the country.[29] Bédié labeled those who did not fit his description of Ivorianness as foreigners and accused them of taking jobs from true Ivorians. Foreigner became

[25] Berman (2001).

[26] The preponderance of ECOWAS members did not support the leaders of Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire, Blaise Compaoré and Félix Houphouet-Boigny (and Bédié), in their decisions to help rebels provoke civil conflict in Liberia.

[27] Stearns (1977).

[28] Cote d'Ivoire transitioned to multi-party democracy in 1990.

[29] See Akindes (2003) for further analysis of Ivoirité.

synonymous with northerner and Muslim, covering some recent immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea. Bédié's party also applied the "foreigner" label to long-standing Ivorian citizens who shared common surnames and ethnic ties with Muslims in neighboring countries.

International and domestic observers recognized that Bédié's embrace of Ivoirité served as a justification to exclude his main rival, former prime minister Alassane Ouattara, from politics. Bédié disqualified Ouattara from competing in presidential elections on the grounds that Ouattara's father was from Burkina Faso, and Ouattara therefore could not be Ivorian Opposition parties reacted to Bédié's insistence on enforcing the Ivoirité rule by boycotting Cote d'Ivoire's 1995 elections. With only one opponent remaining in the presidential race, Bédié won a landslide victory.

Official discrimination against "foreigners" extended to all national institutions. Bédié purged the government of many officials from the north and used his security forces to attack certain ethnic groups. Security forces evicted Burkinabe laborers in southwestern Cote d'Ivoire on his orders, causing thousands of Burkinabe migrants to flee the country.[30] As Bédié promoted officers based on ethnicity and failed to pay soldiers' allowances,[31] marginalized junior officers demanded better pay and living conditions. When Bédié refused their demands, the soldiers collaborated with frustrated senior military officers in 1999 to remove Bédié in a coup.[32] Bédié called on ECOWAS co-members to intervene on his behalf.

5.6.1 Co-members' responses to Bédié's request for help

ECOWAS members did not respond favorably to Bédié's requests for assistance after the December 1999 coup. While Bédié initially lingered near the Abidjan airport under the protection of French soldiers, members of the Ivorian military looted Abidjan and threatened to kill Bédié if they captured him.[33] France flew Bédié to safety in Togo but made it clear they did not intend to restore him to power. Bédié then flew to ECOWAS co-members, including Nigeria and Mali, to

[30] Toungara (2001).
[31] Particularly vocal opposition to Bédié came from returned peacekeepers who had not received their bonuses.
[32] Boutellis (2011); Zounmenou and Loua (2011).
[33] McNeil Jr. (1999).

petition for their assistance.[34] Still, ECOWAS members did not threaten intervention. Instead of calling for the military junta led by General Robert Guei to reinstate Bédié, ECOWAS called for the junta to quickly organize elections. Their decision to condemn the coup but not support Bédié was clearly informed by consideration of Bédié offensive Ivoirité nationalism and problematic foreign policies.

Ivoirité policies angered Bédié's ECOWAS co-members for several reasons. First, the policies implied that Muslims and people descended from Burkinabe, Guinean, or Malian parentage were lower-skilled and inferior to Christians from the south of Cote d'Ivoire. This was understandably insulting to many Muslims in those countries.

Second, ECOWAS co-members foresaw that Bédié's xenophobic policies would lead to violence against their citizens and outward migration of workers and refugees living in Cote d'Ivoire. Because Cote d'Ivoire's neighbors relied economically on the wages of migrants, the expulsion of those migrants by the thousands threatened their economic and political stability. Many refugees from the civil conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were also forced to flee into other West African countries amidst rising xenophobia. Several of Bédié's ECOWAS co-members therefore discouraged him from continuing Ivoirité policies. Bédié brushed them off.

In contrast to Bédié, General Guei had condemned Ivoirité during the 1990s, at one point refusing to send his forces to break up opposition protests. After the coup, Guei initially signaled his desire to reverse the hated Ivoirité policies.[35] It is therefore unsurprising that ECOWAS members would not want to remove Guei immediately to reinstate Bédié. ECOWAS officials all but admitted that Bédié's stubborn commitment to Ivoirité policies put him on bad terms with co-members, and that this partly explained their unwillingness to intervene on his behalf.

When ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyaté was asked by a reporter about why ECOWAS did not support Bédié, Kouyaté "made a distinction between the situation in Sierra Leone, where ECOWAS had to send troops to support [and reinstate] President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, and

[34] Adebajo (2000).

[35] Guei later went back on his word and supported the Ivoirité regulation of presidential candidates Lamin (2005).

what happened in Cote d'Ivoire."[36] Kouyaté claimed that although ECOWAS condemns all coups, Bédié was much less popular domestically than Kabbah.[37] The African Union took a similarly permissive approach, allowing Guei to attend their next annual summit.[38]

5.7 Cote d'Ivoire - 2002

After Bédié's departure, ECOWAS co-members confronted the turbulent presidencies of General Robert Guei and Laurent Gbagbo. Neither leader cooperated with co-members in diplomatic negotiations from the start to the end of their terms; Gbagbo kept ECOWAS mediators busy with shuttle diplomacy for almost a decade. As a result of their obstinacy and continued reliance on Ivoirité, both leaders were viewed as irresponsible and neither was in good standing with ECOWAS. My theory predicts that ECOWAS and co-members would therefore be unwilling to support them during crises. However, whereas ECOWAS did not assist Guei, they did initiate a peacekeeping operation that helped Gbagbo remain safely in office. In the following case, I describe Guei's brief tenure before focusing on whether ECOWAS members intended to protect Gbagbo. I find that although Gbagbo instrumentally used peacekeepers and mediators to stall progress toward elections, power-sharing, and constitutional reforms in Cote d'Ivoire, he did so without intentional support from co-members. Several intervening factors help to explain Gbagbo's survival in office until 2010, including the role of France.

While Gbagbo was still a member of the pro-democracy opposition, General Guei rose to lead the 1999 coup against Bédié. International and domestic actors immediately denounced the coup and pressured Guei to organize presidential elections. Guei announced that elections would take place in October of 2000 and that he would stand as a candidate. This reasonable timeline initially pleased co-members, but Guei then pushed the Ivorian Supreme Court to ban his two strongest opponents in the presidential race, Alassane Ouattara and Emile Constant Bombet. When

[36] Ejime (2000).
[37] Ejime (2000).
[38] Shannon et al. (2015).

the Supreme Court complied, Cote d'Ivoire's two largest political parties chose to boycott the election in response. This left only Guei and Laurent Gbagbo as well-known candidates.

In May of 2000, ECOWAS and the African Union pushed Guei to allow disqualified candidates back into the race but were met with hostility. Guei made it clear in their meeting that he had very little regard for ECOWAS and the AU interference, which in turn angered foreign dignitaries present. As Nigerian Foreign Minister Sule Lamido said "With the recent treatment of the OAU Heads of State by Gen. Guei, one would have been tempted to recommend that we should keep aloof and let him destroy himself and his country in his obstinacy and intransigence."[39]

At the election's conclusion, Guei and Gbagbo each declared himself the winner despite preliminary tallies indicating victory for Gbagbo.[40] Pro-Gbagbo protesters flooded the streets of Abidjan in response to Guei's claim to victory. As protests turned violent, many in Guei's security forced turned against him and forced him to flee the country. Laurent Gbagbo became the new president.

However, the change in administration did not bring an end to xenophobic Ivoirité policies. At the end of a national reconciliation forum in 2001, the forum's organizers recommended that Gbagbo should recognize opposition leader and northerner Alassane Ouattara's Ivorian nationality. Gbagbo declined to do so, saying that it was for the courts to decide.[41]

Gbagbo's continuation of Ivoirité disappointed ECOWAS co-members. In a private meeting between Nigerian President Obasanjo and Burkinabe President Compaoré, Compaoré explained that he "decided to keep his distance when he foresaw a xenophobic regime emerging in Cote d'Ivoire." Compaoré "revealed that indeed he was close to Gbagbo but what did Gbagbo expect when several Burkinabe were killed during upheavals in Cote d'Ivoire?"[42]

Gbagbo certainly viewed foreign interveners and mediation as a threat. There are also indications that he was well aware of how much his fate depended on not completely alienating ECOWAS co-members. In August of 2001, Nigerian Foreign Minister Sule Lamido reported to

[39]Lamido (2000).
[40]McKenzie (2000).
[41]arb (2001).
[42]Baiye (2001b).

President Obasanjo that Gbagbo was making “an activist diplomatic effort" to mend fences and improve ties with his ECOWAS co-members. Gbagbo attempted to “rekindle the warm personal relationship" he previously had with Senegalese President Wade and met with Burkinabe President Compaoré to establish “mutual assurances of concrete action to safeguard not only the peace but also the good relations between the two countries" (Lamido 2001). Lamido interpreted Gbagbo’s behavior as an attempt to re-enter the “mainstream" and ingratiate himself with neighbors so that they would support him despite continued marginalization of his opponent, Alassane Ouattara When Obasanjo met with Gbagbo, Gbagbo “stated that President Blaise Compaoré was a close friend belonging to the same International Socialist Movement who had given him substantial financial and moral support since 1989 in his (Gbagbo’s) political struggles." Gbagbo asked Obasanjo to help him improve his relations with Compaoré and Malian President Konaré, saying as well that “he needed them as much as they needed him."[43]

However, Gbagbo did not cease with the xenophobic rhetoric his co-members advised against. Amidst ongoing tensions, mutinying soldiers attempted a coup against Gbagbo in September, 2002. The coup attempt began with approximately 800 soldiers from the north who Gbagbo intended to decommission. They accused Gbagbo of assuming power in an illegitimate election and extending Ivoirité to justify violence and discrimination against northerners.[44] Though the coup failed, the conflict it sparked spiraled into civil war. Rebels from the Movement Patriotic de Cote d’Ivoire (MPCI) seized control of the northern half of Cote d’Ivoire, while Gbagbo retained control over the southern half. Led by the activist Guillaume Soro, the MPCI merged with a coalition of rebel groups into the Forces Nouvelles (FN). Gbagbo claimed that the Burkinabe government supported these rebels in the north.

Two additional rebels groups, the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and the Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO), formed near the Liberian border in western Cote d’Ivoire. MPIGO and MJP recruited along both sides of the border, likely with some support from Charles Taylor, and raided local Ivorian communities.

[43] Baiye (2001a).
[44] Akindes (2003).

5.7.1 Co-members' response to the 2002 crisis

ECOWAS quickly condemned the putschists and declared support for Gbagbo in an emergency summit on September 29, 2002. The heads of state from Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo were tasked with negotiating a peaceful resolution between all parties to the emerging conflict. This six nation Contact Group of ECOWAS members met with Gbagbo and MPCI rebels to negotiate in October but failed to reach an agreement. Angered by ECOWAS granting any recognition to the rebels, Gbagbo told ECOWAS co-members he had a "strong preference for aerial bombardment" instead of peace negotiations.[45] The portion of the Ivorian military under Gbagbo's control lacked the capacity to overpower rebelling forces in the north on their own. ECOWAS members rejected the request to immediately bomb rebel groups, telling Gbagbo that negotiations should precede the use of force.

Straight away, Gbagbo's actions during negotiations angered co-members and ECOWAS officials. Gbagbo stalled and wasted mediators' time, at one point sending a representative to sign a treaty only to then say that the representative was not authorized. Members of the contact group went to Gbagbo for an explanation because "the credibility of the Group and, indeed ECOWAS was dangerously at stake" due to his behavior.[46] After making the Contact Group wait for hours, Gbagbo backed out of the agreement. The ECOWAS Contact Group "reminded President Gbagbo of their sustained efforts and sacrifice, even at the expense of their personal safety, to arrange a ceasefire and pave the way for a peaceful resolution of the conflict...and pleaded with President Gbagbo to reconsider his stance in view of the credibility of the Group," but Gbagbo was "impervious to all entreaties."[47]

The Senegalese Foreign Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio and a UN representative negotiated a ceasefire between rebels in the north and west and the government later in October, 2002.[48] Togo's President Eyadema took charge of negotiations thereafter, bringing together all parties in Lomé to

[45] Onyia (2002).
[46] Onyia (2002).
[47] Onyia (2002).
[48] Kabia (2009, 143).

negotiate a peace agreement and create an inclusive government. The talks failed with both sides walking out of negotiations. Growing increasingly frustrated, presidents Wade, Kuffuor, Eyadema, and Obasanjo flew to Abidjan to intercede with Gbagbo. They intended to deliver the message that ending the rebellion in Cote d'Ivoire "would necessitate political compromise because the essential problems were political not military."[49] They told Gbagbo that the region would help if he wanted it; if not, the region would stand aside. Obasanjo emphasized "that if Gbagbo refused this offer of assistance, Gbagbo himself would lose."[50] Gbagbo agreed to a new round of negotiations and ECOWAS members accepted Gbagbo's request to deploy peacekeepers in December, 2002.

In spite of frustrations with Gbagbo, ECOWAS intervention partly focused on preventing his removal. 1,300 ECOWAS troops and 3,800 French troops deployed to prevent against coup attempts and monitor compliance with the ceasefire between Gbagbo's forces and northern rebel groups.[51] The ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), led by a Senegalese force commander, served alongside France's "Operation Licone" before the UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI) arrived. ECOWAS mobilized troops from Ghana, Benin, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, though not as many as they originally planned to send. Still, ECOWAS troops were better trained and had a clearer mandate than they had in prior deployments. After the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord, ECOWAS troops accepted the task of monitoring its implementation. The UN Security Council also tasked peacekeepers with protecting refugees–largely from Liberia.[52] ECOMICI and MINUCI were "re-hatted" and replaced in 2004 by the UN Peace Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI).

The ECOWAS response to the Cote d'Ivoire crisis is coded as not providing support for the theory because ECOWAS did not punish Gbagbo militarily. However, although ECOWAS peacekeepers protected Gbagbo physically, the Linas-Marcoussis agreement they endorsed threatened to take away Gbagbo's authority. The agreement, negotiated in France, called for many of Gbagbo's powers to be delegated to a new Prime Minister and for Forces Nouvelles members to occupy important ministerial positions. The agreement also legitimized rebels' grievances. In response,

[49] Jeter (2002).
[50] Jeter (2002).
[51] France had approximately 600 troops stationed in Cote d'Ivoire already when the conflict began.
[52] uns (2003)

Gbagbo and the elites around him framed Linas-Marcoussis and subsequent peace agreements as imperialist attacks on Cote d'Ivoire's constitution and sovereignty.[53] They increased their reliance on nationalist rhetoric. The 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, Accra Agreements I-III of 2004, Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Cote d'Ivoire of 2005, and the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement all failed to elicit full compliance from Gbagbo or his opponents.[54]

Regardless of whether Gbagbo's xenophobic rhetoric and stubbornness turned ECOWAS co-members against him, Gbagbo and those close to him claimed that ECOWAS co-members and most other mediators were working against him. Pro-Gbagbo elites apparently viewed South Africa as the only sympathetic mediator. Prominent members of government such as Gbagbo's wife, Simone Gbagbo, stated in interviews that the rebellion was supported by the UN, ECOWAS members, the US, and France.[55] Other participants' views on the role of France seemed to shift over the course of the crisis. In 2003, Nigerian Foreign Minister Sule Lamido wrote "France, the erstwhile colonial power in Cote d'Ivoire, has assumed the role of not only keeping the peace, but also that of protecting the Government of President Laurent Gbagbo."[56] Tavares (2011) argues that French leaders did not want to be seen as unilaterally intervening in Cote d'Ivoire, nor did they want to take on the crisis alone in practice.

By 2004 relations between France's President Chirac and Gbagbo soured. Disagreements between the two culminated with the Ivorian air force killing nine French soldiers stationed in Bourbaki as part of Operation Licorne. France responded by bombing and destroying the entire Ivorian air force. Nevertheless France, along with the United Kingdom and United States, remained reluctant to hold Gbagbo fully accountable in the UN Security Council throughout the 2000s.[57]

Gbagbo was certainly not in good standing with the administration of Nigerian President Obasanjo. Cote d'Ivoire had pledged troops for ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone that Gbagbo would never deliver. In a letter advising President Obasanjo on how to respond to Cote d'Ivoire's

[53]Piccolino (2012).
[54]Zounmenou and Loua (2011).
[55]Piccolino (2012).
[56]Lamido (2003).
[57]Boutellis (2011).

crisis, Lamido wrote "...the role of Cote d'Ivoire in the course of ECOMOG's, nay Nigeria's involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has not given us any serious encouragement to come to its rescue, as would have been otherwise desired. It is indeed ironic that one of the rebel factions is allegedly being supported from Liberia"[58]

Obasanjo was frustrated most of all by Gbagbo's obstinacy. In a 2020 interview, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo said that trying to elicit cooperation from Gbagbo was the greatest foreign policy challenge of his administration. In a private meeting, President Obasanjo told African Union Commission Chairperson Alpha Konaré that Obasanjo's frustration with Gbagbo finally pushed him to speak instead with Gbagbo's wife, "the Party Leader in Parliament and only adviser that Gbagbo seems to listen to and obey," on February 1, 2005.

Eventually, Burkina Faso's President Compaoré facilitated the "final" agreement between rebels and Gbagbo's government in March, 2007.[59] However, lasting damage to Gbagbo's reputation followed him in subsequent years. When Gbagbo attempted to challenge presidential election results indicating that his long-time opponent, Alassane Ouattara, won in 2010, ECOWAS quickly recognized Ouattara's win. ECOWAS's apparent partiality toward Ouattara was noted by other African leaders: "former South African president Thabo Mbeki, the AU's mediator in the post-electoral crisis, accused the regional body of being too quick to recognize Ouattara as the winner."[60] After Gbagbo refused to leave office in 2011, the UN accepted a request from ECOWAS to authorize the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) to protect civilians. However, rather than only protecting civilians, French forces under the UN banner supported pro-Ouattara Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) as they arrested Gbagbo.

[58]Lamido (2003).

[59]That Compaoré was involved despite previously supporting rebels may indicate that some of Gbagbo's suspicions about Compaoré's intentions were resolved.

[60]Zounmenou and Loua (2011).

5.8 Implications

The evidence in this chapter complements results from statistical tests in prior chapters. Statistical analyses established that on average, African regional organization members are more likely to conduct pro-government military interventions in countries where the incumbents previously contributed to regional security cooperation. And regional organization co-members are more likely to conduct anti-government interventions in countries where the incumbents have not contributed to regional security cooperation. Those chapters use contributions to security cooperation to operationalize whether a leader is in good standing with co-members.

In this chapter, I focus on one organization and use a large n qualitative analysis to identify the proportion of crises resolved in a manner consistent with my predictions. I do find that whether an incumbent was in good standing informed whether co-members from ECOWAS intervened on their behalf in a majority of crises. I classify leaders as being in good standing or not based on their diplomatic record as well as their contributions to regional security initiatives.

Two case studies provide clearer evidence for the theory's proposed mechanisms by tracing decision-making processes in three crises from the sample. The crisis in Guinea-Bissau includes a incumbent leader who was in good standing with ECOWAS co-members promptly received assistance upon request from co-members during a security crisis. In contrast, the first crisis in Cote d'Ivoire includes a leader who clearly alienated co-members and destabilized neighboring countries. As expected, ECOWAS's resolution of the first Cote d'Ivoire crisis disfavored that incumbent, Henri Bédié In the second Cote d'Ivoire crisis that followed, coding indicates that ECOWAS intervened in a manor favorable to an incumbent who was not in good standing. This seems to present a challenge to the theory and warrants closer examination. Upon considering the evolution of the protracted second Cote d'Ivoire crisis, I find that an external intermediary, France, played an important role in shifting ECOWAS members' responses. Nevertheless, while the military intervention undertaken by ECOWAS initially benefited the incumbent, evidence indicates that ECOWAS members did support peace agreements which disfavored the incumbent.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This dissertation sought to explain cooperation among illiberal heads of state in regional integration organizations. It addressed the protective benefits and disciplining mechanisms RIOs introduce to encourage mutual aid and discourage destabilizing behavior. Importantly, the dissertation proposes how illiberal leaders and their democratic counterparts alike sustain cooperation with co-members over time. In fact, across Africa, many repressive leaders facing looming domestic security threats participate just as readily in RIOs as their more stable democratic counterparts. The relative scarcity of work addressing how illiberal leaders deal with collective action problems in Africa and elsewhere is likely a reflection of longstanding biases within the academic study of international relations. The preponderance of work that develops and tests theories of regional cooperation draw from the Global North, assuming that leaders of wealthier democracies are more motivated and better equipped to cooperate through RIOs. I argue, in contrast, that regional cooperation is equally or more important to insecure and illiberal RIO members. Particularly for leaders guilty of extensive rights violations, RIOs are important not just for managing relations with neighboring states, but also for protecting against domestic security threats. These leaders cooperate not just to increase their odds of political survival, but to increase their actual odds of survival.

Chapter 2 presented a theory of regional cooperation driven by mutual aid and stability to explain what motivates leaders to cooperate through international organizations. I have argued that

leaders' preoccupations with personal and political survival inform their commitments to regional cooperation. Member state leaders use RIOs to hedge against domestic threats, manage donors, and capture numerous benefits of multilateralism. To remain entitled to benefits, member state leaders contribute personnel and resources for regional security cooperation, and avoid violating RIO rules. Of course, leaders may be tempted to defect when they have short time horizons, or place reduced value on future cooperation in favor of short term survival calculus. We might expect that vulnerability to security threats shortens a leader's time horizon such that they could be more likely to renege on promises. However, the insecure leader's concern for their fate if they *are* deposed actually lengthens their time horizons with respect to co-members. If they are forced to flee, leaders often get away with the help of allies and make their first stop in friendly neighbors. Failing to assist co-members and remain in good standing could reduce the inclination of neighboring co-members to help a leader if they are forced to seek asylum. Leaders with the greatest need for RIO assistance should therefore be most motivated to remain in good standing by contributing.

Quantitative analyses in Chapter 3 demonstrate that repressive leaders vulnerable to irregular turnover consistently contribute security personnel to neighbors across Africa and parts of the Middle East in the post-Cold era. I argued that this reflects their greater need for external support to avoid removal and post-tenure reprisal. Rather than free-riding, these leaders position themselves as providers of regional security to generate goodwill with RIO co-members who could be "first responders" and mediators in future crises. By increasing their participation in regional organizations with mutual defense pacts, anti-coup clauses, and other regime-boosting mechanisms, leaders deter threats and secure a path to exile if needed.

This does not require that all leaders in each RIO are close friends who see eye-to-eye at all times or support their co-members remaining in office in perpetuity, but that leaders are pragmatic in managing their interactions. They want not only to benefit from targeted RIO support, but also to select for like-minded co-members. In fact, in addition to helping cooperative leaders remain in office, RIO members punish non-cooperative leaders. In Chapter 4, statistical tests establish that RIO members are more likely to intervene in support of leaders who have previously contributed

security personnel to a co-member, and more likely to intervene militarily against those leaders who have not deployed to support at least one co-member. When a leader fails to meet obligations of RIO membership, the leader's co-members are less inclined to protect them. Co-members often prefer to allow non-cooperators to be replaced, and may use RIOs to intervene against them under the guise of ceasefire monitoring and peacekeeping. As the costs imposed by donors on RIOs that support dictators increases, only those members who contribute to regional security are likely to secure protections.

The results in Chapters 3 and 4 characterize the behavior of RIO co-members on average with respect to security personnel deployments and biased military interventions. Neither provides definitive evidence about causal processes and leaders' decision-making in all deployments and interventions under consideration. To test for the presence of stipulated causal mechanisms in relevant security crises, Chapter 5 focuses on events in one regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States. For 17 crises where ECOWAS members plausibly could have or did intervene between 1990 and 2017, case evidence suggests that leaders did condition their responses based on whether the member in crisis was in good standing. In most cases, leaders were significantly more willing to offer assistance to a co-member who previously engaged in security cooperation to benefit their neighbors.

The foregoing tests of the dissertation's theory all focus on African–and to some extent, Middle Eastern–RIO members. Within Africa, the vitality of the 12 RIOs under consideration vary significantly. RIOs in West and Southern Africa most consistently advance the interests of member state leaders, whereas RIOs in the Great Lakes region and East Africa are more often encumbered by rivalries. In general, African regional organizations give voice to different norms than some of their counterparts on other continents. Some of the ideals most closely associated with African regional decision making include consensus-based decision making, solidarity, collectivism, and informality.[1] All of these norms reinforce the style of decision making described in this dissertation: decision making focused on mutual aid and obligations to group members. African

[1] Aning and Edu-Afful (2016); Tieku (2013).

leaders' willingness to make collective decisions through informal channels, rather than relying on lengthy procedures to respond to ongoing events, also lends to faster and more personalized responses to crises.[2] If norms prescribing solidarity among heads of state are weaker beyond Africa, RIOs may be less likely to organize mutual aid systems and foster reciprocity to the same extent. In regions where leaders are less able to take rapid decisions through informal channels, it will be harder for RIOs to promise and deliver immediate military support in rapidly evolving events like coups.

Nevertheless, elite solidarity and the usefulness of RIOs to protect vulnerable leaders are likely to generalize beyond Africa to a significant extent. In Europe, leaders might invest more effort in personally assisting their counterparts from European Union co-members if they expect they will need assistance in the future. EU member state economies are more tightly integrated than the economies of African states, and leaders may prefer to bail out co-members who have more consistently cooperated with regional initiatives in the past. Rather than focusing mutual aid as much on security cooperation, an analogous EU system of mutual aid and leader vulnerability might center more on debt financing. However, leaders should face more difficulty producing some of the benefits described in the dissertation, such as rubber stamping fraudulent elections, if their RIO staff are better protected against political interference by leaders. Organizations which include deeply committed liberal democracies alongside electoral autocracies may also be unable to support illiberal leaders on many dimensions due to clashing preferences. But, to the extent that leaders erode the independence of regional organizations during an ongoing era of democratic backsliding, scholars should anticipate a move toward self-serving regional cooperation among vulnerable leaders.

Broadly, the dissertation speaks to debates in international relations and comparative politics around the importance of external influences for democratization. By lending rhetorical and security support to leaders who repress political opponents, RIOs sometimes help leaders prevent or reverse democratization. To the extent that donors train RIO election monitors and peacekeepers who are

[2]Hardt (2014) finds that the African Union responds to crises faster than regional organizations on other continents. She attributes this in large part to informal decision making.

then misused to protect incumbents, Western donors' efforts to promote liberal values increase the likelihood that RIOs are implicated for democratic backsliding.[3] Repressive leaders who might otherwise remain ineligible for bilateral security assistance from some donor states absent reforms also benefit from regional training programs that are funded by donors. In both instances, RIOs essentially create loopholes for repressive leaders whose behavior alienates donors. If donors do not want to be complicit in helping RIO members slow democratization, they likely need to rethink RIO financing.

The theory also may explain why more democratic member state leaders are sometimes willing to protect illiberal RIO co-members. I have predicted democratic members become complicit in supporting their repressive counterparts if those counterparts prove themselves useful for maintaining regional stability. The dissertation therefore contributes to the smaller body of work considering when illiberal leaders and democrats cooperate as well as the growing literature focused on cooperation among illiberal leaders. Although leaders are more likely to support counterparts from similar regimes, democratic institutions prove not to be prerequisites for intensive security cooperation between states in several regions. National and regional security cultures affect the depth of cooperation, but leaders of various regime types across sub-regions continue to task RIOs with training regional standby brigades. They work to improve interoperability between their security forces at the same time as they become increasingly authoritarian. This trend calls into question the sustaining forces behind regional cooperation, even in organizations modeled to resemble the European Union. It is increasingly difficult to sustain the conventional wisdom that regional cooperation is incompatible with authoritarianism or insecurity.

[3]The use of state resources by incumbents to appease, co-opt, or repress key groups in order to limit opportunities for opposition groups is a hallmark of democratic backsliding (Haggard and Kaufman 2016).

Appendices

A Coup Risk Model

I adapt the measurement model from Sudduth (2017) which is as follows:

$$y_{it} \sim Bernoulli(q_{it})$$

$$log_{it}(q_{it}) = dz_{it}$$

where there are *i*=1...n countries and *t*=1...m years. I use data on 158 countries covering 1990-2015. I include information from more than the 54 countries in my sample, assuming that leaders update their beliefs about coup risk based on coups around the world. y_{it} is a binary *Observed coup* variable which equals 1 if a country experiences at least one coup attempt in a year and 0 otherwise. Coup data used to construct the binary coup event indicator is from Bjørnskov and Rode, who combine and verify coup data from several popular coup datasets, including those from the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall and Marshall 2018) and Powell and Thyne (2011).[4] The model assumes that coup risk fits a Bernoulli distribution with latent distribution q_{it} and that we observe a coup attempt with probability q_{it} each country-year.

I then model the logit of latent coup risk $log_{it}(q_{it})$ as a linear function of motive and capacity indicators z_{it}. The model's estimated parameters d indicate how much each variable related to the military's motive and capacity to stage a coup actually contributes to coup risk. z_{it} includes

[4]This dataset includes coups which were not primarily led by military actors, which are excluded by Powell and Thyne.

% Change GDP, *% Change Population*, *Infant mortality odds*, *Counterbalancing*, *Government expenditure on the military*, *Military support*, *Number of anti-government demonstrations*, a *Military dictator* dummy, an *Executive election year* dummy, and a *Coup in last 10 years* dummy. I save the predicted coup risk q generated in each of 3000 simulations for each country year.

Data on GDP per capita changes, population changes, and government expenditure on the military come from the World Bank and data on regime type used to create dummy variables indicating whether a country is under military dictatorship comes from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)'s regime data. The count of anti-government demonstrations comes from Banks and Wilson (2020). Infant mortality odds is calculated by the World Health Organization as the probability of dying between birth and age one per one thousand live births. Information on election timing is from the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz et al. 2018). Counterbalancing refers to the fragmentation of a country's military into multiple military and paramilitary units to reduce coup risk. I use data on counter-balancing from Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) to account for domestic coup-proofing. Military support is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the military is the group that the current political regime relies on most strongly in order to maintain power according to the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge et al. 2020).

Table 1 presents the average coefficients on each coup risk predictor across the 3000 simulations. Countries with growing economies, higher military spending, and where the regime's support base is the military are less susceptible to coups. We also see that the strongest predictors of whether a country will experience a coup in any given year are whether its leader is a military dictator and whether that country has had a coup in the previous 10 years.

Table 2 illustrates that the model does a good job of assigning high risk to country-years in my sample of African and Middle Eastern countries where a coup attempt ultimately did occur between 1990 and 2015.

Table A.1: Posterior summaries of coup risk model

Variable	Coup Attempt
GDP growth	−0.0722
	(−0.0727, −0.0717)
Military expenditure	−0.0544
	(−0.0572, −0.0516)
Military dictator	1.3672
	(1.3564, 1.3779)
Coup in last 10 years	0.6331
	(0.6215, 0.6447)
Infant mortality odds	0.0155
	(0.0153,0.0158)
Protests	0.0053
	(0.0046, 0.0060)
Executive election	0.2129
	(0.2045, 0.2214)
Population growth	0.0814
	(0.0771,0.0858)
Military support	−0.5769
	(−0.5869, −0.5669)
Counterbalancing	0.2094
	(0.1945, 0.2243)
N	3,509

Estimates are posterior means. 95% Bayesian credibility intervals are presented below estimates.

B Summary statistics

Table 3 presents summary statistics for the covariates from the paper's main models.

C Robustness checks: Chapter 3

Table C.4 presents the results from the first two models corresponding to hypothesis one when eighteen coup risk outliers are included. These observations excluded from the main text's

Table A.2: Classification table for coup risk model

	No Coup Attempt	Coup Attempt	N
Low Risk Predicted	510	3	513
High Risk Predicted	467	46	513
N	977	52	1,104

The model assigned coup risk above the median to 94% of country-years which experienced coups attempts in Africa and the Middle East.

Table B.3: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Personnel to co-members	1,711	0.385	0.487	0	1
Coup risk	1,711	0.047	0.052	0.002	0.288
Repressiveness	1,711	−0.508	0.252	−0.952	−0.030
Non-rivalrous	1,711	1.463	0.205	−3.500	1.500
Armed forces size	1,659	65,263	117,504	800	866,000
At war	1,711	0.209	0.407	0	1
GDP (PPP)	1,708	90.002 bn	178.943 bn	637.250 mn	1.600 tn
No. missions in co-members	1,711	2.072	0.964	0	4
Personalist	1,711	0.110	0.313	0	1
Dist.-weighted contribution of co-members	1,711	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.019

results were in the top .001% of predicted coup risk. They were excluded to ensure that extreme values would not have undue influence on the estimated coefficients. The magnitudes of regression coefficients and standard errors are slightly altered by their inclusion.

Table C.4: Logistic Regression Output: Outliers Included

	Dependent variable:	
	Personnel to co-members	
	(FE H1)	(RE H1)
Coup risk x Repressive	0.390**	0.364**
	(0.153)	(0.141)
Coup risk	−0.383*	−0.417*
	(0.205)	(0.195)
Repressive	−0.039	0.075
	(0.246)	(0.203)
Non-rivalrous	0.164	0.192
	(0.169)	(0.148)
Armed forces size	−1.490***	−0.831***
	(0.403)	(0.281)
At war	0.050	0.049
	(0.136)	(0.125)
GDP (PPP)	1.845***	0.901***
	(0.608)	(0.298)
Number missions in co-members	0.098	0.127
	(0.237)	(0.204)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	1.244***	1.155***
	(0.196)	(0.167)
Personalist leader	0.482**	0.263*
	(0.198)	(0.158)
t	−0.027	−0.093
	(0.160)	(0.148)
t^2	0.015	0.020*
	(0.012)	(0.011)
t^3	−0.0004	−0.0005*
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No
Country, RIO fixed effects	Yes	No
Random intercepts: country, RIO	No	Yes
Observations	1,674	1,674
AIC	1,061.65	1,333.49

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The first two columns in Table 5 include the main models from the paper with an added control for the amount of aid finance pledged by the United States each year. I use AidData Research Release Version 3.1 (Tierney et al. 2011). Aid data availability limits the scope of this analysis from 1990 to 2011. The main results are largely unchanged and US aid does not appear to be significantly correlated with whether a state sends troops to RIO co-members each year. The third and fourth columns of Table 5 control for whether or not a state was a French colony. While being a former French colony is positively related to the propensity of states to contribute troops to RIO co-members, the substantive effect of the main interaction term remains largely unchanged.

In the robustness checks presented in Table 6 I demonstrate that the results are also not impacted by controlling for the level of democracy in a state's neighbors or openness to regional trade. Bilateral trade data is from Fouquin and Hugot (2016) and includes trade in merchandise, but not services. It is important to note that for African countries in particular, dyadic trade data is often unreliable and excludes large volumes of informal trade. The spatial democracy variable is created by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) according to their coding of democracy.

Table C.5: Robustness to US aid and former French colony status

	Dependent variable:		
	Personnel to co-members		
	(Aid FE)	(Aid RE)	(FR RE)
Coup risk x Repressive	0.465**	0.438**	0.396***
	(0.181)	(0.166)	(0.138)
Coup risk	−0.474**	−0.496**	−0.338*
	(0.214)	(0.196)	(0.165)
Repressive	0.023	0.190	0.089
	(0.290)	(0.233)	(0.206)
US aid	−0.019	−0.003	
	(0.105)	(0.109)	
French colony			0.135
			(0.405)
Non-rivalrous	0.148	0.190	0.197
	(0.196)	(0.168)	(0.145)
Armed forces size	−1.910***	−0.933***	−0.829***
	(0.530)	(0.329)	(0.283)
At war	0.136	0.130	0.053
	(0.160)	(0.144)	(0.124)
GDP (PPP)	1.708***	0.764**	0.913***
	(0.634)	(0.334)	(0.301)
Number missions in co-members	0.178	0.150	0.129
	(0.285)	(0.231)	(0.204)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	0.982***	0.966***	1.159***
	(0.209)	(0.180)	(0.168)
Personalist leader	0.665***	0.347**	0.253
	(0.232)	(0.164)	(0.159)
t	−0.114	−0.183	−0.092
	(0.207)	(0.190)	(0.148)
t^2	0.027	0.031*	0.020*
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.011)
t^3	−0.001*	−0.0008*	−0.0005*
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No	No
Country, RIO fixed effects	Yes	No	No
Random intercepts: country, RIO	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,335	1,335	1,656
AIC	853.29	1,109.23	1,332.52
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table C.6: Robustness to neighborhood democracy levels and openness to regional trade

	Dependent variable:			
	Personnel to co-members			
	(Spatial FE)	(Spatial RE)	(Trade FE)	(Trade RE)
Coup risk x Repressive	0.405**	0.382**	0.540***	0.509***
	(0.150)	(0.138)	(0.173)	(0.159)
Coup risk	−0.292	−0.334*	−0.455**	−0.485**
	(0.173)	(0.163)	(0.209)	(0.195)
Repressive	−0.056	0.121	−0.119	0.062
	(0.258)	(0.204)	(0.301)	(0.237)
Spatial democracy	0.196	0.192		
	(0.152)	(0.138)		
Regional trade openness			−0.338**	−0.226
			(0.171)	(0.148)
Non-rivalrous	0.160	0.194	0.192	0.216
	(0.167)	(0.145)	(0.187)	(0.158)
Armed forces size	−1.468***	−0.709***	−1.499***	−0.787***
	(0.404)	(0.273)	(0.427)	(0.158)
At war	0.047	0.053	0.089	0.091
	(0.136)	(0.123)	(0.149)	(0.135)
GDP (PPP)	1.870***	0.847***	1.979***	0.886***
	(0.614)	(0.292)	(0.661)	(0.318)
Number missions in co-members	0.063	0.140	0.084	0.188
	(0.236)	(0.200)	(0.273)	(0.233)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	1.263***	1.172***	1.244***	1.158***
	(0.199)	(0.168)	(0.206)	(0.174)
Personalist leader	0.462**	−0.148	0.628***	0.318
	(0.198)	(0.146)	(0.228)	(0.176)
t	−0.051	−0.148	0.003	−0.081
	(0.161)	(0.146)	(0.176)	(0.162)
t^2	0.017	0.023**	0.012	0.018
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)
t^3	−0.0005	−0.0006**	−0.0004	−0.0005
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country, RIO fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Random intercepts: country, RIO	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,656	1,656	1,497	1,497
AIC	1,057.09	1,330.98	949.94	1,210.95
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

In Tables 7-10 I demonstrate that the results are robust when "jack knifing" to remove each

RIO and re-running the models with each RIO sequentially excluded.

Table C.7: Robustness to excluding each RIO sequentially (ECOWAS, SADC, LAS)

	Dependent variable:					
	Personnel to co-members					
	(No ECOWAS)	(No ECOWAS)	(No SADC)	(No SADC)	(No LAS)	(No LAS)
	(FE)	(RE)	(FE)	(RE)	(FE)	(RE)
Coup risk x Repressive	0.600***	0.573***	0.391**	0.362**	0.525***	0.481***
	(0.195)	(0.179)	(0.159)	(0.148)	(0.173)	(0.158)
Coup risk	−0.532**	−0.558**	−0.126	−0.186	−0.319	−0.384*
	(0.225)	(0.212)	(0.185)	(0.173)	(0.200)	(0.188)
Repressive	−0.140	−0.052	0.480	0.431*	−0.564*	−0.127
	(0.270)	(0.226)	(0.307)	(0.241)	(0.316)	(0.240)
Non-rivalrous	0.165	0.193	0.250	0.407	0.146	0.159
	(0.188)	(0.160)	(0.476)	(0.440)	(0.184)	(0.163)
Armed forces size	−1.543***	−0.891***	−1.339***	−0.669**	−1.294***	−1.330***
	(0.443)	(0.310)	(0.485)	(0.331)	(0.456)	(0.362)
At war	0.135	0.119	−0.053	−0.044	0.066	0.068
	(0.159)	(0.143)	(0.155)	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.137)
GDP (PPP)	2.125***	1.045***	1.109*	0.520	1.819***	1.719***
	(0.688)	(0.338)	(0.661)	(0.342)	(0.665)	(0.432)
Number missions in co-members	0.066	0.107	−0.012	0.025	0.302	0.257
	(0.266)	(0.223)	(0.253)	(0.219)	(0.250)	(0.213)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	1.296***	1.242***	1.171***	1.118***	1.287***	1.209***
	(0.214)	(0.189)	(0.233)	(0.198)	(0.224)	(0.192)
Personalist leader	0.532**	0.293*	−0.011	−0.070	0.937***	0.512***
	(0.226)	(0.126)	(0.260)	(0.216)	(0.271)	(0.186)
t	−0.167	−0.229	−0.126	−0.168	0.393*	0.268
	(0.173)	(0.161)	(0.197)	(0.180)	(0.206)	(0.185)
t^2	0.024*	0.028**	0.029*	0.030**	−0.015	−0.005
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
t^3	−0.001**	−0.0007**	−0.001**	−0.0007**	0.0002	0.0000
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country, RIO fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Random intercepts: country, RIO	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,402	1,402	1,403	1,403	1,425	1,425
AIC	864.95	1,122.08	818.63	1,062.90	854.01	1,085.80
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Table C.8: Robustness to excluding each RIO sequentially (ECCAS, EAC, CENSAD)

	Dependent variable:					
	Personnel to co-members					
	(No ECCAS)	(No ECCAS)	(No EAC)	(No EAC)	(No CENSAD)	(No CENSAD)
	(FE)	(RE)	(FE)	(RE)	(FE)	(RE)
Coup risk x Repressive	0.397**	0.377**	0.420**	0.399**	0.328*	0.316*
	(0.151)	(0.137)	(0.152)	(0.141)	(0.173)	(0.156)
Coup risk	−0.323	−0.347*	−0.322	−0.354*	−0.207	−0.247
	(0.175)	(0.164)	(0.176)	(0.166)	(0.196)	(0.183)
Repressive	−0.096	0.012	0.025	0.126	−0.212	−0.022
	(0.259)	(0.211)	(0.256)	(0.145)	(0.278)	(0.224)
Non-rivalrous	0.202	0.225	0.149	0.174	0.215	0.218
	(0.185)	(0.158)	(0.164)	(0.145)	(0.196)	(0.162)
Armed forces size	−1.550***	−0.844***	−1.461***	−0.840***	−1.600***	−0.872***
	(0.429)	(0.295)	(0.404)	(0.284)	(0.431)	(0.293)
At war	0.071	0.074	0.080	0.077	0.090	0.092
	(0.148)	(0.134)	(0.138)	(0.126)	(0.146)	(0.130)
GDP (PPP)	2.034***	0.988***	1.731***	0.870***	2.072***	0.834***
	(0.657)	(0.314)	(0.595)	(0.300)	(0.659)	(0.296)
Number missions in co-members	0.154	0.189	0.114	0.153	0.076	0.135
	(0.259)	(0.216)	(0.243)	(0.208)	(0.243)	(0.209)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	1.301***	1.210***	1.179***	1.120***	1.266***	1.081***
	(0.213)	(0.182)	(0.202)	(0.172)	(0.199)	(0.158)
Personalist leader	0.461**	0.239	0.450**	0.246	0.506**	0.252
	(0.191)	(0.155)	(0.198)	(0.159)	(0.211)	(0.165)
t	−0.051	−0.127	−0.048	−0.104	−0.007	−0.070
	(0.169)	(0.155)	(0.160)	(0.149)	(0.167)	(0.154)
t^2	0.015	0.021*	0.018	0.022*	0.013	0.018
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
t^3	−0.0004	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.0006**	−0.0004	−0.0005*
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country, RIO fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Random intercepts: country, RIO	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,526	1,526	1,614	1,614	1,422	1,422
AIC	959.95	1,221.40	1,026.90	1,291.69	901.00	1,154.30

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.9: Robustness to excluding each RIO sequentially (MRU, IGAD, COMESA)

	Dependent variable:					
	Personnel to co-members					
	(No MRU)	(No MRU)	(No IGAD)	(No IGAD)	(No COMESA)	(No COMESA)
	(FE)	(RE)	(FE)	(RE)	(FE)	(RE)
Coup risk x Repressive	0.405***	0.392***	0.410**	0.388**	0.346**	0.323**
	(0.143)	(0.134)	(0.150)	(0.138)	(0.156)	(0.141)
Coup risk	−0.240	−0.278	−0.343*	−0.365**	−0.285	−0.302
	(0.168)	(0.160)	(0.176)	(0.165)	(0.181)	(0.169)
Repressive	−0.042	0.059	0.081	0.161	0.146	0.168
	(0.251)	(0.206)	(0.254)	(0.207)	(0.276)	(0.215)
Non-rivalrous	0.186	0.211	0.085	0.114	0.309	0.287
	(0.174)	(0.152)	(0.099)	(0.085)	(0.240)	(0.183)
Armed forces	−1.471***	−0.811***	−1.367***	−0.719**	−1.385***	−0.746**
size	(0.406)	(0.283)	(0.406)	(0.279)	(0.443)	(0.300)
At war	0.034	0.032	0.043	0.037	0.087	0.079
	(0.137)	(0.125)	(0.131)	(0.121)	(0.138)	(0.125)
GDP (PPP)	1.845***	0.912***	1.744***	0.833***	1.783***	0.878***
	(0.616)	(0.301)	(0.607)	(0.295)	(0.654)	(0.315)
Number missions	0.107	0.131	−0.029	0.009	0.203	0.172
in co-members	(0.236)	(0.203)	(0.244)	(0.208)	(0.272)	(0.224)
Distance-weighted	1.260***	1.168***	1.276***	1.199***	1.240***	1.110***
others' contributions	(0.199)	(0.171)	(0.197)	(0.168)	(0.223)	(0.184)
Personalist leader	0.463**	0.251	0.433**	0.232	0.365*	0.201
	(0.199)	(0.159)	(0.197)	(0.157)	(0.194)	(0.155)
t	−0.057	−0.122	−0.058	−0.114	0.024	−0.033
	(0.161)	(0.148)	(0.161)	(0.149)	(0.164)	(0.151)
t^2	0.017	0.021*	0.016	0.020*	0.010	0.014
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
t^3	−0.0005*	−0.0005**	−0.0004	−0.0005*	−0.0003	−0.0004
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country, RIO fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Random intercepts: country, RIO	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,669	1,669	1,605	1,605	1,471	1,471
AIC	1,046.42	1,315.44	1,030.20	1,294.93	948.90	1,209.06

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.10: Robustness to excluding each RIO sequentially (AMU, CEPGL, CEMAC)

	Dependent variable:					
	Personnel to co-members					
	(No AMU)	(No AMU)	(No CEPGL)	(No CEPGL)	(No CEPGL)	(No CEPGL)
	(FE)	(RE)	(FE)	(RE)	(FE)	(RE)
Coup risk x Repressive	0.414**	0.402***	0.414**	0.395***	0.408**	0.383**
	(0.149)	(0.140)	(0.149)	(0.138)	(0.149)	(0.136)
Coup risk	−0.301	−0.337*	−0.301	−0.333*	−0.279	−0.312*
	(0.173)	(0.165)	(0.173)	(0.164)	(0.179)	(0.158)
Repressive	−0.014	0.088	−0.014	0.086	−0.067	0.053
	(0.252)	(0.208)	(0.252)	(0.206)	(0.253)	(0.207)
Non-rivalrous	0.164	0.191	0.164	0.106	0.159	0.183
	(0.168)	(0.149)	(0.168)	(0.148)	(0.170)	(0.150)
Armed forces size	−1.484***	−0.805***	−1.484***	−0.832***	−1.592***	−0.881***
	(0.404)	(0.276)	(0.404)	(0.283)	(0.416)	(0.289)
At war	0.056	0.052	0.056	0.053	0.032	0.041
	(0.135)	(0.123)	(0.135)	(0.124)	(0.141)	(0.128)
GDP (PPP)	1.830***	0.909***	1.830***	0.905***	1.952***	0.952***
	(0.611)	(0.298)	(0.611)	(0.300)	(0.631)	(0.306)
Number missions in co-members	0.114	0.141	0.114	0.138	0.090	0.123
	(0.236)	(0.204)	(0.236)	(0.203)	(0.239)	(0.205)
Distance-weighted others' contributions	1.249***	1.121***	1.249***	1.161***	1.208***	1.128***
	(0.197)	(0.162)	(0.197)	(0.168)	(0.200)	(0.172)
Personalist leader	0.465**	0.250	0.465**	0.253	0.543***	0.307*
	(0.199)	(0.157)	(0.199)	(0.159)	(0.201)	(0.161)
t	−0.028	−0.088	−0.028	−0.092	−0.003	−0.075
	(0.160)	(0.148)	(0.160)	(0.148)	(0.164)	(0.151)
t^2	0.015	0.019*	0.015	0.020*	0.014	0.019
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
t^3	−0.0004	−0.0005*	−0.0004	−0.0005*	−0.0004	−0.0005*
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Country clustered SEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country, RIO Fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Random intercepts: Country, RIO	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,559	1,559	1,656	1,656	1,587	1,587
AIC	1,059.08	1,316.83	1,059.08	1,330.70	1,009.56	1,277.52

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D Robustness checks: Chapter 4

The results presented in Table 11 illustrate that there is potential evidence of bandwagoning among RIO co-members. When the GDP per capita of the target state in an intervention is added to the outcome stage of the model predicting pro-government intervention, it is apparent that interventions in wealthy states are more likely to be pro-government. It is also the case, however, that wealthy states are less likely to experience interventions in the first place. Inclusion of target state GDP per capita in the outcome equation does decrease the estimated magnitude of the effect of prior contributions on the likelihood of intervention.

Table D.11: Two-Stage Model of Intervention and Siding With the Government: Robustness to target capacity (bandwagoning)

	Dependent variable:	
	Selection Intervention	Outcome Anti-gov intervention
	(1)	(2)
Ever deploy to RIO co-members		0.136^{***}
		(0.019)
Number of anti-gov protests		-0.118^{**}
		(0.054)
Difference in V-Dem Polyarchy scores		-0.089^{***}
		(0.030)
Number of alliances	0.068^{***}	-0.023
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Foreign policy similarity	0.183^{***}	0.187^{***}
	(0.042)	(0.047)
Battle-related deaths (target)	0.171^{***}	
	(0.008)	
Number shared ethnic groups	-0.001	
	(0.019)	
GDP per capita (target)	-0.695^{***}	0.352^{**}
	(0.138)	(0.145)
Distance	-0.461^{***}	
	(0.047)	
V-Dem Polyarchy score (intervener)	-0.001	
	(0.025)	
Battle-related deaths (intervener)	0.015	
	(0.023)	
Coup attempt	0.076^{***}	
	(0.015)	
Observations	36,257	36,257
Log Likelihood	$-1,665.518$	$-1,665.518$
ρ	0.668^{***} (0.049)	0.668^{***} (0.049)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

It is plausible that leaders choose to intervene in states which produce oil, natural gas, or minerals during conflicts to exploit these resources. To assess whether the presence of strategically important resources is driving my results, I first control for the quantity of oil and natural gas produced in the target state each year. In a separate model, I control for the value of minerals exported from the target state each year. Due to multicolinearity, I cannot include all three controls in the same model. Data on oil and natural gas production is from the US Energy Information Administration. Data on the value of minerals exported comes from the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) site.

Tables 12 and 13 present the results with controls for the amount of natural gas and the amount of oil produced in the target state added to the selection equation. The control for the number of battle-related deaths of the intervener, which has little explanatory value but was included in the base models, is removed from the pro-government intervention model in Table 12 in order to avoid perfect separation.

Table D.12: Two-Stage Model of Intervention and Siding With the Government: Robustness to Oil and Gas Endowment

	Dependent variable:	
	Selection Intervention	Outcome Pro-gov intervention
	(1)	(2)
Ever deploy to RIO co-members		0.165**
		(0.072)
Number of anti-gov protests		−0.169
		(0.234)
Difference in V-Dem Polyarchy scores		−0.156***
		(0.052)
Number of alliances	−0.143**	0.003
	(0.068)	(0.090)
Foreign policy similarity	0.193*	0.081
	(0.107)	(0.123)
Battle-related deaths (target)	0.220***	
	(0.041)	
Number shared ethnic groups	0.060	
	(0.042)	
GDP per capita (target)	−0.920*	
	(0.541)	
Distance	−0.443***	
	(0.116)	
V-Dem Polyarchy score (intervener)	−0.026	
	(0.072)	
Coup attempt	0.062	
	(0.063)	
Natural gas produced	0.008	
	(0.094)	
Oil produced	0.149	
	(0.107)	
Observations	32,753	32,753
Log Likelihood	−1,407.280	−1,407.280
ρ	0.410* (0.247)	0.410* (0.247)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.13: Two-Stage Model of Intervention and Siding Against the Government: Robustness to Oil and Gas Endowment

	Dependent variable:	
	Selection Intervention	Outcome Anti-gov intervention
	(1)	(2)
Ever deploy to RIO co-members		-0.074^{***}
		(0.029)
Number of anti-gov protests		0.010
		(0.148)
Difference in V-Dem Polyarchy scores		0.041
		(0.032)
Number of alliances	-0.137^{**}	-0.069
	(0.065)	(0.065)
Foreign policy similarity	0.222^{**}	-0.080
	(0.102)	(0.080)
Battle-related deaths (target)	0.204^{***}	
	(0.027)	
Number shared ethnic groups	0.072^{*}	
	(0.043)	
GDP per capita (target)	-0.610	
	(0.409)	
Distance	-0.423^{***}	
	(0.100)	
V-Dem Polyarchy score (intervener)	-0.026	
	(0.068)	
Battle-related deaths (intervener)	-0.001	
	(0.045)	
Coup attempt	0.067	
	(0.056)	
Natural gas produced	0.051	
	(0.073)	
Oil produced	0.031	
	(0.089)	
Observations	32,753	32,753
Log Likelihood	$-1,297.992$	$-1,297.992$
ρ	-0.770^{***} (0.037)	-0.770^{***} (0.037)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Tables 14 and 15 present the results with an added control for the value of minerals exported by the target country in the selection equation. The control for the number of battle-related deaths of the intervener, which has little explanatory value but was included in the base models, is removed from the pro-government intervention model in Table 14 in order to avoid perfect separation.

Table D.14: Two-Stage Model of Intervention and Siding With the Government: Robustness to Minerals Endowment

	Dependent variable:	
	Selection Intervention	Outcome Pro-gov intervention
	(1)	(2)
Ever deploy to RIO co-members		0.164**
		(0.070)
Number of anti-gov protests		−0.189
		(0.208)
Difference in V-Dem Polyarchy scores		−0.153***
		(0.051)
Number of alliances	−0.164**	0.005
	(0.068)	(0.097)
Foreign policy similarity	0.219**	0.082
	(0.109)	(0.132)
Battle-related deaths (target)	0.237***	
	(0.047)	
Number shared ethnic groups	0.056	
	(0.040)	
GDP per capita (target)	−0.640**	
	(0.272)	
Distance	−0.466***	
	(0.116)	
V-Dem Polyarchy score (intervener)	−0.023	
	(0.072)	
Coup attempt	0.062	
	(0.066)	
Mineral exports value	0.193**	
	(0.082)	
Observations	32,723	32,723
Log Likelihood	−1,406.072	−1,406.072
ρ	0.411* (0.227)	0.411* (0.227)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.15: Two-Stage Model of Intervention and Siding Against the Government: Robustness to Minerals Endowment

	Dependent variable:	
	Selection Intervention	Outcome Anti-gov intervention
	(1)	(2)
Ever deploy to RIO co-members		-0.055^{*}
		(0.028)
Number of anti-gov protests		0.042
		(0.103)
Difference in V-Dem Polyarchy scores		0.014
		(0.030)
Number of alliances	-0.042	-0.069^{***}
	(0.056)	(0.063)
Foreign policy similarity	0.189^{*}	-0.095
	(0.106)	(0.087)
Battle-related deaths (target)	0.166^{***}	
	(0.021)	
Number shared ethnic groups	0.029	
	(0.043)	
GDP per capita (target)	-1.138^{**}	
	(0.488)	
Distance	-0.426^{***}	
	(0.104)	
V-Dem Polyarchy score (intervener)	0.028	
	(0.064)	
Battle-related deaths (intervener)	-0.016	
	(0.033)	
Coup attempt	0.096^{*}	
	(0.057)	
Mineral exports value	0.145^{*}	
	(0.076)	
Observations	32,723	32,723
Log Likelihood	$-1,385.499$	$-1,385.499$
ρ	-0.811^{***} (0.058)	-0.811^{***} (0.058)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

It is also possible that interventions could be driven by economic dependence within each dyad. Therefore, I control for the value of formal recorded trade between the countries in each dyad-year. Dyadic trade data comes from Fouquin and Hugot (2016)'s Historical Bilateral Trade and Gravity Data set (TRADHIST) and includes merchandise trade, excluding trade in services. Using this data, the analysis is limited from 1990-2014. I present the results of this robustness check in Tables 16 and 17. The control for the number of battle-related deaths of the intervener, which has little explanatory value but was included in the base models, is removed from the anti-government intervention model in Table 17 in order to avoid perfect separation. The inclusion of trade data results in 4,082 fewer observations included in the analyses. The reduction of observations is likely to be more problematic for the anti-government intervention model, as anti-government interventions are rarer events in the sample. It is also important to note that many dyads have significant volumes of informal trade flows, which are not captured in this data, and that data accuracy is uneven. When including the dyadic trade flows, I do not estimate a significant relationship between a country's deployment record and the likelihood of anti-government intervention (or any of any other predictors of anti-government intervention).

Table D.16: Two-Stage Model of Intervention and Siding With the Government: Robustness to Bilateral Trade Volume

	Dependent variable:	
	Selection Intervention	Outcome Pro-gov intervention
	(1)	(2)
Ever deploy to RIO co-members		0.121*
		(0.063)
Number of anti-gov protests		−0.687***
		(0.242)
Difference in V-Dem Polyarchy scores		−0.128***
		(0.041)
Number of alliances	−0.146*	−0.105
	(0.077)	(0.126)
Foreign policy similarity	0.297**	0.087
	(0.120)	(0.123)
Battle-related deaths (target)	0.364***	
	(0.132)	
Number shared ethnic groups	0.080	
	(0.049)	
GDP per capita (target)	−0.215	
	(0.463)	
Distance	−0.466***	
	(0.163)	
V-Dem Polyarchy score (intervener)	−0.059	
	(0.095)	
Coup attempt	0.103*	
	(0.056)	
Dyad trade flow	1.298	
	(0.919)	
Observations	28,641	28,641
Log Likelihood	−935.445	−935.445
ρ	0.317* (0.170)	0.317* (0.170)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.17: Two-Stage Model of Intervention and Siding Against the Government: Robustness to Bilateral Trade Volume

	Dependent variable:	
	Selection Intervention	Outcome Anti-gov intervention
	(1)	(2)
Ever deploy to RIO co-members		−0.044
		(0.028)
Number of anti-gov protests		0.334
		(0.330)
Difference in V-Dem Polyarchy scores		−0.0002
		(0.033)
Number of alliances	−0.152**	−0.035
	(0.074)	(0.077)
Foreign policy similarity	0.343***	−0.043
	(0.103)	(0.062)
Battle-related deaths (target)	0.303***	
	(0.096)	
Number shared ethnic groups	0.108	
	(0.051)	
GDP per capita (target)	−0.479	
	(0.447)	
Distance	−0.376***	
	(0.124)	
V-Dem Polyarchy score (intervener)	−0.042	
	(0.093)	
Coup attempt	0.107**	−0.003
	(0.048)	(0.011)
Dyad trade flow	−1.286	
	(1.152)	
Observations	28,641	28,641
Log Likelihood	−847.234	−847.234
ρ	−0.760*** (0.129)	−0.760*** (0.129)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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