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REPORT ON PORTUGUESE GUINEA AND  
THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT

*In our first issue, we introduced our readers to the Guinean Revolution - ("A Talk With Gil Fernandez"). This subsequent feature centers on Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC). The following is Mr. Cabral's statement to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs of February 26, 1970 printed here in its entirety.*

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MR. CABRAL: Sir, I have some notes.

MR. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR. (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa): You may proceed, sir.

MR. CABRAL: Sir, I thank you very much. I would like to say, first, that my colonial language is Portuguese, and I would like to speak Portuguese, but in order to get more understanding, I will try to speak English.

First, I would like, on behalf of the people of Guinea and Cape Verde, on behalf of all my fellows, to salute you and the committee and to thank you very much for this opportunity to inform you about the situation in our country, the situation of our people.

We have been for 7 years fighting a very hard fight against colonial domination for freedom, independence, and progress.

Our presence here is, first of all, to salute you and the American people. We think the major part of the American nation is with us in this hard fight against colonial rule. And it is very good for us to tell you that we are fighting, and are following the example given by the American people when they launched a great struggle for the independence of this country.

We would like also to thank you very much, and this committee, for the work done in Africa about the African problems, for your last visit in Africa in a special study mission, and to tell you that maybe it was enough to show our agreement with the conclusions of your report, but it is necessary to inform you and to help you in order that you may help us.

We will explain the situation in the country and also tell something about the use of the weapons of NATO by Portugal against our people. We will have to tell you that in our country we are not against the Portuguese people. We are not fighting, and we never fight the Portuguese people.

We are against colonial domination. We are fighting the colonial system. But we hope, really we hope, that after our independence, our liberation, we can get good relations with Portugal, with the Portuguese people, and work together hand-in-hand for democracy, peace and progress.

And the best propaganda made about our fight, our position, have been made by the Portuguese deserters and by the Portuguese prisoners we released last year.

We think in our country that we have no interest, and we are not interested in accusing the United States, because of the fact that the United States gives weapons to Portugal. We think that the United States has the right, like Portugal, to take all the measures they think necessary for their security. But we are coming here to tell frankly that we don't understand that in the political field, and in the material field, it seems that the United States is with the Portuguese, that the support is there for the Portuguese.

Why? Because the weapons received by Portugal in the framework of NATO are used by Portugal against us. That is not the fault of the United States, but we think that during all this time, with the colonial war in our country, it would be very good if some measures would be taken in order to avoid the use of NATO weapons against us.

We regret deeply in our country that in the United Nations, the position of the United States is not for our cause. I repeat, I am not accusing. I am regretting.

We think in our country that the sacred interests of our people are not in competition or contradiction with the interests of the United States, or even not in contradiction with the interests of the Portuguese people, and we think that our fight is based on the same principles that constitute the bottom, the heart of the Constitution of the United States.

We are going to win this fight. We have to win. Portugal must be recognized in the framework of history. Portugal occupied and exploited our country for more than a century. Maybe colonialism had also some positive aspects. We have to recognize this.

But the time has arrived where colonialism has to finish.

Portugal is making many efforts, using all kinds of help in order to maintain our peoples under colonial domination. But we are sure we are going to win, and we have until now liberated more than two-thirds of our country.

We are, like you know, a very small country between the Republics of Senegal and Guinea. We are not only underdeveloped, but not developed at all. The situation in my country, before the struggle, was that agriculture was the main base of our economy. About 60 percent of the exportation in the country were only peanuts.

We didn't have any kind of industry. Only 14 persons had passed the university until 1960 in my country, and 99.7 percent of the population were illiterate. We had only two hospitals, one in Bolama, other in Bissau, and in all the country only 300 beds for the sick people.

The mortality for the children in some regions had claimed about 80 percent of lives of our children. You can realize what kind of situation we had after all the colonial domination and more than 500 years of Portuguese presence in our country.

We tried during the years of 1950, 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956 to convince the Portuguese Government that it was necessary to change. In that moment, even we didn't think about independence. We hoped in that moment to change, to have civil rights, to be men, not treated like animals in general, because the Portuguese divided us into two groups, the indigenous people and the assimilado people.

At that moment, after the adaptation of the resolution in the United Nations granting independence for all colonies the Portuguese changed a little on paper, but not in practice.

We wanted at that moment, when we were beginning to demand our rights, to pass from the situation of Portuguese of second class to Portuguese like Portuguese. We received, as answer, only repression, imprisonment, torture, and in 1959 after the creation of our party, when we called a strike in the Port of Bissau, the Portuguese troops killed about 50 workers in 20 minutes and wounded more than 100. This massacre showed us that it was not well, it was not good, it was not intelligent to fight against the Portuguese with hands empty.

We didn't want, absolutely not, to resort to violence, but we realized that the colonial Portuguese domination was a situation of permanent violence. Against our aspirations they systematically answered with violence, with crimes, and we decided that in that moment to prepare ourselves to fight.

In that moment, like you know, sir, Africa began to become independent. The "wind of change" was blowing over Africa. The other colonial powers decided to decolonialize. Portugal signed the United Nations Charter and later Portugal voted for the proclamation of the right for independence of all people.

But Portugal never accepted to apply this international decision. Portugal insisted, the Portuguese Government insisted that we were provinces of Portugal.

If in the beginning of our colonial life we were exactly like the Portuguese, we had all the rights the Portuguese had, maybe it would be possible to convince us that we were Portuguese in the Portuguese provinces. But in our country we never had rights, the minimum rights of man, and in that moment it was very late to convince us that our country was a Portuguese province.

We saw Africa beginning with independence, many African states, and we decided to do our best also to get our right to self-determination and independence. That is the reason for 7 years of fighting.

We have liberated more than two-thirds of the country. In the liberated areas of our country, facing the Portuguese bombs, we are trying to build a new life. In the liberated areas, for example - I can tell you that all of this has been confirmed by journalists and filmmakers and writers, like some men from Sweden and other countries that have been in our country for 1, 2, or more months. We have organized the education, the services of education. We have now more than 150 schools. The Portuguese, in all Guinea, in the time of colonialism, had 45 missionary schools, so-called elementary schools, and 11 official schools.

We have now about 15,000 children in the schools. Before, in my country there were only 2,000 children, but the indigenous people; that is, 99.7 percent of the population, couldn't go to their official schools, only to the missionary schools.

Now, in our country, we have established in the liberated areas, in spite of the bombing, permanent bombing by Portuguese planes, four hospitals - not very nice hospitals, but what we can do in this stage of our life. We have trained nurses during these years, more than 250 nurses, men and women. We have more than 100 sanitary posts in order not only to assist the wounded or sick fighters, but to assist the population of the liberated regions.

We have organized and developed in the liberated regions, our party, our political organization, our administration, and

in this moment we can say that our country is like a state of which a part of the national territory is yet occupied by the colonial forces.

Portugal controls only the urban centers and some little parts in the countryside. We control the major part of the countryside, and in the contested regions we are fighting each day in order to complete the liberation of our country.

One can ask how Portugal, an underdeveloped country also, one of the most backward in Europe which has some regions with more than 46 percent of illiterates - I am referring to official figures - how can Portugal fight all of these colonial wars in my country, in Angola and in Mozambique?

The Portuguese people are progressively realizing that colonial wars are not only against the African people, but also against their own interests.

We think that with this war the Portuguese Government is losing or making it possible to lose one of the best chances Portugal has in history, because our hopes were and still are in spite of all the crimes against our people, that we could, in the independence, like an African people, develop the best relations with Portugal, even to study and to decide together some problems concerning the development of our country and the progress of our peoples.

But Portugal is able to do what she is doing in Africa because, in our opinion, she is using all the means she can get from the economy of Portugal first, but also and principally from the help Portugal receives from its allies or friends.

We would like to make clear that we are not for the break of the relations with Portugal. We are not for the stopping of commercial relations, economic relations of Portugal, no. But there is a problem, a historical problem, now. We are an African people. We have to get our dignity, our rights, our independence.

The international laws have to be respected and applied in our country. Portugal is not respecting this. People who get relations with Portugal have to appreciate and to decide in what measure these relations may be used by Portugal against the African peoples.

Portugal is a member of NATO. We are not against or for the NATO. But we do not think that for the liberation of our country it is necessary to finish with NATO, no. The independence of our people does not pass necessarily by the end of

NATO. These are two independent things.

But we think that the force the Portuguese have, in order to fight three colonial wars in Africa, comes from the situation of Portugal as a member of NATO. We know very well that Portugal, in Europe, has an important strategic position, but we know also, and we understand that when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, not only Portugal but also the overseas territories were affected. We understand that very well.

We understand also that some parts of the territories are very important in the framework of general strategy, but we understand also that today, like it is remembered in the "NATO's 15-nation resolution October 1968", our country Guinea is the last territory of West Africa dominated by a NATO power. It is true.

But we don't think that it is absolutely essential to maintain, to keep the Portuguese domination over our country in order to keep the strength or the capacity of NATO, speaking under the strategic plan.

We understand very well that it is very difficult to put some problems to Portugal, but not only for 1 year, for 2 years, or 3 years, but now for 9 years in Angola, 7 years in my country and more than 5 years in Mozambique, Portugal is using the means she receives from NATO in order to destroy our peoples.

We have the proof of this in our country. People that went to our country have seen with their eyes the means used by the Portuguese forces.

We have here some photos showing people burned by the Portuguese, using the means, like bombs received from NATO. But we ask this: Is Portugal's Government in agreement with the principles of NATO itself?

In the preliminary part of the treaty these principles are defined, but Salazar, referring to the NATO ideology for instance, in 1949 said in a speech, and I quote "The definition of this ideology is obviously unfortunate and suffers from vacuousness and imprecision of certain formulas that are already worn out and disturbing, because they are employed everywhere in the most diverse interpretations." And he added: "We feel ourselves bound by the obligations of the pact and by the general ends, not by doctrinary assertions tending to regiment political systems about whose virtues we in our country are sufficiently aware."

It is proven that Portugal has been and still is against the principles of NATO, but she uses the means NATO gives her

against our people.

MR. DIGGS: *May I suggest, Mr. Cabral, that in view of the fact that some members have to go to the floor, that we suspend your general statement, and let the members ask questions and then, of course, if there is sufficient time following that, anything you wish to say that hasn't been covered in the interrogation may be added at that time.*

MR. CABRAL: I was speaking, but I didn't know that the time is limited.

MR. DIGGS: *You have done very well. I think you have reached a point now where we might go into questions.*

*I have before me a press release from the Embassy of Portugal, dated December 4, 1968, Prime Minister Caetano's speech before the National Assembly of Portugal on the opening day of its general session.*

*Without objection, the entire speech will be made a part of the record.*

(Speech follows):

Prime Minister Marcello Caetano's Speech Before the National Assembly of Portugal

Professor Marcello Caetano, Prime Minister of Portugal, addressed the Portuguese legislature on the opening day of its final session. Elections for the new National Assembly will be held next year. The following is an unofficial translation of important excerpts from the Prime Minister's address.

On Portuguese Africa

...We are all aware of the fundamental significance of the Overseas Provinces in Portuguese public affairs at the present time...In that year (1961) a very violent outbreak of terrorism in Angola led to the massacre of thousands of people - at times whole families were butchered - and to the devastation of vast areas which were left in ruin and desolation.

The swift, forceful reaction of the people of Angola themselves, aided by the small military and police forces then available in the province, dominated events and would very quickly have overcome the outbreak of terrorism but for the material aid the insurgents received from neighboring territories and - to say the least - the moral support of other countries which might have expected to gain something



from the destruction of Portuguese authority.

Since 1961 these same factors have led and supported sub-  
version in Angola which later spread to Portuguese Guinea and  
Mozambique. In no case have we been faced with a spontaneous  
uprising of the native population. In general we have had to  
face incursions from bases located on neighboring territories,  
or receiving tactical support from such territories. Both  
the financing and the weapons come from abroad, specially in  
Russia and Red China, that the terrorist cadres are trained,  
while many instructors and leaders have come from Cuba.

The various movements and groups set up to support sub-  
version in Portuguese Africa - and perhaps, eventually to  
fight for power - have enjoyed a wide and favorable audience  
in certain sectors of the foreign press, in many chancelleries,  
and at the United Nations General Assembly. Some of these  
help the terrorist movement on account of their own party  
alignments, others because they naively believe they are sup-  
porting a generous cause, others still out of sheer self-interest,  
and quite a few because they are afraid to antagonize the domi-  
nant current of world opinion.

This raging storm notwithstanding, Portugal has calmly  
maintained her position. Some people in various countries  
thought that this persistence resulted simply from Dr. Salazar's  
personal obstinacy. But the fact of the matter is that Portu-  
gal's attitude could not have been otherwise.

Hundreds of thousands of white people live, work and ful-  
fill their destinies in Angola and Mozambique. Many were born  
there, and some belong to the third, fourth and even fifth  
generation of families long settled in the province. They are  
Africans. Side by side with them, there are millions of blacks,  
who, for centuries before, were only familiar with tribal life,  
Portuguese Nation a common homeland and the basic conditions  
for their social and economic development. Portugal is respon-  
sible for the security of these populations and for the preser-  
vation of all they have created which constitutes their way  
of life.

Portugal cannot abandon her people, of whatever color or  
race, to the whims of violence, to the fury of resentments,  
to tribal hatreds, or to the devious maneuvers of international  
politics; nor can she gamble away the values which, under the  
protection of her flag, have turned primitive lands into pro-  
mising territories in the process of civilization.

Could the Portuguese have calmly watched the savage des-  
truction of a civilized way of life? Could the Portuguese

have allowed racial hostility to grow and widen a gulf between two races, when the progress of southern Africa depends on their close association and collaboration? Could the Portuguese have watched the destruction of an achievement which, while incomplete like all human enterprises, represents the positive expression of a multi-racial society, cherished by blacks and whites alike, a society which also represents an example of understanding almost unique in the region?

We declared war on no one. We are at war with no one. Subversion bears no name and its attacks are ordered by unidentifiable persons. We merely defend ourselves. We defend lives and property. We defend not *one* civilization, but civilization itself...In short, we are defending the real interests of the peoples integrated into the Portuguese Nation...

...Can anyone doubt that behind the groups which proclaim themselves as defenders of the rights of the native population there are imperialist designs struggling for world supremacy? We have constant proof of this, but nowhere so clearly as in Portuguese Guinea.

Portuguese Guinea is a small territory densely populated by an industrious rural people with whom we started trading in the 15th century. Unlike Angola and Mozambique, Guinea did not offer the vast empty spaces which would favor the settlement of Europeans. Thus, the Portuguese presence in that province could not have been different from what it was: political unity and pacification of the different races living there with their different customs and religions, development of the economy by protecting the native worker, social aid and welfare work which brought great success in the struggle against the sleeping sickness and endemic diseases.

The great majority of the population of Guinea are fighting side by side with the regular forces against the terrorists. Yet, in this province, the terrorist movement appears to be far more extensively and effectively supported by the socialist powers, especially the U.S.S.R., than in the other provinces. The impression is that a persistent and hurried effort is being made there, with no limit on the supply of weapons and other assistance. The *REASON* for this special interest is not hard to find: the parties responsible for these attacks do not hide the fact that Portuguese Guinea is a necessary base for an attack on the Cape Verde archipelago - the islands which command a key position on the lines of communication between the northern and southern halves of the Atlantic, and also between the east and west of that ocean.

At a time when the Soviet fleet grows from day to day in the Mediterranean, while Russia seeks to set up military bases

and firm alliances in the Middle East and North Africa, the great importance of the Cape Verde Islands is inescapable - should they fall into hands friendly to Soviet Russia. Europe is being surrounded...

...The defense of the Overseas Provinces (military forces, economic development and social works) places a heavy burden on the budget of Portugal in Europe. So heavy is this charge that no one can maintain in good faith that the continuance of the Portuguese presence in the Overseas Provinces is dictated by economic convenience or the desire for profit...

#### On Economic and Social Factors

...The Government cannot deviate at this time from the policy of austerity which has been implemented thus far, although it will meet the most urgent needs of public administration and will continue with the policy of economic development without which, to a large extent, the growth of the Country would come to a halt.

Public administration must be improved in its structure, methods and personnel. The Government intends to study and put into effect a serious-minded administrative reform which, if it is to be a *serious* one, cannot be done hastily...

...As regards the present Development Plan the Government will give preference to investments of more immediate reproductivity. Emphasis must be lent to investments concerning rural welfare and such social infrastructures as electrification, water supplies, transport and communication networks, and others to benefit agriculture and country life, while providing the industries with the indispensable marginal economies; in this regional perspective we shall not lose sight of the correction for existing imbalances and we shall pay particular attention to projects affecting basic education, professional training and public health. In the housing field we are trying to accelerate current projects which should show sizeable results in 1969.

...We shall try to maintain and, if possible, to accelerate the rhythm of social progress, so that it may keep up with economic development and insure a more equitable distribution of income. In this respect the situation of rural workers will be given special attention, as a matter of common justice and also to attract to the fields the labor force agriculture needs. We are studying the adoption of family allowances for rural workers to be followed gradually with an extension of welfare and health benefits...

On Political Factors

...In the first two months I have sought to conduct domestic policy within the guidelines I defined in the declaration I made immediately after the new Government took office, which met with a very favorable reception throughout the Country.

Efforts have been made to allow a wider expression of opinion, more extensive and thorough information, a closer sharing of all the people in public life. We have sought to create a political climate free from hatred and from the desire to retaliate, which will permit normal relations between persons professing different opinions. We are trying to get all the good citizens to collaborate with the Government. Some positive results the Government has already achieved in this connection.

Inevitably, some have shown alarm, thinking that we are going too far, while others consider our steps too timid and ask for better proof of our stated intentions.

It may even be expected that at this juncture concrete measures will be announced to exemplify a given line of policy. Some are indeed being considered and I expect to put before the National Assembly during this session some Bills which will enable it to express itself on the policies to be adopted.

In this connection, however, the Government reserves itself the right to proceed with the necessary caution - not only is the world situation far from uncloudy, but we must also be aware that interests inimical to Portugal will not be allowed to infiltrate the home front...

...Those citizens who do not wish to see their Country communized must define their attitudes and be ready to fight for them with firmness. Freedom cannot serve as the means to destroy liberty. Otherwise we should be subject to the boldness of an active minority dominating the apathetic majority, and recent history shows us the tragic example of Kerenskys and Masaryks...

...During the last two months the Government has been given ample proof of the support of the great mass of the Portuguese people. There is no doubt that the Country desires the continuation of order, social peace, a stable currency, sure economic progress and the defense of the overseas provinces. But it is equally clear that all desire greater rapidity in decisions and a swifter rhythm in economic and cultural development. We are trying to meet this double desire and we shall continue to do so...

MR. DIGGS: There is one point here that appears to be at odds with the point that you made about how much territory the liberation movement actually controls, and what kind of support it has, and I thought we might get your comments on his interpretation.

The Prime Minister stated: "The great majority of the population of Guinea are fighting side by side with the regular forces against the terrorists," which, as you can see, would seem to be inconsistent with the point that you made about the amount of territory that you controlled.

Could you make some comment on that?

MR. CABRAL: Yes, sir.

We are a small country with not much more than 600,000 people in population, between 600,000 and 800,000. In our condition, and in a country where there is no mountains at all - the highest point is 300 meters - it would not be possible to fight a fight like ours, for 7 years, against an enemy which has more means than us, if we did not have the support of the people.

During 7 years we are fighting and we can receive people from abroad like guests for 1 month, 2 or more months. How is it possible if the great majority of the population is fighting side by side with the Portuguese against us, you see.

It is difficult to make people believe. It is better to come and see. We can, for instance, if you agree, invite you to send some people to see the country - or to be aware of the witnesses given by many peoples in the world - we will be very glad to receive them and they can see our people in the countryside involved in the fight for the new life we are creating in our country.

Another example: The President Americo Tomas, of Portugal, has been in my country - if I don't forget, I think it was February of 1968. He was in Bissau, the capital. He went to Bafata, a Portuguese camp, by plane. He went back to Bissau, and he went to Bolama always by plane. He went to another island and back by plane to Bissau.

He couldn't go by car or another way. But in the time of colonialism, when they ruled the country, all this - because my country is very small - all these travels, except to the island, will be done by car. But the Prime Minister of Portugal also has been in my country last year, in 1969 - I think in April - during his travel to Africa. He was in my country for 6 hours. Then he went to Angola. He spent

these hours in the Governor's palace in Bissau, and he himself gave a speech there telling that "to change the situation here, it is necessary to make a miracle."

Then some people suggested he should go to Bolama, but the staff of the Army told him that it was not possible to assure the security of the Prime Minister, because we had made an attack against Bolama some days before.

You see, I can tell you all I want, the Portuguese can tell all they want, but it is better to go and see.

*MR. DIGGS: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Morse, a member of the subcommittee.*

*MR. F. BRADFORD MORSE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.*

*I have a couple of questions. You indicate that the objectives of your movement were democracy, peace and progress for your people. What kind of government have you established in those areas of your country over which you now have control?*

*MR. CABRAL: In the areas we control now, we don't have a proclaimed government. We run ourselves through the political organization of the party and through the administrative services we created.*

In each village, in the countryside, there is a committee of the population with one person in charge of education, one person in charge of the civil services, one person in charge of the health and hygiene, one person in charge of supply, and one person for the political problems.

Last year we created, and we are creating now, in the major part of our villages a tribunal composed by the people of the village, and all of these people are elected by the population of the village.

We have at what we call zone level, committees of zones with a political responsible, a responsible for the security, responsible for health and hygiene, education, supply, and so on, like at the lower level in the villages. The people of the villages are linked to these people of the zonal committees.

In the zone committees, because we are in war, five people are designated by the party. The rest of these people, the other five, are elected by the population in the zone, between the best people in the zone in general.

Altogether, the zones, we have the interregion. There is a committee of interregions. This is the embryo for our

government. The characteristics of this is that the people at the village level up to the interregion rules themselves, and we do it in order to give our people the chance now to do what the Portuguese never gave them, to have responsibilities.

We think there is a real democracy in our organization, of our life now. But we think that step by step we can organize better and make the elections also for all people at the zonal level and at the interregional level.

Only now we are in war, we have to take measures in order to avoid the infiltration of the enemy.

*MR. MORSE: Eduardo Mondlane, whom I knew, received considerable support and I presume that his organization still receives financial support from private sources in the United States. Do you have any support from the United States?*

*MR. CABRAL: Until now, no, sir.*

*MR. MORSE: I mean private support.*

*MR. CABRAL: We get some private support to our social organization, like the hospital we have created. We received recently from the American Committee on Africa small help. Now the United Auto Workers have decided to give us important help in the humanitarian field.*

*MR. MORSE: Where does your principal support come from?*

*MR. CABRAL: From our people, first. Second, from Africa, both directly between the African Governments and us, and principally through the OAU organization. Any sources, anticolonial sources that decided to help us, we accept their help. Some Socialist countries help us, and we receive humanitarian help from some other countries. We receive help from many organizations in Western Europe like France and Italy and Holland. Last year Sweden decided to give us a very important help, and this help began to come to our hands. We also have this year the creation of a committee in England and in Belgium, to get some help for us.*

*MR. MORSE: Does your party, the PAIGC, have an ideological base?*

*MR. CABRAL: Yes, we have. Our ideology is nationalism, to get our independence, absolutely, and to do all we can with our own forces, but to cooperate with all other peoples in order to realize the development of our country.*

It is very important. We will do our best in order to avoid any kind of exploitation of our people in the future,

because we have been exploited enough by the Portuguese. It is the duty of our party.

MR. MORSE: *Does the Republic of South Africa assist the Portuguese in their efforts?*

MR. CABRAL: Yes; the Republic of South Africa uses our airport of Bissau, but principally the airport of Salt Island. Recently South Africa cooperated with Portugal in enlarging the international airport of Salt Island.

MR. MORSE: *Do the South Africans provide any arms to the Portuguese in Portuguese Guinea?*

MR. CABRAL: We have no evidence of it, because we never got arms from South Africa there.

MR. MORSE: *Have you ever encountered French arms?*

MR. CABRAL: French helicopters, French warships, yes, all given to Portugal in the framework of NATO. But our colleagues from Angola told us that South Africa not only gives arms, planes and helicopters, but also sends some people there to South Angola.

MR. MORSE: *I have no further questions at the moment. Thank you.*

MR. DIGGS: *The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Derwinski, a member of the subcommittee.*

MR. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI: *Thank you, Mr. Chairman.*

*Mr. Cabral, in your basic testimony, you made reference to international law and the concern you have with the proper application of international law.*

*Recognizing that very often the end justifies the means - the actions of any group or individual, to what extent do you recognize the inconsistency within the framework of international law when you use sanctuaries in Senegal and Guinea to conduct your military activities?*

MR. CABRAL: First, I would like to say that in this field of international law, like in the moral field in general, we have to make a scale of values. We think that even if we used the territory of Guinea and Senegal, we think that more politically, historically, the law, the international law calling all nations to recognize the right of each people to be independent, is more important in this historical context than the international law, telling that one country cannot accept other people fighting in its territory.



But we can demonstrate by law that our country is not Portugal. Our country is not Portugal. Portugal is an invader, is an occupant, and I think if some invader came here in the United States, occupy your country, you have the right to go to Canada, to prepare yourselves and reconquer your right to be free.

MR. DERWINSKI: *In other words, you challenge the legality of the Portuguese claim that Portuguese Guinea is a province of Portugal and that the people there have all the rights of Portuguese citizens. You don't acknowledge the validity of that position.*

MR. CABRAL: *I don't acknowledge it, and also I don't recognize it. The facts also prove that this claim is not true.*

MR. DERWINSKI: *You also read a quote from Mr. Salazar from 1949. I have before me a quote that you made in October, 1969, in the Soviet Union. I understand you were there on the occasion of the 100th Anniversary of Lenin's birth. I am quoting from this newspaper article. It quotes you as saying, "We refute the ideologists of imperialistic influence which try to minimize the role played by Lenin, the founding of the U.S.S.R. denying the importance of his ideas for the contemporary world for the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."*

*While I recognize you were a guest in the Soviet Union, and you would hardly be denying the principles that Lenin stood for, but just what did you mean by "national liberation movements in Asia," for example?*

*What national liberation movements in Asia do you support or associate with?*

MR. CABRAL: *We are not necessarily associated with any liberation movement in Asia, but we support the struggle of the people of South Vietnam.*

MR. DERWINSKI: *In other words, you support the Vietcong?*

MR. CABRAL: *Yes.*

MR. DERWINSKI: *In Africa, what movements in Africa do you support? You support, for example, the Somali tribesmen against Ethiopia?*

MR. CABRAL: *No, sir. About the African countries?*

MR. DERWINSKI: *Yes.*

MR. CABRAL: *We don't support any movement of liberation against*

the African countries, but we support Angola, Mozambique, and all the peoples of southern Africa fighting against the racist domination.

MR. DERWINSKI: *What about Latin America? What movements do you philosophically or in some way associate with in Latin America?*

MR. CABRAL: We are not necessarily associated with any movement in Latin America.

MR. DERWINSKI: *Is there any validity to the reports that there are Cuban Army officers serving in your forces?*

MR. CABRAL: Portuguese reports, sir?

MR. DERWINSKI: *Not necessarily Portuguese. I understand that there was a Cuban Army officer captured recently and interviewed by Western newsmen.*

MR. CABRAL: Yes, sir. It was a Cuban.

MR. DERWINSKI: *I mean a Cuban officer in your forces.*

MR. CABRAL: Sir, we have Cuban doctors helping us in our country. And this man came - I am getting away from the problem of my struggle - but this man came to visit his colleagues there, the doctors, and afterward he was taken by the Portuguese. He is not our Lafayette, and we have no Cuban people fighting with us in our country.

MR. DERWINSKI: *In answer to a question from Mr. Morse here when he asked you the sources of support, you listed them in priority, your own people, other African states, African sources, and Western Europe.*

MR. CABRAL: The Socialist countries, too, some Socialist countries.

MR. DERWINSKI: *I have before me an article from Newsweek, July 5, 1965, and Newsweek by American standards is an objective and reasonably liberal publication. They state here, and I quote: "The rebels" - referring to your group - "are relatively well armed with weapons of Czech and Russian make."*

*At another point, they write about the other equipment from the Soviet bloc countries. To what extent is your military hardware from the Soviet Union or bloc countries?*

MR. CABRAL: To what extent? Unfortunately we consider that not a good extent, not enough.

MR. DERWINSKI: *Not enough support. By that you mean that they*

have not given you planes the way they have other countries?

MR. CABRAL: Unfortunately, no. You know, sir, if they give us planes, we would not be a liberation movement. The liberation movement must be poor with no heavy weapons, trying to do the best by themselves.

MR. DERWINSKI: In their scale of priorities, you don't rate as high as Nasser evidently, so you don't get the type of equipment that Mr. Nasser gets?

MR. CABRAL: We are not an independent state.

MR. DERWINSKI: I see. The thing I am trying to get at - we have all sorts of material here which are published in the Western press, and I realize that sometimes you people may refer to it as being imperialistic, but nevertheless in the free press these reports tend to be consistent. They all emphasize the fact that your equipment is Russian, Czech, in some cases Chinese, and it also leads me to ask, then, to what extent have you been involved or have you been able to stay aloof from the Sino-Soviet split?

MR. CABRAL: If you will permit me to tell you something?

MR. DERWINSKI: Yes, please.

MR. CABRAL: If the journalists gave attention in the Portuguese side, they would insist that the planes used by Portugal come from the United States, the weapons from the United States, from Germany, and so on. It is stated repeatedly, all the Portuguese weapons are not produced in Portugal, but in the NATO powers.

But you see, Portugal, Salazar, in spite of that, says: We don't accept the ideology of NATO and so on.

If Portugal doesn't accept foreign ideology why should we? We do not have to be involved in these problems of other peoples. We are fighting for independence of our country. We don't put ourselves in the conflict of other peoples.

MR. DERWINSKI: Let's assume that you might someday be successful in your struggle. What type of government will you then set up? What would be the philosophy or the political structure of that government? Would it be a Socialist state, as you used the term?

MR. CABRAL: In our country we have different opinions of convenience from some of our African brothers. These names - Socialist, Communist, and so on - come from special conditions. In Africa, in my country, we don't like to use labels.

We can tell you this. We will establish a government, a democratic government, respecting the rights of man and all the liberties, for each people, without any kind of segregation.

We defined this very well in our program. People seeing what we do, may tell, if they want, comparing it with their standards, their skills, can say: "They are Socialist, they are a capitalist state, or something other." They take their own responsibility.

But, we, we want democracy, peace, progress, and justice, social justice in our country. Naturally, we cannot get it in 2 days, or 3 days. We have to go step by step to this end.

*MR. DERWINSKI: You have problems in the Portuguese Guinea as well as in almost any country in Africa with tribalism. There have been repeated reports that a number of the tribes do not participate. In fact, they have been quite loyal to the Portuguese in this struggle.*

*To what extent, then, is your movement based on a tribal rather than a thoroughly national base?*

*MR. CABRAL: We think the principal force of our movement is that it never involved tribal groups. We tried during these years to join all our people together, all the tribes, or ethnical groups, all the people in the fight. In the beginning of the fight, the Fula group, because of their traditional chiefs, went a little with the Portuguese. But step by step they are realizing that they are African, not Portuguese.*

*MR. DERWINSKI: I understand the report says 60,000 refugees from this conflict in Senegal that supposedly you, in effect, disown as having any responsibility for, and there have been reports that they, therefore, have suffered from health and nutritional problems. They are, in effect, legitimate refugees of the war, yet are not given any consideration or, say, support from your group.*

*What is the status of these refugees in Senegal?*

*MR. CABRAL: The problem of refugees in Africa have a special situation, because we have boundaries defined by the colonialists. On one side and on the other side there often are families, the same people. The people that are refugees are, in general, people of the boundary regions, they went the other side, they join their family.*

We agree and thank very much the United Nations for what they are doing for these refugees, but we will remember that in our country there are several hundreds of thousands of people living and walking in the liberated zones. But the situation

of the refugees in Senegal is good in general, no great problems.

They are receiving some help from the United Nations and the Senegalese people do their best also to help them. But they are all in general families of this people.

MR. DERWINSKI: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. DIGGS: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Bingham, a member of the full committee.

MR. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM: I am glad to welcome you here, Mr. Cabral.

I wonder if you would tell us what action was taken by the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, in regard to your country this past year and in previous years.

MR. CABRAL: During the past years the United Nations adopted resolutions proclaiming the legitimacy of our fight: is a very good help, moral and political help. The committee for the decolonization adopted a resolution recommending the collaboration between the specialized agencies of the United Nations and the liberation movements through the OAU. This also is a good help, and when put into practice, is a very good thing for us because we have many social problems now that could be resolved by this collaboration.

They are the main important things I can tell you. We appreciate what the United Nations did for us.

Also there have been in Africa the committee of decolonization and the Commission for Human Rights, which is very important also in order to inform the United Nations about the situation of our people.

MR. BINGHAM: Do you have copies of the resolutions here with you?

MR. CABRAL: No, sir.

MR. BINGHAM: Would you be able to supply those resolutions for the record? It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, it would be helpful for the record to have copies of the most recent resolutions adopted by United Nations bodies.

My impression is that they were adopted by very large majorities at the General Assembly. I think it would be helpful for the record to have the votes also if you could send them.

MR. CABRAL: I don't have the documents, but I can supply them.

MR. BINGHAM: Mr. Cabral, you mentioned that you have some photographs there. We didn't have a chance to see them. Did you mean that the burns were caused by napalm?

MR. CABRAL: Yes, sir, by napalm bombs like this.

MR. BINGHAM: Your statement was that they could not be manufactured in Portugal, is that correct?

MR. CABRAL: Absolutely, sir. They have indications in English, the numbers and all other data.

MR. BINGHAM: Do they indicate the source, the manufacturer?

MR. CABRAL: No, not the source, but some English experts tell us that these bombs are from the United States.

MR. BINGHAM: So far as your procurement of arms is concerned, do you obtain arms wherever you can get them?

MR. CABRAL: Unfortunately, no, sir.

MR. BINGHAM: No, you misunderstand my question.

MR. CABRAL: Accept?

MR. BINGHAM: You will accept arms from any source?

MR. CABRAL: Any source, sir, and even if the people giving me the arms want, I will not tell his name or the source. I will keep silent.

MR. BINGHAM: You do not inquire of the ideology -

MR. DIGGS: Excuse me. Would the gentleman yield at that point? Would that include ex handles from Governor Maddox? [Laughter]

MR. BINGHAM: When you receive arms from some country, you do not inquire about the ideology of that country?

MR. CABRAL: Never, sir.

MR. BINGHAM: I would like to say, Mr. Cabral, that for myself I support your position. I have, in my service at the United Nations and here, long been opposed to our policy of continuing to supply military arms and other assistance to Portugal.

MR. CABRAL: Thank you very much, sir.

MR. BINGHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. DIGGS: Thank you.

I think we should mention at this point the reason that Mr. Cabral is in the United States. He was invited here by Syracuse University to give the first Eduardo Mondlane's memorial lectures, a series which began on or about the 20th of February.

Mr. Cabral, have any countries in addition to your support from the Organisation of African Unity and in addition to certain supplies that you have received from countries that you have named, have any countries formally recognized the national movement of the PAIGC, and if so, in what ways?

MR. CABRAL: All the African countries, through the OAU, recognize that the PAIGC, as the national liberation movement of Guinea and Cape Verde - and we have very good relations with the governments in these countries, in the African countries. We met the heads of state many times. We have all the facilities, like a government in general.

Out of Africa there is no, in general, relations with the governments, but with the organizations of solidarity, and on this basis we have these relations. Only with Sweden - the Social Democratic Party of Sweden invited us to the congress of this party and there we have meetings with the leaders of Sweden, including the Prime Minister - the new Prime Minister.

The relations are between the specialized organizations of these countries and us.

MR. DIGGS: There have been varying reports, Mr. Cabral, about the number of trained soldiers that the PAIGC has. Without, of course, violating any of the security that obviously you must recognize in connection with that subject, there have been indications that there was some 10,000 trained soldiers that you have.

Is there any way that you can just give us some general idea about this and about how well they may be supplied, whether you expect more, and where they are receiving their training within the context of the security that I am sure you have to recognize.

MR. CABRAL: Yes. We based our fight in the support of our people. In this way we can arm - give weapons to many people, really. We didn't do it because of two reasons: First, because we don't have enough means to give arms to all people who can take up arms; secondly, also because of technical problems. The greater is your armed people, more problems you get. And you have to face more difficulties in order to supply people with ammunitions, to control the people, like a regular army and so on.

But I can tell you, without any kind of prejudice of security, that these figures related in general are a little more than the people we have armed. We can arm more people if we get means, and technically it is possible. But we would like to emphasize that we have our regular army fighting through the country, we have people in the liberated regions armed also, what we call the militia and the armed population for self-defense.

One of the principal aims of the Portuguese now is to come with the helicopters, to burn the villages, to burn the crops, and kill the children and other people, like child showed in this picture, a child wounded by a Portuguese soldier.

We give weapons to our population in the liberated zones in order to assure their self-defense. If you count all of these people, it is near the figures you have. About the suppliers, it is known also. The Portuguese know it very well.

The reason the Portuguese are bombing the Republics of Guinea and Senegal, is because we cannot, at this moment, receive our supplies directly: you see, we have to pass them through the neighboring countries. Even coming from Africa, we receive our supplies through the Republic of Guinea in general. We, ourselves, are in charge of all the transportation of these means. Unfortunately, inside our country our people carry on their heads all these kinds of supplies.

*MR. DIGGS: It has been said, Mr. Cabral, that once Guinea is independent, that this will accelerate or directly lead to the liberation in Angola and Mozambique. Would you comment on that?*

*MR. CABRAL: Yes, sir. The Portuguese know it very well and they tell it sometimes. Some days ago the Washington Post also reported from Lisbon that our country is the key for the liberation, total liberation of Africa, from the Portuguese colonial rule.*

The Portuguese know that now they are in a very bad situation in the country; they are doing all they can to resist, to keep the country. But we think that if we liberate our country, it will be easier for Angola and Mozambique to liberate. But also if, for some chance, Angola liberates itself before, it will be more easy for us and Mozambique to liberate.

*MR. DIGGS: How about the refugees problem? How many refugees from Portuguese Guinea are in Senegal or in any other contiguous countries?*

*MR. CABRAL: In the Republic of Guinea there are no refugees*



at all. Even the United Nations consulted the Government there about refugees. They answered that it is true, that there are no refugees there. There are some people who came from our country, but they are with their families.

In Senegal, the figure presented in general is 60,000. We don't discuss these figures, but we call the attention only that it is very easy to pass the border, to go back and forth. On the other hand, there are many people in Senegal, even before the beginning of the fight, and now it is very difficult to distinguish people that were there, because of economic integration, from these people that are escaping the war.

*MR. DIGGS: The refugees that are in these various countries, are they receiving help from the U.N. High Commission for Refugees?*

*MR. CABRAL: Yes, sir; through the Government of Senegal.*

*MR. DIGGS: Could you give us some indication of the kind of help that they are getting and the amounts of it? Do you have a general idea?*

*MR. CABRAL: I don't have here exactly the amount, but I know that they receive financial help, and also some goods, like wheat and corn and other cereals and also sugar, milk, and the Government of Senegal takes this and through official organizations they give it to the refugees.*

*MR. DIGGS: Another interesting point that was made by the Prime Minister in his speech that I alluded to earlier on the opening day of the final session of the Portuguese Legislature, is what he considers to be the real reason for the special interests of certain supportive elements to your movement.*

*I presume he means specifically the Russian support, that Portuguese Guinea is a necessary base for actually the capture of Cape Verde, the islands which command the key position and the lines of communication between the northern and southern halves of the Atlantic and also between the east and west of that ocean, the implication being that if you are able to secure your independence, that they, because of their assistance, will be in an influential place to jeopardize the security of the free world or with respect to those routes.*

*Would you care to comment on that?*

*MR. CABRAL: Yes, sir. For the Portuguese Government, who is the one facing this problem of the liberation movement, for them we are all Communists.*

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With your permission, I will tell you that for them you are very definitely a Communist, because for the Portuguese all people supporting the liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies are Communists.

We don't believe that Cape Verde Islands in the actual situation of the problems of war have the importance they give. They are trying to get more support from the NATO powers, because of the situation they have in Guinea, and they tell that if we take Guinea, we will assault Cape Verde Islands and make the islands a base for the Communists.

I can assure you that the condition for the help we receive from any people is that there must be no conditions at all. And we have a fundamental principle: people fighting for independence, must be independent in the mind and in the action.

If tomorrow, for any reason, some country because of giving us support, should try to dominate us, we will fight again against this country like we fight today against the Portuguese domination. That is our position.

*MR. DIGGS: There was a New York Times article from Lisbon on the 23rd of February stating that an oppositionist by the name of Francisco Zenha, who ran as a Socialist candidate in the October election, is being held by the security police for investigation into incitement of demonstrations against Portugal's colonial wars in Africa.*

*Is this a sort of an isolated situation, or do you have knowledge of how much support you might have among the Portuguese people in Portugal itself for various reasons?*

*MR. CABRAL: I know personally Francisco Zenha, from the time I was a student in Portugal. He has been always a democrat, but this is not an isolated case. Fortunately, we recognize that the Portuguese people are each day more conscious of the dangers of the colonial war. And they become in Portugal each day more interested in demonstrating against colonial wars. Even the young people in Portugal are now very active, including some people of the Portuguese Church, demonstrating and publishing leaflets against the Portuguese colonial war.*

Also, I can say that in the last 2 years about 14,000 young Portuguese deserted from Portugal in order to avoid going to the Portuguese Colonial Army.

In the last days, Premier Caetano made a statement calling these young people to come back to Portugal and assured them, that there will be no trial against them, but

not that there will be no colonial army to wait for them and to take them.

We can tell you that this is a force for our fight that the people who love peace and progress in Portugal are with us and each day these people are more. I can tell you that when Mondlane was assassinated, the students of the traditionally reactionary faculty in Portugal, the Faculty of Law, they put in the main room there a big photo of Mondlane and they demonstrated against the assassination of Mondlane.

*MR. DIGGS: The PAIGC has been characterized as the most successful and the closest toward achieving goals of any of the liberation movements in Africa. How do you account for the success of your movement relative to the other liberation movements in Africa?*

*MR. CABRAL: The general opinion is that we have got great success. Why? We think it depends on many factors. Firstly, geopolitically we are well situated, we think, with the Republics of Guinea and Senegal - in our side with us, you see. But we also know that a great force for our fight has been the fact that, before we launched the fight, we prepared during many years, mobilizing the people in the countryside, organizing the people, and after we prepared our people step by step.*

We did our best to keep people together. When, in Senegal some people from our country claimed that they had a movement also, and it will be a danger for the unity of the liberation movement, we called them to come to the country and to join us in the fight against Portuguese colonialism. Some came and others refused.

Today they are not considered like a serious movement. We will try to keep our unity, and to avoid any kind of division, in order to liberate our country.

*MR. DIGGS: Finally, Mr. Cabral, what role do you think the United States should play with regard to the freedom movement in Portuguese Guinea?*

*MR. CABRAL: First, sir, I think it would be very good if the United States put in practice what you recommended in your report about Southern Africa in general. Because we are also - not geographically but politically - a part of southern Africa. It would be a very good help, the discontinuation of the military aid to Portugal until Portugal decides to respect the international law, and if they decide to respect our rights to self-determination and independence, that is the first step. That is the first thing we would like to see done.*

But also, we know each day more that the majority, the large majority of the American Nation, according to the principles of this country, are with us in our fight. Morally they support us.

Day by day there are people trying to do something materially for us. It is also very good, but we think that if you are right when you tell that the United States is the most powerful symbol of democracy, and if people here absolutely are conscious of this, they have to do something for us.

Basically, you can tell they are committed, you are here committed with justice, with freedom, with dignity. And we are fighting exactly for this.

If you are against - opposed - to injustice, tyranny, we are also fighting against injustice and tyranny. We think that the United States can do something to help us. Like now, the United Auto Workers decided to do something, sending us medical supplies; even also they decided to send us some goods, some textiles for our population in the liberated zones.

We don't ask for weapons, but if it will be possible to also help us in this field, it would be very nice. Such a help would finish with the situation described by Congressman Derwinski here, that the press always are reporting that our party receives material from the Eastern countries. If the United States would give it to us, it would be possible for us to develop a new force, you see. That is our opinion, sir, about this.

But we think also that this possibility, this chance, this opportunity to be heard here by you and this committee is better for the American people and for us is also a very good help. It is a very good help from the United States for us.

*MR. DIGGS: I want to thank the gentleman for his very enlightening statement and enlightening response to some very delicate questions. We hope that the remainder of your visit to the United States will be productive and through your efforts more people will learn about what is really involved with respect to the liberation movement in Portuguese Guinea with its implications for American foreign policy interests and the interests of the free world.*

*The subcommittee stands adjourned.*

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

AFRICAN PARTY FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE  
ON THE SITUATION OF OUR ARMED STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

(Report to the OAU Liberation Committee meeting, Dakar, June 1969)

[Amilcar Cabral, Secretary General]

The report presented by the Ad-hoc Military Sub-commission (Guinea, Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal) appointed by the OAU liberation Committee, which visited our Country (during August/September), has certainly and duly informed the Liberation Committee and the Military Experts Commission about the real situation concerning our liberation struggle. The objective information supplied by the Sub-commission, on the bases of a direct contact with the reality, is also valid in relation to the essential aspects of our situation, and to all the conclusions that the Military Experts would have reached. And this, the more so, that in the present stage of our struggle (and taking in account the particular characteristics of the war we are fighting), significant changes occur with a certain slowness, even if each day progress in the struggle is achieved on several fronts.

This is the reason why this report will be concise, limited to the fundamental features of the strategic situation, the development of ours and the enemy's activities, and finally to the situation in the war front during the first five months of this year.

We will start by paying attention to certain aspects of the political situation which, while dictating the military situation, is, at the present, strongly influenced by the development of the armed struggle.

The Political Situation

Since the replacement of the military "Governor" which took place a year ago, when General Arnaldo Schultz failed in his attempts to liquidate our struggle, and was replaced by General Antonio Spínola (a military man with considerable experience in repression in Portugal and Angola), Portuguese policy in relation to our Country went through some alterations. In fact if in its essence the policy is the same, the government has nevertheless changed its approach, in an attempt as wide as futile to demobilize our people and undermine our struggle.

Such policy has two main characteristics. On one hand, acts of gentleness and trickish attention are lavishly bestowed upon the population in zones and urban centres still under its occupation, such as social and religious concessions, hasty building of schools, sanitary stations, mosques, trip to Portugal,

scholarship grants, etc...Mass-media propaganda glorifies the "Portuguese World" and the paradise of "Overseas Provinces", where there is no racial hatred, and where "all mankind is equal before the law and God". The "Governor" himself has launched an appeal "for reconciliation", and for the building of a "Guinea better than that of yesterday and better than today's". They talk about peace and the evolution toward a situation "where the children of the Country, at last prepared, would be able to take their destiny in their own hands". We - the nationalists - are accused as the abettors of war, and accused of not wanting peace which would enable the government to build a better life, etc., etc.

During the few hours "visit" recently made to the Capital of our Country by the Portuguese Head of Government, he affixed his seal of approval to this present policy, making an appeal for reconciliation, offering the fighters the "peace of braves", and to all those who want, a better Guinea, under the shadow of the Portuguese flag. He nevertheless acknowledged - he, that the Chiefs of Staff had advised not to leave the city of Bissau for no one would be able to ensure and warrant his safety - that "only a miracle could change the situation" which the colonialists find themselves in our Country.

On the other hand, the enemy is sending each week new troop contingents to our Country, intensifying its criminal bombings and terrorist assaults against the population in liberated zones, burning live-crops, killing live-stocks and, whenever possible it carries on indiscriminate massacre of the civilian population, mostly elderly persons and children.

It is with this double face policy - of smile and blood - that the Portuguese colonialists are vainly trying to close the road leading to our freedom. It is, after all, the reflection and the most striking consequence of the success of our struggle, and of the failure of the Portuguese colonial war in our Country. Smiles and gentleness lavished in the zones still under occupation, coupled with crimes of devastation attempted in the liberated regions, are evidences of the utter disarray the colonial authorities find themselves in, in spite of all the sacrifices we have to bear.

On our side, either by a direct political work near the popular masses in the liberated regions, or through the waves of our "Liberation Radio", we have been fighting this policy, and denouncing these enemy acts and maneuvers. We have been strengthening the Party organization at all levels, and trying to improve the standard of living of the population, for, whatever the situation might be, people can not fight for ideas alone.

We can state - and the testimony of several visitors is

an irrefutable proof - that our Party is stronger than ever, and that our people is firmly attached to our organization, which is leading our struggle. At the same time, we are developing an underground political work in the zones of Guinea still occupied, and also in Cape Verde Islands, and accelerating the demobilization of colonial troops by means of a steady and adequate propaganda.

The political situation, which conditioned the starting of our armed struggle to counter Portuguese colonial aggression, is now strongly influenced by the development of the armed struggle: In spite of all the difficulties, our struggle is steadily advancing, dooming all the enemy maneuvers and "change of attitude", aimed at undermining our liberation struggle, to a resounding failure.

#### The Military Situation

In a general way, the military situation is characterized by an increasing retreat of colonial troops toward the main urban centres, and by an intensification of our offensive attacks against Portuguese entrenched camps, and the very urban centres where they are falling back to. These facts, in the framework of combined "movement" and of changing contradictions, which defines the war, characterizes an advanced and well defined stage of evolution of a war of national liberation against colonial or imperialist aggression.

In fact, we have reached a stage where the situation seems to be the opposite of the one prevailing in the beginning of the struggle. The main axis, or the strategical spinal cord of the enemy is shifting and shrinking, and it is now limited to road sections linking the main urban centres (Bissau-Mansoa, Bafata-Gabu, Bissau-Bula-Canchungo and Bambadinca-Bafata), including also some water ways on which ports are located which are essential for supplying inland entrenched camps. In the beginning of the struggle the enemy enjoyed a great deal of mobility, now it seldom dares to leave its barracks, for we are almost totally controlling all the roads. Any attempt to venture on these roads without armored vehicles is generally followed by a great loss of human lives. The generalized scattering of enemy forces which took place in the beginning, has now been replaced by a hasty concentration of the enemy forces, which, after suffering heavy losses during harassing attacks to its fortified camps, has sought shelter in the main urban centres. The enemy is no longer trying to regain control of the population in the liberated regions, instead, it's desperately trying to maintain its influence on the population in the zones which it still occupies. Large so called clearing operations, by means of armored personnel carriers and on foot, have been replaced by aerial bombings and attempts

to carry out terrorist assaults; the old "administrating power" of the beginning of the war has become a terrorist hiding night and day underground and behind fortified bunkers. Paralyzed, attacked and harassed wherever he is, the enemy has progressively lost all its offensive capabilities, and consequently resorting to defensive tactics, preparing to resist in its last bastion against the assault of our forces.

Obviously, the solution for such a situation, which is a prelude to a total and certain defeat of the aggressors, depends upon our capabilities and upon the concrete possibilities that we have intellectually and materially, to overcome this stage and bring about a qualitative change in our action, deepening the contradiction among the enemy and definitely create an untenable situation, indeed unsupportable in the urban centres.

For that, we must reinforce our operations of blocking the rivers still used for supplying some urban centres, engage more effectively enemy war planes and helicopters, and increase the isolation of urban centres, creating thus a permanent state of insecurity in these centres either from outside or from inside.

#### *1. The Enemy Activity*

The enemy activities are practically limited to:

(a) Aerial bombardments (napalm, white phosphorous, and fragmentation bombs).

(b) Terrorist assaults against the population of liberated regions (assassinations, burning of villages and crops, and killing of livestock).

(c) Regroupment of population in the occupied zones in strategic hamlets, Gabu and Canchungo, and mainly around the urban centres).

(d) Attempts to hastily build tar-covered roads (aimed at preserving the link between the main urban centres, and therefore to avoid using waterways where our operations are becoming more and more frequent and efficient).

(e) Provocations and aggressive acts against areas in neighbouring Countries, in order to intimidate the authorities of these Countries and place them in contradiction with ourselves.

The effect of aerial bombardments, that we are facing every day with more and more courage, in spite of our limited means, is small due to our specific conditions, except for the material destruction of villages (it's aimed above all at regions which are well known for the attachment of the population to our Party and our struggle: Kitafine, Cubucare, Tom-bali, Unal and Gampara in the South, Mores Candjambari and Saara in the North).



The fulfilment of Party orders, which forbid the establishment of permanent guerrilla bases, made it practically impossible for the aircrafts to carry on operations against our armed forces. We can assert that, in spite of the intensification of aerial bombardments against villages and population and the considerable material losses, the enemy does not achieve its goals of indiscriminate killing of the civilians, because of the civil defense measures that we have undertaken. Moreover, the increasing number of aircrafts that we have shot down or damaged made the enemy pilots more prudent (bombing at very high altitude), which shows that we can still further check the enemy air operations if we had more efficient means.

Terrorist assaults by means of helicoptered troops, the landing of marines or combined operations, are mostly aimed against the population living further away and not permanently protected by our forces (Central Como, Southern Cubiseco, Gampara, and the rivers of Corubal and Farim).

These attempts aimed mostly at massacring the population, destroying the crops and livestocks, are day by day running up against the resistance of the armed population (population and popular militia), and our armed forces. If in these zones, (Como and shores of Corubal river), the enemy was able to burn part of the harvest, it was also during that operation and similar ones, that the enemy suffered the heaviest losses in human lives.

The regrouping of villages in occupied zones in "strategic hamlets" is getting more and more difficult, either because of deep rooted habits and traditions, or because being aware of the progress of our struggle the population does not want to take any compromising attitude toward the colonialist. Some hamlets which were built in the area of Gabu and Canchungo for instance, were totally destroyed by our forces while avoiding inflicting civilian casualties. Our attack was directed against the so called "troops of protection".

Frightened by the power of land mines placed under the few dirt roads still used by enemy troops, the colonialists have hastily decided to build tar-covered roads, or to cover the old ones. These works which are carried on mostly in the contested areas or in zones still under occupation (Gabu, Bafata and Canchungo), is costing the enemy very dearly in human lives and in material. In the present stage of our struggle, tar will not prevent our operation against Portuguese convoys. The building of these roads does not involve any political implications; it is somehow convenient for us to let the Portuguese build during the few days which they still have in our Country and to pave the roads which they were not able to in over a century of colonial exploitation.

Provocations and repeated acts of aggression carried on against neighbouring Countries, directed against villages near the border, which are bombed and hit with long range guns, have taken place in the Senegalese and Guinean territories. In spite of the few casualties registered during these criminal acts, the enemy was not able to disrupt the solidarity of the Guinean and Senegalese government toward our struggle. On the contrary.

## 2. Our Activities

Our operations are characterized as follows:

(a) *Continuous attacks against Portuguese entrenched camps and against occupied urban centres.* During these operations, only the cities of Bissau (except for its airport which was attacked on February 19, 1969), Bafata and Gabu, have not yet been attacked. On the other hand, following successive violent attacks during the 11 months, the enemy was forced to pull back and evacuate with heavy losses, 19 entrenched camps, specially the important camp of Sanconha, Cacoca, Madjo, Madina-Boe, Beli, Bandjara, Xexe, Contabane, Gangenia and Gan-Carnes, all of them with considerable strategic importance. To give an idea about the intensity and frequency of these attacks, it is enough to point out, that last year alone, we have carried on 500 attacks to these camps.

(b) *Ambushes on the roads in contested areas, obstruction of water ways used by the enemy as supply route.* The objective of these operations is obvious; one must only recall that last year we have mounted with success 197 ambushes and sunk 62 boats. It is during these ambushes, which unfortunately are rare because of the enemy increasing paralysis, that we have the possibility of destroying more efficiently its forces.

(c) *Attacks against port installations and airfields.* Encouraged by the success we had when we attacked Bissau International Airport, located only at 9 Km from the center of the Capital, and by the attack against the Port of Binta (on Farim river), we have increased and will further increase these types of operations which are of great importance for the destruction of the colonial war infrastructure.

(d) *Commando operations against urban centres.* It is a type of operation that we are progressively developing, which has already been carried on with success against several cities and urban centres, mainly Farim, Mansoa, Catio, Bula, Mansaba, Fulacunda and even Bolama which is located on the Island of Bolama. These operations will also be further increased.

We have to point out that last year we made 27 war prisoners, which is a considerable number due to the specific conditions of our struggle. Six of these prisoners have already been released with the help of the International Red Cross.

In conclusion we can state that in spite of all the difficulties that we are facing, our activities are steadily developing, widening and diversifying in accordance with the progress of the struggle, whose advance is conditioned not only by our specific internal situation, but also by external factors either positive or negative.

### 3. *Our Main Needs*

The progress of our struggle, that even the enemy is no longer hiding, demands each day more and more efforts and sacrifices from our population and our fighters. While mostly relying on our own efforts and sacrifices, we nevertheless are aware (faced with the specific situation in our Country, and with the increasing support that Portugal allies are given to this colonial war against Africa), that we need an adequate aid from our allies and fellows in the struggle - from African States and all anti-colonial forces.

It is imperative that those who can and wish to help us definitely understand that our armed struggle has become now a war of major proportions, and a war, even if it has been fought by a very poor people but sure of its rights, demands increasing financial and material means, in order to be carried on successfully.

(a) Ammunitions in great quantity and suitable for the type of weapons we have.

(b) Means of transportation (trucks, jeeps) for the renewal of our logistic system and also ambulances for the wounded.

(c) Anti-aircraft guns.

(d) Medication and hospital supplies to save the life of our wounded combatants, and the lives of the civilian population victim of Portuguese colonial crimes.

(e) Enough financial means to face successfully the increasing cost of the war.

If these needs are answered, which is not the case at present, nothing will be able to stop the successful end, relatively soon, of our armed national liberation struggle. Independent Africa and all the anti-colonialist forces can give an appreciable contribution to this end.

### 4. *Statistics for the First Five Months of this Year*

During 1969, our operations were intensified on all fronts of combat. Better results still would have been achieved, if we have had all the necessary means (materially and financially), and if on all fronts we had adequate supply of ammunitions.

The figures which follow are the last statistics computed for the first five months of this year:

Ambushes and skirmishes	89
Attacks to entrenched camps	214
Enemy entrenched camps taken over	8
Attacks to airfields and dock installations	8
Commando operation in urban centres	3
Vehicles destroyed	36
Boats sunk	12
Aircrafts shot down or damaged	6
Helicopters shot down or damaged	5
Enemies killed	429
Enemies wounded	great number
Deserters	2

Note - According to reports received from several battle fronts, operations carried on by our fighters against entrenched camps have greatly increased during the month of June. We carried on 65 attacks against entrenched camps and urban centres, and put out of action 107 enemy soldiers including 3 field officers.

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*\*Copies of this transcript may be obtained by contacting the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.*

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