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Author
McCourt, David M

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Hegemonic Field Effects in World Politics: The United States and the Schuman Plan of 1950

David M. McCourt

University of California, Davis

Abstract

This paper casts American influence over the Schuman Plan of May 1950 as a *hegemonic field effect*, pushing forward recent attempts to develop more dynamic models of hegemonic ordering in world politics. Far from an automatic enactment of US preferences for European unification by French policy-makers, as prevailing macro-level theories imply, the Schuman Plan—French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's proposal to pool French and German coal and steel—was the product of a "structural homology" that developed between the French and American political fields after 1945. American officials in Paris, empowered by their control of Marshall Aid, fostered an alignment of the French and American political fields, empowering centrist coalitions and technocratic planners in France, who favored pro-capitalist, pro-European integration policies, of which the Schuman Plan was a signature artifact. The paper explores the implications of this historical case for the further development of relational meso-level theories of hegemony.

Keywords: hegemony, US foreign policy, Schuman Plan

> The U.S. contribution to the origins of the Schuman Plan was vital. (Gillingham 1991a, 175)

> [O]f a deliberate American effort to get the French to propose what Schuman proposed, there is no trace. (Diebold 1959, 45)

Introduction

On May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed that French and German coal and steel be placed under a supranational high authority. "World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it," Schuman proclaimed. The Plan was certainly creative, and bold—its aim was to integrate key areas of the economies of former enemies, five short years after World War II's end. For Schuman, such a step would "change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims."[1] Two years later, Schuman's plan became the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner of today's European Union (EU). The Schuman Plan and the ECSC were thus crucial to the later trajectory of European integration; without them, the course of intra-European cooperation would have looked radically different.

This paper assesses the relationship between the Schuman Plan and America's emergence as the hegemon in world politics after 1945. The Schuman Plan's connection to US hegemony is puzzling. On the one hand, European unification was strongly in America's national interests, promising to stimulate economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 301). America's desire for sort of federation was, in turn, clearly communicated to Europe's leaders from the end of

1 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en, accessed May 2020.

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the War (Beloff 1963; Hitchcock 1997). America's emergence as the hegemon was thus an irreplaceable stimulus to changes in French attitudes toward Germany, from animosity to calls for economic integration. As the ECSC and later the European Communities, the Schuman Plan furthered the institutionalization of the American-led liberal international order.

Yet, on the other hand, emerging before the American liberal order was fully institutionalized, the Schuman Plan was also far from a simple reflection of American hegemonic will, raising important questions about the nature of hegemony and hegemonic ordering in world politics more broadly. The Plan was, in fact, a highly contingent development. In France, Leftists worried about the way the Plan pegged France to America, as did Gaullists on the right, who preferred an independent "Third Force" foreign policy. In the United States too, economic interests aside, support for unity flowed from a liberal internationalist foreign policy many conservatives in Congress opposed. In addition, the Plan is an example of the way smaller European states manipulated US policy-makers by persuading the new hegemon to accept arrangements distinct from its preferences (Ikenberry 1989, 376).

How then can we account for the influence of the new US hegemon on the Schuman Plan—influence at once clear and powerful, yet diffuse and indirect? In this paper, I cast the Schuman Plan as a *hegemonic field effect*. In so doing, I further a nascent field-theoretic approach to international hegemony (Nexon and Neumann 2017), part of an emerging "Hegemony Studies 3.0" (Ikenberry and Nexon 2019).

Hegemonic field effects are political outcomes that result from relationships of structural similarity, or "homology," between the political fields of hegemons and those in their orbit. Structural homologies occur not only when hegemons directly interfere in the domestic politics of lesser states, or embed their vision of order in international institutions, as common models of hegemonic influence suggest, but also when their domestic political arenas *align* in terms of the main ideological divisions and the primary modes of conducting politics. Hegemonic field effects emerge via structural homologies that bring to the fore actors with similar dispositions and worldviews across fields. Based on those dispositions, empowered actors perceive political opportunity structures in similar ways, developing aligned political strategies within their distinct fields.

The Schuman Plan was a hegemonic field effect of this sort. Between 1945 and May 1950, the French and American political fields aligned politically, featuring strong populist movements on the Left and right, and an embattled center. The main driver of the structural homology was the Marshall Plan, which gave US officials sent to Paris to oversee the use of American funds significant power to shape French political struggles. American officials used their influence to underpin centrist political actors supportive of the Western alliance, backing key French officials including Schuman and Minister of Modernization Jean Monnet. The core aspects of the Schuman Plan were a function of this structural homology between the interconnected American and French political arenas. Individuals holding dispositions similar to the designers of the Marshall Plan—notably officials in the French Planning Department—developed a technocratic solution to the problem of French access to German raw materials for reconstruction. Their ideas were then operationalized by leaders like Schuman who, with American support, was empowered to propose a controversial plan for European reconstruction that only months earlier would have been politically unthinkable.

My argument has important theoretical and empirical implications. Theoretically, a hegemonic field effects approach has merit versus competing macro- and meso-level perspectives on hegemony in world politics. In particular, it nuances Gramscian and network theories by drawing attention to the specifically *political* conditions under which the presence of elite connections either generate or fail to generate outcomes in distinct political fields. The key aspect of US–French connections prior to 1950 was not merely the existence of an epistemic community promoting liberal hegemony, but the efficacy of liberal internationalist policy solutions to common problems in political contexts featuring strong opposing forces.

Empirically, a hegemonic field approach suggests a more complex picture of American hegemonic decline. Foregrounding hegemonic field effects draws analytical attention to transnational actors seeking to foster such structural homologies across states. Similar to the important recent arguments of Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon (2020), a hegemonic field effects approach implies that the rise of populist leaders globally—predominantly on the political right—is less an effect of a simple diminution of US power and the fracturing of the liberal international order, and more an effect of a change in the character and extent of the hegemonic field effects still emanating from, but also *acting back upon*, the American hegemon.

The following section explores in detail the concept of *hegemonic field effects*, set against an assessment of existing approaches to hegemony in international relations (IR) theory. I then illustrate the approach in the case of American impact on the Schuman Plan, showing

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how a structural homology between the American and French political fields, empowered and disposed key actors in France to launch the Schuman Plan in May 1950. A short conclusion draws out the argument's main theoretical and empirical implications.

American Hegemony: Macro- and Meso-Level Accounts

From the perspective of traditional, macro-level, accounts of hegemony in IR and sociology, the Schuman Plan—alongside the other institutional foundations of the liberal international order constructed after 1945—reflected the interests of the new American hegemon. World systems theory (Arrighi and Silver 1999; Wallerstein 1983), hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin 1981; Kindleberger 1973), and power transition theory (Kugler and Organski 1989; DiCicco and Levy 1999) all share the view that hegemony refers to the influence wielded by a predominant state defined in terms of economic and military capacity. For Immanuel Wallerstein (2000, 255), hegemony is "that situation in which the ongoing rivalry between the so-called 'great powers' is so imbalanced that one power can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at the very least by effective veto power) in the economic, political, military, and even cultural arenas." For G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan (1990, 284), "At the international level, the emerging hegemon articulates a set of normative principles in order to facilitate the construction of an order conducive to its interests." Since European integration reflected America's economic and political interests in a united Western Europe, it was from a macro-level perspective a reflection of American hegemony.

The complex and indirect nature of postwar American power—typified by its influence over the Schuman Plan—however, gives lie to the vision of hegemonic ordering suggested by many of the more high-level and deterministic variants of macro-level approaches. Such approaches often say little about *precisely how* hegemonic influence operates. Crucially, they also play down the role of weaker actors in hegemonic orders (Ikenberry 1989, 376). Adequate accounts of American hegemony should be able to explain the *functioning* and not merely the *fact* of US influence.

Approaches directed at the meso-level of world politics offer a more granular perspective able to capture more of how hegemony functions. Meso-level approaches are thus central to the attempts of scholars like G. John Ikenberry and Daniel H. Nexon (2019), Carla Norloff (Norloff and Wohlforth 2019), Alexander Cooley (Cooley and Nexon 2020), and Paul Musgrave (2019), to foster a new wave of hegemonic studies, one that focuses on the politics of hegemonic orders, the varied mechanisms of hegemonic ordering, and the often unintended feedback loops by which hegemons are impacted by the takers of hegemonic order. Two meso-level approaches are particularly strong challengers to the sort of field-theoretic approach developed here: a Gramscian view, which focuses on the activities of a transnational ruling class, and a perspective that stresses the role of international networks of experts and elites. Each points to important actors in the transfer of American preferences over the emerging international order after 1945 missed by the "mile high" viewpoint of macro-level theories.

Scholars such as Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, and Kees Van der Pijl (2012) have developed a Gramscian perspective on hegemony that distinguishes itself from macro-level theories by addressing the question of how the material power of dominant states in their periods of hegemony comes to be seen as legitimate, both domestically and internationally. For Cox (1996, 137), consensual domination is fostered by a "complex of international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries." Typically emerging after major wars, "hegemonies of this kind are founded by powerful states which have undergone a thorough social and economic revolution. The revolution not only modifies the internal economic and political structures of the state in question but also unleashes energies which expand beyond the state's boundaries" (Cox 1993, 61; see also Ikenberry 1992, 284). As Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990, 288) explain, such hegemonic class blocs work to sustain "universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries."

A related perspective, particularly prominent among historians of US foreign policy, challenges state-centric accounts of American postwar hegemony by focusing on the role of "transatlantic political networks" (Kaiser, Leucht, and Gehler 2010). Picking up just after the events described in this paper, for example, Brigitte Leucht (2010, 18) explores how "networks of a variety of academic and other experts, civil servants and state and non-state actors crucially contributed to shaping the first supranational European institutional and antitrust law." Elsewhere, Ikenberry (1992) explores a similar transatlantic expert community of American and British economists who shared a Keynesian understanding of how to restructure the international economy at the end of the War. In network theoretic terms, then, American hegemony consists of a specific transnational network of

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elites across which shared preferences for liberal order are transferred and maintained (for related arguments, see Nexon 2009; MacDonald 2014).

Operating at the meso-level, Gramscian and network-based interpretations of postwar American hegemony are a clear improvement on macro-level theories of American hegemony. In the following section, however, I develop an alternative meso-level account, which builds on the work of a group of scholars seeking to transnationalize the field theory of Pierre Bourdieu (Buchholz 2016; Cohen 2011; Dezelay and Garth 2011; Dubois 2014; Go 2008; Go and Krause 2016, Mudge and Vauchez 2012; Nexon and Neumann 2017; Musgrave and Nexon 2018). The concept of "field," I show, offers a useful alternative perspective to class- and network-based accounts.

Specifically, the field concept gives priority to the social structure of the ties between elites over the fact of those ties (see Bottero and Crossley 2011, 100). To illustrate, as I detail below, many of the individuals positioned centrally in the dense interconnections between America and Europe after 1945 were economic and cultural elites, and they favored an American-led liberal international hegemonic order. Yet their *political* influence in the United States and countries under its influence was not automatic. In France, for example, the power of actors like Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet was a function of not only their elite status, but also their control of the reins of the French state. In short, the *actors* other meso-level accounts highlight were central; the question is why their *economic* and *cultural* power translated into specifically political efficacy. Consequently, vis-à-vis network and Gramscian approaches, a field perspective foregrounds the state as a key site in which elites struggle over political authority and the power to shape policy that comes with it.

Hegemonic Field Effects and Structural Homologies

Field theory depicts social life as separated into relatively discrete arenas—"fields"—in which actors engage in struggles over some form of authority: money in the economic field, political power in the case of the state, and prestige in cultural fields such as the academy (for extended discussions, see Swartz 1997; Martin 2003; Bourdieu 2019). Fields feature an unequal distribution of field-specific capital—again, such as money, political power, or prestige—with which inhabitants engage in struggle, and which impacts how participants view the struggle itself. Crucially, fields thus shape and are shaped by the dispositions and worldviews of the inhabitants of the field—what Bourdieu calls their *habitus*—which are in turn systematically related to the amount of capital each participant holds in the field. Field, capital, and *habitus* are, in sum, co-constituted; how individuals perceive and interpret the world is bound up with their position within it, with certain ways of seeing the world becoming natural, taken for granted, or *doxic* (see Pouliot 2010 for a powerful application to IR).

From a field-theoretic perspective, consequently, hegemony in world politics is based on much more than a preponderance of material power—military and economic—on the part of one state in an international system characterized in state-centric terms. Hegemony derives instead "from the possession of a plurality of *meta-capital* in world politics" (Nexon and Neumann 2017, 2). Hegemonic states that enjoy "highly asymmetric military and economic capabilities"—like the United States after 1945—gain the ability "to shape and even create other fields—such as, in the contemporary era, diplomacy, finance, and sports. They influence what counts as salient capital—performances and goods—within these fields, as well as the exchange rates of different capitals across them" (Nexon and Neumann 2017, 2). The notion of *hegemonic field effects* is designed to conceptualize how hegemonic states "shape other fields" and influence "what counts as salient capital" in social fields beyond their borders.

One way to address this issue is offered by scholars deploying field theory to the dynamics of transnational or supranational social fields, wherein hegemons and other powerful states wield significant influence. Scholars have analyzed, among other transnational fields, the EU (Mérand 2008; Mudge and Vauchez 2012), international diplomacy (Pouliot 2010; Adler-Nissen 2011), and global professions like peacebuilding (Goetze 2017). Field theorists have not only re-asserted the importance of such arenas in IR, and their proliferation, against statist models, but also offered a way to understand the practical means by which powerful enact their hierarchical visions of international order, i.e., through the construction and maintenance of transnational fields.

However, while field theory rightly rejects a vision of international politics as horizontally ordered among co-equal units (Adler-Nissen 2011, 327), nation-states remain crucial actors. Even weak nation-states are immense stocks of symbolic capital, determining through their political, educational, and economic fields much of what occurs within the boundaries. Domestic fields are thus important sites of social struggle when it comes to determining state action in international politics. A field theory of hegemony should not therefore limit itself to transnational fields, but should also analyze the interplay

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between the domestic political fields of hegemons and states under their influence, with transnational fields in some instances intervening between the two (see, for example, Pouponneau and Mérand 2017).

To this end, the concept of *hegemonic field effects* denotes political outcomes driven by the entanglement of social fields centered in non-hegemonic states with those in a hegemonic state. Hegemonic field effects occur when "structural homologies"—or relationships of structural similarity—develop between fields within the hegemonic state and those of lesser states. Simply put, field effects are the outcome of analytical interest; structural homologies are the mechanism underpinning them.

"Homology," sociologist Yingyao Wang (2016, 354) explains, "refers to a morphological resemblance between the structures of different fields." The term homology originated in biology, where it "refers to similarities in structure and anatomy of different organisms" (Wang 2016, 354). What is being compared using the concept of structural homology is the positional and dispositional makeup of social fields—the way in which individuals in linked fields see and act on the world in aligned ways. In Wang's (2016, 354) terms, fields "are comparable to each other on account of homologous relations, in what agents with similar status and capital converge with each other by making consistently similar choices regarding schools, disciplines, occupations cultural products, or political stances." Structural homology captures "resemblance in difference" in Bourdieu's (1988, 178) words—the ways in which actors situated in distinct fields, yet connected by aligned positions, come to perceive, appreciate, and act upon the world in similar ways.

As one of Bourdieu's signature concepts, fields have proliferated in sociology and beyond, as scholars have examined a plurality of cultural, economic, and professional fields. As a consequence, identifying fields and their boundaries has been a major concern. Here, I limit myself to the analysis of the influence of the American *political* field—the struggle over state power (see Bourdieu 2015)—and the political field of France. There is, however, no reason to limit analyses of the structural homologies that underpin hegemonic field effects to political fields alone (see, e.g., Stampnitzky 2013; Mudge 2018 on the importance of expert fields). Nonetheless, taken to the analysis of hegemonic ordering in world politics, what is being analyzed using the notion of structural homology are the effects of interconnections between the political field of the hegemonic power on the structure of the political struggle—i.e., the main forms of power and the political opportunities—in the non-hegemonic state.

How do structural homologies emerge? Wang (2016, 359) identifies three principal mechanisms. First, supply and demand dynamics link producers of field-specific goods, fostering similarities across fields. Here, such goods are political—such as electoral strategies and political language, and financial control, as over Marshall Aid. Second, cross-field structural homologies can also be forged by individuals with shared backgrounds and hence similar *habitus*, who move between positions of influence in distinct fields. Finally, homologies can also emerge between fields at a distance, without such direct physical contact, in what Wang likens to "mimetic" institutional isomorphism as described by neo-institutionalist theory (Wang 2016, 361). Not mutually exclusive, all three may be more or less present in different contexts, as they are in the case of the United States and the Schuman Plan.

Less abstractly, all three mechanisms are well captured in the concept of the "internationalization of palace wars," which legal scholars Yves Dezelay and Bryant S. Garth (2002) see as central to dynamics of hegemonic and imperial ordering (see also Pouponneau and Mérand 2017). As Dezelay and Garth (2002, 6) note, "leading global powers, including the United States, tend to export not just their specific approaches or products but also their internal fights and the strategies used to fight these fights." The influence of powerful states does not occur automatically, but comes through the interconnection of political contests in what Dezelay and Garth label the "exporter" and the "importer" of palace struggles. Hegemonic field effects are created when the political field of the importer state is reconfigured in such a way to promote outcomes that follow the logic of the exporter state—the hegemon.

Below, I demonstrate how leaders of the American Democrats came to share a perspective on postwar reconstruction with the French Christian Democratic Party, the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP). However, structure goes beyond party contestation, to the whole range of positions available and thinkable for a politician to take, the types of individuals who populate a political field, and how they see the world. In the case of the Schuman Plan, a specifically technocratic set of dispositions rose to prominence in both the United States and France.

An exporter state can thus alter the political field of other states by, for example, strengthening certain domestic players within by providing resources for agents to draw on in their domestic struggles. Dezelay and Garth (2002, 6) refer to the use of foreign resources in this way as "international strategies," which "refer to the ways that national actors seek to use foreign capital, such as resources, degrees, contacts, legitimacy, and expertises—which we pluralize in order to highlight the competing forms and technologies—to build their power base

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at home." Schuman, Monnet, and other creators of the Schuman Plan made extensive use of such international strategies in the form of contacts and forms of expertise powerful within the United States.

Crucially, as Dezelay and Garth emphasize, "[h]egemonic processes . . . produce paradoxical results. For example, the Cold War objectives of the American foreign policy establishment were brought to fruition by people—including human rights activists—who saw themselves as opposed to the establishment" (2002, 13). Such paradoxical forms of causality are evident in the case of the Schuman Plan of 1950, which I reconstruct in the following section. Before doing so, I address further the conceptual and methodological implications of viewing hegemonic ordering processes as field effects.

How Structural Homologies Emerge

As a concept, structural homology has been largely overlooked in the vast literature on Bourdieu in sociology: "In contrast to the massive scholarly energy devoted to recounting, developing, and applying his three other concepts (field, capital and habitus), homology has attracted little attention" (Wang 2016, 354). The reason is likely that the concept seems overly mechanistic: a sort of billiard ball model of how changes in one field create isomorphisms in adjacent fields. As David Swartz (1997, 135–36) asks, "Homology in terms of just what?" What, *precisely*, becomes similar across fields? How do we know a structural homology when we see one? Are all structural homologies the same? "Bourdieu's notion of structural homology unfortunately stops short of shedding light on th[ese] important question[s]" (Swartz 1997, 135–36). Unless we are to rely on a mechanistic understanding of homology, we need to consider its methodological implications.

A first step is to connect structural homology to Bourdieu's other key concepts of *habitus* and practice. In Bourdieu's (1977, 83–84) words, habitus is "the real principle of the structural homologies or relations of transformation objectively established between [fields]." Habitus is "A system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analytical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems" (Bourdieu 1977, 82–83). To the extent that structural homologies emerge, it is via the emergence of a similar *habitus* among individuals across interconnected but distinct fields. As Swartz (1997, 134) notes, "Though Bourdieu's homologies between fields are structural and functional, they are not intended to suggest objective properties independent of the practices of agents." Since both fields and habitus are *enacted*, "homology is a product of practice and history" (Wang 2016, 358).

Foregrounding *habitus* and practice has important methodological implications. Given that fields and habitus are by definition historical artifacts, there are no fixed rules when it comes to how structural homologies are formed or how they operate since they emerge in and through practice—there are "no transhistoric laws of the relations between fields" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 109). Only limited generalizations as to the nature of homologies and their effects are possible.

In the case of US hegemony, American influence on states within its hegemonic orbit will differ in each case, as the state fields of each state have different histories. With no determinate rules of homology formation, the task for the researcher is to trace carefully the narrowing of the "space of possibilities" of political action and the historical formations of both fields and structural homologies between them. To the question "how do we know when we see a structural homology between fields?," the answer is *we know them via them via their effects*. This might seem a circular logic. However, it accords with the circular or mutually constitutive understanding of causality characteristic of Bourdieusian field theory, like relational approaches in sociology more broadly. Just as we recognize the force of gravity from its effects, a field-theoretic approach highlights the forces created via structural homologies, foregrounding affinities, harmony, correspondence, and analogies between the intersubjective and the mental, and between the institutional and the social (Wang 2016, 360).

In the following section, I cast the Schuman Plan as a hegemonic field effect—the outcome of a structural homology between the US and French political fields after 1945. Throughout I emphasize the role of individuals, drawing primarily on oral histories, memoirs, and biographies of the key participants, in addition to the almost inexhaustible primary and secondary work on the period, to reconstruct the structure of capitals and dispositions in the respective fields.

The Schuman Plan as a Hegemonic Field Effect, 1945–1950

French Prime Minister Robert Schuman's proposal of May 1950 to pool French and German coal and steel was a gambit aimed at seizing the diplomatic initiative over European reconstruction, which in early 1950—driven

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by the United States and Britain—was moving swiftly toward a rehabilitated Western Germany (Hitchcock 1997; Milward 1984, 395). French policy-makers hoped to tie increases in German coal and steel production to the Monnet Plan—a multi-year strategy named after Minister of Modernization Jean Monnet to revolutionize France's industrial base, devastated by the War. Given US support for integration, once initial concerns over a potential European steel cartel were dispensed with, Schuman's proposal was quickly accepted in Washington as an ambitious first step toward European economic unity.

Seemingly a clear example of the exercise of American hegemony, the Schuman Plan's relationship to postwar American power is less straightforward. In historian Michael J. Hogan's (1987, 378) words, the Plan was "inspired in part by American policy" but "was not the byproduct of American initiative." Hogan's view is typically of attempts to acknowledge the importance of American hegemony without overstating it, as the epigrams above suggest (see also Melandri 1980). William Diebold's (1959, 45) reasoning is worth quoting at length:

> Considering the degree of American involvement in Europe, Washington's interest in European integration, and the links between American officials and Adenauer, it is inevitable that some should see the United States as the real originator of the Schuman Plan. That was one of the arguments the Communists used to discredit the French proposal, but they regarded the point as virtually self-evident and adduced no allegations of any interest about specific activities. Non-Communist opponents of the Schuman Plan also thought they detected the American hand, operating through Adenauer and possibly Monnet. But no one has produced any real evidence and in a matter like this the absence of evidence becomes almost a positive case. It would have been to the advantage of many of the opponents of the Schuman Plan to prove it was an American device. On the American side, in the years that have passed, there would have been strong temptations to claim the Schuman Plan as a success for United States diplomacy, and that has been done only in broad terms. So the absence of leaks strongly suggests that there was nothing to leak.

Although many have hoped to locate the Schuman Plan idea in America, the Plan was the initiative of Schuman, Monnet, and officials in the French Planning Department, under only indirect US influence.

Not only was the Schuman Plan a French development rather than a clear product of hegemonic power, it followed a set of complex and contingent developments that shifted France and the United States toward European integration after 1945. In neither France nor America was something like the Schuman Plan realistic at War's end. Indeed, the Plan only emerged after marked turnarounds in both countries that made the Plan thinkable, well before it became politically practicable.

For historian A.W. Lovett (1996, 426), "Schuman's proposal, had it been made five years before (or even as little as two) would have been tantamount to treason." French foreign policy in 1945 favored a punitive peace, reparations, the removal of German factories, and the separation of the coal-rich Ruhr region separated from Germany (Gimbel 1976, 45, 188). Gaining control over German coal and steel remained a priority for French policy-makers until the Schuman declaration, as evidenced by the creation of the International Authority for the Ruhr in 1949. As Alan Milward (1984, 397, emphasis added) explains, indeed, "Much of the emotion which was so quickly attached to [the Schuman Plan] was attracted because it seemed to offer some prospect of European unity and peace *at the very moment when those ideals seemed no longer to have any political force*."

Far from a clear American national interest too, the Schuman Plan followed a marked change in US foreign policy after 1945 through which America adopted the hegemon role. In the War's immediate aftermath, American policy-makers were not thinking in terms of a globalist foreign policy and European unity. Truman was preoccupied by calls for peace, demobilization, and a reduction in governmental involvement in the economy (Ferrell 1994, 178–239; Hamby 1995, 293–337). Moreover, although "American support for integration was virtually unanimous after the War" (Rappaport 1981, 122), official policy pointed in the opposite direction, "recommend[ing] that the Ruhr, 'the cauldron of wars,' should not only 'be stripped of all previously existing industries but so weakened that it can never again become an industrial area'" (Schwartz 1991, 19). Materially preponderant, a globalist American foreign policy was not foreordained; it emerged piecemeal from an intense contest spanning domestic and foreign policy. By 1948, the United States had embraced unification, primarily through the Marshall Plan (adopted in April 1948), which included a concrete call for European unity. However, this was far from inevitable in 1945.

How did the situation in early 1950 on both sides of the Atlantic come to be? Why were Schuman and Monnet in positions of power over French foreign policy by spring 1950? Why were calls for integration with Germany thinkable and politically plausible? Why was an approach based on functional integration the core of Schuman's Plan? On the US side, how had European integration emerged as a priority after 1945? How

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had an unlikely coalition of moderate Democrats and internationalist Republicans found common cause in an anti-Soviet foreign policy centered on a large-scale foreign aid program? And why did the Marshall Plan have a New Deal aspect, despite the political power of anti-New Deal Republicans?

The following account details first how the structure of the American political field empowered a coalition of anti-communist liberals and conservative Congressional Republicans to design and pass a large-scale aid package to Europe, one that rhetorically and practically promoted economic integration. I then describe the internationalization of the internal American palace war, via which a structural homology emerged between the American and French state fields. This structural homology empowered moderate conservatives like Schuman and Monnet to change French policy toward Germany in technocratic directions mirroring developments in the United States.

Part 1: From Retrenchment to Hegemony—European Unity and the Structure of the American Political Field, 1945–1947

Agitation for European unity was widespread in America after the War, with social and business elites who resemble the transnational class-based and professional networks foregrounded by other meso-level approaches doing much to foster pro-integration sentiment. On March 25, 1947, Senators William Fulbright and Elbert Thomas, working together with Hale Boggs, introduced concurrent resolutions stating that "Congress favors the creation of a United States of Europe within the framework of the United Nations" (Winand 1993, 20). Fulbright, Thomas, and Boggs were part of a group that coalesced around the so-called American Committee for a Free and United Europe, generously funded to the tune of $1 million from the Rockefeller Foundation. As historian Pascaline Winand (1993, 20) notes, "Senator Fulbright, along with other key personalities in business, academic and government circles, sought to galvanize public and governmental enthusiasm for a united Europe in the United States and in Europe through the activities of the American Committee for a Free and United Europe." The newly established Policy Planning Staff at the State Department under George Kennan's direction also supported the creation of an integrated Western Europe,[2] as did American-sponsored private IR councils like the Council on Foreign Relations. As Council official William Diebold (1950, 115) later noted, "During the last war many official and unofficial planners hit on the idea of internationalizing the heavy industry of the Ruhr–Lorraine area," an idea discussed as early as 1942.

Yet while these groups were important nodes in transatlantic networks, American *political* pressure took the institutionalized form of the European Recovery Program (ERP)—the official name of Marshall Plan (1948–1952). The ERP's preamble "urged the participating countries to join in a United States of Europe" (Kindleberger 1997, 190). In addition, Congress voted annually on the release of funds, making progress toward unification an informal condition of aid. Most importantly, Marshall Aid tied the United States to Western Europe through the Committee of European Economic Cooperation, giving American officials power—and a physical presence—inside participating countries. The structural homology that developed between the American and French fields was dependent on the creation and implementation of the ERP. Explaining America's role in the Schuman Plan therefore requires first accounting for the ERP and its passage through Congress.

Neither outcome was inevitable. As Marshall Plan speechwriter Joseph Jones (1964, 90) later remembered, in early 1947 "The all-absorbing question of the day was not whether the President would or could lead the United States to accept heavy world responsibilities, but how far the new Congress would roll back New Deal legislation, cut appropriations for the armed services and foreign relief, and carry on back to the political isolation of the 1920s and the economic isolation of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff." Many Americans desired nothing like the massive outlay of funds for European reconstruction Secretary of State George Marshall promised in his speech of June 5, 1947.

How then did the Marshall Plan emerge? Marshall Aid followed two contingent turnarounds in US politics after 1945: first, the embrace of an explicitly anti-Russian foreign policy; and second, the acceptance of large-scale aid to address Europe's economic and political problems, particularly the prospect of Communists coming to power in France and Italy. These changes were themselves field effects: a product of the principal divisions in the American political field in the immediate postwar years, and of the dispositions of key powerful actors therein.

In the immediate postwar period, the US political field was structured along a loosely defined division between conservatives and liberals (see especially Bell 2004). The central lines of opposition rent conservatives (against) from liberals (for) over the extension of the New Deal Domestic domestically. In foreign policy, conservatives (skeptical) and liberals (hopeful) split over the possibility of cooperation with Russia (Theoharis 1970, 1–9).

2 See PPS/55, "Outline: Study of U.S. Stance toward Question of European Union." Reprinted in Nelson (1983, 82–102).

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President Franklin Roosevelt had maintained an uneasy alliance between the two camps, but he died in April 1945, giving way to a more conservative administration of Harry Truman (Allen and Shannon 1950, 10; Clifford 1991, 78).

In international policy, the significance of Truman's assumption of the presidency was that he was less inclined than his predecessor to "bend over backward" to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. Although not desirous of conflict (e.g., Clifford 1991, 123–29), two sets of events pushed the Truman administration toward an explicitly anti-Soviet foreign policy.

First, a series of diplomatic clashes with Russia, including evidence of espionage, fostered the viewpoints of hardliners over the potential for cooperation with Moscow (Freeland 1972, 121). Notable among them were Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Ambassador to Russia Averell Harriman, Secretary of State James Byrnes, and other Russia experts George Kennan and Charles "Chip" Bohlen. These individuals brought with them what Daniel Yergin (1977) calls the "Riga axioms"—a conviction shared among foreign service officers with links to the Latvian capital of Russia's fundamental antipathy toward America. Harriman was particularly important for Truman's evolving views, sounding the alarm that America must get tough with Moscow (Gaddis 1972, 201).

Second, a large-scale strike wave across in 1946 fostered fears of an internal communist threat, linking geopolitical worries about the Soviet Union with the problem of militant labor (Clifford 1991, 87–96). The strikes brought the Truman administration toe-to-toe with powerful union leaders like John Lewis, head of the coal miners' union. Truman, backed by influential members of his administration like John Snyder and moderate-liberal Clark Clifford, decided to use strong measures to force a return to work, including drafting striking miners. "Communism" domestically and internationally thus became conflated, used by both the administration and its opponents in a way that connected domestic and foreign political issues. For Bell (2004, 92), "The bellicose language of the administration on the subject of world communism allowed Republicans like [Richard] Nixon to import the issue of anti-communism into domestic debates and call into question the place of the New Deal in postwar politics."

The 1946 strike wave and mid-term elections of the same year fostered the explicitly anti-Russian foreign policy favored by Truman's advisors and increasingly the president himself. Communism's double meaning is a crucial yet typically ignored aspect of America's embrace of an internationalist foreign policy (with the exception of Bell 2004). Without it, however, it is impossible to understand the urgency felt in spring 1947 when British leaders ceased financial support for Greece and Turkey. Hamstrung in domestic legislation on account of the Republican victory in the 1946 mid-term elections, foreign policy remained within Truman's control (Theoharis 1970, 57). Britain's withdrawal gave license to Truman and the hardliners who sought a new foreign policy. As Bell (2004, 85) explains, the question was where could moderate liberal Democrats and moderate internationalist Republicans meet? The answer was a policy focused on rehabilitating Europe to prop up the European economy and stabilize capitalist democracy, couched in strongly anti-communist rhetoric.

Part 2: From Structure to Habitus—Anti-communism, Foreign Aid, and the ERP, 1947–1948

Why did the window of opportunity for an anti-communist, anti-Soviet, foreign policy result in a massive foreign aid package that inscribed support for European integration? For proponents of approaches based on transnational elite networks, the reason was the personal connections of individuals such as Jean Monnet with powerful pro-federation Americans like Dean Acheson and Felix Frankfurter (Chiara-Pascanut 2014). What such approaches miss is *why* these individuals were powerful politically, and why the ERP took the form it did. Again, Truman's Democrats suffered a resounding defeat in the 1946 mid-terms—a serious defeat for those hoping for the formation of New Deal–type spending program the ERP embodied.

Here, political capital and *habitus* are useful concepts. It is necessary to shift from the structure of the American political field to the individuals who made it happen, the power they wielded, and the dispositions that shaped their policy preferences. These included Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall, and a group of State Department officials including Acheson, George Kennan, and William Clayton, and younger policy planners. What set these individuals apart was not membership of transnational class-based networks and links to French elites. Rather, they shared a combination of political capital in the American field as moderates untainted by the New Deal, and a technocratic *habitus* tied to using aid to support reconstruction, couched in anti-communist rhetoric.

Marshall's prestige was immense because of his service as Chief of Staff during World War II (Lankford 1996, 188). As popular among Republicans as Democrats, he was immune to charges of being

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soft on communism, which tainted his predecessor Byrnes, despite his "get tough with Russia" approach (McCullough 1992, 478–80). Marshall therefore had sufficient political capital to withstand criticism of his proposal from the Left—concerned over its implications for world peace—and the right—concerned about cost and its potential for permanent American commitments internationally.

Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson was another proponent of aid. Lacking the power and influence of his boss and less well known publicly, Acheson was considered a strong Rooseveltian liberal—a weak political position from 1946. Acheson's political capital rose, however, when he adopted an explicitly anti-Russian position after events in Iran in early 1946, when Soviet troops in the country prevaricated over a withdrawal agreed at Potsdam. Acheson is therefore a good example of the shift to an anti-communist stance of otherwise moderate-to-liberal Democrats, a key group who backed the President's robust anti-Soviet foreign policy from early 1947. Acheson floated the first trial balloon of an integrated aid program at a speech made in Cleveland, Mississippi, in April 1947.[3] It was also Acheson who suggested the tactic of scaring the country into foreign aid (Freeland 1972, 4–5). As Marc Trachtenberg (1999, 50) explains, in early 1947 in "high policymaking circles, there was a pervasive fear that the US public might sooner or later turn away from world politics . . . [So they] needed to present the international situation in stark and morally charged terms."

Marshall and Acheson provided the high-level direction for a large-scale aid package. Returning from the spring 1947 foreign ministers' meeting in Moscow convinced that cooperation with the Soviet Union was dead, and that meaningful moves toward the rehabilitation of Germany had to be made, Marshall initiated a change of course. A central component was the formation of the Policy Planning Staff, to be headed by George Kennan.

Kennan's influence in policy-making circles was secured in February 1946 when, under the pseudonym "X," he sent from Moscow his famous "Long Telegram," which located present diplomatic difficulties with the Soviet Union deep in the Russian national psyche. Kennan's telegram provided a focal point for an emerging consensus in Washington on the need for a new departure in relations with the Soviet Union, and it was distributed widely by Harriman and Forrestal. Kennan became an important link between the Russian hardliners around Truman and a group of younger men and women at State attracted to a broad reassessment of US postwar foreign policy.

Kennan's Policy Planning Staff sent Marshall an initial set of conclusions on May 23, 1947 [*Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*), 1947, vol. 3, Western Europe, 223–30]. The memo "considered that one of the long-term deficiencies of the European economy as a whole was its excessive fragmentation, the lack of competitive flexibility in commercial exchanges, the lack, in particular, of a large consumer's market . . ." (Kennan 1983, 337) The short-term problem could best be addressed by choosing a specific bottleneck in the Western European economy—such as coal production in the Rhine Valley—as a way of proving US commitment and ability. The long-term problem, the memo stated, could best be addressed through a large-scale American aid package for the reconstruction of Europe.

Kennan was thinking along lines similar to another key figure in the formation of the Marshall Plan: Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs William Clayton. The real "'catalyst' of the Marshall Plan," in Acheson's words (Fossedal and Mikhail 1997, 196; Jones 1964, 248–49), Clayton was deeply concerned about the widespread breakdown of economic life in Europe he witnessed on a trip there in spring 1947, and about its knock-on effects on the balance of payments between Europe and America. Together with his deputy, Paul Nitze—early cold warrior and later formalizer of America's policy of "containment" of the Soviet Union—Clayton was convinced that only an integrated spending program providing upward of $5 billion a year to Europe would suffice.

Clayton's call for a vast spending program would have been politically impracticable had it been made by many others in a post-mid-term Washington. However, Clayton had unique bipartisan appeal that gave his views purchase. As his biographer notes, "When Truman, Marshall, and the Congress heard a man of Clayton's stature and business background (he had built a $75 million cotton merchandising company, so it was hard to dismiss him as a naïve idealist) arguing for billions of dollars in assistance, they knew it was urgent and required" (Fossedal 1993, 11).

Although Clayton called for massive foreign aid spending, which might have smacked conservatives in Congress as New Deal in spirit, Clayton avoided such charges as he was well known to be no New Deal ideologue. Clayton was at once economically liberal and fiercely anti-communist. As he expressed in early March 1947, "If Greece and Turkey succumb, the whole

3 Available at https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?documentid=8–8&pagenumber=1, accessed January 2020.

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Middle East will be lost. France may then capitulate to the Communists. As France goes, all Western Europe and Africa will go. These things must not happen. They need not happen." (Fossedal 1993, 217). The solution, for Clayton, was a coordinated European recovery plan backed by American financial assistance.

Together, Marshall, Acheson, and Clayton provided the impetus for a large-scale international commitment. Crucially, that commitment would take the form of a spending program, which, far from following from the structure of American capitalism, went against the prevailing political logic of the time. To understand why, it is necessary to appreciate the role of a set of lower level government officials who often fail to appear in histories of America's adoption of hegemony after 1945, and specifically the formation of the Marshall Plan. Planners like Harold Van Buren Cleveland, Ben T. Moore, Charles Kindleberger, Paul R. Porter, Miriam Camp, Charles Bonesteel, and Thomas C. Blaisdell (see Hogan 1987, 36) were indicative of the thousands who had flooded into Washington to administer the New Deal and the expansive administrative architecture constructed to run the war effort. The Marshall Planners were empowered by Truman and Marshall to develop a practical program of aid.

The Marshall Planners were not of a piece, but they shared a *habitus* with two key features: first, they were technocrats, seeing the problems of reconstruction as technical rather than political or ideological; second, they were convinced that the United States had an expansive role to play in the postwar world, which underpinned a sincere conviction of the need for America to take bold action to grasp control of world events. As Hogan (1987, 19) explains, the younger Planners "tried to transform political problems into technical ones that were solvable, they said, when old European ways of conducting business and old habit of class conflict gave way to American methods of scientific management and corporative collaboration." For John Gimbel (1976, 30), "Within the State Department there was a strong inclination to regard the end of the War as the beginning of an opportunity . . . to use the American presence in Germany to undo the mistakes of the 1920's and 1930's."

Together, Marshall, Acheson, Clayton, and the younger Marshall Planners put together an ambitious proposal for foreign aid to Europe. Yet, Marshall's offer remained a vague idea until the fall of 1947, and did not become a full-fledged program until the first months of 1948—two years before the Schuman Plan. What happened in the interim? How did a policy generated in Washington lead to a policy designed and initiated within a separate state field? In the following sections, I detail how American influence created a structural homology in France, fostering key actors and groups and forging a similar and complementary field structure.

Part 3: The Creation of a Structural Homology between the American and French Political Fields, 1948–1950

After the end of the War, the French political field shared important characteristics with the American, divided between powerful Leftist and rightist forces in the shape of the Communists and the party of former resistance leader Charles de Gaulle, respectively. de Gaulle left the scene in January 1946, returning in summer 1947 to win close to 40 percent of the votes in the October 1947 elections. Leftist forces spanned the gamut from the Communist Party of France to non-Marxist socialist parties. While the contents of American and French political divisions were different—i.e., the French Communists were not the same as the American progressives, nor were the Gaullists the conservatives—the structure had a homology before the Marshall Plan deepened American influence in France. The division opened up a narrow but durable space of opportunity for moderate-centrist parties and technocratic officials to develop something like the Schuman Plan.

The homology between the American and French fields—the "similarity in difference"—was furthered over the course of 1946 and 1947. A split in the ranks of the Left rent Communists from socialists in ways analogous to what was occurring in the United States, as liberal followers of Truman and progressive followers of Wallace split from one another in the fall of 1946 and early 1947 (Markowitz 1973). In the United States, the issue was whether Communists had any place within the Democratic Party. In France, the question was whether Leftists could support Jean Monnet's modernization plan, with its fundamental principle of keeping wages low. The resulting militancy within labor's rank and file pushed the Communist Party further to the left. On May 5, 1947, the Communists were dismissed from the government of socialist Paul Ramadier, signaling an "unmistakable" shift to the center in French politics (Esposito 1994, 12).

Many assumed the Communists' ouster was at Washington's behest. However, no evidence of an ultimatum exists (Wall 1991, 67). The split in the Marxist parties meant, as historian Jean-Pierre Rioux (1989, 97) explains, that although "they had a clear electoral majority between them," the Marxist parties "in effect left the outcome [of French politics] in the hands of the Christian Democrats of the [*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*] MRP."

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For Simon Serfaty (1968, 52), the effect of this three-fold division in the French political field meant "European unification, in as much as it depended on France's consent, depended upon the unification of the French political system." Like the question facing Truman in early 1947 of what foreign policy program could bring Democrats and Republicans together, the question facing French centrists was what international policy could unify the fractious French parties. Although there was a deep-seated desire in France for non-alignment between the Anglo-Saxons and Russia, it had no functional political expression (Rioux 1989, 139; see also Jackson 2006 on the importance of the notion of "the West" in unifying the French field). The Leftist program seemed to require an independent French military effort, beyond the country's capacity. That left the right and centrists, and their three currents of opinion on Europe: nationalists (Gaullists and moderates), minimalist Europeanists (mostly socialists and a few Radicals), and the maximalists (Christian Democrats) (Serfaty 1968, 59). Until 1950, minimalists were largely in charge. Early 1950, however, saw strong moves on the part of Britain and the United States toward German rearmament, which "convinced the minimalists of the validity of the supranational ideal" (Serfaty 1968, 52).

America's influence was exerted within this domestic context. The Marshall Plan was crucial to the empowerment of centrist parties and politicians. Together with NATO—founded in April 1949—the Marshall Plan "institutionalized an American role in the internal politics and economics of the European nations" (Wall 1991, 158). The European Cooperation Administration (ECA)—the organization created to oversee the disbursement of Marshall Aid—grew to 600 staff over the life of the Plan, as American officialdom in Paris expanded "like crazy" (Weisbrode 2009, 108.) A set of powerful individuals like Ambassador Jefferson Caffery and ECA director David K. Bruce wielded significant influence as "the United States and France entered into an intimate relationship characterized by unprecedented American involvement in French internal affairs" (Wall 1991, 11).

American involvement in the French palace war took the form of support for centrist governments to prevent the takeover of the government by either the CPF or the Gaullists. The United States backed the governments of centrists: Radical Henri Queuille (September 1948 to October 1949), and Christian Democrats Robert Schuman (November 1947 to July 1948, and September 5–11, 1948) and Georges Bidault, the founder of the moderate MRP (October 1948 to July 1950). American support for moderates was well understood at the time. Ambassador Caffery set the tone of American political priorities in France soon after the liberation of Paris: "Shortly after arriving in Paris in the fall of 1944, Caffery concluded that America's most important objective in relations with France should be the preservation of democracy and the exclusion of communist influence from the government in Paris" (Sapp 1982, 181). For Gimbel (1976, 35), "A stable France would contribute to the frustration of socialists, communists, and leftists—whatever their ultimate goals for France may have been."

By September 1948, support for centrist governments was official US policy. As a September 20 State Department policy statement conveyed, "objectives with regard to France are that France should . . . remain committed to democratic processes of government in the sense understood in the west" (*FRUS*, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, 651–52). To that end, France should "orient its foreign policy toward the U.S." and "contribute its full share to the formation of a more closely integrated western Europe" (*FRUS*, 1948, vol. 3, Western Europe, 652).

The mechanism of American influence was the release of so-called counterpart funds, a central pillar of the ERP that became key to the French Treasury balancing its books (Wall 1991, 158–72). Counterpart funds were themselves an effect of the political priorities of the American political field. Facing serious opposition to foreign aid from Congressional conservatives, who disliked the New Deal associations of the ERP, aid was not to be disbursed as direct grants. Rather, French orders funded with Marshall Aid were placed with the French government in francs and then fulfilled in dollars from released funds. Congressional opponents were assuaged because the use of counterpart funds was tied the aid to domestic American production, did not increase the balance of payments disparity with the United States—a key factor in the Marshall Plan's creation, and gave Congress control over the direction of the monies.

Discretion over the release of counterpart funds gave Americans in Paris like Caffery and Bruce a powerful role in French palace wars. Financial control conveyed the ability to save French Cabinets or let them fall, as they did frequently. The clearest example was in late 1948, when the Queuille government requested an advance on counterpart funds to stave off a collapse in the context of widespread strike action. Composed of centrists Schuman, Rene Mayer, and Jules Moch, American officials hoped to prevent the government's collapse. Bruce, Caffery, and William "Tommy" Tomlinson from ECA-Paris all urged the release of funds.

Before they could save the Queuille government, Bruce, Caffery, and those who agreed with them had

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to triumph in a palace war of their own. Some in Washington, notably Henry Labouisse—coordinator for foreign aid assistance at the State Department—felt that the United States should stand up to Queuille and withhold funds. Labouisse was supported by Congressional conservatives keeping a close eye on American aid. Bruce, Caffery, and Tomlinson succeeded in outmaneuvering Labouisse, securing the funds. However, this example demonstrates how US political capital inside the French political field was strongly impacted by both French and American political dynamics. On a number of occasions, sitting French governments overstated the health of the French economy to try to secure monthly releases of counterpart funds. The reality of shortfall in receipts would then require new releases to ensure the French Treasury did not have to resort to borrowing from the Bank of France, which had an inflationary effect and was strongly opposed by Washington. French policy-makers were thus far from dupes to the whims of the American hegemon.

Soon after securing the funds needed to avoid the collapse of his government, Queuille pushed through the French National Assembly a set of far-reaching price and wage policies. The *Loi Des Maxima* of December 1948 included partial exchange of bank notes, a proclaimed determination to tax the middle class, and a prohibition of any inflationary advances to the state by the Bank of France. The law was not an American edict, but it certainly looked like one; there were widespread charges that the law had been directed from Washington after it emerged that ECA officials had told the French governments in November that they were "strongly of the opinion that the chances of France obtaining adequate appropriations from the next American Congress are distinctly poor unless a realistic fiscal and financial program for 1949 is adopted by the French Assembly" (Wall 1991, 170). American embassy staff were forced to deny stridently that the United States had demanded greater austerity on a public still living with rationing and widespread shortages.

The emergence of a structural homology between the French and American political fields favored centrist policy-makers like Schuman, Monnet, Moch, and Bidault—the key individuals behind the Schuman Plan. They were tied together, and to the United States, by more than structural position within the French political field, however. They shared a set of dispositions with Marshall, Clayton, and the younger State Department officials, which led them to adopt similar viewpoints on the problems of reconstruction and to develop aligned policy solutions—of which the Schuman Plan was an artifact.

Part 4: French Technocratic Elites and the Schuman Plan of May 1950

The centrist politicians propped up by US support were "predisposed toward ambitious economic modernization plans to make France able to compete with a resurgent Germany, and less vulnerable to either external or internal Communist attacks" (Esposito 1994, 1). Echoing Hogan, Esposito (1994, 5) traces this predisposition to "a bipartisan policy synthesis forged in the 1920s and 1930s, a so-called New Deal neo-corporate synthesis, in which laissez-faire and free trade economics were successfully reconciled to a regulatory, limited role for a government now acting as a Keynesian manager of aggregate demand." William I. Hitchcock (1997, 39) agrees, "the Monnet Plan signaled the emergence of a new style of French diplomacy, one that avoided direct confrontation, in favor of consensual, technocratic, and apolitical agreements, while pursuing the national interest at the expense of traditional rivals."

However, like the Marshall Plan, the Schuman Plan reflected nothing like a "policy synthesis" in the French postwar political struggle. Rather, it followed from the creation of a unique configuration of office holders and empowered officials who had emerged victorious in intense competition in the American and French political fields after 1945. In strikingly similar ways to the struggle going on in the American political field, a core component of the victory of centrists in the French palace war was the empowerment of a set of young, tenacious technocrats, who believed in the potential of planning for solving domestic and international problems. "This new managerial elite was made up of youngish, cosmopolitan insiders, some of France's leading technical civil servants, who in the postwar years were uniquely situated to effect policy. These were men who had traveled, had studied abroad, and whose outlook on economics and rational strategy had been transformed by their experiences during the war." (Hitchcock 1997, 2).

The creation of the *Commissariat Général du Plan*, in particular, placed key technocratic personnel in influential positions, including Monnet, Robert Marjorlin, Pierre Uri, and Etienne Hirsch. Others such as Guillaume Guindey and Oliver Wormer (Finance) and François Bloch-Lainé (Treasury) were also well placed. Once again, the key point here vis-à-vis comparable meso-level accounts of American hegemony is, first, to draw attention to the structure of the *political* struggle and the ability of planners to exert political as opposed to class-based or social influence, and second, to emphasize the importance of the planners' technocratic dispositions to the content of their views.

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Like many of their American counterparts, French planners shared a particular mindset and administrative style that spilled over into foreign policy: "the same transformation in mental attitudes that we have charted in the economic sphere would take hold in the Foreign Ministry as well" (Hitchcock 1998, 40). They formed part of a movement of French intellectuals sociologist Antonin Cohen (2012) terms the *Troisieme Voie* (the "third road" or "third track") between socialism and capitalism. Sharing similar backgrounds at the *grand écoles*, many were trained in economics and affiliated to Keynesian economic thought, with some experience of the United States. Following the "personalist" or communitarian philosophical movement of Emmanuel Mounier, Alexandre Marc, and Jean de Fabrègues (Cohen 2012, 129), Francois Perroux—a Professor of Political Economy at the University of Paris—played a decisive role in its diffusion; he made it more "Germanic" and more "economic" (Cohen 2012, 130). Within this context, the concept of *communauté* or community that came to be associated with movements toward European unity had a specific meaning in relation to how to regenerate and modernize France and its citizens in a way that nevertheless avoided the perceived dangers of communism and Gaullism.

A result of the structural homology between the French and American political fields was the emergence of "A symbiotic relationship . . . between Americans and some French officials, who worked together toward the same ends" (Wall 1991, 95). The French side of this structural homology—in particular, the close relations between influential Americans and Monnet, the principal architect of both the Schuman Plan and the plan that took his name—has been well chronicled by historians (Hackett 1995), as already noted. As John Gillingham (1991b, 136) explains, Monnet's "list of close associates [read] like a *Who's Who* of the Washington policy-making establishment," including Bruce, American High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy, Clifford, and numerous others. Monnet thus enjoyed privileged access to decision-making circles in Washington, where key aspects of the Schuman Plan originated, especially from Will Clayton, whom Monnet later recalled "Clayton helped me clarify my ideas which resulted in the creation of the coal and steel community" (Garwood 1958, 33).

On the American side, ECA Director and later US Ambassador to France David Bruce were particularly influential. As Kenneth Weisbrode (2009, 98) claims, it was Bruce, "not Caffery, whose approval was solicited each time the French formed a new cabinet." The ECA team under Bruce gave "decisive backing" (Rioux 1989, 134) to Monnet and the modernizers. However, while Bruce was influential on account of his elite background—for his biographer Bruce was *The Last American Aristocrat*—Bruce's sway cannot be put down to his background nor his friendship with Monnet. Bruce, like Caffery and Tomlinson, was the effect of the fields that had brought them to prominence. Bruce, then, held influence in the American political field on account of his wartime service with the Office of Strategic Services and his position as Assistant Secretary of State for Commerce under Averell Harriman—another American aristocrat who had taken over from Henry Wallace after the latter was fired by Truman in September 1946 for questioning Byrnes's foreign policy. Bruce, then, was no die-hard liberal. As his biographer Lankford (1996, 190) recalls, in Bruce "the nation's mostly Republican business leaders found a sympathetic advocate, even if he had been a staunch Roosevelt man."

Other Americans with sway inside the French political field on account of Marshall Aid shared key features with Bruce. ECA directors Paul Hoffman (1948–1950) and Richard Bissell (1950–1952) are indicative.

As the former chief executive of the Studebaker car company, Hoffman was preferred by Congress for the post to another frontrunner: Clayton (Behrman 2008, 170). Although he was attacked by Congressman Ralph Waldo Gurian as a "soft-shelled New Deal operator" (Behrman 2008, 170), Hoffman was not generally considered tainted by the New Deal. Hoffman had helped Wendell Wilkie fight FDR for President (Raucher 2014, 48) and had been critical of the over-reach of state power of the National Recovery Administration. Appointed to the Harriman Committee to study the likely effects of the ERP before becoming director, no less than Michigan Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg "found [Hoffman] to be the common denominator of the thought of the nation" (Vandenberg 1952, 393).

Richard Bissell's resume (Groton, Yale) more closely approximates that of a transatlantic elite. A member of the Eastern establishment, Bissell (1996, 7) later admitted "there *was* an Ivy League establishment in the sense of a body of men who had similar backgrounds and knew one another well, [which] had a good deal of influence on public affairs"—Bissell's *political* capital came, however, from his acceptability to sufficient Democrats and Republicans on account of his distance from the New Deal. Bissell was not tainted with New Deal associations, having been an early organizer of the America First Committee at Yale. He had also been recruited to Marshall Plan work from his position at the War Shipping Administration (Bissell 1996, 33) by Russia hardliner Harriman.

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Bruce, Hoffman, and Bissell embody several paradoxes at the heart of America's influence over the Schuman Plan, raising important questions about the nature of American hegemony more broadly. First, the Marshall Plan—the chief policy instrument of American hegemony in the case of the Schuman Plan—was designed and administered by individuals who had been empowered as precisely *not* the type of people who would back New Deal–type programs like the ERP. In the case of Bruce, his biographer explains (Lankford 1996, 214), he "was the first to admit he was not a yellow-dog Democrat." Caffery too was no liberal New Dealer. He "had no reputation in Washington as a liberal," yet in the context of the French palace war, "he was brought to support the views of the progressives at the lower echelons of the Paris embassy" (Wall 1991, 73).

Second, American influence over the French political struggle—or palace war—had the effect of backing policies that would never have been possible in the United States. Early on, ECA officials criticized the socialist government of Paul Reynaud's decision to cut consumption "because it did not take into due account the different situation of wage earners and their willingness to support the left" (Esposito 1994, 34). As Wall (1991, 172) astutely comments, "It is remarkable how socially conscious American business circles were capable of being when looking at a society other than their own." To be sure, the issue for American officials was the need "to show that the Marshall Plan could deliver schools, hospitals, houses, rather than the communists" (Wall 1991, 175). Nonetheless, the paradox remains striking, as American actions to support centrist governments and their prioritization of modernization ended up helping "the French to rebuild their economy while maintaining a society based on a grossly unequal distribution of wealth" (Wall 1991, 72). Far from foisting austerity on unwilling French governments, American officials in Paris actually tried to push the Paris governments to adopt policies more sympathetic to the conditions of the French working class. "American officials who viewed economic planning in their own country as anathema embraced the Monnet Plan as a responsible guide out of the mire of France's postwar stagnation . . . One of them ironically was Bruce, tooth-and-claw foe of New Deal domestic programs." (Lankford 1996, 209).

Accounting for the contradictions in American influence over France and the origins of the Schuman Plan thus requires refashioning claims of direct impact to grasp the contradictory effects of American influence over French policy-making between 1945 and 1950. Direct impacts of Americans on French politics abounded—especially as transnational networks and the new "power elite" of what Greg Herken (2014) terms "The Georgetown Set." The more appropriate question, however, is how the intersection of the American and French political fields empowered political actors to create a specific window of opportunity for Schuman and Monnet in spring 1950 from which the Schuman Plan emerged.

Conclusion

Commentators espouse either fear or satisfaction at the prospect of the end of American hegemony, depending on their view of the liberal international order. Yet, even among its critics, few look forward to the end of the *Pax Americana*, since shifts in global power promise instability, possibly war (e.g., Allison 2017). Assessments of the consequences of hegemonic decline, however, turn on the way in which hegemony is conceptualized (see especially Cooley and Nexon 2020, 18–53). In that vein, this paper has drawn attention to *hegemonic field effects* and structural homologies as a key mechanism of hegemonic influence. This approach centers on the internationalization of palace wars, and the myriad ways in which the American political field has intertwined with the political fields of other countries under the United States' sway, creating at certain times structural homologies across interconnected fields, empowering actors with common political dispositions.

Drawing conclusions from a single historical case like American influence over the Schuman Plan after World War II requires humility. Although defeated, France in 1945 was still a power of a different order to, say, Latin American states under US hegemonic sway today. Nonetheless, a number of tentative implications follow from the foregoing case study.

My argument, in short, suggests that hegemonic field effects are more likely not only when transnational networks across countries are present, but also when they come to underpin a structural homology across hegemonic and non-hegemonic political arenas. First, therefore, future research on American hegemony that takes the claims developed here seriously should focus on the formation and decline of structural homologies between the American political field and other national fields of power. Scholars should carefully trace the effects of the American political field on the principal divisions and forms of capital in other national fields of power, and vice versa. Such an approach promises to not only highlight important personal connections and networks, as would related meso-level approaches, but also identify the key mechanisms in operation and the space of political

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opportunity under construction, without imputing power and interests to hegemons in ways characteristic of still prevailing macro-level theories.

Second, whereas standard macro-level perspectives on hegemony overwhelmingly focus on the power of hegemons to transfer their preferences to weaker actors, a hegemonic field approach highlights the feedback loops wherein weaker actors unduly influence hegemons highlights. Structural homologies between hegemonic and non-hegemonic political fields can thus act as vectors for influence from non-hegemons to hegemons (see also Ikenberry 1989). In addition to demonstrating the potential of field approach to explain "action at a distance" via connections between separate but linked fields (see also Wendt 2015), such an approach can more easily grasp than traditional approaches highly paradoxical outcomes. American support for socialist and semi-socialist governments in Western Europe after 1945 is a case in point. Acceptable on account of being non-Communist, the United States supported Left and center–left governments engaged in state-led political experiments anathema to many moderates and conservatives in late 1940s America.

Together, third, these implications draw attention to specific processes and mechanisms scholars expect will accompany the breakdown of American hegemony. From a field-theoretic perspective, the rise of populist leaders such as Narendra Modi in India, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Boris Johnson in Britain reflects less a simple decline of a liberal international order tied to American leadership, and more the formation of new structural homologies with the US political field. Here, both the dispositions of new types of political actors wielding novel forms of power and new political divisions are fostered across hegemonic and non-hegemonic fields. As explored in depth by Cooley and Nexon (2020, 110–36), the rise of populist governments skeptical or even hostile to globalization might be a reflection of the continuation of American hegemony, rather than its decline. This approach raises the comparative question of why some political fields have featured successful populist projects, whereas in other countries such projects have failed, and the extent to which this is related to the presence or absence of structural homologies across political fields.

Finally, the foregoing suggests a new line of empirical investigation centered on the limits of American hegemony—geographical and ideological. Specifically, the approach highlights the degree of openness of non-liberal countries to the formation of structural homologies with the US political field. To what extent, for example, are structural homologies possible between the United States and competitors such as Russia and China? During the 1990s, to illustrate, the US and Soviet/Russian political fields featured a brief and partial alignment, with strong US support for the presidency of Boris Yeltsin and his partial attempts at democratic reform (McFaul 2018). Rather than considering ideology—here authoritarianism—as a permanent barrier to the exercise of American hegemonic influence, and Russia and China as therefore natural challengers to US hegemony, we might ask how at times greater openness to structural homology has emerged.

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