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Education as a Population Control
Mechanism in China:
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Children in Shanghai

Trinity Wang

Education as a Population Control Mechanism in China: The Education and Policy for Migrant Children in Shanghai

Trinity Wang



Abstract: This research investigates the different educational opportunities available to migrant children here defined as children whose *hukou* (household registration) is incompatible with their residing locality due to parental migration. I focus on Shanghai, the city with the largest migrant population in China. In the first section of this paper, I introduce the *hukou* system which maintains the regional exclusivity of public education among other forms of welfare and debars migrant children from having the same education opportunities as children with local-*hukou*. Then, I historicize major policy changes and effects, drawing from official statistics as well as international literature. The second section is comprised of my interviews with principals, administrators, and teachers from seven schools in Shanghai. Through the cross-comparison of numerous factors, this research finds a recurring trajectory from 2008-2018 among the interview migrant schools. Due to Shanghai's city-wide demolition of unauthorized constructions and increasingly stringent migrant student admission requirements, migrant families are radically expelled from the city, resulting in a continuing decrease of student enrollment which threatens the survival of the remaining private migrant schools.

Keywords: *Hukou, Migrant Education, Education Policy, Migrant Schools, Public Education*

Introduction

The *hukou* system, also known as the household registration system, was implemented in 1958 by the Communist Party of China as a social mechanism to monitor internal migration. It documents each citizen's place of registration and stratifies the population into local residents and non-local migrants. "To some extent, [the *hukou*] is an internal 'citizenship' for Chinese people" (Chen and Feng, 2013, p.76). It institutionalizes on a national-scale what Charles Tilly (1998) calls "categorical inequality" or the assigning of social memberships and unequal resource allocation (qtd. in Hao et al., 2014, p.515). Since individuals are only entitled to the public services and welfare programs within their *hukou* locality, migrants are excluded from basic forms of social security such as housing, healthcare, and education (Qian and Qian, 2017, p.239-240). Furthermore, *hukou* transferal is mandated by each province. Barriers to gaining a local *hukou* are set up in part to control population size and also to protect the rights of local *hukou*-holders who are increasingly anxious about the massive inflow of migrants and their consumption of limited resources. Thus, many migrants are caught between the economically-propelled mobility of their work and the relative immobility of their *hukou*, which remains tied to their hometown. During the past three decades, the gap between rural and urban development has widened, intensifying the social inequalities within the *hukou* system.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics, "there were an estimated 288 million rural migrants in China in 2018, making up more than one-third of the entire working population" ("Migrant Workers and Their Children," 2019). In particular, megacities like Beijing and Shanghai have experienced unsustainable population growth due to the ceaseless inpouring of migrants and corresponding policies to restrict migration. One of the major strategies employed is known as *jiao yu kong ren* or education as a form of population control. This essay investigates the processes and outcomes of the implementation of this strategy in Shanghai, the city with the largest migrant population in China.

By 2018, Shanghai was oversaturated with more than

9,726,800 permanent migrant residents, constituting 40% of its total population (Shanghai Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Because it is one of the four municipalities under the direct administration of the central government of China, all migrants in Shanghai are trans-provincial. Its neighbor, Anhui Province, is its number one migrant-exporting province, followed by Sichuan Province, Henan Province, Jiangxi Province, Suzhou Province, and Fujian Province. Geographically, migrants are concentrated in Shanghai's suburban districts as well as the remote outskirts, particularly in Qingpu district. Migrants create additional stress on the funds and resources of these districts. For instance, in 2012, Shanghai's average teacher-student ratio was 1:15.81, the highest being 1:19.79 in the Songjing district (remote outskirts) and the lowest ratio being 1:10.59 in the Huangpu district (central district) (Wu, Wang, & Zhong, 2012, p.22).

Many migrants migrate as a family unit, bringing their children along so that they will not become "left-behind children" (a status which is associated with psychological and behavioral problems as a result of abandonment) and may receive better education in the cities. Chen and Feng (2012) reported that there was one migrant child for every three children in Shanghai. The term "migrant children" is defined as children who migrated with their parents and whose place of *hukou* registration is incompatible with their residing province (city/county). The Chinese derogative term for them is "*nong min gong zi di*," meaning the children of farmers and laborers. Though it is mainly colloquial, even the National Bureau of Statistics of China used this term until it was officially changed to a more respectful term, "*sui qian zi nu*," meaning children who migrated along with their parents.

The assigned locality of one's *hukou* is by law paternally inherited unless one is eligible to transfer it to another locality. Thus, even though many migrant children are born and raised in the cities, they keep their fathers' *hukou* which restricts their access to public resources such as education — arguably the most crucial determinant of future income and profession. The public education system of China is bound up with the *hukou* system in a way that jeopardizes the rights of migrant children. Funding is distributed from each city-level education bureau

down to each district/county-level education bureau based on the number of students with local *hukou* in the region. As funds for public education are not portable across administrative units, the migration of school-age children is not matched by a national-scale reallocation of funds. Without adequate funds allocated for migrant students, they become a financial burden to their host cities and districts. To prioritize students with local *hukou*, public schools in Shanghai made the *hukou* a mandatory criterion for admission. Migrant children applying to public schools need to provide a list of documents including: *hukou*, residence permits, birth certificates, parents' IDs, immunization records, and social insurance. However, if one of the parents has the local *hukou*, the migrant child is eligible for public school enrollment. Seeing this opportunity, some migrant parents “fake divorce,” having one partner then “fake marry” a willing local *hukou* holder (Fu, 2018). Compensation for the local is usually negotiated beforehand. This example illustrates merely one way in which the *hukou* system has fragmented and traumatized migrant families in China.

In the 1990s, Shanghai strictly barred all migrant children from public schools. Even though public schools later opened up to migrant students, an extra fee called *jiedufei* (transient schooling fee) was charged. As a market response, hundreds of unlicensed private schools targeting migrant children sprang up. Without funds and regulation from education bureaus, some developed a profit-driven business model, charging tuition at a higher rate than public schools and compromising the quality of education by hiring unlicensed teachers. These schools rarely had complete year groups and were referred to as “slum schools” for their substandard facilities. While public schools occupied official lands designated for education, migrant schools rented private lands and reconstructed existing structures into undersized campuses. Many of these migrant schools had to move frequently upon contract expiration or other issues.

Nevertheless, Shanghai is generally considered a lenient city in comparison to others. According to Cheng (2011), Shanghai established the notion that migrant children are also “our children ... [and are] to be treated with reason and sympathy” (p. 96). District-level education bureaus paired migrant schools

with public schools for resource sharing, standardizing the faculty employment process, and designating a supervisor for each migrant school. In 2008, Shanghai launched a “three-year action plan for the education of migrant children” which was summarized in four Chinese characters: “*guan*” closedown, “*bing*” combine, “*zhuan*” privatize, and “*ting*” stop. Under this plan, the government closed down all migrant schools in the central districts and selectively “privatized” migrant primary schools in the peripheral districts. The term privatization is used to refer to the official incorporation of migrant schools into Shanghai’s system of private education. This reform period is also called “*Na Min*,” which directly translates to “incorporate” and “private,” respectively. The privatization of primary migrant schools was negotiated through service purchase contracts, which established a funding relationship between the government and the schools. This suggests that the government is now purchasing education for migrant students from these schools. The funding includes a 6,000 Chinese Yuan standard tuition subsidy per student as of 2018. Receiving the same amount of funds as local students, migrant students no longer needed to pay high tuition; only lunch fees were charged. The government also gave each school a one-time subsidy of 500,000 Chinese Yuan for general repair.

While primary migrant schools joined the private schooling system, migrant middle schools were closed down and prohibited even in the peripheral districts. This left students who were not qualified for public middle schools to choose between transferring to schools in their “hometown” or terminating their education prematurely. Those who chose to stay in Shanghai often began working after middle school graduation or enrolled in vocational schools. For those who were able to complete pre-tertiary education in Shanghai, the national college entrance exam (*gaokao*) became another barrier because it must be taken in one’s *hukou* locality. The *gaokao* is designed differently in each city/province in accordance with the local high school curriculum. Thus, migrant students who aim to score high on the *gaokao* should transfer back to a school in his or her “hometown” as early as possible (ideally before high school). Most students transfer when rising from primary to middle school. To limit

the admission of out-of-province students, universities typically assign an admission quota to each province. Peking University, National Tsing Hua University, Fudan University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and other first-tier universities are concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai where the *hukou* students have statistically higher chances of being admitted than the non-*hukou* students who must compete in a larger pool for a fewer number of spots. Although Shanghai announced plans to open *gaokao* to non-*hukou* students in 2018, only a few qualify. Therefore, this plan is practically ineffective for the larger population.

Interviews

Between June and July 2018, I conducted a series of 30-minute to 60-minute interviews with principals, administrators, and teachers of seven schools from four districts: three privatized and government-funded migrant schools, four public schools with a mix of local and migrant students, and Shanghai's only public school that is completely comprised of migrant students, Jin Ding School.

Shanghai Pu Dong Minban Lian Ying Primary School (Pu Dong New Area)

Interviewee: Principal Gao Jia Zhong

Principal Gao informed me that Lian Ying Primary School was founded in 1997 for migrant students. At its height between 2003 and 2005, this school had more than 1,800 students. In preparation for the 2010 World Expo, the government of Shanghai organized mass demolition and relocation of households within the construction area. Lian Ying Primary School was ordered to relocate to a smaller campus, which could only accommodate 800 students. This privately rented structure does not satisfy Shanghai's official standard for school campuses; its undersized playing field is an empty space between a ring of two-story houses in which the classrooms are located. The number of students at Lian Ying continues to drop at an alarming rate. By 2018, the

student number was a mere 300. Recruiting new students each year has become the school's biggest challenge. This is partly due to requirements for migrant students to provide residence permits and social insurance, which disqualifies a large number of students. Another cause is Shanghai's city-wide demolition of unauthorized construction, which forced migrants to either relocate into unauthorized, low-rent residential areas proximal to factories or to return to their "hometown." The combined result is a radical reduction of students who can enroll at Lian Ying Primary School. Principal Gao says the school will be lucky to admit ten new students with legal student identity in fall 2019.

Lian Ying Primary School was privatized in 2009 under the oversight of Pu Dong New Area's Education Bureau. Principal Gao compares himself to a consignor for the government, implying the loss of agency in school management after the conversion. The bureau provides yearly funding for student tuition, faculty salary, and campus maintenance, but Principal Gao claims that the funding has been decreasing over the past few years. He also claims that teachers are being paid less than 3,000 Chinese Yuan per month, barely higher than the minimum wage of Shanghai.

In addition to decreasing funding, the bureau also ceased to provide teacher training programs for Lian Ying Primary School. Principal Gao claims that the school originally partnered with a neighboring public school called Sanlin Central Primary School for resource sharing and open class events, but no exchange or activity occurred between 2016 and 2018. "The gap between them and us is quite embarrassing," he said. The teacher turnover rate at Lian Ying is relatively high; younger, female English teachers tend to leave for better opportunities. Financially tied, the school did not recruit new teachers to make up for the absent positions; instead, elder Chinese teachers were asked to cover for both subjects.

The only "school nurse" at Lian Ying sat in a small dingy room designated for the infirmary and watched soap dramas. She had neither a registered nurse license nor professional experience in medical care, and she was there merely to cover the position and provide basic care such as bandaging. When asked whether the school accommodated any students with special needs or

disabilities, she said that although there was one student with Down Syndrome, no special care or program was provided to him. The student studied among his peers despite not being able to grasp the materials and was seen eating trash on the playing field during class time.

According to Principal Gao, Sanlin Town originally had seven migrant primary schools, but five schools were closed by the local education bureau. In 2018, Lian Ying Primary School was one of the two remaining schools. Principal Gao estimates that the number of migrant schools in the entire Pu Dong New Area has dropped from 41 to 29.

Shanghai Pu Dong Wan Liao Private Primary School (Pu Dong New Area)

Interviewee: Principal Wang Zhi Yu

Principal Wang founded Wan Liao Primary School in 1999. She says it was originally named Si Zao Primary School and sat on the rented legacy of a community school. When Wan Liao was privatized in 2008, it received new desks and chairs from the local education bureau. Principal Wang notes that these utilities have not been replaced by the education bureau in the past ten years; she recently purchased new desks and chairs and installed multimedia facilities in the classrooms, paying out of her own pocket. At the time of the interview, 532 students were enrolled; their *hukou* represented 13 provinces across China, the northernmost being Jilin Province and the southernmost being Yunnan Province. Upon graduation, about one-third of the students transferred back to their “hometown.” Principal Wang states that common jobs of the parents include catering, service, and construction — about a third work for Shanghai’s express delivery companies. When parents work night shifts, students do homework in their teachers’ offices or homes as they wait for their parents to pick them up. Teachers at Wan Liao are constantly overworked. On average, each one of them teaches up to 20 blocks per week, far higher than public school standards. Of the 28 teachers, only 12 had received a bachelor’s degree.

Shanghai Yu Miao Primary School (Minhang District)

Interviewee: Vice Principal Yao Tao

Yu Miao Primary School was founded in 1996 and privatized in 2009. It also received abundant government subsidies to renew its campus and set up multimedia facilities during the first few years after conversion. By 2018, its remaining subsidies were running out. Vice Principal Yao says that he planned to consolidate the school's buildings to protect against earthquakes with magnitudes up to levels of seven and eight. However, the Minhang Education Bureau rejected his funding request. Principal Yao was left to pay for the consolidation project at his own expense, though he could not afford the originally planned security level and had to postpone the project. Vice Principal Yao echoes the human resources director at Jin Ding School, saying that the bureau is extremely strict when it comes to checking the financial reports of private schools like his.

Yu Miao's total student population remained steady at around 1,500 in its first 15 years. However, during 2016-2018, the number of students almost halved due to the demolition of unauthorized constructions and the strict admission policy. Around 900 students were studying at Yu Miao in June 2018. The number of first grade classes had been reduced from five to three. "Our future is uncertain," Vice Principal Yao confessed. According to the student family background survey provided by him, the students at Yu Miao came from a total of 26 provinces in China. Expectedly, Anhui Province is the number one migrant-exporting province, followed by Sichuan Province. A second-grade parent sampling shows that 25% of the parents had primary diplomas, 54% had high school diplomas, 11% had attained bachelor's degrees, and 6% were illiterate. Despite the majority of them not having attended higher education, their expectations of their children's education were high: in a multiple-choice survey, 32% expected their children to obtain a doctorate degree, 15% selected a master's degree, and 28% selected a bachelor's degree. In addition, of the 45 teachers at Yu Miao, 60% had bachelor's degrees, and only 30% had junior college or vocational school

diplomas.

Vice Principal Yao says Yu Miao is supported by non-profit organizations including the Shanghai Charity Foundation, Save the Children, and Shanghai Roots & Shoots, which provides lessons on dental health. It also has teacher training programs with East China Normal University and benefits from firms such as NBA China that practice corporate social responsibility (CSR).

Shanghai Qibao No. 3 Middle School (Minhang District)

Interviewee: Principal Cheng Qing

In 2011, Principal Cheng was commissioned by the Qibao Education Bureau to prepare for the establishment of Qibao No. 3 Middle School. By 2018, the school ranked number three in the entire Minhang District for its students' outstanding performance on *zhongkao*, or the entrance exam for senior high schools. Migrant students account for 15% of all students at Qibao No. 3 Middle School. Unlike the aforementioned public schools, it is not obligated to accept government-assigned students in the Shanghai online admission system. It only accepts non-*hukou* students if they can provide a property ownership certificate which proves that their parents own a house in Shanghai. Principal Cheng asks, "How do we distinguish between blue-collar migrant laborers and successful migrants?" He answers his own question by saying, "Well, those with property in Shanghai are the ones who made it." He claims that even with this requirement, accommodating eligible students is already enough pressure for the school. Qibao No. 3 Middle School's students are from high-income residential areas; Principal Cheng particularly mentions a top-ranking "market village" called Jiuxingcun where a substantial amount of *hukou* students live.

Principal Cheng helped coordinate the privatization reforms of migrant schools during 2008-2009 on behalf of the Minhang Education Bureau. He claims that many parents reacted negatively to the closing down of their children's schools at the time. To that, he responds, "If you still think your child's old school is better after a month, I will transfer your child back."

Principal Cheng claims that the school proactively tries to convince migrant students from seventh grade onwards to transfer back to their “hometown” and prepare for the local *gaokao*. When asked to compare *hukou* and non-*hukou* students, he says that migrant students generally lack preschool education and private tutoring. Their knowledge tends to be limited to textbook knowledge, while local students are more well-rounded and informed. This may be explained by the differences in family education as local parents tend to devote more time to interacting with their children than migrant parents, some of whom are preoccupied with work.

Finally, Principal Cheng argues that although manipulating education as a mechanism for population control can cut official expenditures and free-up public resources, the government of Shanghai, waving the flag of standardization, showed no responsibility for the migrant children of this city. It only wants to accommodate the elites, though the migrants (mainly lower-middle class laborers) are considered indispensable and their eviction is also consequential to the economy of the city.

Jing’an District, Shanghai Ling Nan Middle School

Interviewee: Admissions Director Cao Ding Qi

Ling Nan Middle School is a public school founded in 1990. Director Cao says she has worked here since 1994. This school has a steady source of migrant students from a nearby residential area called Pengpuxincun. Ke Ji Primary School and Yang Qu Primary School are its two main sources of students. Of the 381 students enrolled at the time of my interview, 125 were non-*hukou* students. Upon entering middle school, all students are either placed into homerooms called “key classes” or “parallel classes” based on their entrance exam scores. Those who scored higher in core subjects are placed in “key classes,” while those with mid to lower range scores are placed in the “parallel classes.” This homeroom arrangement is also linked with teacher proficiency, as experienced teachers are usually allocated to “key classes” to ensure that those students will succeed on the *gaokao*. Migrant students make up roughly 15% in the “key classes” and

50% in the “parallel classes.” Each year, 20 to 30 of them transfer back to their *hukou* locality after finishing sixth grade.

Among the seven schools discussed in this research paper, Ling Nan Middle School is the only school in central Shanghai. It belongs to what was formally named the Zhabei District, economically the weakest district in central Shanghai. In 2015, Zhabei District was combined with Jing’an District, the commercial center of Shanghai. Director Cao says that the Zhabei District benefits from sharing funds with Jing’an District. She says this move allows them to share funds and resources for public education with the Jing’an District’s Education Bureau. However, the local education bureau did not provide subsidies for migrant students in this school like it did for migrant students in private schools.

Shanghai Hua Lin Middle School (Pu Dong New Area)

Interviewee: Party Branch Secretary Wang Ying

Hua Lin Middle School was founded in 1995 as a public junior high school. It has 400 students, 70% of whom are non-*hukou* students. Located on the urban-rural fringe of Shanghai, Hua Lin Middle School also faces the challenge of student recruitment. Each year, students rising from migrant primary schools are assigned to nearby public schools by the local bureau based on their temporary resident permit. Secretary Wang said that even though a substantial number of students are within the assigning area of Hua Lin Middle School, the average number that actually enrolls each year is a class of 40. When circumstances allow, most parents try to send their children to better schools outside of the area. Often that means “getting in through the back door.” Thus, a considerable portion of Hua Lin Middle School’s student source is pulled out of its original assignment. Its high percentage of migrant *hukou* students may be one of the factors that cause local parents to avoid sending their children here, as migrant schools are stereotypically perceived to have lower educational quality and low socioeconomic compositions. At Hua Lin Middle School, local *hukou* students and non-*hukou* students

are separated by class. Migrant students can be placed into a local class when they accumulate 120 points and qualify for a local *hukou*. Of the 100 to 200 students recruited for sixth grade, a third would transfer back to their “hometown” by the end of the year. Ms. Wang said, “There is little point in transferring after they rise to seventh grade.”

Shanghai Jin Ding School (Putuo District)

Interviewee: Vice Principal Zhou Jian Kui

In August 2009, the “three-year action plan” took effect in Putuo District where all migrant primary schools were ordered to close down. Impacted students were temporarily absorbed into public schools nearby. According to Vice Principal Zhou, some migrant schools only served cabbage and rice to students “whose bodies are still growing.” Students’ health was being jeopardized by the lack of regulation for these schools. During the *Na Min* period, several migrant school owners felt their interests were being violated and created “chaos” in the district. Cao Yang Primary School and Zeng Guang Middle School were entrusted with the task of managing relocated students. The Shanghai Jin Ding School was founded in 2009 as a public, government-sponsored, nine-year school to properly accommodate migrant students in Min Hang district. It remains the only public school with 100% non-*hukou* migrant students in Shanghai. At its early stage, Jin Ding “borrowed” faculty from other public schools, many of whom perceived working there as a charitable act. Moral education directors struggled to manage the migrant students, whose problematic behaviors included fighting and stealing the school’s water meters and metal staircase bars, then selling these items for money.

Vice Principal Zhou shared anecdotes of his visits to migrant students’ homes: in those early years, students had crude studying conditions. Some students lived in basements, some lived under a bridge, and some even lived in metal huts by a railway. A family of eight shared a single room. Many students had no desk to do their homework on and had to write on their bed. When Vice

Principal Zhou hosted the first parent-teacher conference in 2009, parents came to school riding tricycles (loaded with recycled old refrigerators), small trucks, or motorcycles. They wore slippers and undershirts, chewing sunflower seeds or smoking as they stood on the field. Vice Principal Zhou recalls that one parent said to him, “I have never attended a parent-teacher conference before in my life.” For many migrant parents and students, Jin Ding was their first formal school. Vice Principal Zhou says, by 2018, most students live in decent apartments with their own rooms and decorated desks while parents typically commute using scooters or private cars. At parent-teacher conferences, they dress in clean and respectable clothing.

The Min Hang Education Bureau forbade Jin Ding from recruiting new students in 2009, deeming its purpose as serving only the provision of compulsory education for then current students. New migrant students who were eligible for public school enrollment had to apply to other schools. However, facing the overwhelming number of school-age migrant children in Min Hang district, Jin Ding cautiously recruited one class of first-grade students in 2010. By 2017, the school was recruiting 12 classes per year and expanded to three campuses, located throughout the Putuo District. Eligible students are assigned to Jin Ding annually through Shanghai’s online admission system. Unlike normal public schools, Jin Ding does not accept migrant students who accumulated 120 points and, therefore, qualified for local *hukou*. Students who reached 120 points after enrolling at Jin Ding may transfer to a regular public school and take the college entrance exam with students holding a local *hukou*. Other students often either transfer back to their “hometowns” or choose alternative programs such as vocational schools.

Jin Ding faces the problem of student performance polarization, as students with access to preschool education and extra tutoring significantly outperform those without. The polarization patterns are especially evident in math and English classes. An English teacher at Jin Ding said that migrant students speak English with strong dialect accents and are not confident enough to speak in class even when encouraged. Family education is another major factor in student performance at school. Most

parents' highest degree is a middle or high school diploma. However, Vice Principal Zhou stresses that the school will not lower educational standards because these students are migrants; it will exhaust all possible resources to support their development. To better accommodate the special needs of migrant students, Jin Ding designed a special curriculum that is divided into five lesson areas: technical, handiwork, creative, behavioral, and moral.


As the only 100% migrant student public school in Shanghai, Jin Ding has received considerable attention from the government as well as non-government organizations. Social support often came in two forms: supplies or human resources. According to Vice Principal Zhou, charity groups including Stepping Stones, Save the Children, and Shanghai Roots & Shoots have consistently organized educational and health programs for students at Jin Ding. The Children's Palace has sent volunteer teachers for nine consecutive years, providing free lessons on how to build ship and car models. East China Normal University and Madam Ambassadors offered teacher training programs, while the sports bureau also provided training programs for an array of sports including judo, track, weight-lifting, and canoeing. Two students from Jin Ding School entered Shanghai's second-tier sports teams, and those who enter the first-tier can qualify for Shanghai *hukou*. By providing a wide range of extracurricular activities, the school helped its students attain the local *hukou* in non-traditional ways and prepared them for future professions in case they choose to stay in Shanghai.

Jin Ding was divided into three campuses. In 2019, two of its current campuses will move to a new and larger campus that is assigned by the government. The third campus, also the smallest, might move over to join the other two when its 10-year contract with its current location expires in five years. The government's plan is to eventually accommodate all 3,000 students in the new campus, but Vice Principal Zhou expressed concern over security and crowdedness.

Conclusion

A universal trajectory for migrant education emerged over

the past decade (2008-2018). During the three-year reform, all of the interviewed schools were privatized and received financial support from their local education bureau. Then, coinciding with the city-wide demolition of unauthorized constructions which “purged” migrant populations across Shanghai, each school experienced a gradual decrease in student enrollment. At the same time, the opening of public-school admissions also attracted a substantial number of migrant students from these private schools. With the radical decrease of students on one hand and dwindling funds from the local education bureau on the other, the remaining schools are quickly diminishing. Given that the migrant education policies of Shanghai are synchronized with the general migrant accommodation quota, as the migrant growth rate continues to fall, migrant schools might be completely displaced by the full assimilation of migrant students into Shanghai’s public and private education systems.



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