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Tracking down the Conditions for Singular Thought

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

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by

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I can't thank Nathan enough for being patient with me to write this dissertation. I think that I am fortunate to be on the right track for studying philosophy as a beginning scholar in that his teaching has made me stay focused on trying to know well about some foundational issues for studying philosophy. He has always been willing to help me, and now I got more than 10 hardcopy papers with his written comments. I come to have the tendency to think that the name "Nathan" is the abbreviation of the definite description "the greatest academic advisor of mine".

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ABSTRACT

Tracking down the Conditions for Singular Thought

by

Jeonggyu Lee

The primary aim of this dissertation is to investigate the conditions for having a singular thought, a thought directly about an object. For example, if I think about Trump that he is the present U.S. president, I have a singular thought about Trump, while if I simply think that the 45th U.S. president is the present U.S. president, I only have a descriptive thought regarding Trump. In the dissertation, I defend the trackability condition for singular thought: in order for a subject *S* to have a singular thought about an object *O*, *S* can track down O in principle. Then I address the intimately related questions of whether there is the contingent *a priori* and whether names are predicates.

In Introduction, I first clarify what the central topic of this dissertation is by disambiguating the concept of singular thought. I shall make clear that our issue is about the conditions for having object-relative singular thought. Then I introduce two arguments for a substantial constraint on singular thought.

In Chapter 1, I consider the acquaintance condition for singular thought. I first introduce Russell's strict notion of acquaintance as a condition for singular thought. Then I present Kripke's objections against the Russellian theory of ordinary names and explain what the moderate notion of acquaintance is. Lastly, I argue that there are some intuitive cases for

having singular thought that even the moderate notion of acquittance cannot cover.

In Chapter 2, I criticize the so-called "knowing-wh" constraint on singular thought, according to which we must know what an object is in order to think about it. I provide the following as a plausible analysis of knowing-wh: "*S* knows who (or what) *N* is" is true in *C* if and only if for some property *P*, "*S* knows that *N* has *P*" is true in *C* (where *P* is important for interlocutors' interest and purpose). Then I argue that knowing-wh, understood this way, is neither necessary nor even sufficient for singular thought.

In Chapter 3, I suggest *trackability* as the condition for singular thought: in order for a subject *S* to have a singular thought about an object *O*, *S* must grasp a certain track of *O*. In principle, *S* will encounter the very object *O* at the starting point of the track if she keeps following the track she grasps. I argue that this tracking idea provides a unified explanation for various cases about singular thought. Then I provide responses to liberalists' objections against a substantial constraint on singular thought.

In Chapter 4, I argue against the possibility of knowing the contingent singular proposition *a priori*. I first start from clarifying the argument for the contingent *a priori* and point out one implicit assumption the argument for the contingent *a priori* hinges on, which is the real issue behind the contingent *a priori*: the assumption that stipulative linguistic knowledge can play a justificatory role in having extra-linguistic knowledge in question. I argue that this assumption is implausible and, hence, so is the argument for the contingent *a priori*.

In Chapter 5, I consider another related issue: predicativism about names, the view that names which occur in argument positions have the same type of semantic contents as predicates. To defend the referentialist view that the semantic content of a name is simply its

reference, I present three objections to predicativism – the modal, the epistemic, and the translation objections – and show that they succeed even against the more sophisticated versions of predicativism defended by Fara and Bach.

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Introduction: Singular Thought and Arguments for a Constraint

This dissertation investigates the conditions for having singular thought and some related issues. In this introduction, I shall clarify what the central topic of the dissertation is before getting into the main chapters. First, I disambiguate the concept of singular thought: there are at least two concepts of singular thought; one is a form of singular thought, and the other is object-relative singular thought. I shall make clear that our issue is about the conditions for having object-relative singular thought. Second, I provide two arguments for a substantial constraint on singular thought, on the basis of which I will track down what this constraint must be like through this dissertation.

0.1. The Object Relative Concept of Singular Thought

I am now thinking about Donald Trump that he is the present U.S. president. Intuitively, I am having a thought about Trump. But I can also think that the 45th U.S. president is the present U.S. president. In some sense, this second thought is still about Trump since he is the 45th U.S. president. However, there is an intuitive crucial difference between these thoughts that reveal two different ways for us to be related to the world. The second thought is about Trump, because Trump satisfies the property of being a unique 45th U.S. president. But the very same thought can be about any person who satisfies this property. It could have been about, for example, Hillary Clinton, if she had won the presidential election. Here the thought is *indirectly* about Trump in that this aboutness is mediated by particular qualitative descriptive contents.[1] By contrast, the first thought is *directly* about Trump in that here the

[1] Strictly speaking, the second thought is still directly about the U.S. We have to replace the name "the U.S." by

aboutness is not mediated by any qualitative descriptive contents: I think about him in some direct way.[2]

This first type of thought has its various names: a singular thought, a *de re* thought, an object-directed thought, an object-involving thought, a purely referential thought and a relational thought. The second type of thought also has its own various names: a descriptive thought, a *de dicto* thought, a general thought, an object-dependent thought, a purely conceptual thought and a notional (or satisfactional) thought. Each term in fact has a little different meaning and its own origin.[3] In this dissertation, however, I shall use the term "singular thought" and "descriptive (or general) thought" as default. This is not because I have a certain philosophical position regarding these terms, but because they are the most widely used terms among contemporary philosophers.

So far, I have introduced a relatively theory-neutral concept of singular thought.

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the definite description such as "the third largest country in the world" in order to get the thought which is not directly about any objects. But for convenience, I will keep using the name "the U.S." as if it were a definite description.

[2] This relatively neutral explanation of a singular thought as a thought not mediated by any qualitative descriptive contents is friendly to Ephraim Glick's analysis of a singular proposition, on the supposition that singular thought is a thought whose content is a singular proposition: A proposition *p* is singular with respect to an object *o* iff *p* is about *o*, but not merely about *o* by concerning one or more properties of *o*. (Glick forthcoming: 23).

Although I have also introduced different modal profiles between two thoughts in order to help readers understand, as Glick (forthcoming: 24-26) points out, this difference is not essential for demarcating two thoughts. For example, if I think that 458 is Tom's favorite number, I have a singular thought about 458, while if I think that the sum of 259 and 199 is Tom's favorite number, I have a descriptive thought about 458. Still, since it is impossible that the sum of 259 and 199 is not 458, if I think that the sum of 259 and 199 is Tom's favorite number, I have a descriptive thought about 458 with respect to every possible world.

[3] For example, Tim Crane (2010: 29-30) maintains that a *de re* thought essentially involves a relation to an existing object that must be object-dependent, but we can have a singular thought about the non-existent. Jody Azzouni (2011) argues that the contrast between the term "singular" and "general" is misleading in that *plurally-directed* singular thought is also possible. I can have a singular thought about the Bardy twins or *Bourbaki*, and these singular thoughts are *plurally* objects-directed. Due to this, he suggests using the term "objects-directed" and "descriptive" to show the contrast between two kinds of thoughts.

However, historically, Bertrand Russell first suggested to differentiate these two thoughts in terms of the concept of a proposition's constituent. According to Russell (1905, 1910), propositions can literally have non-conceptual objects as constituents as well as properties and functions, but not every proposition has such objects as its constituents. Analyzing semantics of definite descriptions, he argues,

> The actual object (if any) which is the denotation is not (unless it is explicitly mentioned) a constituent of propositions in which descriptions occur; and this is the reason why, in order to understand such propositions, we need acquaintance with the constituents of the description, but do not need acquaintance with its denotation (Russell 1910: 127).

Therefore, according to Russell, the proposition that the 45th U.S. president is the present U.S. president does not have as its constituent Donald Trump, and it is equivalent to the proposition that something is uniquely 45th U.S. president and is uniquely present U.S. president.[4] We can entertain this proposition even if we are not acquainted with Trump.

However, the proposition that Trump is the present U.S. president has Trump as its constituent, and this kind of proposition is often called "Russellian singular proposition". Here the proposition is directly about the person, Trump, in the sense that it has Trump as its constituent, whereas the proposition that the 45th U.S. president is the present U.S. president is only indirectly about Donald Trump in the sense that even though he is uniquely 45th U.S. president, the proposition does not have him as its constituent.[5]

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[4] According to Russell (1905), a sentence "The *F* is *G*" has the logical form such as "$\exists x(Fx \ \& \ \forall y(Fy \rightarrow x=y) \ \& \ Gx)$", and there is no free directly referential term in this form.

[5] This is a rough explanation of the distinction between directness and indirectness about an object based on the concept of constituents. See Salmon 2007 for a more detailed analysis.

On this Russelian view, we can define a singular thought as a basic propositional relation of a subject to a singular proposition, which contains a particular object as a direct constituent.[6] This view is now prevailing among many philosophers, but it is also alleged that under this definition of singular thought, there are modal and temporal problems regarding propositions about the existence of an object.[7]

Needless to say, it is important to examine whether there are plausible answers to these criticisms. But this is not the aim of this dissertation, and I shall defend the Russelian view at another time. Fortunately, an investigation of the conditions for having singular thought does not seem to force us to commit to a certain theory laden definition of singular thought and singular proposition. We can go with the theory-neutral intuitive definition of singular thought (proposition), i.e., a thought (proposition) directly about an object.

However, an important terminological disambiguation is still indispensable for clarifying

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[6] Joshua Armstrong and Jason Stanley (2011) argue that with a transitivity of constituency, it is possible that a proposition contains an object as a constituent but is not directly about that object. Their argument is as follows: "Let 'Harry' name the proposition that Hannah is a philosopher. Harry contains Hannah a constituent. Suppose that John tells Bill that he is happy that Harry is true. John knows that 'Harry' refers to a proposition, but is not himself acquainted with Hannah. If Bill trusts John, it seems that he can come to know by testimony that John is happy that Harry is true, and a fortiori grasps that proposition. But Harry contains Hannah as a constituent, and by transitivity, so does the proposition that John is happy that Harry is true. So Bill's thought that John is happy that Harry is true is not a singular thought about Hannah, though it has its content a Russellian singular proposition containing Hannah as a constituent. Bill can therefore grasp a proposition containing an object as a constituent, without having acquaintance with that constituent." (Armstrong and Stanley 2011: 220).

I believe that this argument is mistaken. It does not seem that Bill grasps the proposition that John is happy that Harry is true. This becomes clearer if we substitute "Harry" with "the proposition that Hannah is a philosopher" (Here "Harry" seems an abbreviation of "the propositions that Hannah is a philosopher".) Bill cannot grasp the proposition that John is happy that the proposition that Hannah is a philosopher is true. Indeed, he simply cannot grasp the proposition, Harry. Armstrong and Stanley might think that since Bill can grasp the proposition that John is happy that the proposition referred by "Harry" is true, Bill can grasp the proposition that John is happy that Harry is true. But this is not so. We cannot grasp the proposition simply by grasping that the sentence which expresses that proposition is true. In fact, Bill even cannot reasonably infer the proposition that John is happy that the proposition referred by "Harry" is true from John's utterance. The name "Harry" is irrelevant to John's happiness at all. What he can grasp is just that the sentence "John is happy that Harry is true" is true.

[7] For example, see Plantinga 1983 and Crisp 2007.

the aim of this dissertation.[8] Suppose that I am now seeing the cup in front of me and directly thinking about that cup: my thought is not mediated by any descriptive content expressed by, for example, the description "the cup Jennie bought yesterday". Intuitively, this is a singular thought directly about that very cup. Now consider the person who has the same internal psychological as mine without seeing a real cup. She is hallucinating. In this situation, does she have a singular thought or not? The answer is "Yes and no".

First, it seems that her thought is still not a descriptive thought indirectly about the cup. It is not mediated by any descriptive contents as we supposed, and she at least *tries* to think *directly* about a particular cup. In this sense, the *form* of her thought is singular. Therefore, if our original question is whether she has a form of singular thought, then the answer is "Yes." Second, however, it also seems natural to say that she fails to have a singular thought *about any real cup*: there is no real cup at all. So, if our question is whether she has a singular thought *about a particular cup*, then the answer is "No".[9]

What matters for the aim of this dissertation is the second concept of singular thought, i.e., the object-relative concept of singular thought. That is, my primary interest is to investigate the conditions for having a singular thought *about a particular object O*, not the conditions for having a form of singular thought. As we have seen in the above cup case, it seems that having a certain form of singular thought is not enough to determine which object I am thinking about. But the conditions for having object-relative singular thought should provide an explanation of how the object I am now thinking about is determined.[10] Hereafter, for

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[8] I thank Daniel Korman for pressing me to address these matters.

[9] A similar distinction is also found in Burge 1977; Recanati 2010; Sainsbury 2010; Taylor 2010; Sawyer 2012; Genome 2014.

[10] There is no prima facie reason to think that the same conditions must apply to both concepts of singular thought. I rather expect that there would be different conditions for each concept of singular thought. This is

convenience' sake, I will use the term "singular thought" to mean <object-relative singular thought> through this dissertation, except when an explicit disambiguation is needed.[11]

0.2. Arguments for a Substantial Constraint on Singular Thought

As we have seen, since singular thought is directly about a particular object, and crucially different from descriptive thought, it seems natural to think that there must be some substantial conditions for a subject to have a singular thought. In this section, I introduce two arguments for a substantial constraint on singular thought. Each argument rests on our intuitions about the truth of each form of the following singular propositional attitude ascribing sentences.

(1) *S* believes of (or about) *N* (or the *F*) that it (or s/he) is *G*.

(2) *S* believes that *N* is *G*.[12,13]

I assume that other things being equal, our intuitions about the truth of these two forms of

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because, as we have seen in the above cup case, having forms of singular thought seems a purely psychological matter, while having object-relative singular thoughts seems to be partly dependent on an object external to our pure psychological state. (I will discuss this externalist characteristic of object-relative singular thought in depth in Chapter 3.1.) Therefore, I believe that if Robin Jeshion's cognitivism for singular thought is interpreted as an analysis of the conditions for having a form of singular thought as it seems (Jeshion 2010), it would be compatible with my work in this dissertation (See Chapter 3.2.4.).

[11] There should be another issue of deciding which concept of singular thought has been the focus of earlier theories of singular thought. Although I am inclined to say that Russell had primarily in mind objective-relative singular thought when he suggested the acquaintance condition for singular thought (Russell 1910), I also would be neutral on this terminological issue in this dissertation.

[12] "*N*" is a directly-referential term: a name, an indexical, a demonstrative or an unbound personal pronoun, and "the *F*" is a definite description.

[13] Strictly speaking, these sentences ascribe a singular *belief* to *S*. But for convenience, I shall use the propositional attitude verb "believe" in most cases and assume that having belief implies having thought.

sentences can be prima facie evidence of *S*'s having singular thought. For example, if we have the shared intuition that the sentence "Ralph believes of the shortest spy that he is nimble" is true in a certain circumstance, then it is prima facie evidence for Ralph's having singular thought about the shortest spy. Likewise, if we have the shared intuition that the sentence "Ralph believes that Ortcutt is nimble", which contains the name "Ortcutt", is true in a certain circumstance, then it is prima facie evidence for Ralph's having singular thought about Ortcutt.[14]

Both arguments attempt to show that on the presupposition that *N* is the *F*, even if *S* believes the relevant descriptive proposition that the *F* is *G*, the singular belief ascribing sentences (1) and (2) will always fail to be true unless a certain substantial constraint is satisfied.[15]

0.2.1. Exportation Argument

The first argument is based on the observation that exportation in a belief sentence is not always allowed. Consider the following pair of sentences:

(3) Ralph believes that the shortest spy is a spy.

[14] To be sure, I am not supposing that every intuition about the truth of the sentence type (2) suggests that *S* has a singular thought. Surface syntactic structure is sometimes misleading. For example, when a personal pronoun is used as an anaphor (a so-called "lazy pronoun"), it might fail to show that *S* has a singular thought. Suppose that I do not have any singular thought about the shortest spy. Still, the belief ascribing sentence, "I believe that the shortest spy is a spy, and also believe that he must be nimble," seems true if I believe that the shortest spy must be nimble. Here the personal pronoun "he" is used as an anaphor to denote the same thing as whatever "the shortest spy" denotes, and our intuition that this belief ascribing sentence is true fails to show that I have a singular thought about the shortest spy. For each belief ascribing sentence, we have to carefully examine whether "*N*" in (2) is a genuine directly referential term.

[15] These are not brand-new arguments. See Quine 1956; Kaplan 1969; Donnellan 1977; Salmon 1997, 2004.

(4) Ralph believes of the shortest spy that he is a spy.

The sentence (4) is the result of exporting the description "the shortest spy" from (3). But it seems obviously possible that (3) is true, while (4) is false. Suppose Ralph believes that the shortest spy exists. (Like us, he believes that there are spies in the world, and no two spies have exactly the same height.) Then from the meaning of the description "the shortest spy", he also believes that the shortest spy is a spy. So (3) is true. But still, it seems that if there is no such thing as so-called *appropriate cognitive connection* as a substantial constraint between Ralph and the shortest spy, that very person, say, Ortcutt, then it seems that Ralph cannot believe of the shortest spy, Ortcutt, that he is a spy. If Ralph is just an ordinary person like us, Ralph might not have any belief about a certain particular person that he is a spy: (4) is false.

In order for (4) to be true, it seems that there must be an appropriate cognitive connection between Ralph and Ortcutt. Suppose, for example, that Ralph finally meets Ortcutt, and Ortcutt provides convincing evidence that he is the shortest spy to Ralph. From then on, he can think of the shortest spy: he can believe of the shortest spy that he is a spy. In this case, the constraint is satisfied by meeting the shortest spy.[16]

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[16] Hawthorne and Manley argue that the sentence type (1) is rarely used in ordinary English for ascribing singular thought. They provide the result of some corpuses and Google searches for this, and suspect that philosophers of language will encounter these locutions far more often in philosophical settings than in ordinary settings. They maintain that if these locutions are expressions of art, then there is no relevant pre-theoretical intuition of whether singular thought is ascribed by these locutions (Hawthorne and Manley 2012: 53-56).

It might be true that we rarely use the belief ascribing sentence type (1) in our daily life. But first, simply omitting "of *N*" in (1), we can get the sentence form which is frequently used in ordinary English. Surely that is what is at issue (Thanks to Nathan Salmon for indicating this point). Moreover, it does not follow from its rareness that we do not have any pre-theoretical intuitions about the truth-value of the sentence type (1). The intuitive understanding of singular thought is simply thought directly *about* a certain object, and so we must partly depend on our intuition regarding locutions such as "think of" and "believe of." I believe that the exportation argument is based on our shared pre-theoretical intuition about the truth-value of (4). We might ask

0.2.2. Singular Proposition Argument

The second argument is regarding a singular proposition. Compare the following pair of belief ascribing sentences:

(5) Ralph believes that if the shortest spy exists, the shortest spy is a spy.

(6) Ralph believes that if Ortcutt exists, Ortcutt is a spy.[17]

Let us suppose that Ortcutt is the shortest spy. Again, it seems that the truth of (5) does not guarantee the truth of (6), unless a certain substantial constraint is satisfied. If Ralph is a rational person, then he will believe that if the shortest spy exists, the shortest spy is a spy. He in fact can know *a priori* the proposition that if the shortest spy exists, the shortest spy is a spy: it is just cheap descriptive knowledge. But it does not follow from this that Ralph believes the singular proposition about Ortcutt that if Ortcutt exists, Ortcutt is a spy: only people in the spy world might sincerely believe this proposition. Again, my diagnosis is that this is because there is no appropriate cognitive connection as a substantial constraint between Ralph and Ortcutt, which can enable Ralph to think or believe about Ortcutt, that very person. Unless this constraint is satisfied, Ralph cannot believe any singular proposition about Ortcutt.

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ordinary speakers whether they think that (4) is true or not.

To be sure, one might philosophically argue that our intuition about the exportation argument is wrong. But then we need an argument for this. Just saying that we rarely use the belief ascribing sentence type (1) is not enough to show that our intuition is useless, or that ordinary people do not have any intuition about it. Therefore, before encountering a counter argument, it seems safe to regard our intuitions about the truth-value of (4) as a prima face evidence for supporting the exportation argument.

[17] We can also use a complex demonstrative "that person" instead of the name "Ortcutt" with contexts where we are pointing at Ortcutt.

* * *

I have introduced two arguments for a substantial constraint on singular thought. I believe that they are simple, but intuitive and plausible. These arguments attempt to show that in order to have singular thought, there must be an appropriate cognitive connection as a substantial constraint, but the arguments *per se* do not provide any concrete explanation of what this appropriate cognitive connection must be like. I will track down what this must be like through this dissertation.

I begin Chapter 1 by considering Russell's strict notion of acquaintance as a condition for singular thought. I argue that even the moderate notion of acquaintance cannot cover every intuitive case of having singular thought. In Chapter 2, I consider the knowing-wh condition for singular thought and argue that knowing-wh is neither necessary nor even sufficient for singular thought. In Chapter 3, I suggest the trackability condition. I argue that my suggestion provides a unified explanation for various cases about singular thought. Then I provide responses to some of liberalists'[18] objections against the arguments for a substantial constraint I have presented in this introduction. In Chapter 4 and 5, I investigate two issues, which are intimately related to the conditions for having singular thought. First, in Chapter 4, I argue against the contingent *a priori* by showing that there is no way to know a singular proposition in question by means of linguistic stipulation. In Chapter 5, I criticize predicativism about names, the view that names which occur in argument positions have the same type of semantic contents as predicates.

[18] They are also called "latitudinarians" or "anti-acquaintance theorists".

Chapter 1: The Acquaintance Condition for Singular Thought

In this chapter, I first introduce Russell's strict notion of acquaintance as a condition for singular thought. Then I present Kripke's objections against the Russellian theory of ordinary names and explain what the moderate notion of acquaintance is. Lastly, I argue that there are some intuitive cases for having singular thought that even the moderate notion of acquittance cannot cover.

1.1. Russell's Strict Notion of Acquaintance

In the history of analytic philosophy, Bertrand Russell was the first philosopher who had substantially attempted to provide the conditions for singular thought. According to him, in order to grasp a certain proposition, a subject must be acquainted with every constituent of that proposition:

> The fundamental epistemological principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this: *Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted* (Russell 1910: 117).

He also describes his Acquaintance Principle as follows:

> *Whenever a relation of supposing or judging occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind is related by the relation of supposing or judging must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted* (Russell 1910: 118).

Recall that on the Russellian view, a singular thought is a basic propositional relation of a

subject to a singular proposition, which contains a particular object as a direct constituent. Therefore, according to Russell, in order to think a singular thought, it follows that a subject must be acquainted with an object that is a constituent of the singular proposition in question. For example, in order to think about Donald Trump that he is the present U.S. president, I have to be acquainted with Trump as well as the property, being uniquely present U.S. president.

For the sake of argument, let us formulate Russell's acquaintance principle without his concept of constituents as follows:

> *Acquaintance Principle*: In order for a subject *S* to have a singular thought about an object *O*, *S* must be acquainted with *O*.

Now the question is how we can understand the notion of acquaintance. Circa 1910, Russell's notion of acquaintance was extremely strict.[1] He first analyzed acquaintance with direct awareness of an object.

> I shall first of all try to explain what I mean by "acquaintance." I say that I am *acquainted* with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself (Russell 1910: 108).

> We shall say that we have *acquaintance* with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths (Russell 1912: 78).

Still, we need to analyze what Russell means by the term "direct awareness". According to Russell, if we are directly aware of something, then we can never be mistaken about our

[1] Russell (1905) once had a moderate notion of acquaintance in mind, but he had changed his view.

awareness of that object, and there are only three kinds of things of which we can never be mistaken about our awareness: sense-data, universals, and the self. Therefore, we can be acquainted with only these three things, which in turn means that we can only have singular thoughts about sense-data, universals, and the self.

At this point, what makes Russell's concept of acquaintance too strict is that it does not make it possible for us to have singular thoughts about ordinary physical objects (as well as other people's minds). They are the things of which we can be mistaken about our awareness. According to Russell, they are rather known to us in terms of knowledge by description, not knowledge by acquaintance. Russell explains this with his Bismarck example as follows:

> Assuming that there is such a thing as direct acquaintance with oneself, Bismarck himself might have used his name directly to designate the particular person with whom he was acquainted. In this case, if he made a judgment about himself, he himself might be a constituent of the judgment. Here the proper name has the direct use which it always wishes to have, as simply standing for a certain object, and not for a description of the object. But if a person who knew Bismarck made a judgment about him, the case is different. What this person was acquainted with were certain sense-data which he connected (rightly, we will suppose) with Bismarck's body. His body as a physical object, and still more his mind, were only known as the body and the mind connected with these sense-data. That is, they were known by description. […] It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only known by description, we often intend to make our statement, not in the form involving the description, but about the actual thing described. That is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we could, to make the judgment which Bismarck alone can make, namely, the judgment of which he himself is a constituent. In this we are necessarily defeated, since the actual Bismarck is unknown to us (Russell 1910: 114-116).

Here Bismarck can have a singular thought about himself, because he is directly aware of himself. However, any people besides himself cannot have any singular thought about Bismarck. They cannot be directly aware of the person, Bismarck. Their awareness must be mediated by their sense-data regarding Bismarck's body, and that is why their awareness of Bismarck could be mistaken. Therefore, even if Bismarck and others try to grasp the same

singular proposition, say, that Bismarck is hungry, only Bismarck, who is acquainted with Bismarck himself, can grasp this singular proposition, while others, who cannot be acquainted with Bismarck in principle, fail to do it. The general result is that we always fail to have singular thoughts about any ordinary external physical object.

When we try to grasp a certain singular proposition about a physical object with names of those objects, such as "Bismarck" or "Donald Trump", what we actually grasp is the descriptive proposition expressed by the sentence where the name is replaced by a certain definite description which denotes the same thing as the name refers to. Here a definite description can vary according to which definite description a subject associates the name with. For example, if I associate the name "Bismarck" with the definite description "the person who created the first welfare state in the modern world", when I try to grasp the singular proposition that Bismarck is hungry, what I actually grasp is the descriptive proposition that the person who created the first welfare state in the modern world is hungry.

In this respect, Russell distinguishes logically proper names from ordinary proper names in English.

> Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions. That is to say, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description (Russell 1910: 114).

Ordinary names in English are in fact disguised definite descriptions. That is, the form of the sentences "*N* is *G*" does not express any singular proposition if "*N*" is an ordinary name,[2] and therefore, we fail to grasp the singular proposition we intend to grasp with the name "*N*".

Russell claims that only a sentence containing a logically proper name can express the

[2] Except when the name is used to refer to the speaker herself or to an item of her direct acquaintance.

singular proposition about the object referred to by that name, and we only have two logically proper names in English: "I" and "this".

> The denotation, I believe, is not a constituent of the proposition, except in the case of proper names, i.e. of words which do not assign a property to an object, but merely and solely name it. And I should hold further that, in this sense, there are only two words which are strictly proper names of particulars, namely, "I" and "this." (Russell 1910: 121).

The word "I" is a logically proper name, because it is used to refer to the speaker herself. The word "this" also can be a logically proper name if it is used to refer to certain particular sense-data, not used to refer to an ordinary physical object. They are the words to be able to refer to the objects of which we are directly aware.[3]

The concept of Russellian logically proper names is intimately related to the Millian view of ordinary proper names. Millians hold that ordinary names also have the characteristics which Russell's logically proper names are supposed to have. That is, on the Millian view, the scope of Russellian logically proper names is extended to ordinary names: the semantic content of an ordinary name is also simply its reference.

Saul Kripke (1980) argues for this Millian view against the Russellian view of ordinary names, the so-called descriptivism, which maintains that a name has the same semantic content as the description a speaker associates the name with.[4] In the next section, I will introduce Kripke's argument against it, and show that we can grasp singular propositions about ordinary objects.

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[3] For the same reason, it seems that Russell should have included the pronoun "it" in logical proper names, at least under the assignment of an object of direct acquaintance. (Thanks to Nathan Salmon for indicating this point)

[4] Since Frege and Russell are considered to have a similar view of ordinary names, it is sometimes called "the Frege-Russell theory of names".

1.2. Kripke's Objections against Descriptivism about Names

We have seen that Russell's strict notion of acquaintance as a condition for singular thought results in the extreme view that we can directly think only about sense-data, universals, and the self. Under this extreme view, a sentence containing an ordinary name in fact expresses the general proposition expressed by the sentence containing an associated description in place of the name, and we fail to grasp a singular proposition about the object that at first glance we think that the name seems to refer to.

However, Kripke (1980) argues that names and descriptions work in a completely different way in English. He criticizes the description theory of names about both semantics and meta-semantics. The former claims that a name has the same semantic content as an associated description, and the latter claims that the reference of a name is the object that satisfies an associated description. Among Kripke's epistemic, modal, and semantic objections, the first two objections are against the semantic claim of the description theory, while the third objection is against both. So here, I shall briefly introduce Kripke's semantic objection.[5]

His strategy for the semantic argument is to show that the definite description a speaker associates a name with is neither necessary nor sufficient for semantics and meta-semantics of a name. One can possibly grasp a proposition in question even if she does not have any suitable definite description. Let us first see why a definite description is not necessary with Kripke's Feynman example (Kripke 1980: 71-72). Consider the utterance "Feynman is on television". Intuitively, ordinary people can grasp the proposition expressed by that utterance,

[5] Keith Donnellan (1970) also provides arguments similar to Kripke's.

even if they have not gotten any definite description which is satisfied by Feynman. If the description theory is correct, then ordinary people, who only associate the name "Feynman" with the indefinite description "a famous physicist", might instead grasp the proposition something like that a famous physicist in the U.S. is on television. But clearly this is not the case. They seem to grasp the proposition that Feynman, that very person, is on television. Speakers' indefinite description also does not help to fix the reference of the name "Feynman", because there are many famous physicists in the U.S. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that speakers can refer to Feynman with the name "Feynman" in spite of their ignorance of any proper definite description.

Let us second see why it is not sufficient with Kripke's Gödel-Schmidt case (Kripke 1980: 83-85). Suppose a hypothetical situation where Schmidt (an imaginary person) in fact proved the incompleteness of arithmetic and Gödel plagiarized Schmidt's proof and published it under his name. Now consider ordinary people who associate the name "Gödel" with the definite description "the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic". When they heard the utterance "Gödel is on television", they seem to grasp the proposition that Gödel, that very person, is on television, not the proposition that whoever proved incompleteness of arithmetic, possibly Schmidt, is on television. Speakers' wrong definite description also does not affect to fix the reference of the name "Gödel". They still seem to refer to Gödel with the name "Gödel", not Schmidt which satisfies the description they associate the name "Gödel" with.

Kripke's semantic argument seems quite plausible, and it is in fact widely accepted among most philosophers in these days.[6] In this dissertation, for the sake of argument, I shall

[6] But as always, there is an opposite position. See, for example, Searle 1983; Kroon 1987; Jackson 1998.

assume that the semantic content of a name is its reference and we can grasp a singular proposition about an ordinary object.[7] I will also simply accommodate our natural intuition that we can directly think about an ordinary object.

Then in what condition can we grasp the semantic content, namely, the reference of a name? As we have seen, Russell's strict notion of acquaintance cannot be an answer for this question. We actually grasp a singular proposition about an ordinary object, not a related descriptive proposition as Russell claims. Kripke (1980) provides his causal-historical picture as an explanation of how we can grasp the reference of a name, or in other words, how we can competently use a name.[8,9] According to Kripke, to grasp the reference of a name, we have to be linguistic community members who are properly communicatively connected with an initial baptism for the reference of the name. For example, the reason why ordinary people can grasp the reference of the name "Feynman" is that they are properly connected with the initial baptism for Feynman. His parents might name him by proper ostension[10] and let some people know his name by using "Feynman" to refer to Feynman, and then those people might

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[7] Except Chapter 5. It might be suggested that the semantic view of names that the name "Feynman" has the same semantic content as the definite description such as "the man named 'Feynman'" can avoid Kripke's objections. I will discuss this so-called being-named condition of names in Chapter 5, criticizing predicativism about names, the view that names are predicates, not referential terms.

[8] Donnellan (1970) also provides the picture for a reference mechanism, which is similar to Kripke's.

[9] The term "competently" is required for excluding a case where a speaker incompetently uses a name. For example, suppose I heard the name "Pierre" from my friend, and use the name "Pierre" to refer to a certain person by uttering "Pierre is a person I want to meet". But my friend fooled me. There is no person whose name is "Pierre" around my friend. In this case, I use the name "Pierre" incompletely, and there is no way to competently use the name "Pierre" as a name for a particular person because it is a fake name. Another example is Kaplan's Newman1 case (Kaplan 1968). The name "Newman1" is introduced to refer to the first child born in the 22nd Century. In this case, I believe that we cannot competently use the name "Newman1" until the baby is born. I will discuss it in depth in Chapter 4.

[10] According to Kripke, the reference of a name can be fixed by a definite description as well as ostension. But it is controversial whether any additional constraint is needed for introducing this so-called descriptive name. I will discuss it in depth in Chapter 4.

again let others know his name by using "Feynman".[11] All of them are communicatively connected with the initial baptism for Feynman. Through this process, the range of the communicative-chains for the name "Feynman" is gradually extended, and if I finally hear the name "Feynman" from any speakers who are already communicatively connected with the initial baptism for Feynman, then I come to have an ability to competently use the name and grasp its reference. Here Kripke provides one important condition for proper communicative-chain:

> When the name is "passed from link to link", the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it. If I hear the name "Napoleon" and decide it would be a nice name for my pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition (Kripke 1980: 96).

For being properly communicatively connected, I must have the intention to use the name "Feynman" to refer to the same person as the speaker from whom I heard it refers to. Only when satisfying this condition, I can competently use the name "Feynman" and grasp the semantic content of it.

1.3. The Moderate Notion of Acquaintance

We have seen Kripke's objection against the description theory of names and his alternative causal picture for how we can completely use a name and grasp the reference of it. In this section, with Kripke's alternative picture, I shall introduce the moderate notion of

[11] Strictly speaking, parents give their child a first name, and it might be more suitable to say about Feynman's first name "Richard" here. But for convenience, I will suppose that his parents name him "Feynman".

acquaintance as a condition for singular thought.[12]

First, in most cases where an initial baptism is performed by ostension, a baptist perceives a particular object she intends to baptize, and perception seems the most obvious means for us to enable to have singular thought: it seems obvious that we can think about something we now perceive. Giving up Russell's strict notion of acquaintance, we can broaden the concept of acquaintance as allowing a subject to be acquainted with a physical object by perception, in the sense that there is still some kind of epistemic relation between a subject and an object.[13]

To be sure, a present perceptual connection is short-lived and sustained only when a subject perceives. But even if I stop looking at, or otherwise perceiving an object, with some memories to retain the connection between me and the object, it still seems obvious that I can think about the thing I once perceived. Therefore, it is better to define the term "perceptually acquaintance" as consisting of not only a present perceptual connection but also a previous perceptual connection retained by proper memories.

For having singular thought by perceptual acquaintance, a particular linguistic name is not necessary. We can think about what we have seen or touched without naming it. But introducing a name is extremely facilitating of having singular thought, especially for people who have not yet perceived a named object. As we have seen in the last section, ordinary

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[12] Kent Bach thinks that Kripke's causal picture is a good start point for the investigation of the conditions for singular thought. He says, "[T]he main insights that underlie the causal theory of names properly belong to the theory of singular thought." (Bach 1987: 11-12). Thus, the moderate notion of acquaintance I will introduce in this section would be similar to the conditions for singular thought Bach suggests (Bach 1987: 11-45).

[13] Here I am not investigating what the genuine concept of acquaintance is, but simply introducing a new usage. We can surely use another word like "shmacquaintance" for this if we want. However, some philosophers think that even under Russell's concept of acquaintance, we can be acquainted with ordinary physical objects (See Johnston 2004; Dickie 2010).

people, who do not have any identifying information about Feynman, can still grasp a singular proposition about Feynman, and it also seems clear that they can think about Feynman as well, once they are properly communicatively connected with the use of the name "Feynman" in the linguistic community. For example, by hearing my utterance, "Feynman is a famous physicist", you seem to be able to believe about Feynman that he is a famous physicist, even if you have not seen him. I will describe this case by saying that you are acquainted with Feynman by communicative-chain.

Still, introducing a name is not necessary for people who have not yet perceived an object to have singular thought about it. Suppose I say, "Today I met the author of *What Do You Care What Other People Think?*", then hearing my utterance, you seem to be able to believe about the author of *What Do You Care What Other People Think?* that I met him,[14] even if you have not seen Feynman and do not know his name. But it is very inconvenient for you to have a singular thought about Feynman this way. In this case, if you totally forget the information about Feynman and also who the source of the information is, you cannot think about Feynman anymore. By contrast, if you heard the name "Feynman", you can think about him as long as you properly remember his name. Using a name is much more convenient way of thinking about an object. But in any of these two cases, whether or not you heard the name, the reason why you can think about Feynman is, I suggest, that you are properly communicatively connected with the very person, Feynman.

Kripke's causal picture is about a name, not a definite description. So, what I mean here by "proper communicative connection" is a little broader then Kripke's concept. In the above example, it seems clear that you can think about the author of *What Do You Care What Other*

[14] To be sure, you can also have a descriptive thought that I met whoever the author of *What Do You Care What Other People Think?* is.

People Think?. This is because I can think about the author of *What Do You Care What Other People Think?,* say Feynman, and you heard my utterance about him. But suppose I do not have any ability to think about the shortest spy, and just say, "The shortest spy is a spy". By hearing my utterance, you surely cannot think about the shortest spy that he is a spy. The difference between these two cases is whether you are properly causally communicatively connected with a relevant object. In the first case, you are properly connected with Feynman mediated by me, but in the second case, the connection cannot be mediated: there is no connection between me and the shortest spy from the beginning.

In conclusion, under the moderate notion of acquaintance, there are two ways to be acquainted with physical objects: perception and communicative-chain. Perception is certainly a more direct way to be acquainted with physical objects than communicative-chain. It seems that the moderate notion of acquaintance as a condition for singular thought seems a prima facie plausible view. But I shall present two potential problems with this view in the next section.

1.4. Potential Problems with the Moderate Notion of Acquaintance

In this section, I introduce two potential problems with the moderate notion of acquaintance as a condition for singular thought. There seem to be some intuitive cases where we can have singular thoughts without either perception or communicative-chain.

Let us first consider the following two cases:

Morse Code) By chance, I just communicated with a man on the other side of the world by Morse code with an old communication device without exchanging each one's name. After

communication, I think about him that he might live in a cold area.

Camera Owner) I found the lost camera in the movie theater, and it seems that someone who watched the movie before I entered left this camera. I start to think about the camera owner that she was careless and must be worried about her lost camera.

In both examples, it seems clear that I can have a singular thought about the person in question. In the *Morse Code* case, I can think about the person I communicated, but I have never perceived him: I have never seen his appearance, I have never heard his voice, and I have never touched his body. Moreover, there is no communicative-chain that connects me with him: I have never heard his name. Likewise, in the *Camera Owner* case, I can have a singular thought about the camera owner, but there is no perceptual or communicative connection. We have to find the conditions for singular thought that can address these two cases.

Second, it seems that we can have singular thoughts about various kinds of objects other than physical objects, such as abstract, fictional, and future objects that we cannot literally perceive. Robin Jeshion points out that the conditions ought to be general enough to apply to singular thoughts about various kinds of objects (Jeshion 2002a: 56-58, 2010: 116-118). One of Jeshion's examples is about a future object:

Dessert Sensations) Some time ago, my father began planning a cake-delivering business. Before making any investments or any contacts with cake-producers or restaurants, he coined a name for his then future business "Dessert Sensations." He expressed his dreams thus: "I hope that Dessert Sensations will be a success" (Jeshion 2010: 117).

Intuitively, Jeshion's father can think about Dessert Sensations, his future business. But it seems that he cannot literally perceive this future object. Therefore, we have to find the

conditions that can accommodate singular thoughts about various kinds of objects.

I shall suggest the trackability condition as a view which can address these problems in Chapter 3. However, before doing this, I shall first consider the knowing-wh condition for singular thought in Chapter 2. It might be thought that in order to directly think about a particular object, we have to know what that object is, and it seems that we can have knowledge-wh about various kinds of objects. In the next chapter, I will analyze the concept of knowing-wh and argue that the knowing-wh condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for singular thought.

Chapter 2: The Knowing-wh Condition for Singular Thought

Some philosophers hold the view that in order to have a singular thought about a particular object, we must know what that object is. In this chapter, I argue against this knowing-wh condition for singular thought. I analyze three characteristics of knowing-wh and argue that knowing-wh is neither necessary nor sufficient for singular thought.[1]

2.1. The Knowing-wh Constraint

The underlying idea of the knowing-wh constraint on singular thought has its own intuitive appeal. It might seem natural to suggest that a subject *S* must have a sort of epistemic ability to discriminate a particular object *O* from other objects to think about *O*. Suppose one presents another similar object to *S* and asks, "Is this the object you have thought and talked about?". If *S* does not have any discriminating knowledge, it seems that she cannot appropriately reply, "No, that thing is not what I have been thinking and talking about."

In Chapter 1, we have seen that Bertrand Russell introduces the strict notion of acquaintance as direct awareness; if we are directly aware of something, then we can never be

[1] The term "knowing-wh" is intended to facilitate to talk about two kinds of knowing-whs at once: knowing-who for persons and knowing-what for things. It seems controversial whether knowing-where for places, knowing-when for times, and knowing-why for reasons have the same characteristic as knowing-who and knowing-what. It seems more controversial whether knowing-how for ways has the same characteristics as those of the other knowing-whs. They have been orthodoxly regarded as different, after Ryle (1945) argued it. But Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson maintain that usages of "knowing-how" can be analyzed in the same way as those of "knowing-wh" from the perspective of syntax and semantics, and therefore, knowing-how is reducible to knowing-that on the assumption that knowing-wh is a species of knowing-that (Stanley and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011). In this chapter, I reserve my judgement on these issues.

mistaken about our awareness of that object. Here Russell's position can be interpreted as a kind of the knowing-wh condition for singular thought. Consider again the following paragraph:

> *Whenever a relation of supposing or judging occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind is related by the relation of supposing or judging must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted.* This is merely to say that we cannot make a judgment or a supposition without knowing what it is that we are making our judgment or supposition about. It seems to me that the truth of this principle is evident as soon as the principle is understood" (Russell 1910: 118).

Here Russell presents his Acquaintance Principle to the effect that in order for *S* to have a singular thought about *O*, *S* must be acquainted with *O*. He explains what this means by stating that "we cannot make a judgment or a supposition without *knowing what* it is". Therefore, there seems to be a possibility of interpreting his claim as one that we have to know what *O* is, in order to have singular thought about *O*.[2]

However, we have also seen that Russell's strict notion of acquaintance disallows a subject from being wrong about which thing is at issue. Although under this strict notion of acquaintance, we have direct knowledge-wh only about sense-data, universals, and the self, we can still consider a moderate version of the knowing-wh condition for singular thought.

Among contemporary philosophers, Gareth Evans developed Russell's idea and suggested discriminating knowledge as a condition for having singular thought:

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[2] Although, it is well-known that Russell's strict notion of acquaintance, in disallowing a subject from being wrong about which thing is at issue, enables us to have singular thoughts only about sense data, universals, and the self (Russell 1910), we can still consider a moderate version of this view which embraces the idea that singular thoughts about ordinary objects are surely possible, such as what Russell (1905) himself once had in mind.

> In order to make Russell's [above] Principle a substantial principle, I shall suppose that the knowledge which it requires is what might be called discriminating knowledge: the subject must have a capacity to distinguish the object of his judgement from all other things (Evans 1982: 89).[3]

Although it is not clear which philosophers other than Russell and Evans explicitly defend the knowing-wh constraint on singular thought, and it is not the aim of this chapter to examine who is committed to this view, I suspect that some philosophers such as Kaplan 1968 Quine 1977, and Donnellan 1977 sometimes implicitly exploit the knowing-wh constraint on singular thought.

To be sure, it is unfair to ascribe the Russellian knowing-wh view to all of them; they have not explicitly defended it. However, there are some clues that they might implicitly exploit the knowing-wh constraint at some points. Although providing the correct interpretations of each philosopher's view is not the aim of this chapter, I will suggest some possible interpretations.

First, W. V. Quine (1977) in fact rejects the concept of singular thought at all. But this is because singular thought needs the knowing-wh requirement, and this requirement is context-sensitive, which means to Quine that of itself the notion of knowing-wh is empty.

Second, David Kaplan (1968) suggests that for having singular thought, or in his words, for exporting "α" from "*S* believes that α is …" to "*S* believes of α that it is …", *S* must have

[3] In fact, Evans introduces the term "discriminating knowledge" as a theory-laden term and suggests that it is different from "knowing-wh" as an ordinary expression. He maintains that one must have in mind a *fundamental idea* of an object in order to have discriminating knowledge where a fundamental idea is a thought about an object as the possessor of a special kind of its essence (Evans 1982: 107-108). In this chapter, however, I will stay focused on the term "knowing-wh" that is not theory-laden. For criticism of Evans, see Hawthorne and Manley 2012: 71-83.

the *en rapport* relation with the denotation of α, which is usually regarded as the acquaintance relation by many philosophers. However, he provides three conditions of having *en rapport* relation as follows (Kaplan 1968: 203):

(i) α denotes x,

(ii) α is a name of x for *S*,[4] and

(iii) α is (sufficiently) vivid

Here the issue is how the condition (iii) should be interpreted.

Kaplan explains the condition (iii) as follows:

> The notion of a vivid name is intended to go to the purely internal aspects of individuation. Consider typical cases in which we should be likely to say that Ralph knows x or is acquainted with x. Then look only at the conglomeration of images, names, and partial descriptions which Ralph employs to bring x before his mind. Such a conglomeration, when suitably arranged and regimented, is what I call a vivid name (Kaplan 1968: 201).

With this vividness condition, Kaplan wants to explain why we cannot felicitously say, "There is someone who Holmes believes to be the murderer" in the case where Holmes just observed the victim and does not have any knowledge-who about the murderer. (Kaplan 1968: 204).[5] To be sure, claiming that Kaplan's vividness condition is exactly the same as the knowing-wh condition still seems to be far-fetched, but they at least look very similar in many aspects.

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[4] This condition indicates that *S* must be communicatively connected with the proper naming ceremony of α that is performed by a baptizer's perception of x.

[5] In fact, this is Kaplan's initial view about singular thought. He has changed his view later in Kaplan 1989a, 1989b

Lastly, there are some passages in Donnellan 1977 that are open to the interpretion that Keith Donnellan implicitly uses the knowing-wh constraint. For example, he says,

> Now suppose that you say to me "Vladimir is called by me 'Vladimir'" and I do not have the least idea who Vladimir is. From the general principle I can see that if you have asserted anything, your sentence expresses a truth. But I do not believe that I know that Vladimir is called "Vladimir" by you. I do not know the truth of what your sentence expresses (Donnellan 1977: 19).

Considering that one aim of his paper is to provide the conditions for singular thought, here Donnellan seems to explain that he fails to have a singular thought about Vladimir, because he does not have the least *idea of who* Vladimir is.

I shall argue that this seemingly plausible knowing-wh constraint is not necessary for singular thought. I shall also argue that having knowledge-wh does not even secure having singular thought. To show this, I shall first analyze three important characteristics of knowing-wh, and then provide situations of singular thought without knowing-wh and those of knowing-wh without singular thought.

2.2. Characteristics of Knowing-wh

In this section, I will discuss three important characteristics of knowing-wh. It is not my aim to provide the thorough analysis of knowing-wh here, but I believe that this analysis can provide some intuitive explanation of knowing-wh, which I need for the purpose of this chapter.

2.2.1. Context-sensitivity of Knowing-wh

The first characteristic of knowing-wh I shall introduce is context-sensitivity. Consider the following sentence:

(1) The copy boy knows who Clark Kent is.

As Steven Boër and William Lycan argue, our verdict as to whether (1) is true, depends not only on the state of the copy boy's knowledge about Kent, but also on interlocutors' interests and purposes regarding Kent. They said,

> Consider the plight of the copy boy at the *Daily Planet* who catches occasional glimpses of Clark Kent. It is true that the copy boy knows who Kent is, in that the boy can produce Kent's name, address, staff position, journalistic accomplishments, salient personal characteristics, preference in sandwich condiments, and the like, but in an obvious way the boy also does *not* know who Kent is; he does not know that Kent is really the Man of Steel, scion of Krypton, and savior of Truth Justice, and the American Way (Boër and Lycan 1986: 6).

Here our copy boy knows who Kent is for the everyday purpose of going about the newspaper business but not for the purpose of getting immediate help for Lois Lane. For each context, the intuitive and natural reply to the question "Does the copy boy know who Kent is?" would be "Yes" and "No", respectively. Therefore, we can naturally conclude that the truth-value of the sentence "*S* knows who *N* is" is dependent on contexts which provide interlocutors' interests and purposes regarding *N*.[6,7]

[6] There have been many philosophers who advocate knowing-wh contextualism. See Quine 1977; Searle 1979; Kvart 1982; Boër and Lycan 1986; Kaplan 1986; Salmon 1988; Schaffer 2007; Masto 2010; Hawthone and Manley 2012.

2.2.2. Knowing-wh and Knowing Property

The second characteristic of knowing-wh I shall introduce is also related to context-sensitivity. To know who *N* is is surely to know some property of *N*, and as we have seen, which property *P* of *N S* must know in order for *S* to have knowledge-wh is context-sensitive. But nevertheless, is there any minimal requirement for property *P S* must know in order to have knowledge-wh?

Boër and Lycan reply "Yes", and claim that *P* must be an identifying property, which can be expressed by a definite description. Consider the following two replies to the question "Who is Cicero?":

(2) Cicero is the Roman orator who drove Catiline from the city with four vehement speeches.

(3) Cicero is a famous Roman orator.

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[7] On the other hand, David Braun defends invariantism for knowing-who. He first maintains that a proposition answers a question if and only if it provides information about the question's subject matter. Any proposition that is not logically true, and concern the subject matter of the question can be a genuine answer to a semantic question. For example, according to Braun, all of the propositions expressed by the following sentences are genuine answers to the semantic question expressed by "Who is Mark Twain?": Mark Twain is the author of *Huckleberry Finn*, Mark Twain is a famous author, Mark Twain is a right-handed person, and Mark Twain is a person who is over three inches tall. Second, he suggests the following analysis of knowing-who: *S* knows who *N* is if and only if *S* knows a proposition that answers the semantic question of who *N* is. Therefore, if I know that Mark Twain is a person who is over three inches tall, then I know who Mark Twain is across contexts (Braun 2006: 24-32).

His strategy to handle our intuition of contextualism is to turn it over to pragmatics. For example, even though the proposition expressed by "Mark Twain is a person who is over three inches tall" is always a genuine answer, a questioner might or might not be satisfied with this answer according to certain contexts. But once you know that proposition, you know who Mark Twain is regardless of the interlocutor's satisfaction (Braun 2006: 33; see Masto 2010 for criticism).

There are in fact many intricate issues with this, which are also related to the debate between contextualism and invariantism for knowledge-that, and I will not deal with these issues in depth here. However, if Braun's invariantism is right, then it seems that knowing-wh cannot be a substantial requirement for singular thought as supposed. I already have knowledge-wh for every person whose name I have heard, and it is quite trivially satisfied. But the main problem will still remain the same: our question will simply become whether *satisfaction-wh* is a constraint on singular thought.

Boër and Lycan argue that while (2) can be an appropriate answer to *genuine*-"who" question, (3) cannot. According to them, the purpose of genuine "who" questions is to get some identifying information suitable for a certain context. But the reply (3) cannot provide any identifying information about Cicero, which should be expressed by a definite description. The fact that there are several famous Roman orators prevents us to identify who Cicero is (Boër and Lycan 1986: 28).

They take it for granted that sometimes (3) seems to be an appropriate answer. But they argue that this is because we sometimes ask superficial "who"-questions. If "Who is *N*" is superficial, it is an ellipsis of something like "Who is *N that he is F*?" which in turn amounts to "What property of *N* makes him *F*?". They say,

> Suppose that it is [Ralph]'s first day in the army, and [Ralph] is still unclear about rank and the meanings of insignia. [Tom], an officer, approaches [Ralph] and says "Clean up the barracks!" On [Tom]'s departure, [Ralph] turns to a comrade and says, "Who is *he* to give me orders?" The comrade replies, "He's a *captain*, stupid!" This indefinite reply is perfectly adequate. But notice that "Who is [Tom] that he can give me orders?" is not the same questions as "Who is [Tom]?" (Boër and Lycan 1986: 28)

Then they conclude, "since ["who"] questions, when they are genuine questions about *N*'s identity, do not tolerate [indefinite replies like (3)] and since "who" questions that do tolerate such replies are not really questions about *N*'s identity, we feel justified in eliminating [indefinite replies] from further consideration" (Boër and Lycan 1986: 29).

I disagree with them. I believe that (3) can be a perfectly adequate answer to the genuine who-question, "Who is Cicero?" in some contexts such as playing a trivia game where I am

supposed to match famous people to their jobs.[8,9] Boër and Lycan might claim that here it is in fact an ellipsis of something like "Who is Cicero that you should know his job?" However, I do not think that there are really two totally different kinds of "who" questions, one of which is "Who is *N* that he is *F*?", and the other being simply "Who is *N*?". It seems to me that the first one is just a "who" question where a questioner's interests and purposes in a context are explicitly uttered. The purpose of the questioner in this trivia game context is to check some property of Cicero (i.e. his job) that I should know, and the purpose of Ralph in the above example is to know some property of Tom which allows him to give Ralph orders. It seems right because we even paraphrase the possible "who" questions in the *Clark Kent* case in the previous section as something like "Who is Kent that I will meet him tomorrow?" or "Do you know who Kent is that he is the Man of Steel?" according to different purposes.

I suggest that the more general purpose of "who" questions is simply to know some important property *P* of *N* in context *C* (which provides interlocutors' interests and purposes), whether or not to know that *N* has *P* is sufficient to know identifying information of *N* expressed by a definite description. This suggestion has at least two advantages over that of Boër and Lycan's. First, it fits with ordinary English speakers' intuitions. In the above examples, if one can appropriately provide answers such as "Cicero is a famous Roman orator" or "Tom is a captain", we naturally believe that she knows who Cicero or Tom is in those contexts. We do not think that since there are in fact two totally different kinds of "who" questions, she still does not "know who" Cicero or Tom is in the primary sense. Second, on my suggestion, we can get a generality of explanation. I have proposed that to know who *N* is

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[8] Thanks to Daniel Korman for suggesting this context.

[9] Kripke (1980: 83) agrees with this idea, even though it is not clear whether he is a defender of the context-sensitivity of knowing-wh. Braun (2006), as we have seen in n.7, will admit that it is an adequate answer, even though he is an invariantist.

is to know some important property *P* of *N* in *C*. In order to refute this suggestion and defend their two different questions thesis, Boër and Lycan first need to explain why simply knowing important property *P* of *N* in *C* cannot be the general purpose of "who" questions and also explain why ordinary speaker's intuitions are wrong, and then must argue against the plausible idea that "Who is *N* that he is *F*?" is one purpose-explicit version of "Who is *N*?". Before they provide all of them, I feel justified in admitting an indefinite answer as an adequate answer to "who" questions in some contexts.

Now let us sum up our discussion so far: "*S* knows who (or what) *N* is" is true in *C* if and only if "*S* knows some important property *P* of *N*" is true in *C* (which provides interlocutors' interests and purposes).

2.2.3. Knowing-wh and Knowing-that

The last characteristic I shall discuss is about the relationship between knowing-wh and knowing-that. Many philosophers have held the view that knowing-wh is reducible to knowing-that;[10] knowing-wh is knowing a proposition *p*, where *p* is the answer to the question of the wh-clause. For example, knowing who Kent is is knowing the proposition that Kent is a scion of Krypton (in a given context).

Jonathan Schaffer (2007) disagrees; he claims that knowing-wh is not reducible to knowing-that. He argues that if knowing-wh were just knowing the true answer, then all knowing-whs that have the same true answer would become equivalent, but they are not. For his example, if George W. Bush is speaking on television, the questions "Is Bush or Janet

[10] See Hintikka 1975; Lewis 1982; Boër and Lycan 1986; Higginbotham 1996; Stanley and Williamson 2001; Feldman 2002: Chapter 2; Braun 2006.

Jackson on television?" and "Is Bush or Will Ferrell on television?"[11] have the same true answer, "Bush is on television", and consequently, knowing whether Bush or Janet Jackson is on television and knowing whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television just become equivalent to knowing that Bush is on television on the reductionist view. However, Schaffer claims that the two knowing-whethers are clearly not equivalent. Since knowing whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television is a relatively hard task compared to knowing whether Bush or Janet Jackson is on television, it is possible that one knows the latter while fails to know the former. From this, Schaffer holds the question-including view of knowledge-wh: knowing-wh is knowing a proposition *p as* the true answer of the question of the wh-clause. To know whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television is to know that Bush is on television, *as* the true answer of whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television (Schaffer 2007).[12]

Although both positions disagree about the complete reducibility of knowing-wh to knowing-that, they agree with the idea that knowing-that is at least *necessary* for knowing-wh in that Schaffer suggests some additional requirement for knowing-wh. This relatively weak idea seems plausible whether or not Schaffer's position is right, and what I need for the argument in this chapter is just this. As far as knowing-that is necessary for knowing-wh, it will not affect the result of my argument.

However, Katalin Farkas (2016, 2017) has recently argued that there are some cases where a subject has knowledge-wh even without knowledge-that:

A: I don't know Pierre's phone number, but you do, right?

[11] For clarification of the context, Ferrell did an impersonation of Bush.

[12] In fact, Schaffer concludes that knowing-that is rather reducible to knowing-wh by pointing out that every piece of knowledge is question-relative.

B: I do.
A: Can you give it to me?
B: Of course (reaching for her smartphone).

In this example, Farkas suggests that knowing-wh is attributed to B, based on her ability to answer the question. At the time of the attribution, B lacks knowledge-that. She does not know *that* Pierre's phone-number is 123456789 when she is reaching for her smartphone. Nevertheless, if the attribution of knowing-wh to B is correct, then we have here a case of knowing-wh without (contextually relevant) knowing-that (Farkas 2016: 113-114).

I want to make two comments on this argument. First, even if her argument is sound, it will not affect the result of my argument. She only claims that there are some cases of knowing-wh without knowing-that, but still, there seem lots of relatively clear cases of knowing-wh with knowing-that. If I know who Cicero is, then it usually means that I know, for example, *that* Cicero is a Roman orator (in a certain context). We can simply limit our issue to these clear cases of knowing-wh with knowing-that.

Second, it seems that there are some alternative explanations of the above example. It might be claimed that strictly speaking, B does not know what Pierre's phone number is. She does not know that Pierre's phone number is 123456789 and cannot let A know Pierre's phone number without her smartphone. It seems certainly unnatural to say that B knows what Pierre's phone number is but does not know that Pierre's phone number is 123456789 at the same time. Therefore, it can be suggested that what B actually knows is not Pierre's phone number, but just how to find out his phone number. Of course, A also knows how to find out Pierre's phone number, that is, by asking B, and in this case, we correctly judge that A does not know what Pierre's phone number is. What we need here is some explanation of why we have a wrong tendency to the extent that we do think that B has knowledge-wh and A does

not. Our tendency is perhaps complicatedly dependent on how easily the subject can access a source of information, whether the source of information is in her possession, whether she once knew information, etc. Providing a whole error theory for this position with details is not the issue here, but I think that it is not unpromising.[13]

Alternatively, it also might be claimed that even if we can admit that B knows what Pierre's phone number is, this is still because of B's knowledge-that: B knows *that* Pierre's phone number is the number on B's smartphone with the name "Pierre". The idea is that the context-sensitivity of knowing-wh can explain why B's knowledge-that can count as knowing-wh in this context. For example, in a quiz show, if the question is "What is Pierre's phone number?", and if B cannot instantly provide an answer with the exact number, then it is natural to think that she does not know what Pierre's phone number is, even if she can find it out on her smartphone. Using a smartphone is usually prohibited in a quiz show. By contrast, in some ordinary contexts, if B knows that Pierre's phone number is the number on her smartphone with the name "Pierre", she would qualify as knowing what Pierre's phone number is. The problem with this suggestion is that A also knows that Pierre's phone number is the number on her smartphone with the name "Pierre", but A seems not to qualify as knowing what Pierre's phone number is.

One possible response to this is to take a step back and claim that even though knowing-

[13] Farkas seems to think that if the above suggestion is right, then since both A and B know how to find the answer, we cannot explain why we naturally judge that only B has knowledge-wh, while A does not. But the same problem seems to arise in Farkas's suggestion too. She suggests that the ability to answer questions bears an intimate relation to knowledge-wh. However, in some sense, A also has the ability to answer her own question, that is, by asking B or by borrowing B's smartphone. Farkas provides some differences between B's ability and A's ability such as whether the subject has easy, readily available access to information which is automatically endorsed by her upon retrieval, and which was produced and stored through a reliable entry-forming process that is integrated with her cognitive character (Farkas 2016: 119). But the exact same explanation can be used to account for why we have a wrong tendency to think that B has knowledge-wh, contrary to A. Then the issue might be whose intuition is stronger and more plausible, and which theory is more elegant. This is an interesting issue, but I will discuss it in-depth at another time.

wh is not reducible to knowing-that, knowing-that is still necessary for knowing-wh. Both A and B have the same knowledge-that, but only B meets some additional requirement for having knowing-wh.[14] One might object to this idea that here the relevant proposition is that Pierre's phone number is 123456789, not that Pierre's phone number is the number on her smartphone with the name "Pierre".[15] But if this is right, then we can simply go back to the first alternative that B does not have knowledge-wh, because she does not know that it is 123456789. That is, there are two possibilities: B has knowledge-wh or B does not have knowledge-wh. If she does, then we can hold the second alternative. If she does not, then we can hold the first alternative. In any case, we need a relevant knowledge-that for having knowledge-wh.

I have argued that we need knowledge-that for knowledge-wh. Although there might surely be many relevant issues here, for our purpose it is enough to hold that knowing-that is necessary for knowing-wh. Also, even if Farkas's suggestion is correct, I can limit the issue to relatively clear cases of knowing-wh with knowing that, as I said earlier.

Finishing this section, I suggest the final analysis of the ordinary expression "knowing-wh" as follows:

> *Knowing-wh*: "*S* knows who (or what) *N* is" is true in *C* if and only if for some property *P*, "*S* knows that *N* has *P*" is true in *C* (where *P* is important for interlocutors' interest and purpose).[16]

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[14] Something like that Farkas mentioned in her paper (see n.13).

[15] Farkas suggests it in correspondence.

[16] If you want to adopt Schaffer's analysis, what you need is just add the phrase "as the true answer of the indirect question" to the know-that-clause.

2.3. Knowing-wh and Singular Thought

So far, I have analyzed the concept of knowing-wh. With this analysis, in this section, I shall argue that knowing-wh is neither necessary nor sufficient for singular thought. To show that it is not necessary, I provide some cases where a subject obviously has a singular thought about a certain object, but does not know who she is, or what it is. To show that it is not sufficient, I provide some cases where a subject obviously knows what a certain object is but does not have any singular thought about it.

2.3.1. Knowing-wh Is Not Necessary for Singular Thought

I will first argue that knowing-wh is not necessary for singular thought. As we have seen at the last section, in order to say that *S* knows who (or what) *N* is in *C*, *S* must know a particular proposition that *N* has *P*. But the proposition *S* must know in order to have knowledge-wh varies across contexts, because what count as important property *P* of *N* varies across contexts. Therefore, once we notice that an ordinary person cannot know all important properties of *N* in every context, it is not difficult to construct cases where *S* does not have knowledge-wh even if she has a singular thought.

The general strategy is as follows: imagine any subject *S* who obviously can have a singular thought about *N*, and then allocate *S* in any conversational context where "*S* knows that *N* has *P*" is false, while *P* of *N* is important for interlocutors' interest and purpose in that context. Or, raise the standard of knowledge-wh as it happens in contexts where knowledge skepticism is at issue.

Here is an example that satisfies the conditions presented in the above strategy:[17]

Breaking Bad) Suppose that Hank has a very close friend whose name is "Walter". He surely has some singular thoughts about Walter. However, unbeknown to him, Walter was actually a manufacturer of narcotics. He has manufactured drugs under the nickname "Heisenberg". Suppose further that Walter gets arrested for drug manufacturing and Hank is questioned as a witness by the DEA. If he is asked, "Did you already know who Heisenberg was?", his answer would be clearly "No!", for he did not know that he was one of his closest friends.

Here it is obvious that Hank has had singular thoughts about Heisenberg (i.e., Walter), but the knowledge ascribing sentence, "He knew who Heisenberg was" seems to be false in this context; he did not know that Heisenberg was one of his closest friends.

We can also construct a counter-example regarding a definite description.

Unknown Visitor) Suppose that my colleague and I are working together in the office. Suddenly, a stranger opens the door, and says, "Hi everyone! Long time no see!" My colleague asks me below his breath, "Do you know who the man opening the door is?", and I reply, "No, I do not know who he is."

Directly perceiving him, I can have singular thoughts about the man opening the door in this case: I can have some singular thoughts about him regarding his appearance, his height, his tone of voice, etc. But "I know who the man opening the door is" seems to be false in this context. I do not know his name, occupation, his relationship with us, etc.[18,19]

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[17] Many philosophers have provided examples to show that knowing-wh is not necessary for singular thought. See Kvart 1982: 300; Boër and Lycan 1986: 132-133; Salmon 2004: 246-247; Hawthorne and Manley 2012: 71-73. My aim here is to provide an explanation of how their examples work.

[18] It might be objected that unless the description "the man opening the door" is used referentially, I am not actually entertaining any singular thought about the man opening the door at the very time when I utter the sentence. I do not want to deny this observation here. However, our issue is about a subject's ability to think about an object, i.e., whether the subject can think about the object when she intends to think about it, not

With these examples, I believe that it now becomes quite clear that knowing-wh is necessary for singular thought. However, is it not at least sufficient for singular thought? In other words, is it not possible that singular thought is rather a requirement for knowing-wh, so there is still a certain relation between the two?

2.3.2. Knowing-wh Is Not Sufficient for Singular Thought

It may seem more plausible that singular thought is necessary for knowing-wh. Since to know who *N* is is to know a particular property of *N*, it might be thought that in order to know the property of *N*, we must at least have the ability to think about *N*.

In this section, I shall provide a counter-example against the above reasoning, but before providing my own argument, let us first examine some attempts by other philosophers. Here is Boër and Lycan's:

> You are a police detective investigating a murder and [referring non-rigidly] or attributively [to] "the murderer." You prove that whoever did the murderer is (again attributively) the person who lives at such-and-such an address. Then for present purposes (that of laying hands on the culprit and throwing him in jail), you do know who the murderer is, but we may suppose that you have no attitudes *de* him in the sense of grade-5 aboutness, since you have not yet tracked him down at the address in question. Thus in some contexts there is "knowing who" without *de re* belief (Boër and Lycan 1986: 133).

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whether the subject is actually entertaining singular thought at a given time.

[19] It is not difficult to see that some less plausible variants of the knowing-wh condition are also subject to similar counter-examples. For instance, Quine (1977) arguably defends the *having an opinion-wh* condition for singular thought, and here is Igal Kvart's counter-example for this: "[S] notices a tall man snatching his purse and disappearing into the crowd. Not recognizing him or knowing him, S has no opinion who the purse-snatcher is, […] Yet, surely S believes of that thief, hence of someone that he is the purse-snatcher" (Kvart 1982: 300). It may also be suggested that perceptual discrimination is necessary for singular thought. But I can still have singular thoughts about my friend even if I cannot discriminate him from his clones, or I can also have singular thoughts of historical characters and people whom I have not met yet.

In this example, you know who the murderer is. He is the person who lives at such-and-such an address. But Boër and Lycan think that you do not have a singular thought about the murderer as grade-5 aboutness, which can be only built by a perceptual relation between a subject and an object. Since you do not have any perceptual connection with the murderer, you cannot think about the murderer as grade-5 aboutness.

However, as Boër and Lycan themselves acknowledged, and as we have seen in Chapter 1, we can have a singular thought about an object without perceptual connection. We can think about a certain historical character or a person who we have not yet met. I believe that in the above example, you can think *about* that very murderer, for example, that he is vicious, that he is meticulous, etc. In fact, they think that causal connection is also enough to ensure singular thought. Their point is just that if aboutness is interpreted as strong as the grade-5, it is possible that *S* cannot think about a particular individual, even if *S* knows who she is (Boër and Lycan 1986: 128-133). Therefore, Boër and Lycan's example is not suitable for our natural concept of singular thought.

Let us then consider Kvart's examples.

> Suppose the inhabitants of some Russian village, plagued by burglaries performed in similar style, come to the conclusion that among them lives the village burglar. They also believe that, in their village, as in every other, there is one KGB agent. Now, on the site of one burglary they notice an article typically possessed by KGB agents, which leads them to conclude that the village burglar is the local KGB agent, and so to acquire an opinion as to who the village burglar is. In fact, however, there was no village burglar - at work were the uncoordinated activities of various local children; nor was there a local KGB agent - an oversight on the part of the KGB (Kvart 1982: 300).

Kvart argues that in this example, they have an *opinion* who the village burglar is (the local

KGB agent), but cannot have a singular thought about the village burglar because there is nobody whom they think of (Kvart 1982:302).

Here is his other example:

> […] *S* notices at a party the man in the corner, and believes him to be drinking a martini and to be the only martini drinker. Noticing the man's impressive –conversation, he takes him to be eloquent, thus [he comes to believe that the martini drinker is eloquent.] In fact, however, the man in the corner drinks water. Unbeknownst to *S*, [there is another man who is the only martini drinker at this party] (Kvart 1982: 301).[20]

Again, Kvart argues that *S* has an *opinion* who the martini drinker is (the man in the corner who is eloquent), but *S* clearly fails to have a singular thought about the martini drinker.

However, Kvart's examples are not suitable for our purpose either. He argues that *having an opinion-wh* is not a sufficient condition for singular thought, but the condition of having an opinion-wh is easily satisfied, compared to the condition of knowing-wh. At the first example, it seems possible that people have an opinion-who for a non-existent person, but they cannot have knowledge-who for a non-existent person while thinking that she exists. At the second example, *S*'s opinion-who might surely be wrong, while knowledge-who cannot be false. In short, we are corrigible in having opinion-wh in regard of existence or property, but this is not allowed for knowledge-wh.

Then how can we construct an intuitive counter-example that shows that knowing-wh is not sufficient for singular thought? Let us recall our analysis of knowing-wh and replace "*N*" by "the *F*". Then we get the following analysis of knowing-wh with respect to a definite description:

[20] I slightly modify his example for our purpose.

Knowing-wh': "*S* knows who (or what) the *F* is" is true in *C* if and only if for some property *P*, "*S* knows that the *F* has *P*" is true in *C* (where *P* is important for interlocutors' interest and purpose).

Let us recall the exportation argument for a substantial constraint on singular thought in Introduction 0.2.1. The point of that argument remains the same about knowledge; even if "*S* knows that the *F* has *P*" is true, it does not follow that "*S* knows about the *F* that it has *P*" is true, so that *S* has a singular thought about the *F*. Therefore, to construct a counter-example, we have to come up with some context where *P* of the *F* is important for interlocutors' interest and purpose, but *S* only has the descriptive knowledge that the *F* has *P*.

Now consider the following example:

Shooting Tournament) Some spies are conspiring to assassinate the boss of their enemy group Ralph is in. They debate who should try to assassinate Ralph's boss and agree that the winner of tomorrow's shooting tournament in their group must try to assassinate Ralph's boss. However, Ralph is eavesdropping on their conspiration. Then his colleague asks Ralph, "Do you know who will try to assassinate our boss?" Ralph replies, "Yes, I know who, the winter of tomorrow's shooting tournament."

In this context, "Ralph knows who will try to assassinate his boss" seems to be true, because "Ralph knows that the person who will try to assassinate his boss is the winner of tomorrow's shooting tournament." is true. Ralph knows an important property of the person who will try to assassinate his boss in this context, and that is why he has knowledge-wh. However, as we supposed, Ralph only has the descriptive knowledge that the person who will try to assassinate his boss is the winner of tomorrow's shooting tournament in the above context. But as we have seen in Introduction 0.2.1, it does not guarantee that Ralph also has a singular

thought about the person who will try to assassinate the boss in the same context. Knowing-wh is not sufficient for singular thought.

The above case involves a definite description, i.e., "the person who will try to assassinate Ralph's boss". But is it also possible to construct a counter-example regarding a name? To see this, let us revise the original *Shooting Tournament* example a little bit by supposing further that Ralph and his colleague introduce the name "Ortcutt", for the description "the person who will try to assassinate the boss", as a Millian name, not as an abbreviation.[21,22] Suppose also that his colleague asks Ralph, "Do you know who Ortcutt is?" Then it may seem that "Ralph knows who Ortcutt is" is true, even though he does not have any singular thought about Ortcutt as we supposed.

However, it seems that there is something problematic here. Compare the following two sentences:

(4) Ralph knows that whoever person designated by the name "Ortcutt" is the winner of tomorrow's shooting tournament.

(5) Ralph knows that Ortcutt, that very person, is the winner of tomorrow's shooting tournament" is true.

Although (4) seems to be true, it seems unclear whether (5) is also true.[23] But according to

[21] Then the proposition expressed by "Ortcutt is the person who will try to assassinate the boss." becomes an alleged example of the contingent *a priori*. I shall argue against this at Chapter 4.

[22] Here the issue is not whether they have any practical reason to introduce the name "Ortcutt" as a Millian name, not as an abbreviation. It is at least theoretically possible that they introduce "Ortcutt", and this theoretical possibility is enough for discussing our issue. As Donnellan (1977: 14) points out, "We must separate the factual issue of whether it is part of our actual practice ever to introduce names in this way from the theoretical issue of whether names could be introduced in this way."

[23] Thanks to Nathan Salmon for indicating this point to me.

our analysis of knowing-wh, what we need in order to guarantee the truth of "Ralph knows who Ortcutt is" is the truth of (5), not the truth of (4); the truth of (4) only guarantees the truth of "Ralph knows who the person designated by the name 'Ortcutt' is". In fact, (5) ascribes singular knowledge about Ortcutt to Ralph, but we suppose that Ralph does not have any singular thought about the person who will try to assassinate this boss, Ortcutt. Since singular knowledge requires singular thought, and knowing who Ortcutt is needs a particular singular knowledge about Ortuctt that Ralph, who does not have any singular thought about Ortcutt, cannot have, "Ralph knows who Ortcutt is" is false.[24,25]

If the above diagnosis is right, it seems that we cannot construct a counter-example regarding a name. However, the *Shooting Tournament* case is enough to show that knowing-wh is not sufficient for singular thought. Therefore, summarizing this section, we can conclude that knowing-wh is neither necessary nor sufficient for singular thought.

* * *

In this chapter, I have argued that knowing-wh is neither necessary nor sufficient for singular thought. My arguments hinge heavily on the context-sensitivity of our judgement about ascribing knowledge-wh. Therefore, it might be thought that although the expression "knowing-wh" is context-sensitive, knowing-wh *according to the epistemic standard S* is

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[24] Thanks to Korman for helping me to reformulate the argument.

[25] We can invent a similar example regarding the number π. Suppose that I am the first person who introduced the name "π" for referring the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. Suppose further that although I introduced the name "π", I do not have any least idea of what exact number π is: I do not even know that $3<\pi<4$. In this case, I know that the number designated by the name 'π' is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, and therefore, I can know what the number designated by the name 'π' is in some contexts. But I do not seem to know that π, that very number, is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, and also do not seem to know what number π is.

necessary for singular thought. However, if the standard S is not that low, then it seems clear that there must be a case where a subject has singular thought without knowing-wh. By contrast, if S is extremely low, then the knowing-wh constraint under this interpretation is trivially satisfied, and it is no longer a substantial requirement for singular thought as supposed. In either case, the knowing-wh condition for singular thought seems not to be promising.

Chapter 3: The Trackability Condition for Singular Thought

In this chapter, I suggest *trackability* as the condition for singular thought. I argue that the tracking idea provides a unified explanation for various cases about singular thought. Then I consider some objections against a substantial constraint on singular thought we have seen in Introduction 0.2, and provide responses to them.

3.1. Trackability as a Substantial Constraint

Let us recall two arguments for a substantial constraint on singular thought in Introduction 0.2. I believe that they are simple, but intuitive and plausible. These arguments attempt to show that in order to have singular thought, there must be an appropriate cognitive connection as a substantial constraint, but the arguments *per se* do not provide any concrete explanation of what this appropriate cognitive connection must be like. In Chapter 1 and 2. we have seen that both the acquaintance condition and the knowing-wh condition as a substantial constraint do not work. In this chapter, I shall explain my working hypothesis about this constraint.

My suggestion is that an appropriate cognitive connection is something that must enable a subject to track down an object in principle. I propose the following trackability as a substantial constraint.

> *Trackability*: In order for a subject *S* to have a singular thought about an object *O*, *S* must grasp a certain track of *O*. In principle, *S* will encounter the very object *O* at the starting point of the track if she keeps following the track she grasps.

Now it needs some clarification, because terms like “encounter” and “track” seem a little metaphorical. But rather than providing strict definitions of these terms, I shall describe how my suggestion provides an explanation of some cases about singular thought. I expect that these terms will become clearer as the explanation with examples proceeds in this section.

Various kinds of cognitive connections can be a track of an object. As we have seen in Chapter 1.3, acquaintance theorists believe that perception and memory are the obvious means for having singular thoughts about physical objects, and I also first suggest these as the most obvious and direct means for tracking. I can think about something I now perceive, and if I track down the origin of my perception, I will encounter the very object I am now thinking about. To be sure, present perceptual connection is short-lived and sustained only when a subject perceives an object. But even if I stop looking at or otherwise perceiving an object, it still seems obvious that I can think about the very thing I once perceived in terms of memories to retain the connection between the object and me. Again, if I track down the origin of my memories, then I will encounter the very object about which I am now thinking about.

We have also seen that most acquaintance theorists also believe that communicative-chain enables us to have singular thought. For example, once an ordinary speaker is properly communicatively connected with the use of the name “Feynman” in the linguistic community, it seems obvious that she can think about Feynman, even if there is no direct perceptual connection between them and Feynman. By hearing someone’s utterance, “Feynman is a famous physicist”, they seem to be able to believe of Feynman that he is a famous physicist, even if they have not seen him. In this case, a certain communicative-chain from Feynman is a track that enables them to track down the very person, Feynman.

Still, tracking an object in terms of a communicative-chain is not limited to the use of a linguistic name. We have also seen the following case in Chapter 1.3: suppose I say, "Today I met the author of *What Do You Care What Other People Think?*", then hearing my utterance, you seem to be able to believe about the author of *What Do You Care What Other People Think?* that I met him, even if you have not seen the author, Feynman, and do not know his name. In this case, you are still properly communicatively connected with Feynman through me, and this connection enables you to track down Feynman.

So far, so good. I just have explained how my suggestion can accommodate the intuitive appeal from the acquaintance theory. Let us now consider again the *Camera Owner* case in Chapter 1.4:

> *Camera Owner*) I found the lost camera in the movie theater, and it seems that someone who watched the movie before I entered left this camera. I start to think about the camera owner that she was careless and must be worried about her lost camera.

The problem with the acquaintance theory was that although it seems obvious that I can have a singular thought about the camera owner, there seems to be no perceptual or communicative connection I can grasp to track down the camera owner.

Here the causal connection between the owner and myself I grasp plays the role of a track, and it is generally a good source of tracking an object.[1] If I keep following this causal track, I will encounter the camera owner at the starting point of this track. In fact, as the *Camera*

[1] By the term "causal connection", I mean a connection appropriate for our common-sense ordinary concept of causation. Here I am not assuming any philosophical theory of causation: any theory accepting ordinary intuition about causation can be accompanied. For example, I will not borrow the concept of causation under which every past event is the cause of any present event in that every particle is intricately causally linked, that is, any small change of one particle affects every particle via a myriad of causal chains. I think that this is not an ordinary concept of causation in any sense.

owner case reveals, singular thought obtained from grasping a causal track is quite ordinary in our daily life.[2]

At this point, it is worth taking note of one crucial characteristic about singular thought: a particular singular thought is externally individuated, when the appropriate track of an object is external to a subject's purely internal psychological state.[3] That is, even if my internal psychological state stays the same across different external environments, it is possible that I have a singular thought about a different object, or I fail to have a singular thought in a different environment. The descriptive information I have is not enough to determine the object I am thinking about.

For example, a causal track of a physical object is external to a subject's internal psychological state. Suppose that Jane is the actual owner of the camera in the above *Camera Owner* case. Then my thought is about Jane in this case (Case 1). However, it is possible that even if I am in the same psychological state, that is, even if I found the same camera in the same movie theater and have the same descriptive information, Jim is the actual owner of the camera. In that case, my thought becomes about Jim (Case 2), not Jane. It is even possible that there is no camera owner at all. The camera might be automatically assembled in terms

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[2] There are many philosophers who advocate or seem to advocate a causal constraint on singular thought. See Davies 1981: 97; Salmon 1986: 179-180 n.19, 2004: 246-251; Fitch 1990; Neale 1990: 18; Lewis 1999: 380-381; Azzouni 2011; Sawyer 2012.

Among them, Sarah Sawyer's "trace-based" acquaintance view seems most similar to my view in this chapter. She suggests that we can have a singular thought about a particular physical object by perceiving an evidential trace of that object, which constitutes causal contact with the object. But she does not explain how her concept of evidential trace can be extended beyond a causal connection (Sawyer 2012: 275-278). My view could be interpreted as a developed version of her theory as we will see in this section.

[3] Here I leave room for the possibility that a particular singular thought can be individuated internally if the track of an object is internal to a subject's psychological state. Singular thoughts about sense-date, fictional objects, or abstract objects might be candidates for internal individuation. But still, singular thoughts about any kind of objects *through communicative-chain* are individuated externally (see n.6).

of physical laws by sheer luck. Then I fail to think about the camera owner (Case 3).[4,5]



As the above figure effectively shows, the external track I grasp determines which object I think about in each case. In other words, if I follow the track I grasp, I will encounter the very object that I am now thinking about.[6]

One might now wonder why I do not simply suggest that a causal connection is a substantial constraint on singular thought in that perceptual and communicative connections are also causal. If all of these are a certain kind of causal connection, then is it not enough to claim that a subject thinks about the object only if she is causally connected with? Why did I

[4] This picture can be regarded as a singular thought version of the Putnamian twin earth scenario (Putnam 1975).

[5] This is compatible with the claim that in Case 3, I have thought about the mythical person (*Cf.* Salmon 1998). It might be argued that if a subject fails to have successful singular thoughts about physical objects, then she has actually thought about mythical objects.

[6] The same scenario can apply not only to causal connection but also to perception and communicative-chain. Suppose I perceive a particular physical object. Then I can have a singular thought about that object. But it is possible that even if I am in the same psychological state, I perceives a different object, or I am hallucinating. Also, even if I heard the name "Feynman" from the same person in the same situation, it is possible that I am thinking about a different person other than Feynman, who has the same name "Feynman", or there is no real person called "Feynman" by the person from whom I heard the name.

employ the seemingly redundant concept of tracking, in addition to causal connection, to explain relevant phenomena about singular thought?

There are two important reasons for this, which also can be regarded as potential objections against a causal constraint on singular thought. First, it is claimed that we can be causally connected only with physical objects. However, as I pointed out in Chapter 1.4, we seem to have singular thoughts about various kinds of objects such as abstract, fictional, and future objects. In contrast with causal connection, tracking can apply to any kinds of objects. To be sure, for those kinds of objects, there is nothing like direct perceptual connection, which constitutes a track of a physical object. But something similar is there, and it enables us to track down those kinds of objects. That is, for different kinds of objects, different kinds of tracks are applied.

For example, suppose we have a singular thought about the number 3, and suppose further that we cannot perceive the number 3 like other physical objects as many philosophers admit. However, we might be able to, so to speak, *intuit* (or be acquainted with) it. Here my view is not involved in any ontological positions about numbers by using the term "intuit". What I intend to say is that *if* any positions, whether or not numbers are abstract entities, mental constructions, or symbols, that accept the view that numbers are a certain kind of object are right, and *if* we can have singular thoughts about numbers, then there must be a way for being directly cognitively connected with numbers, which is in parallel with perceiving physical objects, and which enables to track those numbers. I simply call this way "intuition". Surely, if one intuits a certain number and uses its name, others can be communicatively connected with that number mediated by that person, and tracking becomes available even if they do not intuit it.

The above tracking picture can be applied to any other kind of object as well. If there are

fictional or future objects, and if we can have singular thought about them, then there must be a way to be directly cognitively connected with those objects, which is parallel with perceiving physical objects, and that direct way can become a source of a communicative-chain. For example, let us suppose that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was directly cognitively connected with Sherlock Holmes because he is the creator of this fictional character;[7] then others can be properly communicatively connected with Sherlock Holmes by Conan Doyle's use of the name "Sherlock Holmes". Again, if there is nothing like fictional objects in the world, then these objects are simply excluded from the scope of the investigation of the conditions for having singular thought.

Therefore, alleged counter-examples about non-physical objects against the acquaintance theory simply does not apply to the view I hold. For instance, Jeshion provides the list of examples to show that there is acquaintanceless singular thought. Let us consider again Jeshion's example we have seen in Chapter 1.4:

> *Dessert Sensations*) Some time ago, my father began planning a cake-delivering business. Before making any investments or any contacts with cake-producers or restaurants, he coined a name for his then future business "Dessert Sensations." He expressed his dreams thus: "I hope that Dessert Sensations will be a success" (Jeshion 2010: 117).

Jeshion argues that even though her father was not (causally) acquainted with Dessert Sensations, it is intuitive that he had a singular thought about it.[8]

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[7] For the sake of argument, here I assume that creation is a plausible prima facie candidate for being directly cognitively connected with a fictional object

[8] I suspect that this is one reason why Jeshion in fact investigates the conditions for a form of singular thought. However, as I clarified in Introduction, there are two concepts of singular thought; one is a form of singular thought, and the other is an object-relative singular thought, and it seems that Jeshion fails to distinguish these two concepts. If Jeshion's cognitivism is interpreted just as an analysis of the conditions for having a form of

However, as I suggested, *if* there is a future object like Dessert Sensations, and *if* we can think about Dessert Sensations,[9] then there seems to be a way to be directly cognitively connected with that object, which enables us to track it. A thorough investigation of how we can be directly cognitively connected with a future object is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but perhaps a subject's having the intention to create it with some specific knowledge of a way of creation, or simply being able to trace the creation of a future object would be related to a way to be directly cognitively connected with the object.[10] Since Jeshion's father had the intention to start the business with some specific knowledge of a way of creation, he, as a potential creator, could have singular thoughts about it. Jeshion also could think about his business, because she is communicatively-connected with it via his father's use of the name "Dessert Sensations". Again, for different kinds of objects, different kinds of tracks are there.

The second reason why I employ the concept of tracking instead of causal connection is that even for singular thought about physical objects, there seem to be cases where a subject *S* can certainly track down an object *O*, even though there is no causal track from *O* to *S*. Here are some examples from John Hawthorne and David Manley (hereafter "H&M"), which are originally devised to counter the causal theory of singular thought.

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singular thought, then her work is compatible with my work as an analysis of the conditions for having an object-relative singular thought. (See 3.2.4.)

[9] I suspect that it would be controversial whether "Dessert Sensations" refers to one particular future business. But let us assume that it does for the sake of argument.

[10] The following cases might be examples of being able to trace the creation of a future object. Suppose that by doing complicated calculations in meteorology, we can predict when and where the next typhoon will form. We see a weather map on screen and keep tracing the time and place of its formation. In this case, there seems to be the intuition that we can have a singular thought about the next typhoon. Or suppose that you have a particular sperm cell and a particular ovum. There seems to be the intuition that we can think about the future child who will results from the process of uniting that sperm and that ovum (*Cf.* Soames 2002: 89-93). In both cases, if we have singular thoughts about those objects, the reason seems to be that we can trace the creations of both objects. (I thank Paolo Bonardi for pointing out the tracing idea about future objects.)

Car Engine) Suppose a mechanic points at a car and says, "Let me see that engine". We would not want to deny that there is a particular engine such that the mechanic wants to see it. And yet there may be no causal relation here to speak of (H&M 2012: 28).[11]

Smith's Fiancée) Suppose Jones learns in some indirect fashion that his old friend Smith is now engaged to a woman (perhaps via learning the general fact that everyone in a group to which Smith belongs is engaged) and that there is a virus afflicting women in Smith's town. Jones calls Smith and (before Smith speaks) says: "Is she all right?" (H&M 2012: 31).

In both cases, there seems to be no causal track from the object to the subject. In the *Car Engine* case, the engine has not yet causally affected the mechanic. She rather infers from her general knowledge about cars that there must be a particular engine inside that car. Likewise, in the *Smith's Fiancée* case, there has not been any causal interaction between Smith's Fiancée and Jones. Jones rather infers that Smith has his fiancée from the general rule that everyone in his group must be engaged. Nevertheless, in both cases, it seems that the mechanic can think about that very engine, and Jones can think about Smith's fiancée.

I agree with their view that in some cases, a subject can have a singular thought about a physical object, even though there is no causal connection from the object to the subject. However, it is a little hasty from this to conclude that there is no substantial constraint on singular thought. It seems that these two cases are essentially different from the shortest spy case in Introduction 0.2, and I believe that the difference is whether a subject grasps a track of an object, which enables her to track down the object. For example, the mechanic knows that there is the very engine that has *interacted with* the car she now sees. In other words, she knows that the car is (causally) connected with the very engine she now thinks about.

[11] If the mechanic has seen the movement of the car by the engine, the engine becomes causally connected with her. So we have to additionally suppose that the mechanic first saw the car when it was at a stop, and it has not been in motion by the engine.

The grasp of this connection between the car and the engine enables her to track the engine about which she can have a singular thought. Likewise, Jones knows that Smith has interacted and is (causally) connected with Smith's fiancée. The grasp of this connection enables Jones to track Smith's fiancée about which he can have a singular thought.

In both cases, the car and Smith play the role of a mediator to provide the tracks of the engines and his fiancée for the mechanic and Jones. By contrast, in the shortest spy case, there is no way for Ralph to track down the shortest spy. To be sure, if Ralph finds someone or something that has interacted with the shortest spy and also knows that there have been interactions between these two, he would grasp a track of the shortest spy and can have a singular thought about him. But before grasping any track of the shortest spy, it seems obvious that Ralph can only have a descriptive thought about the shortest spy.[12]

As we have seen in this section, I believe that this tracking idea can provide a unified explanation for various cases about singular thoughts. I prefer to categorize my theory as a moderate version of the acquaintance theory in that it accommodates its intuitive appeal. I might be able to employ a new concept like acquaintance via tracking. But this is a terminological issue. Whether or not tracking is appropriate to be included in the concept of acquaintance, it enables us to have a singular thought about various kinds of objects.

[12] There might be an objection that since Ralph knows that there is the shortest spy who has causally interacted with, say, the Earth, and Ralph is acquainted with the Earth, which plays the role of a mediator to provide a track of the shortest spy, I must conclude that Ralph can think about the shortest spy. However, as I pointed out in n.1, it seems that this causal interaction is not an ordinary concept of causation. I do not borrow the concept of causation under which everything is causally connected via the Earth. It seems clear that this is not an ordinary concept of causation in any sense. (I thank Daniel Korman for raising this issue.)

3.2. Objections and Responses

In this section, I shall provide responses to some of H&M's objections against a substantial constraint, which can also apply to the trackability condition that I have suggested in the last section.

3.2.1. Infelicity of Singular Thought Ascribing Report

H&M maintain that even if a substantial constraint is clearly satisfied, there are a variety of cases where the felt infelicity of the singular thought ascribing report is equally strong. They first consider Stephen Schiffer's purse snatcher case (Schiffer 1979: 65-66).

> *Snatcher*) Someone snatches Thelma's purse, but Thelma does not catch a very good look at his face. As she is chasing him, it is acceptable to point at him and say either of the following:
>
> [(1)] Thelma thinks that he is a thief.
> [(2)] That man is such that Thelma believes he is a thief.
>
> So far, so good: after all, most would allow that Thelma has singular thoughts about the man. However, suppose that later Thelma is unable to pick him out of a line-up at the police station. In this context, even if we know that the third man in the line-up is the man she was chasing, we could not point at him and comfortably utter either [(1)] or [(2)]. So what governs the varying acceptability of these sentences? Clearly, Thelma has singular thoughts about the third man in the line-up, so the problem is not that she does not satisfy CONSTRAINT. […] It might be argued that by this time she has lost her singular thought about the man that he is a thief; but this does not square with the fact that in other contexts, even at this later time, [(1)] and [(2)] are felicitous. (For example, we would happily utter them while looking at a film of the incident) (H&M 2012: 40).

They complain that a constraint does not satisfactorily explain the infelicity of (1) and (2) when Thelma is unable to pick the snatcher out of the line-up: it is far-fetched to claim that she has lost her singular thoughts about the snatcher when (1) and (2) are infelicitous,

because there are still other contexts where (1) and (2) are felicitous. They argue that there are alternative explanations of these phenomena, which employ the concept of modes of presentation instead of a constraint.

> She has two modes of presentation of him, and the context of the police line-up makes one of these modes salient. Whether Thelma thinks of him as a thief *under that mode* appears to be what is governing the acceptability of the ascription in that context. Naïve theorists will treat this as a pragmatic phenomenon, and notional theorists will treat it as a semantic one. Either style of explanation will also have the resources to explain why many other singular-thought-requiring ascriptions to Thelma at later times seem perfectly felicitous. By contrast, an account of the infelicity data about Thelma in terms of CONSTRAINT fails to handle the felicity data (H&M 2012: 42).

The infelicity of (1) and (2) might be explained by naïve theorists in terms of treating modes of presentation as a pragmatic phenomenon, or by notional theorists in terms of treating them as a semantic phenomenon. We do not need to employ any concept like a substantial constraint on singular thought to explain it.[13]

I entirely agree with all of their claims except that proponents of a substantial constraint should provide an explanation of the felt infelicity. They simply miss the point. They bring in another issue and mix it with our original one. Our issue is about the conditions for singular thought, not Frege's Puzzle. Proponents of a constraint only hold that if a singular thought ascribing sentence is true, then it means that a substantial constraint is satisfied and the truth of the sentence is evidence of a subject's having singular thought. In other words, a substantial constraint must be satisfied as a necessary condition for a singular thought ascribing sentence to be true. That is all that proponents of a constraint are claiming. For example, if we have the intuition that (1) or (2) is true in a

[13] Jeshion provides a similar argument (Jeshion 2001: 119-123).

certain context, then it is evidence that Thelma has the ability to have singular thoughts about the snatcher and that a substantial constraint is satisfied. Then Thelma's having singular thought is an established fact as H&M also agree, and that is the end of the story. Thelma does not need to be able to think about the snatcher under every possible guise to have singular thoughts about him. This is impossible for her. Why (1) and (2) are sometimes infelicitous even if Thelma has singular thought is simply another issue. Regardless whether Thelma has certain modes of presentation or useful information in contexts, she has singular thoughts about the snatcher anyway. Proponents of a constraint do not need to hold additionally the implausible inverse that if a singular thought ascribing report is infelicitous, then that is evidence that a subject does not have any singular thought.

For example, suppose the singular belief ascribing sentences "The copy boy believes of Superman that he can fly" and "The copy boy believes that Superman can fly" are true. Then we can safely conclude that the copy boy has singular thoughts about Superman, that very man, aka Clark Kent. He perhaps saw that Superman was flying. Now it is an established fact that the copy boy has the ability to have singular thought about Superman. To get this ability, the copy boy does not need to be able to think about Superman under every possible guise. It is impossible for him. Of course, there might be some infelicitous singular belief ascribing reports like "The copy boy believes of Clark Kent that he can fly" or "The copy boy believes that Clark Kent can fly." But explaining the felt infelicity is not relevant to whether the copy boy has singular thoughts. Proponents of a constraint can agree that it might be explained by some other theoretical (naïve or notional) tool-kits regarding Frege's Puzzle that H&M suggested above, because it is simply another issue. There seems to be no reason why proponents of a constraint cannot do this.

In order to criticize a substantial constraint thesis, opponents have to argue that there

are cases where a singular thought ascribing sentence is true but the constraint is not satisfied, not cases where the constraint is satisfied, but a singular thought ascribing sentence is infelicitous. I will consider this line of criticism in the following sections.

3.2.2. "There is Someone That *S* Believes to Be *F*" Locution

H&M argue that "there are contexts where it seems we can make true claims of the form 'There is someone that *S* believes to be *F*' simply because *S* accepts a claim of the form 'There is a unique *G* that is *F*'" (H&M 2012: 50). On the supposition that the "There is someone that *S* believe to be *F*" locution is an appropriate form of a singular belief ascribing sentence in our ordinary discourse, they conclude that even if a substantial constraint is not satisfied, there is a case where a subject has singular thought.

Here is one of their examples:

> *Shortest Politician*) [S]uppose we are debating about whether the shortest politician, whoever that is, is likely to be a spy. Ralph thinks that the shortest politician is not only a spy but also the shortest spy. Here, "Someone is believed by Ralph to be the shortest spy" is acceptable.
>
> Such examples are easy to contrive if we note the connection between the exported description and various "wh"-questions. Assume it is known that there is a shortest politician. If it is acceptable in a context to answer the question "Who does Ralph believe to be the shortest spy?" by saying, "The shortest politician", then it will also be acceptable in that context to claim
>
> [(3) There is someone Ralph believes to be the shortest spy.]
>
> (Likewise, if it is acceptable in a context to answer the question "Who does Ralph believe to be a spy?" with a list that includes "The shortest politician", it will be acceptable in context to report that there is someone that Ralph believes to be a spy.) (H&M 2012: 46).[14]

According to H&M, no substantial constraint is satisfied in this case. Ralph first only had the

[14] This is similar to Ernest Sosa's example (Sosa 1970: 891).

descriptive belief that the shortest politician is the shortest spy. However, in the context H&M suggested above, it is acceptable to utter (3). Therefore, there must be a non-substantial and easy way to have singular thought.[15]

I agree with them that (3) is felicitous in the *Shortest Politician* case. What I disagree with is their assumption that the "There is someone that *S* believe to be *F*" locution is an appropriate form of a singular belief ascribing sentence in our ordinary discourse. The reason is that when ordinary people felicitously use this locution, their interest is often on the "existence" of an object, not the "singularity", and not even the "uniqueness".

H&M's argument begins with Ralph's accepting a claim of the form "The *G* is the *F*", and from this, they maintain that it is acceptable to claim that there is someone Ralph believes to be *F* in some contexts. However, the same argument can go with the form "A *G* is an *F*". For example, suppose that there is a multiple-choice question for children like "Which of the following is a spy?", and the choices are "a short spy", "a short dog", and, "a small cup". Here if Ralph believes that a short spy is a spy, and there exists a short spy in the world, then for the same reason as H&M's case, it seems acceptable to claim that there is something Ralph believes to be a spy in this context. But it is far-fetched to say that Ralph has a singular thought about any particular spy. There is even no descriptive information that picks out any unique object at all.[16]

For a more evident example, suppose that Ralph had the descriptive belief that only a car

[15] H&M consider the easy availability of referential vehicles and the context-sensitivity of singular thought as possible alternative explanations of this case (H&M 2012: 50-51).

[16] We can also explain away the felt felicity of the report, "There is something Ralph believes to be a spy" by pointing out the fact that Ralph believes about the abstract entity, viz. the property of being a short spy that it is a spy. This is an acceptable result for proponents of a constraint, if we assume that Ralph is cognitively connected with this abstract entity. (I thank Nathan Salmon for indicating this point.)

is a machine. Then for the question "Is there anything Ralph believes to be a machine in the world?", ordinary people might reply, "Yes, there is something Ralph believes to be a machine in the world", simply because a car exists in the world. Still, in this context, there is even no descriptive information that picks out any unique car, and it is far-fetched to say that now Ralph has a singular thought about any particular car. The focus is rather on whether a car exists in this world, neither the singularity nor even the uniqueness of a particular car. Suppose further that every car is destroyed by car haters; then we might say that there is no longer something Ralph believes to be a machine in the world. If any car is assembled again, then we might say again that there is something Ralph believes to be a machine in the world.

If my diagnosis of the "There is someone that *S* believe to be *F*" locution in ordinary discourse is right, H&M's argument loses its persuasiveness. (3) seems felicitous in the above context, because Ralph believes that the shortest politician is the shortest spy and the shortest politician exists, not because Ralph has a singular thought about the shortest politician. Once we know that the shortest politician exists, then ordinary people might naturally claim that there is someone Ralph believes to be the shortest spy. But it still seems clear to me that Ralph's descriptive thought is not about any particular politician, and it seems false as well that Ralph believes of the shortest politician, that very person, that he is the shortest spy. The "There is someone that *S* believe to be *F*" locution seems not to be an appropriate form of a singular belief ascribing sentence in our ordinary discourse.

3.2.3. Projection of Singular Thought

Still, there seem to be some cases where we can make true claims of the form "*S* believes that *N* is *G*", even if a substantial constraint is not satisfied. H&M provide the following

example.

> *Philosopher*) [P]erhaps there are contexts where "Ralph believes that they are *F*", and "*N* is one of them" entails "Ralph believes *N* is *F*". Certainly there are contexts where such transitions seem felicitous. For example, there are contexts where one of us can say "Phil believes I am engaged in a worthless activity" on the basis of Phil saying "Philosophers are engaged in a worthless activity" (H&M 2012: 51).

Here we have to suppose that Phil does not have any interactions with us to ensure that a substantial constrain is not satisfied. Perhaps we accidentally overheard what Phil says.

Here is my own similar example about the shortest spy:

> *Nimble Spy*) Ralph infers that the shortest spy must be nimble from the fact that a short man is generally nimble, and says, "The shortest spy must be nimble." Ortcutt, the shortest spy, and I are watching Ralph's behavior by surveillance camera, and I say to Ortcutt "Now Ralph believes that you must be nimble."[17]

The idea of these examples is that if a subject *S* believes that every (or the) *G* is *F*, and *N* is *G*, then it is felicitous to claim that *S* believes that *N* is *F* in some extremely relaxed contexts. The above contexts are these cases, and the following singular belief ascribing sentences are felicitous in each case.

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[17] This is similar to Sosa (1970: 890), Kaplan (1989a: 555-556 n.71), and Wettstein (1986: 205)'s examples, but they must be modified by eliminating any causal connection between the subject and the object to make sure that a substantial constraint is not satisfied. In all of their examples, there seems to be a causal connection between the subject and the object. Salmon points out that the subject has singular thoughts in those so-called *pseudo de re* cases, and belief reports must be interpreted as reporting singular beliefs (Salmon 2004: 241-245). Our cases are significantly different from those in the sense that no substantial constraint is satisfied. Rachel Goodman's (2017: 3.2.5) example is similar to ours. No constraint is satisfied in her example.

(4) Phil believes that I am engaged in a worthless activity.[18]

(5) Ralph believes that you must be nimble.

I would like to call these cases *the projection of singular thought* to the effect that both contexts are such that the speaker projects their ability to have singular thought onto the subject. That is why the singular belief reports such as (4) and (5) seem felicitous. But I believe that they are actually false and it is not that difficult to show why.[19]

For example, in the *Philosopher* case, if we feel some felicity from the report (4), that is because, I suggest, I can (pragmatically) convey to my interlocutor the conditional proposition expressed by "If Phil knows (or believes) that I am a philosopher, he will believe that I am engaged in a worthless activity" or something similar. This proposition seems true. However, the proposition literally expressed by the sentence "Phil believes I am engaged in a worthless activity" itself seems false. In this context, since we suppose that no substantial constraint is satisfied, it is also supposed that Phil does not know (or believe) that I am a philosopher. Then it seems false to claim that Phil does not know (or believe) that I am a philosopher but he believes that I am engaged in a worthless activity, from the fact that Phil believes that philosophers are engaged in a worthless activity. What the context contributes here is not to make what I literally say true, but to make me convey something true, say, the conditional proposition. It seems clear to me that if we as interlocutors are reminded that Phil

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[18] There is in fact a scope ambiguity. Under the wide-scope reading, (4) is disambiguated as the sentence "$\exists$ x(I am engaged in x & Phil believes x is a worthless activity)". But even if it is felicitous, it only suggests that Phil has a singular thought about the activity I am engaged in. Therefore, I will assume that H&M's intention is to argue that even under the narrow-scope reading, (4) is still felicitous, and it suggests that Phil has a singular thought about me. (I thank Salmon for indicating this point.)

[19] François Recanati (2010: 168-169, 2013: 152-153) claims that since the result that Phil and Ralph have singular thoughts is clearly unacceptable, the criterion for singular thought is not given by attitude reports. But it seems to me that simply saying "It is clearly unacceptable" is begging the question H&M would not agree with. We need an argument to show why it is unacceptable.

does not know (or believe) that I am a philosopher in this context, we will deny that Phil believes that I am engaged in a worthless activity.

Likewise, in the *Nimble Spy* case, the reason why (5) sounds felicitous is that by saying (5), I can (pragmatically) convey the conditional proposition that if Ralph knows (or believes) that you (Ortcutt) are the shortest spy, then he will believe that you must be nimble. But by supposition, Ralph does not know (or believe) that you are the shortest spy, and it is false to claim that Ralph does not know (or believe) that you are the shortest spy but he believes that you must be nimble, from the fact that Ralph believes that the shortest spy must be nimble. (5) is false.

In short, to make "*S* believes that *N* is *F*" true from the truth of "*S* believes that every (or the) *G* is *F*", what we need is not the fact that *N* is *G*, but the fact that *S* knows (or at least believes) that *N* is *G*. Since it is supposed in the contexts, where no substantial constraint is satisfied, that *S* does not know (or believe) that *N* is *G*, it is false to claim that *S* does not know (or believe) that *N* is *G* but *S* believes that *N* is *F*. That is, the right conjunct is false. The felt felicity is explained by the fact that in our contexts, we can (pragmatically) convey the conditional proposition that if *S* knows (or believes) that *N* is *G*, then *S* believes that *N* is *F* by saying "*S* believes that *N* is *F*". I think that this diagnosis seems to provide a neat explanation of these *projection of singular thought* cases.[20]

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[20] For these projection cases, Goodman (2017) rather suggests that attitude verbs are context-sensitive terms. According to her, (4) and (5) are literally true, because in some contexts of using "believe", it is possible that the truth-condition of "*S* believes that *p*" does not need *S*'s entertaining the content *p*. It is sometimes governed by the speaker's (not *S*'s) beliefs about the object of the attitude ascribed (or the speaker's beliefs about the audience's beliefs). That is, in the *Philosopher* context, for example, although Phil is just entertaining the descriptive content expressed by "Philosophers are engaged in a worthless activity," it suffices for (4) to be true, because the truth-condition here is governed by our belief that I am a philosopher, not Phil's. Phil is truly belief-related to the singular content even though his mental-state is not singular.

This is an interesting suggestion, but the context-sensitivity view of attitude verbs Goodman holds seems to

3.2.4. Jeshion's Cognitivism and Significance Condition

Jeshion holds the so-called cognitivism about singular thought. Here I briefly introduce her cognitivism and raise a few problems. Her view roughly consists of two claims. First, we think singular thoughts about objects if and only if we think of them through mental files: mental files constitute the agent's individuation of objects and mode of identification of objects, and each mental file is a repository of information that the agent takes to be about a single object. Second, according to Jeshion's cognitivism, what constrains the introduction of mental files is a significance condition: a mental file is initiated on an object only if that object is significant to the agent with respect to her plans, projects, affective states, motivations, etc. Therefore, from these two claims, it follows that the significance condition becomes a constraint on singular thought (Jeshion 2010).

Part of Jeshion's reasoning hinges on the difference between the following two similar examples.

> *Footprints*) You are running along the edge of the Pacific Ocean and see a trail of footprints in the sand. You think to yourself, "Man, he has big feet." You have no interest whatsoever in discovering whom the big-footed runner is, and no standing general interests in foot sizes. As

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commit to the retraction problem. Suppose that Goodman's view is right, and (4) is literally true because the truth of (4) does not need Phil's entertaining the singular content that I am engaged in a worthless activity due to the meaning of "believe" in the context. Now suppose further that my friend, Jim asks me, "Hey, Phil does not know that you are a philosopher. Then how can he believe that you are engaged in a worthless activity?" Now my reaction might be something like "Well, you are right. He actually does not believe that I am engaged in a worthless activity. (But what I intend to convey is that if he knows that I am a philosopher, he will believe that I am engaged in a worthless activity.)", not something like "Now you are using the word 'believe' different from how I used. Still what I said was literally true." That is, if "believe" is a context-sensitive term, I will not retract what I said. However, suppose that I say "This cell is large" in a laboratory, and even if one asks me "Hey, didn't you say yesterday that a human being was small? Then how is it possible that that cell is large?", I will not retract what I said. I might explain that the situation is different from yesterday. That is because the words "small" and "large" are context-sensitive terms and they mean something different according to criteria in different contexts. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that "believe" is not a context-sensitive term at least in the form Goodman suggests.

you run along, you give no further thought to the footprint (Jeshion 2010: 115).

Bearprint) I go off camping in the Sierras with my family. We set up our tent, hoist our food in a tree. […] The mud on the banks reveals what I recognize to be a grown male bear's footprints. Later, after washing up the dishes from dinner, my husband notices what he recognizes to be fresh bear scat. Knowing what we know about bears-especially that they are solitary and territorial-we automatically start debating about whether we should go AWOL. I say: I think we should get off his turf (Jeshion 2010: 117).

According to Jeshion, our intuition says that the subject has singular thought only in the *Bearprint* case, even though they have roughly the same kind and amount of evidence of the objects in both cases. This is because the bear is significant to the subject only in the *Bearprint* case: she begins to worry and undertake deliberation, planning, and action in connection to that bear, while the subject does not have any interest in the jogger in the *Footprints* case. In other words, only in the *Bearprint* case, the subject initiates a mental file for the particular bear because it is significant to her (Jeshion 2010).

Another reason for cognitivism is based on Jeshion's observation that we seem to be able to have singular thought about various objects including even nonexistent objects. According to her, we have an intuition that astronomers' Vulcan thoughts in the past have the same form as other singular thoughts. The thought is not descriptive in that it is not fully conceptualized. Furthermore, the nonexistence of the planet seems inessential to the characterization of the subject's psychological state; it seems that the psychological state would be the same even if the planet existed. Once Vulcan is significant to astronomers, the Vulcan mental file can be initiated in their psychology (Jeshion 2002a: 58).

However, there are several problems with cognitivism. First and foremost, Jeshion's cognitivism seems to be an analysis of the conditions for having a form of singular thought, but as I pointed out in Introduction, there are at least two different concepts of singular

thought, and our issue in this dissertation is the conditions for having objective-relative singular thought. In the above Vulcan case, there is in fact the other intuition about whether astronomers had a singular thought: if we ask whether they had a singular thought *about any particular planet*, the answer must be "No, they failed to have it."[21] Jeshion seems to fail to distinguish these two concepts of singular thought, and there is no prima facie reason to think that the same conditions must apply to both. While Jeshion's significance condition seems to be interpreted as a condition simply about initiating a mental file, which is related to a form of singular thought, it does not guarantee the subject having an object-relative singular thought. Still, if the significance condition is interpreted as a condition for a form of singular thought, it is compatible with the trackability condition for object-relative singular thought I have suggested in this chapter.

Second, in a similar vein, it seems that the subject at least can have an object-relative singular thought about the jogger in the *Footprints* case.[22] A substantial constraint is satisfied because the subject is causally connected with the jogger, and there seems to be no reason to think that she cannot think about that person. To be sure, she might not *consciously* think about the jogger when she sees the footprints unlike the *Bearprint* case, but that does not mean that she cannot think about that jogger. Our issue is whether the subject has the ability to think about a certain object when she intends to think, not when the subject is actually entertaining singular contents. Since the subject has the same ability in both cases, there seems to be no crucial difference between two. The only difference is the fact that the subject is presently explicitly entertaining a singular content about the bear in the *Bearprint* case, but

[21] This is consistent with the claim that they have singular thoughts about Vulcan as a mythical object (*Cf.* Salmon 1998). See n.5.

[22] Sawyer (2012) and Genone (2014) also think that the subject has singular thought in this case.

this is not our issue.

Lastly, as Goodman points out, even if we interpret Jeshion's cognitivism as a theory of a form of singular thought, it seems that initiating a mental file when the object is significant to the agent does not even guarantee having a form of singular thought. That is because sometimes the pattern of significance tracks the instantiation of a certain set of properties in the world by whichever particular thing happens to possess those properties. Here is Goodman's example: imagine that I am a collector of ceramics. My interest in ceramics is aesthetically driven. I am interested in acquiring pieces with certain *general* properties like color, shape, texture, etc. I have developed a strong interest in acquiring a piece that meets a certain property specification. If I find out, for example, the Italian cup isn't the right color, this particular object is no longer of interest to me. There is stability to my plans, projects and affective states—they remain consistently directed at the object with certain properties—it's just that my beliefs about which thing that is change. The point of the example is that it combines significance with thinking of a thing only insofar as it is the possessor of certain properties, and this is the mark of descriptive rather than singular thought. Goodman thinks that it suggests we should take seriously the proposal that there can be a descriptive mental file that is on whichever thing satisfies certain properties (Goodman 2016a, 2016b).[23]

In short, it seems true that a mental file is initiated only if an object is significant to the subject, but first, this significance condition is not a constraint on objective-relative singular thought. There are at least two different concepts of singular thought, and the significance condition seems to be only about a form of singular thought. There is no reason to think that

[23] Likewise, it seems plausible that if the shortest spy is significant to Ralph (For example, Ralph might believe that the shortest spy, whoever he or she is, wants to kill him), he might initiate a descriptive mental file about the shortest spy before a substantial constraint is satisfied.

the same condition also must apply to objective-relative singular thought. Second, the significance condition in fact does not seem to be directly relevant to acquiring the ability to have object-relative singular thought. It seems that a more substantial constraint must be satisfied for this. Lastly, there seem to be the existences of descriptive mental files.

3.2.5. Introducing Names by Reference-Fixing

Let us recall the singular proposition argument in 0.2.2, and compare again the following pair of belief ascribing sentences:

(6) Ralph believes that if the shortest spy exists, the shortest spy is a spy.

(7) Ralph believes that if Shorty exists, Shorty is a spy.

Let us now suppose that Ralph introduces the name "Shorty" by means of the definite description "the shortest spy". But he introduces "Shorty" as a Millian name, not as an abbreviation. In order words, "Shorty" is a descriptively introduced name in the sense that the role of the description here is simply to fix the reference of a name, not to give its meaning.

Then according to Saul Kripke (1980), by this linguistic stipulation, Ralph, as a stipulator, can know *a priori* the contingent proposition that if Shorty exists, Shorty is a spy. Ralph does not seem to need to do any empirical investigation to know that if Shorty exists, Shorty is a spy because he himself introduced the name "Shorty". Since the linguistic stipulation guarantees Ralph's singular knowledge, it also seems to guarantee the truth of the singular belief ascribing sentence (7). But if (7) is true, then Ralph has a singular thought about Shorty. Therefore, there seems to be an easy way to know the singular proposition even if a

substantial constraint is not satisfied.[24]

The issue in fact needs further discussion. Here there are complicated issues regarding linguistics stipulation, the contingent *a priori*, and singular thought. I shall discuss them in depth in the next chapter.

* * *

In this chapter, I have suggested trackability as a substantial constraint on singular thought, and provide responses to some objections. As we have seen, I believe that my suggestion can provide a unified theory of singular thought.

[24] Proponents of this reasoning as follows: Kaplan 1979; Kripke 1980; Jeshion 2000, 2001, 2002; H&M 2002.

Chapter 4: The Myth of Descriptive Names

At the end of the last chapter, I mentioned the objection from descriptive names. In this chapter, I shall argue that there is no way to have extra-linguistic knowledge in question simply by introducing a descriptive name. I first start from clarifying the argument for the contingent *a priori* and point out one implicit assumption the argument for the contingent *a priori* hinges on, which is the real issue behind the contingent *a priori*: the assumption that stipulative linguistic knowledge can play a justificatory role in having extra-linguistic knowledge. I argue that this assumption is implausible and, hence, so is the argument for the contingent *a priori*. Then I consider the attempt to assimilate our issue into an instance of Frege's puzzle, and argue that Frege's puzzle is not directly relevant to what is at issue. Finally, I explain why there is nothing epistemically special about descriptive names as distinct from ostensive names.

4.1. Descriptive Names and the Contingent *A Priori*

Consider the following situation:

> *Newman2*) Time flies like an arrow. Now is September 2099. A century ago, our celebration for the first baby born in the 21st Century was successful. He was named "Newman1" and becomes a 100-year-old man. We are now preparing the next celebration for the first baby born in the 22nd Century. Again, the celebration organizing committee agrees to name the first baby born in the 22nd Century "Newman2".[1]

[1] The example is from Kaplan 1968, 1978. I have slightly changed his example to avoid any ontological commitment to future objects if possible. In my example, since now is September 2099, the unborn baby who will be the first baby born in the 22nd Century already exists in his or her mother's womb.

Suppose that Shandra is one of the committee members. Then, does she know when Newman2 will be born?[2] Many might be inclined to reply "Yes", because Shandra seems to know that he or she will be born at January 1st, 2100 on the assumption that the first baby will be born at that day (not at January 2nd). In this chapter, I shall argue that Shandra does not know it.

Let us start by considering an argument in favor of the view that Shandra knows when Newman2 will be born in the above situation, the Kripkean argument for the contingent *a priori*. Consider the following sentence:

(1) If Newman2 exists, Newman2 is the first baby born in the 22nd Century.[3]

According to Kripke (1980), the proposition expressed by (1) is knowable *a priori* to Shandra, as a stipulator of the name "Newman2". She is the very person who first introduces the name "Newman2" by means of the description "the first baby born in the 22nd Century". Through this linguistic stipulation, it seems that she does not need to do any empirical investigation in order to know the proposition expressed by (1). Without attending the new-era celebration, and without seeing who will be the first baby at the celebration, she can know *a priori* the proposition expressed by (1).

Here "Newman2" is a descriptively introduced name, not an abbreviation: the role of the description "the first baby born in the 22nd Century" is simply fixing the reference, not giving

[2] For convenience, let us suppose that the question is asking which day Newman2 will be born in this context.

[3] The if-clause "If Newman2 exists" in (1) is used to avoid the worry about whether the existence of a particular physical object is not knowable *a priori*. (See Carter 1976, Cowles 1994, and Ray 1994 for the debate about this issue.)

the meaning of the name "Newman2".[4] That is why the proposition is contingent. If Newman2 had been born a little earlier or later, another baby could have been the first baby born in the 22nd Century:[5] there are some possible worlds where Newman2 is not the first baby born in the 22nd Century. Therefore, the proposition expressed by (1) that Shandra knows *a priori* is a contingent one.

A few remarks would help to clarify this argument: first, it is assumed that the proposition expressed by (1) is a singular proposition, which is directly about Newman2. So, the proposition is about a fact in the world external to us, in the sense that a particular external physical object, Newman2, has a particular contingent property, the property of being a unique first baby born in the 22nd Century. Therefore, it is also assumed that if Shandra knows the singular proposition expressed by (1), she has the singular knowledge about Newman2 that he or she is the first baby born in the 22nd Century.

Second, in a similar vein, I will assume the Millian theory about descriptive names, the view that the semantic content of a name is simply its reference, and also assume that it is at least theoretically possible to introduce a descriptively introduced name as a Millian name, not as an abbreviation.[6] As Keith Donnellan pointed out, what is at issue is not whether ordinary speakers will introduce the name "Newman2" as a Millian name or as an abbreviation in a real-life situation: "We must separate the factual issue of whether it is part of our actual practice ever to introduce names in this way from the theoretical issue of

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[4] I shall use the term "descriptive names" for names whose references are fixed by mean of definite descriptions, but it does not imply that they express descriptive contents. I will rather assume that they are descriptively introduced Millian names.

[5] We might be able to say this after the new-era ceremony, or we can assume determinism for the sake of argument. But this assumption is not essential for the Kripekan argument.

[6] Therefore, I will not consider the description theory-friendly positions about descriptive names such as Evans 1979 and Reimer 2004. For criticism of these positions, see Salmon 1988: 198-199n. and Jeshion 2004.

whether names could be introduced in this way" (Donnellan 1977: 14). The contingent *a priori* is a theoretical issue.

Third, the issue is whether a contingent proposition is knowable a *priori* to a stipulator, not to any others. It seems uncontroversial that there is no way for a non-stipulator, who was not present when the stipulation occurred, to know *a priori* the proposition expressed by (1): she needs some empirical investigation to justify her belief to know it. Namely, the issue is whether a stipulator is in the epistemically privileged position to know *a priori* the proposition that cannot be knowable *a priori* to any non-stipulators.

I shall argue that there is no Kripke style contingent *a priori*.[7] But this is just a part of my aim in this chapter. In Section 4.2, I point out one implicit assumption the argument for the contingent *a priori* hinges on, and that is the real issue behind the contingent a priori: the assumption that stipulative linguistic knowledge can play a justificatory role in having extra-linguistic knowledge. In Section 4.3, I argue that this assumption is implausible and, hence, so is the argument for the contingent *a priori*. In Section 4.4, I consider the attempt to assimilate our issue into an instance of Frege's puzzle, and argue that Frege's puzzle is not directly relevant to what is at issue. In Section 4.5, I explain why there is nothing epistemically special about descriptive names as distinct from ostensive names.

4.2. The Real Issue behind the Contingent *A Priori*

With the remarks I mentioned in Section 4.1, let us reformulate the Kripkean argument for the contingent *a priori*. Suppose that a stipulator *S* introduces a descriptively introduced

[7] The other contingent *a priori* issue is regarding sentences containing indexicals such as "I exist", "I am here now", and "*P* iff actually *P*". I shall remain neutral on this issue.

name "*N*" by means of a reference-fixing description "the *F*", then we can reconstruct the argument as follows:

Argument for the Contingent *A Priori* (ACA):[8]

(ACA1) By performing the act of linguistic stipulation, *S* has the linguistic knowledge that "If *N* exists, *N* is the *F*" is true.
(ACA2) If so, then *S* is justified in believing that if *N* exists, *N* is the *F*.
(ACA3) If *S* is justified in believing that if *N* exists, *N* is the *F*, then *S* knows that if *N* exists, *N* is the *F*.[9]
(ACA4) *S*'s linguistic knowledge that "If *N* exists, *N* is the *F*" is true is *a priori.*
(ACA5) The singular proposition that if *N* exists, *N* is the *F* is contingent.
(Conclusion) *S* knows *a priori* the contingent singular proposition that if *N* exists, *N* is the *F*.

Since we assume that *S*'s linguistic knowledge by her own linguistic stipulation is *a priori* in (ACA4), on the assumption that knowledge whose justification is based on another *a priori* knowledge (and *a priori* reasoning) is also *a priori*, the conclusion follows from these five premises.

Here I believe that the real issue is on (ACA2). Since it is important to understand precisely what is going on there, I reformulate the idea behind it at length as follows:

Justification from Stipulative Linguistic Knowledge: *S*'s linguistic knowledge, which is based on *S*'s own linguistic stipulation, that "If *N* exists, *N* is the *F*" is true plays a justificatory role for *S* in having the extra-linguistic knowledge expressed by the sentence in question.

The crucial part of *Justification from Stipulative Linguistic Knowledge* (henceforth "*JSLK*") is that *JSLK* is about a case where *S*'s linguistic knowledge is based on her own linguistic

[8] Thanks to Korman for helping me to reformulate the argument.

[9] This is for putting aside the Gettier problem for the sake of argument.

stipulation.[10] Since we assume that *S*'s linguistic knowledge by her own linguistic stipulation is *a priori* in (ACA4), if *JSLK* is true, then there is *a priori* way for *S* to get extra-linguistic knowledge by her own linguistic stipulation, and this extra-linguistic knowledge would be an instance of the contingent *a priori*.

The problem is that *JSLK* is implausible. How can *S*'s linguistic knowledge by her own performance of linguistic stipulation play a justificatory role in having extra-linguistic knowledge about the world external to *S*? Keith Donnellan (1977), Nathan Salmon (1986, 1988), and Scott Soames (2003: Chapter 16) are skeptical about this possibility.[11] For example, Donnellan says,

> If a truth is a contingent one then it is made true, so to speak, by some actual state of affairs in the world that, at least in the sorts of examples we are interested in, exists independently of our language and our linguistic conventions. How can we become aware of such a truth, come to know the existence of such a state of affairs, merely by performing an act of linguistic stipulation? (Donnellan 1977: 13).

I believe that this worry is legitimate, and the real issue behind the contingent *a priori* is on *JSLK*.

At this point, it is worth noting that *JSLK* is a more general claim about stipulative linguistic knowledge as a justificatory source. *JSLK* itself does not mention the epistemological and the modal statuses of the singular proposition that if *N* exists, *N* is the

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[10] Therefore, it is important to distinguish between *JSLK* and justification from testimony. The latter is not about *S*'s own linguistic stipulation: roughly speaking, if *S* understands the proposition expressed by a sentence "*P*" and has a reliable source except herself to believe that "*P*" is true, then *S* is justified to believe the proposition expressed by "*P*". This principle seems plausible. However, our case is not about testimony from other sources, but about linguistic knowledge from *S*'s own stipulation.

[11] It is interesting that Saul Kripke himself is explicitly aware of this worry too. (Kripke 1980: 63n.).

F.[12] Namely, it implies that in principle, the same issue can arise from any kinds of singular propositions that have the same form regardless of their epistemological and modal statuses, when a stipulator introduces a descriptive name "*N*" by a reference-fixing description "the *F*". Based on this observation, I will argue against *JLSK* in Section 4.3.[13]

However, before providing an argument against *JSLK*, it would also be worthwhile to mention the role of (ACA4) in the argument. There are in fact two ways to criticize the argument for the contingent *a priori*. The first way is to falsify (ACA4), and to argue that *S*'s linguistic knowledge by performing an act of stipulation is not *a priori*. Then even if *JSLK* is true, *S*'s extra-linguistic knowledge, whose justificatory source is from *S*'s linguistic knowledge, would not be *a priori*. The second way, which I will take on in this chapter, is to criticize *JSLK*, and argue that *S*'s stipulative linguistic knowledge, even if it is *a priori* (i.e., even if (ACA4) is true), does not play any justificatory role for *S* to have the extra-linguistic knowledge at all.

For the sake of argument, I will assume that (ACA4) is true through this chapter. But it is not beyond doubt. For example, Soames (2003: 408-410) argues that stipulative linguistic knowledge is not *a priori*, while Daniel Korman (2010) criticizes Soames's argument.[14]

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[12] It also does not mention both epistemological statuses of the proposition to a stipulator and to a non-stipulator. The former status depends on whether (ACA4) is true, given that *JSLK* is true.

[13] Jonathan Sutton (2001: 257-258) clearly got this point. Robin Jeshion (2000: 298-303, 2001: 113-114) maintains that the issue is whether a stipulator can have non-inferential or direct *a priori* (extra-linguistic) knowledge. This is misleading. Some basic logical or mathematical reasoning might be direct *a priori* and non-inferential, but not related to linguistic stipulation. Conversely, it may be the case that children who first acquire a language might need some inference from their introducing a name "*N*" to know that "If *N* exists, *N* is the *F*" is true. Jeshion's concept seems relative to each person's ability to reasoning, but our issue is simply about whether stipulative linguistic knowledge can be a justificatory source. By echoing Jeshion's point, Chris Tillman and Joshua Spencer (2012: 121-122) simply mentions a stipulator's "epistemic shortcuts" but does not explain at what point they arise.

[14] According to Korman, Soames requires publicity of *a priori* knowledge: if anyone can know it *a priori*, then everyone can know it *a priori*. Since there is no way for non-stipulators to know *a priori* the proposition that "If

Although this is, of course, an important issue, I shall stay neutral about it in this chapter. No matter the truth of (ACA4), the point of *JSLK* is that there is still a relatively easier way, whether or not it is *a priori*, for a stipulator to have extra-linguistic knowledge simply by performing an act of linguistic stipulation. I shall argue against this.

4.3. The Argument from Mathematical Knowledge

The aim of this section is to provide a more general argument against *JSLK*, which is partly based on Donnellan (1977), Salmon (1986, 1988), and Soames (2003). Although it may seem intuitive that *JSLK* is implausible, proponents of the contingent *a priori* would not agree with this prima facie intuition. Therefore, we need a substantial argument against *JSLK*, which can effectively *describe* why *JSLK* is an implausible principle. The strategy of my

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N exists, *N* is the *F*" is true (they have to empirically learn a stipluator's language to know it), it is not *a priori* at all. However, in the very same chapter, Soames (2003: 417-411) himself defends the view that the proposition that *P* iff actually *P* is knowable *a priori*, even though this proposition is not knowable *a priori* for inhabitants of a world other than our own where *P* is the case. Therefore, Soames must accept that publicity requirement is not correct, and (ACA4) is true (Korman 2010).

Perhaps Soames might have required publicity of *a priori* knowledge, but then what Korman's argument really shows is that Soames faces a dilemma: he must accept that (ACA4) is true or deny that the proposition *P* iff actually *P* is knowable *a priori*. I believe that the second horn is still viable. It might be argued that we need empirical justification to know that our world is the actual world, @.

However, it seems that Soames's argument is not essentially based on publicity of *a priori* knowledge, but based on a certain characteristic of a justificatory source. For Soames also argues that a stipulator's knowledge of certain *empirical* facts about her own use of the description "the *F*" to introduce and fix the referent of the name "*N*" plays a justificatory role in knowing the proposition that "If *N* exists, *N* is the *F*" is true (Soames 2003: 409). Soames seems to think that a stipulator cannot have knowledge even about her own performing an act of linguistic stipulation simply by reflection or *a priori* reasoning without recourse to any experience. Certainly, knowing some kinds of one's own performances needs empirical justification. Suppose that I performed an experiment in a lab yesterday. It seems that my belief that I performed an experiment is empirically justified. To be sure, it would be controversial whether our case about a linguistic performance is similar to this, or perhaps it might become a terminological issue whether knowledge about one's own linguistic performance is *a priori*. Again, I will stay neutral about this.

argument against *JSLK* is to start from a relatively clear case where *JSLK* does not work, and then to show that our cases have exactly the same structure.

Let us first consider the following situation:

> *CorrectSum*) Jennie should do her math homework, but she is too lazy to do it. She comes up with an easy way to solve the homework problems. She introduces the name "CorrectSum" and fixes its reference by means of the description "the sum of 3,428 and 5,377".

Let us set aside the question of whether "CorrectSum" can be a correct answer to this arithmetical problem. Instead, let us stay focused on the question of whether Jennie knows the arithmetical singular proposition about the correct sum, which is expressed by the following sentence:

> (2) If CorrectSum exists, CorrectSum is the sum of 3,428 and 5,377.

Now it seems clear that if she does not perform any kind of calculation, she does not have any arithmetical knowledge about the correct sum, i.e., 8,805 that if it exists, it is the sum of 3,428 and 5,377. Simply introducing the new descriptive name "CorrectSum" is not sufficient for having substantial arithmetical knowledge. She only comes to have the stipulative linguistic knowledge that "CorrectSum is the sum of 3,428 and 5,377" is true, or that whatever number referred to by "CorrectSum" is the sum of 3,428 and 5,377. However, this stipulative linguistic knowledge cannot play any justificatory role in getting extra-linguistic arithmetical knowledge. In order to know substantial mathematical facts by making cognitive contact with the so-called mathematical world, what we need as a

justification is a substantial mathematical reasoning, not linguistic manipulation.[15]

Note that there are various ways of knowing one and the same arithmetical proposition, which correspond to various types of calculations, which are in turn related to various ways of taking that same proposition. For example, we can calculate the sum of 5 and 7 based on the decimal system and come to know the proposition that 5 + 7 = 12. We can also do a little different type of calculation based on the binary system and come to know the same proposition expressed by the different sentence "$101_{(2)} + 111_{(2)} = 1100_{(2)}$". We do not even need any systematic numeral system to know that 5 + 7 = 12. Imagine the situation where I calculate the sum of the total number of apples and oranges by arranging them suitably and in some sense *seeing* the number of them. I might say, "The sum of the number of these apples (while pointing to 5 apples) and the number of those oranges

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[15] However, consider the following sentence (T): "CorrectSum is the sum of 3,428 and 5,377" is true if and only if CorrectSum is the sum of 3,428 and 5,377. Since the truth of (T) seems trivial, does Jennie already know the proposition expressed by (T)? So, can't she infer that CorrectSum is the sum of 3,428 and 5,377 from her linguistic knowledge that "CorrectSum is the sum of 3,428 and 5,377" is true and the trivial knowledge about (T)?

I believe that knowing the proposition expressed by (T) is not trivial, and she does not have this knowledge. Or at least we should not simply assume that she has that knowledge. Donnellan (1977: 18-19) argues that we must distinguish knowing that "*P*" is true from knowing that *P*. For example, suppose that I am a foreigner who starts to learn English. I have learned its basic grammar. I have also learned what "is", "true", and "if and only if" mean (or how they work), but not yet what "snow" and "white" mean. Suppose further that I am from a tropical rain forest region, so I haven't had any chance to get the least idea of what snow is; I haven't seen it, and I haven't even heard about it. Now suppose the English teacher says (or writes), "Snow is white" without any explanation about the meaning of the sentence. On the assumption that the teacher is a reliable person who does not tell a lie, now I know that "Snow is white" is true. Now consider the following (T'): "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white. Can I infer that snow is white from what the teacher says and my knowledge about (T')? It seems not. I still do not know that snow is white. I do not even know what snow is. What I know is that "snow is white" is true whatever that sentence means. To be sure, I know the proposition that (T') is true. But to know that snow is white, what I have to know is the proposition expressed by (T'), not the proposition that (T') is true. That is, we can use knowledge about the proposition expressed by (T') only if we appreciate all the meaning of the words in (T'). If I already know what "snow" and "white" mean, but wonder whether snow is white or black, then I can infer that snow is white from the teacher's testimony and my knowledge about (T') (see n.10).

As we have seen through the previous chapters, it seems that Jennie does not have the ability to think about the correct sum unless a substantial constraint is satisfied. Or at the very least, we should not assume the controversial view that Jennie knows the proposition expressed by (T) without any argument, even if we can assume that she knows that (T) is true. (Thanks to Korman for raising this issue.)

(while pointing to 7 oranges) is the number of these fruits (while placing 5 apples and 7 oranges together.)"[16] By seeing and grasping the number of things in each group, I come to know that 5 + 7 = 12. The point of these illustrations is that although there can be various ways of justifying our beliefs towards one and the same arithmetical knowledge, all of those justificatory processes, in any case, must at the very least consist of a substantial calculation, which is essentially different from linguistic manipulation.[17]

Let us now consider our original *Newman2* case. The case in fact has exactly the same structure as the *CorrectSum* case, so that the very same diagnosis can be applied. Just as we cannot have any knowledge about substantial arithmetical facts in the mathematical world without calculations, we cannot have any knowledge about a concrete physical object that it has a certain contingent property in the physical world without any empirical investigation. In the *CorrectSum* case, Jennie cannot know the extra-linguistic arithmetical fact about the correct sum, i.e., 8,805 that if it exists, it is the sum of 3,428 and 5,377 before doing any kind of calculation. Likewise, in the *Newman2* case, Shandra cannot know the extra-linguistic contingent fact in the physical world about a particular physical object, Newman2, that very baby, that if he or she exists, he or she is the first baby born in the 22nd Century before doing any empirical investigation.

In order to know the singular proposition expressed by (1), Shandra has to do some substantial empirical investigation about Newman2, that very baby, not linguistic manipulation. For example, Shandra should participate in the new-era celebration and see who finally becomes the first baby born in the 22nd Century among candidate babies, say,

[16] In fact, the proposition semantically expressed by this utterance is not directly about 5, 7, or 12. However, I can naturally convey the proposition that 5 + 7 = 12 in this context.

[17] Exceptions might be justifications from testimony and from memorization, but still they seem to ultimately depend on others' or my previous mathematical calculation.

Jim, Jane, May, and Lisa. Suppose that Lisa becomes the first baby born in the 22nd Century. By seeing this, Shandra finally comes to have the *a posteriori* knowledge that Lisa is the first baby born in the 22nd Century. However, did Shandra know about Lisa, aka Newman2, that if she exists, she is the first baby born in the 22nd Century even before participating this ceremony? It seems not. Shandra only has had the linguistic knowledge that whichever baby referred to by the name "Newman2" is the first baby born in the 22nd Century, or that "Newman2 is the first baby born in the 22nd Century" is true in any case. But it is not knowledge directly about Newman2, aka Lisa. Without making any substantial empirical contact with Newman2, which can play a justificatory role in knowing the singular proposition expressed by (1), Shandra cannot know any extra-linguistic contingent fact about Newman2 in the physical world external to us, simply by performing an act of linguistic stipulation.[18]

Of course, there might be various ways of contacting the same fact and of knowing one and the same singular proposition expressed by (1), which are related to various ways of taking that same proposition. One might directly participate in the new-era ceremony. Another might hear the news form Lisa's father. Others might watch the new-era ceremony on a television broadcast. However, all of those justificatory processes, in any case, must at the very least consist of empirical investigation, not linguistic manipulation. This is exactly like the fact that in order to know the arithmetical singular proposition expressed by (2), a justificatory process for having this knowledge must consist of a substantial calculation, not linguistic manipulation. No substantial extra-linguistic knowledge, whether it is *a priori* or *a posteriori*, can ever be easily obtained simply by manipulating or inventing

[18] In fact, Shandra cannot even think about Newman2 if the view I have provided through the previous chapters is correct.

some words in one's own idiolect, except the very knowledge that she herself performs this linguistic manipulation.

I expect that it might still be tempting to think that the proposition expressed by (1) is knowable *a priori*. I believe that this is because there is the intuition that in a real-life situation, it is likely that we introduce the name "Newman2" as an abbreviation of the description "the first baby born in the 22nd Century". There may be no practical reason to introduce the name "Newman2" as a Millian name if we cannot have any knowledge about her, that very baby, before the new-era ceremony.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is true that there is no practical reason to introduce the Millian name "Newman2". Still, that does not help proponents of the contingent *a priori* much. First, if we introduce the name "Newman2" as an abbreviation, then the proposition expressed by the sentence (1) becomes knowable *a priori*. But in this case, it also expresses the necessary proposition that if the first baby born in the 22nd Century exists, then the first baby born in the 22nd Century is the first baby born in the 22nd Century. This is a hackneyed example of the necessary *a priori* that does not attract any special interest.[19]

Second, and more importantly, as I pointed out with the quotation from Donnellan 1977: 14 in Section 4.1, our issue is theoretical, not factual. Even if there is no practical reason to introduce the Millian name "Newman2", it does not mean that it is theoretically impossible to introduce it. In fact, nothing theoretically precludes me from doing this. I

[19] It might be claimed that we might introduce "Newman2" as an abbreviation of "the *actual* first baby born in the 22nd Century". Then arguably, the proposition expressed by the sentence (1) is contingent and knowable *a priori*. However, then it does not of any distinct philosophical interest from the other contingent *a priori* regarding indexicals mentioned in n.7. But as I assumed in Section 4.1, our issue is whether there is any Kripke style contingent *a priori*, which is related to knowing a singular proposition about a particular object, not a descriptive proposition.

can even introduce “Newman2” as a Millian name right now and start to exchange it with other Millians. This theoretical possibility is sufficient for our issue. We should stay focused on this possibility and keep being cautious to avoid the temptation to think that a descriptive name is used as an abbreviation.

So far, I have argued that the *Newman2* case is similar to the *CorrectSum* case. However, what if Jennie introduces the name while doing a calculation? Consider the following case:

> *Numbie*) Doing her math homework, Jennie wants to name the numbers that she gets as the answers to the homework problems. She introduces the name “Numbie”, while correctly calculating the sum of 3,428 and 5,377.

In this case, Jennie is in a position to know the proposition expressed by (3).

> (3) If Numbie exists, Numbie is the sum of 3,428 and 5,377.

However, what plays a justificatory role for Jennie in having this arithmetical knowledge is not her stipulative linguistic knowledge, but the calculation she did when she introduced the name.

In fact, some famously alleged cases for the contingent *a priori* have the same structure as the *Numbie* cases: a stipulator’s knowledge is not justified by her stipulative linguistic knowledge, but by a substantial empirical investigation. Consider the following three cases:

One Meter) In 1793, France adopted the meter as its official unit of length. They used the standard meter bar S to introduce the name "one meter" for the length of S.[20]

Neptune) Urbain Le Verrier discovered some unexpected changes in the orbit of Uranus. With some mathematical apparatus, he inferred that an unknown planet caused gravitational perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. He decided to name this unknown planet "Neptune".

Jack the Ripper) In 1888, serial murders involving female prostitutes had occurred around the Whitechapel district of London. Pursuing a murder suspect, journalists and detectives named this serial killer "Jack the Ripper".

Now consider the following three sentences regarding each case:

(4) If the bar S exists, the length of S at t_0 is one meter.

(5) If Neptune exists, Neptune is the planet that causes perturbations in Uranus's orbit.

(6) If Jack the Ripper exists, Jack the Ripper is the man who committed the serial murders involving female prostitutes around Whitechapel district.[21]

In every case, I agree that each subject knows the propositions expressed by (4), (5), and (6), respectively. However, this is because the subject justifies his or her belief by means of empirical investigation when (or before) he or she introduces the name, not by means of linguistic stipulation.

First, consider the *One Meter* case, Salmon persuasively argues that the stipulator's

[20] For the sake of argument, I will assume that they introduced the term "one meter" as an ordinary name. (However, Salmon plausibly analyzes this term as follows: "A more plausible account parses the word 'meter' and its pluralization 'meters', as comprising a simple (non-compound) *functor* (like the 'squared' in the algebraic phrase 'three squared') i.e., an operator that attaches to a singular term to form a new singular term." (Salmon 1988: 197n)).

[21] Strictly speaking, we also need the if-clauses such as "If Uranus exists" in (5) and "If Whitechapel district exists" in (6) to avoid the existential worry. But I will omit them for convenience. Conversely, we can add the phrase "If one meter exists" in (4) if we want, but it seems redundant.

justificatory process for knowing the proposition expressed by (4) can only be empirical.

> [I]t would seem that no matter what stipulations one makes, one cannot know without resorting to experience such things as that S, if it exists, has precisely such-and-such particular length at t_0. It would seem that one must at least *look at* S's length, or be told that it is precisely that long, etc. Therefore, it would seem that the meter sentence is not *a priori* but *a posteriori*. (Salmon 1988: 198).

The stipulator's experience, i.e. her looking at S's length plays a justificatory role in knowing the singular proposition expressed by (4). If the stipulator has not yet seen the stick S and has absolutely no idea of its length, it seems clear that she does not know the proposition expressed by (4), although she has the linguistic knowledge that whatever length referred to by "one meter" is the length of S at t_0.

The other two cases are similar. In the *Neptune* case, Le Verrier knew the singular proposition expressed by (5). But how did he come to have this knowledge? Not simply by the linguistic stipulation he performed. He in fact discovered the astronomical fact about Neptune that it is the planet that causes perturbations in Uranus's orbit by doing empirical scientific investigation. He gathered some empirical data by observing some perturbations through a telescope, which were actually caused by Neptune, that very planet. He made contact with this very fact about Neptune, and this experience played a justificatory role in knowing the proposition expressed by (5).

The *Jack the Ripper* case is also similar. Let us assume that the detectives knew the singular proposition expressed by (6). Still, it is not by the linguistic stipulation they performed. They discovered the fact about Jack the Ripper that he was such-and-such a murderer by doing some empirical investigation such as inspecting the scenes of incidents and finding traces the murderer left, which were causally related to Jack the Ripper, that

very murderer. They made contact with this very fact about Jack the Ripper, and this experience played a justificatory role in knowing the proposition expressed by (6).

None of the above situations are like the *Newman2* and *CorrectSum* cases where a stipulator introduces a name by means of a pure definite description only, without any substantial justification. Rather they are like the *Numbie* case where Jennie introduces the name while doing a calculation, i.e., a substantial justification of her belief. Every stipulator in the above cases introduces the name with empirical justification of his or her belief. Again, there would be various ways to know the same propositions expressed by (4), (5), and (6), which are related to various ways of taking the propositions. But all of those justificatory processes must, in any case at the very least, consist of empirical investigation, not linguistic manipulation.

At this point, as Salmon (1988: 201-202) indicated, we have to bear in mind that in the above cases, the stipulator's experience not only plays a peculiar role in grasping a proposition (by grasping the reference of a name in question in our cases), but also plays a justificatory role in knowing the same proposition. It is especially important to notice that experience's playing one role does not exclude its playing the other role. In fact, the cases of the same experience's playing both roles are common when we first hear a particular person's name and grasp its reference. Suppose you say, "Feynman is a famous physicist" and this is my first time hearing the name "Feynman". Now consider the following sentence:

(7) If Feynman exists, Feynman is called "Feynman" by you.

In this situation, the same experience enables me to grasp the reference of the name

"Feynman", and also plays a justificatory role in knowing the proposition expressed by (7), which indicates the information I used when I grasped the name "Feynman". It seems obvious that I cannot know *a priori* that he is called "Feynman" by you without proper empirical justification based on my experience.

The following example of introducing an ostensive name would be more helpful to clearly understand our cases:

> *Pinky Clone*) I am a scientist who has created lots of clones. I would like to name each clone, but since they look like exactly the same, I think that I need some way to distinguish them qualitatively in order to appropriately use the names I give them. I decide to put a pink shirt on one clone and name him "Pinky".

Now consider the following sentence:

> (8) If Pinky exists, Pinky wears a pink shirt.

In this case, my visual experience about the pink shirt the clone wears helps me to fix the reference of the ostensive name "Pinky". However, it still seems obvious that knowing the singular proposition expressed by (8) is *a posteriori*, even if the proposition indicates the information I used when I introduced the name "Pinky". The same visual experience plays a justificatory role in having this knowledge; I have to at least see the color of the shirt Pinky wears to know it. There is no other way to know it without recourse to any experience. This is similar to the above three cases in that the name-introducer's experience helps him or her to fix the reference of a name, but at the same time it plays a justificatory role in knowing the proposition, which indicates the information he or she used when introducing the name.

In this section, I have argued that *JSLK* is implausible. There are two possible cases for introducing a descriptive name: either there is no justification for having extra-linguistic knowledge, or there is a substantial justification, whether it is *a priori* or *a posteriori*, which is not from linguistic manipulation. In both cases, stipulative linguistic knowledge does not play any justificatory role in having extra-linguistic knowledge. Therefore, I believe that it is safe to conclude that *JSLK* is false, until any plausible argument for *JSLK* is found.

4.4. Frege's Puzzle and the Contingent *A Priori*

In this section, I consider one possible strategy for defending the contingent *a priori* raised by Jeshion. She argues that the problem of the continent *a priori* has the same structure as Frege's puzzle; it is just one variant of Frege's puzzle. Once we understand this fact, we come to realize that there is nothing mysterious about the contingent *a priori*. We can just apply the same Millian solution to Frege's puzzle, whatever it is, to our issue about the contingent *a priori*.[22] In this section, I will argue that Frege's puzzle is not directly relevant to our issue.

I will first briefly introduce Jeshion's idea with her own terminology. According to her, the Millians who want to explain how beliefs towards the same proposition can differ in their cognitive values must take *belief states* as the object of epistemic appraisal and the primary bearers of justification.[23] The same singular proposition may be grasped in more than one

[22] Sutton (2001) adopts a similar strategy, but his strategy seems not thoroughly Millian. Tillman and Spencer (2012) provides a very similar argument to Jeshion's, which is based on the concept of information isolation (see n.25).

[23] This is regarded as a shared view among Millians such as Salmon 1986, Soames 1987, and Braun 1988

way, and these ways of taking the proposition individuate distinct belief states towards the same proposition. Two belief states having the same content can have distinctive justifications, and nothing prevents them diverging in source: empirical evidence might be required for one belief state to be justified, while reflection might suffice for the other. (Jeshion 2000: 305-312).

For example, Millians would accept that Pierre can have more than one belief state towards one and the same proposition that Paderewski is Paderewski. Let us suppose that Pierre is in Belief State MM when he takes this proposition in the way he does in thinking of Paderewski as the musician for both instances of Paderewski in the proposition, and he is in Belief State MS when he takes the same proposition in the way he does in thinking of Paderewski as the musician for one occurrence of Paderewski and as the statesman for the other. MM can be *a priori* justified: his ways of taking Paderewski are the same, and he can justifiably believe the proposition that Paderewski is Paderewski without any empirical investigation. But MS must be empirically justified: since he has two unconceptually connected ways of taking Paderewski, reflection is not sufficient to justifiably believe the same proposition (Jeshion 2000: 308-309).

This is a brief explanation of the gist of the Millian solution, but how is this solution supposed to shed light on our issue? According to Jeshion, once we understand that there are substantially different ways for justifying beliefs towards the same singular proposition, viz., one is *a priori* and the other is *a posteriori*, then we come to realize that there is nothing mysterious about the possibility that there is a relatively easier way for a stipulator than others to justify her belief state to know the same singular proposition. By performing a linguistic stipulation, the stipulator comes to be in a certain belief state towards the proposition which can be very easily justified, while a non-stipulator is normally not in that

same belief state. Therefore, without any special worry like the one Donnellan has, we can take at face value the result of the contingent *a priori*, say, the asymmetry of the epistemic efforts between a stipulator and a non-stipulator to know the same proposition.

To be sure, Jeshion's intention is not to defend the above Millian solution to Frege's puzzle, but to argue that the Millians who adopt this solution can also apply it to our issue. However, in order to apply the same Millian strategy, it must be given that there can be essentially different ways to justify two belief states towards one particular proposition in a specific situation. There is an independent reason to think that it is given in the *Paderewski* case; the proposition in question is about Paderewski's identity, i.e. the proposition about Paderewski that he is him, which seems obviously knowable by reflection independently of any experience, and there clearly exists a way in which knowing the truth of this identity claim is a piece of cake. However, our cases are not about knowledge of identity, but one instance of them is about knowledge of a particular physical object that it has a certain contingent property. It is at least not clear whether this is also knowable *a priori*, as is knowledge about identity. We need a substantial argument for this part.

In other words, if we already showed that *JLSK* is true, and if there were a way for a stipulator to justify her belief towards the proposition in question by linguistic stipulation, then we could apply the Millian solution to our case without any problem. But the real issue is whether the stipulator's belief state can be justified by linguistic stipulation, i.e., whether *JLSK* is true, and I have argued why it is implausible at length in Section 4.3. The Millian solution in itself does not shed any light on our real issue before it is given that *JLSK* is true.

To see effectively why, let us consider the following *Shripkean* argument for the contingent *a priori*: suppose that Cher is taking a science exam. One of the exam questions is "Which planet causes the perturbations of Uranus's orbit?", and the choices are "Mercury",

"Venus", "Jupiter", "Saturn", and "Neptune". At first, Cher does not have any idea of the answer, but suddenly she has a feeling that the name that starts with "N" must be the answer. She finally comes to believe the proposition expressed by (5). Proponents of the Shripkean contingent *a priori* argue that Cher knows the proposition expressed by (5) *a priori*. Given that knowing our own gut feeling is *a priori*,[24] then there is *a priori* way to know the proposition expressed by (5) based on knowledge of this feeling. But others who do not have the same gut feeling cannot know the same proposition *a priori*.

It might first seem mysterious how Cher knows the proposition expressed by (5) without any empirical justification. But once we understand that the situation has the same structure as Frege's puzzle, then we can admit that Cher is simply in a belief state, which can be *a priori* justified. My intention is to show that this reasoning is clearly absurd; the real issue is that a gut feeling cannot play any justificatory role in knowing this proposition. Likewise, whether or not *JLSK* is true is not touched by the Millian solution to Frege's puzzle. Proponents of the contingent *a priori* need an independent argument for *JSLK*.[25]

In fact, Jeshion provides a short explanation of how a stipulator can easily justify her own belief states.

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[24] The role of this part is parallel to (ACA4) in the original argument for the contingent *a priori* in Section 4.2.

[25] Tillman and Spencer (2012: 130-137) provides a pragmatic explanation about why a stipulator does not seem to have any extra-linguistic knowledge (or at least justified true belief), even though she actually has it. Roughly speaking, this is because the stipulator's belief state is informationally isolated for any other usual purposes. For example, in the *CorrectSum* case, Jennie actually knows what number the sum of 3,428 and 5,377 is. But we are inclined to deny that she has that knowledge because her belief state is not proper for the usual purpose of providing a numeral in the decimal (or any other) system.

However, their explanation also presupposes that *JLSK* is true without any substantial argument. Suppose that based on her gut feeling again, Cher comes to believe that Jack the Ripper was sleeping exactly 14.5 hours when he was a week old. Surprisingly, her belief turns out true completely by sheer luck. However, this is not knowledge at all simply because it is not justified. It is certainly implausible to say that even though she has this knowledge, we are inclined to deny this because her belief state is informationally isolated for our dominant purpose to catch Jack the Ripper. Like Jeshion's, their strategy can be viable only if whether and how a stipulator has or doesn't have extra-linguistic knowledge is already explained (see n.29).

> The content of the definite description *D* that S uses to fix the reference of the name *N* provides S with a way of taking *α*, Wd. S's belief state [when S takes the proposition that *α is Φ* in the way Wd] is such that Wd includes, or is identical to, the property *Φ* that S ascribes to *α*. It is *a priori* justified because in taking [the proposition that *α is Φ*] solely in way Wd, S can recognize [the proposition that *α is Φ*] as true without reliance on sense experience (Jeshion 2000: 310).

However, this explanation in itself seems implausible. Consider an ordinary person who always associates Einstein with the property of being a famous physicist. Her belief state is such that the way of taking Einstein includes the property of being a famous physicist that she ascribes to Einstein. However, it does not follow that she is in a position to know *a priori* that Einstein is a famous physicist due to her way of taking that proposition, unless we assume the description theory of names and maintain that ways of taking affect her belief content as well.[26] It seems obvious that regardless of her ways of taking, she needs some empirical investigation to know that Einstein is a famous physicist.

Jeshion might think that only if a way of taking *α*, Wd includes the property *Φ* that is used when S *first* grasps *α* of the name *N*, S's belief state can be *a priori* justified. I have already argued at the end of Section 4.3 that this is not true with the *Feynman* and *Pinky Clone* cases. For example, even if my way of taking Pinky includes the property of wearing a pink shirt, which is used when I grasp the reference of "Pinky", it does not mean that my belief state can be *a priori* justified without looking at the color of the shirt Pinky wears. The same goes for our *One Meter*, *Neptune*, and *Jack the Ripper* cases. In general, it does not follow that the belief state, when S takes the proposition that *α is Φ* in the way Wd, can be *a priori* justified, even if Wd includes the property *Φ* that S ascribes to *α*, unless we assume that the description theory of names is true or that S uses the name as an abbreviation. We

[26] Therefore, according to the description theory of names, which proposition is expressed by "If *N* exists, *N* is the *F*" depends on which properties a particular speaker associates the reference of "*N*" with. But Kripke's modal and epistemic arguments show that this result is at best highly implausible.

should keep in mind that ways of taking do not affect the contents of beliefs according to the Millian theory of descriptive names.[27]

Of course, I take for granted that there are various ways of taking the same singular proposition, as I have described in Section 4.3. Some belief states might be relatively easily justified, while others might not. For example, for ordinary people who use the decimal system, the belief state in regard to accepting the sentence "5 + 7 = 12" may be easily justified, while the belief state in regard to accepting the sentence "$101_{(2)} + 111_{(2)} = 1100_{(2)}$" may not, even if both are *a priori* justified. In addition, these two kinds of belief states might differ in their cognitive values. However, I have emphasized that both justifications must be through substantial calculation, regardless of whether or how one is easier than the other. Linguistic manipulation cannot play any justificatory role in either case.

Likewise, the belief states in regard to accepting the sentence, for example, "Jack the Ripper is the murderer" may be easily justified, while the belief states in regard to accepting the sentence "Richard Johnson is the murderer" may not be, even if both are empirically justified. The first belief state can be justified simply by inspecting the scenes of incidents and finding traces the murderer left, while justifying the second belief state might need lots of evidence which practically enable us to catch the murderer. Obviously, they have different

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[27] Sutton (2001) seems to make a similar mistake. According to him, we can relate one name to various name concepts. For example, one can relate "one meter" to her ostenstive name concept whose reference is fixed by ostenstion, while the other can relate to her descriptive name concept whose reference is fixed by the definite description concept <the length of stick S at t_0>. In the *One Meter* case, since the stipulator relates "one meter" to her descriptive name concept, she is in a position to know *a priori* that one meter is the length of stick S at t_0 without recourse to any experience, but this is trivial *implicit* knowledge everyone can have in principle, not extra-linguistic knowledge.

However, even if the stipulator relates "one meter" to the descriptive name concept, it is still puzzling how she can know the contingent singular proposition *a priori*. It seems not to be trivial implicit knowledge at all. Moreover, if the stipulator has some kind of trivial knowledge as Sutton suggests, it is difficult to know how she has it unless the stipulator's descriptive name concept is used as an abbreviation of her definite descriptive concept. I suspect that like Jeshion, Sutton also (mistakenly) thinks that ways of taking can affect the contents of beliefs.

cognitive values, especially regarding the arrest of the murderer. However, in both cases they are empirically justified by making substantial contacts with Jack the Ripper, that very person, in two different ways. Again, linguistic manipulation cannot play any justificatory role in knowing this extra-linguistic fact about Jack the Ripper in the physical world.[28,29]

4.5. The Myth of Descriptive Names

Before finishing this chapter, I shall briefly explain why there is nothing epistemically special about descriptive names as distinct from ostensive names. I will confine the issue to names of physical objects for convenience, but I believe that it can also shed some light on names of other kinds of objects.

It is generally agreed that an ordinary ostensive name is introduced by a name-giver through some perceptual acquaintance relation to the reference of the name: the name-giver performs a naming ceremony by uttering, for example, "I will name this baby 'John'". But we utter something different when introducing a descriptive name. Suppose that Le Verrier performs a naming ceremony for Neptune by uttering, "I will name the planet that causes perturbations in Uranus's orbit 'Neptune'". Since we use a complex demonstrative such as "this baby" when we perform a naming ceremony for an ostensive name while using a definite description for a descriptive name, we might think that an ostensive name must be essentially different in some way from a descriptive name.

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[28] The canonical example of this case is about the different cognitive values conveyed by the sentences "Hesperus shines brightly tonight" and "Phosphorus shines brightly tonight". Interestingly, Jeshion also seems to admit that both belief states can only be empirically justified (Jeshion 2000: 308).

[29] Given that both belief states are justified, Tillman and Spencer's pragmatic explanation now becomes a viable option.

This is not true at least for canonical descriptive names like "Neptune" and "Jack the Ripper", because what plays a necessary role in a naming ceremony for a descriptive name is not pure descriptive information, but some *causal* acquaintance relation to the object.[30] For example, Le Verrier is causally connected with Neptune by observing perturbations in Uranus's orbit, and this causal relation is what enables him to name Neptune "Neptune". Suppose that we are creatures who can in some sense point toward physical objects in our causal connection field, just as we can point toward objects in our visual field. Then we might perform a naming ceremony by uttering "I will name that planet 'Neptune'". However, since we cannot point toward objects in causal connection field, we cannot perform a naming ceremony by using a complex demonstrative, but rather use a definite description to help us track down the very object as the origin of the causal connection. In other words, the role of a definite description is simply to clarify which object is causally connected with a name-giver. But what plays an essential role in a naming ceremony for a descriptive name is this causal acquaintance relation to the object. After all, both types of naming ceremonies are based on our empirical cognitive contact with the reference of a name. The difference is simply whether this contact is perceptual or causal. I believe that descriptive names can even be re-categorized as ostensive names via causal acquaintance.

I suspect that the intuition that a stipulator comes to have substantial knowledge about a physical object by introducing a descriptive name is due to the fact that she has already made empirical cognitive contact with that physical object, as we have seen at the *Neptune* and *Jack the Ripper* cases.[31] However, once we understand that there is no essential difference

[30] By this, I simply mean that a name-giver is causally connected with the reference of a name under the ordinary concept of causation. (see Chapter 3: n.1)

[31] Even in the *One Meter* case, the stipulator can in some sense already be acquainted with that very length, one meter, by means of perceiving the length of the stick S.

between these canonical descriptive names and ostensive names, then it becomes clear that there is nothing epistemologically special about introducing these descriptive names. Again, that is why the propositions expressed by (5) and (6) regarding the descriptive names "Neptune" and "Jack the Ripper" have the same characteristic as the proposition expressed by (8) regarding the ostensive name "Pinky". They are simply propositions that specify the properties that help a name-giver to grasp the reference of a name.[32]

However, it is still theoretically possible that we have *non-canonical pure descriptive names* in our language. The examples are "Newman2" and "CorrectSum"; we have not yet made any cognitive contact with the references in these cases.[33] In fact, it is a little difficult to find a real-life example of a pure descriptive name, because it seems that in many cases, if we have not yet made any cognitive contact with an object that satisfies a definite description, we tend to use that name as an abbreviation.[34] There seems to be no practical reason to introduce it as a Millian name into our language if we have not yet grasped its reference.

Still, regardless of whether there are real-life examples, nothing precludes us from introducing pure descriptive names for objects we have not yet made any contact with.

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[32] In addition, there is also parallelism between a descriptive name and an ostensive name when a name-giver fails to introduce a name for a physical object because she is misguided. Le Verrier also introduced the descriptive name "Vulcan" for the planet that causes some irregularities in Mercury's orbit. But there is no planet like Vulcan. This case is parallel to the case where a name-giver is hallucinated when she is introducing an ostensive name for a particular physical object. In both cases, there is no empirical contact with a real object as intended; one is causal, and the other is perceptual.

[33] The other famous example is Gareth Evan's Julius case (Evans 1983). "Julius" is the pure descriptive name for the inventor of the zip.

[34] This might be challenged by some names in mathematics. For example, it may be the case that mathematicians introduced the pure descriptive name "π" for the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, even if they have not made any cognitive contact with that very number, π. Although how names in mathematics work needs an in-depth discussion, in this case I suspect that they actually made some cognitive contact with π, not by calculating what the exact number π is, but by *looking at* the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter via drawing and comparing the lengths of a particular circle and its diameter. There are various ways to make cognitive contact with the same object (*Cf.* Salmon 1988: 206-217).

Sentences containing these names then would express singular propositions, but I have argued that there is no way for a stipulator to know these singular propositions simply by performing an act of linguistic stipulation. To know them, she has to make some cognitive contact with these facts in some way, which plays a justificatory role in knowing these propositions.

* * *

In this chapter, I have mainly argued that stipulative linguistic knowledge by introducing a descriptive name cannot play a justificatory role in having extra-linguistic knowledge. Even if Shandra introduces the name "Newman2" for the first baby born in the 22nd Century, her stipulative linguistic knowledge cannot play a justificatory role in having the extra-linguistic singular knowledge that Newman2 is the first baby born in the 22nd Century. Shandra still does not know when Newman2 will be born.

Chapter 5: Against Predecativism about Names

Criticizing the description theory of names in Chapter 1.2, I have assumed that the semantic content of a name is its reference and the singular proposition expressed by a sentence containing a name is directly about its reference throughout this dissertation. However, according to contemporary predicativists about names, names which occur in argument positions have the same type of semantic contents as predicates. In this final chapter, I shall argue that these bare singular names do not have the same type of semantic contents as predicates. I will present three objections to predicativism – the modal, the epistemic, and the translation objections – and show that they succeed even against the more sophisticated versions of predicativism defended by Fara and Bach.

5.1. Predicativism about Names

Names which occur as unmodified bare singulars in argument positions seem to be used to refer to particular objects. Consider the following sentence:

(1) Alfred is a philosopher.

The bare singular name "Alfred" in (1) seems to simply refer to the very person, Alfred. This common usage of a name is often called a "referential use" of a name. Referentialists (or Millians) maintain that the semantic content of a bare singular name is just its reference. That is, the semantic content of the name "Alfred" in (1) is the individual, Alfred himself, who is a constituent of the singular proposition that Alfred is a philosopher.

However, names also can occur in predicate positions. Here are some variants of Tyler Burge's examples of so-called "predicative uses" of names (Burge 1973: 429).

(2) Alfreds are always snobs.

(3) An Alfred joined the club today.

(4) The Alfred who joined the club today was a baboon.

(5) There is one Alfred in Princeton.

(6) Not every Alfred is crazy; some are sane.

Considering its syntactic position, it seems that the name "Alfred" in each case can be used only as a predicate (or specifically, as a count noun): "Alfreds" in (2) occurs as a bare plural, and "Alfred" in (3), (4), (5) and (6) occurs as a complement to an indefinite article, a definite article, a numeric determiner, and a quantifier, respectively. We can replace "Alfred" in (2) – (6) by, for example, the predicate "attorney" without any grammatical infelicity.

For the sake of convenience, let us take it for granted that names have predicative uses, and the name "Alfred" is literally used as a predicate in (2) – (6). Now the question is whether the name "Alfred" in (1) is of the same type as "Alfred" in (2) – (6), i.e., whether the name "Alfred" in (1) is also a predicate.[1]

Referentialists claim that the name "Alfred" in (1) is not a predicate, because its semantic content is simply the individual Alfred, which is different from the semantic content of any ordinary predicate. But there are several prominent theorists who have contended that even bare singular names are predicates: Sloat 1969; Burge 1973; Bach 1987, 2002; Elbourne 2005;

[1] Stubborn referentialists might argue that since the semantic content of a name is simply its reference for any of its occurrences, the name "Alfred" in (2) - (6) is not literally used. In this chapter, however, I shall set aside this possibility, and take for granted that (2)-(6) are literal, predicative uses.

Matushansky 2008; Sawyer 2010; Fara 2011, 2015a, 2015b. These predicativists hold the semantic view that a name invariably has the same type of semantic content as a predicate, whatever it is. For example, if, as the orthodox position has it, a predicate contributes the property it expresses to the proposition expressed by the sentence containing that predicate, then a name also expresses a property and contributes that property to the proposition expressed by the sentence containing that name.

One of the primary rationales for predicativism is the so-called "uniformity argument": Other things being equal, a simpler, more uniform, and more economic theory is better than any other competing theories. That superior theory could explain all *relevant* phenomena more uniformly than others. Based on this reasoning, predicativists argue that if they can provide a unified theory of names without any inconsistency, it is superior to the theory that provides a separate semantic explanation for bare singular names from names in predicate positions. In this vein, Burge (1973: 437) says, "Our account covers plural and modified occurrences as well as singular, unmodified ones. A constants view not only is more complicated in that it must give a different semantics for these different occurrences. […] But it is also faced with the task of justifying its disunification. Appeal to 'special' uses whenever proper names clearly do not play the role of individual constants is flimsy and theoretically deficient."

One possible way of criticizing this uniformity argument is to attempt to show that there is actually no firm ground on which predicativists can maintain that their theory can provide more unified semantic explanation than referentialism.[2] This way of criticism presupposes the possibility that both theories can at least provide a consistent semantic explanation for the

[2] As an example, Robin Jeshion (2015a, 2015b) criticizes predicativism in this way.

relevant phenomena of names, and argues that there is no reason to think that predicativism is simpler and more uniform then referentialism. It is, therefore, not for directly *refuting* predicativism, but for showing that as a theory, predicativism is not superior to referentialism.

In this chapter, however, I shall attempt to directly refute predicativism by arguing that bare singular names cannot be predicates at all. This way of criticism attacks the very condition of "other things being equal" by showing that other things are actually not equal: there are some phenomena of which a competing theory cannot provide an explanation. Suppose, for example, that the eccentric semanticist holds the view that a preposition has the same semantic content as a predicate. She claims that her theory is superior because it explains the relevant phenomena uniformly. The obvious way of criticizing her theory is simply to show that a preposition cannot have the same semantic content as a predicate.

Similarly, I shall argue that a bare singular name in an argument position does not have the same semantic content as a predicate. I first introduce predicativists' being-named condition of names and present three objections against it: the modal, the epistemic, and the translation objections. Then I consider Delia Graff Fara's "the"-predicativism and Kent Bach's nominal description theory as possible responses and show why they fail.

5.2. Being-Named Condition of Names

A predicate expresses a certain property, and if an object has that property, then the object is in the extension of that predicate. For example, the predicate "bachelor" expresses the property of being an unmarried man (or simply being a bachelor), and if an object has the property of being an unmarried man, it is in the extension of the predicate "bachelor". Likewise, since predicativists think that a name is a predicate, they have to provide what kind

of property a name (as a predicate) expresses and when an object is in its extension.

Here are some of predicativists' suggestions:

> A proper name is a predicate true of an object if and only if the object is given that name in the appropriate way (Burge 1973: 428).

> [When] a proper name occurs in a sentence it expresses no substantive property but merely the property of bearing that very name (Bach 2002: 73).

> A name "*N*" (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called *N* (Fara 2011: 496, 2015a: 64).

Although they seem a little different at first glance, they all have in common the view that simply calling an object a certain name "*N*" is not enough to make it so the object is in the extension of the predicate "*N*". For example, suppose that I just temporarily call my friend "Alfred" and never use this name again. According to these predicativist views, my friend is not in the extension of the predicate "Alfred". Burge excludes this case by using the term "given" and "appropriate": my friend is not given that name in an appropriate way. Bach also clarifies his terminology, "the bearer of '*N*'" as follows:

> This is my wording, which I prefer to the usual "the individual called '*N*'". The latter is unfortunate because "is called" suggests not only "is named" but "is referred to by" (Bach 1987: 135n).

Similarly, Fara differentiates two uses of "being called".

> To be called Willard is to have "Willard" as a name. To be called "Willard" is for someone to address you or refer to you using that name. […] You can be called Willard without being called "Willard", and you can be called "Willard" without being called Willard; you can have names that no one ever addresses you by, and you can be addressed by names other than your own (Fara 2011: 493).

Her suggestion is that in order to be in the extension of a name "*N*", an object must bear the name "*N*". Being addressed by "*N*" is neither sufficient nor necessary for an object to be in the extension of the name "*N*".[3]

Now it seems clear that all of them hold the view that to be in the extension of a name "*N*", an object must be (appropriately) named "*N*". From this, I suggest the following "being-named condition" as the view shared by predicativists:

> *Being-Named Condition*: An object is in the extension of a name "*N*" if and only if that object is (appropriately) named "*N*"

In this chapter, I will assume that this condition is at least applicable to a predicative use of a name like "Alfred" in (2) – (6). The question is whether it is also applicable to a referential use of a name like "Alfred" in (1).

This being-named condition in itself is not yet a predicativist analysis of bare singular names. There could be various positions of explaining how this condition applies to bare

[3] Burge claims that predicativists are free from the burden of analyzing the term "given" or "appropriate way". He says, "The vague necessary and sufficient application condition for proper names which I have offered may be regarded as a mere stand-in for a full-fledged empirical account of how objects get proper names attached to them. Baptism, inheritance, nicknaming, brand-naming, labeling may all be expected to enter into such an account. Semantics, however, need not await the full returns of sociology." (Burge 1973: 435)

In the same spirit, Fara suggests, "Kripke's 'causal theory of reference' could well be maintained as an analysis of what it is to be called Michael – to be in the extension of the name 'Michael'" (Fara 2015a: 73), and do not provide any further analysis of the concept of bearing a name. I agree with their view that providing a strict necessary and sufficient condition for bearing a name is not predicativists' task.

singular names. But we can first naturally consider the description theory which holds that a bare singular name "*N*" has the same semantic content as the definite description "the object (appropriately) named '*N*'".[4] In the next section, I will criticize this description theory by presenting the modal, the epistemic, and the translation objections.

5.3. The Modal, the Epistemic, and the Translation Objections

In this section, I present three objections against the description theory which holds that a bare singular name "*N*" has the same semantic content as the definite description "the object (appropriately) named '*N*'". They are the modal, the epistemic, and the translation objections.[5]

Let us first consider the Kripkean modal objection (Kripke 1980). This objection is based on the observation that names and definite descriptions have different modal profiles: names are rigid designators that designate the same object in every possible world (if that object exists), while definite descriptions typically are not. Compare the following two modal sentences:

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[4] I also believe that most predicativists' views are more or less similar to this description theory except Burge's "that"-predicativism (see n. 12). This point will become clearer as we will see in Section 5.4 and 5.5.

[5] William Kneale (1962) suggests that a name "*N*" has the same semantic content as the description "the object called '*N*'". But Saul Kripke persuasively argues that if "the object called '*N*'" means "the object called '*N*' *by me*", Kneale's theory violates the non-circularity condition. He says, "We ask, 'To whom does he refer by "Socrates"?' And then the answer is given, 'Well, he refers to man to whom he refers.' If this were all there was to the meaning of a proper name, then no reference would get off the ground at all." (Kripke 1980: 70).

However, "the object (appropriately) named '*N*'" does not violate the non-circularity condition. As seen in Section 5.2, this is different from the description "the object called '*N*' by me". We can successfully pick out the object that is appropriately named "*N*" in our linguistic community without any circularity.

(7) Trump might not have been Trump.

(8) Trump might not have been the man named "Trump".

If the name "Trump" and the definite description "the man named 'Trump'" have the same semantic content, then (7) and (8) must have the same truth condition as well. However, there seems to be no true reading of (7), whereas there is an intuitive true reading of (8).[6] If Trump had been abandoned by his parents when he was very young and had been adopted by another family, he might have had a different name, say, "Drump" instead of "Trump". But still, Trump could have been no one else other than Trump himself. The name "Trump" designates the same person Trump with respect to possible worlds, while the definite description "the man named 'Trump'" can designate another person with respect to another world. They cannot have the same semantic content.

The second objection is the Kripkean epistemic argument against the description theory (Kripke 1980). It is based on the fact that the following two sentences have different epistemic statuses:

(9) If Trump exists, Trump is the man named "Trump".

(10) If the man named "Trump" exists, the man named "Trump" is the man named "Trump".

The proposition expressed by (10) is clearly knowable *a priori*, while the proposition expressed by (9) is knowable only *a posteriori*. Knowing what name a certain person has obviously needs an empirical justification. In order to know that Trump has the name "Trump", I have to see what name linguistic community members commonly use to refer to

[6] The sentence (8) surely has its own false reading when the definite description "the man named 'Trump'" takes wide scope.

Trump, or they have to inform me of what Trump's name is. Before having the relevant experiences about it, there is no way to know what name he has.[7]

One might be tempted to think that it is trifling to tell someone that Trump is the man named "Trump" because the same name "Trump" is used and mentioned in the single sentence, and she may doubt whether it is *a posteriori*. This tendency is understandable, but when I hear someone utters "Trump is the man named 'Trump'", the utterance itself plays a role as a testimony to inform me that a certain person has the name "Trump". Still, knowing the fact that he has the name "Trump" by this testimony is surely an empirical process, and having that name is a contingent fact about the person Trump in the external world, that I cannot know *a priori*.[8] Therefore, this argument again shows that the semantic content of the name "Trump" cannot be given by the definite description "the man named 'Trump'".[9]

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[7] As we have seen in Chapter 4.2: n.14, it is controversial whether the proposition expressed by (9) can be known *a priori* at least to the name-giver. In this chapter, however, I shall exclude this special case and assume that the subject is not the person who gave Trump the name "Trump".

[8] To be sure, testimony is not the only process that enables the subject to know it *a posteriori*. For example, by hearing the shout, "Hey, Trump!" from somewhere, or by finding out the name "Trump" on the class roster, I can correctly infer that there is the man named "Trump" in my linguistic community and know that that very person's name is "Trump". Still, these are an empirical justificatory process like receiving testimony. (Thanks to Korman for raising this issue to me.)

[9] Jeshion suggests a possible response for descriptivists to the epistemic objection: "The strong descriptivist has available a story that rebuts the objection. Strong descriptivism maintains that in learning a name for an individual, the speaker associates some salient uniquely identifying conception of that individual with the name. She then comes to take that conception as supplying the content of the name. Such association of the conception with the name does typically employ the services of sense perceptual experience. The speaker does, say observe α or hear things about α by testimony. However, these sense perceptual experiences contribute only to the subject's acquiring an understanding of the name. The circumstances under which a subject takes semantic content to give the content of a name precede, and are not contributors to, her justification for believing what is expressed by *if N exists, N is the F*. […] The rebuttal relies upon sharply distinguishing the contributors to belief and meaning acquisition and the contributors to belief justification." (Jeshion 2002b: 341-342).

The point of this response is that we can consider whether justification is *a priori* or *a posteriori* only after the speaker acquires all the contents of the words that a sentence consists of. She might acquire the content of a name "*N*" through experience, but it is not relevant to belief justification. And if the content of a name "*N*" is given by "the *F*", then justifying her belief that if *N* exists, *N* is the *F* can be *a priori* to her.

Let us finally consider the translation objection. Compare the following two sentences:

(11) Trump is the present U.S president.

(12) The man named "Trump" is the present U.S. president.

This objection hinges on the intuition that the proposition expressed by (11) is simply about the person Trump, while the proposition expressed by (12) is about a particular name "Trump". Both seem to express different propositions contrary to what descriptionists would expect.

It becomes clearer by means of a so-called "translation test".[10] If we translate (11) and (12) into other languages, which preserve their literal meanings, then translated sentences express evidently different propositions. Consider the following Korean translated sentences of (11) and (12):

(13) 트럼프는 현재 미국의 대통령이다.

The main problem with this response is that if the description "the *F*" that plays a role of giving the content of the name "*N*" can be arbitrary across speakers, then it leads to the absurd consequence that we can know any fact about *N a priori* in principle. Suppose that the semantic content of the name "Aristotle" is given to me by that of the description "the teacher of Alexander the Great", then the proposition that if Aristotle exist, Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander is knowable *a priori*. However, if the semantic content of "Aristotle" is given to you by that of the description "the author of *Nicomachean Ethics*", then the proposition that if Aristotle exists, Aristotle is the author of *Nicomachean Ethics* is also knowable *a priori*. Then it seems to follow that any proposition about Aristotle can be knowable *a priori* in principle. (Or "Aristotle" simply becomes a name in each one's idiolect).

Predicativists might bite the bullet and claim that only the description "the man named '*N*'" can play a special role of giving the semantic content of the name "*N*", and (9) and (10) in fact express the same proposition about the name "*N*", which seems counter-intuitive. Then they have to provide an error theory for explaining this counter-intuitiveness. I will consider Bach's position for this and criticize it at Section 5.5.

[10] The general idea of the translation test for judging whether two or more sentences express the same proposition originates from Alonzo Church 1950, 1954 and G.E. Moore 1959. Both had mentioned that the basic insight of this test is due to C. H. Langford. (Thanks to Salmon for informing this to me).

(14) “Trump”라 이름 붙여진 사람은 현재 미국의 대통령이다.

They seem to be correct translations, which preserve the literal meanings of (11) and (12). However, it seems possible that a certain Korean speaker who knows the proposition expressed by (13), i.e., that Trump is the present U.S. president, does not know the proposition expressed by (14). Suppose that she does not know any letter of English. Then she surely cannot grasp the English name “Trump”.[11] Even if she knows that Trump is the present U.S. president, she does not know the proposition expressed by (14) that the man named “Trump” is the present U.S. president.

To be sure, she might know the proposition that the man named “트럼프” is the present U.S. president, but this is different from the proposition expressed by (14). One is about the Korean translated (or transliterated) name “트럼프”, while the other is about his original English name “Trump”. They are different names. Since (12) is about the name “Trump”, not “트럼프”, the correct translation of (12) is (14), not “‘트럼프’라 이름 붙여진 사람은 현재 미국의 대통령이다.” Thus, we can safely conclude that since (13) and (14) clearly express different propositions, their synonymous counterparts (11) and (12) also express different propositions. Again, the name “Trump” cannot have the same semantic content as the definite description “the man named ‘Trump’”.

I believe that these three objections can be applied to any predicativism that uses the being-named condition to explain the nature of bare singular names. In the following sections, I will consider Fara’s “the”-predicativism and Bach’s nominal description theory as possible responses and will argue that they fail.

[11] For this reason, it is more effective to use a language that consists of letters totally different from the English alphabet.

5.4. Fara's "The"-predicativism and Her Responses

"The"-predicativism is the view that whenever a name "*N*" occurs as an unmodified bare singular in an argument position, the unpronounced definite article "the" always co-occurs tacitly in front of "*N*" and they constitute the incomplete definite description "$\emptyset_{\text{the}}$ *N*" (Sloat 1969; Matushansky 2008; Fara 2015a, 2015b). According to these "the"-predicativists, there is actually the definite article "$\emptyset_{\text{the}}$" ahead of the name "Alfred" in (1) as follows:

(15) $\emptyset_{\text{the}}$ Alfred is a philosopher.

Here the incomplete definite description "the Alfred" works the same way as other incomplete definite descriptions, say, "the table". As "the table" denotes one contextually salient table when used in context, "the Alfred" denotes one contextually salient person named "Alfred" when used in context. The name "Alfred" in "the Alfred" plays a role as a predicate like "table" in "the table".[12]

Fara (2015: 99-100) maintains that this "the"-predicativism is immune to the modal objection, because if incomplete definite descriptions are rigid, then the sentence "Trump might not have been the Trump" (Fara's version of (8)) becomes false and has the same truth

[12] By contrast, Burge (1973) holds "that"-predicativism. This view is the same as "the"-predicativism except that the unpronounced demonstrative "that" instead of "the" always co-occurs in front of a bare singular name "*N*". Therefore, according to the theory, the real structure of (1) is "$\emptyset_{\text{that}}$ Alfred is a philosopher."

Bach (1987) and Rami (2014) criticized "that"-predicativism by pointing out that a bare singular name has its non-demonstrative use. For example, Rami observes, "[T]he reference of a name like "Alfred" can be fixed by different manifest non-demonstrative referential intentions. I might use "Alfred" with the intention to refer to the person I have met at a certain party that bears the name "Alfred" or I might use "Alfred" with the intention to refer to the same object as someone else did by using this name. […] But it would be incorrect to determine the referent of a complex demonstrative in such a non-demonstrative way" (Rami 2014: 850). I agree with his observation, but of course the same criticism is not applicable to "the"-predicativism.

value as (7). But I believe that her view that incomplete definite descriptions are rigid designators is problematic. Let us first consider Fara's following example:

(16) Olga enjoyed the party.

Here Fara claims that the incomplete definite description "the party" in (16) is a rigid designator.

> If you were to sincerely utter [(16)], you would be talking about some one particular party – call it BASH[13] – and saying of it that Olga enjoyed it. […] When you use the incomplete description "the party", you use it to talk about a particular party, to say something about *it* – as opposed to whatever party is so-and-so (as Donnellan 1966 might have put it), where "is the so-and-so" is supposed to stand in for some particular completing description recovered from the context. (Fara 2015a: 97).

Fara's argument for it is based on the observation that incomplete definite descriptions, like names, do not seem to take narrow scope (Fara 2015a: 99-100). Her argument starts with a modal variant of (16):

(17) Olga might have enjoyed the party.

She maintains that if "the party" in (17) can take both scopes with respect to the modal "might", (17) in some contexts could have the same truth condition as the following sentence containing a complete definite description:

[13] It is ironic for Fara to introduce the name "BASH" to explain this. If the bare singular name "BASH" were also the incomplete description "$\emptyset_{the}$ BASH", how can it play an explanatory role as distinct from the incomplete description "the party"?

(17') Olga might have enjoyed the party that I went to last night.

Then she argues that since complete descriptions can take narrow as well as wide scope, (17') has the following two readings:

($17'_N$) This might have been: Olga enjoyed the party that I went to last night.

($17'_W$) The party that I went to last night is an x such that this might have been: Olga enjoyed x.

But according to her, since (17) only has the wide scope reading represented in ($17'_W$), "the party" in (17) cannot have the same semantic content as the complete description "the party that I went to last night". She says,

> [(17)] is true just in case there is a possible world in which Olga enjoyed BASH, whether or not I went to BASH in that world. It is irrelevant that there are possible worlds in which I went to some different party last night that was enjoyed by Olga. In other words, [(17)] has only the truth conditions that it would have if the incomplete definite description were rigid (Fara 2015a: 100).

Since an incomplete definite description is rigid, a bare singular name that has "$\emptyset_{\text{the}}$ *N*" as its real structure is also rigid. The modal objection gets resolved.

However, it seems that (17) can have the narrow scope reading represented in ($17'_N$). Suppose that my friend and I know that Olga enjoys a party when and only when I am with her, and Olga really wanted to go to a party with me last night, but she could not. If I utter the sentence (17) in this context, my utterance seems to express the proposition expressed by ($17'_N$). I am talking about whatever unique party that I went last night. Since I already know

that Olga enjoys a party when and only when I am with her, it seems implausible to say that in this context, my utterance of (17) is true just in case there is a possible world in which Olga enjoyed BASH, whether or not I went to BASH in that world as represented in (17'w). For this reason, it does not seem that incomplete definite descriptions are invariably rigid.[14]

Here I am not defending any particular theory holding the view that an incomplete definite description is an ellipsis of a complete one, or that its semantic content is completed with respect to a context.[15] My claim is quite a weak one, that there are non-rigid attributive uses of incomplete definite descriptions. That is, what I maintain is simply that in a certain context, (16) could express the proposition that Olga enjoyed the unique party that I went to last night. This is what even proponents of the semantic significance of the referential/attributive distinction of definite descriptions surely accept (Donnellan 1966; Wettstein 1981, 1983). Their position is that in addition to attributive uses, referential uses are also semantically significant: there are two types of semantic uses of definite descriptions.

However, Fara cannot hold this view, which admits that incomplete definite descriptions are not rigid when used attributively, as long as her aim is to defend "the"-predicativism from the modal objection, because bare singular names are invariably rigid designators. She also cannot revise her view and maintain that only an incomplete definite description that has a name as its complement is always used referentially, so that even "the party" can be used attributively but "$\emptyset_{\text{the}}$ Trump" cannot: bare singular names are incomplete definite

[14] It is much easier to come up with an example of attributive uses of incomplete definite descriptions like "the mayor". Fara claims that a definite description containing this relational predicate is not incomplete because it has a hidden contextual variable: [the mayor of x]. But it is unclear why the fact in itself that it has a hidden contextual variable entails that it is complete. It seems that "the mayor of the city" seems still an incomplete definite description. (Thanks to Teresa Robertson for helping me to clarify this issue.)

[15] See Sellars 1954 for an ellipsis approach, and see Salmon 1982, 1990 and Stanley and Szabó 2002 for a contextual completion approach.

descriptions only used referentially, and that is why they are rigid. This is surely an ad-hoc strategy and the theory no longer provides the unified semantics predicativists have sought. In fact, it is not predicativism at all but clumsy referentialism, because that difference is actually referentialists' point as to why bare singular names are different from other predicates.[16]

More importantly, as Nathan Salmon (1990b: 92) pointed out, there is the widely shared semantic intuition that "the such-and-such" never refers to (denotes, designates) something that is not a such-and-such. Likewise, if a sentence contains "the *F*", then it seems plausible that the semantic contents of "the" as an operator and "*F*" as a predicate must semantically contribute to the proposition expressed by the sentence.

The upshot is that the semantic content of "the *F*" is not the denoted object itself at all. This is clearer if we consider the difference between the following two sentences:

(18) The party was a social gathering.

(19) BASH was a social gathering.

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[16] On this point, we cannot criticize a certain predicativist position simply because it admits that the semantic content of a bare singular name in a sentence is the reference itself. For example, Jeshion criticizes Burge's "that"-predicativism for this reason. She says, "The chief problem with this ["that"-predicativism] is that complex demonstratives do not themselves make the semantic contribution of predicates to sentences containing them, and thus the predicativist loses the single semantics that is supposed to be the main advantage over the referentialist analysis. That is, for the predicativist, "Alfred" in its apparently referential uses is supposed to make the very same contribution […] as it does when it occurs in the apparently predicative uses [as given by the being-named condition]. But on this analysis, in apparently referential uses, names make the semantic contribution to a sentence that a complex demonstrative makes – which is not given by [this condition]" (Jeshion 2015a: 231-232).

However, predicativists' claim is only that any occurrence of a name has the same semantic content as that of a predicate. They do not need to claim that a bare singular name itself has the same semantic content as a predicate. It is a possible line of strategy for them that the real structure of a bare singular name is different from its surface one, and the name in the real structure still play a role as a predicate. For example, as we have seen, Fara claims that the real structure of a bare singular name "*N*" is "$\emptyset_{\text{the}}$ *N*". Suppose that the semantic content of "$\emptyset_{\text{the}}$ *N*" were simply its reference. Still, "*N*" in "$\emptyset_{\text{the}}$ *N*" can play a role as a predicate. It is exactly like the role of "table" in "the table". Even if the semantic content of "the table" were the object itself, "table" is still a predicate.

If the semantic content of (18) is the same as that of (19), which is a singular proposition, then it is puzzling why (18) seems *a priori* (and analytic), whereas (19) seems not. If I say, "I participated in BASH yesterday", then the hearer comes to know that BASH is some kind of event and can start to competently use the name "BASH". But she can still wonder what kind of event it is: knowing the proposition expressed by (19) is surely *a posteriori* for him unlike knowing the proposition expressed by (18).[17,18]

This consideration strongly suggests that referential uses of definite descriptions are not semantically significant, as many philosophers have pointed out (Kripke 1977; Salmon 1982, 1990; Bach 1987: Chapter 5 and 6; Neale 1990; Stanley and Szabó 2000).[19] Furthermore, as already noticed, even if referential uses of incomplete definite descriptions were semantically significant, as long as semantically significant non-rigid attributive uses are still available, Fara fails to show that incomplete definite descriptions invariably work as rigid designators, which is necessary for her to explain why names are rigid. Last but not least, "the"-predicativism does not provide any plausible answers to the epistemic and the translation objections.[20]

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[17] If we consider a name for a physical object instead of a name for an event such as BASH, our intuition becomes even clearer. Compare the pair of the following two sentences: "The tall guy is tall" and "Tom is tall". The first sentence obviously seems *a priori*, while the second sentence seems not (in a context where the incomplete description "the tall guy" denotes Tom).

[18] A similar point was indicated by Salmon (1981: 45 n.8). We might regard it as the epistemic objection against incomplete definite descriptivism about names.

[19] For clarification, the consideration surely does not entail that incomplete definite descriptions cannot be (pragmatically) *used* rigidly, but it only suggests that incomplete descriptions are not rigid *de jure* as names are at the semantic level. Most expressions can be used rigidly with a speaker's particular intention in a context, but it is irrelevant here.

[20] One possible maneuver for "the"-predicativism is to exploit the rigidified operator "actual". For example, consider the sentence "The philosopher might not be a philosopher." It might be suggested that the semantic intuition of the truth of this sentence is explained by the covert operator "actual" (or "present") that rigidifies the

5.5. Bach's Nominal Description Theory and His Responses

Bach maintains that a bare singular name "*N*" is semantically equivalent to the description "the bearer of '*N*'". He calls his theory "nominal" because it says that when a name occurs in a sentence, it expresses no substantive property but merely the property of bearing that name. As already seen at Section 5.2, in his terminology, "The object bears the name '*N*'" does mean the same thing as "The object is appropriately named '*N*'" (Bach 1987, 2002).

Like Fara, Bach also has a view that the definite description "the bearer of '*N*'" is incomplete in the sense that there are many objects that have the same name "*N*". But his responses to the objections are completely different from Fara's. Bach agrees with the idea that definite descriptions, whether they are complete or incomplete, are non-rigid, and referential uses of definite descriptions are not semantically significant. However, he argues that a bare singular name "*N*" has in fact the same semantic characteristics of the definite description "the bearer of '*N*'". That is, names are not rigid designators, and (7) has its own true reading as well as (8).[21]

He attempts to explain away our intuition about the rigidity of names by extending the pragmatic account of referential uses of incomplete definite descriptions and thereby

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description "the philosopher".

Likewise, it might be suggested that bare singular names are rigidified incomplete definite descriptions with the covert operator "actual", while "*N*" in "the actual *N*" plays a role as a predicate such as "philosopher" in "the actual philosopher". (See Plantinga 1978; Stanley 1997) However, this suggestion has also been persuasively criticized by some philosophers (See Salmon 1982/2005: 32-40; Soames 2002: 39-49), and I will not repeat this here but want to point out that it still cannot be a satisfactory answer to the epistemic and the translation objections.

[21] Bach has not provided an explicit reply to the epistemic objection. But surely he might embrace the consequence of his position that the sentence (9) is also *a priori* like (10).

assimilating ordinary referential uses of names to referential uses of descriptions. Names seem to be rigid because we often (pragmatically) use them referentially, just as we often use incomplete descriptions referentially. But still, the semantic content of a bare singular name "*N*" is non-rigid and is always the same as that of the description "the bearer of '*N*'", not the reference itself (Bach 1987: 167-174; 2002: 85-88).

However, is there any real case where we use bare singular names non-rigidly like incomplete definite descriptions? Bach's answer is affirmative.

> [S]uppose that Aristotle's parents decided to name their first two sons "Aristotle" and "Aristocrates" but hadn't decided in which order. Then, when their first son was born, they made up their minds and named him "Aristocrates", saving "Aristotle" for their second son, the future student of Plato. They could have made the reverse decision (Bach 2002: 88). In this circumstance, if his parents had named him "Aristocrates", Aristotle would have been Aristocrates instead of Aristotle (Bach 2002: 85).

Bach maintains that in this situation, "Aristotle" is used literally and non-rigidly, and we have a true reading of the following sentence:

(20) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle.

which actually means that Aristotle might not have been the bearer of "Aristotle"[22]

He provides another similar example of "literal" uses of names.

[22] Strictly speaking, Bach's claim must be that the first occurrence of "Aristotle" in (20) is used referentially, while only the second occurrence of "Aristotle" in (20) is used literally. Thus, according to him, the true reading of (20) is still not what (20) literally expresses, which is the proposition that the bearer of "Aristotle" might not have been the bearer of "Aristotle".

> The electoral process is under attack, and it is proposed, in light of recent results, that alphabetical order would be a better method of selection than the present one. Someone supposes that "Aaron Aardvark" might be the winning name and says, "If that procedure had been instituted, Ronald Reagan would still be doing TV commercials, and Aaron Aardvark might have been president." […] His statement is true if there is a possible world in which whoever possesses that name is president. So as used here "Aaron Aardvark" has narrow scope with respect to "might" (Bach 1987: 146-147).

In this context, according to Bach, when the speaker utters the following sentence, "Aaron Aardvark" is used literally.

> (21) Aaron Aardvark might have been president.

(21) is true if there is a possible world where whoever possesses the name "Aaron Aardvark" is president, not a possible world where the very person whose name is "Aaron Aardvark" in the actual world is president.[23]

However, the intuition about the suggested readings of (20) and (21) seems to arise from confusing use and mention. Kripke observed these sloppy, colloquial speeches in ordinary English.

> [I]t is not true that Aristotle might not have been Aristotle, although Aristotle might not have been *called* "Aristotle", just as 2 × 2 might not have been called "four" (Sloppy, colloquial speech, which often confuses use and mention, may, of course, express the fact that someone might have been called, or not have been called, "Aristotle" by saying that he might have been, or not have been, Aristotle.[…]) (Kripke 1980: 62n).[24]

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[23] Bart Guerts (1997) also quotes Bach's Aaron Aardvark example to show that names can take narrow scope.

[24] As mentioned in Section 5.2, being called "*N*" is a different property from being (appropriately) named "*N*". But Kripke's point has still remained the same about the property of being named "*N*".

Of course, in some contexts, the utterance of (20) can convey the proposition that Aristotle might not have been the bearer of "Aristotle", and the utterance of (21) can convey the proposition that whoever bears the name "Aaron Aardvark" might have been president. But it does not seem that they semantically express those propositions.

Bach claims that he is not committing this vulgar mistake, but rather suggesting that (20) and (21) have readings "that Kripke does not consider, one involving the 'is' of predication rather than identity." (Bach 2002: 84). But it seems question-begging, because this suggestion itself still seems to arise from confusing use and mention. This becomes clearer if we devise the exactly same kind of examples for ordinary predicates. Consider the following situations:

> *Laptop*) Suppose that the inventor of the laptop hadn't decided which word she used to name it. She was torn between two words "laptop" and "lapdown". Finally, she made up her mind and named it "laptop". But she could have made the other decision. In this circumstance, if she had named it "lapdown", laptops would have been lapdowns instead of laptops.

> *Alligator*) The process of naming species stirs up controversy, and it is proposed that any species names starting with the letter "a" must be names of plants. In this circumstance, someone says, "If that procedure had been instituted, alligators might have been plants."

In these circumstances, we can covey something true by uttering the following two sentences:

(22) Laptops might not have been laptops.

(23) Alligators might have been plants.

But it seems clear to me that these sloppy, colloquial speeches do not suggest any view that the semantic content of "laptop" is the property of being in the extension of the word "laptop", or the semantic content of "alligator" expresses the property of being in the extension of the

word “alligator”. This is to confuse use and mention. Their semantic contents are the property of being a small portable computer and the property of being a such-and-such reptile.

Likewise, I believe that to suggest that the semantic content of “*N*” is the same as that of “the bearer of ‘*N*’” through the examples of (20) and (21) would be to make the very same mistake. They seem to be the same kind of sloppy, colloquial speeches as (22) and (23). Without providing any *theory-independent* reason why only the utterances of (20) and (21), not (22) and (23), in those circumstances can be evidence of the terms expressing a nominal property, and as long as we can devise the same kind of sloppy speech cases for ordinary predicates, it seems safe to conclude that the semantic content of a name “*N*” is its reference, while it can sometimes pragmatically convey the content of the description “the bearer of ‘*N*’”, just as the semantic content of the predicate “laptop” is the property of being a small portable computer, while it can sometimes pragmatically convey the property of being in the extension of the word “laptop”.

Bach also provides a response to the translation objection. He holds an extreme view that since names are not lexical items, they are not translatable, and if they are not translatable, (13) becomes not a correct translation of (11) as far as it contains the Korean name “트럼프”. Then the translation objection would lose one of its bedrocks. He says,

> Proper names are not lexical items in a language. Dictionaries are not incomplete for not including them, and your vocabulary is not deficient because of all the proper names you don’t know. […] You just have to recognize it as belonging to the category of proper names and know how to apply the [nominal description theory] schema to it. […] Proper names do not, strictly speaking, belong to particular languages, and thus are not translatable. (Bach 2002: 82)

The intuition of translatability of a name arises because there are some counterparts of it. However, he argues that these counterparts are not translations of the name.

> Of course [names] do have pronunciations and spellings characteristic of particular languages, and they have counterparts with pronunciations and spellings characteristic of other languages, but these counterparts are not translations of one another. Consider the name “John”, for example, and its counterparts “Juan”, “Johann”, “Jean”, and “Ian”. Despite their distinctive pronunciations and spellings, each of them can be used without anomaly (or italics) outside its home language. For example, if you wish to speak in English about your Spanish friend [Juan], you do not switch to “John”, and in writing you do not use italics. (Bach 2002: 82).

His point seems to be that if you want to speak about your Spanish friend whose name is “Juan”, you can simply utter, for example, the sentence “Juan is a philosopher”. You do not need to use its English counterpart “John” as a translation of “Juan” and utter the sentence “John is a philosopher”. If the name “Juan” is a lexical item in Spanish, how is it possible to just utter, “Juan is a philosopher.” in English?

I believe that it is simply because “Juan” can be a lexical item in both English and Spanish. Both languages share the same alphabets, and there is no problem with introducing the name “Juan” in English. But consider a language that consists of letters totally different from the English alphabet such as Korean. It seems far-fetched to claim that you can utter the sentence, “유진 is a philosopher”. This is not a proper English sentence at all. You need the name “Eugene” as an English translation of “유진”, and then you can utter the sentence “Eugene is a philosopher.”

Contrary to Bach, I suggest rather that names belong to particular languages. The name “Trump” belongs to English (and to any language with the same alphabet), while the name “트럼프” belongs to Korean. A translation (or transliteration) of a certain name into another language is the process of giving a new name in that language to the same object referred to by the original name. For easily noticing that the new name refers to the same object, we usually choose the name as the one that has the most similar pronunciation to the original

name as possible.[25] Of course, if a certain speaker is not familiar with English, it is possible that she knows the proposition expressed by (11), while not knowing the proposition expressed by (12), as I have argued in Section 5.3.[26]

Furthermore, even if Bach were right about the view that names are not translatable, we still have the prima facie strong intuition that the proposition expressed by (11) is simply about the person Trump, while the proposition expressed by (12) is about the name "Trump". To be sure, if a speaker sincerely utters the English sentence (11), in many usual cases, we can correctly infer that she also believes that the man named "Trump" is the present U.S. president because he uses the name "Trump" when he utters (11). But it does not mean that she is also talking about the name "Trump" by uttering (11). This is exactly like the fact that even if we can correctly infer that when she sincerely utters (11), she also believes that Trump is in the extension of the predicate "president" because she uses the predicate "president", it does not mean that she is talking about the predicate "president" by uttering (11), or that (11) expresses the proposition about the predicate "president". It simply has the property of being president as its constituent.

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[25] Here my question is about how we translate a certain name into another language that does not yet have any translation in that language at present. However, if there is the origin of a name, then it is surely a matter of etymology, as with "London" in English and "Londres" in French. (Thanks to Salmon for indicating this point).

[26] Bach (2002: 82) simply states that being unfamiliar with particular names does not betray any linguistic deficiency, and learning them does not add to your knowledge of a particular language. However, it is unclear what he has in mind as linguistic proficiency (or deficiency). By this, he does not seem to merely mean syntactic proficiency. According to him, learning lexical items in dictionaries increases linguistic proficiency, but names are not lexical items. Then should we conclude from this that learning the state name "California" does not, but learning the predicate "ailurophile" does make us become more proficient in English? Or should famous names in dictionaries be exceptions to this? It seems that this concept of linguistic proficiency simply has practical criteria. A more natural position, I believe, is that just as long as a certain name consists of the English alphabet, it thereby directly becomes a lexical item in English (and in any language with the same alphabet). Surely, dictionaries do not contain all names, but this is simply because there are too many names to be included in dictionaries, not because they are not lexical items.

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In this chapter, I have argued that predicativists fail to provide satisfactory responses to the modal, the epistemic, and the translation objections. Bare singular names are not predicates. The semantic content of a name is its reference.

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