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Managing humanitarian emergencies: How host governments constrain international intervention

By

Allison Namias Grossman

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in

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University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Leonardo R. Arriola, Co-chair
Professor Susan D. Hyde, Co-chair
Professor Aila M. Matanock
Professor Michaela Mattes

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Abstract

Managing humanitarian emergencies: How host governments constrain international intervention

by

Allison Namias Grossman

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

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Professor Leonardo R. Arriola, Co-chair
Professor Susan D. Hyde, Co-chair

Under what conditions do host governments enable or obstruct the delivery of goods and services to people in need in the aftermath of humanitarian emergencies? Every year, donors give hundreds of millions of dollars to United Nations' agencies and international NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid to people in need. These humanitarian organizations must gain the permission of the host government to reach their intended beneficiaries, but neither practitioners nor scholars account for the role host governments play in enabling or obstructing humanitarian organizations' operations. While agents of the state are sometimes quick to collaborate with international actors, in other circumstances they deny emergencies exist and impose restrictions that prevent humanitarians from delivering aid. By tracing the process through which governments decide to acknowledge an emergency exists, allow international organizations to provide aid, and impose restrictions on aid after it arrives within their borders, I show that host governments shape whether and how humanitarian aid is distributed, the time it takes organizations to provide aid, and who is able to access the benefits of aid.

My theory explains that states' decisions are driven by leaders' need to maintain a reputation for competence among both domestic constituents and international donors. States collaborate with humanitarian organizations when doing so will improve their reputation for competence and deny the existence of humanitarian emergencies when leaders fear donors or constituents will blame them for the existence of the emergency. Collaborating with humanitarian organizations strengthens governments' reputation for competence in response to fast-onset disasters but undermines governments' reputation for competence in response to slow-onset disasters. To avoid damage to their reputation for competence, host governments impose restrictions on humanitarian organizations that prevent these organizations from revealing novel, credible information that would damage the government's reputation for competence if revealed.

I leverage cross-national data, original surveys, and in-depth interviews to assess the theory and its implications. I first analyze cross-national data to test whether governments are more likely to obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance in response to slow-onset emergencies compared to fast-onset emergencies. I then use interviews with representatives of donor countries and an original survey of 530 humanitarian professionals to describe the various strategies governments use to restrict humanitarian organizations and illustrate the consequences of these restrictions for humanitarian organizations' operations. Drawing nine months of fieldwork, I use the case of Niger to illustrate the logic underpinning government decisions to restrict or collaborate with humanitarian organizations. I use a survey of over 400 Nigerien government officials to test my expectations regarding host-government officials' attitudes and behaviors toward humanitarian aid.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction
The Government of India attracted international attention when it rejected offers of humanitarian assistance in response to an Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 that left over 9,000 Indians dead. The government claimed it had "adequate resources" to offer relief to victims and positioned itself as a donor, offering tsunami relief to other countries in the region (AFP 2004; Carnegie and Dolan 2019). By taking this stance toward humanitarian aid, the Government of India surprised international donors and humanitarian organizations who had expected the government to accept their offers of aid. Humanitarian organizations criticized the Indian government for refusing their offers, and a spokesperson for the Indian government defended its decision, asserting the government's own competence to provide sufficient help to those affected: "There has been an impression created by some international media that India is not accepting foreign aid because it is out to prove something and it is unable to contain the disaster on its own. I would like to state that both these views are incorrect. India's response to the disaster was extremely prompt. We are confident that we have the capabilities and resources to overcome it" (AFP 2005). However, the government later relaxed its stance and quietly gave permission for U.N. and other aid agencies to help.

When an earthquake struck Kashmir nine months after the government's its initial, public rejection of emergency humanitarian aid, the government again publicly rejected international offers of support (Sengupta 2005). Belying this public rejection of aid, the government allowed international aid agencies into areas of Indian-controlled Kashmir that had previously been off limits less than a week after the earthquake (Misra 2005). In the decade since, the government has maintained a policy of publicly refusing offers of international aid in response to floods and earthquakes (Bagchi 2018; Sengupta 2005), even when it later reverses these policies to allow international actors to deliver humanitarian aid.

The same earthquake devastated Pakistan-administered areas of Kashmir, but the Pakistani government reacted differently, publicly declaring the event as an emergency and requesting support from international organizations, earning praise from international actors, such as the United Nations (Sengupta 2005). However, the government received substantial domestic criticism for failing to act quickly enough, and in response President Musharraf promised to "prove the cynics wrong" by attracting more funding for emergency response from international sources (Coll 2005).

Why would the government of India publicly reject aid, facing international criticism for this policy choice, and quietly reverse course? Why repeat this pattern less than a year

later? Why would the government of Pakistan, confronting the same earthquake, pursue a different strategy--welcoming international aid while struggling to mobilize a sufficient domestic response? When disaster strikes, governments receive offers of assistance from foreign governments to help people suffering. Governments' decisions to enable or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid can have life or death consequences for people in need. Understanding why governments obstruct humanitarian aid can facilitate policy solutions that alter government incentives such that enabling aid becomes more attractive than obstructing it. This dissertation answers the following questions: Why do governments around the world prevent people living within their borders from accessing humanitarian aid? Why do their responses to emergencies vary over time and across emergency events? I argue that when governments face events that cause mass suffering, they weigh both domestic and international consequences when determining how to respond. In addition to the material consequences of damage and loss of life, governments also concern themselves with the reputational consequences of their policy choices.

I argue that the difference between responses by the governments of India and Pakistan can be attributed to differences in their dependence on external material resources and differences in their pre-existing international reputations for competence. Before the earthquake, India did not depend on resources from international actors to fund everyday state functions and was broadly seen as competent by international observers. By contrast, the Pakistani government depended on foreign sources of revenue to fund essential state functions and was broadly seen as incompetent by international observers. These differences meant that when the government of India publicly rejected aid, it was interpreted as a credible signal of its competence by international observers because these observers saw India's claim—to be able to provide sufficient aid without international support—as plausible based on their pre-existing beliefs regarding the government's capability to meet the needs of its citizens. Having derived this international reputational benefit, India quietly allowed international aid organizations to provide aid in order to shore up support from those affected by the emergency.

Identical action by Pakistan would have had different consequences. International actors would not have interpreted such a statement as credible because observers' prior beliefs about the Pakistani government indicated the government lacked the capability to meet the needs of its citizens without external support. If the Pakistani government rejected international aid in response to the earthquake it would only reinforce perceptions of the government's incompetence. The government of Pakistan instead welcomed international humanitarian aid in order to demonstrate its competence internationally. However, the Pakistani government did not appear

threatened by criticism from domestic sources because it came from domestic constituents that were not essential for the regime or leadership's political survival.

I contend that governments' choice of emergency response is mediated by a preference to develop and maintain a reputation for competence in the eyes of both domestic and international audiences. Government leaders in poor and aid-dependent states will prioritize their international reputation for competence, so long as they maintain support of their essential domestic supporters. Developing an international reputation for competence can be both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable for state leaders. It is a useful strategy that enables government leaders to access international benefits they can then use to shore up domestic support. Governments will facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid when doing so bolsters their international reputation for competence and they will prevent aid delivery when they anticipate that providing aid would undermine either their domestic or international reputation for competence.

Existing explanations

I build on existing scholarship studying the dynamics of international intervention, the practice of humanitarianism, and foreign aid. A large body of research studies the dynamics of international interventions, including both coercive military interventions and interventions to encourage peace, democracy, economic development, and other normatively desirable outcomes.[1] This scholarship identifies myriad problems that prevent interventions from achieving their desired objectives, chiefly principal agent-problems and problems of enforcement. To overcome these problems, interveners use both carrots and sticks, promises of material benefits or punishments to induce recipients to adopt a desired policy or set of policies (Barnett 2016; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2016). These benefits include preferential trade deals, promises of investment or aid, or debt relief (Barry, Clay, and Flynn 2013; Dietrich and Wright 2015; Hafner-Burton 2005; Winters and Martinez 2015). Punishments include withdrawing or withholding of these benefits (Escribà-Folch 2012; Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Vadlamannati, Janz, and Berntsen 2018).

In response, leaders of recipient states will alter their policies, at least cosmetically, to conform to donor preferences in order to gain access to these benefits (Birchler, Limpach, and Michaelowa 2016; Hyde 2011; Wright 2009). However, these interventions are often undermined by a lack of alignment between the preferences of recipient states, donors, and the organizations that implement them (Briggs 2017; Dionne 2017; Findley et al. 2017). Governments will impose restrictions on foreign

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[1] For a broad overview see for example: (Findley 2018; Krasner and Weinstein 2014; Lake 2016; Matanock 2020).

influence when leaders fear these efforts will undermine their political survival by strengthening their political opponents (Bush 2015; Chaudhry and Heiss 2021; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016; Ritter 2014).

Responses to humanitarian emergencies are typically excluded from research that investigates how international intervention influences the preferences and policies of states that receive this aid. A robust literature documents the preferences of humanitarian aid donors (Bermeo 2016; Dietrich 2013; Drury, Olson, and van Belle 2005; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014; Olsen, Carstensen, and Høyen 2003) and practices of humanitarian aid organizations (Barnett 2011, 2013; Barnett and Weiss 2008; Krause 2014; Stoddard 2003), but there is little scholarly investigation of how offers of international aid in response to humanitarian emergencies or the presence of international humanitarian aid influences host government policy or practice. Carnegie and Dolan (2019) propose that governments reject offers of aid after natural disasters in order to demonstrate their self-sufficiency on the international stage, but their analysis is limited to wholesale rejections of aid and does not investigate the domestic political incentives that motivate host government to value their international reputation for competence. I build on their insight that host governments reject aid to demonstrate their competence to international observers by examining the incentives poor governments face to prioritize their international reputation for competence. I argue that an even broader range of government behavior toward emergency aid can be explained by these incentives.

Scholarship on governments' responses to humanitarian emergencies focus on the domestic political incentives that encourage host governments to provide or fail to provide aid to people in need. Building on Amartya Sen's seminal insight; governments will provide aid to people in need when their ability to remain in power depends upon it (Sen 1983). Governments are more likely to provide aid to people in need when they rely on their support for political survival, and domestic publics will remove leaders who fail to provide sufficient assistance (Achen and Bartels 2004; Besley and Burgess 2002; Cole, Healy, and Werker 2012; Healy and Malhotra 2009). However, when governments do not rely on support from people affected by emergencies, failing to respond and allocating funds to other priorities can prove politically beneficial (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Plümper and Neumayer 2009).

Humanitarian aid is typically portrayed as politically neutral, or if politically beneficial, it is seen as aligned with the interests of the state. Humanitarian aid is seen as a substitute for resources the state would otherwise be obligated to provide and in many contexts recipients of humanitarian aid attribute the benefits they receive to the state; this can lead to increased support for the incumbent government (Fair et al. 2017;

Kosec and Mo 2017; Narang and Stanton 2017). According to this logic, non-state armed groups impose restrictions on humanitarian aid delivery in order to prevent government actors from deriving benefits associated with humanitarian aid provision or to redirect these benefits to armed groups (Narang 2014, 2015; Narang and Stanton 2017; Wood and Molfino 2016; Wood and Sullivan 2015). This literature describes humanitarian aid as exacerbating conflict and misery and inadvertently supporting the parties to conflict by providing resources to civilians that parties to conflict would otherwise be obligated to provide, thereby allowing conflict parties to allocate funds to war that they would otherwise be required to obligate to service provision (Kuperman 2008; Terry 2002). Governments may explicitly withhold food or other forms of support from populations in order to gain strategic advantage (Keen 2008; de Waal 1997, 2018).This body of scholarship, in conjunction with research on targeting civilians during war, can explain the logic motivating government actors to restrict aid where the government is an active party to conflict (Bussmann and Schneider 2016; Lyall 2019). However, these arguments do not account for variation in government policies to restrict or facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid outside of a counterinsurgency framework.

In peacetime, conventional wisdom on host governments' perceptions of foreign aid indicate that host governments should accept humanitarian aid when it is offered. In response to humanitarian emergencies, donors offer to fund service provision, which they would not otherwise make in ordinary non-emergency settings. This aid represents additional non-tax revenues to which the government would not otherwise have access. Accepting this aid would both enable government to use donor resources to respond to their constituents' urgent demands for services and to use their own resources for other priorities (Bermeo 2016). This would enable government to then redirect its own revenues to other priorities, whether programmatic or patronage (Briggs 2012; Jablonski 2014). However, donors impose control mechanisms that make it difficult for government actors to direct aid flows (Dietrich 2013), and humanitarian aid in particular is channeled through non-governmental organizations which donors see as more efficient and technically capable compared to host government structures. Existing research does not sufficiently account for host government preferences over different types of aid flows and how these preferences shape host government policy choices.

Roadmap of theory
This argument is based on the preferences of host governments to allocate scarce resources. In a non-emergency status quo, governments face constraints from both domestic and international audiences that affect their policy choices. Within these constraints, leaders see improving their country's reputation for competence as a useful strategy to maintain or increase their control over scarce resources. Both domestic and international audiences use the government's reputation for competence as a heuristic

to allocate benefits and punishments. Host government authorities cultivate positive reputations for competence to secure benefits and avoid punishment. In many poor, aid dependent states, domestic and international reputations for competence are interdependent because governments rely on revenues from international sources to provide benefits to their essential supporters. However, when the reputational incentives of these audiences conflict, host governments prioritize the audience which poses the greatest threat to the government's ability to remain in power.

Humanitarian emergencies present an opportunity for host governments to both improve or damage their reputations for competence. In response to emergencies, domestic publics demand additional resources and action from government. International actors offer aid, and evaluate governments' performance in facilitating aid delivery. These emergencies also attract extraordinary attention from domestic and international media, attracting observers' attention to government performance. Governments can improve their reputations for competence if they exceed their audience's expectations regarding their performance or damage their reputation for competence if they underperform these expectations. Both domestic and international audiences update their assessment of the host government reputation for competence when the government's actions diverge from the audience's expectations based on past behavior.

Based on their own past experiences and observation of their peers, host government officials anticipate that their performance in response to an emergency will have consequences for both their domestic and international reputations for competence. When possible, host governments adopt policies to improve their reputation for competence among both audiences. However, some emergencies reveal that governments are less competent than their pre-existing reputations would suggest by exposing the government's lack of preparation or pre-existing capacity to deliver services to its citizens. Specifically, responding to slow-onset emergencies is more likely to damage host governments' reputation for competence compared to fast-onset emergencies because both domestic and international observers are more likely to attribute the occurrence of slow-onset events to government incompetence compared to fast-onset events. When governments fear that emergencies will reveal this incompetence, and they lack the material and human resources that would allow them to demonstrate competence, host governments will elect to reject the idea of an emergency and emergency needs in order to avoid damage to its reputation for competence.

Scope conditions:

This theory and its implications are limited to poor countries that rely on sources of revenue provided by foreign governments and international organizations to fund the everyday functions of the state. These sources of revenue include concessional loans, foreign direct investment, and foreign aid. Dependence on these foreign sources of aid and investment implies that leaders see their international audience as important to their continued political survival. Consequently state leaders should be sensitive to events or information that would lead international audiences to withdraw or limit their material support. I do not expect these incentives to apply to governments that rely primarily on domestic sources of revenue to fund their essential functions.

This does not mean that governments of wealthier countries are immune from the reputational consequences of emergency response. Rather, in wealthier countries that do not depend primarily on international sources of revenue to fund essential state functions, I anticipate governments will consistently prioritize their domestic over their international reputation for competence. These domestic audiences remove governments that fail to demonstrate their competence in response to emergencies (Besley and Burgess 2002; Cole, Healy, and Werker 2012; Healy and Malhotra 2009). These governments' prospects for political survival depend on convincing their domestic audiences of the government's competence, and the government's international competence in response to humanitarian emergencies is not directly relevant. This relationship is likely not driven solely by governments' wealth but also their regime type, as wealthier states are more likely to be democracies.[2]

Humanitarian emergencies are increasingly concentrated in poor, aid-dependent states. A disaster events occur in every country in the world, poor countries suffer the greatest impact and are more likely to experience complex humanitarian emergencies, which occur when natural hazards interact with conflict to produce greater suffering (Coppola 2015, 26). As scholars in the critical tradition argue, emergencies are the result of political processes; policy choices mediate the consequences of all events, even those that are plausibly exogenous (Barnett 2011; Calhoun 2010; Keen 2008). The political conditions in poor aid dependent states—scarce resources, weak formal governance structures, limited accountability—are more likely to produce emergencies, making it all the more crucial to understand why governments are more likely to allow international actors to provide aid in some cases rather than others.

I also limit the scope of this study to states that are recognized members of the international system. Although both states and non-state armed groups actors can

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[2] Although it is difficult to separate the effects of wealth and regime type empirically, I test the relationship between regime type and my outcomes of interest to the best of my ability.

facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid or impose restrictions, this analysis is limited to host governments' incentives and policy choices. Like state authorities, rebel groups can manipulate the delivery of humanitarian aid to garner support or undermine support for their political opponents (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009; Narang and Stanton 2017). Significant scholarly attention has been devoted to documenting how humanitarian aid influences rebel groups' strategic incentives (Keen 2014; LeRiche 2004; Lischer 2006; Lyall 2019; Narang 2014, 2015; Wood and Molfino 2016; Wood and Sullivan 2015). In comparison, little research has been dedicated to understanding how humanitarian aid affects the incentives of state actors.[3]

I limit this reputational argument to state actors because there are important differences between the way international actors view and engage with internationally recognized states and non-state armed groups. Most importantly, internationally recognized states claim Westphalian sovereignty, which confers upon them the right to set the terms of participation in international politics and the right to limit foreign actors involvement in their domestic affairs (Krasner 1999). Although the sovereignty of weak states is often violated when more powerful actors intervene in domestic politics, foreign actors seek consent from the recipient state for many types of interventions, including the provision of foreign aid or election observation (Krasner and Risse 2014; Krasner and Weinstein 2014; Matanock 2020). International actors do not face equivalent constraints in engaging with rebel groups (Lemke 2019); they are not required by international law to seek the consent of rebel groups before intervening in territory they control. Sovereignty entitles states to benefits from international actors to which non-state armed groups do not have access, such as membership in international organizations and eligibility for concessional lending from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and aid from U.N. agencies (Fazal and Griffiths 2014). These benefits shape the reputational incentives that are the focus of this dissertation, thus I limit the analysis to sovereign states that are eligible for such benefits.

Definitions
This section defines key terms used throughout the dissertation. I begin by defining key categories of actors that play important roles in responding to humanitarian emergencies: host governments, donors, and humanitarian organizations. I then define humanitarian emergencies, including fast and slow onset events that can become classified as humanitarian emergencies and humanitarian aid, which is given in response to these emergencies.

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[3] Important exceptions include (Keen 2008; Stoddard 2020; de Waal 1997)

Host government refers to the officially recognized state structures that govern the country where a given event occurs. Specifically, it refers to the sovereign, internationally recognized government in power at the time of the event. I use the term state leader to refer to the individual or group of individuals wielding executive power in government.

I use the terms donor or donor government to refer to governments that provide concessional financing or aid to poorer countries. Different donors have heterogeneous preferences, and different donors favor providing different types and combinations of aid (Dietrich 2016; Steinwand 2015). In this dissertation, I focus on donors that consistently give both humanitarian aid and other forms of aid to poor countries. The most significant donors of humanitarian are the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and Scandinavian countries. These countries aid budgets for priorities such as development and security are also among the largest in the world. They delegate the implementation of their policy priorities to state structures within the host government, to international organizations, and to NGOs. Although China and other new donors comprise a growing proportion of concessional lending and aid to poor countries, these donors are less engaged in humanitarian aid and are thus not analyzed in detail in this manuscript.[4]

For the purposes of this project, the term humanitarian organization refers to an international organization or NGO that delivers aid in response to humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian organizations provide essential goods and services to save lives and mitigate suffering of people struggling to meet their basic human needs, regardless of individuals' identities or allegiances (Krause 2014, 14). Humanitarian organizations include the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and members of the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, prominent international NGOs such as Médécins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Save the Children, and United Nations agencies such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Red Cross is considered the first modern humanitarian organizations, founded to provide aid to the wounded in war irrespective of their allegiance, and since its founding humanitarian assistance has historically been provided by non-state actors organizations who claim independence, impartiality and neutrality as foundational tenets of their organizations (Barnett 2011).

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[4] It is possible that these new donors comprise an alternative audience for host governments to demonstrate competence. I plan to address this alternative explanation in future versions of the manuscript. There is persuasive evidence at the local level that Chinese aid projects create incentives for corruption (Brazys, Elkink, and Kelly 2017; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018).

Humanitarian organizations respond to market failures in the provision of essential services; they provide essential goods and services where both public and private actors do not. These organizations provide services when they judge that the state is unable or unwilling to do so. They claim authority to provide aid based on the principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality, which as enshrined in the Geneva Conventions guarantee them access to people in need of care. There is substantial heterogeneity among humanitarian organizations, which position themselves against each other to prove that their approach best embodies the principles of independence impartiality and neutrality (Barnett and Weiss 2008).

I define humanitarian emergencies as events that cause suffering that domestic and/or international actors judge extraordinary such that policy response beyond normal service delivery is required. Domestic and/or international actors deem ordinary means insufficient to alleviate suffering, and they mobilize extraordinary resources to provide goods and services to people in need.[5]

I use the term event to describe a particular hazard that has occurred without specifying whether or not relevant actors have classified it as an emergency. I distinguish between the event and the emergency because not all adverse events become understood as emergencies or disasters. Events become emergencies when they are understood to overwhelm relevant actors capacity for response (Coppola 2015, 34). Emergencies are defined by the idea that they are exceptional deviations from otherwise normal social conditions (Calhoun 2010, 45)

The category of humanitarian emergency is not an objective classification but rather an overtly political category. It is the outcome of a political process of contestation and negotiation among multiple actors, each seeking an outcome favorable to themselves (Calhoun 2010). It is deployed strategically to call attention to situations to which specific actors seek to attract attention. An important consequence of the political nature of this category is that there exists no commonly accepted empirical threshold to differentiate emergency from non-emergency circumstances. There is no number of lives lost, people displaced, or property destruction that automatically qualifies an event as an emergency. The challenge inherent to defining emergencies empirically is that these events are often defined in terms of different actors assessment of the need for external assistance to meet the needs produced by the event (Everett 2016). To overcome this challenge, I include the process of how events become classified as emergencies in my analysis.

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[5] Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms disaster and emergency interchangeably.

Throughout this dissertation, I differentiate between events that are fast-onset (plausibly exogenous) and slow-onset (endogenous) to government policy choices. Fast-onset, or rapid onset, events occur with little warning and most damage occurs within hours or days of the event. These include earthquakes, floods, and volcanic eruptions. Slow-onset or creeping disasters occur gradually, with no clear moment of onset, and their consequences are difficult to measure or attribute. These include droughts, food crises or famines, and epidemics (Coppola 2015, 34). However, events with more overtly political causes, such as food crises, famines, epidemics, and conflicts can also be classified as humanitarian emergencies (Ticktin 2014, 280).

Conflicts can be classified as humanitarian emergencies, but they are not automatically considered humanitarian emergencies because of the political nature of the humanitarian emergency category.[6] When conflicts or other episodes of political violence are classified as humanitarian emergencies they are referred to as complex humanitarian emergencies. These events are more likely to be considered complex humanitarian emergencies when they cause greater disruption to civilian life in the form of casualties or displacement. Everett (2016) defines complex humanitarian emergencies as episodes of political violence that displace at least 500,000 civilians or cause at least 20,000 civilian deaths within a five year period. For the purposes of this project, I include complex humanitarian emergencies in the slow-onset category of events.

Humanitarian assistance or aid refers to aid given in response to humanitarian emergencies intended to save lives and alleviate suffering. Not intended to alter structural factors that cause harm. It includes financial or material resources to alleviate suffering resulting from humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian aid provides basic services such as food, water, shelter, medical care, and protection from harm, but it does not eliminate the underlying factors that make individuals vulnerable to suffering (Barnett 2005). This aid is given during or immediately after an event to alleviate acute suffering and to return affected populations to their status-quo conditions (Olsen, Carstensen, and Høyen 2003). Although the practice began as the provision of medical care to those wounded in war, it is now given in response to both natural disasters and man-made phenomena (Everett 2016)

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[6] As I will show, when an actor classifies an event as a humanitarian emergency they create an imperative for action; donors and governments do not classify events as emergencies when they do not want to create such an imperative to act.

The concept of humanitarian aid is closely related to concept of a humanitarian emergency; both fall under the broader concept of humanitarianism, or the practice of providing help after an emergency. Humanitarianism is premised on the idea of shared humanity, which brings with it an obligation to save the lives of the world's most vulnerable and neglected populations. (Barnett 2013, 380). The definitions I use to describe both humanitarian emergencies and humanitarian aid are narrower than many; a broader definition includes any activity to relieve suffering, including efforts to address the root causes of vulnerability (Barnett 2013, 383).[7] I have adopted this narrower definition because it is empirically tractable and corresponds closely to the definition used by mainstream humanitarian organizations.

Humanitarian organizations are the primary set of organizations that deliver humanitarian aid. Donors justify bypassing the state in favor of non-state actors with the exigencies of imminent or actual threat in order to save lives and the importance of neutral, impartial, and independent service provision. This logic is predicated on the conceit that humanitarian assistance is a short-term proposition. If humanitarian assistance was a long-term project, these organizations would need to negotiate the terms of their presence with the state and would have incentives to maintain the state's favor. Recent trends suggest that humanitarian assistance is increasingly a long-term proposition; thirteen countries have been the subject of UN-coordinated appeals in at least eight of the last ten years, and six of these have had UN-coordinated appeals every year since 2007 (Lattimer 2017)

Research Design

To test observable implications of the theoretical framework, described in greater detail in Chapter 2, I employ statistical analysis of cross-national data and two original surveys, in addition to semi-structured interviews with donors, humanitarians and government officials, supplemented by secondary sources. This multi-method approach enables me to test observable implications of my theory at multiple levels of analysis: cross-national, national, and individual.

I deploy cross-national analysis to demonstrate that structural factors such as poverty, aid dependence, and regime type are insufficient to explain variation in government's decisions whether or not to classify events as humanitarian emergencies. These analyses indicate that, contrary to existing explanations, donors take host government

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[7] Early critics of humanitarian organizations argued that by providing care to individuals harmed by war, they obviated political actors of the responsibility to resolve the political roots of suffering (Krause 2014, 103)

preferences into account when determining where to offer aid, suggesting that analyses that only examine whether recipients accept or reject aid are subject to selection bias.

To illustrate the reputational mechanism at work, I employ an in-depth case study of emergency management in Niger. I chose the Nigerien case because it satisfies the scope condition of poverty and dependence on foreign aid funds but presents substantial variation in other variables of interest, namely regime type and type of emergency event, that enable informative within case comparisons. The Nigerien case illustrates that governments of poor countries value control over aid resources and see improving their reputation for competence as a useful strategy to increase their ability to allocate these resources according to their preferences. The Nigerien governments' strategies to manage humanitarian emergencies vary according to the type of emergency event, but this variation cannot be attributed to the country's regime type or dependence on foreign aid, two factors with significant explanatory power in cross-national analysis.

To substantiate my claim that Nigerien government values its international reputation and sees its access to desired benefits as contingent on maintaining a positive reputation for competence, I analyze an original survey of Nigerien government officials. I chose to use a survey in order to test whether preferences expressed in individual interviews or in public statements by government official were systematically shared by government officials and influenced their approach to the daily tasks of government. I find that reputational concerns are salient for the majority of survey respondents and many survey respondents express frustration with the limitations on access to funding imposed by donors.

I then return to a global level of analysis to assess the relative frequency and consequences of host government restrictions from the perspective of people employed by humanitarian organizations. I use a survey of a global sample of humanitarian officials to assess how often these individuals encounter restrictions from host governments and evaluate whether these restrictions achieve their intended effect of constraining humanitarian organizations. I find that humanitarians see host government restrictions as consequential. I find that these restrictions constrain humanitarians not because host governments possess powerful enforcement capabilities but because humanitarians choose to defer to host government restrictions.

Case selection
I expect this theory to apply to poor states that depend on foreign sources of revenue (to varying degrees) to fund essential functions of the state. The cross-national analysis in Chapters 3 and 6 includes a sample of countries that are representative of this

universe of cases and display, "useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest" (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296). The countries included are all classified as low or lower middle income by the World Bank for the majority of the period of the study (1989-2019). Their dependence on external sources of funding varies according to measures of both foreign direct investment and foreign aid, from zero to fifty percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[8]

In addition to the cross-national analysis, Chapter 4 and 5 present evidence from the case of Niger. Niger is an impoverished West African state that borders the Sahara Desert; the country confronts natural hazards, such as droughts and floods, regularly and has experienced food crises, famines, and forced displacement of its own population and those of its neighbors due to low intensity insurgency. The country depends heavily on aid; Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 11.1 percent of the country's Gross National Income in 2019.[9]

Niger represents a typical case in the universe of cases to which this theory applies. As is necessary for a typical case, Niger presents variation on the dependent variable of interest--host government policy toward humanitarian emergencies—that cannot be satisfactorily explained by existing explanations (Seawright and Gerring 2008). As the qualitative case study in Chapter 4 illustrates, the Government of Niger has at various times welcomed and opposed the delivery of humanitarian aid within its borders.

The case of Niger also includes useful variation in regime type, which has considerable explanatory power in cross-national analysis conflict status, a competing explanation. During the period under consideration, Niger has experienced both autocratic and democratic regimes. By showing that variation in regime type cannot explain all variation in government policy toward humanitarian aid and humanitarian emergencies, I can rule out regime type as the dominant factor explaining variation in government policy toward humanitarian aid. Similarly, during the period under study, there have been periods where the Government of Niger has engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns against non-state armed groups and periods of domestic peace. By showing that government policy toward humanitarian aid is not a simple function of whether or

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[8] See Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 for further detail on variation in dependence and definition of the cross-national country sample.

[9] See Table 4.1 in Chapter 4. This exceeds averages rates for both low income countries and sub-Saharan African countries in 2019 (World Development Indicators n.d.) The country's relatively extreme levels of aid dependence are a recent development; when average levels of aid dependence are compared across years in the sample, levels in Niger appear closer to the sample mean. See Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3

not the government is engaged in counterinsurgency, I provide evidence that this is not the dispositive factor that shapes government policy toward humanitarian aid.

Dissertation overview

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework in greater detail. It first specified the preferences of governments of poor states in non-emergency status quo conditions. Facing scarce domestic resources, governments turn to foreign governments and international organizations, which provide benefits to governments that enact their preferred policies. These international actors prefer to delegate to governments they view as competent, and governments thus seek to portray themselves as competent to attract desired forms of aid and investment. It then describes how humanitarian emergencies present opportunities for governments to either strengthen or undermine their reputations for competence because these emergencies focus the attention of both domestic and international actors on government performance. I then explain how differences in host government's pre-existing reputation for competence, the type of emergency event, and regime type influence shape the incentives host governments face.

Chapter 3 examines host governments' decisions to classify events as emergencies and donors' decisions to allocate aid. My theoretical framework predicts that host governments will be more likely to classify fast-onset rather than slow-onset events as emergencies because slow-onset emergencies are more likely to damage the government's reputations for competence. I anticipate that these government decisions will influence donors' propensity to offer aid, meaning that host governments play a dispositive role in deciding what events become understood as humanitarian emergencies. I expect democracies and states that are more dependent on foreign sources of revenue, such as development aid and foreign direct investment to be more sensitive to damaging both their domestic and international reputations for competence and thus more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies than slow onset ones. Donors will consequently be more likely to offer aid in response to events that host governments have already classified as emergencies. I test these expectations using a dataset of disaster events occurring in poor countries from 1989 to 2019 and find that democratic states are less likely to classify slow-onset rather than fast-onset events as emergencies, and that donors follow the lead of host governments. I further find that donors are more likely to offer aid to governments that depend heavily on development aid and FDI, but this effect is conditional on disaster type.

Chapter 4 introduces the case of Niger and presents a qualitative case study of the country's management of humanitarian emergencies since independence, drawing on semi-structured interviews and ethnographic observations from nine months of fieldwork

in Niger. The case study provides evidence that subsequent governments have expressed clear preference for long-term investment and development aid over short-term emergency response. The Nigerien government's ability to access these preferred sources of revenue has been limited by decision by donor governments and international organizations, whose decisions are mediated by the host government's reputation for competence. These host governments have pursued different strategies to improve their reputation for competence, thereby convincing donors to provide them with their preferred source of revenue: denying the existence of an emergency to maintain access to development aid or when denying the existence of an emergency proved infeasible, attempting to demonstrate competence as an aid partner to convince donors the emergency had ended.

Chapter 5 builds on insights from Chapter 4, applying the analysis to government officials who carry out government policies. I use a survey of almost 400 government officials to test whether or not their preferences match those I expect based on evidence from Chapter 4. I find that survey respondents value Niger's international reputation and perceive factors that suggest incompetence – insecurity and corruption – as undermining the government's reputation for competence. The results further suggest that the majority of Nigerien government officials understand development aid as a better solution to the country's problems than humanitarian aid and see the government as too dependent on foreign aid. They see the country as unable to access private investment and development aid because of the ongoing characterization of the country as experiencing an emergency. Taken together these survey results and interview evidence suggest that Nigerien government officials would prefer for their government to exert greater control over humanitarian aid and other forms of foreign intervention within the country's borders. They see improving the government's reputation for competence as a mechanism to gain greater control.

In Chapter 6, I return to the global level of analysis, using a survey of individuals working for humanitarian organizations to document the prevalence of host-government imposed restrictions and the consequences of these restrictions for humanitarian organizations' operations. I find that humanitarians encounter both administrative and coercive restrictions in the majority of contexts in which they work. However, these restrictions are only consequential if humanitarians comply with them, and given the lack of accountability between humanitarian organizations and host governments, they have few clear incentives to comply. However, I find that humanitarians report complying with host government restrictions at high rates because they see deferring to host government authority as the normatively desirable way to deliver humanitarian aid and the best way to ensure their own organizational survival. Humanitarian

organizations limit their operations to a greater degree than host government enforcement requires, restricting their own ability to deliver aid to people in need.

Chapter 7 summarizes the main empirical and theoretical contributions from the dissertation. It also explores limitations in the research design and additional data collection and analysis that could strengthen future versions of the project. Lastly, I explore directions for future research   following this project.

Chapter 2: A reputational theory of host government preferences

Introduction

My theory of host government responses to humanitarian emergencies starts with a general theory of host government preferences. I argue that state leaders of poor countries seek to maximize not only the volume of foreign resources that foreign states provide, but also control over the allocation of these resources. To gain discretion over these resources, host governments must convince the international actors who provide these benefits that they are reliable, but it is difficult for governments to send a reliable signal of competence because both competent and incompetent states attempt to portray themselves as competent to attract the benefits that accrue to competent states. They can send such a signal, and develop a reputation for competence, by making and meeting obligations to their international benefactors. State leaders in poor countries will prioritize developing an international reputation for competence because resources from international actors enable their political survival; they depend on foreign resources to provide benefits to domestic constituents to ensure their continued support.

After articulating these preferences, I describe how they shape governments responses to humanitarian emergencies--events that cause extraordinary human suffering, such as natural disasters, famine, and forced displacement. Mass suffering attracts attention from domestic and international media, focusing observers' attention on government performance. This presents governments with an opportunity to improve its reputation for competence by exceeding expectations or to damage its reputation for competence by under-performing. State leaders anticipate these reputational consequences. Leaders will openly acknowledge the event as an emergency and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need when they are confident the state can exceed expectations and enhance its reputation for competence. This is more likely to occur in response to fast-onset events. The same leaders will deny or minimize the existence of the emergency and limit information and access to humanitarian organizations when they doubt their government's ability to meet or exceed these expectations. This is more likely to occur in response to slow-onset events Both strategies are undertaken in pursuit of the same goal, increased discretion over resource allocation.

In the tradition of the "second image reversed," I illustrate how international incentives shape domestic policy choices (Peter Gourevitch 1978). In addition to normatively desirable outcomes such as democratic governance, international incentives can inadvertently produce normatively undesirable outcomes by entrenching authoritariain governance, creating incentives for corruption, and undermining domestic mechanisms

of political accountability (Buntaine, Parks, and Buch 2017; Hyde 2011; Pevehouse 2005).

My framework builds on a robust literature that theorizes and documents the role of reputation in international relations. Reputation refers to expectations about an actor's future behavior derived from that actor's past behavior (Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth 2018; Tomz 2007). Reputations are multidimension; actors do not have only one reputation that is good or bad, but can possess reputations for multiple traits, and actors' reputation for a given trait can vary across multiple audiences (Brutger and Kertzer 2018, 494). Concerns about reputation shape leaders' behavior across issue areas on both the domestic and international stages: "If there is one feature of reputation and status on which scholars agree, it that leaders, policy elites, and national populations are often concerned, even obsessed, with their status and reputation" (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014, 381).[10]

I draw on recent research documenting the divergence of preferences between donors and recipients of various forms of international intervention (Dionne 2017; Findley et al. 2017; Heiss and Kelley 2017). Studies of the consequences of contradictory preferences between donors and recipients focuses on the consequences of powerful states imposing their preferences on weaker recipients. However, robust evidence from the study of development aid shows that recipient governments manipulate such interventions to further their own objectives (Briggs 2012; Jablonski 2014; Winters 2014). Similarly, states impose both legal and extralegal restrictions to constrain international efforts to promote democracy and human rights (Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016; Escribà-Folch 2012) and international actors adapt their approaches to aid provision in order to maintain access to these contexts (Bush 2015). Despite this robust research agenda, little research investigates how the imposition of donor preferences influences the preferences of recipient governments, beyond creating incentives for corruption or rent-seeking. In this project, I theorize a set of host preferences, shaped by donor incentives, and document how these preferences shape humanitarian aid provision.

I further build on a rich literature that documents how responses to humanitarian emergencies shape practices of governance and domestic political incentives in the countries in which they work. I define humanitarian emergencies as events that cause

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[10] It is possible to differentiate the reputation of a state from its leader, but states' reputations often endure and are difficult for individual leaders to alter (Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth 2018) I differentiate between the reputation of leaders and the states they lead in the case study of management of humanitarian emergencies in Niger. In other sections of the manuscript, I treat these as coterminous.

suffering that domestic and/or international actors judge extraordinary such that policy response beyond normal service delivery is required. Determining which events become understood as emergencies is a political process, and the classification of an event as an emergency is the result of such negotiation (Barnett 2009; Calhoun 2010; Fassin 2007). The provision of humanitarian aid can create material incentives for predation and extend the duration of conflict (Lischer 2006; Narang 2014, 2015).

I argue that state leaders value their reputations, and reputational concerns influence their policy choices. I focus on what I term a government's reputation for competence. Essentially, this refers to a reputation to follow through on promised commitments. It is similar to a "signaling reputation," a reputation for issuing sincere signals, or a "reputation for action," (Jervis 1989; Schelling 1966). I describe two key audiences for the government's reputation for competence: the domestic winning coalition, who I refer to as the government's essential backers, and the international audience of foreign donors. The content of a reputation for competence differs according to the audience evaluating the state's reputation. For the domestic audience, comprised of the government's essential supporters, a reputation for competence captures the idea of the government's will and ability to provide the benefits upon which support is conditioned. This can include the delivery of both programs and patronage. For the international audience it refers to the government's will and ability to meet promised commitments.

My conceptualization of a reputation for competence relies on the idea of audience costs – that audiences punish leaders when leaders' behavior damages the country's "credibility, face, or honor" (Fearon 1994). Domestic audiences impose costs when leaders back down after explicit threats or reverse course on actions that implicate the leader's or country's "credibility, face, or honor" (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014, 387). This implies that domestic audiences should impose costs when leaders publicly commit to a policy designed to demonstrate the country's competence and then fail to follow through.

Both domestic and international observers hold beliefs about the competence of a given state and its leader. These beliefs are formed on the basis of past performance. If the leader (and state apparatus) behaves consistent with this perceived level of competence, the reference level, there is no change in the government's reputation for competence. However, if the leader behaves inconsistent with the reference level, the government's reputation for competence will change. If a leader who typically delivers on their promises suddenly fails to follow through on a policy commitment that the audience views as a priority, the reputation for competence will be damaged. Conversely, if a leader who typically fails to deliver on policy priorities successfully delivers the expected benefit, the reputation for competence will improve.

A state's reputation for competence varies according to its audience. The same action can improve a state's domestic reputation for competence while undermining its international reputation for competence and vice versa. For example, rejecting offers of aid can negatively affect the government's domestic reputation for competence and at the same time positively affect the government's international reputation for competence if the government's essential supporters see the government's rejection of aid as the government withholding promised benefits while international observers see the same action as proof of the government's ability to provide aid to its citizens without foreign support. It is also possible for an action that changes a state's international reputation for competence in the eyes of one audience to have no effect on the reputation for competence in the eyes of a different audience.

I argue that states value their reputation for competence and seek to establish a positive reputation for competence in order to access material benefits. These material benefits include both control over material resources and continued time in office. In asserting that states seek a positive reputation for competence in order to access material resources and continued power, I do not claim that there is no intrinsic benefit to a positive reputation for competence or that I can prove this motivation is instrumental rather than intrinsic. Even instrumental motives, to acquire material gain by improving a reputation, are shaped by social, cultural, and psychological factors (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014, 382).

Overview of humanitarian response process:
This section describes the process through which humanitarian aid is allocated and distributed. The following section describes the preferences of actors involved and how they shape this process.

Figure 2.1 provides a visual overview of the process of humanitarian response. The humanitarian response process begins with the occurrence of an event that causes human suffering. Governments, donors, and humanitarian organizations then determine whether or not the event requires external intervention and should be classified as a humanitarian emergency.[11]

Figure 2.1: Steps in the humanitarian response process

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[11] Despite evidence that investments in prevention are more cost effective than investment in emergency response, the majority of emergency relief aid is dedicated to emergency response and allocated only after an event occurs and is classified as an emergency (D. J. Clarke and Dercon 2016).

The host government makes the first decision regarding how to respond to the emergency event. Host governments typically learn of events before international actors, which enables them to decide how to respond before international actors become involved.[12] The host government can choose to acknowledge the event and classify it as an emergency. When governments classify events as emergencies, they mobilize their own material and human resources to help people who are injured or displaced. Alternatively, host governments can choose to take no action to help people in need, ignoring the event and its consequences.

Donor governments observe the host government's decision and then decide whether or not to offer humanitarian aid. Donors can to offer humanitarian aid regardless of the government's decision to acknowledge or ignore the emergency event. When donors offer humanitarian aid, they offer to fund the provision of goods and services through to international NGOs and international organizations.[13] Figure 2.2 plots the volume of humanitarian aid delivered through different types of implementing organizations; the majority of this funding flows through United Nations agencies and international NGOs,

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[12] I make this simplification for ease of exposition. Reality is more complex, and it is possible for international actors to learn of events first and exert pressure on host governments before these governments have chosen their approach

[13] Donors provide funds directly to these organizations, who deliver agreed-upon goods and services on behalf of the donor government. For more on the relationship between donors and humanitarian NGOs see (Krause 2014).

which sub-contract with NGOs based in the recipient country. A much smaller proportion of humanitarian aid flows are delivered via state channels.

Donors prefer to deliver humanitarian aid through humanitarian organizations because they perceive these organizations to be more effective and impartial than government structures (Krause 2014). Donors justify working through non-governmental channels by invoking the urgency of providing with humanitarian aid to people in need. With lives hanging in the balance, donors want to avoid the delay and political diversion they associate with working through government structures. Donors perceive the objectives and incentives of humanitarian organizations to be more aligned with donor governments' own, and donors thus see humanitarian organizations more likely to deliver their preferred results compared to host governments.

Figure 2.2 : Global volume of humanitarian aid by type of implementing organization: 2000-2019[14]

If donors do not offer humanitarian aid, governments can request aid directly from donors. Alternatively, they can choose not to request external support and make do with local resources. When governments request aid from donors, the decision whether or not to provide aid reverts to donors. In Figure 1, this is represented by the dotted line connecting government request to donors offering aid or ignoring the request.

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[14] Author calculations based on Financial Tracking Service (FTS), December 2020, http://fts.unocha.org

If donors offer humanitarian aid, host governments then decide whether to accept or reject their offer. If governments reject offers of aid, donors and humanitarian organization can lobby government to change its policy through both private diplomacy or public shaming. However, they require government permission to deliver aid within the borders of any sovereign state. If governments reject aid and are not persuaded by lobbying, donors and humanitarian organizations cannot legally provide aid within the country's borders.[15]

When host governments accept aid, they governments permit humanitarian organizations to operate within their borders. This is depicted as a binary choice in Figure 2.1, however host governments can negotiate with donors over the specific terms of aid before accepting. The amount of aid to be given, the type of good or service to be provided, and the identity of the actor who will deliver aid are all subject to negotiation. Host governments can use these negotiations both to convince donors to give a greater volume of aid and to deliver aid via modalities that are more appropriate to local conditions. However they can also use these negotiations to impose restrictions on where, when, how, and to whom humanitarian organizations can deliver aid.

By opening the door to humanitarian aid, governments do not cede all authority and control over aid provision to donors and humanitarian organizations. To operate in a country, both IOs and NGOs must sign legal agreements with host governments that stipulate the conditions of their operations. They are also subject to existing regulations within the host government's legal framework on non-governmental organizations. Host governments can choose to maintain the status quo regulatory environment or to impose new restrictions on humanitarian organizations. These restrictions can include new policies, such as fees for service, mandatory reporting on activities, or requiring organizations to seek government authorization for travel within the country. They can also include slowing organizations' operations by delaying their ability to gain necessary permissions.

When host governments impose these restrictions, humanitarian organizations decide whether defer to restrictions or to defy them. Deferring to restrictions enables humanitarians to provide aid to people in need but limits the scope of aid provision to areas that align with government interests. If humanitarians defying restrictions, they

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[15] Chapter VII intervention, authorized by the UN Security Council, provides the only legal exception. This approach has only been used in Syria to authorize cross-border aid in opposition-held areas where President Assad would not authorize humanitarian access.

risk punitive action from government which may result in a complete ban on their activities.[16]

Preferences of host governments, domestic audiences, and international audiences in a non-emergency status quo

First, I briefly describe the preferences of host government actors regarding the allocation of scarce resources. Second, I enumerate the preferences of both domestic and international audiences and how these actors' preferences influence the host government's policy choices. Third, I explain how both domestic and international constraints are mediated by the host government's reputation for competence.

This theory of actor preferences treats international reputation for competence as an instrument used by leaders to access scarce resources and domestic reputation as an instrument used by leaders to ensure their political survival. While asserting an instrumental logic for the value of reputation for competence, I do not rule out that states may also attach an intrinsic value to being perceived as competent by their domestic and international audiences.

<u>Host government leaders prefer to remain in power and control resource allocation</u>

With rare exceptions, political leadership of central governments prefer to remain in power.[17] Remaining in power confers numerous benefits: control of the apparatus of the state and ability to enact preferred policies. It is commonly assumed that political leaders prefer to maximize the volume of material resources they control. Incumbents can deploy fungible resources to remain in power by distributing them as patronage or investing in programs (Briggs 2012; Jablonski 2014). Leaders can also use these resources to enrich themselves, providing a golden parachute in case of removal.

Leaders face constraints to both their ability to remain in power and their ability to attract and direct the distribution of material resources. They are constrained by both the need to meet the demands of those whose support keeps them in power and the availability of material resources from both domestic and international sources. They see maintaining a reputation for competence as a useful tool to secure material resources and ensure their continued political survival.

<u>Domestic audiences prefer competent governments</u>

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[16] Humanitarian organizations can also ask donors to impose political pressure on host governments. As I will show in Chapter 6, humanitarian organizations rarely choose to escalate to donors for fear of politicizing their operations.

[17] As Hyde (2011) explains, in some cases leaders have preferences for democracy that supersedes their preference to remain in office.

To remain in power the government must maintaining support of a minimum winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita 2005). I refer to constituents without whose support the government would lose power as the government's essential supporters. These constituents' support of government leadership is conditional on the government delivery benefits they deem essential. If government fails to provide these benefits essential supporters withdraw their support of government, which threatens the government's ability to remain in power. Essential supporters' preferences can be heterogeneous regarding what benefits they deem essential.[18]

These essential supporters prefer a government they believe will reliably deliver essential benefits compared to a government they believe will not or about which they are uncertain. They use the incumbent government's past performance to develop expectations about its future performance. In this way, essential supporters' support of government is conditional on the government's reputation for competence, which I hereafter refer to as the government's domestic reputation for competence. When government reliably delivers essential supporters preferred benefits, the government develops a reputation for competence; essential supporters believe the government will continue to deliver these benefits based on its past positive performance and will continue to support government. When government fails to reliably deliver these benefits, the government develops a reputation for incompetence; essential supporters believe government will not consistently deliver benefits upon which their support relies. Consequently, they will assess potential alternatives to determine if these are more likely to reliably deliver the benefits they require.

Domestic audiences' preferences for a competent government introduce constraints on the host government's ability to remain in office. To remain in power, host governments must maintain a reputation for competence by reliably providing the benefits that essential supporters prioritize. Providing these benefits requires government to correctly identify the benefits upon which support is conditioned and to control sufficient resources to provide such benefits.

When governments control insufficient resources to provide these benefits to their essential supporters, they risk damaging their reputation for competence and losing the support they need to remain in office. Conversely, when governments control more resources than are required to provide benefits their essential supporters demand, they can allocate this surplus of resources to other priorities. These could include expanding their base of support, rewarding loyal supporters, or using these funds for personal gain.

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[18] It is possible to replace lost supporters with new ones, but losing these supporters nevertheless create greater uncertainty over the government's abiliy to remain in power.

The availability of domestic resources limits the volume of resources available for government to control and thereby poses a constraint to governments' ability to satisfy its essential supporters and remain in office.

Host governments are constrained by the availability of domestic resources
Controlling more resources helps leaders insure against the risk of removal by both expanding their base of support and providing benefits to supporters who would otherwise defect. However, gaining control of resources is costly and governments access to resources is constrained. The availability of domestic resources poses a key constraint to the government's ability to provide benefits required by essential supporters and to pursue additional policy priorities.

Domestic revenues can be divided into those derived from taxing the public and those derived from non-tax sources, namely revenues from natural resources controlled by the state. Governments vary in their access to both tax and nontax revenues. Governments lacking one type of revenue can substitute the other; states with weak tax bases but significant natural resource wealth can substitute non-tax revenue.

The volume of domestic revenues to which governments have access varies substantially across states, and poor countries face greater constraints compared to their wealthy counterparts. This is not a simple consequence of geography, but the result of underdevelopment. When tax bases are weak, government revenues from taxation are insufficient to meet demands for services. Consequently, governments cannot fund themselves via taxation. This creates a vicious cycle; capable bureaucracies are necessary to collect taxes, but taxes are necessary to fund capable bureaucracies. Lacking the capital necessary to strengthen their tax bases, governments often look to nontax resources to substitute for taxation. However, the supply of nontax resources is in turn limited by the country's natural resource endowments. While some natural resources are easily extracted or lootable, many require costly exploitation to gain access to their revenues. For the reasons articulated above, few poor governments possess the domestic capital necessary to exploit these resources. This prevents many poor governments from relying on natural resources as a substitute for tax revenue. Nonetheless, governments of poor countries need to find the resources necessary to maintain a reputation for competence in the eyes of their essential supporters or face removal.

International audiences' preferences determine the availability of foreign sources of revenue
Foreign sources of revenue, such as aid, trade, or investment, pose a potential alternative for governments facing domestic resource constraints. These foreign

revenue sources promise a windfall of non-tax revenue that governments facing domestic resource constraints can substitute for domestic revenues to provide benefits to their essential supporters. However, these foreign revenue sources are not simple substitutes for other forms of non-tax revenue, such as natural resource rents (Bermeo 2016). The foreign actors who supply these revenues--donors, lenders, and investors—condition the availability of foreign revenue sources and the way these revenues can be used.

Similar to domestic revenue sources, there is meaningful variation in access to foreign sources of revenue for different governments. While access to domestic revenue sources varies according to natural factor endowments and the strength of a government's tax base, access to foreign revenue sources depends on the preferences of the foreign actors who supply these resources.

Foreign sources of revenue include lenders, investors, and aid donors; I focus here on foreign aid donors because these donors set the agenda in terms of the type of foreign revenues governments can access. This is because private entities are more risk averse than aid donors; donors provide foreign aid in contexts that private actors deem too risky for other forms of investment. Due to the difficulty of gathering quality information about the risk to their returns in contexts characterized by uncertainty, private actors use foreign aid allocation as a costly signal that of lowered risk (Garriga and Phillips 2014). Foreign aid donors are the first movers and other actors observe their experiences and use this to inform their own decision-making. More depends on government behavior toward foreign aid than just the aid itself.

Donors use aid to further their own foreign policy priorities: "Powerful international actors hold preferences about the characteristics of other states and encourage these characteristics indirectly through the allocation of international benefits" (Hyde 2011, 30). Although policy priorities vary by donor, existing research has established several consistent patterns in donor preferences: aid donors prefer to give aid to countries of greater strategic importance, to former colonies, and to countries that are well governed and less corrupt.[19] These preferences are a consequence of donor governments' own domestic political incentives to spend their limited foreign policy budgets effectively (Dietrich 2016).

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[19] See (Dietrich 2016; Steinwand 2015) for discussions of preference heterogeneity among donors. Aid donor preferences have become increasingly diverse as the pool of significant aid donors has grown; while the U.S. and European donors are the largest traditional aid donors, China, India, and Gulf states have emerged as new aid donors in the 21st century.

To accomplish their foreign policy goals, donors must solve the well-documented principal-agent problem, in which the principal (donor) wants to ensure that the agent to whom they delegate (recipient government) uses resources to achieve their preferred policy. However, in providing aid to recipient governments, donors delegate implementation to recipient governments whose policy preferences may not align with donors' policy preferences. Donors and investors use myriad tools to solve the principal-agent problem, including conditionality, oversight and reporting procedures, and delegation to private partners instead of state structures. These tools increase accountability between donor and recipient and limit the recipient government's discretion (Winters 2010a).

Despite donors' preferences to provide aid to well-governed and geo-strategically important states, these states have less need (and often desire) for aid compared to less politically stable, less strategically important states. This pattern has emerged as many previously lower-income states have ascended to middle-income status; now many of the poorest states are also many of the most poorly governed. This has implications for how donors allocate aid; in practice donors divide their aid budget between the strategically important and stable states and less geo-strategically important, less stable states. However, they do not provide the same volume of aid or the same agreement terms to all countries. Donors will give aid over which they can exercise greater direct oversight when they give aid to poorly governed countries (Winters 2010b; Winters and Martinez 2015). This means that donors are more likely to provide aid through mechanisms that bypass direct government control when providing aid to states they see as poorly governed or corrupt (Dietrich 2013; DiLorenzo 2018). As a corollary, donors provide aid over which recipient governments can exercise greater discretion to governments they perceive as well-governed.

When donors are particularly concerned about potential misuse of funds, they solve the principal-agent problem by delegating aid to private, non-state actors instead of to recipient governments (Dietrich 2013). These actors are seen as more efficient, technically competent, and professional. Compared to host governments, their preferences are more similar to donors because they rely on securing donor funding to ensure institutional survival. This comes at a cost, by delegating aid delivery to NGOs, donors create and strengthen parallel forms of governance that may compete with the state. Donors prefer to delegate to states but delegate to NGOs when delegation to states appears too risky. Donor delegation to NGOs benefits both donors and the organizations they fund, often to the detriment of host governments.

International audiences create incentives for host governments to cultivate a reputation for competence

As a result of donors' preferences, leaders of poorly governed states, particularly those that are also geo-strategically unimportant to donors, have limited opportunities to attract foreign revenues. The demand for aid among such countries exceeds the amount that donors are willing to supply, and consequently governments' bargaining position are weak relative to donors. Governments can make demands--to receive aid funds directly and to exercise sole discretion over aid allocation--but donors have little incentive to acquiesce. Because many governments compete for the same funds, donors can simply find another government to accept their more restrictive terms. This competitive environment, and governments' limited leverage to alter the terms upon which donors offer aid, creates incentives for governments to portray themselves as donors' ideal recipients.

Donor preferences for good governance and competition for limited aid create incentives for host governments to convince donors that they possess donors' preferred characteristics (good governance, stability). Host governments pursue this strategy to gain the benefit of increased discretion over the use of aid funds and access to additional foreign sources of revenue, such as foreign direct investment. If host governments can convince donors they possess these preferred traits, donors will see them as reliable agents and provide increased discretion over aid. Other international actors observe donors' decision to provide discretion and interpret donor behavior as an indication (costly signal) of the host government's good governance and stability. Consequently, these additional donors will be more likely to invest after observing this interaction.

This poses a problem for governments: how can they convince donors they are well-governed and stable when donors' prior beliefs indicate that the host government is poorly governed and unstable? To persuade donors that that they are well-governed and stable, government leaders must alter donors' beliefs about their future behavior. They can pursue this goal by adopting institutional reforms and/or altering their current behavior to comport with donors' preferences.

Such strategic behavior is common in international politics, where, "State leaders condition their behavior on anticipated international benefits" (Hyde 2011, 31). Host governments want to convince donors that they are well-governed (behavior) in order to receive greater discretion over aid funds (the benefit), which they can use to fulfill their political objectives.

However, institutional reforms are costly, requiring resources and political will, and implementing such reforms can threaten patronage networks and remove opportunities for rent-seeking. Weakening these existing governance structures could in turn damage the government's domestic reputation for competence, thereby threatening the government's ability to remain in power.

To avoid paying such costs, government actors will find less costly ways to signal their competence to donors. As Dietrich (2011) argues, governments of poorly governed countries strategically comply with donor priorities in areas that are of high priority for donors when compliance with these priorities is relatively cheap for governments. For example, when governments face the decision to accept or reject aid that limits their discretion, they will accept these terms if they want to convince donors that they are competent. Accepting this aid communicates to donors that government actors are willing to forego potential private benefits in the name of efficacy.

Government actors accept this aid in order to improve their reputation for competence in the eyes of donors because they believe that doing so will make donors more likely to provide greater discretion over aid in the future. By complying with restrictions and meeting donors' expectations they demonstrate donors' preferred characteristics and cultivate a positive reputation for competence in the eyes of donors. Governments can then use this evidence of positive performance to "justify additional aid inflows" (Dietrich 2011). Governments can also harm their reputation for competence by failing to operate efficiently and deliver the donors' preferred policies.

<u>Host governments face tradeoffs between international and domestic reputations for competence</u>
The two previous sections describe the incentives resulting from government actors' desire to cultivate a reputation for competence among both domestic and international audiences. When these incentives align, governments can enact policies that benefit both domestic and international reputations for competence. When offered foreign aid, international reputational incentives indicate that government actors should accept the offer and enact donors preferred policies to demonstrate competence to donors, improving the government's reputation for competence. If government's essential domestic supporters also demand aid and tolerate necessary policy concessions, government's domestic reputation for competence also improves.

However, when reputational concerns regarding domestic and international reputation for competence produce contradictory incentives, host government officials must decide which reputation to prioritize. By prioritizing either domestic or international reputation, they accept that their decisions will likely damage the reputation they do not prioritize.

Recalling the stylized example in the previous paragraph, international reputational incentives suggest that government actors should accept offers of aid and enact donors preferred policies in order to demonstrate their competence to donors. Nevertheless, essential supporters may oppose aid or the policy concessions government must accept in order to receive it. I would expect essential supporters to oppose aid if accepting it required the government to make policy concessions that would jeopardize supporters' access benefits upon which they condition their support of government. If the government accepted aid despite domestic opposition from essential supporters and enacted policy concessions that undermined essential supporters' access to benefits, the government's domestic reputation for competence would be damaged. The government's essential supporters would interpret the government's decision as a signal that the government in power will not reliably deliver the benefits they deem essential.

For example, donors frequently condition budget support aid on host governments' adoption of anti-corruption policies. If they accept aid and adopt such policies, governments improve their reputation for competence among donors by demonstrating their will and ability to meet a stated obligation to donors. After observing this demonstration of competence, donors will update their beliefs regarding the government's competence. Consequently, they will be more likely to provide government with greater discretion over aid in the future. However, enacting such anti-corruption policies would undermine the government's domestic reputation for competence if essential supporters' loyalty depends on their access to benefits from corruption. Accepting aid and adopting anti-corruption policies would indicate incompetence to these domestic supporters because by enacting these policies, the government is signaling that it will not prioritize maintaining these promised benefits. In this situation, domestic and international incentives indicate contradictory policy choices. The government could prioritize its domestic reputation for competence by refusing to enact anti-corruption policies and continuing to provide benefits to essential supporters. However, this policy choice would damage the government's international reputation for competence, jeopardizing future access to and discretion over aid flows. Alternatively, government could prioritize its international reputation for competence by enacting anti-corruption policies, but this policy choice would undermine the government's domestic reputation for competence, undermining support of constituents the government upon whom government relies to remain in power.

When faced with this tradeoff, which reputation for competence do government actors prioritize? I argue that they will prioritize maintaining reputation for competence for the audience that poses the greatest threat to government's continued ability to remain in power. Conventional arguments based on an audience costs framework suggest that

governments prioritize their domestic reputation in most instances. As Fearon (1994) argues, governments prioritize domestic audiences because they are more likely to intervene to remove incompetent governments than international ones. International intervention to remove leaders, by comparison, a rare event. This logic implies that governments should prioritize domestic over international reputation when removal from office by domestic actors is more likely than removal by international actors. However, governments often make decisions that suggest they value international reputation disproportionate to the risk of removal posed by international audiences. Governments exert effort to improve or maintain their international reputation and avoid stigma (Adler-Nissen 2014; Hyde 2011).[20]

International actors affect governments' prospect of survival through mechanisms other than direct intervention, namely the allocation of international benefits, such as aid and investment. The degree to which international actors affect the government's survival varies according to the host government's reliance on foreign sources of revenue to fund essential budgetary priorities. When governments' domestic sources of revenue are insufficient to satisfy the demands of governments' essential domestic supporters, they rely on international actors to provide revenue to compensate for this shortfall. In other words, governments rely on resources provided by international actors to demonstrate competence to their domestic audiences. To provide benefits to essential supporters, host governments need to convince donors to both allocate these funds and to delegate discretion over these funds to host governments. To convince donors to provide funds governments can allocate as they wish, government actors need to cultivate an international reputation for competence.

When host governments depend on continued funding from international actors to meet the needs of their domestic audiences, their domestic reputation for competence is threatened if international actors stop providing these revenues. Host governments would be left without the means to provide benefits upon which supporters condition their support, rendering the government vulnerable to domestic removal. The host government's domestic reputation for competence relies on these government actors' ability to attract revenue from international actors.

Consequently, when host governments depend on international sources of revenue to fund activities the domestic audience deems essential, the government's domestic

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[20] Governments value their various international reputations for both material and affective reasons. While I do not rule out that governments may value their reputation for competence for reasons other than the material consequences for their own survival, these consequences are the focus of this theory.

reputation for competence becomes *dependent* on its international reputation for competence. Governments need to prove their competence to international actors to secure funding that will allow them to meet the needs of their domestic audience in the future. Governments prioritize improving their international reputation for competence in order to strengthen their domestic reputation for competence.

Government actors will tolerate reputational damage when it is necessary to maintain or improve their reputation for competence of the audience they prioritize. However, they prefer to avoid unnecessary damage to their reputation for competence. Even when governments clearly prioritize domestic reputation for competence, they prefer to avoid damaging their international reputation for competence.

Host government preferences in the context of humanitarian emergencies
Having described a general set of host government preferences, I now turn to explaining how these preferences play out in the context of humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian emergencies can profoundly shape both domestic and international perceptions of government competence because they act as focal points for both domestic and international audiences. Responding to humanitarian emergencies is a high stakes, life or death proposition. As such, these emergencies typically attract extraordinary attention from both domestic and international media, which focus the attention of domestic and international audiences on the suffering of those affected and on the success or failure of government efforts to alleviate this suffering.

Responding to humanitarian emergencies is a high-stakes test of government competence. In non-emergency settings, states are judged based on their ability to fulfill the social contract, to provide essential services to facilitate human flourishing. Emergencies test states' ability to provide these essential services in the worst possible conditions – urgent needs, damaged infrastructure, limited resources, and, often, insecure environments.

Humanitarian emergencies can be seen as a difficult test of government competence and the high-stakes nature of the challenge leads them to have outsize consequences for a government's reputation for competence. Before an emergency occurs, governments have established domestic and international reputations for competence, formed on the basis of their past performance. I refer to these pre-existing reputations as the reference level of competence. When governments out-perform their reference level of competence in an emergency setting, observers interpret this as a strong indicator and will update their perception of the host government's competence because the government performed well in spite of unfavorable conditions. Similarly, when governments under-perform their reference level of competence in response to

emergency conditions, this is a strong indicator that the government's previous reputation for competence was undeserved because the government was unable to deliver when it mattered most. When governments perform in line with their reference level of competence, their reputation does not shift.

Existing research supports my contention that government response to emergencies affects domestic publics perceptions of government competence and their allocation of benefits and punishments. Domestic publics reward governments they perceive as performing competently in response to emergencies with increased support and more time in office (Fair et al. 2017; Kosec and Mo 2017). These same domestic publics punish incumbents they view as performing incompetently in response to emergencies (Achen and Bartels 2004; Cole, Healy, and Werker 2012; Healy and Malhotra 2009).

Little research has explored the reputational implications of managing humanitarian emergencies on the international stage. Carnegie and Dolan (2019) show that host governments use responses to natural disasters to improve their international status by demonstrating self-sufficiency, but they do not discuss the potential instrumental benefits that may result. Natural disasters are negatively associated with future foreign direct investment (Escaleras and Register 2011), but this study does not account for the mediating role of governments' reputation for competence.

However, outside of the context of humanitarian emergencies, there is substantial evidence that international actors provide benefits to governments they view as more competent and withhold them from governments they view as incompetent. International actors reward post-conflict governments that successfully administer development programs with increased foreign direct investment and donors reward governments they view as less corrupt more capable with aid funds and FDI (Asiedu 2006; Dietrich 2011; Garriga and Phillips 2014). When allocating aid to countries they view as incompetent and corrupt, donors limit government control of aid resources, electing to delegate to non-governmental organizations instead (Dietrich 2013, 2016; Winters and Martinez 2015).

I argue that host governments' concerns about their domestic and international reputations for competence influence government policy choices throughout emergency response. These reputational concerns influence whether governments treat a given event as an emergency, whether they accept or reject offers of international support to respond to the event, and the restrictions they impose on humanitarian organizations operating with their borders.

Emergency type shapes government decisions

The reputational consequences of responding to a given emergency depend on the type of event. I distinguish the reputational consequences of two categories of events: fast-onset and slow-onset. Fast-onset events include those typically thought of as "acts of god": cyclones, earthquakes, floods, and their attendant consequences: mudslides, tsunamis, or landslides. It is easy to determine when fast-onset events begin, and these events—whether man-made or natural in origin—are widely seen as exogenous.[21] If fast-onset emergencies are plausibly exogenous to government policy choices, slow-onset phenomena are endogenous to these policy choices. Slow-onset phenomena include droughts, epidemics, food shortages, and complex humanitarian emergencies. It is often difficult to determine when slow-onset phenomena begin or attribute causality. Consequently it is difficult to assess the consequences of slow-onset phenomena.

Fundamentally, the reputational consequences of responding to these types of phenomena differ because it is easier to for states to demonstrate competence in response to fast-onset rather than slow-onset events. It is easier to demonstrate competence in response to fast onset events because governments can avoid blame for the occurrence of fast-onset events, which are discrete, measurable, and exogeneous, whereas it is more difficult for states to avoid blame for the occurrence of slow-onset events, whose onset is difficult to define and which can easily be seen as caused or exacerbated by government policy choices.

Because governments are less likely to suffer reputational consequences of blame for the occurrence of fast-onset emergencies, they have more to gain from demonstrating competence in response to these emergencies. The opposite is true for slow-onset emergencies, governments are more likely to be blamed for failing to prevent the occurrence of slow-onset emergencies and therefore can derive little reputational benefit from responding to them when they receive public attention. It thus benefits governments to deny and conceal the occurrence of slow-onset emergencies because doing so allows them to avoid blame that would damage their international, and in some cases domestic, reputation for competence.

Both domestic and international audiences are more likely to attribute blame to governments for the occurrence of slow-onset events compared to fast-onset events. Fast-onset events are broadly perceived as exogenous to government policy choices, whereas slow-onset events are seen as endogenous to government policy choices. When emergencies occur, people attribute blame for the event and the response. It is

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[21] Fast-onset events are also referred to as rapid-onset or sudden onset disasters. Even when humans are at fault for the occurrence of a fast-onset event, such as starting a wildfire, the wildfire itself is seen as an accident and not the result of political choices.

difficult to assign blame to host government for the occurrence plausibly exogenous events. Domestic publics blame governments and punish them for failing to respond to these events, but they do not hold governments responsible for the fact that the event occurred. However, because slow-onset events occur gradually and increase in magnitude over time, it is more plausible that government actors could intervene to prevent the event from resulting an emergency. It is thus more plausible to blame government authorities for failures of prevent for slow-onset events. Both domestic and international audiences can still blame governments for a failed response to a fast-onset event, but they will not blame government for the occurrence of the event itself.

Blame for the occurrence of emergencies has direct implications for a host government's reputations for competence. It implies that the government had time to intervene but failed to do so. Both domestic and international publics are less likely to blame governments for the occurrence of fast-onset events, and therefore governments are less likely to suffer reputational costs for responding to fast-onset events. Governments are more likely to suffer international reputation costs when they are blamed for slow-onset emergencies, while the consequences of blame on domestic reputation for competence vary.

On the domestic stage, this may or may not negatively affect the government's reputation for competence. It will undermine the government's reputation for competence if failing to prevent the emergency means the government failed to provide benefits to its essential supporters. However, if essential supports are unaffected or even benefit from the failure of response, the government's domestic reputation for competence will not be adversely affected and may even be enhanced. The government's domestic reputation for competence will be unaffected if essential supporters are unaffected by the emergency. The government's domestic reputation will be enhanced if essential supporters' access to benefits is enhanced by the government's failure to allocate resources to emergency response because these resources have been allocated to essential supporters instead.

On the international stage, blame for slow onset events will typically harm the host government's reputation for competence. Donors interpret the government's failure to prevent the emergency as a lack of technical capacity and/or political will to respond. Both indicate incompetence. This either confirms their prior beliefs about a government's lack of competence or lead them to believe a government is less competent than previous beliefs would suggest. They respond to incompetence by channeling aid funds to non-state actors instead of government coffers.

Governments prefer to avoid blame for emergencies in order to avoid the potential international and domestic reputation costs. There are several strategies they can pursue to avoid blame. First they can invest in emergency prevention. However, this strategy is unlikely because such investments carry little domestic reputational benefit (Gailmard and Patty 2019). The scarcity of resources in poor states make investments in prevention even less likely compared to their wealthier counterparts. Alternatively, governments can attempt to avoid reputational costs by responding to emergencies as quickly as possible in order to demonstrate their competence. This strategy is more likely to be effective in response to fast-onset emergencies, which governments are rarely blamed for. It is easier to demonstrate competence in response to fast onset emergencies. The clarity of the moment of onset allows governments to clearly illustrate that they responded as soon as they were informed of the event. It is more difficult to demonstrate competence in response to slow-onset emergencies, which governments are more likely to be blamed for. It is difficult to assess how quickly governments respond, due to uncertainty regarding the moment of onset, making it more difficult to avoid blame. Critics can always point to the failure of prevention or argue that the government should have responded more quickly. That the slow onset event has caused sufficient damage to receive attention is itself an indicator of incompetence.

A final strategy available to governments in order to avoid blame is to deny the existence or magnitude of an event. Governments can deny an event occurred or assert that the event did not result in deaths, displacement or damage of sufficient magnitude to warrant emergency response. This is less feasible for fast-onset emergencies where there is collective understanding of when the event occurred and clearer evidence of its impact. It is more feasible to deny the occurrence of slow-onset emergencies due to high levels of uncertainty around when they started and the difficulty of measuring their consequences. Without a shared understanding of what the event is, when it started, and how it has affected people, governments can more easily manipulate information to deny the event occurred or minimize its effects.

When an event occurs, causing property damage, injury, and loss of life, government authorities must select a course of action. The following sections describe each step of the stylized process presented in Figure 1. I explain how the different reputational consequences of fast and slow onset emergencies shape government policy choices at each stage of their response to these events.

Host governments decide to classify events as emergencies
The first decision government authorities confront is whether or not to classify the event as an emergency. Taxonomizing, classifying, and ranking phenomena profoundly shape the way individuals and societies understand phenomena. Standardizing and classifying

populations and phenomena are tools central to the rise of the modern state and these tools remain key to the exercise of state power (Scott 1998; Spruyt 1996). States declare states of emergencies to differentiate ordinary from extraordinary circumstances and justify the use of extraordinary powers (Bjørnskov and Voigt 2018). An ordinary situation becomes an emergency by virtue of the exercise of state power, evidenced by the declaration of a state of emergency.[22] For the purposes of disaster response, an event becomes a humanitarian emergency the moment that authorities classify it as such (Coppola 2015, 327).

By classifying an event as a humanitarian emergency, a government indicates that the event has caused exceptional suffering and it is urgently necessary to mobilize a response, using extraordinary resources (Calhoun 2010). Governments signal to all observers that they judge it necessary to mobilize extraordinary resources to address exceptional suffering. Classifying an event as a humanitarian emergency, "shapes not only who is supposed to act but what is supposed to be done" (Barnett 2013, 393).

At the most fundamental level, classifying an event as a humanitarian emergency changes the way the event is understood. It renders those harmed by the emergency as sympathetic victims in need of assistance. For government authorities, it justifies the use of extraordinary measures to provide aid to people in need. When government authorities classify an event as an emergency, they indicate that government will mobilize resources to provide goods and services to people harmed by the event. These services exceed those provided by the state in normal, non-emergency conditions.[23]

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[22] Classifying an event as a humanitarian emergency has different implications for state authority from declaring a state of emergency. When government authorities declare a state of emergency, it accrues additional powers that can be used however it sees fit (Bjørnskov and Voigt 2018). Classifying an event as a humanitarian emergency does not imply the accrual of any such powers to the state.States will sometimes declare a state of emergency in addition to classifying events as humanitarian emergencies and thus classification decisions could be use instrumentally to justify states of emergency. However, classifying events as humanitarian emergencies implies additional scrutiny that limits the effectiveness of such a gambit.

[23] This emergency classification process is not specific to poor countries; in California the state does not classify house fires as emergencies because the capacity of local fire stations is presumed adequate to respond to immediate needs resulting from the fire and property owners' insurance is presumed adequate to compensate for property damage. By contrast, when wildfires consume large swaths of land, the state classifies this as an emergency, issuing a state of emergency declaration that "local authorities lack the resources needed to cope with the emergency," mobilizing extraordinary resources, including calling up the national guard, and providing services and grants to those who suffered injury or property damage as a result of the fires (Newsom 2019).

When state leaders classify an event as an emergency, they obligate their government to mobilize its resources to respond to the event in question. This decision also unlocks access to material resources from both domestic and international sources to enable governments to meet these obligations. These resources are not available without an emergency designation. Domestically, the material consequences of classifying an event as an emergency differ depending on the legal framework of the host state. They typically include the ability to spend money outside of typical appropriations processes and the ability to mobilize state security forces and civil agencies to respond to the emergency. On the international stage, emergency classification influences donors' propensity to offer aid funds and the volume and type of aid offered. Under international law, foreign actors cannot intervene in the affairs of sovereign states without the explicit consent of the state's government. When host governments classify events as emergencies, they indicate that their ordinary capacities are insufficient to respond to resulting needs. This triggers donors to offer to fund emergency response. Often these offers of emergency aid are accompanied by suspending other aid programs to rededicate funds to emergency response.

If host governments fail to use these resources to respond to humanitarian emergencies after classifying the event as an emergency, they invokes audience costs. Emergency classification represents a public commitment to respond, and failing to meet this commitment undermines the government's "credibility, face, or honor" (Fearon 1994). Both domestic and international audiences will judge government's performance in relation to such a commitment. Exceeding expectations will produce reputational benefits whereas failing to meet expectations will result in reputational costs.

The consequences of emergency classification for the government's reputation for competence vary depending on the audience (domestic or international), the reference level of government competence (pre-existing belief that government is competent or incompetent), and the type of event in question (slow- or fast-onset). State leaders will choose not to classify events as humanitarian emergencies when they anticipate the costs are likely to exceed its benefits.

State leaders will be more likely to prioritize their domestic reputation in their decision-making calculus if their essential supporters are adversely affected by the emergency event. They will be more likely to classify an event as an emergency if their essential supporters suffer negative consequences from the event because essential supporters are more likely to update their assessment of government competence on if supporters themselves suffer harm. When essential supporters are negatively affected, they are more likely to demand government provide emergency services such as housing, food, healthcare and assistance with recovery. Because access to such services has outsized

consequences for their wellbeing, individuals harmed by emergencies are likely to update their perception of government competence based on their evaluation of the host government's response to the emergency.

I expect the probability of essential supporters being adversely affected by an emergency event to vary with the regime type of the government. Consequently, I expect regime type to condition state leaders' relative prioritization of their domestic and international reputations for competence. In humanitarian emergencies, leaders in autocracies should place less weight on demands made by their domestic audiences because the affected population is less likely to include the government's essential supporters. As a corollary, I expect democratically elected governments to be more sensitive to damage to their domestic reputation.

In autocratic states, audiences tend to be smaller and comprised of elites, compared to democracies (Weeks 2008). As the proportion of the population that comprise the government's essential supporters increases, the more likely it is that some of the government's essential supporters will be adversely affected by the emergency and demand a response from government. When government's essential supporters comprise a larger proportion of the population (a larger winning coalition), classifying the event as an emergency and mobilizing resources in response is more likely to strengthen the government's reputation for competence and failing to do so is more likely to undermine the government's reputation for competence. In democracies, voters punish governments that fail to respond to these demands for services in response to natural disasters (Achen and Bartels 2004; Cole, Healy, and Werker 2012; Healy and Malhotra 2009). They see governments that respond quickly as more competent and these governments are more likely to remain in power (Fair et al. 2017; Kosec and Mo 2017).

I expect democratically elected governments to be more likely to classify events as emergencies and mobilize their own resources in response to them compared to autocratic governments. Although essential supporters in autocracies also condition their support on perceptions of government competence (Guriev and Treisman 2015), these elites are less likely to view emergency response as key indicator of government competence, because the government's competence to respond to emergencies does not directly affect their own access to benefits. Government resources are finite, there is an opportunity cost to providing resources to the response. Government authorities may decide that those resources are better spent providing a benefit to its essential supporters to maintain power. This is consistent with arguments that suggest failing to respond to emergencies can be rational for leaders when allocating resources to other

priorities provides greater benefits to their essential supporters (Plümper and Neumayer 2009).

Among governments of similar regime type, the type of emergency further conditions their propensity to classify events as emergencies. Governments are more likely to classify fast-onset events than slow-onset events as emergencies because there are fewer reputational costs associated with classifying fast-onset events as emergencies compared to slow-onset emergencies. Expected differences by regime type also have implications for governments' propensity to classify fast and slow-onset events as emergencies. Because responding to fast-onset emergencies is more likely to result in reputational benefit and failing to do so is more likely to produce reputation costs, I expect democracies to be more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies than slow-onset events. Overall, I expect democracies to be more likely to classify both fast- and slow-onset events as emergencies compared to their autocratic counterparts.

Figure 2.3: Theoretical predictions for emergency classification by regime type and event type

Donors decide to offer aid

After host governments decide whether or not to classify an event as an emergency, donors decide whether or not to offer aid to the populations affected by the emergency.[24] Donors decisions to offer aid are driven by myriad factors, including geopolitical interests and the magnitude of harm resulting from the event (Drury, Olson, and van Belle 2005; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014). I argue that host

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[24] I make this simplification for the purposes parsimony; donors can and sometimes do offer aid to governments before they decide to classify events as emergencies to exert diplomatic pressure. However, I assume that governments have the choice to act first because they are more likely to be informed of an event before donors.

governments' classification decisions and the type of emergency event also influence donors' decisions to offer humanitarian aid. Donors are not directly influenced by the host government's reputation for competence because donors delegate humanitarian aid delivery to humanitarian organizations, not state structures.[25] Because donors do not provide host governments with discretion over the allocation humanitarian aid, donors are less concerned than about the competence of these structures to deliver aid.

Host government classification decisions influence donors' decisions because donors want to use their resources effectively and avoid offering aid where it is unlikely to be accepted. Donors can afford to be selective in deciding where and when to offer humanitarian aid because the demand for humanitarian far exceeds the volume of aid donors are willing to provide. Most appeals for humanitarian aid are under-funded; in 2017 $25.2 billion was requested through the U.N. system, but donors only provided $14.9 billion in funding (P. K. Clarke 2018, 18). Given this significant demand, donors prefer to provide aid where they receive an indication that host governments are most likely to accept it.

Host governments' classification decisions act as a signal to donors that the government is planning to respond to an emergency and would welcome donor support. All else equal, donors are thus more likely to offer humanitarian aid to governments that have classified an event as an emergency and requested support from international actors. Because I expect democracies to be more likely to classify events as emergencies, I expect donors to be more likely to offer humanitarian aid to democracies than autocracies. Similarly, because I expect all types of governments to be more likely to classify fast-onset rather than slow-onset events as emergencies, I expect donors will be more likely to offer humanitarian aid in response to these emergencies.

However, donors sometimes offer humanitarian aid in the absence of a classification decision by the host government. For donors to offer aid in the absence of government classification decision, donors need to be able to observe the event and determine whether or not it overwhelms the capacity of the recipient government. This is more likely to be the case in fast-onset rather than slow-onset events because fast-onset events are observable and their consequences are quantifiable. Consequently, in the absence of government classification, donors will be more likely to offer aid in response to fast-onset rather than slow onset emergencies.

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[25] The host government's reputation for competence influences donors' allocation decisions for aid when they delegate greater discretion over the allocation of aid funds to state structures.

When governments do not classify events as emergencies, donors can use such offers of aid to pressure reluctant host governments to classify events as emergencies and accept aid. Such pressure from donors can persuade governments to change their policies because they threaten the host governments' reputations for competence. By acting when governments do not, donors draw attention to government inaction, drawing attention to host governments' failure to come the aid of its own people. Whether these offers of aid affect the government's domestic or international reputation for competence depends on the forum in which donors offer aid. When aid is offered in private, only the government's international reputation for competence is at stake because the offer is only known to donors and the government. If the offer is made in public or covered by media, it implicates the government's domestic reputation for competence (in addition to its international reputation for competence) by exposing government inaction more broadly. These dynamics are described in greater deal in the following section on government decision to reject or accept aid.

<u>State leaders accept or reject aid</u>
The decision to accept or reject humanitarian aid affects the government's reputations for competence. Changes to the government's international reputation for competence in turn influence the types of foreign aid donors make available to the government in the future. Changes to the government's domestic reputation for competence affect the government's prospects for political survival.

When state leaders accept humanitarian aid, they accept limited discretion over the allocation of this aid. Governments have less control the distribution of humanitarian aid compared to other forms of foreign aid or to private investment. These other forms of aid and investment are often suspended or redirected to humanitarian aid following government classification of an event as an emergency. This represents a loss for host governments, which often rely on discretion over aid to provide benefits to their essential supporters. Without this discretion over aid governments must substitute other revenue sources or risk damaging their domestic reputation for competence.

Host governments accept humanitarian aid, and its attendant limitations, because they expect to receive increased discretion over future aid flows in return for demonstrating their competence in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. Host governments are willing to make this sacrifice only if they assume that it will result in greater discretion over aid flows in the long term. They gain greater discretion over time by improving their reputation for competence in the eyes of international donors. These gains come from fulfilling commitments to these donors and demonstrating their willingness to collaborate with donors and facilitate aid delivery by implementing organizations.

If host governments expect that they will be unable to improve their reputation for competence after accepting aid, they have little incentive to accept humanitarian aid on the international stage. Failing to meet these commitments, delivering aid ineffectively, and undermining aid delivery by implementing organizations signals incompetence to international donors and will damage the government's international reputation for competence.

Table 2.1 summarizes the consequences of accepting and rejecting offers of humanitarian aid for the government's international reputation for competence. Government's prior policy choices (to classify the event as an emergency) shape observers' expectations regarding governments' propensity to accept or reject aid. The decision to accept or reject aid is either consistent or inconsistent with the initial classification decision. Governments send consistent signals when their classification decision matches their decision to accept or reject aid. Inconsistent signals attract greater scrutiny because they indicate government actors may not be fulfilling their obligations. When government officials accept aid after classifying the event as an emergency, they are sending a consistent signal; the country is experiencing an emergency and needs help. When governments reject aid and do not classify the event as an emergency, they send a consistent signal, rejecting both the idea of an emergency and the need for help. By contrast, when government officials reject offers of humanitarian aid after classifying the event as an emergency, they indicate that an emergency exists, but they do not require external help to meet the needs of people who are suffering. When government officials accept aid without classifying an event as an emergency, they send an inconsistent signal regarding their competence, there is no emergency, but help is required to help people who are suffering.

Table 2.1: International reputational consequences of classifying events and accepting aid by the government's reference level of competence

	Competent		Incompetent	
	Classify	Fail to classify	Classify	Fail to classify
Accept aid	Acknowledges emergency and need for foreign support Fast onset: reinforces competence Slow-onset: signals incompetence	Denies emergency but acknowledges need for foreign support Signals incompetence	Acknowledges emergency and need for foreign support Fast onset: Signals competence Slow onset: Reinforces incompetence	Denies emergency but acknowledges need for foreign support Reinforces incompetence
Refuse aid	Acknowledges emergency but refuses need for foreign support	Refuses both emergency and need for foreign support	Acknowledges emergency but refuses need for foreign support	Refuses both emergency and need for foreign support

	Reinforces competence	Reinforces competence	Reinforces incompetence	Reinforces incompetence

When international actors perceive a government to be competent, they are more likely to interpret the government's rejection of aid as a signal that reinforces its competence. This is most likely to be the case when the government first classifies the event as an emergency, creating an obligation to respond to the event, and then rejects offers of aid. When a competent government takes this course of action, international actors see this as confirmation that the government takes the emergency seriously and has the necessary capacity. However, if an incompetent government took the same course of action, international actors would perceive this as a signal of incompetence; an incompetent government attempting to signal against type the signal would not be seen as credible.

International observers expect governments that classify events as emergencies to accept aid because the classification decision indicates that government judges its own resources and capabilities insufficient to address the needs resulting from the emergency event. In such circumstances international observers expect government actors to accept, or even pre-emptively request aid. International donors see providing aid in such circumstances as an obligation. If governments refuse aid after classifying an event as an emergency, international observers perceive government actors as failing to deliver on a promise to provide aid to their citizens. In addition, by refusing aid, host government actors prevent international actors from living up to what they see as their own obligation to provide aid to people in need.

International observers expect governments that fail to classify events as emergencies to refuse offers of humanitarian aid. When governments fail to classify events as emergencies, they create no perceived obligation for extraordinary action on the part of either government or the international community. The lack of obligation results in less scrutiny.[26] If governments fail to classify an event as an emergency but still accept aid offered to address the event, this inconsistency indicates that the event warrants greater scrutiny from donors. It suggests that the government may be concealing the magnitude of harm and that needs may be greater than acknowledged. Alternatively it could suggest that government actors see this as an opportunity to extract resources from donors without publicly committing their own resources. In either case the consequence is the misuse of aid funds and/or failing to provide aid to people in need. International

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[26] International actors may still pressure governments that fail to classify and refuse aid to reverse their decisions if they believe humanitarian aid is necessary, but for this to be the case they would need to be convinced that an emergency existed that the government was willfully concealing.

actors are likely to pressure governments to change their decision to make it more consistent.

I argue that governments of poor countries should prioritize their international reputation for competence because their ability to provide benefits to domestic audiences is contingent upon convincing international actors of their competence. However, there are select circumstances when I expect host governments to prioritize their domestic reputation for competence. I expect host governments to prioritize their domestic reputation for competence when the government's essential supporters condition their support on the government's response to a given emergency event. Accepting humanitarian aid will benefit government's domestic reputation for competence when essential supporters are adversely affected by an emergency event and demand goods and services that government's domestic resources alone are insufficient to deliver. When failing to provide these goods and services would damage the government's domestic reputation for competence, government actors will accept offers of humanitarian aid even if this results in damage to the government's international reputation for competence. When the government's essential supporters are not directly affected by an emergency event, government will not derive any domestic reputational benefit from accepting humanitarian aid and will follow the incentives produced by its international reputation for competence. The government may in fact derive a domestic reputational benefit from refusing to classify the event as an emergency and rejecting humanitarian aid if creating an obligation to provide aid would cause the government to redirect funds away from benefits to essential supporters in order to provide resources for the emergency response.

The host government's decision to accept or reject offers of humanitarian aid is crucial because it limits the options available following this decision. Once the host government has accepted humanitarian aid, it is difficult for host governments to control the distribution of humanitarian aid. If leaders want humanitarian aid to end so that longer-term investments can begin, they must convince donors that the emergency humanitarian aid is no longer required. If host governments simply reverse their decision without providing any explanation to donors, donors interpret this as inconsistent with their past behavior and indicative of government incompetence. If governments refuse to entertain the idea that an emergency exists and refuses emergency aid, they can avoid this problem.

Maintain regulatory status quo or impose additional restrictions
Once governments allow humanitarian organizations to operate within their borders, they delegate some degree of service provision to humanitarian organizations, either explicitly by funding these organizations themselves or implicitly, by allowing

humanitarian organizations to provide services that the state would otherwise be obligated to subsidize. To ensure that resources are allocated according to their priorities, government authorities prefer to closely monitor humanitarian organizations and enforce humanitarians' compliance. However, host governments ability to monitor and enforce are limited by government capacity, which is already strained in emergencies, and the lack of accountability mechanism between host government and humanitarian organizations.

Host governments lack mechanisms to hold humanitarian organizations accountable because these organizations are primarily accountable to donors, not host governments (Fearon 2008; Krause 2014). For example, international NGOs are less accountable to host governments than NGOs based in the host country because international NGOs do not rely on host governments for funding or their legal status. The lack of accountability between NGOs and host governments is often criticized for entrenching imbalances of power between donors and humanitarians on one side and host governments and recipient populations on the other (Barnett 2013; Fassin 2007; de Waal 1997).

Without direct accountability mechanisms, governments are left with blunt tools to monitor and regulate humanitarian organizations: administrative restrictions and coercive threats. Administrative restrictions include limiting the geographic area where humanitarian organizations can operate, requiring humanitarian organizations to register with government, limiting the number of visas and work permits allocated to humanitarian organizations, imposing taxes and fees for routine procedures, requiring organizations to be accompanied by government security forces. These regulations render humanitarian organizations' activities more legible to government and enable government to extract rents from humanitarian organizations. Host governments enforce these restrictions chiefly through coercive threats; they threaten to expel an organizations' authorization unless the organization complies with the restriction.

Host governments impose new restrictions on humanitarian organizations in efforts to exert control over the material resources and information that humanitarian organizations disseminate. When government authorities see humanitarian organizations interests as aligned with their own, they see no need to impose restrictions as imposing restrictions is costly. However, when host governments see the interests of humanitarian organizations as contrary to their own interests they use restrictions to bring humanitarian organizations in line with their own preferences. Specifically, host governments impose new restrictions when they fear humanitarians will undermine their domestic reputation for competence by strengthening their political competition or threaten their international reputation for competence by exposing government's failure to provide sufficient aid to people in need. Host governments

impose restrictions and issue coercive threats to both prevent humanitarian organizations from undermining their reputation for competence and to punish organizations that do. Punishing one organization proves the credibility of the threat of punishment to others.

There is no reputation cost inherent in imposing restrictions on humanitarian actors, however, if government restrictions are made public, governments may risk greater damage to their reputation for competence. Similar to refusing to classify an event as an emergency and refusing aid, the reputational costs from exposing the cover-up are greater than the costs that would result if the government allowed humanitarian organization to criticize government instead of repressing them. Thus, governments must weigh the potential reputational costs of exposure when deciding whether or not to impose or enforce restrictions on humanitarian organizations.

Humanitarians defer to or defy host-government restrictions
For host government restriction to achieve their intended effect—limiting the reputation costs to government—humanitarians must defer to host government authority and comply with these restrictions. The power imbalance mentioned earlier, between donors and humanitarians on one side and host governments and recipient populations on the other, and the lack of direct accountability between host governments and humanitarian organizations would suggest that these organizations have little incentive to comply with host government restrictions. However, I contend that these organizations are more deferential to host governments than their organizational characteristics would indicate. their ability to fund their operations and their claim to authority rest on respect for international humanitarian law, and the ability to claim to act as impartial, independent, and neutral service providers. If humanitarians chose to comply, they are able to continue operations, but must accept costs imposed by governments, including limiting the geographic scope of aid provision, delays, and increased costs. If they choose to defy these restrictions, they may succeed in pressuring governments to remove restrictions, allowing them to operate freely, however they also risk expulsion, resulting in a complete loss of access.

Humanitarians will choose to defer to host government restrictions in most scenarios because their shared norms and organizational incentives lead humanitarian organizations to prioritize maintaining some access rather risk losing access. Their shared norms, practices and understandings lead them to perceive respecting government restrictions as the best way to uphold their principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Competition among humanitarian organizations for donor funding creates incentives for each organization to prove its ability to operate in restrictive environments where others cannot.

Consequently, host government restrictions effectively limit humanitarians' ability to deliver aid, even when host governments possess minimal capacity to monitor and enforce compliance with such restrictions. This reinforces the norm of respecting government restrictions. When defiance is rare, host governments can easily detect and punish the few who fail to comply. Humanitarian organizations observe host governments punishment of defiant organizations, which reinforces humanitarians' belief that compliance is the best way to maintain access. This results in a paradoxical status quo, in which humanitarians limit their operations in the immediate term in order to preserve access in the future.

Table 2.2 summarizes core hypotheses based on these theoretical expectations. It describes the observable implications of these hypotheses and indicates the chapter in which these hypotheses are tested empirically.

	Hypothesis	Implication	Chapter
H1	Host governments that attach greater value to their reputations for competence are more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies	More democratic governments more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies More dependent governments more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies	3
H2	Donors defer to host government classification decisions	Donors more likely to offer humanitarian aid when host governments classify events as emergencies	3
H3	Host government officials in poor, aid-dependent states value their international reputation for competence	Government officials accept aid even when costly policy concessions are required Government officials more likely to classify and respond to fast-onset rather than slow-onset events	4, 5
H4	Host government officials perceive their international reputation for competence to mediate their access to preferred sources of aid	Host government officials perceive their reputation for competence to mediate their access to development but not humanitarian aid Host governments sanction humanitarian organizations that threaten their reputation for competence	4, 5

H5	Host government officials see humanitarian organizations as competition for scarce resources	Host government officials perceive humanitarian organizations as benefiting from humanitarian emergency classification	4, 5
		Host government officials do not see humanitarian organizations as neutral, impartial, independent	
H6	Humanitarian organizations defer to host government restrictions and comply with coercive threats due to shared norms and institutional incentives	Humanitarians deference is not conditional on the state capacity of the host government	6
		Humanitarians deference depends on organizations' reliance on donor funding	

Chapter 3: What's the emergency? A cross-national analysis of emergency classification by host governments and donor

Introduction

This chapter describes the incentives for governments to classify or fail to classify events as emergencies. It then tests the observable implications of this argument for the type of emergency, regime type of the host government, and dependence on foreign sources of revenue. I find that, consistent with my argument, both democratic and autocratic governments are more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies compared to slow-onset events, although these results are stronger for democracies. Similarly, states that are more reliant on foreign sources of revenue are more likely to classify events as emergencies. I then test whether government declaration decisions condition donor offers of humanitarian aid. Consistent with my argument and contrary to existing explanations, I find that host government classification decisions meaningfully predict offers of aid from the United States, controlling for all factors that predict host government classification decisions.

Classifying an event as an emergency is an essential first step in providing aid to people in need. Classifying an event as an emergency by issuing a public statement or declaring a state of emergency shapes public understanding of an event. Such decisions indicate that extraordinary effort is necessary to provide aid to people in need and invite donations to support emergency response. Governments classify events as emergencies to mobilize resources and ensure that people in urgent need of life-saving support receive this support as quickly as possible. In emergency response, saving time saves lives; aid provided sooner saves more lives than when aid funds are delayed (Idriss 2018).

Although classifying an event as an emergency is a powerful tool states can use to attract domestic and international attention and mobilize resources for emergency response, governments sometimes choose *not* to classify events as emergencies despite clear need for help by those suffering. These governments choose not to classify events as emergencies when leaders want to avoid negative reputational and material consequences: perceptions of incompetence and less discretion over aid allocation.

Consistent with my central argument regarding government's preferences to cultivate a positive reputation for competence, I argue that reputational concerns shape governments' decisions to classify or fail to classify an event as an emergency. Government actors will classify an event as an emergency when doing so will not damage their domestic or international reputations for competence and they will fail to

classify an event as an emergency when they anticipate classifying the event as an emergency would undermine their reputations for competence.

> *Countries will sometimes foot drag acknowledging crises. Governments don't want humanitarians to be present where they have not acknowledged a crisis or have done a poor job responding. Access for humanitarians means journalists get access too.*[27]

Host government classification decisions shape how both international and domestic audiences understand the event in question. Government authorities are typically the first to be informed of an event that causes damage, injury or loss of life. They are the first line of response in deciding what kind of policy response is required and how the event should be understood. If host government authorities classify an event as an emergency, they acknowledge that the event threatens exceptional harm and commit to mobilizing resources beyond the ordinary to mitigate this harm. Classifying an event as an emergency creates an obligation for the host government to act. By contrast, when host governments do not classify an event as an emergency, they create no such obligation to act. Failing to classify an event as an emergency implies that the suffering caused by the event does not merit extraordinary support and is within the bounds of what is acceptably normal.

Classifying an event as an emergency also indicates to foreign donors that the host government is confronting an event that has caused suffering that is beyond the normal capacity of the host state to address. For donors, the classification decision is a signal that the host government's own resources are insufficient to respond to the event. This triggers donors to offer financial and technical support to respond to the emergency.

While host governments are not the only actors who can classify events as emergencies – non-governmental organizations and international organizations can also issue public statements stating than an event is an emergency – host government classification decisions are particularly consequential because they carry the weight of international legal sovereignty. Donors require permission from government before they can provide aid within their borders, and they interpret emergency classification by government as a signal that governments are open to offers of humanitarian aid.

Many accounts of international intervention depict donors as imposing their preferences on recipient states. Existing research on the role of donor preferences in humanitarian aid allocation assumes that donors are the only actors who determine how donors view

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[27] INGO representative 3

emergencies.[28] However, in the case of emergency humanitarian aid, donors wait to offer support until they receive a signal that government authorities would welcome this support. Both bilateral and multilateral donors consult with host governments before offering to provide humanitarian aid. Some donors, including U.N. agencies require a formal invitation from the host government before they will provide aid. Other donors, such as the U.S., are satisfied with tacit consent from government. In interviews with representatives of donor organizations, I was consistently told that donors will not offer aid when they are confident the host government will reject their offer:

> *The U.N. won't go in without an invitation [from the host government] and evidence of need. [...] There is a difference between an explicit invitation and tacit consent. Some countries won't invite aid but will accept aid if it is offered.*[29]

There are many potential reasons for donors to defer to host government classification decisions. They may want to avoid being seen as imperialist or neo-colonialist by forcing the government to adopt policies it would otherwise oppose. They may want to avoid humiliating media coverage of the host government publicly rejecting aid. Donors may also wish to avoid wasting time and resources negotiating with an obstinate government when the demand for humanitarian aid far exceeds the supply, and donors can find a willing recipient elsewhere.

I do not intend to arbitrate among these explanations for donor behavior but instead to show that donors follow government cues in emergency classification. This means that there is a selection problem in the way we understand humanitarian emergencies; the reason public rejections of humanitarian aid are rarely observed is that most rejections occur earlier in the process of defining an event as an emergency. Donors choose to offer humanitarian aid only when they believe governments will accept it. This means that many people that could receive humanitarian aid if donors offered such aid only according to the magnitude of people affected or quantity of casualties do not have the opportunity to receive this aid because government classification decisions mediate donor aid allocation.

Consider, for example, the approach of the Government of Nigeria as increasing numbers of civilians were displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria

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[28] This literature arbitrates between the importance of need (number of casualties or people affected) or donors' strategic interests, but does not account for the mediating role of host government decisionmaking. See (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Drury, Olson, and van Belle 2005; Flynn 2020; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014; Olsen, Carstensen, and Høyen 2003).

[29] Donor representative 12of

in 2015. The United Nations wanted to declare a system-wide Level 3 emergency, the highest level of emergency declaration for the U.N. system that would be used to attract attention and funding for humanitarian aid. The government threatened to expel U.N. agencies if a system-wide Level 3 emergency was declared. This opposition was rooted in a desire to avoid humiliation, as government representatives argued, "we are not South Sudan," and therefore could not merit such a declaration.[30] In public statements, a government spokesperson described their position as, "opposed to the UN using a Level 3 designation. 'It would be incorrect to say at this point that the government of Nigeria is 'unable' to meet the needs in a manner that respects humanitarian principles," Laolu Akande said' (Fick 2016). The government only conceded to declaring a Level 3 emergency in August 2016, as public pressure mounted and they were unable to contain information about conditions in the Northeast.

I use data on disaster events in poor countries between 1989 and 2019 to evaluate the relevance of my reputational theory. I then show that donors are more likely to offer aid when host governments have issued a classification decision.

Theoretical Expectations

Host governments are most likely to classify events as emergencies when they can derive reputational benefits from doing so and least likely to classify events as emergencies when doing so would damage the government's reputation for competence.

As described in Chapter 2, the type of event has implications for the government's reputation for competence. Fast-onset and slow-onset events differ in their observability and ease of attribution of blame. Fast-onset events, by virtue of their discrete nature, are more directly observable and more likely to attract media coverage, which renders attempts to deny their occurrence less than credible. Slow-onset events, which occur gradually without a distinct onset date, are difficult to directly observe and attract less media attention, which makes it easier for governments to deny their existence or magnitude. Regarding attribution of blame, the plausibly exogenous nature of fast-onset events makes it difficult for either domestic or international actors to blame government for the occurrence of the event. By contrast, because slow-onset events occur gradually, there are many opportunities for preventive action. When slow-onset events affect a large enough number of people to be considered emergencies, it is easy for domestic or international observers to attribute the magnitude of the event to government policy failure. More simply, classifying a slow-onset event as an emergency

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[30] Ex-donor representative

is tantamount to a public admission of policy failure, while classifying a fast-onset event as an emergency is interpreted as a commitment to action in unforeseen circumstances.

Classifying a slow-onset event signals government incompetence to both domestic and international observers. Host governments avoid classifying slow-onset events as emergencies to avoid damage to their reputation for competence. However, they must weigh the benefits of preserving their reputation in the short term against the potential reputational damage they would incur if observers discover their concealment of the event. If observers already see the host government as incompetent, they gain little by attempting to avoid further damage and may even be able to derive reputational benefit by addressing the emergency head on and demonstrating willingness to collaborate with international actors. Governments with an existing positive reputation for competence have more to lose by classifying the event as an emergency but also will likely suffer even greater losses if their concealment is detected. These competent governments must weigh how likely their concealment is to be detected; governments with greater ability to repress information are less likely to be detected. For this reason, I expect authoritarian governments to be more likely to be able to successfully conceal slow-onset emergencies and therefore less likely to classify slow onset events as emergencies. It is more challenging for democracies to repress information, and therefore concealment of slow-onset events is more likely to be detected in democracies. I expect democracies to be more likely to classify slow-onset events as emergencies compared to their more autocratic counterparts (although still less likely to classify them as emergencies compared to fast-onset events) because concealment is more difficult and would result in greater reputational damage. If a host government does classify a slow-onset event as an emergency, they create an expectation that the government will provide aid to people in need. Failing to do so would further damage the host government's reputation for competence.

Classifying a fast-onset event as an emergency signals competence to both domestic and international audiences because it represents a commitment by government to provide aid to people in need in response to an unforeseen shock. However, this initial signal of competence will be undermined if government then fails to meet this commitment. This is the case for both governments with a pre-existing reputation for competence and reputation for incompetence. Making a public commitment, in the form of emergency classification, and then failing to meet damages the government's reputation for competence because the government fails to meet the expectations it created.

Once they have classified both fast and slow onset events as emergencies, hosts have a powerful incentive to ensure they can provide help to people in need because failing

to do so would damage their reputation for competence. However, poor governments lack the financial, material, and technical resources to meet the needs of people affected by the emergency without support from donors. This makes governments more likely to accept offers of humanitarian aid after they have classified an event as an emergency.

Governments that fail to classify an event as an emergency do not create the same expectation of emergency response; they do not tie their reputation for competence to the delivery of humanitarian aid. Consequently, they are less likely to accept offers of humanitarian aid. Doing so would be inconsistent with their classification decision and invite greater scrutiny, making it more likely that observers would discover evidence of concealment.

Donors see governments' classification of events as emergency as a signal that the government's own ordinary resources are insufficient to respond to the event. They use government classification decisions as a heuristic for a government's openness to receiving humanitarian aid, assuming governments that issue classification decisions are more likely to accept humanitarian aid than governments that do not classify events as emergencies.

Using classification decisions as a heuristic to assess where aid should be offered, and deferring to the host government's decision can result in effective cooperation when host governments act quickly to classify events as emergencies. For example, in September 2007, the Government of Ghana declared a State of Emergency in response to floods in the Northern region that had affected over 260,000 people since August. Immediately following the State of Emergency declaration, the U.N. sent staff and funds to support the government's relief efforts. This international response was only mobilized after the government issued its declaration and requested aid from the U.N. However, by deferring to government classification decisions, donors implicitly endorse government decisions to ignore some types of emergencies.

Donors and humanitarians acknowledge that the different stakes of fast- and slow-onset emergencies for host governments means that it is easier for them to provide aid in response to fast-onset emergencies.

> *In rapid-onset emergencies you usually encounter few problems because*
> *you are saving lives of civilians that governments care about. The*

government sees you as an opportunity. They relax their rules and grant waivers. Your leverage is saving the lives of their people.[31]

Governments' reputational concerns lead them to fail to classify slow-onset events as emergencies, even when the harm resulting from these slow onset emergencies far exceeds the harm resulting from fast-onset emergencies, which the government is willing to classify as emergencies. For example, in 2000, the Government of the Philippines considered classifying two events as emergencies: a volcanic eruption that displaced 18,000 people and an insurgency that displaced over 80,000 people (AFP 2000; Xinhua 2000). The government quickly declared the volcanic eruption as a "state of calamity" and approved the use of the province's calamity fund to provide aid to people in need. By contrast, the government refused to declare a similar state of calamity in Jolo province, despite the fact that four times as many people were displaced by the insurgency. By declaring the state of calamity in response to the volcanic eruption, the government was able to portray itself as in control of the situation; however the government avoided making the same decision in response to the insurgency because doing so would make it appear that the government could not deal with the insurgency. It is striking that the government did not declare a state of calamity in this case because it would have benefited from increased power in the province to fight the insurgency.

Hypotheses:
This chapter tests two of the main hypotheses specified in Table 2.2 and their observable implications.

Hypothesis 1: Host governments that attach greater value to their reputations for competence are more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies

Hypothesis 1a: Democratically governments are more sensitive to damage to their domestic and international reputations for competence compared to their more authoritarian counterparts. They are therefore more likely to classify fast-onset rather than slow onset events as emergencies and more likely to classify events as emergencies as the proportion of the population affected increases.

Hypothesis 1b. Governments that depend more heavily on foreign sources of revenue are more likely to be sensitive to damage to their international reputation for

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[31] INGO representative 7

competence. They are more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies rather than slow-onset events.

Hypothesis 2: Donors defer to host government classification decisions and they are more likely to offer humanitarian aid after host governments classify events as emergencies compared to the absence of government classification.

Empirical approach

I test my hypotheses regarding government classification decisions in the context of all disaster events in poor countries for the period 1989-2018. I test my hypothesis regarding the relationship between government and donor classification decisions in the case of aid allocation decisions made by the United States Agency for International Aid Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID OFDA).

I rely on the case of USAID OFDA because the U.S. is the single largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance, and it is broadly seen as an agenda-setting donor. Past research on humanitarian donors' allocation decision focuses on the U.S. case (Drury, Olson, and van Belle 2005; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014; Olsen, Carstensen, and Høyen 2003). I leverage a feature of the bureaucratic process used by OFDA to allocate humanitarian assistance; OFDA issues a disaster declaration stating its intent to offer aid each time it allocates aid in response to a humanitarian emergency.

To allocate humanitarian aid, a representative of the U.S. government, typically the Ambassador or the Chief of Mission in the host country, issues a disaster declaration, which is a diplomatic cable that provides the legal authority for USAID OFDA to provide emergency humanitarian assistance. The disaster declaration "outlines the extent of the damage and possible needs and may recommend assistance in the form of funding, material, or technical assistance" (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2019). It also triggers the immediate release of up to $50,000, which can be supplemented based on OFDA's assessment of humanitarian needs.

To decide whether or not to allocate humanitarian aid, OFDA uses three criteria: the event must be beyond the ability of the affected country to respond, the host government must ask for or be willing to accept assistance, and responding to the disaster must be in the interest of the US government (OFDA Report FY 2013 2014). These criteria leave much open to interpretation. While, in principle, the Ambassador has the right to unilaterally issue a disaster declaration, in practice U.S. embassy personnel typically consult with the host country before issuing a disaster declaration. U.S. officials solicit the perspective of the host government seeks their input on the type and amount of aid to provide.

Data

Each observation in the data represents an individual event. Government authorities decide whether or not to classify each event as an emergency and donors decide whether or not to allocate aid to each event. The sample of events in this analysis are drawn from EM-DAT (Guha-Sapir, Below, and Hoyois 2015). The data includes include events occurring from 1989 to 2019 in countries that meet the scope conditions described in Chapter 1. Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.

Country sample:

I include only events that occur in poor countries, consistent with the scope conditions presented in Chapter 1. I anticipate poor countries will be more dependent on foreign sources of revenue, and thus attach greater value to their international reputations for competence. I operationalize this scope condition by limiting the sample to events occurring in countries the World Bank classifies as low income or lower-middle income for the majority of years in the sample. I use the threshold of 55% or greater (years classified as low or middle income) as the cut point for inclusion in the sample. This threshold is likely conservative as seventy five percent of the countries in the data were classified as lower or lower middle income for 55 percent or more of the 30 years included in the study.[32] However, I still expect to observe some variation in dependence on foreign aid and investment among these poor countries. Figure 2.1 illustrates the variation in dependence on foreign and foreign direct investment among countries in the sample. It plots Official Development Assistance and foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP for the countries include in the sample.

Figure 3.1: Aid dependence of countries in sample, measured by mean levels of Official Development Assistance and Foreign Direct Investment as percent of GDP (1989-2019)

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[32] Given that such a large proportion of countries meet the inclusion criteria, it is possible that I should increase the threshold and impose greater restrictions on the sample. I will explore this in future iterations of the empirical analysis

Emergency events:

EM-DAT data include both man-made and natural disaster events that meet at least one of the following inclusion criteria: "Ten (10) or more people reported killed, One hundred (100) or more people reported affected, Declaration of a state of emergency, Call for international assistance" (Guha-Sapir, Below, and Hoyois 2015). Because there is no clear empirical threshold that differentiates when events become emergencies, it is difficult to systematically capture all events that governments could classify as humanitarian emergencies. I rely on EM-DAT because it provides a reasonable starting point, and these data are used in prior studies of donor allocation. However, it is important to note that relying on these data for analysis introduces some limitations: the data are biased toward natural disaster events, not those resulting from conflict, thus fast-onset events are likely over-represented. The underlying information for these data rely on media reporting and thus are subject to resulting biases. They are likely to over-represent fast-onset events, which receive greater media attention and under-represent slow-onset events, which typically receive less media attention (Eisensee and Strömberg 2007).

Event type

I use the event categories included EM-DAT data to categorize the events as slow- and fast-onset. These categories are summarized in Table 2.2.

Table 3.2: Fast- and slow-onset categories of EM-DAT disaster types

Fast-onset	Slow-onset
Extreme temperature	Insect infestation
Earthquake	Epidemic

Flood	Drought
Landslide	Complex humanitarian emergency
Storm	
Wildfire	
Volcanic activity	

Figure 3.2 depicts the number of people affected by both fast and slow-onset events in countries included in the sample and in countries excluded from the sample. Events occurring in the sample comprise the majority of people affected by both fast and slow-onset events. This is consistent with the finding that the consequences of disaster events are exacerbated in poor countries.

Figure 3.2: Millions of people affected by fast and slow onset events in EM-DAT data for in-sample and out-of-sample countries

Dependent variables:

Government classification decision: The variable *government classification decision* (0-1) is coded as 0 when a government does not classify an event as an emergency and 1

when a government classifies an event as an emergency. This variable includes both reports of a government classification decision recorded in EM-DAT and hand-coded data based on media reports.

Figure 3.3: Number of observations for which government classification decisions are missing values by year

There are a large number of missing values in the dependent variable of interest, as there are many instances where it is difficult to differentiate a lack of information about a government classification decision from the absence of a classification decision. As Figure 3.3 shows, this data is not missing at random; this missingness is likely correlated with other variables of interest. Although it is not ideal, I drop observations where the government classification variable is missing from this analysis.[33]

To address concerns about bias in the analysis resulting from censored data in the dependent variable, Figure 3.4 plots events dropped for missingness compared to those included in the sample on key covariates of interest. Slow-onset events are more likely to be included in the sample as are events that receive an OFDA declaration. The coding of government classification decisions is biased toward events that receive an offer of aid from OFDA because I began coding government classification decisions using a set of events that had received OFDA disaster declarations. Events included in the sample affect a larger share of the population than events excluded from the sample due to missingness. There is no difference in deaths as a share of the population between events missing government classification decisions and those where decisions are included. This suggests that the data for which government classification decisions are missing are fast-onset events affecting a smaller share of the population compared to events for which government declaration are non-missing. These events are also less likely to receive offers of aid from OFDA. These patterns suggest that many of events for which government declarations are missing would not be classified as emergencies by host governments.

Figure 3.4: Mean values of key covariates for observations with missing data for government declaration and for observations where data are not missing

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[33] In future iterations of this project, I will address this missing data problem by hand-coding the missing values.

Donor offer: The variable *Donor offer* is a dichotomous (0-1) variable, coded as 0 when OFDA does not issue a disaster declaration for a given event and 1 when OFDA issues a disaster declaration for the event. This variable was coded using annual reports produced by OFDA, which report all of the events for which OFDA issued a disaster declaration for a given fiscal year.

Independent variables:
Slow onset: The variable slow onset is a dichotomous (0-1) variable that takes a value of 0 if the event is a fast-onset event and 1 if the event is a slow onset event. Events were coded as fast- or slow- onset based on the categories presented in Table 3.2

Democracy: The variable *democracy* is a continuous (0-1) variable. I use the measure of electoral democracy from the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2021),

which assigns a value between 0 and 1 to each country on an annual basis. This composite index designed to capture Dahl's idea of polyarchy.[34]

Share of population affected: This variable measures the quantity of people rendered injured or displaced by each event in EM-DAT. I then transform that value as a share of the country's total population by dividing it by the annual measurement of the country's total population from the World Bank. Variable rounded to five decimal places.

Dependence: I operationalize dependence in two ways aid as a percentage of GDP and FDI as a percentage of GDP. Aid as a percentage of GDP is drawn from OECD Development Assistance Committee data that aggregated Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other official aid flows. To calculate aid as a percentage of GDP I aggregate these flows for each country year and dive them by GDP. FDI as a percentage of GDP is drawn from the World Bank World Development Indicators and divided by GDP for each country year. Data on GDP is also from the World Bank World Development Indicators.

Control variables
Share of population deaths: This variable measures the quantity of people dead or missing by each event in EM-DAT. I then transform that value as a share of the country's total population by dividing it by the annual measurement of the country's total population from the World Bank. Variable rounded to five decimal places.

Civilian conflict casualties: This variable measures the total number of civilian casualties resulting from conflict in the year the event occurred. Values for civilian casualties are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, aggregated to the annual level and log transformed (Sundberg and Melander 2013).

Table 3.3: Summary statistics for events in sample

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Donor offer	2,147	0.316	0.465	0	0	1	1

[34] "The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices."

Government classification	2,147	0.271	0.445	0	0	1	1
Slow onset	2,147	0.386	0.487	0	0	1	1
Democracy	2,109	0.413	0.211	0.062	0.217	0.573	0.854
Share population affected	2,147	0.022	0.085	0.000	0.00002	0.006	1.198
Share population deaths	2,147	0.00003	0.0005	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.022
Civilian conflict casualties	2,147	2.083	2.517	0.000	0.000	4.078	10.396
Development aid pct GDP	2,147	0.041	0.062	0	0.004	0.1	1
FDI pct GDP	2,025	0.030	0.044	-0.087	0.007	0.039	0.551

Analysis:

To assess the relationship between the dependent and independent variables of interest, I estimate OLS regression models.[35] I include country-level fixed effects to account for variation across recipient countries. Table 3.4 describes how I operationalize and test each hypothesis.

Table 3.4: Operationalization of hypotheses

	Hypothesis	Independent variable	Dependent variable
	Host governments more likely to classify fast-onset rather than slow-onset events as emergencies	Slow onset (1) fast onset (0)	Government classification decision (0-1)
H1a	More democratic governments more likely to classify events as emergencies than less democratic governments	Polyarchy (VDEM 2020) (0-1) continuous	Government classification decision (0-1)
H1a	More democratic governments less likely to classify slow-onset events as emergencies compared to fast-onset events	Interaction: Polyarchy x Slow onset	Government classification decision (0-1)
H1a	More democratic government more likely to classify events as emergencies as a larger proportion of the population is affected	Interaction: Polyarchy x Share of population affected	Government classification decision (0-1)
H1b	Governments that depend more on foreign aid or FDI less likely to classify slow-onset events as emergencies	Interaction: Dependence x slow onset	Government classification decision (0-1)
H2	Donors are more likely to offer aid after host governments classify events as emergencies	Government classification decision (0-1)	Donor offer (0-1)

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[35] As a robustness check, I estimate logistic regression models and present predicted probabilities from these models in the appendix.

Results and Discussion

The results from regression analysis support Hypothesis 1a and partially support
Hypothesis 1b. Table 3.5 presents results from bivariate regression analysis. Consistent
with my expectations, host governments are overall less likely to classify slow-onset
events as emergencies than fast onset events (Model 1) and more democratic
governments are more likely to classify events as emergencies compared to their less
democratic counterparts (Model 2). The magnitude of the event is correlated with
emergency classification; host governments are more likely to classify events as
emergencies when a higher proportion of the population is affected (Models 3 and 4).
Neither FDI or aid as a percent of GDP is correlated with government classification
decision (Models 5 and 6). A greater number of civilian casualties from conflict is
negatively correlated with government classification decision.

Table 3.5: Bivariate OLS for government classification

	Dependent variable:						
	Government classification decision						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Slow onset	-0.178***						
	(0.019)						
Democracy		0.479***					
		(0.044)					
Pop affected			1.202***				
			(0.110)				
Pop deaths				50.843**			
				(19.319)			
Dev aid pct GDP					0.195		
					(0.155)		
FDI pct GDP						0.276	
						(0.223)	
Civilian conflict casualties							-0.024***
							(0.004)
Constant	0.340***	0.065**	0.245***	0.270***	0.255***	0.258***	0.322***
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Observations	2,147	2,109	2,147	2,147	2,030	2,025	2,147
R^2	0.038	0.053	0.053	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.019
Adjusted R^2	0.037	0.052	0.052	0.003	0.0003	0.0003	0.018
Residual Std. Error	0.436 (df = 2145)	0.429 (df = 2107)	0.433 (df = 2145)	0.444 (df = 2145)	0.440 (df = 2028)	0.442 (df = 2023)	0.441 (df = 2145)
F Statistic	84.526*** (df = 1; 2145)	117.179*** (df = 1; 2107)	119.288*** (df = 1; 2145)	6.926** (df = 1; 2145)	1.576 (df = 1; 2028)	1.527 (df = 1; 2023)	41.204*** (df = 1; 2145)

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 3.6: OLS models for government classification

	Dependent variable:			
	Government classification decision			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Slow onset	-0.166***	0.022	0.007	0.031
	(0.019)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Democracy	0.444***	0.544***	0.524***	0.535***
	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Share population affected	1.375***	0.708**	0.700**	0.685**
	(0.125)	(0.261)	(0.265)	(0.265)
Share population deaths	24.839	21.328	19.004	22.250
	(18.111)	(18.168)	(18.239)	(18.074)
Civilian conflict casualties	-0.016***	-0.019***	-0.018***	-0.018***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Dev aid percent GDP	-0.185	-0.066	-0.038	-0.220
	(0.163)	(0.229)	(0.233)	(0.167)
FDI as percent GDP			0.404+	1.011**
			(0.212)	(0.327)
Democracy x Pop affected		1.674**	1.659**	1.678**
		(0.612)	(0.620)	(0.620)
Slow onset x Democracy		-0.419***	-0.406***	-0.419***
		(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Slow onset x Aid pct GDP		-0.365	-0.298	
		(0.320)	(0.326)	
Slow onset x FDI pct GDP				-1.013*
				(0.424)
Constant	0.159***	0.118***	0.107***	0.090**
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Observations	2,109	2,109	1,998	1,998
R^2	0.149	0.160	0.156	0.158
Adjusted R^2	0.146	0.156	0.152	0.154
Residual Std. Error	0.407 (df = 2102)	0.404 (df = 2099)	0.404 (df = 1987)	0.404 (df = 1987)
F Statistic	61.155*** (df = 6; 2102)	44.338*** (df = 9; 2099)	36.745*** (df = 10; 1987)	37.322*** (df = 10; 1987)

Note: + $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$

Table 3.7: OLS models for government classification with country fixed effects

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
| | Government classification decision | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Slow onset	-0.181***	-0.004	-0.007	0.033
	(0.021)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Democracy	0.553***	0.626***	0.569***	0.575***
	(0.095)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Share population affected	1.385***	0.307	0.181	0.174
	(0.140)	(0.291)	(0.304)	(0.303)
Share population deaths	19.035	15.433	9.845	9.461
	(17.563)	(17.714)	(17.850)	(17.585)
Civilian conflict casualties	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Development aid percent GDP	-0.389	-0.476	-0.323	-0.326
	(0.248)	(0.314)	(0.335)	(0.274)
FDI as percent GDP			0.432+	1.123**
			(0.241)	(0.372)
Democracy x Share pop affected		2.926***	3.143***	3.166***
		(0.712)	(0.733)	(0.732)
Slow onset x Democracy		-0.418***	-0.420***	-0.428***
		(0.098)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Slow onset x Aid pct GDP		0.083	0.077	
		(0.336)	(0.342)	
Slow onset x FDI pct GDP				-1.095*
				(0.450)
Observations	2,109	2,109	1,998	1,998
R^2	0.285	0.297	0.296	0.298
Adjusted R^2	0.249	0.260	0.258	0.260
Residual Std. Error	0.382 (df = 2007)	0.379 (df = 2004)	0.378 (df = 1893)	0.378 (df = 1893)
F Statistic	7.913*** (df = 101; 2007)	8.125*** (df = 104; 2004)	7.663*** (df = 104; 1893)	7.743*** (df = 104; 1893)

Note: + $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$

Table 3.6 presents OLS regression results for the full model specifications to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b. When covariates are added, without interactions (Model 1), the relationship between slow onset emergency and government classification decision remains negative and statistically significant ($p<0.0001$) and more democratic government is positively correlated with government classification decision ($p<0.0001$). As the share of the population affected increases, so does the government's propensity

to classify an event as an emergency (p<0.001) and as the number of civilian casualties from conflict increases, governments are less likely to classify an event as an emergency (p<0.001).

The results remain largely consistent when interaction terms are added to test the conditional relationships between regime type and disaster type and regime type and proportion of the population affected (Model 2). Democracy, share of population affected and civilian casualties remain statistically significant. Consistent with my Hypothesis 1a, more democratic governments are more likely to classify events as emergencies when a higher proportion of the population is affected (p<0.01) and more democratic governments are less likely to classify slow onset events as emergencies (p<0.001). Aid as a percent of GDP and aid interacted with event type have no statistically significant relationship with government's propensity to classify an event as an emergency. These results remain consistent in Model 3, where FDI as a percent of GDP is added as an additional measure of dependence. This variable becomes conventionally statistically significant only in Model 4, when an interaction term with event type is added. Although countries that depend more on FDI are generally more likely to classify events as emergencies, countries that depend heavily on FDI are less likely to classify slow-onset events as emergencies (p<0.05). This result provides some support for Hypothesis 1b, that more dependent countries value their international reputation more highly and are thus less likely to classify slow-onset events as emergencies.

Table 3.7 presents results from the same specifications as Table 2.6 with the addition of country-level fixed effects. The results from Table 2.6 hold with when fixed effects are added, with the exception of civil conflict casualties which is no longer statistically significant when fixed effects for country are included. The core results: interaction terms between slow-onset and democracy and democracy and share of the population affected hold, as do results for FDI as percent GDP and the interaction between slow-onset events and FDI as percent GDP. These results support Hypotheses 1a and 1b, that more democratic and more dependent host governments are more sensitive to international reputational concerns.

Next, I present results from the statistical analysis of Hypothesis 2, evaluating the relationship between host government emergency classification and donor offers of aid. Table 3.8 presents results from bivariate OLS analysis. In bivariate regressions, government classification is positively correlated with donor offer of aid (p<0.001) and slow-onset event is negatively correlated with donor offer of aid (p<0.001) (Models 1 and 2). Democracy is positively correlated with donor classification decision (p<0.001). Both share of population affected and share of population deaths are positively correlated with donor offer of aid (p<0.05) (Models 4 and 5). There is no statistically

significant relationship between FDI as percent GDP or aid as percent GDP and donor classification decision (Models 6 and 7). Civilian casualties from conflict are negatively correlated with donor offers of aid (p<0.01) (Model 8).

Table 3.8: Bivariate OLS for donor offers of aid

	Dependent variable:							
	Donor offer aid							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Government classification	0.276***							
	(0.022)							
Slow onset		-0.428***						
		(0.018)						
Democracy			0.220***					
			(0.048)					
Share population affected				0.284*				
				(0.118)				
Share population deaths					49.552*			
					(20.214)			
Development aid pct GDP						0.023		
						(0.162)		
FDI pct GDP							0.327	
							(0.237)	
Civilian conflict casualties								-0.012**
								(0.004)
Constant	0.242***	0.481***	0.222***	0.310***	0.315***	0.315***	0.316***	0.340***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Observations	2,147	2,147	2,109	2,147	2,147	2,147	2,025	2,147
R^2	0.069	0.201	0.010	0.003	0.003	0.00001	0.001	0.004
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.201	0.009	0.002	0.002	-0.0005	0.0004	0.003
Residual Std. Error	0.449 (df = 2145)	0.416 (df = 2145)	0.461 (df = 2107)	0.465 (df = 2145)	0.465 (df = 2145)	0.465 (df = 2145)	0.469 (df = 2023)	0.464 (df = 2145)
F Statistic	160.041*** (df = 1; 2145)	539.527*** (df = 1; 2145)	21.193*** (df = 1; 2107)	5.800* (df = 1; 2145)	6.009* (df = 1; 2145)	0.021 (df = 1; 2145)	1.908 (df = 1; 2023)	8.342** (df = 1; 2145)

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 3.9 presents results from full regression specifications for Hypothesis 2. Across all models the relationship between government classification and donor offer of aid remains positive and statistically significant (p<0.001). When host governments classify an event as an emergency, donors are between 18 and 20% more likely to offer aid, depending on the model specification. The coefficient for slow-onset events also remains negative and statistically significant (p<0.001) across specifications. The conditional relationships between regime type and share of population affected and regime type and disaster type affected are less robust. These results also differ from the

results for government classification in that more development aid as a percentage of GDP is positively associated with donor offering aid across specifications (p<0.001). However, when aid as percentage of GDP is interacted with event type, the relationship becomes negative but remains statistically significant, suggesting the positive relationship between development aid and offers of humanitarian aid is conditional on the type of event donors are considering.

Table 3.9: OLS models for donor offers of aid

	Dependent variable:			
	Donor offer aid			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Government classification	0.187***	0.180***	0.199***	0.195***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Slow onset	-0.411***	-0.311***	-0.328***	-0.303***
	(0.019)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Democracy	0.054	0.091+	0.100+	0.121*
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Share population affected	0.113	-0.156	-0.132	-0.151
	(0.128)	(0.260)	(0.264)	(0.264)
Share population deaths	15.663	9.012	12.403	19.607
	(17.987)	(18.110)	(18.127)	(17.948)
Civilian conflict casualties	0.001	0.0003	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Dev aid pct GDP	0.836***	1.252***	1.042***	0.613***
	(0.162)	(0.228)	(0.231)	(0.166)
FDI pct GDP			0.510*	1.469***
			(0.211)	(0.325)
Democracy x Share pop affected		0.660	0.557	0.605
		(0.611)	(0.618)	(0.616)
Slow onset x Democracy		-0.156+	-0.142	-0.166+
		(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Slow onset x Aid pct GDP		-0.883**	-0.754*	
		(0.319)	(0.324)	
Slow onset x FDI pct GDP				-1.581***
				(0.422)
Constant	0.363***	0.339***	0.332***	0.309***
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Observations	2,109	2,109	1,998	1,998
R^2	0.244	0.248	0.263	0.267
Adjusted R^2	0.241	0.245	0.259	0.262
Residual Std. Error	0.404 (df = 2101)	0.403 (df = 2098)	0.402 (df = 1986)	0.401 (df = 1986)
F Statistic	96.833*** (df = 7; 2101)	69.263*** (df = 10; 2098)	64.539*** (df = 11; 1986)	65.603*** (df = 11; 1986)

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 3.10 presents results from specifications identical to Table 3.9 with the addition of fixed effects by country. The results from Table 3.9 are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects, with the exception of development aid as percentage of GDP. However, the conditional relationships between dependence and slow-onset events, measured by both aid as percentage of GDP and FDI as a percentage of GDP become more robust once fixed effects are added ($p<0.001$) (Models 3 and 4). This supports the argument that the relationship between dependence and offers of aid is conditional on the type of event. More dependent countries receive more offers of aid for fast-onset events but not for slow-onset ones.

Taken together, the empirical results strongly support Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2. More democratic governments are overall more likely to classify events as emergencies and they are more likely to classify fast-onset rather than slow-onset events as emergencies. Donors are more likely to offer humanitarian aid to host governments that have classified an event as an emergency and less likely to offer aid to more aid-dependent host governments experience slow-onset emergency events.

The empirical results offer some support for Hypothesis 1b, that governments that depend more heavily on foreign sources of revenue are more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies than slow-onset events. The results suggest that this relationship is not robust to multiple measures of dependence; the results for official development aid as a percentage of GDP are not statistically significant whereas the results for foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP remain statistically significant and robust to multiple specifications. This suggests that countries that rely more heavily on FDI may attach greater value to international reputational concerns, but this requires further investigation.

This analysis suffers from several limitations. First, the data used for analysis is biased toward including natural disasters and does not include the full universe of complex humanitarian emergencies, which means one should be cautious in generalizing these results to the full universe of humanitarian emergencies. Second, missing data in the dependent variable should make us cautious about interpreting these results. Third, data on donor behavior is limited to the United States, and while the U.S. is an important donor of humanitarian aid, it is plausible that the results would differ if other donors were included.

Table 3.10: OLS Models for donor offers of aid with country fixed effects

	Dependent variable:			
	Donor offer aid			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Government classification	0.215***	0.208***	0.230***	0.224***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Slow onset	-0.435***	-0.307***	-0.350***	-0.329***
	(0.022)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.053)
Democracy	0.261**	0.293**	0.315**	0.332**
	(0.098)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Share population affected	0.090	-0.475	-0.357	-0.375
	(0.146)	(0.299)	(0.311)	(0.310)
Share population deaths	16.217	3.889	7.787	17.017
	(17.951)	(18.168)	(18.250)	(17.953)
Civilian conflict casualties	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Dev aid pct GDP	0.294	0.935**	0.515	-0.148
	(0.254)	(0.322)	(0.342)	(0.280)
FDI pct GDP			0.357	1.670***
			(0.246)	(0.381)
Democracy x Pop affected		1.556*	1.343+	1.444+
		(0.733)	(0.753)	(0.751)
Slow onset x Democracy		-0.181+	-0.130	-0.149
		(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Slow onset x Aid pct GDP		-1.151***	-1.022**	
		(0.345)	(0.350)	
Slow onset x FDI pct GDP				-2.060***
				(0.460)
Observations	2,109	2,109	1,998	1,998
R²	0.327	0.334	0.350	0.354
Adjusted R²	0.293	0.299	0.314	0.318
Residual Std. Error	0.390 (df = 2006)	0.388 (df = 2003)	0.387 (df = 1892)	0.386 (df = 1892)
F Statistic	9.562*** (df = 102; 2006)	9.546*** (df = 105; 2003)	9.689*** (df = 105; 1892)	9.857*** (df = 105; 1892)
Note:			+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001	

Conclusion

This chapter evaluates why host governments and donors classify some events as emergencies while failing to acknowledge others. The results suggest that host governments are less likely to classify slow-onset events as emergencies compared to fast onset events and democracies are more likely to classify events as emergencies when a larger share of the population is affected by the event. Contrary to my expectations, I observe no clear relationship between propensity to classify events as emergencies and government dependence on foreign aid, but it appears that governments that depend more on FDI are more likely to classify events as emergencies. However, these results are conditional. Although democratic regimes are more likely to classify events as emergencies overall, democratic governments are less likely to classify slow-onset events as emergencies. Host governments are less likely to classify slow-onset events as emergencies when foreign direct investment comprises a greater share of GDP. These conditional relationships are consistent with the reputational theory I propose.

The results presented in this chapter support my expectations that donors' decisions to offer aid are influenced by host government classification decisions. Consistent with my expectations regarding donor preferences, donors are more likely to offer aid to democratic countries experiencing events that affect a significant share of their population. Unlike host governments, it appears aid dependence does not reliably predict donors' aid allocation decisions once fixed effects for recipient countries are included. Donors are less likely to offer aid to countries experiencing slow-onset emergencies and to aid-dependent states experiencing slow-onset emergencies.

Lastly, it should be noted that classifying an event as an emergency does not automatically imply that the government will accept offers of humanitarian aid. As described in Chapter 2, governments can declare an emergency but reject aid in order to attempt to demonstrate their competence. Several brief examples summarizing variation in governments classification decisions and decisions to accept or reject aid are described below. I hope to capture this variation more systematically in future iterations of this project.

Classify event as emergency but refuse aid: India 2018 Kerala floods
The government of India has maintained a policy of refusing emergency humanitarian aid from international donors since 2004. The government of India has since classified situations as emergencies, with the consensus of donors who have offered aid, but the Indian government has rejected offers of emergency humanitarian aid from international sources (Kazmin 2018). Internationally, India has been rewarded for repeated show of competence (Carnegie and Dolan 2019, 11). When India refused humanitarian aid

offered after "the worst floods in a century" in Kerala in 2018, the governor of Kerala interpreted the decision as "political discrimination" against the communist party ruled state by the Hindu Nationalist BJP which controls the central government (Venkataraman, Raj, and Abi-Habib 2018). The BJP also blamed the flood on "mismanagement by the state government" (Aug 22, 2018, and Ist n.d.). This played well with the government's supporters, reinforcing their perception of the government's strength.

Fail to classify and refuse aid: Venezuela complex emergency 2016
Since a movement to recall President Maduro began in 2016, his government has denied that the country faced a humanitarian emergency and characterized offers of humanitarian aid as an effort by political opponents, supported by the U.S., to embarrass the government and invite foreign intervention (Casey 2016; Dube 2018). In 2017, the government stopped providing import permits to organizations that had long delivered humanitarian aid, including medical supplies, into the country (O'Reilly 2017). The Maduro government's opposition to humanitarian aid gained widespread international media attention when Juan Guiado, an opposition politician and self-proclaimed interim president of Venezuela, organized a $60 million aid shipment from the U.S. and Canada in February 2019. In response, Maduro sent troops to the border to block the aid from entering the country. Maduro described the aid as ``fake'' stating that Washington had fabricated the idea of a humanitarian emergency to justify military intervention in Venezuela.

Although the government refused most offers of aid, it permitted aid from Russia and supplies from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to be delivered to hospitals throughout the country (News n.d.). Representatives for ICRC and U.N. criticized the United States and other donors for trying to deliver aid without the consent of President Maduro's government and for politicizing humanitarian aid.

Fail to classify but accept aid: Zimbabwe 2001 food crisis
Governments can resist classifying a situation as an emergency but to allow de facto provision of humanitarian assistance anyway. Governments pursue this approach to avoid assuming public responsibility for the occurrence of an emergency while also reaping the benefits of providing aid to people affected by the emergency.

In 2001 Zimbabwe faced the prospect of significant food shortages, due primarily to government mismanagement of the economy. International donors sought to provide humanitarian aid to people suffering from food shortages, but high-level government officials opposed humanitarian aid distributions. ``Working-level'' bureaucrats were willing to acknowledge the existence of humanitarian needs and to appeal to the UN for

aid, but they were blocked by ministry-level officials who were " unwilling to talk of humanitarian need for `political' reasons" A diplomatic cable from the U.S. embassy describes negotiations between the United Nations country representative and the Zimbabwean officials (Diplomatic Cable 2001/08/21) They were concerned that providing explicitly humanitarian aid would provide an opportunity for the political opposition to undermine government and for international actors to support the political opposition.

Negotiations continued for two weeks, until the Government of Zimbabwe signed an agreement with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), authorizing the creation of a `Relief and Rehabilitation' program that would provide `social and relief activities.' This agreement was a compromise: it allowed UNDP to coordinate humanitarian assistance, while allowing the government to avoid characterizing the situation as a humanitarian emergency or calling the aid humanitarian aid, thereby avoiding public culpability for the food crisis. It took the parties two weeks to arrive at this mutually acceptable outcome; if the government had been willing to acknowledge humanitarian needs, this wasted time could have been spent providing aid to people in need.

Chapter 4: Making sense of divergent approaches to managing emergencies: A qualitative case study of Niger since independence

Introduction

This chapter presents a qualitative case study of government responses to humanitarian emergencies in Niger. It draws on both historical examples and interviews with current and former government officials to describe variation in the government's responses to humanitarian emergencies and stance toward humanitarian aid. I use original interviews, primary source documents, and secondary sources to illustrate how reputational concerns mediate government responses to humanitarian emergencies. This evidence supports my central claim that the central government values its international reputation for competence and makes policy choices to mitigate potential damage to this reputation.

Niger, a West African country that shades into the Sahara Desert in its north, confronts environmental hazards including droughts, locust infestations and floods that routinely endanger its population. These natural hazards, exacerbated by consistently high poverty rates, poor food security, and limited government accountability, have regularly produced famines and food crises. Growing regional instability since the 2012 crisis in Mali, exacerbated by the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has resulted in unprecedented population displacement. In 2019, Niger hosted 179,997 refugees and 191,902 internally displaced persons (UNHCR 2021).

This chapter briefly discusses the Government of Niger's track record managing humanitarian emergencies since independence, but it focuses on the period from 1999-2019. The historical discussion is included to contextualize contemporary events.

Niger satisfies this study's scope condition in that its government relies on foreign sources of revenue to fund essential services. In 2019 Official Development Assistance (ODA) represented 11.1% of the country's gross national income (GNI) and 38.2% of its gross capital formation (World Development Indicators n.d.). As Table 1 illustrates, these rates are substantially higher than the averages among both sub-Saharan African countries and low-income countries. The Government of Niger's dependence on foreign aid is longstanding. Mamoudou Gazibo describes Niger in the early 1990s as, "bankrupt and dependent on aid, especially from western donors" (2005, 74).[36]

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[36] Although the Government of Niger initially benefited from an influx of revenues from uranium exploitation, after 1980 global recession and a decline in uranium reserves led to large public deficits. The government to agree to and enact Structural Adjustment Programs, which led to a drastic reduction of state services (Gazibo 2005, 75).

Table 4.1: Measures of aid dependence in Niger compared to similar countries in 2019[37]

Indicator	Niger	SSA average	Low income average
Net ODA as percent of Gross National Income	11.1	3.2	9.4
Net ODA as percent of gross capital formation	38.2	13.2	26.2

In addition, international actors perceive the Government of Niger (GoN) as incompetent. Politics are broadly understood as clientelistic, requiring personal connections to access services (Mueller 2018a; Oumarou 2014). The Human Development Index (HDI) ranked Niger as last in the world (189/189) in human development for the years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (UNDP 2020).

Theoretical expectations
My theoretical framework is premised on the idea that the governments of poor, aid-dependent states understand that their domestic reputations for competence depend on their ability to continue attracting revenue from international actors. Consequently, I expect the government of Niger to prioritize its international reputation for competence. This chapter describes how the Government of Niger's international reputation for competence has varied over time and what actions it has taken to improve that reputation. This chapter presents qualitative tests of three of the main hypotheses described in Table 2.2—Hypothesis 3, 4, and 5--and their observable implications. These qualitative tests are complemented by quantitative tests of these hypotheses in Chapter 5.

Immediately before the period of interest for this chapter (1999-2019), both the Government of Niger's domestic and international and reputations for competence were negative. In 1996, Niger's previous government was removed by a military coup, belying domestic constituents lack of confidence in the ruling coalition. Donors viewed the government of Niger as unstable and geopolitically marginal, suspending most foreign aid after the 1996 coup (Associated Press 1996).

Starting from this negative position, the newly elected Government of Niger would seek to improve both its domestic and international reputations for competence. To accomplish this, the government would need to indicate its willingness to cooperate with donors. However, because the international community is already predisposed to view Niger as risky and strategically unimportant country, the GoN has relatively few opportunities to change how foreign actors perceive them outside their donor-mediated

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[37] All data in this table is sourced from the World Development Indicators maintained by the World Bank.

relationships. For the GoN, the expected benefits from cooperating with donors are an improved international reputation for competence that yields more aid resources and, potentially, greater discretion over the allocation of these resources.

Nigerien government officials openly characterize their own government as indiscriminately accepting foreign aid during interviews; they portray their own government as weak in relation to donor governments and international organizations.[38] One interviewee said plainly, "the government accepts all offers of aid because they are poor."[39] That discriminating among offers of aid is a luxury the government cannot afford was a common refrain among the officials I interviewed. While government officials might prefer some modalities of aid to others, these officials do not see their government as sufficiently powerful or well-resourced to decline any offers.

Accepting all offers of aid does not mean that government officials are satisfied by the results. Several interviewees expressed frustration that government policy decisions were driven by donor preferences. One interviewee expressed frustration that donors drive policymaking, but acknowledged that government actors often fail to assert their own policy preferences.

> *All our activities are oriented by partners, the government doesn't have its own agenda. Partners come to accompany government, but I have never seen initiative/planning by technical services deciding on activities, responsibilities, or goals without partners.*[40]

Policy disagreements are not seen as sufficient justification to reject aid; none of the individuals I interviewed could cite an example of the government rejecting an aid project based on a policy disagreement with a donor. One interviewee described the government's approach: "As soon as a donor proposes funding we don't look any further. They decide the area of intervention and we negotiate about the budget support." When I followed up and asked specifically about cases of refusal, they dismissed the idea:

> *Governments in Africa are weak and without financing and want Western governments to like them. The idea of governments who refuse aid when*

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[38] This section draws on anonymized interviews conducted during fieldwork in Niger between October 2018 and January 2020.
[39] Government representative 3
[40] Government representative 11

> *not aligned with their priorities is outdated and only applies to states like Nigeria, Algeria, and South Africa.*[41]

The government's stance toward foreign aid is common knowledge among its donors. A donor representative I interviewed in Niger described the government as "not want[ing] to reject anything because the needs are so extreme."[42]

Hypothesis 3a: Although government leadership prefers aid funds delivered directly to government, they will accept all offers of aid, even those requiring costly policy concessions

In a context where government leadership seeks to convince donors to provide aid conditions more favorable to government, an emergency presents an opportunity for the government to improve its reputation for competence, but it can also risk damaging the government's reputation for competence.

The reputational consequences of emergency response are mediated by the type of emergency in question and whether or not blame for the event can easily be attributed to government. I differentiate between fast- and slow-onset emergencies. Fast-onset emergencies include phenomena like earthquakes, floods, or storms that occur suddenly, without much warning and are often thought of as "acts of god." By contrast, slow-onset emergencies refer to phenomena like droughts or epidemics that occur slowly, over time. It is easier to attribute slow-onset emergencies to the failure of government policies and to see these events reaching the status of emergencies as a failure of prevention. Governments can be blamed for allowing a drought to trigger a food crisis, but few would blame government failing to prevent an earthquake that occurred on their watch.

For these reasons, government actors are more likely to suffer reputational consequences from acknowledging a slow-onset emergency and receive reputational benefits from acknowledging a fast-onset emergency. Because slow-onset emergencies are seen as preventable, when governments do acknowledge them, they often face criticism for waiting too long and allowing the event to occur in the first place. However, when governments acknowledge a fast-onset emergency they are often seen as taking initiative in the face of a difficult situation which they could not have otherwise prevented.
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[41] Government representative 12
[42] Donor representative 1

One interviewee, working in public health, noted that despite the existence of a national disease monitoring system, the government was rarely the first to acknowledge disease outbreaks:

> *Despite the existence of surveillance system throughout the country, it is usually a civil society organization or international organization that alerts [the existence of a disease outbreak] because government doesn't want to. They are always reticent to respond. For example, under President Tandja it took three months to respond to an outbreak of meningitis.*[43]

This is not to suggest that governments cannot damage their reputation in response to fast-onset emergencies and improve their reputation in response to slow-onset emergencies. In both situations, government actors can improve their government's reputations for competence by delivering essential benefits to domestic constituents and showing that it is a willing partner for international actors. Similarly, failing to respond successfully can damage the host government's reputation for competence, particularly if this failure follows rejections of international offers of assistance.

However, the reputational consequences of initially acknowledging an emergency differ for fast- and slow-onset emergencies, and this initial difference influences government's policy response. Once the emergency is acknowledged, government actors can work to rebuild their reputation for competence, but they prefer not to suffer the initial damage. For these reasons I expect government actors to react differently to fast and slow-onset emergencies.

Hypothesis 3b: Central government actors will acknowledge and request international assistance for fast-onset emergencies such as floods. They will cover up slow-onset emergencies such as food crises unless external pressure forces them to acknowledge these emergencies.

Once government has acknowledged that an emergency exists, donors fund humanitarian organizations to provide emergency relief on the ground. These funds usually bypass government coffers in favor of multilateral organizations and NGOs because donors view these organizations as more efficient and effective than host government. For donors, emergencies mean that aid must be delivered urgently. They see government actors as lacking the necessary technical experience and capacity to quickly deliver aid to those who are suffering.

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[43] Government representative 6

> *The E.U. chooses implementers; they don't want government to decide alone. Government does not see what [implementers] are doing.*[44]

This runs counter to government's preferred approach to aid delivery, through government structures. Government officials see aid delivery through government as a sustainable long-term strategy compared to the short-term strategy of delivering aid through humanitarian organizations. They see donors' approach to providing short term aid in response to periodic emergencies as unsustainable and ineffective.

> *NGOs don't show up unless there is an urgent problem. For example, when there are floods people come in and do what they want without consulting — there is no effect and multiple organizations end up doing the same thing in the same place. They know the floods are chronic but act surprised.*[45]

An interviewee who had worked in Diffa, the region that had saw the greatest an influx of humanitarian aid in response to the Boko Haram insurgency, described how humanitarian organizations operated independent of government agencies. One consequence was that aid did not contribute to strengthening the local government's capacity. He cited the example of an exercise to map services in the region:

> *When actors came for the emergency we tried to get them to intervene through the [local government] technical services to build their capacity so technical services would be strong when they left. The technical services should benefit from the resources allocated for this crisis. They should be trained. All mapping was done by an NGO, not by technical services. The server where the maps were stored wasn't even in Niger. When that NGO leaves, all the knowledge and information will leave too. Why not work with technical services?*[46]

Because donors choose to deliver aid through humanitarian organizations instead of government channels, government officials see humanitarians as competitors for donor resources.

> *Regional public health officials see humanitarians as substituting or competing with government health clinics. [They] want to manage the clinics run by humanitarians themselves and are skeptical of information coming from health centers managed by humanitarians.*[47]

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[44] Government representative 12
[45] Government representative 2
[46] Government representative 5
[47] Government representative 6

Because donors justify delivering aid through humanitarian organizations based on their designation of an event as a humanitarian emergency, government officials see humanitarian organizations as benefiting from the designation of an event as an emergency. Many government officials contested the idea that regions affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, hosting refugees and IDPs, should still be treated as emergencies and receive humanitarian aid.

A former government official who worked in Diffa, the region worst-affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, from 2016-2018 explained:

> *An emergency is when people are being displaced, but you can't say it is an emergency for multiple years. I don't want an emergency for many years because it makes people dependent. I fought NGOs on this but partners [donors] want to continue because it is easier to spend money. Partners don't want to talk about development.*[48]

Their sentiments were echoed by another government official who worked in Diffa:

> *Emergency should only refer to when populations are moving [displacement]. Once they are stable, we should transition to development, you can't have three years of emergency. But it is very easy for donors to spend money on emergencies and harder to spend on development. People define emergencies in ways that benefit them.*[49]

Several interviewees suggested that humanitarians were prolonging the emergency in order to continue to reap financial benefit, to the detriment of government actors.

> *Even [donors and humanitarians] have interests. No one wants the flow of money to end. Partners have more interest sometimes than Nigernes. They send experts who are well paid, people for whom money is sent do not benefit. Projects buy huge cars. The cost of offices is greater than the amount for beneficiaries.*[50]

Hypothesis 5: Government officials see humanitarian organizations as competition for scarce aid resources; they see these organizations as benefiting and therefore seeking to prolong emergencies.

Consequently, central government actors see persuading donors the emergency has ended as the best way to improve their reputation for competence and convince donors redirect aid to government. They perceive humanitarians' statements about ongoing

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[48] Government representative 13
[49] Government representative 6
[50] Government representative 11

need for humanitarian aid to threaten the transition away from short-term humanitarian aid toward long-term development aid.

Hypothesis 4: Government officials will sanction humanitarian organizations that provide information that portrays the country as requiring additional emergency response.

Alternative explanations:
Existing theoretical frameworks attribute the Government of Niger's policy choices to structural factors such as poverty, aid-dependence, or regime type, but these structural factors are insufficient to explain variation the Government of Niger's approach toward managing humanitarian emergencies. One expects a country that is persistently poor to implement donor policies in order to secure aid funding. While this describes the GoN's approach during certain periods; others were characterized by resistance to donors' preferred aid modalities and expulsion of aid groups. Niger has remained poor and aid dependent but its policies have varied substantially, as I describe below. Alternatively, one could attribute policy variation to variation in regime type. However, the variation in policy I document does not entirely correspond to variation in regime type – both President Tandja, an autocrat, and President Issoufou, who was democratically elected, expelled the humanitarian organization, Doctors Without Borders, for claiming that need for humanitarian aid exceeded government estimates

Case context
Since independence the Government of Niger has oscillated from autocracy to democracy and back again. Despite periodic reform efforts power has remained concentrated in the executive, and political contestation limited to a small political, military, and economic elite.

The country's first president Hamani Diori, ruled from independence until he was removed by a military coup d'etat in 1974. Diori outlawed opposition parties, ran unopposed in the elections of 1965 and 1970, and consolidated government power in the executive. Diori was removed after his government failed to adequately respond to the 1972-73 famine, amidst allegations that corruption within the regime crippled its response (Idrissa and Decalo 2012, 184). The leader of the coup that removed Diori, Seyni Kountché, ruled Niger until his death in 1987. Kountché took advantage of new windfalls from uranium exploitation to fund an ambitious "development society" program that increased the state's presence in rural areas (Mueller 2018b, 157). His hold on power weakened as funding for his development society dried up; uranium reserves fell as Niger's debt rose. In response, Kountché implemented unpopular structural adjustment policies to access loans from the International Monetary Fund. The military regime he put in place held on to power for only a few years following his death.

Protest against structural adjustment policies by students and labor unions and demands for government reform ushered in the country's first multiparty elections in 1991 (Mueller 2018b, 158). This marked the beginning of a turbulent decade in Nigerien politics. A coup d'etat reinstated military rule in 1996, followed by a second coup in 1999, which paved the way for multiparty elections later that year. Mahmadou Tandja won the 1999 presidential elections, "initiat[ing] a period of hitherto unknown political stability," as the first president to win reelection and to preside over a stable parliamentary coalition (Elischer and Mueller 2019, 3). Tandja's government negotiated debt relief with the IMF and World Bank, attracted new sources of development aid, and benefited from a favorable market for uranium. At the same time, the regime grew increasingly repressive at home, denying the existence of a food crisis in 2005 and cracking down on political opponents. In 2009, near the end of his second term, Tandja sparked a constitutional crisis, holding a referendum to amend the constitution to abolish term limits, enabling his continued rule. In response to Tandja's power grab, the European Union and United States suspended development aid to Niger in 2009 (Elischer and Mueller 2019, 4). Although he won the referendum, in February 2010 Tandja was removed by a military coup that organized successful multiparty elections with the year.[51]

The winner of the January 2011, elections, Mahamadou Issoufou, was seen as a credible democratic reform both at home and abroad, due to his roots in the trade union movement that ushered in Niger's first democratic transition and longtime role as leader of an opposition coalition. (Elischer and Mueller 2019, 5). Both the U.S. and E.U. reinstated development aid to Niger in July 2011 (Thurston 2011), and Issoufou rapidly became a donor darling among Western powers by adopting hardline policies on terrorism and irregular migration that were more popular with donors than with constituents. Issoufou has used his international standing as, "everything the West wants in an African leader" to sideline his political opponents (Thurston 2017). When Issoufou won reelection in 2016, his chief political opponent was in prison on salacious charges of child trafficking that many denounced as political intimidation.

In a dangerous neighborhood, Niger under Issoufou is seen "defying the odds" by maintaining some measure of political stability (Elischer 2018; Ibrahim 2014). Over the course of Issoufou's tenure, regional insecurity has grown, beginning with the 2012 coup and subsequent political crisis in Mali, and exacerbated by the spread of the Boko Haram insurgency beyond Nigeria's borders since 2014. Niger has faced mounting violence from armed groups who operate within its territory and across porous borders.

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[51] Some sources refer to this as a "corrective coup" (Baudais and Chauzal 2011)

The government has declared states of emergency in three regions to facilitate military operations by both Nigerien and foreign forces and increased security cooperation with its neighbors and Western states.[52]

Throughout these turbulent politics, Niger has remained chronically underdeveloped and extreme poverty continues to be endemic. Today, forty five percent of Nigeriens live on less than $1.90 per day, the lowest poverty rate recorded in Niger since independence (World Bank n.d.).[53] The Human Development Index has ranked Niger last in the world in its composite measure of life expectancy, income, and education every year since 2018.

Due in part to chronic poverty, subsequent governments have continually depended heavily on support from foreign partners to fund their policy priorities. Whenever revenues from uranium exploitation, which comprise the main source of domestic revenues have declined, the GoN has sought funding from foreign donors. This indicates that few domestic substitutes exist, and the tax base in Niger remains weak, due to chronic poverty.

Successive governments have been willing to make significant policy concessions in return for aid revenues. Under Kountche, the government enacted unpopular structural adjustment reforms only after uranium prices fell and national debt ballooned. More recently, the GoN adopted a set of domestically unpopular policies criminalizing illegal migration and securing the country's borders in return for investment from the European Union.

Governments have been weakened when donors have withdrawn foreign aid. After opposition to structural adjustment sparked the protests that ushered in Niger's first democratic transition, the IMF proposed additional loans, contingent on structural adjustment programs. Widespread opposition from trade unions, the new, democratic government's base of support, led the government to refuse additional structural adjustment programs.[54] The government scrambled to compensate for expected revenues; government officials resorted to granting diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in exchange for $50 million that the government used to pay public servants (Elischer

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[52] The country is poised to continue along this trajectory, Issoufou's anointed successor, Mohammed Bazoum, handily won the February 2021 presidential elections. When opposition leader Hama Amadou contested the results and supporters took to the streets, the government responded with repression, jailing activists and cutting internet access for 10 days (Abdou 2021).
[53] This estimate is based on data are from 2014; this is likely an underestimate of poverty given the spread of insecurity and violence in Niger since 2014.
[54] The government's opposition to IMF loans triggered withdrawal by other bilateral donors.

2019, 212; Gazibo 2005, 81). Subsequent military coups in 1996 and 1999 deterred donors from expanding their aid portfolios in Niger, as "the absence of external aid prevented the government from satisfying social demands, which developed into social unrest. When troubles became widespread donors became even less willing to help, invest, or grant loans" (Gazibo 2005, 82). Similarly, the suspension of development aid in 2009 in response to Tandja's extraconstitutional power grab further weakened his hold on power.

The following sections describe how subsequent regimes learned from these experiences and adapted various strategies to attract aid revenues.

Managing humanitarian emergencies in Niger

Managing emergencies in Niger is no small feat. By virtue of its geography, bordering the Sahara Desert, Niger is exposed to cyclical droughts and floods. Poverty, poor infrastructure, and weak state response mechanisms exacerbate the consequences of these natural hazards for the Nigerien public. Figure 4.1 summarizes the number of people affected by droughts, floods, epidemics, storms, and insect infestations from 1960 to 2020. This includes both fast-onset phenomena (floods and storms) and slow-onset phenomena (droughts, epidemics, and insect infestations). Each point represents a natural disaster event that occurred in Niger. This figure indicates that droughts affect the largest number of people of any type of natural disaster in Niger, and droughts have become more frequent over the last 20 years.

Figure 4.1: Percent of Nigerien population affected by natural disasters 1960-2019[55]

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[55] Data include all natural disaster events in which ten or more people are reported killed or one hundred (or more people are reported affected. The totals shown here are the total number of people affected by each natural disaster even according to EMDAT (Guha-Sapir, Below, and Hoyois 2015).

In addition to natural disasters, the Government of Niger has also had to manage numerous man-made emergencies. Figure 4.2 plots the number of displaced people living within Niger's borders since 1990. Niger hosted a small number of refugees from Mali and Chad in the early 1990s. The number of displaced people living in Niger increased substantially after 2012, when Malian refugees began fleeing violence in their home country. They were joined by Nigerian refugees fleeing the Boko Haram insurgency in 2013, which soon thereafter crossed the border into Niger, displacing Nigeriens. The volume of both Nigerian refugees and internally displaced Nigeriens grew steadily from 2014 to 2020.

Figure 4.2: Number of displaced people in Niger by country of origin 1990-2019

Managing the 1972-1973 famine

The survival of Niger's political leaders has historically been shaped by their responses to emergencies, namely famines and food crises. Managing emergencies has been a recurrent governance challenge in Niger since at least the early 1970s, and subsequent governments have met this challenge with variable success.[56] Failing to manage emergencies competently has led to the removal of two Nigerien heads of state.

The famine of 1972-1973 represented the first instance of broad consensus among domestic and international actors that food shortages and attendant suffering in Niger were severe enough to be understood as an emergency (Bonnecase 2010b, 24). From the beginning, the Nigerien government saw emergency response as international in nature. The Government of Niger, along with governments of neighboring countries, requested emergency food aid in 1968, when failed rains portended the first signs of drought (Ball 1978, 271). Despite this early action, both government and international actors underestimated the mounting severity of drought and resulting food shortages in subsequent years. Consequently, the Government of Niger was slow to organize its own response or request international aid, despite clear evidence of worsening conditions for its population (Iliffe 1987; Sheets and morris 1974).

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[56] The regional famine across the Sahel that began in 1972 was not the region's first experience with famines; famine also struck the region repeatedly during colonization, in 1912-1914 and 1931.

The central government approved free food distribution on a case-by-cases basis for localities in 1972, but failed to act at scale or request international aid, claiming it possessed sufficient grain stores to respond to the famine (Bonnecase 2010a). The Government of Niger only requested international aid after those displaced by famine gathered in camps in large numbers in 1973. They both rendered the famine visible internationally and organized themselves to demand action from government (Bonnecase 2010a).

According to Iliffe (1987, 255–56), President Hamani Diori delayed acknowledging the severity of the famine and requesting international assistance because he was concerned that doing so would undermine his government's reputation for competence on the international stage.[57] While it is difficult to assess the consequences of Diori's delayed response for Niger's international reputation for competence, it is clear that it damaged the government's domestic reputation for competence. Soon after, President Diori was removed from office by a military coup in April 1974. The government's delayed, corrupt, and insufficient response is widely understood as a central justification for the coup (Higgott and Fuglestad 1975; Mueller 2018b).

Looking for other sources of revenue, Diori pressured France to renegotiate uranium exploitation agreements to secure a greater percentage of revenues for Niger and reported explored selling parts of northern Niger to Libya. These attempts did not come to fruition as Diori was overthrown two days before a high-level meeting with French officials on the uranium negotiations (Idrissa and Decalo 2012, 186).

Managing food crises, floods, and forced displacement: 1999-2010

Forty-six years later, President Mamdou Tandja was removed from office by military leadership in an episode that echoed Diori's removal. The coup that removed Tandja followed public criticism that his response to food shortages caused by drought was insufficient, corrupt, and self-serving (Mueller 2018b, 156–57).[58] Like Diori before him, Tandja consistently claimed that the government had sufficient grain stores to feed those who were hungry. To curry favor with his critics in advance of a referendum that would let him seek an extraconstitutional third term in office, the government distributed rice in several poor neighborhoods in Niamey, "on behalf of the president" (Bonnecase 2010a, 23). This episode can be interpreted as a desperate attempt to rescue his

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[57] Iliffe refers to national pride, and later specifies, "The governments of Niger and Chad also showed themselves incompetent at that time."

[58] Food shortages were not the only contributor to Tandja's removal. The coup occurred after Tandja won a fraudulent referendum vote that allowed him to amend the constitution to seek a third term. Tandja's efforts to seek a third term generated urban protest and international condemnation.

domestic reputation for competence. Tandja won the referendum, widely considered fraudulent, but was subsequently removed from power by the military.

Figure 4.3: Millions of dollars of humanitarian and development aid received by Niger 1990-2019[59]

Despite his opposition to emergency relief, President Tandja by no means opposed other forms of foreign aid. In fact, Tandja attracted more aid funding to Niger compared to his predecessors and was among the first countries in the region to participate in U.S. security assistance for counter-terrorism. This increase in aid can be partially attributed to donors rewarding the nominal return of multiparty democracy with his electoral victory in 1999, after which donors increased development aid and allowed Niger to qualify for debt forgiveness, which resulted in an influx in revenues to government over which donors exercised minimal oversight (Elischer 2019, 215–16).

Tandja's opposition to emergency relief in 2010 was shaped by his government's experience with emergency during and after the 2004-2005 food crisis. Before this emergency, donors gave little humanitarian aid to Niger, but the 2004-2005 food crisis

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[59] Data for development aid for all years and humanitarian aid before the year 2001 from OECD Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Data on humanitarian aid from 2000 to 2019 from UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS), February 7, 2020, https://fts.unocha.org/content/fts-public-api.

shifted donor policy toward Niger. Donors continued to give humanitarian aid, delivered through multilateral and NGO channels, after the conclusion of the 2004-2005 emergency despite opposition under the Tandja government (See Figure 4.3).

During this same period, the proportion of aid delivered by non-governmental channels, as a proportion of overall aid to Niger, began to grow (See Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4: Millions of dollars of aid to Niger by multilateral, NGO, and government channels 1990-2019[60]

Concerns about both the government's domestic and international reputation for competence shaped the government's response to the 2004-2005 food crisis and the Tandja government's approach to managing emergencies until Tandja's removal from office in 2010. In late 2004, Tandja was keen to continue improving Niger's international reputation for competence and grow the volume of foreign aid under his direct control. However, growing food shortages threatened both his ability to maintain discretion over aid funds and his electoral prospects. Locust infestations during the summer of 2004 resulted in poor harvests later that year. The timing was inauspicious for Tandja and his government; legislative and presidential elections were scheduled for December 2004. As early as October 2004, government agencies produced information that poor

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[60] Totals calculated using data from OECD DAC CRS and OCHA FTS. See footnote for previous Figure.

harvests would likely result in food shortages the following year. However, Tandja refused to refer to these food shortages as a crisis or emergency out of concern that doing so would harm his prospects for reelection (Michiels and Egg 2007, 48). Tandja pursued a strategy that would protect both his domestic and international reputations for competence. By refusing to frame the food shortages as an emergency, he sought to avoid blame for the poor harvests. By framing the poor harvests as a developmental rather than a humanitarian problem, he sought to preserve his international reputation for competence and maintain control over the allocation of aid funds.

Tandja did seek aid from the international community early, but he requested aid for development, not humanitarian, activities. Tandja framed the poor harvests as a problem that should be solved using development aid. In November and December 2004, the government repeatedly requested development resources to mitigate the poor harvest and its anticipated effects on food security (Harragin 2006, 22). Development aid, unlike humanitarian aid, was controlled directly by government. Requesting development aid allowed him to preserve his international reputation for competence because he appeared proactive. If successful, this strategy would have also provided him discretion over aid allocation, but donors failed to respond to these early appeals for aid.

International donors only began to mobilize resources to respond to the food shortages in Niger in March 2005—several months after the onset of the crisis. International attention was galvanized in part by a new Nigerien protest movement, which was organized to protest a value-added tax increase on essential food products, water, and electricity (Michiels and Egg 2007, 48). These protests drew significant media attention to the worsening food insecurity situation (Aliou 2008, 45).

Donors and international NGOs began calling for an emergency response to the food shortages, which the Tandja government persisted in depicting as a development issue. By contrast, donors and international NGOs asserted that Niger was experiencing a food crisis that merited emergency aid measures; the UN estimated 2.5 million people out of Niger's population of 10 million were affected by the food crisis. Some organizations went further and asserted country was experiencing famine conditions. The United Nations and international NGOs argued that the Nigerien government should allow and support free food distribution to people affected by the food crisis

Government officials opposed donor and NGO appeals for emergency responses in May and June 2005. Government officials argued that implementing emergency mechanisms, such as free food distribution, instead of existing development approaches, selling staple foods at reduced cost, would disrupt and undermine Niger's

development. When Bernard Kouchner, the co-founder of MSF claimed that, "30,000 children a day were dying in Niger," in June 2005, the Nigerien Minister of Health responded that Kouchner was "propagating false information, whose only aim is to tarnish the image of Niger."

Tandja personally denied that Niger was experiencing emergency conditions. He asserted that the levels of food insecurity and malnutrition were normal for the annual *periode de soudure* (hunger season). Tandja then alleged that UN agencies were exaggerating the situation to raise money for themselves, not for the benefit of Niger. He further stated that claims that the country was experiencing an emergency undermined his rule and bolstered his political opposition.

Tandja's resistance to adopting emergency measures prevented the World Food Program from distributing free food aid to Nigeriens in need for three months (May to August) while they negotiated with government. Their pre-existing agreement with government required them to continue to support the government's program of selling staple foods at reduced cost, despite evidence that even the reduced costs remained unaffordable for most Nigeriens. Eventually, under donor pressure, following a visit from then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Tandja acceded to free food distribution. He then used free food distribution as an excuse to declare the food crisis, and Niger's need of emergency aid had ended, one month later.

The importance of reassuring international observers that the emergency in Niger had been resolved was magnified by Niger's role as host of the *Jeux de la Francophonie,* an international sports competition among 44 French-speaking nations in December 2005. At the height of the emergency, rumors circulated that the games would be moved to neighboring Burkina Faso because of the ongoing emergency in Niger (Samson 2005). Nevertheless, the government was able to persuade the French officials sponsoring the games that they could manage the emergency and successfully hold the games.

This episode illustrates that Tandja saw classifying the food shortages as an emergency as a clear threat to both his domestic and international reputations for competence. However, he only conceded when it became clear that the rest of the world saw the situation in Niger as an emergency and continuing to refuse would only damage his international reputation for competence further. He quickly sought to return Niger to normal, non-emergency conditions by declaring the emergency over at the first signs of improved conditions.

In the aftermath of the 2005 food crisis, Tandja's government continued to assert that Niger needed long-term investment not short-term emergency responses. One week

after the World Food Program published a report stating that 3.2 million Nigeriens needed additional emergency aid -- one week before the scheduled start of the Jeux de la Francophonie – Prime Minister Hama Amadou publicly sought to mitigate damage to Niger's international reputation for competence to an audience of donor and NGO officials (Harragin 2006, 65). At a meeting convened to reflect on the experience of the 2005 food crisis, Amadou delivered a scathing criticism of international actors' insistence on providing emergency aid to Niger. He argued that Niger needed massive development investment to overcome the structural issues that produced crises, and Niger could no longer "hold out a hand to the international community to be fed." Amadou stated, "we are not prepared to cheaply sell the dignity of the Nigerien people," (Harragin 2006, 63), implying that this was the consequence of continuing to rely on emergency humanitarian aid.

Amadou's criticism of the international community also focused on donors' practice of delivering emergency aid through NGOs, saying, "[They] place more trust in international aid groups and NGOs than in the government to save Nigerien lives. In our eyes this is a denial of the credibility of our democracy and eve of our country's sovereignty" (Michiels and Egg 2007, 48). His statement illustrates that he associated emergency humanitarian aid with donor delegation to NGOs. Further, he linked this delegation to NGOs with international actors perception that the government was incompetent to provide essential benefits to its citizens.

The Nigerien government's denunciation of emergency aid and insistence on development solutions illuminates the logic at play. Consistent with my argument, the central government saw ending the emergency as a necessary step to improving its international reputation for competence. These actors initially sought to prevent donors from conceptualizing the food shortages as a humanitarian emergency to prevent donors from funding NGO-implemented emergency programs instead of government-implemented development projects. When that strategy failed, and it became clear that continuing to oppose the idea of the emergency would create greater reputational damage, government actors embraced the idea of emergency needs and free food distribution to those in need. To encourage a return to the pre-emergency status quo, the government claimed the emergency was over at the first sign of improvement in the new harvest (Aliou 2008, 71). By showing improvement in emergency conditions, the government could improve its international reputation for competence. Improving its reputation for competence would facilitate access development aid and ensure the *Jeux de la Francophonie* continued as planned.

Tandja and his government learned from their experience in 2005. The following year, in 2006, the government aggressively countered any claims that the country's food

shortages approached emergency levels, a policy which would continue until it contributed to Tandja's removal in 2010.

The government did not reject the idea that the country was experiencing any food shortages in 2006 but continued to assert that these shortages were normal in Niger and required development-based approaches. In March 2006 the government published a report stating that 1.8 million Nigeriens were at risk of facing food shortages and requested $92 million from international donors to support its cash-for-work and food-for-work programs and re-stock the government's grain reserves (IRIN 2006). This stood in contrast to international actors preferred approach to fund direct distribution through NGOs.

The government restricted access to information related to food security. When a BBC news crew sought permission to visit Niger in April 2006 to cover the aftermath of the 2005 crisis, the government revoked the journalists' credentials. A government spokesperson clarified that "the BBC was not expelled from Niger" and could pursue other stories, but the government would no longer accredit journalists who want to work on the food crisis (Harragin 2006, 65). Similarly, a government decree banned institutions from conducting national surveys on food security without government oversight. Consequently the World Food Program must rely on a government agency to conduct its surveys of population vulnerability to food insecurity, a policy that remains in place today.[61]

Beyond food crises, Tandja sought to control the flow of humanitarian aid to areas that would suggest incompetent governance. When the *Mouvement Nigérien pour la Justice* (MNJ), a Tuareg separatist group, began a campaign of violence against both government and civilian targets in February 2007, the government initially refused to acknowledge the source of the violence. Aid organization were initially allowed to deliver aid throughout Agadez, the affected region. However, after the government declared MNJ a rebel group and began its counterinsurgency campaign in June 2007, the government began restricting access to Agadez for both aid agencies and journalists (Massalatchi 2007). In October, the Governor of Agadez asked MSF to suspend its operations, citing security concerns, after the group's vehicles were repeatedly stolen by unidentified insurgents.[62] Shortly thereafter the government stopped granting permissions for any humanitarian aid in Agadez. In December 2007, the government refused to acknowledge the existence of people displaced by the violence and denied

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[61] Interview with World Food Program official, January 2020
[62] "[MSF] wanted to intervene in many different areas and we let them do a lot, but I do not see any point in them continuing. I don't think MSF came here to be threatened at gunpoint." (IRIN 2007)

that any civilians needed humanitarian aid (Humanitarian Access Cut to North 2007).[63] MSF and other humanitarian organizations were only able to resume humanitarian aid activities in Agadez in April 2008, when the government judged that security conditions had improved.

However, consistent with Hypothesis 3b, Tandja did not oppose emergency relief aid to floods that affected the region in 2007. In response to this fast-onset emergency, he recognized these floods as serious and allocated government relief to flood victims. This suggests that the government differentiated between the reputational consequences of failing to respond to floods from the consequences of failing to respond to displacement or food crises.

Managing complex emergencies since 2010
In September 2011, a poor harvest (due to insufficient rains) portended a looming food crisis. Although President Issoufou had been in office for less than six months, he quickly issued a public request for international aid to avert a potential food crisis, drawing favorable comparisons to his predecessor's delayed requests for aid in response to similar harvest conditions (Ford 2013, 12).

His response to the ensuing food crisis was seen as a stark contrast with Tandja's; he explicitly invited humanitarian organizations to work in the country (Elischer and Mueller 2019, 5). The government supported the establishment of a regional humanitarian coordinator for the Sahel in the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in April 2012, which doubled the volume of humanitarian aid funds requested for the region (Ford 2013, 13). The government continued to respond to food shortages and floods that occurred during this period, seeking international assistance in response to the food shortage (Tran 2012) and to floods. In May 2012, the government supported the official declaration of a humanitarian crisis by the World Food Program and UNHCR.

This represented a broader shift toward a more accommodating relationship with donors. Donor officials consistently describe Issoufou and his government as a willing partner across aid sectors, including humanitarian aid (Edwards 2016, 4).

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[63] "Niger's government has denied that there are humanitarian problems in the remote desert and mountain region. "Officially, there are no displaced people and no one has left their home - everything is as usual," a Nigerien NGO official said. "It's a very complicated situation because it's definitely not like that."[…] "The government is not giving any aid itself so why don't they just give authorisation to international aid agencies to do it? The only conclusion appears to be that they don't want these people to be assisted," a well-placed humanitarian official in Niger told IRIN."

My theory would predict that this shift toward greater cooperation with donors would strengthen Issoufou's international reputation for competence as he proved himself and his government a capable and willing partner. I would expect Issoufou's cooperation with donors and willingness to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid to hasten the end of an emergency and increase the availability of development aid.

However, Issoufou's government did not reap the expected reputational (or material) benefits of cooperation because a new emergency was unfolding at the same time. In February 2012, refugees fleeing violence in Mali began to arrive in Niger, settling in informal camps in border towns. By the end of 2012, over 50,000 Malians were living as refugees in Niger (UNHCR 2020). The internal security situation in Niger continued to deteriorate as armed groups displaced from northern Mali relocated their operations to parts of Niger (After Mali, Niger battles to secure its borders 2013). Attacks on refugee camps and throughout TIllabery region that borders Mali complicated the delivery of humanitarian aid to both refugees and host communities.

The deteriorating security situation in Mali benefited the Government of Niger in other ways. It led France and the U.S. to rapidly increase the scale of their security assistance and cooperation in Niger.[64] Consequently, the government's security budget more than doubled. Issoufou was a willing recipient, authorizing the construction and operation of a French military base in Agadez and U.S. drone base in Niamey in early 2013 (Ibrahim 2014, 9).

New aid flows for security and migration were given directly to government with minimal oversight.[65] Donors had previously invested in Mali as the regional bulwark against instability, and after the Malian state collapsed they looked to Niger as an alternative. At this time, after the Malian government's control of its northern regions disintegrated and as insecurity was worsening in Northern Nigeria, donors saw Niger as a potential pillar of stability in an increasingly volatile neighborhood.

Thus, even as insecurity continued to worsen and civilians displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria sought refuge in Niger as early as August 2014, the Government of Niger was able to strengthen its reputation for competence in the

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[64] Western donors had previously seen Mali as the pillar of stability in an otherwise politically unstable neighborhood and their preferred security partner. After the coup and ensuing crisis in Mali, donors were looking for an alternative candidate to preserve stability in the West African Sahel.
[65] Growing insecurity contributed to increased migration flows, including asylum seekers and refugees, through Niger toward North Africa and Europe. These migration flows in turn galvanized the interest of European countries in stabilizing Niger and securing its borders.

eyes of international donors. Donors rewarded the Government of Niger for performing more competently than its neighbors while facing increasingly difficult circumstances. These rewards chiefly took the form of aid funds for security priorities over which government exercised complete discretion with virtually zero donor oversight.[66]

Having access to these funds, independent of the existing development and humanitarian funding allocation process, likely made the government more amenable to accepting humanitarian aid because accepting humanitarian aid would not jeopardize access to security assistance.

In addition, the government of Niger did not see requesting humanitarian aid in response to the Boko Haram insurgency as compromising its reputation for competence because it saw the Boko Haram insurgency as a Nigerian problem, not a Nigerien one. The insurgency was based on the Nigerian side of the border, and the Nigerien government went to great lengths to emphasize that their current problems were result of a Nigerian failure of governance, not a homegrown phenomenon. The GoN attempted to cast itself as a benevolent neighbor, taking care of problems that spilled over the two countries' shared border, through no fault of its own.

By shifting blame for the insurgency and its humanitarian consequences to Nigeria, the government was able to request humanitarian assistance in a way that did not damage and even improved both its domestic and international reputations for competence. The Prime Minister called for both national and international solidarity and support for the situation in Diffa in December 2014 (OCHA 2014). In these early years of the humanitarian emergency in Diffa, government officials accepted the need for both security assistance and emergency humanitarian aid in Diffa and expressed gratitude to donors for their support.

This strategy benefited Issofou and his government both domestically and internationally. Casting the problem of insecurity as a foreign threat against which he was the best defense helped President Issoufou win a second presidential term in 2016 and helped him to attract greater support from foreign donors. This foreign support enabled Issoufou to crack down on political dissent at home; his victory in 2016 was

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[66] These funds undoubtedly contributed to the GoN's efforts to stabilize the country. Although violence continued to escalate, it became increasingly localized and predictable. Many reports suggest government achieved tenuous stability in areas at risk of violence by coopting or paying off armed actors who would have otherwise engaged in violence against the state. Although there is no clear documentation linking these payments to new aid flows, it is hard to imagine such payments would have been possible in the absence of such flows.

facilitated by jailing the principal opposition candidate on lurid charges of child trafficking.

The government's strategy toward managing its aid portfolio has evolved in recent years. After Boko Haram began conducting attacks within Niger in 2015, the security situation continued to worsen in Diffa. At the same time, violence along the border with Mali increased. These sustained trends made the government's attribution of blame to its neighbors less credible to both domestic and international observers.

To reestablish security, the government imposed a state of emergency in Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillaberi that remains in effect five years later. Emergency measures included bans on trading and travel that made it harder for people living in the region to survive and restrictions on humanitarian actors' ability to reach people living in areas closest to the border with Nigeria, where the Nigerien military "was conducting-or threatening to conduct—operations against Boko Haram" (Edwards 2016, 23).

The persistence of insecurity and its humanitarian consequences has led the central government to invest in centralizing control of the humanitarian response.[67] In 2016 President Issoufou announced the creation of a new ministry dedicated to managing humanitarian emergencies, the *Ministere de l'Action Humanitaire et la Gestion des Catastrophes (MAH-GC)*.[68] This ministry was created in response to donor pressure for the government to take a more active role in coordinating the humanitarian response, but many observers saw it as a way for the government to capture more resources dedicated to humanitarian aid. This was followed by an announcement that the government would begin a campaign to "clean up" the NGO sector to give the government greater visibility and control over where NGOs work.[69]

Throughout 2017 and 2018, humanitarian aid and foreign security forces continued to flow into the country without noticeable improvements in either humanitarian or security conditions. Many Nigeriens began expressing frustration with the perceived permanence of the emergency response. President Issoufou, whose public persona was usually deferential and grateful to Western donors, began publicly criticizing European governments for their approach to supporting Niger, "Europe is making an effort, but it's not enough. We need more resources for development … it's about attacking poverty," (Maclean and Hama Saley 2018).

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[67] Government representative 7
[68] Ministry of Humanitarian Action and Emergency Management
[69] Government representative 4

Issoufou's call for development assistance in lieu of emergency humanitarian aid or support for security forces marks a shift in his strategy. Government leadership has committed effort and resources to improving its international reputation. In 2018, Niger's last place HDI ranking, below countries like the Central African Republic and South Sudan, produced public outcry and prompted President Mahmadou Issoufou to create an inter-ministerial task force dedicated to improving Niger's HDI ranking. Announcing this task force, a government representative described Niger's ranking on the HDI as "a major preoccupation for the government for several years" (Issoufou Mahamadou crée un Comité interministériel de suivi de IDH 2018). However, the country's HDI ranking has yet to meaningfully change.

Conclusion

The case study presented in this chapter traces variation in the Government of Niger's response to humanitarian emergencies from the country's independence to the contemporary period. Although it does not provide a comprehensive historical account of the governments' approach to managing emergencies, it identifies key patterns and changes throughout this period. The evidence presented here strongly supports Hypothesis 3a, that host government officials value their international reputation for competence and are willing to accept policy concessions in anticipation of reputational benefits. I find some support for hypothesis 3b, that government officials are more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies and request aid in response to these events compared to slow-onset events. I document how subsequent governments have been reluctant to classify slow-onset events as emergencies and respond to them as such. The case material presented here supports Hypothesis 4, that host government officials see their access to revenues as conditional upon their reputation for competence, but I am unable to directly test this hypothesis with this material. I present a quantitative test of Hypothesis 4 in Chapter 5. Lastly, the evidence strongly supports Hypothesis 5, host government officials see humanitarians as benefiting from emergency classification and as winning the competition for scarce resources. I complement this qualitative evaluation with a evidence from a survey of Nigerien government officials working in Niger during the final period under consideration in this case study.

Chapter 5: An endless emergency: humanitarianism as seen by Nigerien government officials

Introduction

In October 2018, a pediatrician working for MSF posted a video on Facebook expressing alarm that 10 children per day were dying from acute malnutrition in the hospital where she worked. International news outlets quickly picked up the story, reporting "unprecedented levels of child mortality" in Niger (AFP September 25, 2018). In response, the Nigerien government ordered the pediatrician's expulsion, accusing her of "manipulating information" (Sciences et Avenir, October 4, 2018). The Minister of Health traveled over 400 miles to visit the hospital where the pediatrician had worked and discredit her statement; he cited government records which document 10 total deaths from malnutrition in the past three months (RFI, October 4, 2018). While he had considered asking MSF to leave, he stated that MSF would be allowed to continue operating the health center because he understood that pediatrician posted the video in her personal capacity, not on behalf of MSF.

Three months later the government of Niger called another prominent international NGO in for a meeting. The military had found goods bearing the NGO's logo in Boko Haram camps, which led some members of the military to suspect that the NGO was directly providing material support to Boko Haram. The Nigerien government threatened to revoke the NGO's permission to operate in Niger. The situation escalated to the point that the head of the NGO was asked to visit Niger to discuss the situation directly with the President. He visited and met privately with the President. The NGO continued its work in Niger.

The outcomes of the two cases are starkly different, for MSF a staff member was expelled and MSF was publicly criticized by the Nigerien government. For the second NGO, there were no negative consequences for its work or reputation after the NGO's president visited Niger. The MSF story received substantial media attention, and both international and Nigerien NGO workers cite it as a reason to be careful what you say about the government. The other NGO's travails, and its near miss of being expelled, are less widely known. This surprising because the accusation against the second NGO (providing material support to enemies of the state) appear much more serious than the accusation against MSF (providing false information about child malnutrition). Yet MSF suffered worse consequences for its actions.

These outcomes can be explained by their differing consequences for Niger's reputation in the eyes of its international donors. This logic is corroborated by interviewees with multiple government officials, who stated that they did not have a problem with NGOs

criticizing them, in fact they understood it was part of their job. They stipulated that if NGOs want to criticize government, they should come to them in private fora instead of confronting them in public; public confrontation served only to raise the NGOs profile and help them fundraise while embarrassing government. In the case of MSF, government officials resented the international media attention that the pediatrician's comments attracted. They perceived her comments as a public criticism of their health system and a challenge to the official narrative that conditions were improving in Niger. By contrast, the second NGO cooperated with government officials' requests to resolve the issue privately, even at the cost and inconvenience of flying in their president for a meeting. This could even be seen as benefiting Niger's reputation as the NGO president's visit was portrayed in the media as celebrating the achievements of the organization's work. It also provides suggestive support for Hypothesis 6; humanitarian organizations prefer to defer to host government restrictions at their own expense.

This chapter builds on insights from Chapter 4's analysis of qualitative data to test Hypotheses, 3, 4, and 5 using data from a survey of Nigerien government officials to evaluate whether preferences regarding humanitarian aid are consistent with my theoretical expectations. While the previous chapter explained how reputational concerns mediated high-level policy choices regarding humanitarian assistance, this chapter demonstrates how these reputational concerns permeate government. By surveying bureaucrats who work both in the center and the country's more peripheral regions, I am able to evaluate whether government officials throughout the country hold preferences consistent with my expectations.

This chapter's focus on working-level bureaucrats is motivated by both theoretical and practical considerations. Theoretically, high-level decisions are only consequential to the degree they are embraced and implemented by bureaucrats. As a principal-agent framework would suggest, large differences in preferences between principals and agents results in the failure to implement the principal's preferred priorities. To assert that the stated preferences of high-level officials represent government policy, it is essential to show that these preferences are shared by those charged with policy implementation. Practically, it is less challenging (although not without difficulty) to collect preference data from lower-level government officials.

Government bureaucrats are a key link in the "aid chain," through which aid projects are implemented (Watkins, Swidler, and Hannan 2012), and their preferences affect aid delivery. These bureaucrats are responsible for essential decisions: they register NGOs and approve or disapprove their applications for tax exempt status; bureaucrats process the arrival of foreign goods, levy taxes, and control the release of goods to aid organizations; they grant permission for organizations to work in specific geographies.

Despite the key roles bureaucrats play to facilitate or constrain aid delivery, their preferences are typically assumed, not interrogated. This chapter seeks to document these preferences. I show that their preferences reflect a shared priorities and logics, although some key differences between regional and central government officials emerge.

Theoretical expectations

Based on the theoretical framework and the case study evidence presented in the previous chapter, I expect that at the time of this survey, government officials in Niger see their international reputation for competence as important. I anticipate that individuals throughout the bureaucracy will share this perception that the government's international reputation for competence is important (Hypothesis 3) because they understand that appearing competent is the way that the Government of Niger can exert greater control over aid flows (Hypothesis 4). If government officials see improving their reputation in the eyes of donors as the key to gaining greater access over resources in the future, I anticipate that they will be more likely to sanction humanitarians for statements that threaten the governments' reputation for competence compared to actions that limit their access to material benefits in the short term because the anticipated benefit from improving their reputation far exceeds the material benefits individual organizations control today (Hypothesis 6).

As part of this logic, I expect these government officials to share the frustrations expressed by government officials quoted in the previous chapter regarding the continued focus on emergency aid over multiple years.

> *Something not said but understood is that the government and its partners have lost credibility for emergency response. We can't keep funding emergencies the same way. They [donors] say this will change but it has not over the past 4-5 years.*[70]

If this perspective is broadly shared by government officials, I expect most host government officials to express a strong preference for long-term investment and development aid over short-term humanitarian aid that is premised on the existence of an ongoing humanitarian emergency. They should prefer this type of long-term investment because it enables both discretion over how fund are spent, and when government possess greater discretion over how funds are spent, they are more likely to be spent through government channels rather than humanitarian organizations.

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[70] Government representative 12

That government officials prefer long-term development funding over short-term humanitarian funding is a key assumption for my theory. If host government officials are indifferent between types of funding, there is no reason for them to attempt to demonstrate competence. Although this is not a core hypothesis, I test whether this assumption is empirically supported.

Interviewees described a lack of funding as the key constraint that prevents government structures from performing their intended functions.

> *Even when regional committees want to respond [to a disease outbreak] they have no financial or logistical means to do so. They only exist in the legal sense.*[71]

> *Technical services do not have the capacity or resources to gather information on the ground.*[72]

Given the perceived lack of progress in emergency response and imbalance in material resources between I expect most host government officials to share the skepticism expressed by interviewees regarding the benefits of delivering aid through humanitarian organizations instead of government structures. Interviewees consistently expressed skepticism that funds spent on humanitarian organizations were spent effectively.

> *Donors and the UN prefer to intervene through NGOS [rather than government] and they are more powerful than I am. When funding comes, NGOs take a percentage and so do sub-contractors. 30% of funds are gone before it even gets to beneficiaries.*[73]

If this perspective is widely shared, I anticipate that government officials will not see international or local NGOs as more effective than government structures. This implies that host government officials do not subscribe to the logic that donors use to justify delivering aid through these organizations; that they are more effective and efficient than government structures. Table 5.2 presents a full list of hypotheses and the operationalization of variables for statistical analysis.

Alternative explanations:
My argument that host government officials prioritize their reputation for competence could be incorrect if the majority of officials in my survey prioritize extracting funds they

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[71] Government representative 6
[72] Government representative 11
[73] Government representative 5

can acquire from humanitarians today over the potential benefits of improving their reputation for competence over the long term. If this logic is operating I would expect host government officials to sanction humanitarian organizations that withhold material benefits rather than those that damage the government's international reputation.

Another plausible alternative would be that even if high level government officials value their reputation for competence, most bureaucrats do not see dependence as negative. If this is the case I would expect the officials in the survey to express ambivalence regarding the type of aid Niger receives and ambivalence regarding the country's dependence on donor funding writ large.

Empirical context
My fieldwork, including survey implementation, occurred in a context of worsening insecurity in Niger, despite unprecedented foreign support for security, migration, and humanitarian assistance. The survey was implemented in July and August 2019 and December 2019 and January 2020. During this period, the Government of Niger hosted the African Union summit; in preparation new roads and building sprung up across the capital seemingly overnight. The Government of Niger sought to portray itself as a stable country, ready to emerge from crisis and continue its development.

Figure 5.1: Millions of dollars of humanitarian aid delivered in Niger by multilateral organizations, NGOs, and government[74]

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[74] Author calculations based on data from UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS), February 7, 2020, https://fts.unocha.org/content/fts-public-api.

Empirical approach

Survey instrument: The survey instrument was designed to elicit officials' preferences regarding humanitarian aid.

The survey included an embedded experiment that was designed to test whether government officials were more likely to sanction humanitarian organizations for withholding a material benefit or for imposing reputational costs on government. It further sought to evaluate the difference between communicating criticism of government in a private forum compared to in a public media statement. The text of the vignette, including all three versions of the text, is included below:

If a humanitarian organization *failed to pay promised per diems to government officeholders* / *criticized the government in private* / *criticized the government in public so it appeared incompetent* how likely would it be that the government would take the following actions: denounce the organization publicly, suspend the organizations operations, or expel the organization from the country. Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of each outcome on a 7-point Likert scale.

Sample Frame

The population of interest includes bureaucrats working in both the capital, Niamey, and at the regional level in Niger's eight regions. I limited the sample to these two levels because the Nigerien state is highly centralized, and decisions made at lower administrative levels (prefecture and commune) must be validated at the regional level and often the national level. This creates a bottleneck as local government officials spend much of their time waiting for approval from the regional capital and from Niamey. If the objective of the survey is to better understand the way government decision-makers perceive and respond to humanitarian aid, these are the most relevant individuals to include.

However, due to logistical and budget constraints, it was impractical to conduct a representative survey of all government ministries and agencies, at last count, there are 43 ministries, in addition to executive agencies that report directly to the prime minister's office. After compiling a list of all government offices, they were selected for inclusion on the basis of two criteria: they must have regular interaction with humanitarian organizations or be responsible for direct service provision. These criteria are based on the rationale that these ministries and agencies shape the context humanitarians work in either directly, by defining the rules that govern humanitarian organizations, or indirectly, by providing (or failing to provide) services. Put differently, these agencies either govern humanitarians or humanitarians must work with or substitute for them. A list of government agencies represented in the survey sample can be found in the appendix.

Similarly, it was infeasible to send enumerators to all eight regions of Niger due to logistical, budgetary, and security constraints. Instead I purposively sampled regions to ensure variation in distance from the capital and the presence of humanitarian assistance. Distance from the capital should matter for accountability, regional bureaucrats who work closer to the capital likely feel more accountable to the center, and through the center to donors. They also likely are able to attract greater resources due to proximity. Bureaucrats who work further from the capital likely feel greater freedom and ability to exercise discretion, but also likely face greater resource constraints. Presence of humanitarian assistance should influence the salience of the questions while its absence should reduce the salience of the questions. People who have experienced humanitarian aid delivery likely have systematically different views about it than those who have not. These criteria and the selected regions are illustrated in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Sample frame for regions

Distance from Capital

⊢ ⊣	**High** humanitarian presence	**High** humanitarian presence

Large distance from capital **Diffa**	**Small** distance from capital **Tillabery**
Low humanitarian presence **Large** distance from capital **Zinder**	**Low** humanitarian presence **Small** distance from capital **Dosso**

Survey implementation

The survey was implemented in collaboration with Abdoulaye Igodoe, a colleague from the Université Abdou Moumouni de Niamey. We recruited enumerators to conduct the survey in Niamey. The enumerators administered the survey in face-to-face interviews with subjects using tablets. The same enumerators were employed for both rounds of the survey We carried out the survey in two waves. The first wave, in July and August 2019 occurred in the capital, Niamey. The second wave was implemented in December 2019 and January 2020 in Diffa, Tillabery, Zinder and Dosso.

Once the offices were identified, enumerators visited each ministry to submit paperwork requesting permission to conduct the survey. One ministry in Niamey declined to participate, but we were able to secure permission from its regional offices to conduct the survey. Several other ministries drew the authorization process out to the point where we were prevented from including their staff. Once enumerators visited each ministry they sought an appointment with the Director of Human Resources or the General Secretary who oriented them toward the relevant departments. For ministries that were difficult to access officially, enumerators asked people they knew socially who worked in these ministries to complete the survey. This approach was used for the Ministry of Interior. Even within agencies where we were given permission to conduct the survey, we had a high non-response and attrition rate. This may bias the survey responses to government bureaucrats who are particularly open to research and friendly toward the United States (enumerators were required to disclose they were working with a researcher from an American university). I anticipate that bureaucrats who are more open to responding to a survey from an American researcher are likely to be those with a more positive opinion of international aid and intervention whereas bureaucrats who refused to participate would be more likely to oppose international aid and intervention and therefore more likely to restrict aid. This implies that the rate of opposition to aid and intervention documented in the survey is likely an underestimate of the true rate, as I am sampling those who are most likely to welcome such activities.

Table 5.2: Operationalization of hypotheses

	Hypothesis	Observable implication	Independent variable	Dependent variable	Test
H3	Government officials prioritize international reputation for competence	Officials value maintaining a positive international image		Having a positive image internationally is unimportant/ important for Niger (1-7)	Mean
		Officials perceive international image of incompetence as harmful to their international reputation	Factors contributing to international image: media, corruption, culture, tourism, poverty, instability, religion, history (0-1)?	Is Niger's international image positive or negative? (1-7)	OLS
	Government officials prefer aid over which they can exercise greater discretion	Government officials prefer long-term (i.e. development) over short-term (i.e. humanitarian) aid	Donors should increase funding for humanitarian aid/development aid (0-1)	Are donor funds insufficient to address Niger's problems or is Niger too dependent on donor funding (1-7)	OLS
				Allocate $10 million among priorities as if you were a donor	OLS
		Central government officials express stronger preferences for development aid	Work in region (outside of capital) (0-1)	Donors should increase funding for humanitarian aid/development aid (1-7)	OLS
H4	Government officials perceive access to preferred, long-term aid as conditional on maintaining a positive reputation for competence	Officials who perceive their country's international image to be more positive will perceive it to be easier to access preferred sources of aid revenue	Is Niger's international image positive or negative? (1-7)	How easy/difficult is it for Niger to access investment (1-7)	OLS
		Officials perceptions of their country's international image are unrelated to perceptions of access to emergency humanitarian aid	Is Niger's international image positive or negative? (1-7)	How easy/difficult is it for Niger to access humanitarian aid (1-7)	OLS
H5	Government officials see no advantage to implementing aid programs through humanitarian organizations	Officials see humanitarian organizations as no more effective than government agencies	How effective are local government services in areas under SoE?	How effective are NGOs in areas under SoE?	OLS
		Officials see humanitarians as self-interested, not impartial		Do you think the following organizations are impartial: OCHA, MSF, ICRC, OXFAM	Mean
H5	Government officials more likely to sanction humanitarian orgs when reputational rather than material costs are imposed	Officials more likely to expel or suspend organizations when they criticize government compared to failure to pay per diems	Treatment conditions: Per diem, private criticism, public criticism	Denounce organization (1-7) Suspend operations (1-7) Expel organization (1-7)	OLS

Data

Table 5.3: Demographic characteristics of sample

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Better off than average	259	0.753	0.432	0	1	1	1
Work in region	392	0.418	0.494	0	0	1	1
Years in government	214	14.598	12.418	0	5	25	45
Muslim	208	0.995	0.069	0	1	1	1
Proud to be Nigerien	387	6.661	0.728	5	7	7	7

Figure 5.2: Geographic distribution of survey respondents by region in which they work

Results

Figure 5.3 shows that over 80 percent of respondents perceive maintaining a positive international reputation to be very important for Niger, supporting Hypothesis 3.[75]

Figure 5.3: Percent of survey respondents rating Niger's international image as important

Table 5.4 presents results from OLS analysis of the relationship between respondents' evaluation of Niger's international image and various factors that could positively or negatively affect the country's international image. The region where respondents work was included to control for potential differences based on geography. The constant suggests that most respondents see Niger as maintaining a relatively positive international image (5 on a 7 point scale). The factor associated with the largest reduction in image rating is corruption, which is associated with a reduction of more than a point on the 7-point scale. This result is statistically significant at (p<.001). Poverty and instability are similarly negative and statistically significant.

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[75] The median response was 7 on a 1-7 scale, and the mean value was 6.55.

Table 5.4: Factors associated with positive or negative international image

|	Dependent variable:
	Image rating
Media	0.546**
	(0.187)
Corruption	-1.060***
	(0.236)
Culture	0.663***
	(0.166)
Tourism	0.226
	(0.209)
Poverty	-2.053***
	(0.185)
Instability	-0.563**
	(0.198)
Religion	0.107
	(0.208)
History	0.047
	(0.184)
Diffa	0.275
	(0.198)
Dosso	-0.550*
	(0.233)
Maradi	-0.338
	(0.228)
Tahoua	-0.168
	(0.309)
Tillaberi	5.311***
	(0.138)
Observations	369
R^2	0.544
Adjusted R^2	0.529
Residual Std. Error	1.302 (df = 356)
F Statistic	35.456*** (df = 12; 356)
Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

I present results from a test of the assumption that government officials prefer long-term development to short-term humanitarian aid in Figure 5.4. The majority of respondents who answered the question (79.7%) prefer donors increase development aid rather than humanitarian aid. There is notable regional variation in these preferences. In Diffa, the region sampled because it hosted a large humanitarian presence and is distant from the

capital, 100% of respondents stated they preferred development over humanitarian aid. Preferences of respondents in Diffa were most similar to respondents in Dosso, the region close to the capital with no humanitarian presence. A greater proportion of respondents in Tillaberi, Zinder, and Niamey expressed a preference for increased humanitarian aid, but the percentage of respondents reporting a preference for humanitarian over development aid never exceeded 30 percent (27.3 in Niamey).

Figure 5.4: Survey respondents reported preferences for development or humanitarian aid, in aggregate and by region

The overall trend in these figures is consistent with my theoretical expectation that the majority of government officials would express a preference development over humanitarian aid. However, it is somewhat surprising that the highest proportion of respondents prefer humanitarian aid in Niamey, the capital.

Table 5.5 evaluates the relationship between preference for humanitarian and development aid and perceptions of aid dependence. Individuals who express a preference for development aid over humanitarian aid are more likely to report that the government depends too heavily on donor funding. Relatedly, respondents working in Diffa, the region worst affected by the Boko Haram insurgency and the region that receives the majority of humanitarian aid in Niger, are more likely to agree with the statement that Niger depends too heavily on donor funding, and as Figure shows, 100% of respondents in Diffa preferred development over humanitarian aid.

Table 5.5: Respondents who prefer development aid more likely to say Niger is too dependent on donor funding

	Dependent variable:
	Aid dependence
Prefer development aid	0.886**
	(0.292)
Diffa	1.279***
	(0.335)
Dosso	0.133
	(0.404)
Tillaberi	0.540
	(0.371)
Zinder	0.899+
	(0.508)
Constant	3.942***
	(0.259)
Observations	370
R^2	0.084
Adjusted R^2	0.071
Residual Std. Error	2.174 (df = 364)
F Statistic	6.638*** (df = 5; 364)
Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Figure 5.5: Survey respondents average allocation of $10 million to priorities in the hypothetical role of donors

In Figure 5.5, I present additional evidence that host government officials prefer long-term over short-term aid priorities. It plots the volume of aid respondents say they would allocate to various priorities if playing the role of donors. On average respondents allocated almost half of their hypothetical aid budget to improving basic services: healthcare and education. Regression analysis reveals some differences by region for each priority: respondents working outside of Niamey allocate an additional million dollars to basic service provision compared to those working in Niamey.[76] There are differences among regions regarding allocation to security; respondents in Dosso give $1.2 million less to security compared to respondents in most other regions (p<.001), and respondents in Diffa give $1 million (p<.05) more to security compared to respondents in other regions. This result reflects the difference in the security situation in these regions. Respondents in Tillaberi give $1.1 million more to invest in infrastructure (p<.0001) compared to respondents in other regions. Respondents in the capital Niamey favor private investment and building government capacity relative to respondents in regions; they allocate .7 million more to infrastructure investment compared to respondents in other regions (p<.0001) and .41 million more to building government capacity (p<.01) compared to their regional counterparts. There are no

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[76] This result is driven by respondents in Diffa, Dosso, and Zinder. There is no statistically significant difference in the volume of funds respondents in Niamey and Tahoua allocate to basic service provision.

regional differences in propensity to give to promote democracy and human rights. Respondents in Niamey favor giving more aid to poor Nigeriens compared to respondents in regions (p<.01), and respondents in Tillaberi favor giving more aid to refugees, an additional .31 million compared to other regions (p<.05). These results paint an overall picture of government actors who favor investing in long-term priorities, namely basic services provision and security. They suggest modest differences between respondents in Niamey and those working in regions.

Table 5.6: Relationship between perception of international image and access to various types of aid

	Dependent variable:			
	Investment	Development aid	Food humanitarian	Flood humanitarian
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Image rating	0.080*	0.065$^+$	0.027	0.027
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Work in region	0.207	0.165	-0.114	-0.072
	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.127)	(0.123)
Constant	3.368***	3.709***	4.333***	4.302***
	(0.187)	(0.197)	(0.189)	(0.182)
Observations	289	281	286	287
R^2	0.027	0.017	0.006	0.004
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.010	-0.001	-0.003
Residual Std. Error	1.074 (df = 286)	1.082 (df = 278)	1.059 (df = 283)	1.028 (df = 284)
F Statistic	3.903* (df = 2; 286)	2.381$^+$ (df = 2; 278)	0.832 (df = 2; 283)	0.598 (df = 2; 284)

Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 5.6 presents results from a test of Hypothesis 4, the relationship between the government's international reputation for competence and access to preferred sources of revenue. It shows the correlation between respondents rating of Niger's international image and their perception of the ease of accessing both long term (investment, development aid) and short term (humanitarian aid in response to food crises and floods. There is no statistically significant relationship between respondents' evaluation of Niger's international image and perceived ease of access to humanitarian aid in response to either floods or food crises. By contrast, respondents who rated Niger's international image more highly were more likely to think that it would be easier for the country to access private investment (p<.05) and development aid (p<.1). These results support Hypothesis 4; government officials see their access to preferred sourcs of revenue as conditional on their international reputation for competence.

Figure 5.6: Perceived competence of international and local NGOs compared to government: Difference of mean with 95% Cis


To test Hypothesis 5, Figure 5.6 presents difference in means for respondents' perceptions of the efficacy of international and local humanitarian NGOs compared to their perceptions of the efficacy of civilian and military government authorities in regions under state of emergency declarations: Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillaberi.[77] The figure illustrates that, contrary to the perspective articulated by donors, government officials do not see either international or local NGOs as more effective than government services on the ground.[78] If anything they see these organizations as less effective than government authorities. The logic articulated by donors would suggest that INGOs are the most effective on the ground, but respondents view them as no more or less effective than the civilian local government services. They do view these actors as less

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[77] Respondents were asked about each region separately but no statistically significant differences were detected among regions for each type of actor (i.e. no statistically significant difference between perceptions of INGO efficacy in Diffa compared to Tahoua or Tillaberi. For these reasons, I present the aggregate results of all three regions together.

[78] I use the term local NGO to refer to NGOs that are based only in Niger. This includes NGOs that operate at the national level and NGOs that operate only locally.

effective than the Nigerien military, a difference of almost one point on a 7-point scale. Respondents perceptions of local NGOs follow a similar trend; they report that these organizations are less effective than both civilian and military government authorities.[79] These results suggest that respondents do not agree with donors' justification for delivering aid through either international or local NGOs – that these organizations are more effective than government agencies at delivering essential services.

Figure 5.7: Respondents perceptions of the impartiality of humanitarian organizations compared to other international and non-governmental organizations

Another common justification for delivering aid through humanitarian organizations is that these organizations are impartial, and their impartiality enables them to provide services where other actors cannot. As another test of Hypothesis 5, Figure 5.7 presents respondents reported perceptions of the impartiality of international NGOs, multilateral institutions, and local NGOs, including both organizations with a humanitarian mission and those without. Responses were similar across both humanitarian and non-humanitarian organizations; respondents do not seem to view humanitarian organizations as systematically more impartial compared to non-humanitarian organizations. There is some heterogeneity among humanitarian

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[79] In addition, respondents view international NGOs as more competent than local NGOs and view military forces as more effective than local civilian government authorities.

organizations. On average, respondents view OXFAM, the International Committee for the Red Cross, and the Nigerien Red Cross as more impartial than the other organizations, including other humanitarian organizations, notably MSF and OCHA. The difference between these is statistically significant (p<.05). By contrast, respondents do not differentiate between the impartiality of MSF, a humanitarian organization that prides itself on its impartiality, neutrality and independence, compared to the World Bank. In sum, there is a statistically significant difference in perceived impartiality among humanitarian organizations and between some humanitarian organizations non-humanitarian organizations. However these differences are inconsistent across organizations, suggesting that individual organizations' reputations are more consequential than their designation as humanitarian or not.

Figure 5.8: Effect sizes for public and private criticism treatments compared to withholding per diem (reference category)

Figure 5.8 presents OLS coefficients from the experiment embedded in the survey to test an observable implication of Hypothesis 4, host governments sanction humanitarian organizations that threaten their reputation for competence. Respondents were presented one of three scenarios: a humanitarian organization failed to pay per diems it had promised, criticized the government in a private meeting, or publicly criticized the government of incompetence to media. Respondents were then asked how government would be likely to respond. My theory would predict that government would be more

likely to sanction humanitarian organizations when their reputation for competence is threatened. Publicly criticizing the government most directly harms the host government's reputation for competence. Privately criticizing the government could indirectly undermine the government's reputation for competence because humanitarians may inform donors if they take such an action. Failing to pay per diems is the control condition here because it does not directly affect the host government's reputation for competence. These results suggest that host governments are more likely to denounce, suspend, and expel humanitarian organizations in response to both private and public criticism compared to the failure to pay per diems. Effect sizes are modest, ranging from an increase of six to twelve percent, but statistically significant ($p<.05$). Table summarizes these results in greater detail.

Table 5.7: OLS coefficients from survey experiment

	Dependent variable:		
	Denounce	Suspend	Expel
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Private	0.441[*]	0.541[**]	0.540[*]
	(0.178)	(0.200)	(0.212)
Public	0.518[**]	0.598[**]	0.836[***]
	(0.168)	(0.189)	(0.200)
Constant	3.977[***]	3.965[***]	3.756[***]
	(0.123)	(0.139)	(0.148)
Observations	266	270	270
R^2	0.039	0.042	0.062
Adjusted R^2	0.032	0.034	0.055
Residual Std. Error	1.144 (df = 263)	1.293 (df = 267)	1.368 (df = 267)
F Statistic	5.314[**] (df = 2; 263)	5.796[**] (df = 2; 267)	8.870[***] (df = 2; 267)
Note:	+ $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$		

These results are consistent with Hypothesis 4, 5, and 6 and with the qualitative evidence presented in the previous chapter. Of course, these results should be interpreted with caution. They may not be representative of the population of interest; the high non-response rate to demographic questions means that it is impossible to rule out some omitted demographic variable that can explain all of the results described here. I can also not rule out the potential influence of social desirability bias; respondents could have been telling me what they believed I wanted to hear as they knew the survey was being conducted for an American researcher.

Conclusion

The survey evidence presented in this chapter suggests that preferences host government officials expressed in interviews are shared more widely by officials in both central government and regional offices. The survey data support Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6. Survey respondents clearly express that the country's international image is important to them, and statistical analysis reveals that respondents view the idea that their country is seen as corrupt or unstable as negatively affecting the country's image. This alone is unsurprising, but when taken together with the result that respondents' perceptions of the country's image are correlated with their perceptions of the government's access to preferred, long-term, sources of aid and investment, it suggests that government officials view their access to preferred sources of aid as mediated by their international reputation. This is further supported by the finding that host government officials report their government is more likely to sanction humanitarian organizations that criticize government, whether in public or in private, than those that withhold material benefits. These results further support the hypothesis that government officials do not see humanitarian organizations as any more competent than government structures and they do not see them as particularly impartial. This suggests that governments do not agree with donors' arguments regarding the benefits of working through humanitarian organizations, namely their effectiveness and their neutrality.

Chapter 6: How host government restrictions constrain humanitarians: Evidence from a global survey of humanitarian actors

Introduction

"When people ask me what the biggest challenge is to humanitarian work, I say host government cooperation." This declaration began a memorable interview with an official working for a major humanitarian international non-governmental organization on barriers to humanitarian aid delivery. As this interviewee illustrates, humanitarians acknowledge host governments' ability to restrict aid delivery to people in need, but there is little documentation of interactions between humanitarians and host governments. This chapter documents humanitarians' perspectives on host government restrictions, answering two related questions: How do humanitarian actors respond to restrictions imposed by host governments? Do these restrictions prevent humanitarian organizations from delivering aid to people in need?

Humanitarians confront numerous obstacles to their work. Existing research illuminates constraints imposed on humanitarians by both international donors and non-state armed groups, but this literature largely overlooks dynamics between host governments and humanitarians. Donors constrain how aid can be used before humanitarian organizations deliver aid, and armed groups divert funds once they arrive on the ground. Host governments operate in between these two types of actors; setting the terms for if, how, when, and where aid can be delivered within their borders. Host governments are either given cursory acknowledgement or treated as broadly irrelevant to humanitarian aid provision; scholars often use the description, "unable or unwilling" to dismiss host governments from their analyses (Barnett and Weiss 2008).

Conversely, research on government crackdowns on NGOs, which takes the power of the state over NGOs seriously, tends to assume that states uniformly possess the capacity and will to monitor and enforce compliance with restrictions. Governments impose restrictions on NGOs, such as limiting the amount of foreign funding they can receive, to prevent donors from strengthening political opposition by supporting citizens to organize and voice their dissatisfaction with the regime (Bush 2015; Christensen and Weinstein 2013). Past research on these restrictions focuses on restrictions imposed on NGOs pursuing overtly political aims, namely promoting democracy and human rights (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Chaudhry and Heiss 2021; Heiss and Kelley 2017). However, I expect governments to employ similar strategies to target organizations whose activities have political consequences, if not overtly political aims, such as humanitarian organizations.

Faced with host-government restrictions, humanitarian organizations can choose to respond with deference or defiance. If humanitarians chose to comply, they are able to continue operations, but must accept costs imposed by governments, including limiting the geographic scope of aid provision, delays, and increased costs. If they choose to defy these restrictions, they may succeed in pressuring governments to remove restrictions, allowing them to operate freely, however they also risk expulsion, resulting in a complete loss of access. I argue that humanitarians will choose compliance in most scenarios because shared norms and organizational incentives lead humanitarian organizations to prioritize maintaining some access rather than none at all. Their shared norms, practices and understandings lead them to perceive respecting government restrictions as the best way to uphold their principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Consequently, host government restrictions effectively limit humanitarians' ability to deliver aid, even when host governments possess minimal capacity to monitor and enforce compliance with such restrictions. This reinforces the norm of respecting government restrictions. When defiance is rare, host governments can easily detect and punish the few who fail to comply. Humanitarian organizations observe host governments punishment of defiant organization, which reinforces humanitarians' belief that compliance is the best way to maintain access. This results in a paradoxical status quo, in which humanitarians limit their *own* access in the short term because they believe it is the best way to safeguard future access.

This chapter tests Hypothesis 6, humanitarian organizations defer to host government restrictions due to shared norms and institutional incentives. To develop and test my expectations, I first interviewed representatives of donors, U.N. agencies, and humanitarian organizations, and I then leveraged insights from these interviews to develop a survey of humanitarian professionals. I developed a sampling strategy to recruit a representative sample of humanitarians, for whom no representative data are available. Compiling contact information collected by U.N. offices and a supplemental sample recruited via social media resulted in 530 unique survey responses. The survey facilitated the collection of systematic data on humanitarians' perceptions of the frequency, importance, and appropriateness of host-government restrictions. In addition to multiple choice questions, it included open response questions, which asked humanitarians to describe their experience confronting government restrictions in greater detail, resulting in rich descriptive data.

Evidence from the survey supports Hypothesis 6. Humanitarians typically comply with host government restrictions because they view deferring to government as appropriate and effective. I show that compliance does not vary with state capacity or the number of restrictions governments impose. However, I find that deference does vary based on

organizational characteristics. This suggests that organizational incentives play a noteworthy role in mediating humanitarians' approach to host governments.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The following section provides an overview of my theoretical expectations and hypotheses, drawing on excerpted interviews with humanitarians and building on the theoretical framework elaborated in Chapter 2. The third section describes the research design used to test these hypotheses, the sampling strategy, and resulting data. The fourth section presents results from empirical analyses, and a fifth section discusses these results in addition to descriptive data from open-ended survey questions and briefly concludes the chapter.

Theoretical expectations

Humanitarian organizations provide goods and services to people in need when other service providers fail to do so. These organizations understand themselves as neutral service providers, responding to the failure of other private and public entities to provide goods and services that are necessary for the survival of people affected by emergencies (Krause 2014, 16). Working in areas that other service providers have written off as too difficult or dangerous means that humanitarian organizations confront many obstacles to providing aid to people in need. These include poor physical infrastructure, broken supply chains for essential goods, and insecure environments where humanitarians' lives are regularly at risk. To confront these challenges, humanitarians draw on their moral authority and the core humanitarian principles enshrined in international humanitarian law: independence, impartiality, and neutrality (Barnett 2005). Humanitarians' moral authority derives from the way these organizations define themselves as prioritizing the preservation of life and alleviation of suffering above all other ends (Barnett 2013; Fassin 2007)

Humanitarians organizations comprise an epistemic community, with shared priorities, practices, and beliefs that operates based on a logic of appropriateness (Barnett 2011; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Krause 2014). They understand their role--saving lives and alleviating suffering--to be good and their rules--humanitarian principles--to be the appropriate way to achieve their goal of reaching people in need. Humanitarian organizations see themselves as impartial service providers, governed by what they refer to as humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality. They use the term ``humanitarian access'' to refer to their ability to reach intended beneficiaries, and lobby governments to provide unhindered access to humanitarian organizations. Humanitarians see their ability to access intended aid recipients as a function of their ability to convince host governments of their impartiality, independence, and neutrality. These organizations perceive restrictions imposed by host governments to undermine their ability to reach people in need.

Despite the centrality of humanitarian principles to the identity of these organizations and advocacy by humanitarians to convince host governments of their sincere adherence to these principles, host governments often perceive humanitarians as political agents of donor states. Donor governments, such as the U.S. E.U. and U.K., fund the vast majority of humanitarian aid, and their political preferences influence where humanitarian organizations provide aid in response to both natural disasters and conflicts (Drury, Olson, and van Belle 2005; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014; Narang 2016; Olsen, Carstensen, and Høyen 2003). Donors channel funds through humanitarian organizations instead of giving funds directly to governments because they see humanitarian organizations as more reliable agents to implement their priorities (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Humanitarian organizations rely on donor funding to ensure their organizational survival, and consequently they are primarily accountable to donor governments not to aid recipients or host governments.

Many humanitarians acknowledge the paradoxes created by relying on states, who use foreign aid to achieve political objectives, to finance humanitarian organizations that rely on claims to impartiality, independence, and neutrality to achieve their goals. Some humanitarian organizations exert greater effort to distance themselves from politics and protect their independence, impartiality, and neutrality, while others accept that aligning themselves with state power renders them inherently political (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Krause 2014). An interviewee working for a major international NGO that relies on U.S. government funding stated plainly, "It would be naive to think we're not political."[80] By contrast, Médecins Sans Frontières will not accept any funding from government donors, and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) only accepts un-earmarked funds from government donors; donors cannot specify the purposes for which funds are used.

Despite efforts to define their organizations in opposition to politics and to insulate themselves from political influence, by distancing themselves from state authority, humanitarians cannot control how they are perceived. As Gourevitch (1999, 5) notes, "The scenes of suffering that we tend to call humanitarian crises are almost always symptoms of political circumstances, and there's no apolitical way of responding to them—no way to act without having a political effect."

Humanitarians face a broad array of host government restrictions, ranging from banal--taxes and fees for visas, work permits, and authorizations--to dramatic--expulsion of humanitarian staff or entire organizations amidst allegations of political sabotage. In

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[80] INGO representative 12

interviews, humanitarians described host-government restrictions as attempts by government actors to control the allocation and distribution of aid.

> *Countries try to control aid for different reasons. For some it is because they see aid as against their interests. For others, they see aid as aligned with their interests, but they want credit for it.*[81]

Based on interviews with humanitarians I conceptualize host government restrictions as comprising administrative restrictions and coercive threats. Administrative restrictions include rules which impose costs on humanitarian organizations' and provide material benefits to the host government. They are often, but not always, formal regulations. These include extractive restrictions that result in the transfer resources from humanitarian organizations to host governments, increasing the cost of aid delivery by increasing the rents that humanitarian organizations pay to government. Examples include regulations requiring organizations to register with government, obtain licenses to operate, and provide regular reports on their activities. Coercive threats refer to threats for which violation results in the expulsion or suspension of an organization or individual. They link the threat of expulsion to humanitarian organizations' specific actions or policies. Coercive threats deter organizations from a particular action; they are often informal and concealed from public knowledge. Examples include threatening to expel organizations if they publish information that portrays government unfavorably or convince them to retract statements that criticize government and threatening to expel organizations unless they stop providing aid in areas where aid would benefit opposition.

Host governments use coercive threats to induce compliance with administrative restrictions. For example, administrative restrictions that increase the cost of providing aid in certain geographic locations, thereby creating incentives for humanitarians to provide aid in areas the host government prefers, are extractive because the host government is using regulations to alter the distribution of aid in line with political preferences. This restriction would become coercive if the host government threatened to suspend or expel humanitarian organizations that fail to comply. An interviewee provided an example from Nigeria, where NGOs are given a quota for the number of expatriate visas, and NGOs that exceed this quota are expelled.[82]

Interviewees saw host governments' imposition of administrative restrictions as reflecting government policy goals. One interviewee cited the example of Kenya, where

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[81] Former donor representative 1
[82] INGO representative 22

the government decided it wanted to close the country's largest refugee camp and subsequently instituted new regulations limiting the number of expatriate staff NGOs could employ; this made it more difficult for NGOs to acquire visas for expatriate staff. Another interviewee described a similar situation Bangladesh; the government was reluctant to allow humanitarians to provide aid to Rohingya refugees, fearing providing aid would encourage more people to cross the border into Bangladesh. All foreign organizations had to register with government, but in practice new NGOs were prevented from registering, while only international organizations that had previously registered received approval. This limited the number of organizations that were able to provide aid, which the government intended to dissuade new refugees from crossing the border.

When host governments impose restrictions, humanitarians' compliance is not guaranteed because host governments confront barriers to monitoring and enforcing humanitarians' compliance. Humanitarian organizations intervene in emergencies, when the host government's capacity is already strained, reducing host governments' already limited human and material resources. As illustrated in [Chapter 5](), government officials often express frustration that they do not know and cannot control what humanitarians are doing in their country; they need to take it on faith that humanitarians are there for the right reasons. Even when host governments can monitor humanitarians, they may be reticent to enforce restrictions if doing so would negatively affect their relationship with donors.

The hierarchical relationship between donors and host governments discourages host governments from enforcing restrictions that would undermine the host government's international reputation for competence. The main humanitarian aid donors—the U.S., U.K., E.U. and France—also dispose more lucrative sources of foreign funding: direct budget support, development finance, and security assistance. If host governments confront donors regarding humanitarian aid, they risk more than future humanitarian aid flows.

Because host governments fear undermining their reputation for competence by defying donors, diplomats from donor countries can use their leverage to pressure host governments to grant humanitarian organizations greater access, and they often succeed:

> *Front line diplomats and USAID representatives can use their leverage to negotiate for humanitarian access [by arguing that] government refusing to*

> *provide access undermines development cooperation. The presence of multiple countries and donors creates a collective pressure point.*[83]

As this interviewee suggests, donors pressure host governments by suggesting that failing to cooperate with humanitarian organizations undermines core donor objectives, which makes donors view the host government less favorably for future investment.

However, as Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate, even in the face of donor pressure, host governments are not powerless. Even in areas of limited statehood, host governments' claim to Westphalian sovereignty grants them sole authority to authorize the presence of foreign actors within their territory (Krasner and Risse 2014). As sovereign states, host governments have the prerogative to expel foreign individuals and organizations that violate domestic laws. Like other NGOs, humanitarian organizations risk losing access to entire countries if they fail to respect host government rules and regulations (Heiss and Kelley 2017; Magone, Neuman, and Weissman 2012). Both donors and humanitarian organizations are required to secure authorization from the host government before they can deliver humanitarian aid.

> *To get humanitarian action you need a framework agreement between the U.N. and host country [government] or an MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] between bilateral donor and the [host country] government.*[84]

Faced with host government restrictions, humanitarian organizations can respond in myriad ways. They can choose to accept host-government restrictions, to negotiate with host governments to modify these restrictions, or they can defy these restrictions. They can pursue these strategies privately by meeting with governments or sending them confidential messages or they can pursue these strategies publicly by publicizing their interactions with government, whether positive or negative. They can also choose to act individually, as a single organization, or collectively, as multiple organizations pursuing similar goals. I contend that humanitarians' shared norms, practices, and understandings, combined with their institutional incentives, lead humanitarian organizations to choose responses that defer to host-government priorities.

Both formal rules and informal norms to govern humanitarian organizations' engagement with host governments. Examples of formal rules include the Red

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[83] INGO representative 3
[84] Donor representative 4

Cross/Red Crescent NGO code of conduct and the Sphere Project standards.[85] Humanitarians claim to authority to intervene in areas where other actors are not allowed derives from principles of international humanitarian law, enshrined in the Geneva Conventions. Humanitarians see respecting the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality of humanitarian aid as central to justifying their activities. Norms include decision rules about when it is appropriate to involve external actors, such as donors, into negotiations. For example, when humanitarians choose to involve external actors, they first turn to the U.N. instead of bilateral donors because host governments often see the U.N. as less politically motivated compared to bilateral donors.

> *There is no finite beginning and end of negotiation process, but there is a clear hierarchy. Everyone turns [first] to the U.N> especially if there's a U.N. peacekeeping mission. Then they turn to major bilateral donors, almost always U.S., E.U., U.K., and France.*[86]

Humanitarians perceive the project of securing and maintaining humanitarian access as a collective endeavor that requires participation by all humanitarian organizations. If host governments believe any humanitarian organization to violate principles of impartiality, independence, and neutrality, humanitarians believe this will damage their own prospects for access. To maintain humanitarian access, humanitarian organizations have developed a norm of seeking consensus among humanitarian organizations working in the same context when negotiating with host governments. When humanitarian organizations perceive host governments are treating them unfairly, they seek consensus to protect each other. By protecting their peers, they also protect the idea of their organizations as impartial, independent, and neutral. Successful cooperation relies on a shared understanding among humanitarians of what type of behavior is appropriate for both host governments and humanitarians. An interviewee described a scenario in which humanitarians were able to overcome arbitrary restrictions by negotiating collectively.

> *[The International Monetary Fund (IMF)] told the government that it had to increase the taxes it collected to qualify for their next round of loans, so [the government] sent out audit teams and claimed that [our organization] wasn't paying sufficient fees. The audit report claimed we owe \$1.4 million. We got together with Mercy Corps, CARE, and Save the Children to check if everyone is being treated similarly, and they were. We were all given 20*

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[85] For further discussion of these standards see Maxwell in (Ndulo and van de Walle 2014)
[86] Donor representative 5

days to respond to the audit report, so we hired a local tax revenue expert to help negotiate [...] we secured an extension and will make sure IMF, the State department, and donors know about this. We will not pay, but appeal as a group to maintain access.[87]

These organizations were able to successfully negotiate with the host government because they agreed that the government's behavior was inappropriate and they were able to coordinate a response and mobilize diplomatic pressure to support them.

A strong norm among humanitarian organizations is to attempt to negotiate with host governments in private before engaging in public criticism. Humanitarians see private negotiations as more effective than publicly criticizing host governments because private negotiations allow humanitarians to preserve their credibility with governments as independent, impartial and neutral actors.

[Going public] is a last resort as it may lead to [our organization] completely losing access, so we only pursue it when access has already been more or less lost. For this to happen, we need high-level sign off. When you see [our organization] being quiet, assume negotiations are happening behind the scenes.[88]

Humanitarian organizations that violate the norm of confronting government in private before going public face sanctions from government. Host governments perceive public criticism by humanitarians as a violation of humanitarians promise to remain independent, impartial and neutral. They punish humanitarian organizations that engage in public criticism by expelling their personnel or the organization as a whole. These sanctions deter other organizations from speaking out. Host governments react strongly to public criticism by humanitarians because criticism by humanitarians carries greater weight with donors. Donors attach greater weight and credibility to allegations made by humanitarians compared to criticism of government from more overtly political actors.

Importantly, when humanitarians violate the norm of confronting host government in private, they also lose the sympathy and support from their humanitarian colleagues. One NGO representative described this dynamic, referring to the incident described at the opening of Chapter 5 when an MSF staff member was expelled from Niger after publicly criticizing the host government for under-reporting child malnutrition. This

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[87] INGO representative 7
[88] INGO representative 3

interviewee did not oppose the content of the MSF staff member's statement but did oppose her method of communication:

> *With respect to MSF, they made an error using an old model of trying to shame government. They can't make public statements without asking authorities. There is a culture of politely approaching the government There are subjects you can't publicly talk about.*[89]

Because humanitarians prioritize maintaining access over other goals, humanitarian organizations police themselves and prevent their staff from speaking out. Due to the strength of norms favoring consensus, humanitarians that want to publicly criticize government know *ex ante* that they will not receive support from their peer organizations. They must then decide whether or not they want to risk speaking out at the cost of losing access. As a result, public criticism by humanitarians becomes a rare event, which makes it is easier for host governments to monitor and enforce consequences the few times that it occurs.

Several alternative explanations could explain humanitarians' deference to state authority, and I use these to derive testable hypotheses to evaluate these against my theory. First, humanitarians could defer to state authority because states are simply more powerful than humanitarian organizations, and they can coerce humanitarians to acting in line with their preferences. If this were true, I would expect humanitarians' deference to host government restrictions to increase with the capacity of the host government in question.

Alternatively, humanitarians could defer to host governments due to incentives created by donors. Donors could reward more deferential humanitarian organizations with funding because these organizations are able to secure greater access while punishing organizations that defy governments. If this were the case I would expect individuals working for privately funded organizations to report more favorable views of confrontation compared to individuals working for organizations that depend on funding from donor government.

Hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6: Humanitarians defer to host government restrictions and comply with coercive threats
Hypothesis 6a: Humanitarians' deference does not depend on state capacity

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[89] NGO representative 11

Hypothesis 6b: Humanitarians deference depends on organizational reliance on donor funding

Research Design

To test these hypotheses, I implemented a survey of humanitarian professionals, sampling a global community of professionals employed by donors, international organizations, and NGOs. I chose to conduct a survey because of the barriers to observing variation in both host government restrictions and humanitarians' responses to these restrictions. Government restrictions of humanitarian organizations are difficult to observe; because they occur in emergency settings, these restrictions rarely result from normal legislative processes that lend themselves to cross-national comparisons. Government-imposed restrictions on humanitarians are often ad-hoc, occurring outside of public view. For these reasons, I wanted to survey humanitarians with firsthand experience of these restrictions, who could describe these restrictions and the logic of their organizations' responses to them.

Survey Design and Implementation

Recruiting a representative sample of humanitarian professionals required an innovative approach because little descriptive data on this population exists.[90] Humanitarian professionals do not match the profile of a typically `hard to reach population,' but surveying them presented several specific challenges: first, they are mobile, many move every six to eighteen months, second, as members of an insular community of practice, they are reticent to criticize host governments to outsiders. When I approached humanitarian organizations that do collect more systematic data, they were unwilling to share these data with me, citing privacy concerns. This resistance persisted, even when I worked through credible interlocutors. To overcome these obstacles, I needed to find a way to identify relevant individuals and to frame questions that would encourage respondents' candor, not activate their defenses.

My approach to overcoming these obstacles builds on the "ethnographic survey'" approach (Thachil 2018). Before designing the survey I conducted interviews with people working for donors, U.N. agencies, international NGOs and NGOs based in host countries. These interviews, which are excerpted throughout this chapter, helped familiarize me with the language humanitarians use to discuss their challenges, enabled me to understand how humanitarians understand their role in the countries where they work, and deepened my understanding of how humanitarians perceive their relationships (both positive and negative) with host governments. These interviews also

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[90] Researchers and practitioners have conducted surveys of humanitarians, but these studies did not attempt to construct representative samples.

helped to specify a more precise population of interest for the survey; my interlocutors suggested that people working on-the-ground were the best informed about the restrictions the organizations faced. Consequently, I focused survey recruitment on individuals who currently or previously worked in roles based in host countries.

Based on insights from these interviews, I designed the survey questionnaire to evoke individuals' perceptions of the most important constraints to their organizations' ability to deliver aid to intended beneficiaries. I compiled a list of types of host government restrictions described by multiple interviewees. To confirm that my descriptions and language reflected the way humanitarians talk and write about these issues, I asked several interlocutors who had expressed interest in the project to provide feedback on the questionnaire. Survey questions assess both the frequency of government-imposed restrictions and the severity of their consequences for humanitarian organizations; it could be the case that restrictions are very common, but they don't have much of an effect on humanitarian organizations' ability to deliver aid. Table 6.1 lists the survey questions I use as outcome variables and the hypotheses to which they correspond.

To identify potential participants, I collected email address from contact lists published online by United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to identify potential participants. These contact lists are maintained by OCHA country offices and updated regularly, due to the high turnover of personnel in field staff roles. OCHA does not make contact lists available for countries where disclosing this information for humanitarian personnel would pose a security risk. Because contact information for humanitarian professionals in these countries is less available, people who have worked in such contexts are likely under-represented in my sample relative to the general population of humanitarian professionals. To address this issue, I recruited a supplementary sample of humanitarian professionals using social media, focusing on groups dedicated to humanitarian professionals. his strategy increased the number of people reporting they had worked in countries where I was unable to find publicly available contact information. There were no statistically significant differences between individuals recruited from the original mailing list and those recruited via social media. Participants were invited to complete the survey via email in October 2019. I used Qualtrics online survey platform to collect responses anonymously.[91] This resulted in a total of 530 responses, of which 330 were complete.

Data and Analysis

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[91] Responses were not associated with the email addresses used for recruitment. After they responded to all questions, they were invited to share their email address if they wanted to receive updates about the research project. The questionnaire stressed that sharing contact information was optional.

The key outcome variables of interest measure humanitarian organizations' propensity to defer to with government restrictions. I operationalize deference with host government restrictions in several different ways. First, I explore how respondents describe their organizations' response to governments' requiring them to use a security escort. Respondents could select options ranging from accepting the escort and completing the mission to declining the escort and completing the mission anyway and they were allowed to select multiple options. In an accompanying open response question, respondents stressed that their decision would depend on the local context. Second, I asked survey respondents how their organization would respond if the host government threatened to expel their organization from the country based on allegations of undermining government authority, exaggerating humanitarian needs, supporting political opposition, or supporting armed opposition. I presented them with different response options, summarized in Table 6.1, ranging from deferential to defiant. Third I measure the conditions in which humanitarians deem criticism of host governments to be appropriate. I use these same outcome variables to test all subsequent hypotheses.

Table 6.1: Operationalization of deference to host government authority

Question	Scale
What is your organization's standard operating practice when a host government mandates use of security escorts?	0-1
When threatened with expulsion would your organization be likely to... Negotiate privately with host government Request headquarters support for private negotiations Request UN support for private negotiations Suspend your aid operations Criticize government publicly	1-7
Is it acceptable for humanitarians to criticize host government?	0-5
If government agents mis-use aid funds	0-1
If government agents demand per diem payments to participate in activities	0-1
If government agents engage in criminal misconduct	0-1
If government agents violate international humanitarian law	0-1
If government agents publicly criticize humanitarian organizations	0-1

Table 6.2: Operationalization of hypothesis 6 and observable implications

	Hypothesis	**Observable implication**	**Independent variable**	**Dependent variable**
H6a	Deference does not vary depending on state capacity	Humanitarians should be no more likely to comply with host governments with high capacity or low capacity	Government control of territory (0-1)	Comply with security escort (0-1)

		Humanitarians should be no more willing to criticize states with low capacity than states with high capacity	Government control of territory (0-1)	Appropriate to criticize government (0-5)
H6b	Deference varies with government dependence on donor funding	Organizations that rely on donor funding should be more likely to comply with host government requests to use security escorts	Organization relies on donor funding (0-1)	Comply with government request to use security escort (0-1)

To control for potentially confounding covariates, I coded the regime type and conflict status of respondents' current or most recent country of employment. Respondents reported the country where they currently work, and I used these responses to code both the regime type and conflict status of these countries at the time of data collection (October 2019). Regime type was operationalized using the electoral democracies index from the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2021). The variable is a continuous (0-1) variable where values closer to 0 are more autocratic and values closer to 1 are more democratic.[92] Conflict status was determined using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Pettersson and Öberg 2020). Countries were coded as experiencing a conflict if they appeared in UCDP's conflict-year data-set. The average regime type and conflict status of countries where respondents work mirrors trends in humanitarian assistance. In 2018, 80% of humanitarian aid was delivered to conflict-affected countries (World Bank 2018), and 80% of survey respondents who identified their most recent post work in a conflict-affected country.

Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for all respondents

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Work for INGO	330	0.46	0.50	0	0	1	1
Work for U.N.	330	0.27	0.44	0	0	1	1
Work for host gov	330	0.01	0.10	0	0	0	1
Work for NGO	330	0.10	0.30	0	0	0	1
Work for Red Cross	330	0.04	0.19	0	0	0	1
Work for donor	330	0.04	0.19	0	0	0	1
Worked SSA	330	0.76	0.43	0	1	1	1
Worked MENA	330	0.21	0.41	0	0	0	1
Worked Europe	330	0.13	0.34	0	0	0	1

[92] This composite index is intended to capture Dahl's idea of polyarchy: "The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices" (Coppedge et al. 2021)

Worked Asia	330	0.35	0.48	0	0	1	1
Worked Oceania	330	0.03	0.18	0	0	0	1
Worked Latin America	330	0.21	0.41	0	0	0	1
Work in home country	330	0.47	0.50	0	0	1	1
Woman	298	0.33	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Age category	294	2.25	0.96	1.00	2.00	3.00	5.00
Exposure to violence	289	0.31	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Feel safe at work	299	3.58	1.03	1.00	3.00	4.00	5.00
Years work experience	297	3.32	1.09	1.00	3.00	4.00	6.00

Results

Before testing the main hypotheses, I first present some descriptive evidence to show that humanitarians frequently face the type of restrictions that I describe. The majority of survey respondents (70%) reported that either administrative or security protocols required by government prevented their organization from accomplishing its goals. Figure 6.1 shows that 45% of respondents cited administrative and security constraints. Fifty two percent reported security protocols prevented them from achieving their goals while 60% reported administrative protocols were to blame.

Figure 6.1: Humanitarian officials self-report encountering administrative and security regulations and these restrictions have become more restrictive over time


a) Prevent from accomplishing goals   b) Restrictions that have worsened over time

Figure 6.2: Percentage of respondents reporting each country is among the most difficult for humanitarian access

Percent
10 20 30 40

In addition, survey respondents report that restrictions tend to increase over time. I asked respondents if they had observed any changes to policies that commonly affect humanitarian organizations, including policies requiring organizations to register with government, limits on visas and work permits for staff, and regulations for importing goods. I then asked them whether these changes resulted in more or less restrictive conditions for humanitarians. For all types of restrictions, except taxes and fees, the average response was that changes led to worsening restrictions. The average respondent observed increasing restrictions at least one of the domains included in this question. This suggests that humanitarians perceive governments as broadly increasing restrictions on their organizations.

Figure 6.2 plots respondents' perceptions of the most difficult countries for humanitarian organizations. The most common responses were Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Libya. All of these countries are currently experiencing protracted civil conflict. News sources have reported evidence of agents of government obstructing humanitarian assistance in Syria, Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is notable that two of these countries were the two largest recipients of humanitarian aid in 2019.

Figure 6.3: Respondents' self-reported rates of compliance with government security escort

Having established that humanitarian organizations encounter government restrictions frequently and that they perceive these restrictions to be worsening over time, I test the hypothesis that humanitarians will respond to government restrictions with deference rather than defiance. I show the average responses to for all the outcome variables measuring deference (as summarized in Table 6.1). I first examine reported behavior regarding using security escorts. I expected most respondents would choose deferential options, such as accepting the escort and completing the mission or deferring the mission and that few respondents would choose defiant options, such as declining the escort and completing the mission alone. The mean response to this question is presented in Figure 6.3. Consistent with my expectations 72% of respondents selected at least one deferential response and only 15% of respondents selected a defiant response. Importantly, every respondent who selected defiant response also selected a compliant response.

Figure 6.4: Humanitarian organizations' reported propensity to respond to accusations by negotiating, denouncing government or suspending operations: Mean responses with 95% confidence intervals

Second, I analyze reported behavior in response to government threats of expulsion. Figure 6.4 presents respondents reports of how likely or unlikely their organization would be to respond to a threat of expulsion by negotiating, suspending operations or denouncing government in public. I find no variation by the content of the threat of expulsion. There are no statistically significant differences between the three negotiation response options, but respondents are significantly less likely to suspend operations than negotiate and they are least likely to criticize the host government in public.

Figure 6.5: Humanitarians perceptions of the conditions under which it is appropriate for humanitarians to criticize government

Third, I present the average response to when humanitarians view criticizing government as appropriate. Figure 6.5 presents a binary variable coding whether or not respondents found it appropriate to criticize the host government in any circumstances. It also presents the average response for each individual circumstance that humanitarians can respond to. The second panel presents a count variable for the number of scenarios respondents said it was appropriate for humanitarians to criticize government. Over 60% of respondents reported it was appropriate to criticize host government if host government officials committed a crime, violated international humanitarian law or misused aid funds. Respondents are much less likely to report it is appropriate for humanitarians to criticize government officials if they demand per diem or in retaliation for criticism of humanitarian actors.

Table 6.4 presents results from OLS specifications testing the relationship between state capacity and host governments' compliance with security escort. In Model 1, the relationship between territorial control and host government compliance with security escort is negative and statistically significant ($p<0.05$). This implies that as governments control more of their territory, humanitarians are less likely to comply with their demands to use security escorts. The direction of this effect runs contrary to the null hypothesis that higher territorial control (as a proxy for state capacity) would be correlated with greater compliance. When control variables are introduced, the relationship between territorial control and compliance remains negative but loses statistical significance. The only control variable to attain conventional levels of statistical significance is conflict status, which is positively correlated with compliance in Model 4 ($p<0.1$), but this result is not robust to other specifications.

Table 6.4: OLS results for relationship between compliance with security escort and state capacity

	Dependent variable:				
	Escort comply binary (0-1)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Territorial control	-0.240*	-0.175	-0.186	-0.158	0.141
	(0.118)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.509)
Democracy index		0.152	0.127	0.151	0.123
		(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.200)	(0.205)
Conflict status		0.113	0.113	0.118$^+$	0.386
		(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.448)
Count new restrictions			-0.015	-0.016	-0.016
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Work for INGO				-0.013	-0.009
				(0.147)	(0.147)
Work for NGO				0.080	0.082
				(0.163)	(0.163)
Work for UN				0.084	0.085
				(0.150)	(0.151)
Work for Red Cross				-0.106	-0.106
				(0.202)	(0.203)
Work for donor				-0.186	-0.178
				(0.192)	(0.193)
Democracy x Conflict					-0.319
					(0.527)
Constant	0.884***	0.680***	0.717***	0.668**	0.424
	(0.086)	(0.154)	(0.160)	(0.206)	(0.452)
Observations	300	300	300	300	300
R^2	0.014	0.023	0.026	0.047	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.013	0.013	0.017	0.015
Residual Std. Error	0.449 (df = 298)	0.448 (df = 296)	0.449 (df = 295)	0.447 (df = 290)	0.448 (df = 289)
F Statistic	4.169* (df = 1; 298)	2.342$^+$ (df = 3; 296)	1.950 (df = 4; 295)	1.579 (df = 9; 290)	1.455 (df = 10; 289)

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

It is possible that this result is driven by my choice of outcome variable. To address this concern, Table 6.5 presents results from the same regression specifications using a measure of respondents' willingness to criticize host government as the outcome variable. This count variable measures the number of scenarios each respondent deemed it appropriate for humanitarian organizations to criticize host government. The

relationship with territorial control remains negative but does not attain statistical significance in any of the models. The variables that appear to best predict willingness to criticize are individuals' type of employer. Individuals who work for INGOs ($p < 0.05$), U.N. agencies ($p < 0.05$), and the Red Cross ($p < 0.1$) are less likely to believe it is appropriate for humanitarians to criticize host government. This suggests that organizational characteristics of humanitarian organizations, not host government characteristics, are correlated with individuals' willingness to criticize host government.

Table 6.5: OLS regression results for willingness to criticize government and state capacity

	Dependent variable:				
	Willing to criticize (0-5)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Territorial control	-0.802	-0.661	-0.590	-0.539	2.808
	(0.488)	(0.529)	(0.531)	(0.533)	(2.099)
Democracy index		-0.153	0.003	-0.022	-0.339
		(0.808)	(0.816)	(0.828)	(0.848)
Conflict status		0.189	0.191	0.190	3.197[+]
		(0.293)	(0.293)	(0.294)	(1.847)
Count new restrictions			0.092	0.123[+]	0.117
			(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Work for INGO				-1.497[*]	-1.453[*]
				(0.609)	(0.607)
Work for NGO				-1.031	-1.013
				(0.673)	(0.671)
Work for UN				-1.546[*]	-1.538[*]
				(0.623)	(0.621)
Work for Red Cross				-1.394[+]	-1.395[+]
				(0.838)	(0.836)
Work for donor				-0.880	-0.784
				(0.797)	(0.796)
Democracy x Conflict					-3.584
					(2.174)
Constant	2.858[***]	2.677[***]	2.449[***]	3.770[***]	1.033
	(0.356)	(0.641)	(0.664)	(0.855)	(1.867)
Observations	300	300	300	300	300
R^2	0.009	0.011	0.016	0.045	0.054
Adjusted R^2	0.006	0.001	0.003	0.015	0.021
Residual Std. Error	1.862 (df = 298)	1.867 (df = 296)	1.865 (df = 295)	1.854 (df = 290)	1.848 (df = 289)
F Statistic	2.697 (df = 1; 298)	1.065 (df = 3; 296)	1.215 (df = 4; 295)	1.507 (df = 9; 290)	1.637[+] (df = 10; 289)

Note: + $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6.6: OLS regression results for compliance and INGO characteristics

	Dependent variable:			
	Escort comply		Criticize government	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Refused	0.642	0.592	-0.755	-1.795
	(0.467)	(0.489)	(1.967)	(2.035)
MSF	0.800	0.746	-0.100	-1.185
	(0.485)	(0.508)	(2.043)	(2.115)
Religious NGO	0.591	0.540	-1.227	-2.288
	(0.473)	(0.495)	(1.992)	(2.062)
Development NGO	0.576	0.495	-1.021	-2.247
	(0.494)	(0.519)	(2.081)	(2.162)
Donor gov funding	0.178	0.190	0.304	0.320
	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.682)	(0.677)
Democracy index		0.101		-1.532
		(0.289)		(1.201)
Conflict status		0.121		0.539
		(0.098)		(0.407)
Constant	-0.000	-0.088	3.000	4.340+
	(0.462)	(0.528)	(1.948)	(2.200)
Observations	152	151	152	151
R^2	0.038	0.048	0.018	0.041
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.002	-0.016	-0.006
Residual Std. Error	0.462 (df = 146)	0.464 (df = 143)	1.948 (df = 146)	1.932 (df = 143)
F Statistic	1.161 (df = 5; 146)	1.035 (df = 7; 143)	0.534 (df = 5; 146)	0.869 (df = 7; 143)

Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

To further explore how organizational incentives relate to humanitarian organizations' deference to host government authority, I analyze the relationship between institutional incentives and deference, exploiting variation in the sources of funding among a subset of respondents, those who work for international NGOs. Respondents who worked for international NGOS comprise the majority of my sample, and these respondents were asked to report which organization is most similar to the organization they work for.[93] I then categorize them according to characteristics that could plausibly influence their behavior. As Table 6.5 suggests, respondents working for INGOs are among those least likely to criticize the host government; this analysis investigates variation among these organizations. Table 6.6 presents the results for both compliance with escorts

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[93] At the end of the survey respondents were also invited to share which organization they worked for, but very few chose to self-identify.

and willingness to criticize government. Contrary to my expectations, I observe no statistically significant differences among INGOs by their reliance on donor funding or other aspects of their organizational profile. While this contradicts my expectations regarding variation in incentives by funding source, it supports my claim that people employed by these organizations have shared beliefs about the appropriate approach to providing humanitarian aid.

This analysis suffers from several limitations. First, survey data is an imperfect representation of real-world events; respondents can exaggerate or lie to portray themselves favorably. Thus it may be the case that respondents over-stated the effects of host government restrictions while underplaying the negative consequences of their own organizations' pathologies. Second, the sample does not perfectly represent the population of humanitarian professionals, and we should be cautious about generalizing on the basis of these results. The survey design also suffers from several shortcomings; insecurity is correlated with many limitations of humanitarian access, but the questionnaire does not differentiate between insecurity where the government is a contributing party and insecurity that is not the fault of government. I hope to address some of these shortcomings in future work studying this population.

Conclusion

Both interviews with donors and humanitarians and survey evidence suggests that host government restrictions meaningfully limit humanitarian organizations' ability to deliver aid to people in need. Survey evidence supports Hypotheses 6a and 6b; humanitarians' deference to host government authority is due not to host governments' ability to meaningfully enforce restrictions they impose but due to shared norms and institutional incentives among humanitarian organizations.

The interviews and survey responses analyzed in this chapter provides evidence that confirms my central claim; host government restrictions impose significant costs and constraints upon humanitarian organizations. These findings suggest that host governments should be included in scholarly and policy discussions of constraints to humanitarian access, in which they are often overlooked. Second, these findings confirm and extend research on international communities of practice, which document how unspoken and informal shared understandings among, for example, aid workers and peacekeepers, can lead such organizations to act in ways that undermine their own objectives. More broadly, these findings illustrate a novel mechanism through which states that are often dismissed as weak can successfully wield state power, despite limited administrative and coercive capacity.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have argued that governments of poor, aid-dependent countries manage their reputations for competence in the eyes of domestic and international audiences in order to retain power domestically and assure access to preferred types of international benefits in the future. In poor, aid-dependent states, host government officials rely on foreign sources of revenue, from aid and foreign direct investment, to fulfill essential state functions and satisfy their essential supporters. By relying on foreign sources of revenue to meet the demands of their essential supporters, host governments' domestic reputation for competence becomes dependent on their ability to attract aid and investment over which they can exercise discretion. Donors reward host governments they view as competent with greater discretion over aid allocation and restrict government discretion over aid allocation when they perceive governments to be incompetent. This creates incentives for host governments to cultivate a reputation for competence among this international audience. Leaders of host governments see their access to benefits as contingent on their international reputation for competence

In response to humanitarian emergencies, donors provide host governments with minimal discretion over aid allocation, preferring to deliver aid through humanitarian organizations they view as more effective due their technical expertise, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. This implies a loss of discretion over aid delivery for host governments, and consequently host government officials want to find ways to signal their competence to donors in order to regain discretion over the allocation of aid and other foreign sources of revenue.

I contend that humanitarian emergencies provide opportunities for governments to enhance their reputation for competence, but these events also pose potential risks to this same reputation for competence. The reputational consequences of emergency events depend on characteristics of the event itself (the type of event, its magnitude) and characteristics of the government (regime type, dependence on foreign sources of revenue). These reputational concerns shape how host governments respond to humanitarian emergencies and which events become understood as humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian emergencies threaten to reveal the difference between the governments' existing reputation for competence and true capacities, if such a gap exists. Host government officials take strategic actions to prevent both domestic and international observers from discovering their incompetence, such as denying the existence of an emergency, concealing the magnitude or severity of suffering and damage, and controlling the flow of people, goods, and information.

Overview of empirical evidence

The evidence presented in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 broadly support the theoretical framework described in Chapter 2. Table 7.1 summarizes the core hypotheses and their empirical implications and the degree of empirical support documented in the empirical analyses.

The cross-national evidence presented in Chapters 3 and 6 illustrate that host governments influence both what events become classified as emergencies and whether humanitarian organizations provide aid to people in need. In Chapter 3, I find strong support for the claim that governments response to emergency events depends on the type of event and the government's regime type; democratic governments are more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies compared to slow-onset events. There is some support for my claim that governments' degree of dependence on foreign sources of investment condition government responses to humanitarian emergencies, although this only obtains for dependence measured by foreign direct investment as percent of GDP and not development aid. This inconsistency warrants further investigation into the implications of host government dependence on different forms of foreign revenues. In Chapter 6, I find that host governments influence humanitarian organizations' delivery of humanitarian aid, even when host governments are willing to allow humanitarian organizations to operate within their borders. I find that host governments' ability to impose restrictions on humanitarian organizations is not a function of the states' coercive capacity but instead the result of shared norms and institutional incentives among humanitarian organizations that lead them to prioritize maintaining access.

Focusing on the case of Niger in Chapter 4 and 5 facilitated an in-depth investigation of the reputational mechanism. Both the qualitative evidence presented in Chapter 4 and the quantitative evidence presented in Chapter 5 support Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. The evidence supports my contention that both state leaders and the government officials that implement policies on their behalf value their country's reputation for competence and see their international reputation as mediating their government's access to the long-term sources of revenue they prefer. Chapter 4 documents various strategies that subsequent Nigerien governments have pursued to improve the country's international reputation for competence in response to humanitarian emergencies that focus both domestic and international attention on the government's performance. In Chapter 5, I show that government officials working throughout Niger see the ongoing humanitarian emergency response as benefiting humanitarian organizations instead of the Nigerien government. They express frustration that the continued treatment of conditions in Niger as a humanitarian emergency is preventing their government from accessing more lucrative sources of revenue and continuing its development.

Table 7.1: Empirical support for key hypotheses and empirical implications

	Hypothesis	Implication	Chapter	Empirical Support
H1	Host governments that attach greater value to their reputations for competence are more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies	More democratic governments more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies	3	Strong
		More dependent governments more likely to classify fast-onset events as emergencies		Partial
H2	Donors defer to host government classification decisions	Donors more likely to offer humanitarian aid when host governments classify events as emergencies	3	Strong
H3	Host government officials in poor, aid-dependent states value their international reputation for competence	Government officials accept aid even when costly policy concessions are required	4, 5	Strong
		Government officials more likely to classify and respond to fast-onset rather than slow-onset events		Strong
H4	Host government officials perceive their international reputation for competence to mediate their access to preferred sources of aid	Host government officials perceive their reputation for competence to mediate their access to development but not humanitarian aid	4, 5	Strong
		Host governments sanction humanitarian organizations that threaten their reputation for competence		Partial
H5	Host government officials see humanitarian organizations as competition for scarce resources	Host government officials perceive humanitarian organizations as benefiting from humanitarian emergency classification	4, 5	Strong
		Host government officials do not see humanitarian organizations as neutral, impartial, independent		Strong
H6	Humanitarian organizations defer to host government restrictions and comply with coercive threats due to shared norms and institutional incentives	Humanitarians deference is not conditional on the state capacity of the host government	6	Strong
		Humanitarians deference depends on organizations' reliance on donor funding		Partial

Limitations and opportunities for future research

One of the most significant challenges of this research project was the inability to systematically measure the main outcome of interest: government obstruction of humanitarian aid. As my research suggests that concealing information is a common strategy used by governments to stop events from becoming understood as emergencies and to prevent humanitarian organizations from intervening, research strategies that rely on publicly available information, such as media reporting, were likely to be subject to significant biases. I was unable to access proprietary data collected by humanitarian organizations on these kinds of restrictions due to their concerns about the political sensitivity of the information and the consequences of its publication. To overcome the lack of systematic data, I used surveys and interviews, but these methods have their own limitations, my data depends on access to individuals and these individuals will and ability to honestly characterize their experiences. I hope that in future work, partnerships with humanitarian organizations could facilitate access to systematic data that would complement the existing data sources presented here.

Drawing on a single case for much of the empirical evidence may limit the generalizability of the findings from the Niger case. I document the importance of the country's international reputation for competence to government officials throughout the state apparatus. However, it is possible that the Nigerien government values its international reputation more than other similar states. Niger is among the poorest countries in the world, and its historical trajectory and dependence on foreign sources of support since independence may imply that the generalizability of the resulting findings is limited in scope.

In this project, I made the decision to treat the international audience as a monolithic, despite evidence of variation in donor preferences. This choice was born from an observation that despite donors' diverse policy preferences, major Western donors shared a proclivity to reward governments that meet the promises they make and avoid the appearance of blatant corruption due to shared foundational organizational incentives and liberal values. However, in making this choice, this project fails to account for the preferences of donors outside of this Western liberal consensus, which comprise a growing share of aid dollars. It is possible that these new donors hold different preferences and reward different state attributes and consequently they could comprise an alternative, potentially competing audience whom host governments seek to satisfy. I chose not to incorporate this potential dynamic into the project due to concerns about scope and issues of data availability regarding aid from these new donors. However, I acknowledge that the existence of these new donors could influence host governments reputational calculus in ways I do not account for here. I plan to account for this dynamic in future versions of the project by developing a discussion of

alternative audiences' preferences regarding the incentives the presence of such alternative audiences would produce. In future work, I hope to test the relevance of such alternative audiences to strengthen my findings.

Another shortcoming of the current version of the project is that it does not distinguish among states that assign different values to their international reputation for competence beyond structural factors such as regime type and aid dependence. As I pulled together this version of the project, it became clear to me that in future versions I should find a way to differentiate among states that attach greater and lesser value to their international reputations for competence within the universe of cases. I expect that this "taste" for reputation would vary according to host government's dependence on foreign aid and investment, such that governments that depend most heavily on donors would be most sensitive to their reputation for competence. I gesture at this idea at several points in the manuscript, but I do not include any explicit taxonomy or test for this assumption in this version of the project. In future iterations, I plan to build this distinction into the theoretical framework.

Contributions

Despite its limitations, the findings from this research advance scholarly understanding of the relationship between international intervention and domestic political incentives. By analyzing the role of recipient states in responding to humanitarian emergencies, I shed light on both the material and reputational consequences of international intervention for host governments. I show that for many states, international intervention is an essential part of their domestic political calculus because governments rely on resources from international actors to provide programmatic or patronage to their essential supporters.

This project contributes to an active research program on government preferences over foreign aid. While existing research portrays recipient governments as seeking to simply maximize the amount of foreign aid they receive, I show that host governments prefer aid over which they can exercise greater discretion, and, facing constraints from donors, they act strategically to convince donors to provide them greater discretion over aid. I contribute to ongoing debates regarding government repression of NGOs. Existing research fails to explain why governments rarely employ violent strategies to repress NGOs. My research shows that, for humanitarian organizations, governments do not need to induce compliance; organizations comply voluntarily because they see compliance as the best way to achieve their organizational objectives.

The findings from this research project suggest that the current approach to responding to humanitarian emergencies is fundamentally political, driven by the interests of host

governments, donors, and humanitarian organizations. Although humanitarian organizations and donors claim that funding humanitarian response through humanitarian organizations facilitates a separation from politics, my research suggests the opposite. The interests of political actors shape humanitarian emergency response from defining what counts as a humanitarian emergency to what organizations are able to intervene to who receives aid. Humanitarian organizations' claims to impartiality, independence, and neutrality in the face of these realities can undermine these organizations ability to achieve their stated objective, delivering aid to people in need.

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Appendix

Chapter 3 Appendix

To demonstrate that results are robust to multiple regression specifications, the figures below present the main results from Chapter 3 as marginal effects from logit regressions

Figure A3.1 Average Marginal Effects: Government classification as outcome

Figure A3.2: Average Marginal Effects: Donor funding decision as outcome

Chapter 5 Appendix

Table A5.1: Percent of respondents working in each office (N=392)

Office name	Percent
Unknown	21.684
Ministère du Plan de l'Aménagement du Territoire et du Développement Communautaire	11.480
Ministère de l'Agriculture et l'Élevage	7.398
Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire, de l'Alphabétisation, de la promotion des Langues Nationales, et de l'Éducation Civique	6.633
Ministère de la Santé Publique	5.357
Ministère des Finances	4.592
Ministère de l'Hydraulique et de L'Assainissement	4.337
Ministère des transports	4.082
Ministère de la Fonction Publique et de la Réforme Administrative	3.827
Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur,de la recherche et de l'innovation	3.571
Ministère de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable	3.571
Ministère de la Promotion de la Femme et de la Protection de l'Enfant	3.061
Ministère des Mines	2.806
Ministère du Petrole	2.806
Cellule Crises Alimentaires (CCA)	2.296
Ministère de l'Intérieur, de la Sécurité publique, de la Décentralisation et des Affaires Coutumières et Religieuses	2.296
Ministère de la Justice	1.786
Ministère de l'Action Humanitaire et de la Gestion des Catastrophes (MAH/GC)	1.531
Ministère de la Population	1.020
Ministère de l'enseignement professionnel	0.765
Ministère de l'Équipement	0.765
Ministère de la Défense	0.765
Cellule de coordination du système d'alerte précoce	0.510
Gouvernorat	0.510
Institut National de la Statistique	0.510
Ministère de la Jeunesse et des Sports	0.510
Ministère du Commerce et de la Promotion du Secteur Privé	0.510
Cabinet du PM	0.255
Conseil Régional	0.255
Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger (OPVN)	0.255
Réseau National des Chambres d'Agricultures du Niger (RECA)	0.255

Table A5.2: Summary statistics for outcome variables

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Government responsible: floods	380	3.813	0.708	2.000	3.000	4.000	5.000
Government responsible: malnutrition	380	3.766	0.745	1.000	3.000	4.000	5.000
Government responsible: IDPs	380	3.655	0.785	1.000	3.000	4.000	5.000
Government responsible: refugees	377	3.345	0.749	1.000	3.000	4.000	5.000
Government responsible: epidemic	384	3.568	0.775	1.000	3.000	4.000	5.000
Government responsible food crisis	383	3.723	0.743	1.000	3.000	4.000	5.000
Government responsible: drought	382	3.670	0.761	1.000	3.000	4.000	5.000
Government responsible: insecurity	381	3.761	0.810	2.000	3.000	4.000	5.000
Importance of international image	386	6.547	1.307	1.000	7.000	7.000	7.000
Rate international image	369	4.938	1.898	1.000	4.000	6.000	7.000
Prefer development aid	387	5.261	2.221	1.000	5.000	7.000	7.000
Prefer development aid (binary)	371	0.798	0.402	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Aid dependence	389	4.941	2.229	1.000	4.000	7.000	7.000
Aid allocate: education /& health	392	4.758	3.295	0.000	2.400	7.000	10.000
Aid allocate: Infrastructure	392	0.914	1.779	0.000	0.000	1.325	10.000
Aid allocate: Private investment	392	0.621	1.928	0	0	0	10
Aid allocate: Poor citizens	392	0.497	1.376	0.000	0.000	0.000	10.000
Aid allocate: refugees	392	0.160	0.733	0	0	0	10
Aid allocate: Improve security	392	2.424	2.699	0.000	0.000	4.325	10.000
Aid allocate: Gov. capacity	392	0.440	1.319	0	0	0	10
Aid allocate: Democracy /& rights	392	0.187	0.662	0	0	0	5
Access: Investment	303	3.851	1.083	1.000	3.000	5.000	7.000
Access: humanitarian (floods)	300	4.413	1.026	2.000	4.000	5.000	7.000
Access: Development aid	294	4.133	1.096	1.000	3.000	5.000	7.000
Access: humanitarian (food crisis)	300	4.413	1.089	1.000	4.000	5.000	7.000
Effective in SOE: Local government	392	2.964	1.932	0	1	5	7
Effective in SOE: INGO	392	2.931	1.812	0	1	4	7
Effective in SOE: NGO	392	2.804	1.841	0	1	4	7
Effective in SOE: Security forces	392	3.862	2.062	0	2	5	7
Impartial: IOM	291	1.100	0.779	0.000	0.000	2.000	2.000
Impartial: OCHA	274	1.128	0.776	0.000	1.000	2.000	2.000
Impartial: World Bank	303	1.112	0.810	0.000	0.000	2.000	2.000
Impartial: MSF	303	1.191	0.816	0.000	0.000	2.000	2.000
Impartial: ICRC	304	1.296	0.799	0.000	1.000	2.000	2.000
Impartial: OXFAM	284	1.299	0.741	0.000	1.000	2.000	2.000
Impartial: NGOs	307	1.078	0.746	0.000	1.000	2.000	2.000
Impartial: Nigerien Red Cross	298	1.295	0.743	0.000	1.000	2.000	2.000