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Moral Psychology is Relationship Regulation

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Psychology

by

Tage Shakti Rai

2012

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Moral Psychology is Relationship Regulation

by

Tage Shakti Rai

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2012

Professor Alan Fiske, Co-Chair

Professor Keith Holyoak, Co-Chair

Genuine moral disagreement exists and is widespread. To understand such disagreement, we must examine the basic kinds of social relationships people construct across cultures and the distinct moral obligations and prohibitions these relationships entail. In Chapter 2 of the dissertation, I develop Relationship Regulation Theory, which postulates that there are four fundamental and distinct moral motives embedded in different social-relational schemas. Unity is the motive to care for and support the integrity of in-groups by avoiding or eliminating threats of contamination, and providing aid and protection based on need or empathic compassion. Hierarchy is the motive to respect rank in social groups where superiors are entitled to deference and respect but must also lead, guide, direct, and protect subordinates. Equality is the motive for balanced, in-kind reciprocity, equal treatment, equal say, and equal opportunity. Proportionality is the motive for rewards and punishments to be proportionate to merit, benefits to be calibrated to contributions, and judgments to be based on a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits. The

four moral motives are universal, but cultures, ideologies, and individuals differ in when they activate these motives and how they implement them. Unlike existing theories (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006; Turiel, 1983), Relationship Regulation Theory predicts that any action, including violence, unequal treatment, and "impure" acts, may be perceived as morally correct depending on the moral motive employed and how the relevant social relationship is construed. In Chapter 3, I report two experiments that I conducted to investigate whether activating social-relational schemas would lead to corresponding activation of moral motives. In Experiment 1, I found that framing a social group in terms of Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking social-relational schemas led to activation of Unity and Hierarchy motives, respectively. In Experiment 2, I found that priming Communal Sharing and Market Pricing Schemas led participants to allocate bonuses in a hypothetical vignette differently in ways that reflected the use of Unity and Proportionality motives, respectively. In Chapter 4, I incorporate notions of character into Relationship Regulation Theory. Specifically, I argue that moral judgments are partially based on evaluations of other people as prospects for social relationships. I use this relationship-based perspective of moral judgment to explain cases where an actor's intentions are neglected in observers' moral judgments of them.

The Dissertation of Tage Shakti Rai is approved.

Anne Peplau

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2012

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents and my sisters for teaching and encouraging me to always do what I love, to know what I can control and what I can't, and to embrace where life takes me.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

We disagree about who can marry, when life begins, and whether and whom we can kill. Sometimes we reward only merit, other times we give to those in need, and still other times we demand exact equality. How do we decide what is right and just? Where do our moral judgments come from? And crucially, why do we disagree?

In this dissertation, I will argue that the fundamental bases to our moral psychology are grounded in the cognition we use to regulate our social relationships, and that different ways of relating entail distinct moral obligations and transgressions. These different ways of relating establish the criteria by which moral judgments are measured. In its strongest form, this perspective recognizes that the moral status of actions cannot be determined independent of the social-relational contexts in which they take place. I will present experimental evidence to suggest that moral disagreement arises from competing moral motives that are activated when people employ different social-relational schemas to navigate otherwise identical situations. While these experiments provide a window into how perceptions of correct moral action change across social-relational contexts, they do not yield an explanation of the important role that character and its corresponding inferences of virtues and vices play in moral judgment. I will argue that a crucial aspect of moral judgment is the ability to look beyond the rightness and wrongness of actions and evaluate whether someone is a good or poor prospect with whom to enter or continue with a social relationship.

Background

In my Master's Thesis, I focused on the ways in which we process moral situations, with a particular focus on biases and heuristics in moral judgment. For example, most research has

found that people neglect the number of victims when making charitable donations to a cause (i.e., the amount people donate does not increase with the number of victims) (Desvousges, Johnson, Dunford, Hudson, Wilson, & Boyle, 1993). I examined whether eliciting comparative processes could make people more sensitive to the number of victims in need and lead to greater donations (Rai, 2007). As I continued in my graduate studies, I began to realize that although I had conducted several studies to demonstrate biases in moral judgment, I still lacked a clear picture of what exactly it was that I was biasing. What were the bases to moral judgment that I was biasing downstream? As a result, I began my investigations into the fundamental moral motives guiding our moral psychology, a project that would later become my dissertation.

Traditional cognitive-developmental approaches in moral psychology generally focused on testing the intuitions of western philosophy and law as a starting point for investigations into the fundamental bases of our moral psychology. These approaches emphasize the importance that children and adults place on preventing harm and upholding equality independent of any authority, in cases that involve anonymous strangers. Any factors that affected moral judgment but fell outside of these domains, such as differences in moral judgment based on the social-relational contexts within which moral judgment took place, were deemed non-moral social biases (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983). The cognitive-developmental approach has already been proven inadequate in regards to how people *process* moral information. Specifically, cognitive-developmentalists drew on western philosophical intuitions to argue that moral judgments are made through a process of conscious reasoning based on "rational" criteria. In contrast, most recent research has demonstrated that our moral judgments are generally reached independently of conscious reasoning and are often driven by "irrational" biases and heuristics, some of which I had empirically demonstrated in earlier work (Haidt, 2001; Mikhail, 2007).

At the same time, culturally informed approaches to moral psychology were beginning to demonstrate that cognitive-developmental approaches to understanding the *bases* to our moral judgments were similarly constrained by their overreliance on western philosophical intuitions. Instead of taking western philosophical intuitions as their starting point, these cultural theories were built in a descriptive manner based on content analyses of problems informants labeled as "moral", coupled with the more culturally informed intuitions of the researchers. In particular, these cultural approaches argued that across cultures and history, the breadth of moral concerns was far greater than concerns with avoiding harm and preventing inequality, and included concerns with the purity of souls, respecting authority, and expressing loyalty for in-groups (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2008). Although I agree that the moral sphere should be extended beyond issues of harm and fairness, the descriptive approach favored by cultural theories of morality was largely atheoretical. Rather than building a theory of the bases of moral psychology by attempting to taxonomically categorize the kinds of judgments that people label as "moral" descriptively, I thought a more effective approach would be to consider *why* we have a sense of morality at all. Why did our sense of morality evolve and what is its function?

In adopting this functionalist perspective, the most prominent arguments suggest that our sense of morality support cooperative behaviors necessary for successful group living, and that our moral psychology only could have evolved if it was sensitive to the specific interactive strategies of social-relational partners (Frank, 1988; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2005; Joyce, 2006). I extended these analyses to develop Relationship Regulation Theory, which argued that the essential function of our moral psychology is to regulate our social relationships, and as such it cannot be separated from the social-relational contexts within which it takes place (Rai &

Fiske, 2011). Rather, our moral psychology is embedded in our social-relational cognition, and much of what had traditionally been seen as social biases in moral judgment actually forms the core of our moral psychology. Thus, a theory of the bases of our moral psychology must begin with an understanding of the kinds of social relationships into which people enter, and an analysis of the specific moral obligations and transgressions entailed by them. I followed Fiske (1990) and Krebs and Denton (2005) suggestion that Fiske's (1991, 1992) taxonomy of social relationships would be the ideal framework within which to develop a theory of moral the moral psychology.

Once we view moral psychology as embedded in our social-relational cognition, several questions emerge. First, if morality functions to regulate our social relationships, then do different social relationships entail different moral motives? If so, then we must examine the fundamental social-relational frameworks people use to relate and characterize the moral motives within them. As I will argue in Chapter 2, there are four fundamental schemas for social relationships that people use across cultures, each of which entails a distinct moral motive for guiding judgments and behavior (Chapter 2 is a reproduction of a research article completed during my doctoral studies; Alan Fiske is second author on the paper).

If distinct moral motives are embedded in different frameworks for navigating social relationships, then will people come to different conclusions about what is morally correct depending on the social-relational schemas they are employing to understand a situation? In Chapter 3, I will present two experiments examining whether activating different social-relational schemas leads to the activation of corresponding moral motives in domains of fairness and violence. If different moral motives are tied to different social-relational schemas, this would suggest that differences in the social-relational schemas people use to perceive a situation may

underlie many moral disagreements. In addition, there are many aspects to our moral psychology that do not reflect specific obligations and transgressions as defined by moral motives, but instead are focused on an individual's moral character.

In Chapter 4, I will review relevant literature to argue that *virtues* and *vices* are best considered as individual characteristics that our moral psychology focuses on because they are particularly diagnostic of whether someone will be an effective social-relational partner. From this perspective, many considerations that we perceive as fundamental to moral judgment, such as an actor's intentions, their causal responsibility, and their personal control over an outcome are actually epiphenomenal to the actual target attribute of evaluating a person as a relationship prospect. Under conditions where people are provided with information that someone will be a poor relationship prospect, then intentions and causal responsibility will be relatively neglected in judgments of blame and punishment.

Chapter 5 is a general discussion for the dissertation and my research plans moving forward. In the remainder of this introduction (Chapter 1), I provide a broad overview of research in the field of moral psychology and discuss the contents of my dissertation and its contribution to the field.

Moral Psychology:

A Broad Overview of the Current State of the Field

The age of enlightenment was characterized by skepticism of tradition and authority as sources of knowledge, and faith in the ability of reason and logic to explain several aspects of human life, including morality (Kramnick, 1995). As Macintyre (1981) has noted, Enlightenment thinkers developed a *rationalist* conception of morality as grounded in abstract, impartial, universal, logical principles that had the potential to be reasoned toward a priori of experience

through conscious reasoning. The rationalist conception of morality is a *prescriptive* claim about how we ought to judge and behave. Contemporary debates in moral psychology, a field aimed toward *descriptive* analysis, has largely been characterized by arguments over the extent to which the rationalist conception of morality is an accurate reflection of how people actually make moral judgments (Haidt, 2008).

Proponents in the rationalist tradition emphasize that people process moral judgments through rational reasoning, and that moral judgments are based on analyses of the harm and fairness of actions independent of the social-relational contexts within which they occur (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983). In contrast, recent approaches argue that what we call moral psychology is actually the result of interactions among competing mental systems that are not designed specifically for handling 'moral' situations (Stich, 2006). Proponents of these non-rationalist theories emphasize the role of intuitions, emotions, cognitive biases, and motives in processing moral judgments (Greene & Haidt, 2002), and they argue that moral judgments are often based on considerations that would be deemed non-moral in the rationalist tradition, including the social relationships involved and obligations to leaders and in-groups, as well as concerns with maintaining physical, spiritual, and ideological purity (Rai & Fiske, 2011; Haidt, 2007; Shweder et al., 1997). I will first review arguments regarding the process by which moral judgments are made and then I will review the various theories regarding the bases or defining features of moral judgment.

How we process moral judgments

Whereas research into the defining features or bases of moral psychology focuses on the *content of* moral judgment, research into how people *process* moral judgments focuses on how people connect inputs to the output that takes the form of a moral judgment. Drawing on Marr's

(1982) levels of analysis, research that focuses on content occurs at the computational level and asks what the goals of the system are and what problems it is trying to solve, while research that focuses on process occurs at the algorithmic level and asks about the mental representations that are used by the system and how those representations are manipulated. Do people make moral judgments through a process of conscious reasoning, or are their judgments based on unconscious processes? Are moral judgments the result of a domain-specific mental system, or are moral judgments the result of domain-general cognitive processes applied to problems that have morally relevant consequences (Waldmann, Nagel, & Wiegmann, 2012)? Much of the research that I have conducted that is not reported in this dissertation focuses on this process-based line of research. I will discuss some of that work in more detail below.

Moral judgment through conscious reasoning

Beginning with Kohlberg (1963), moral psychologists in the cognitive-developmental perspective have been geared toward understanding children's moral development toward an adult moral psychology that reflects rationalist criteria (Haidt, 2008). When Kohlberg (1963) developed his moral stage theory, he designed hypothetical moral dilemmas, such as the famous case of Heinz, a husband who must decide whether or not to steal a drug to save the life of his wife. Based on the pattern of participants' responses, Kohlberg generated a stage theory of moral development in which individuals moved from an orientation of avoidance of punishment toward respect for social contracts and the potential for generating universal ethical principles. Importantly, Kohlberg argued that once individuals moved to a new stage they would abandon the reasoning of previous stages. Any inconsistencies in this process reflected failures to perform up to the level of competence because of non-moral biases due to context or perspective (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).

The 'new synthesis' in moral judgment

Krebs and Denton (2005) reviewed a large body of evidence summarizing the immense inconsistencies in how individuals reason across moral stages. Even under ideal testing conditions, participants reason from many different stages depending on the situation in question. As Kohlberg's influence has waned, several new theories of moral psychology emphasizing the role of affect have emerged (Haidt, 2001; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Nichols, 2002, 2004; Prinz, 2006, 2008). In Greene et al.'s (2001) fMRI study of participants' responses to moral dilemmas, the authors argued that moral judgment can occur through analytic reasoning, but will often be handled through affective processes if the subject of moral inquiry is emotionally salient. In his analysis of etiquette rules, Nichols (2002, 2004) has argued that our moral judgment emerges from moral principles, but affect is required to enact those principles.

Haidt's (2001) social-intuitionist model (SIM) integrates affective and automatic processing (Zajonc, 1980; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), affect as motivation and information (Damasio, 1994), and motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) to argue for a radical departure from the rationalist emphasis on conscious reasoning. According to SIM, individuals do not reach moral judgments by reasoning toward them at all. Rather, moral judgments are the result of 'automatic, affectively laden intuitions' (Haidt, 2008, p.70) to an eliciting situation. Moral reasoning occurs after the judgment has already been produced and largely reflects post-hoc justifications of our intuitions that we use to persuade others to support our opinion. Haidt (2001) has defended his model through anecdotal evidence that many of his participants cannot logically explain the sources of their moral judgments nor can they change their moral judgments after being presented with evidence supporting the opposite view, a process he refers to as 'moral

dumbfounding.' Haidt and his collaborators (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008) have also primed individuals to feel an emotion, such as disgust, before evaluating an unrelated hypothetical moral vignette. Priming conditions include hypnosis to neutral words (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) and having participants tested in disgust-inducing surroundings (Schnall et al., 2008). In each of the studies, the authors have found that judgments of moral wrongdoing are harsher when individuals are primed to feel disgusted, suggesting that emotions rather than conscious reasoning drive moral judgments.

Universal Moral Grammar

In recent years, the theory of a universal moral grammar (UMG) has emerged as an attempt to maintain the rationalist bases of morality (Mikhail, 2007; Hauser, 2006). According to UMG, normative moral principles (e.g., prohibition of intentional battery) are realized psychologically within a "universal grammar" for a modular "moral faculty", analogous to the theory of universal grammar for human languages proposed by Chomsky (1965). In contrast to notions of affective primacy and intuition posited by SIM, UMG argues that what Haidt (2001) refers to as 'intuition' actually involves a complex chain of reasoning to parse the causal-intentional structure of actions into relevant components. UMG sidesteps the weaknesses in Kohlberg's theory by claiming that conscious reasoning is unnecessary because rational inference processes occur in an automatic, unconscious fashion (Mikhail, 2007; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007).

UMG has garnered support from experiments in which moral judgments are elicited for paired dilemmas designed to isolate the effects of potential moral principles. For example, Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, and Mikhail (2007) presented participants with one of two versions of the "trolley problem" in order to isolate the "doctrine of double effect", which states

that harm is acceptable if it occurs as an unintended but foreseen consequence of action in service of a greater good, but not as a means toward an end (Foot, 1967). In both versions, a trolley headed toward five people can be redirected onto a sidetrack where it will be stopped from looping back to the main track by a heavy object. Participants were less likely to judge the action as permissible if it was indicated that the object was a man than if it was indicated that a man was standing in front of the object, suggesting that the man's death is more acceptable when it is an unintended but foreseen side effect of action rather than a means to stop the trolley.

Heuristics and Biases

It has been argued that UMG's method of presenting paired moral dilemmas to identify domain-specific moral principles, such as a doctrine of double effect, can not in fact empirically distinguish a domain-specific principle from a domain-general bias or heuristic (Sunstein, 2005; Rai & Holyoak, 2010). Thus, participants' judgments may have been due to using the doctrine of double effect, but judgments also could have been due to variation in attentional focus, salience of the objectification of the man, or perhaps some implicit hope that the man in front of the object might somehow escape (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007). Biases and heuristics have been studied extensively in a number of domains, including the evaluation of gambles, consumer preferences, and risk perception, where seemingly small changes in wording or order often lead to large differences in judgment (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002). In the context of the trolley problem, Petrinovich and O'Neill (1996) found that judgments are affected by whether options are described in terms of the number of people who would be saved or in terms of those who would die under the different options, just as in Kahneman and Tversky's (1984) "Asian disease" problem in which participants had to choose among risky options for preventing a disease outbreak (for a review of biases and heuristics in moral judgment, see Sinott-Armstrong,

2008). According to researchers in the biases and heuristics tradition, evidence of biases suggests that moral judgments are generated through the same processes as other kinds of judgments and do not support a theory of a domain-specific UMG.

In a study not reported in my dissertation, Rai and Holyoak (2010) empirically demonstrated the inability of the paired dilemma method to distinguish between evidence for UMG and evidence for domain-general biases in reasoning. According to Hauser et al. (2008b, p. 173), "to assess whether particular principles serve as the basis for our moral judgments" we must "develop a battery of paired dilemmas that isolate psychologically meaningful and morally relevant, principled distinctions" and "determine whether these targeted principles guide subjects' moral judgments." We adopted this approach; however, rather than relying on prescriptive philosophy as the sole source of hypotheses about "psychologically meaningful and principled distinctions," we turned to research in the fields of consumer preferences and risk perception on domain-general biases. In our Experiment 1, we drew on research in perceptual fluency, which argues that people use the easy of processing as a cue for judgments. If processing is difficult, people will infer that an option is less preferred. We hypothesized that generating more reasons to sacrifice someone would be more difficult and thus decrease support for the option. Indeed, we found that support for sacrificing potential victims in the trolley problem paradoxically *decreased* if participants were given the option to express *more* reasons to take the action. In our Experiment 2, we drew on research suggesting that people are more sensitive to proportions than actual numbers. We found that people were more likely to support sacrificing someone to save a high proportion of victims at risk than a low proportion of victims at risk even if the number of victims saved remained constant. In our Experiment 3, we demonstrated this effect of proportions in a within-subject design, such that the same people

reported that they needed to save a greater number of people if more were at risk in order to justify an identical sacrifice. These experiments demonstrated that eliciting judgments of paired moral dilemmas are unlikely to empirically distinguish whether moral judgments occur through a process of rational reasoning in a domain-specific moral psychology, or through biases of the sort found in domain-general decision contexts that require active weighing of costs and benefits (Rai & Holyoak, 2010).

Summary

Building on the intuitions of post-enlightenment moral philosophers and the moral stage theory developed by Kohlberg (1963), moral psychologists in the cognitive-developmental tradition have assumed that moral judgment occurs through a process of conscious reasoning. In recent years, this view has given way to one in which everyday moral judgments are driven primarily by unconscious reasoning and intuitions, which at the very least must be mediated by emotions, such as disgust (Haidt, 2008). More extreme perspectives argue that some moral judgments do not consult reasoning processes at all and are driven exclusively by affective states (Prinz, 2006; 2008). Finally, the output of any unconscious processing is heavily influenced by domain-general biases and heuristics, including framing effects, perceptual fluency, and proportional thinking (Rai & Holyoak, 2010; Sunstein, 2005).

<div align="center">

What are moral judgments based on?

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Differences in how we process information during moral judgment accounts for much of moral disagreement. However, in many instances the source of moral disagreement are the differing goals or motives people have rather than the processes by which they make moral judgments (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Only by examining the fundamental bases, defining features, or motives that people are trying to satisfy can we explain cases where people reason identically but

reach different conclusions due to having different goals. Is there a core content that distinguishes moral judgment from other kinds of judgment? Or do people simply acquire norms of correct behavior as socially transmitted in their respective cultures, with no pattern to this content (Churchland, 1996)?

Universality, harms and fairness, and authority independence

Turiel (1983) endeavored to demonstrate that there were defining features that made moral content different from other kinds by investigating whether rationally derived moral criteria, such as universality and impartiality, could be used to distinguish between individuals' responses to different social rules. Nucci and Turiel (1978) designed hypothetical classroom and schoolyard scenarios and presented these scenarios to children to examine whether differences in their responses would emerge. This line of research led to domain theory (Turiel, 1983), which posited that in coming to understand the social world, people draw a distinction between moral rules, such as harming another person, and rules about social conventions, such as raising your hand in class. According to domain theory, people have shared intuitions that social conventions are context specific, authority dependent, and rule-contingent, whereas moral judgments are based on rules that are universal, independent of authority, and intrinsically linked to concerns with preventing harm and upholding equality. Thus, whereas a child would judge that it is acceptable for a student to speak without raising her hand if there is no rule against it or an authority figure allows it, children would still judge that it is wrong to hit another child even if the rules or an authority allowed it. The moral/conventional distinction has been found across cultures and in children and adults (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). Blair (1995) demonstrated that unlike normal individuals, psychopaths are unable to distinguish between conventional and moral rules, suggesting that acquiring the moral/ conventional distinction may be predictive of

normal development.

Violations of Domain Theory

Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) have called the moral/conventional distinction into question by using hypothetical vignettes of disgusting behaviors such as having sex with a dead chicken. Previous findings had suggested that in some cultures, behaviors that lacked any overt harm, such as spiritually contaminating acts, were still moralized (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). However, Turiel, Killen, and Helwig (1987) have argued that whereas Westerners did not find these practices harmful, people in other cultures did find the behaviors harmful, which is why they were moralized. In contrast, Haidt et al.'s (1993) examples reflected situations that participants reported were moral violations that were universally wrong and independent of authority, but not harmful. These patterns were particularly strong in low SES and Brazilian populations, suggesting that many of our views on morality may reflect educated, western biases. Similar results were found in Nichols' (2002) studies of children's and adults' responses to etiquette rules, where people judged that some etiquette violations, such as picking one's nose, were not harmful, but were still morally wrong. Whereas Haidt et al. (1993) and Nichols (2002) demonstrated that concerns with harm and justice were not a necessary component of moral judgment, Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng, and Fessler (2007) designed hypothetical vignettes that were analogous to Turiel's (1980) schoolyard examples to examine the role of authority independence. Although it has been found that children do not condone the actions of authorities when acts are harmful (Laupa & Turiel, 1986), Kelly et al. (2007) found that adults do condone harm when it is seen as an accepted practice in other socio-historical contexts, such as in the case of seventeenth century sailors being beaten for insubordination.

Three Moral Codes

In an effort to construct a theory of morality that more accurately reflected the types of moral judgments and behaviors present across cultures, anthropologist Richard Shweder and colleagues (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) abandoned western philosophical preconceptions of morality and generated a theory of morality based on the themes that emerged out of moral discourse in Orissa, India. Moral intuitions of informants were analyzed using a set of 39 probes regarding potentially moral situations, to which informants responded in Oriya. A content analysis of the English translations of informants' responses revealed three clusters of moral transgressions, which were categorized as three moral codes representing the ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity (Shweder et al., 1997). The autonomy code concerns respect for individuals and refers to moral violations regarding harms, rights, and justice. The community code concerns beliefs about duty and hierarchy, and refers to violations of communal will and tradition. The divinity code concerns conceptions about the purity of our souls, and refers to moral violations that endanger and pollute one's own purity, or that of one's kin. Shweder et al. (1997) argued that western philosophical notions of morality are primarily based on the autonomy code and that moral phenomena concerning the community and divinity codes cannot be understood in the western philosophical framework. This hypothesis is supported by studies finding that Americans judge autonomy-based rationales for behavior as having a stronger moral base than community and divinity-based rationales when compared to Indians (Miller & Bersoff, 1992) and Filipinos (Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, and Banaszynski, 2001).

Moral Foundations Theory

Haidt and Joseph (2004, 2008) have expanded on the three moral codes by conducting a content analysis of five major cross-cultural and evolutionary accounts of morality (Brown,

1991; Fiske, 1991; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Shweder et al., 1997; de Waal, 1996). "We began by simply listing the major kinds of social situations these five authors said people (or chimpanzees) react to with a clear evaluation as positive or negative. We then tallied the number of 'votes' each item got, that is, the number of authors, out of the five, who referred to it directly," (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p.58). From this content analysis, suffering/compassion, reciprocity/fairness, and hierarchy/respect were identified as candidates for innately prepared moral concerns. Based on Haidt's previous work (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997) purity/sanctity was added as an innately prepared moral concern (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), and later suggestions from others led to the inclusion of in-group/loyalty (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). Harm/care refers to an innate sensitivity to detecting suffering, particularly in infants and young children. Fairness/reciprocity refers to a predisposition toward reciprocal altruism. In-group/loyalty and hierarchy/respect are meant to account for the influences of social groups and power asymmetries among individuals. Purity/sanctity emerges out of concerns over avoiding physical or spiritual contamination. These foundations are argued to be the source for the 'affectively laden intuitions' that are processed in SIM (Haidt, 2008), and are the basis of Moral Foundations Theory (MFT).

MFT postulates that different groups rely on the different foundations to different degrees. In particular, American liberals are thought to rely primarily on harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations, whereas American conservatives rely on all of the foundations equally. Haidt's (2007) evidence comes from the MFT questionnaire, in which individuals are asked to state how relevant each foundation is to their judgments of right and wrong, such as "Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country," (In-group/loyalty) as well as their level of agreement with particular moral statements, such as "I would call some acts

wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural" (purity/sanctity).

But where do the moral concerns come from? Why do we have the bases that we do? These are questions with which the descriptive approaches of the three Moral Codes and Moral Foundations Theory will continue to struggle. Haidt (2008) has attempted to work backwards toward an evolutionary account of the moral foundations, but even he remains agnostic as to how many moral foundations we may have, and has even recently added a sixth moral foundation of "liberty" meant to capture moral beliefs tied to individual freedom.

Relationship Regulation Theory

According to Relationship Regulation Theory (RR), our moral psychology functions to regulate our social relationships (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Thus, in order to understand the bases of our moral psychology, we must examine the basic kinds of social relationships people construct across cultures and the distinct moral obligations and prohibitions these relationships entail. This emphasis on the social-relational context within which our moral psychology must be realized can be traced back to Piaget's (1932) observations of children's games of 'marbles', where he argued that moral rules are generated through interaction and immersion in social groups, and that different group dynamics would lead to different rules. Whereas Piaget (1932) argued that children progress from moral rules that focus on obedience to authority toward more egalitarian norms of fairness, RR argues that different moral motives are always available and are facilitated by different social contexts. In Chapter 2, I develop the argument for RR in detail and provide evidence drawn from across the social sciences. Essentially, I extended Relational Models Theory (Fiske, 1990, 1991, 1992) to identify four fundamental and distinct moral motives that are embedded in different schemas for social relationships. **Unity** is the motive that underlies 'Communal Sharing' (CS) schemas for social relationships. Unity motivates people to care for

and support the integrity of in-groups by avoiding or eliminating threats of contamination and providing aid and protection based on need or empathic compassion. **Hierarchy** is the motive underlying 'Authority Ranking' schemas (AR). Authority motivates people to respect rank in social groups where superiors are entitled to deference and respect but must also lead, guide, direct, and protect subordinates. **Equality** is the motive that underlies 'Equality Matching' (EM) schemas. Equality motivates people toward balanced, in-kind reciprocity, equal treatment, equal say, and equal opportunity. **Proportionality** is the motive that underlies 'Market Pricing' (MP) schemas. Proportionality motivates people to prefer rewards and punishments to be proportionate to merit, benefits to be calibrated to contributions, and judgments to be based on a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits. The four moral motives are universal, but cultures, ideologies, and individuals differ in where they activate these motives and how they implement them. Unlike existing theories (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006; Turiel, 1983), RR predicts that any action, including violence, unequal treatment, and "impure" acts, may be perceived as morally correct depending on the moral motive employed and how the relevant social relationship is construed.

In Chapter 3, I present the results of two experiments I conducted to test the primary prediction of RR; that activating different social-relational schemas will lead to the activation of corresponding moral motives. In Experiment 1, I presented participants with hypothetical vignettes about a social group that was described in terms of either CS, AR, EM, or MP social-relational terms. Participants were then presented with collective action problems in the domains of decision-making, navigating exchanges, distributive justice, and moralized violence. For each problem, participants rated how morally acceptable four options were, each of which corresponded to one of the moral motives. If different social-relational schemas entail distinct moral motives, then framing the group in terms of different social-relational schemas should lead

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participants to increase their support for options that reflect the moral motives that correspond to those schemas. I found that framing a group in CS terms and AR terms increased support for Unity motives and Hierarchy motives, respectively. However, I found no support for Equality and Proportionality motives. If moral motives are embedded in cognitive schemas for social relationships, then activating the social-relational schema in one context may lead to activation of its corresponding moral motive in a different context.

In Experiment 2, I primed different social-relational schemas by asking participants to think of various kind of social roles, after which I asked them to rank their preferences for how bonuses should be distributed in a hypothetical company. I found a significant interaction such that participants who were primed with communal sharing were more likely to support need-based distribution and less likely to support equity-based distribution than participants who were primed with market pricing. The results of these studies provide partial experimental support for RR.

Intention, Causal Responsibility, and Virtue

Regardless of the bases for moral judgment, it has been argued that once a transgression has been identified, people are concerned with determining whether someone is causally responsible for the transgression, and whether they caused the transgression intentionally. If someone was not the cause of a transgression and did not act with any intentional malice, they should not be blamed or punished. As I detail in Chapter 4, there is substantial evidence to suggest that people are typically judged more severely if they committed the transgression intentionally rather than accidentally (for reviews, see Mikhail, 2007; Cushman, 2008). However, there are interesting aberrations in moral judgment and the law where intention and other rationalist criteria are discounted in our judgments of blame and punishment. As I discuss

at length in chapter 4, these aberrations can only be explained within a broader view of moral psychology that acknowledges that in addition to judging the rightness and wrongness of acts, people are always judging whether someone is a good or poor prospect for entering into or continuing a social relationship. From this perspective, virtues and vices function to regulate relationships because they are indicative of someone's social-relational potential (also see Rai & Fiske, in press).

Meta-Ethical Perspectives

Most recently, moral psychologists have become interested in the role that meta-ethical beliefs play in moral judgment and behavior. For example, Vohs and Schooler (2008) found that inducing disbelief in free will increased cheating on a later test. In research not reported in my dissertation, (Rai & Holyoak, 2012), I have demonstrated that relativistic worldviews are tied to less severe moral judgments and greater willingness to engage in immoral behavior. In our Experiment 1, I analyzed data from a national sample and found that relativistic worldviews predicted less severe judgments of punishment for various crimes. In our Experiment 2, I found evidence for a causal link by demonstrating that participants who were primed to think of moral relativism expressed less severe judgments of punishment for various transgressions. In our Experiment 3, I examined behavioral consequences of relativism and found that participants exposed to an argument for cultural relativism were more likely to cheat on a later test.

Summary

Moral psychologists in the cognitive-developmental tradition have focused primarily on issues of harm and fairness. Shweder et al. (1997) and Haidt (2007) have expanded the sphere of moral concerns to include issues of group loyalty, purity, and respect for authority. I have argued that rather than attempting to categorize the content of morality that we find in the world, we

should begin by investigating the function our morality serves. In this regard, I have argued that our sense of morality evolved to regulate our social relationships, and consequently different kinds of social relationships entail different moral motives. Building on RR, I have argued that rationalist criteria for assigning blame and punishment, such as intention and causal responsibility, should actually be reconceptualized within a broader relational perspective, according to which people are constantly evaluating other people as prospects for social relationships. Finally, future research should attend to the broad meta-ethical perspectives people have about the nature of morality and how this impacts moral judgment and behavior.

Conclusion

Contemporary approaches to addressing the bases to our moral psychology and how we reach moral judgments reflect *rationalist*, *descriptive,* and *functional* perspectives. Prominent rationalist perspectives include Kohlberg's moral stages (1963), Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983) and Universal Moral Grammar (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007). These theories begin with prescriptive philosophical theories of how people *ought to* judge and behave morally as their starting point for generating descriptive theories of how people *actually* judge and behave morally. These approaches have argued that moral judgments are based in abstract, logical, universal principles that reflect rational reasoning.

In recent years, researchers working from the descriptive perspective have argued that by ignoring concerns that fall outside of prescriptive moral philosophy, the Rationalist approach fails to capture the full breadth of moral concerns across situations and cultures (Shweder et al., 1997; Haidt, 2007). Prominent descriptive approaches include the Moral Codes Theory (Shweder et al., 1997) and Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2008). According to these perspectives, theories of moral psychology should be data-driven, meaning they should be built

by seeking patterns in the content that people regard as moral across cultures. Although the descriptive approach is quite useful, its primary drawback is that it provides little theoretical explanation for why people have the concerns that they do and what conditions lead to the predominance of some concerns over others.

Functionalist approaches begin with the question of why our sense of morality would have evolved at all and have typically emphasized the importance of cooperation for the maintenance of functional social groups. From this perspective, morality evolved to facilitate the generation and maintenance of long-term social-cooperative relationships with other individuals which, on average, were more beneficial than the pursuit of smaller short-term advantages through defection (Joyce, 2006; Frank, 1988; Gintis et al., 2005). Building on these functionalist approaches, I developed RR, which argues that in any relationship, individuals are presented with opportunities for exploiting or otherwise taking advantage of their relational partners for various reasons (e.g., short-term temptations, short-sighted selfishness). People need competing motives that lead them to regulate and sustain social relationships by controlling their own behavior and sanctioning others. These social-relational motives form the core of moral psychology across cultures. Thus, in terms of *process*, RR is similar to the UMG approach insofar as it predicts that moral judgment is characterized by a universal grammar of social relations and corresponding moral motives that is implemented in culturally variable ways (Bolender, 2003). This process is often biased downstream by biases and heuristics in judgment. In terms of *content*, RR is similar to descriptive theories in so far as the moral motives cover bases for morality that have traditionally been neglected by rationalist approaches, including the morality of in-groups and hierarchies.

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Chapter 2

Moral Motives for Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality[1]

> In 2006, Zahra al-Azzo was kidnapped and raped near her home in Damascus,
> Syria. Following her safe return, her older brother stabbed and murdered her in
> her sleep. In response to his killing her, Zahra's family held a large celebration
> that night. According to the United Nations Population Fund, 5,000 similar
> "honor killings" occur each year. (Zoepf, 2007)

Around the world, people have disparate beliefs and practices related to responsibility,

revenge, taboos, violence, and acceptable lifestyles. Faced with such extensive diversity and

disagreement about what is right, just, necessary, or fair, we must consider the bases for these

competing judgments and behaviors. Is there a theory of moral psychology that can account for

the sense of obligation felt by Zahra Al-Azzo's family in killing her and their subsequent

celebration of it and the horror, outrage, and shock experienced by most Western readers who

hear such stories?

In the present paper, we argue that to elucidate the bases for moral judgment, we must

abandon the assumption that moral judgments are based on features of actions independent of the

social-relational contexts in which they occur (e.g., Did the action cause harm? Was the action

unfair? Was the action impure?). Rather, we must reconceptualize moral psychology as

embedded in our social-relational cognition, such that moral judgments and behaviors emerge

out of the specific obligations and transgressions entailed by particular types of social

relationships (e.g., Did the action support us against them? Did it go against orders from above?

Did you respond in kind?). In so doing, it will become evident that moral intuitions are not based

on asocial principles of right actions, such as prohibitions against intentionally causing harm

(Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007; Turiel, 1983) and inequality (Turiel, 1983) or concerns with

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"purity" (Haidt, 2007). Rather, moral intuitions are defined by the particular types of social relationships in which they occur. In its strongest form, a social- relational approach to moral psychology posits that the moral status of actions cannot be determined independent of the social- relational contexts in which they take place. Rather, any given action will be judged as right, just, fair, honorable, pure, virtuous, or morally correct when it occurs in some social-relational contexts and will be judged as wrong when it occurs in other social- relational contexts.

By integrating moral psychology into social-relational cognition, we unify findings and theory from moral, cultural, developmental, and social psychology to provide insight into social-relational evaluation, cooperation, conflict, and violence. A theory of moral psychology should provide a framework for understanding judgments of virtue, notions of fairness, systems of justice, in-group favoritism and out-group hostility, care and apathy, prejudice, loyalty, leadership and followership, approach–avoidance, and moralized forms of violence, such as spanking, whipping, capital punishment, revenge, torture, honor killing, and genocide. Our social-relational approach to moral psychology predicts that (a) there are distinct moral motives, obligations, and violations that correspond to four basic types of social relationships and that (b) constituting different social-relational models evokes their corresponding moral motives and evaluations.

Whereas other approaches assume there are bases to moral judgment whose expression may be biased by social-relational context, we begin by drawing on the immense body of literature on social relationships to identify the basic kinds of relationships people perceive and construct that determine the morally required response in a given situation. Subsequently, we analyze the distinct obligations and transgressions that each type of social relationship entails to

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yield four fundamental moral motives underlying our social-relational psychology: Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality. This social-relational approach leads to the insight that universality in moral psychology results from all individuals in all cultures basing their moral judgments and behaviors on the same set of moral motives for regulating social relationships. Diversity in moral judgment, emotion, motivation, and behavior results from individuals, institutions, ideologies, and cultures employing different social-relational models or different implementations of the same models in any given domain of life.

By taking a social-relational approach, we will find that some deep moral disagreements reflect genuinely different moral positions embedded in social relationships, groups, practices, institutions, and cultures and cannot simply be attributed to differences in knowledge or logical reasoning among competing parties. Consequently, there are legitimate moral perspectives that cannot be directly or systematically reconciled with each other. (For similar claims, see Berlin, 1969; Bolender, 2003; Fiske, 1990; Goldman, 1993; Harman, 1996; Wong, 1984, 2006.) Philosophers commonly accept a version of such moral pluralism in the trade-off between principles of upholding rights and preventing harm. The present paper argues for a different kind of pluralism based on the distinct kinds of social relationships that people perceive, construct, sanction, resist, and seek to sustain or terminate. As a consequence, this approach predicts that some acts and practices that some people perceive as evil actually have a moral basis in the psychology of the people who commit them. We do not have to condone these practices, but if we are to have any hope of opposing them, we do have to understand them for what they are: morally motivated acts, not simply errors in judgment, limitations of knowledge, or failures of self-control.

The Need for a Social-Relational Morality

Post-Enlightenment philosophical approaches to morality emphasize that moral judgments ought to be based on principles that are abstract, logical, and universal and thus independent of an individual's social position, personal relationships, or future interpersonal consequences (Kant, 1785/1989; Rawls, 2005; for a review, see Kramnick, 1995). Cognitive-developmental, rationalist and some empiricist approaches to scientific moral psychology work within this framework. As a consequence, in describing moral judgments they make a conceptual distinction between moral intuitions or reasoning, on the one hand, and the social biases that may distort expression of such judgments, on the other (for a similar critique, see Miller & Bersoff, 1992; for a review of how morality became distinct from social-relational context in philosophy, see MacIntyre, 2007; in psychology, see Haidt, 2008).

Thus, when Piaget (1932/1965) observed young children judging that certain actions in the game of marbles were wrong because they imagined authorities said so, while older children generated their own rules as a group, he assumed that young children's behavior was due in part to social constraints, such as lack of freedom to generate their own rules, and that egalitarian values would emerge in the absence of such social biases. Kohlberg (1981) used responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas to argue that individuals' moral development progressed from an orientation of avoiding punishment toward a respect for social contracts and eventually to the discovery of universal ethical principles. Deviations from this progression were thought to be due to "non- moral" biases, such as social pressure (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Krebs & Denton, 2005). The social-interactionist perspective (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987) is founded on a distinction between social conventions and moral judgments. Social conventions, such as raising your hand in class or wearing a school uniform, are context specific, authority dependent, and rule contingent. In contrast, moral

judgments, such as the perception that hitting a classmate is wrong, are based on rules that are universal, independent of authority, and intrinsically linked to concerns with preventing harms and upholding equal rights and justice. Failures to uphold these principles (e.g., in-group favoritism) are attributed to inadequate intergroup experiences, coercive cultural institutions, or mistaken beliefs of previous generations (Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006).

By adopting this distinction between moral psychology per se and the social influences that distort moral judgment, the cognitive-developmental and rationalist approaches to moral psychology largely separated themselves from social psychological studies of prescriptively immoral real-world behaviors and anthropological findings regarding diverse moral practices across cultures. Interested in how Nazi officers could commit inhumane acts during World War II, Milgram (1963) found that some participants would obey an authority figure even if they believed they were administering potentially deadly electric shocks to another person. Interested in understanding how people treated those from different groups, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) demonstrated that even minimal information about group membership, such as participants' art preferences, could result in the choice to maximize the differences between the rewards given to the in- group relative to the out-group, rather than to maximize total rewards for everyone.

At the same time, anthropologists and historians have identified vast differences in moral attitudes across cultures and time. For example, in the context of sex and gender, is it morally permissible for people of the same gender, or of different races, to have sexual relations, and should they have the right to marry? May people engage in sexual relations simply for pleasure, or should sex be restricted to marriage? Should men and women choose whom they marry, or should their elders choose for them? In marriage, does sex have to be a joint choice, or can one

spouse compel the other? Should men or women be allowed to have multiple spouses

simultaneously? Should women have equal rights in relationships with men, or should men have

complete authority over their daughters, sisters, and wives? These are questions that elicit strong

moral judgments and little consensus cross-culturally. Yet, by distinguishing between moral

judgment and the social-relational context in which it takes place, we must attribute variation in

judgments and behaviors to "non-moral" social or selfish biases, such as the relationships among

the people involved, the influences of cultural institutions, or differences in cognitive and

emotional development that bias an individual's ability to articulate and follow "true" moral

judgments.

Morality Embedded in Social Relationships

The a priori categorization of social-relational context as separate from bases for moral

judgment is ironic, given the rich history in social psychology of demonstrating the influence of

context in nearly every aspect of social behavior and cognition (S. T. Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Ross

& Nisbett, 1991). For example, even if helping is cognitively salient, individuals are less likely

to help a stranger if they are preoccupied with another social obligation (Darley & Batson, 1973).

Likewise, cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists have demonstrated that nearly all

reasoning and judgment depends deeply on the framing of the problem or decision and that

genuine preferences may not even exist in the abstract but, rather, are constructed relative to

particular contexts (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Slovic, 1995; Thaler,

1999). For example, in moral dilemmas designed to contrast de- ontological with utilitarian

reasoning, preferences change depending on whether options are framed in terms of lives saved

or lost, or depending simply on the order in which moral dilemmas are encountered (Haidt &

Baron, 1996; Petrinovich & O'Neill, 1996; Rai & Holyoak, 2010). Finally, evolutionary analyses

of cooperation have shown that propensities to act morally only evolve (whether by biological or cultural selection) if they are responsive to the specific interactive strategies and prospects of social partners and if they take into account reputational consequences and the likelihood of third party punishment (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003, 2005).

The literature in social, cognitive, and evolutionary psychology suggests moral psychology may be inseparable from its social-relational context. In the remainder of the paper, we propose a theory of moral psychology in which moral motives, judgments, sanctions, redress, emotions, and actions are embedded in social-relational models for living in groups. We consider the various types of social relationships people seek and perceive and the distinct moral obligations and transgressions these relationships entail. From this perspective, our sense of morality functions to facilitate the generation and maintenance of long-term social- cooperative relationships with others (Fiske, 2002, 2010a; Frank, 1988; Joyce, 2006). As a consequence, fundamentally different types of social relationships will entail fundamentally different moralities.

We refer to this approach as *relationship regulation*. It is predicated on the notion that in any relationship individuals are presented with opportunities for exploiting or otherwise taking advantage of their relational partners for any number of reasons (e.g., short-term temptations, shortsighted selfishness) in ways that violate models for social relationships. Actions that violate the social-relational model that participants and observers are using are thereby immoral. In order for relationships to function, people need competing motives that lead them to regulate and sustain social relations by controlling their own behavior and sanctioning others; without such relationship-regulating motives, relationships would collapse. Thus, relationship regulation theory (RR) posits that

the core of our moral psychology consists of motives for evaluating and guiding one's own and others' judgments and behaviors (including speech, emotions, attitudes, and intentions) with reference to prescriptive models for social relationships. Failing to behave in accord with relational prescriptions is considered a moral transgression and leads to emotions such as guilt, shame, disgust, envy, or outrage. These emotions proximally motivate sanctions including apologies, redress and rectifications, self-punishment, and modulation of or termination of the relationship. Moral psychology also encompasses concerns about and obligations to others with whom one has relationships, together with associated positive emotions such as com- passion, loyalty, and awe.

We use the term *motive* to indicate that our moral psychology provides not only the relevant moral evaluations but also the motivational force to pursue the accompanying behaviors that are required to regulate and sustain relationships (for an earlier use of "moral motive" in psychology see Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006). Although the motives tacitly guide moral judgments and actions, we do not necessarily expect people to be able to spontaneously explicate their judgments in terms of the moral motives or endorse these judgments upon conscious reflection, as they might for explicitly held, ideologically articulated moral principles (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009; see Levy, 1973, on hypo/ hypercognition).

In addition to being cognizant of moral motives that are necessary to maintain functioning social relationships, people must be attuned to individual characteristics that make people good prospects as relationship partners in some or all types of relationships. Virtues, such as honesty, wisdom, and kindness, and vices, such as laziness, insensitivity, and recklessness, are quasi-moral (Miller, 2008) traits that are not tied to particular moral motives but are important for evaluating the social-relational potential of other individuals. Diligence, self-control, attentiveness, and energy are traits that improve the prospects for fruitful and rewarding relationships with individuals, while their stupidity, forgetfulness, and lack of self-control detract

from them. Other virtues and vices may be somewhat specific to particular types of relationships: A quick- thinking person may make a good military leader, while someone who fails to adequately pay attention to details may not be a good person to choose as your accountant. But all virtues and vices affect others' motivation to form or sustain social relationships. Moreover, their valence may change depending on particular socio-historical circumstances and contexts. In some times and places, frugality may be quite a virtue, while in other times and places it is most morally praiseworthy to "live to the fullest" by spending, consuming, and giving lavishly. In short, virtues and vices form a penumbra around moral motives, per se.

Certain combinations of relationships also have moral implications that are not features of any of the component relationships and motives (Fiske, 2010b). For example, if you are my friend, it is a moral betrayal to me for you to help my enemy. A man married to a girl's mother should not have sex with the girl. Children of the same parents should be kind to each other. Thus, there are aspects of RR that concern the entailments of certain social relationships for other relationships or the immorality of certain combinations of relationships. Although the present paper focuses on identifying moral motives that function within different kinds of social relations, virtues and meta-relational combinations of relationships are important features of RR in the broader sense.

In the same sense that the scientific concept of mass is not identical to the folk concept of weight, RR is a scientific model of moral psychology and as such does not capture everything that is entailed by the folk model of "moral." Indeed, it could not do so because the folk model is different in every culture. Likewise, it may encompass aspects of psychology not construed as moral in some folk models. However, RR is intended to capture much of what is meant in lay terms by moral while still maintaining the advantages of a theoretically derived, deductively

coherent enterprise. Thus, we posit the parsimonious theory that morality functions to sustain

social relationships, and as such our moral psychology changes with corresponding changes in

our social- relational psychology. If RR encompasses a broad domain of important psychosocial

phenomena that can be clearly and simply explained in terms of relationship regulation, it is a

good theory, regardless of whether the phenomena that it encompasses correspond precisely to

the folk domain of moral in any particular culture. The scientific concept of force does not map

exactly onto the (variable and often fuzzy) folk concept of force in any culture, but it is

nonetheless an invaluable concept—indeed, much better for describing and explaining physics

than is the folk concept.

Theoretical approaches that have considered the possibility of a social-relational morality

include that of Joan Miller (Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990), whose

experiments found that among Indian participants and some Westerners, interpersonal

obligations were often conceptualized in moral terms. Similarly, role theories (Biddle & Thomas,

1966; Goffman, 1959), relational theories of identity (Brewer & Gardner, 1996), and cultural

approaches to social psychology (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Morris & Leung,

2000; Triandis, 1989) posit that at any given time, people are behaving in accord with a

particular social role instantiated in culture that includes particular moral obligations and norms.

At the same time, considerations of special obligations in philosophy (Jeske, 2008) posit that in

addition to the "natural duties" owed toward all people, there is a class of duties that apply to a

subset of persons, such as the duties of parents toward children. Finally, preferences for different

forms of distributive justice oriented toward equity, equality, and need vary based on social

domains and the groups people find themselves in, such as families or work interactions (Clayton

& Opotow, 2003; Deutsch, 1975; Folger, Sheppard, & Buttram, 1995). Although these are

important contributions, the impact of existing relational conceptualizations on the broader study of moral psychology has been minimized because these conceptualizations fail to provide a grounded account of the types of obligations, roles, relational identities, or relevant social domains that exist, how many there are, or how they vary across cultures. Thus, if our sense of morality emerges out of our need to regulate our social relationships, we must begin with a proper taxonomy of social relationships in order to identify the bases for core moral judgments and behaviors.

Relational Models Theory

Fiske (1991, 1992, 2000; Fiske & Haslam, 2005) proposed relational models theory (RMT) as a means for understanding and characterizing motivated coordination of social relationships. Ac- cording to RMT, there are four basic mental models, or schemas, that we employ to coordinate nearly all social interactions. These models are communal sharing (CS), authority ranking (AR), equality matching (EM), and market pricing (MP).

We use CS models when we perceive people in the same group or dyad as undifferentiated and equivalent in a salient feature, while others are not. Families, teams, brotherhoods, military units, nationalities, ethnicities, and some close friendships are often thought of in CS terms. When we rank or order individuals along a particular dimension, we are using an AR model. AR allows us to know the relative position of individuals in a linear hierarchy, such as between dominant and subordinate individuals, adults and children, military officers, and people of different castes, ages, or genders in many societies. When people use EM models they attend to additive interval differences in order to achieve and maintain balance. EM is manifest in activities such as turn taking, in-kind reciprocity, even distributions, and randomization procedures such as coin flipping. MP relations involve the use of ratios and rates to compare

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otherwise non-comparable commodities on a common metric, such as in the monetary exchanges between buyers and sellers in a marketplace or costs and benefits of a social decision.

It is important to note that in any complex relationship between two or more persons, individuals often employ multiple models at the same time to navigate different aspects of different social- relational interactions (Fiske, 1991). For example, Goldman (1993, pp. 344 – 345) wrote that "two friends may share tapes and records freely with each other (CS), work on a task at which one is an expert and imperiously directs the other (AR), divide equally the cost of gas on a trip (EM), and transfer a bicycle from one to the other for a market-value price (MP)." It is likely that such combinations of models are reflective of most complex relationships (Fiske, 2004). As we discuss in greater detail later, each of the relational models can be enacted, or constituted, in a variety of ways. Constituting a model incorrectly can often be as morally inappropriate as employing the wrong model altogether. Although not the primary focus in this paper, such moral violations are similar to notions of procedural justice, whereby individuals often care more about the process by which outcomes are achieved than the outcomes themselves (for a review, see Lind & Tyler, 1988).

RMT is based on a synthesis of classical social theory (major influences include Durkheim, 1893/2008; Marx, 1848/1972; Piaget, 1932/1965; Ricoeur, 1967; Tönnies, 1887/1957; Weber, 1905/ 1958), integrated with later research in social psychology and related fields, together with ethnological comparisons of many cultures and ethnographic fieldwork in depth among the Moose of Burkina Faso. Since the theory's original formulation, scores of studies of diverse aspects of cognition and behavior, using a great variety of methods and data analytic techniques, have validated RMT (for a review of RMT, see Haslam, 2004; for a bibliography of relevant studies, see www.rmt.ucla.edu). These studies include cluster (Haslam

& Fiske, 1992), taxometric (Haslam, 1994), and factor-analytic (Haslam & Fiske, 1999)

analyses; formal analyses (Jackendoff, 1992, 1999); memory (Fiske & Haslam, 1997; Fiske,

Haslam, & Fiske, 1991) and decision-making (McGraw, Tetlock, & Kristel, 2003) experiments;

ethnography (Whitehead, 2000); neuroscientific investigations (Iacoboni et al., 2004); and

correlational studies of psychopathology (Caralis & Haslam, 2004; Haslam, Reichert, & Fiske,

2002). RMT has also proven useful in understanding many real-world phenomena and numerous

theoretical issues ranging from the allocation of household chores (Goodnow, 1998) to

perceptions of distributive justice (Connelly & Folger, 2004; Folger et al., 1995). The structures

of these four models appear to be fundamental (Bolender, 2010), and they map onto the four

basic scale types for organizing relations in data (Stevens, 1946). Thus, CS is homologous with

nominal (categorical) measurement, wherein the organizing principle is group membership;

formally, it consists of equivalence relations. AR maps onto ordinal measurement scaling,

wherein the linear order of individuals is salient but differences cannot be quantified;

mathematically, it is a linear ordering. EM corresponds to interval measurement, wherein

differences can be added and subtracted to track imbalances; it has the structure of an ordered

Abelian group. MP has the structure of a ratio scale with a defined zero point: It is an

Archimedean ordered field (Fiske, 1992).

Moral Motives

By organizing and parsing social-relational context into four basic models for social

interaction, we can move beyond ad hoc descriptions of roles, relational identities, special

obligations, or social domains and develop a theory of the different moral motives that are

crucial for driving individuals to generate and maintain the types of social relations described in

RMT (Bolender, 2003; Fiske, 2002; Fiske & Mason, 1990; Goldman, 1993; Jackendoff, 1999).[2]

But positing that moral motives within relational models form the core of our moral psychology still leaves open the question of just how moral psychology is embedded in our social relationships. Thus, whereas RMT identifies the different forms and structures of social relationships, our aim is to examine the moral obligations entailed by different models, the ways in which models can be violated and thus lead to redress or breakdown of a relationship, and how people are motivated to adhere to these obligations and violations in order to generate and maintain adaptive, functioning social relationships. Although much of the content of particular moral judgments will still depend on how the relevant social relationships are construed (e.g., who is the superior vs. subordinate, what is the extent of the damage caused, what counts as a turn and whose turn it is), the key to our approach is that it will identify the criteria upon which moral judgments are made and behaviors enacted. Thus, when employing an MP model and its corresponding moral motive, individuals may disagree about the nature of the cost–benefit calculation, but they do not disagree that conducting a cost–benefit calculation is the correct course of action (even though such calculation might be despised when employing other models and their corresponding motives). The moral motives within the four social-relational models are directed toward Unity (CS), Hierarchy (AR), Equality (EM), and Proportionality (MP). These motives are responsible for guiding our moral judgments and behaviors, including when we are thinking about our own or others' actions, when we are responding to others as a second party, and when we are observing or sanctioning others as a third party.

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[2] The validity of the basic tenet that moral psychology is embedded in social relationships does not depend on the more specific claim that the four relational models are the foundations of morality, of course. But we make this additional claim because there is solid theoretical grounding and ample empirical evidence for believing that the relational models are the frameworks for most social-relational cognition (Fiske & Haslam, 2005; Haslam, 2004). Moreover, RMT enables us to understand how moral psychology is connected to culture, social development, emotions, neurobiology, phylogeny, and evolution.

Unity

> The Hutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity and be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. The Hutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Hutu brothers. They must constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda. The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.
>   -Excerpt from the Hutu Ten Commandments, propaganda used to spur anti-Tutsi sentiment prior to the Rwandan genocide (Berry & Berry, 1999).

The moral motive in CS models is Unity. Unity is directed toward caring for and supporting the integrity of in-groups through a sense of collective responsibility and common fate. If someone is in need, we must protect and provide for that person; if someone is harmed, the entire group feels transgressed against and must respond. If an in-group member is contaminated or commits a moral violation, the entire group bears responsibility and feels tainted and shamed until it cleanses itself. A threat to the group or its integrity, or to any member of it, is felt to be a threat to all.

Unity is partially captured by conceptions of a moral circle (Singer, 1981) and the construct of moral inclusion–exclusion (Clayton & Opotow, 2003; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1990, 1992), whereby only those who are included in the group are within the scope of moral concern. Thus, within in-groups, Unity requires that we give or provide aid based on need without regard to earned merit or any expectation of later reciprocation, as echoed in analyses of communal relationships and friendship (Clark & Mills, 1979; Fiske, 1991; Silk, 2003), need-based forms of distributive justice (Deutsch, 1975; Folger et al., 1995), Gilligan's (1982) ethics of care, and theories of in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1999). For example, when asked to complete a task with a partner, participants were more likely to use pens with the same ink color if they were friends rather than strangers, suggesting that they were not concerned with who received credit for the task (Clark, 1984, Studies 2 and 3). Cross-culturally, food-sharing norms are common in small-

scale societies. Among the Ache foragers of Paraguay, hunters often receive only a small portion of their own kills, and families who cannot hunt are still provided for (Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Gurven, 2004). Moreover, individuals report that they are most likely to sacrifice themselves to save those in their own group (Swann, Gomez, Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010), as well as to spend their time and money to hunt down those who have harmed someone in their group (Lieberman & Linke, 2007). Such preferential treatment toward in-group members extends beyond cases of need because Unity dictates that people within CS relations can take freely from each other, as notions of individual ownership are minimized and active accounting of exchanges is morally prohibited. At the same time, all those within the CS relation share responsibility for the wrongdoing of a single group member. Lickel and colleagues (Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006; Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001; Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003) have found that such collective responsibility for wrongdoing is mediated by perceptions of interpersonal interdependence among those connected to a wrongdoer, which in turn is associated with the use of CS models in perceiving social groups. In-group members will also unite against outsiders if they are perceived as posing a threat to the cohesion of the in-group. We theorize that ethnic violence and genocide occur when out-groups come to be viewed as disgusting threats of contamination that must be eliminated to preserve the integrity of the in-group.

Unity often facilitates intense care and sacrifice for those within the CS relation, but because the cohesion shared by those in a CS relation is typically experienced as a sense of common substantial essence (Fiske, 2004), any sort of difference may pollute the CS relationship. Intensely felt, culturally institutionalized CS relations commonly entail taboos concerning food or sex, and violations of these taboos defile the relationship. The purity of such

CS groups thus depends on not eating certain foods or not eating or drinking with outsiders, or not performing certain sexual acts or not having sexual relations with certain persons. Incest defiles the family, adultery defiles a marriage, and a higher caste person eating with a person of lower caste defiles the entire high caste, as does sexual relations with persons of lower caste. In northern India, marriages with non-caste members or individuals outside of recognized community boundaries have even resulted in community leaders and family members opting to kill the young couples involved (Flintoff, 2010).

This tension between restoring Unity by healing and reincorporating while simultaneously wishing to restore Unity by cleansing and expunging is evident in many cultures. In some cultures, a family member who engages in homosexual relations is degraded and may be cast out of the family. Pedophiles who sexually abuse children are separated from their families and communities; one can even imagine being motivated to kill a family member who repeatedly commits incest. In the United States, the male partner of a rape victim may feel the woman has been "damaged" by the rape and may avoid sexual contact with her (Rodkin, Hunt, & Cowan, 1982, p. 95). Likewise, early Christian theodicy interpreted suffering as defilement, so that a victim of misfortune evoked dread of contagious impurity; to avoid contamination, the community would exile the sufferer (Ricoeur, 1967). Similarly, in regard to the treatment of excommunicates, it was stated that "no Christian should eat or drink with them, or give them a kiss, or speak with them" (Peace Council of Elne-Toulouges, AD 1027, as quoted in Head & Landes, 1992, p. 335). In the West, this Unity motive, emotionally experienced as disgust, long led to the enforced segregation of victims of leprosy and, more recently, to avoidance of people infected with HIV—regardless of whether the afflicted person had any control over becoming infected. These attitudes are analogous to one's feelings about surgical removal of a cancerous

organ or limb: It is sad to lose a body part but wise and wonderful to be purified of the cancer.

In honor cultures, a woman who has sexual relations outside marriage, even against her will, defiles her family, which is shamed and shunned. Other families will not marry members of the defiled family and often will not eat or drink or socialize with them. The only way to remove the family's shame and reintegrate the family into the community is to kill the polluted woman. Hence the celebration that occurred following Zahra Al- Azzo's killing reflects an attempt to reestablish Unity, both within the family and within the community.[3] From this perspective, difference in our moral response to rape lies in the manner in which the CS model between daughter, family, and community has been constituted and how the impact of rape on these CS relations is construed. Some communities view the defilement caused by rape to be beyond repair, and others view it as less threatening. The moral motive of Unity is the same but is resolved differently, leading to expulsion and care, respectively. Thus, although Westerners may find the act horrific, honor killing emerges out of the same moral motive as our own responses to rape. For the communities in which honor killing occurs, the act is quintessentially moral because it redresses a fundamental violation of an essential social relationship.

Ethnological and historical evidence from many cultures suggest that the strongest cues to constituting CS relations and their corresponding motives for Unity involve indexical cues of bodily similarity, including intimate touch and sex, nursing, blood- sharing rituals, body modifications and marking (e.g., genital modifications, facial scarification, matching tattoos, uniforms), and rhythmic, synchronous movement (e.g., marching, dancing, being carried) (Fiske,

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[3] Honor and shame also involve an element of AR in the relation between men and women, because fornication threatens the authority of fathers, husbands, and brothers. The cultural evolution of the social-relational models and how they are construed is a fascinating question in its own right. The Unity and Hierarchy motives that underlie honor and shame emerged in pastoral societies where there was little or no overarching political authority (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Schneider, 1971). In such societies, the only way a family could protect its chattel was through its reputation for violent reprisal (Wilson & Daly, 1992).

2004). Combining several of these, as is often the case in adolescent initiation rites or boot camp,

creates strong feelings of Unity and fosters a willingness to sacrifice one's life for one's mates

(Dulaney & Fiske, 1994). Mimicry, synchronous activity, and the sensation of touch have been

found to increase pro-social behavior, such as when waitresses receive larger tips after they

repeat the words of their customers (van Baaren, Holland, Steengart, & van Knippenberg, 2003),

or when participants cooperate more in economic games after walking in step with each other or

singing in unison (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009) or receiving a short massage (Morhenn, Park,

Piper, & Zak, 2008). RR predicts that Unity may also be constituted by seeking out and

emphasizing sources of commonality among those in the group, including interests, values, and

beliefs (for related perspectives, see Durkheim, 1893/2008; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Thus, cues

to similarity and group membership can increase in-group favoritism and out-group hostility

(Sherif, 1956; Tajfel et al., 1971), and even sharing a birthday increases cooperation in a

prisoner's dilemma game (Miller, Downs, & Prentice, 1998). Historical analyses have also found

that Union soldiers in the Civil War who had social commonalities with each other, such as

belonging to the same religion or race or coming from the same town, were more likely to risk

their lives for their military company by staying rather than deserting (Costa & Kahn, 2003).

Hierarchy

> On March 16, 1968, a company of U.S. soldiers led by Lt. William Calley entered
> the hamlet of My Lai, Vietnam, and murdered over 500 civilians, primarily
> women and children. At his trial, Calley argued that he murdered the civilians
> because he was following orders and respected the authority of his superiors.
> Such incidents are not un- common in wartime, and Nazi officers made similar
> arguments to explain their acts of genocide during World War II, as did the
> guards in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. ("My Lai Massacre," 2010).

The moral motive in AR models is Hierarchy. Hierarchy is directed toward creating and

maintaining linear ranking in social groups. Subordinates are motivated to respect, obey, and pay

deference to the will of superiors, such as leaders, ancestors, or gods, and to punish those who disobey or disrespect them. Superiors, in turn, feel a sense of pastoral responsibility toward subordinates and are motivated to lead, guide, direct, and protect them. Unlike theories of social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) or system justification (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), RMT does not take the position that hierarchies are inherently immoral, exploitive, or even undesirable. Nor do legitimate hierarchies emerge out of pure force or coercion. In many cultures, people perceive hierarchy as natural, inevitable, necessary, and legitimate (Fiske, 1991; Nisbet, 1993; Tiedens, Unzueta, & Young, 2007; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In our own lives, Hierarchy is experienced when we expect our edicts to be followed by those under our care, such as our children, students, or supporters, as well as that they give us the respect we deserve as their parents, teachers, or leaders. In turn, we feel morally obligated to guide, protect, and stand up for them.

Whereas the social-interactionist perspective assumes that truly moral judgments cannot ever be based on the will of authorities (Turiel, 1983), RR posits that motives for Hierarchy create moral expectations that individuals at the top of the hierarchy are entitled to more and better things than individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy. People generally believe that deans are entitled to bigger offices, better furniture, and higher stipends than graduate students. Likewise, Homans (1953) found that ledger clerks at a company were upset that less important employees received identical pay, even though the ledger clerks believed their pay was otherwise fair and that they would not receive better wages at any other company. Similarly, Lammers, Stapel, and Galinsky (2010) found that individuals who were primed to feel an elevated sense of power judged their own hypothetical moral transgressions, such as stealing a bicycle, more leniently than the same transgressions committed by others. This discrepancy disappeared when

participants believed their power was illegitimate in some way, suggesting that these feelings of entitlement occur within an AR model motivated by Hierarchy rather than feelings of coercive power. Although superiors may feel a greater sense of entitlement, they are also perceived as being morally responsible for the actions of their subordinates (Shultz, Jaggi, & Schleifer, 1987). When coupled with Unity, Hierarchy may motivate individuals to rank social groups, with the in-group at the top and the out-group at the bottom. For example, during the Nazi rise to power, the Nazis passed a set of animal rights laws that ranked humans and animals alike on a hierarchical scale in which Aryans, wolves, and eagles were at the top of the scale and Jews and rats were at the bottom. By virtue of these positions, Nazis reasoned they could legitimately experiment on Jews (Sax, 2000). Similarly, superiors may order subordinates to commit violence for a variety of immoral or morally motivated reasons,[4] but subordinates will often follow through with the violence because they are employing an AR model and its corresponding Hierarchy motive, in which they are morally obligated to obey the will of superiors.

AR relations and their corresponding Hierarchy motives are constituted iconically through force, magnitude, space, and time (Fiske, 2004). Ethnological and historical evidence suggests that those in authority are often presented as greater in force, physically higher in space, larger, in front, or temporally preceding. Leaders often use clothing and headdresses to increase their size and height, and subordinates bow or prostrate themselves before them. Experimentally, in economic games such as Ultimatum, wherein a "proposer" is given a sum of money and has to make a onetime offer to a "responder" who can either accept or reject the offer, it has been found that assigning the proposer role based on rank from scores on a previous quiz led to lower offers

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[4] In addition to possible immoral motives, Calley may have felt moral motivation to instigate the My Lai Massacre if he viewed all Vietnamese as polluting threats to his group (Unity), believed he was morally bound by orders from superiors (Hierarchy), felt he should "even the score" for American deaths at the hands of Vietnamese (Equality), or believed that killing innocents was justified if it weakened the morale of enemy soldiers (Proportionality).

than when role assignments were random (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994).

Equality

> In 1991, a fight between children of the El-Hanashat and Abdel-Halim clans in Egypt ended in two deaths, sparking a blood feud. The most recent murders were in 2002, when 22 El-Hanashat members were gunned down. In response, a surviving El-Hanashat stated "no matter what sacrifices it takes, we are determined to kill as many of them [Abdel-Halims] as were murdered." (Halawi, 2002)

The moral motive in EM models is Equality. Equality is directed toward enforcing even balance and in-kind reciprocity in social relations. It requires equal treatment, equal say, equal opportunity, equal chance, even shares, even contributions, turn taking, and lotteries (e.g., for conscription, for a dangerous assignment, for choosing ends of the field in sports). Equality provides the moral motivation for maintaining "scratch my back and I will scratch yours" forms of reciprocity and pursuing eye-for-an-eye forms of revenge. Thus, Equality accounts for the sense of obligation we feel both in inviting people to our home after they have invited us to theirs and in seeking to hurt people precisely the way they have hurt us.

Equality motives for keeping track of whose turn it is and tracking costs and benefits to ensure that they have been distributed equally are reflected in analyses of equality-based forms of distributive justice (Deutsch, 1975; Folger et al., 1995), as well as the expectation of balanced reciprocal benefits in exchange relationships (Mills & Clark, 1994). Equality motivates individuals to be more sensitive to receiving the same amount as someone than to the total amount they receive (Bazerman, White, & Lowenstein, 1995). Similarly, people often use an equality heuristic in determining fair allocations among groups of individuals (Allison & Messick, 1990; Messick & Schell, 1992). For example, responders in the Ultimatum game often reject offers that are not a 50–50 split, even though this results in neither party receiving any money (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). We theorize that Equality motivates individuals to enforce tit-

for-tat strategies in their interactions, in which individuals initially cooperate and then reciprocate their partner's actions in kind (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). In legal systems, Equality motivates third parties to punish criminals in- kind for their crimes. Examples include the accepted use of the death penalty for those convicted of murder in the United States as well as the recent controversy surrounding a Saudi Arabian judge's inquiries into whether a man found guilty of assault could have his spinal cord medically severed in the identical position as that of his paralyzed victim (Jamjoom & Ahmed, 2010).

EM relations and their corresponding Equality motives are constituted through the concrete operations of the relational acts themselves, such as turn taking, tit-for-tat, or random assortment (Fiske, 2004). These acts consist of either a definite one-for-one balance or a statistical balance of opportunity through randomization. It has been hypothesized that the salience of random assignment to roles and use of terms such as divide support 50 –50 splits in the standard version of the Ultimatum game (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1996).

Proportionality

In 1996, during an interview on the television program 60 Minutes with then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the following exchange took place in regard to U.S. sanctions on Iraq:

Lesley Stahl: We have heard that half a million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?

Albright: I think this is a very hard choice, but the price - we think the price is worth it. (Hewitt, 1996)

The moral motive in MP models is Proportionality. Proportionality is directed toward calculating and acting in accord with ratios or rates for otherwise distinct goods to ensure that rewards or punishments for each party are proportional to their costs, contributions, effort, merit, or guilt. Unlike our earlier example of the death penalty, U.S. law does not ever require that

someone convicted of assault be assaulted in turn. Rather, the judge is expected to hand down a sentence that is proportionate to the crime in terms of time the defendant must serve or a fine that must be paid. Similarly, in a number of cultures (e.g., ancient Egypt), people expect that their fate in the afterlife will depend on the weighing of all their good and bad deeds on the scales of justice, implying a belief that the morality of all sorts of acts can be weighed on the same scale (Pritchard, 1954). The primary violation of Proportionality is cheating, whereby we strictly define the term as referring to instances in which individuals attempt to gain benefits that, according to cultural standards, are not proportional to what they deserve.

As echoed in equity-based forms of justice (Deutsch, 1975; Folger et al., 1995), Proportionality does not imply that individuals will attempt to exploit each other to maximize their own benefits. For example, Adams (1963) found that when students felt that they were being overpaid for proofreading, they worked harder so as to reduce the inequity they perceived between their lack of qualifications and the pay they were receiving. At the same time, hostility toward welfare or "handouts" may be based in Proportionality motives, whereby people are entitled to keep what they have earned and no one should receive something for nothing. Thus, people who believe that effort is important for life success are less likely to support welfare (Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Fong, 2001), suggesting that they believe people who are poor have not put in enough effort to deserve their help.

We theorize that people are motivated by Proportionality when making moral trade-offs that require doing harm or giving up some good in order to bring about a greater moral good. For example, a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits may lead us to judge that sacrificing one person is worth saving five people when in a moral dilemma (Foot, 1967; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). In real-world contexts, Proportionality motives are used to

frame judgments regarding acceptable losses for bringing about greater goods, such as in moral assessments of the accept- ability of collateral damage, or in the use of kill ratios to justify sacrificing military personnel. For example, in justifying the decision to use atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then U.S. President Harry Truman stated that "a quarter of a million of the flower of our young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities" (Alperovitz, 1996, p. 516). More generally, utilitarian morality relies on ratio scales of consequences, where good and bad outcomes can be scaled as proportions and multiplied by the number of people affected (Mill, 1863).

MP relations and their corresponding Proportionality motives are constituted symbolically. For example, the most ubiquitous MP symbol is money. It has no intrinsic value, and yet it can be used in exchange for a variety of goods (Fiske, 2004). Experimentally, Heyman and Ariely (2004) found that offering low monetary compensation for a task led individuals to exert less effort than when they received no compensation at all. The authors hypothesized that mentioning monetary compensation constituted an MP model of helping in which individuals calibrated their helping behavior to the level of compensation they received, whereas in the absence of compensation participants constituted a CS model in which they helped to the extent of their ability (for similar results, see Gneezy & Rustich, 2000). Similarly, when deciding the fairest way to allocate bonuses in a company, equal allocation among all employees is less favored for monetary bonuses than for nonmonetary bonuses, such as food or vacation time (DeVoe & Iyengar, 2010).

Null morality

Positing that different social-relational models entail different moralities raises the question of what moral obligations exist when relevant social relationships are absent or are not

activated and attended to. Similar to notions of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999) and dehumanization (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007), RR predicts that the lack of any kind of relationship motivation leads to moral indifference. For example, Brandt (1954) found that among Hopi Indians, children were allowed to capture and inflict pain on birds. When probed, the Hopi were fully aware that the birds were suffering; they were simply unconcerned with the birds' plight. Cross-culturally, it has often been the case that people recognize certain rules and prohibitions within established community boundaries but perceive no such obligations outside of those boundaries. Thus in the Philippines, Ilongot young men who were grieving, morose, or diminished felt no compunctions about seeking catharsis by cutting off the heads of strangers and, indeed, were feted and honored for doing so (Rosaldo, 1980).

Conflicting Moralities

RR suggests that conflicting moral judgments and behaviors may be due in part to individuals and groups constituting different social-relational models and corresponding moral motives for otherwise identical situations. Moreover, third parties will disagree over correct policies and practices if they employ different social- relational models as frameworks for interpreting the morality of actions. Consequently, RR radically departs from existing theories that must attribute acts of violence to non-moral biases (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007; Turiel, 1983), equate fairness with equal treatment toward all persons (Haidt, 2007; Turiel, 1983), and consider the "purity" of actions as independent of their social- relational contexts (Haidt, 2007; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997).

Moral violence

For theories of moral psychology that argue that the bases for moral judgments and behaviors always include prohibitions against intentional harm or battery (Hauser, 2006;

Mikhail, 2007; Turiel, 1983), support for violence can only be interpreted as a moral violation, an error in moral performance, or a necessary evil toward bringing about a greater good. Yet historically, harm to enemies, even their kin and children, was not seen as a necessary evil but was often viewed as morally praiseworthy. Beating one's own children for disobedience, sometimes quite severely from a Western view, is also praiseworthy in many parts of the world, and across cultures, many people feel morally bound to harm those who have harmed them and to physically punish some transgressions. Some legal systems previously did or currently do impose corporal punishments for certain crimes, and a few cultures even condone execution. Moreover, in cultures and historical periods in which executions were public, they were often quite popular spectator events—as was the case with hangings in the United States during the 18th and 19th centuries—suggesting that corporal punishment is not always seen as a necessary evil. Even if we were to label all of these behaviors as errors in moral performance, we need a theory that can explain the pattern in such "errors."

RR predicts that intentionally harming others will be perceived as more or less acceptable, and even morally praiseworthy, depending on the social-relational context within which it occurs (see Moio, 2007, for a similar perspective in analyzing torture). Such harm ranges from everyday verbal aggression to full-scale ethnic conflict. When engaging a CS model, individuals will be motivated by Unity, whereby violence directed toward the in-group is less acceptable than violence toward out-groups and violence is morally praiseworthy if the victim is perceived as a potential threat or contaminant to the in-group. At the same time, Hierarchy motivates people to judge that superiors committing violence against subordinates is more acceptable than vice versa and may even be praiseworthy if done to instruct or punish. Moreover, violence is more morally acceptable if committed under orders from superiors, and subordinates may view such violence

as morally required. When motivated by Equality, violence will be judged as justifiable and perhaps even required if it is committed in retaliation for a previous transgression (i.e., eye-for-an-eye revenge). RR also predicts that individuals will perceive violence as a necessary evil when they are motivated by Proportionality, whereby harm is acceptable if the benefits outweigh the costs.

Evidence supporting these predictions includes Cohen, Montoya, and Insko's (2006) cross-cultural analysis of violence in small-scale societies, which found that violence toward out-groups is supported more than violence toward in-groups. The association is moderated by in-group loyalty, defined as a feeling of "we" directed toward the local community, as would be predicted if these attitudes emerge out of motives for Unity. In vignette experiments, participants are less likely to support sacrifice for the greater good in a moral dilemma when the sacrificial victim is described as a close relative (Petrinovich, O'Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993), and extreme out-group members are the most likely to be sacrificed (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010; Swann et al., 2010). These results suggest that participants may be motivated by Unity to preferentially direct violence toward out-group members and away from in-group members. Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng, and Fessler (2007) found that participants did condone harm as morally appropriate when they perceived it as an accepted practice in a particular social-relational context, such as the case of 17th- century sailors being beaten for insubordination. RR suggests that harm is condoned in the case of 17th-century sailors because participants employed a Hierarchy motive that legitimizes the punitive beating of a sailor by a superior officer. Vignette experiments such as these are constructed to create conditions that minimize performance errors (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), suggesting that responses accurately reflect participants' intuitions.

Regarding real-world moral disagreement, RR predicts that many disagreements regarding

the acceptability of violence may be due to different individuals employing different moral motives to determine the criteria upon which moral judgments are made. Thus, when researchers who experiment on animals argue that killing a small number of animals is morally justified because their deaths save a much greater number of human lives, they are appealing to Proportionality motives. Such utilitarian justifications are likely effective because most people view most nonhuman animals as outside of the scope of moral concerns (Opotow, 1993; Singer, 1975). These justifications may fail to sway animal rights activists not because they have calculated the costs and benefits differently, but because the activists may be using a CS model to understand crucial aspects of the relationship between humans and animals, whereby such a trade-off would be morally prohibited.

Fairness

Whereas other theories assume that fairness implies impartiality and equal treatment (Haidt, 2007; Turiel, 1983), RR predicts that even and balanced treatment will only be judged as fair if one is employing an Equality motive. Equal treatment - ranging from dividing food equally to requiring everyone to pay the same amount for parking to providing equal legal rights to every person - will be morally prohibited when one is employing a Hierarchy motive, whereby superiors are entitled to greater rights and responsibilities, or a Proportionality motive, whereby rights and responsibilities should be proportional to merit, effort, contribution, or ability. If one is employing a Unity motive, in-group members will feel entitled to preferential treatment over out-group members. Within the group, those motivated by Unity will feel they should simply give what is needed, as it is rude to explicitly keep track of how much each individual takes and contributes - it is unseemly to be concerned about equality. Furthermore, the notion of stealing may be nonsensical when employing a Unity motive, whereby those within the CS relation can

take freely from each other, or a Hierarchy motive, whereby superiors have dominion over all things and are entitled to appropriate what they want or need.

Evidence supporting these predictions includes Clark and Waddell's (1985) finding that failing to offer repayment for a favor increased perceptions of being exploited in partners led to expect an exchange relationship but not in partners led to expect a communal relationship. If those who expected communal relationships were employing CS models to interpret the interaction, they would have viewed demands for immediate reciprocity as a moral violation of Unity motives that require sharing freely. In regard to Hierarchy, Hoffman et al. (1994) found that proposers made lower offers in the Ultimatum game when they were assigned to their position based on high scoring ranks on an earlier quiz. High scorers' lower offers did not result in increased rejection rates. Further studies are needed to determine if proposers and responders employed Hierarchy motives whereby higher ranking individuals deserved more.

With regard to real-world moral disagreement, arguments in favor of affirmative action are often framed in terms of Equality, whereby different ethnicities should be placed on equal footing, and arguments against affirmative action are typically framed in terms of Proportionality, whereby college admittance should be given to the most academically proficient and talented students, regardless of color. When actions that are fair when people employ a Proportionality motive, such as asking how much one would have to pay for a good or service, are undertaken in domains in which people typically employ other moral motives, participants find the behaviors quite immoral, such as when asked how much monetary compensation would be fair for purchasing U.S. citizen- ship (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). Ginges et al. (2007) found that inclusion of monetary incentives actually increased opposition to compromise proposals regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict for some

participants. RR suggests that such taboo "trade-offs" over sacred values occur because Unity dictates that cost–benefit analyses in which individuals within the CS group are treated as commodities that can be weighed against each other are morally despicable. When someone offers you a million dollars for your daughter, you do not counter with three million - you regard the offer as heinously offensive.

Purity

There have been two other major attempts to transcend Western philosophical preconceptions of morality and construct a theory of moral psychology that more accurately reflects the types of moral judgments and behaviors present across situations and cultures (for a review, see Sunar, 2009). Shweder et al. (1997) argued that there are three moral codes: autonomy, which captures concerns with harms and rights; community, which consists of beliefs about duty and following communal will; and divinity, which refers to conceptions of the body as a sacred temple that must remain pure. The moral foundations theory (MFT) of Haidt and colleagues (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2008) represents an extension of the three moral codes, positing that there are five innately prepared foundations to our moral psychology. Prohibitions against harm (harm/care) and predispositions toward Trivers' (1971) notion of reciprocal altruism (fairness/reciprocity; see Trivers, 1971) map onto Shweder et al.'s autonomy code, commitment to our social groups (in-group/loyalty) and respect for those higher in the hierarchy (authority/respect) map onto the community code, and moral reactions of disgust against spiritual or physical contagions that must be avoided (purity/sanctity) map onto the divinity code.

RR adds to MFT (and, by extension, the three moral codes) by grounding the foundations in a theory of social relationships and thereby predicting when and how people will rely on one

foundation over another. As indicated above, RR argues that intentional harm may be positively or negatively valenced, while the form that fairness takes varies depending on the moral motive employed. Also, whereas the authority/respect foundation emphasizes the moral obligations of subordinates toward superiors, our Hierarchy motive also focuses on the obligations of superiors to direct, lead, guide, and protect subordinates and predicts that people will use the authority/respect foundation when they are employing an AR model to navigate their social relationships. Finally, RR predicts that concerns with purity emerge when people are engaged in CS models and motivated by Unity to uphold group boundaries and avoid contamination of our groups. Consequently, the foundations of in-group/loyalty and purity/sanctity are actually variants of the same social-relational regulation motive.

RR predicts that "impure" moral acts (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993), such as odd sexual fetishes, will be judged negatively and punished because they pollute and endanger the cohesion of the social group. Other examples of purity/sanctity violations include reacting morally to incest, washing a toilet with a national flag, and eating the family dog after it was accidentally run over by a car (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2008). Yet, what is upsetting about incest is that it is a violation of a particular constellation of kinship relationships; indeed, specific configurations of kinship relationships define what constitutes incest. In some cultures, sexual relations with your older brother's wife, or with your father's brother's daughter, are incest; in other cultures, where CS relationships are constituted differently, sexual relations or marriage among these kin are prescribed. Similarly, washing toilets with a national flag is judged as immoral because nations symbolize meaningful social groups, so we predict that people will cast harsher moral judgments of such acts when they identify strongly with their nationality. At the same time, people may find the prospect of eating an animal morally disgusting and abominable when they identify with the

animal (either as a species or as an individual; Durkheim, 1915). Conversely, without a CS relationship with a species, people may have no moral and culinary reason not to eat it. Indeed, many American Indian, East Asian, and other cultures traditionally raised and ate dogs, and experimentally, participants who had recently been manipulated to eat beef were less likely to include cows in their moral circle (Loughnan, Haslam, & Bastian, 2010). Moreover, taboos against eating certain animals are important constituents of the CS relationships of totemic clans and the CS identity of Jews, Muslims, and Brahmins (for a review, see Whitehead, 2000). Similarly, castes (jati) in South Asia and elsewhere are constituted in part by moral rules against eating with outsiders, moral strictures against caste women having sex with outsiders, and other contact-avoidance rules whereby violations are morally disgusting and horrifying (Dumont, 1980).

That Unity violations are often tied to physical contact or bodily incorporation may be due to the indexical constitutive cues of CS that rely on such mechanisms. Note also that these Unity violations may sometimes become coupled with motives for Hierarchy in religiously based concerns where individuals cast Unity-violating acts as disobedience to God's will or injury to God's flock. Last, consistent with a RR account, behaviors that would otherwise be disgusting and elicit negative moral judgments are nonetheless often perceived as morally good if used to build group cohesion, such as in the case of college hazing rituals or initiation rites (Dulaney & Fiske, 1994).

Shweder et al.'s (1997) and Haidt and Joseph's (2004, 2008) attempts to expand the sphere of moral concerns beyond issues of harms and rights have ignited invaluable theoretical discourse and experiments meant to disentangle what types of judgments and behaviors should be considered "moral" (Royzman, Leeman, & Baron, 2009; Turiel et al., 1987). Although this is

an important topic within the field of moral psychology, RR moves beyond arguments related to labeling. Thus, regardless of whether one wishes to identify judgments and behaviors related to violence, inequality, or impure acts as morally motivated or not, RR predicts when and how people will engage in such judgments and behaviors depending on which social-relational models and corresponding moral motives are active.

Future Directions

The reconceptualization of moral psychology as RR and the identification of four fundamental moral motives can illuminate the nature of freedom, the connection between moral psychology and religion, the study of moral emotions, moral development, and the neurobiological underpinnings of our moral psychology.

Freedom from relationships

In some cultures, freedom - autonomy, independence - is a core moral and political value. Historically, freedom is rooted in anti-AR motives that restrict the legitimate reach of authority (Boehm, 1999), as well as the spread of MP relations into one domain after another, as first recognized by Marx (1848/1972), Maine (1861/1963), Tönnies (1887/1957), and Durkheim (1893/2008). The commoditization of labor, land, exchange, and time depends upon freedom to choose where to work, how to use land, what to produce and what to consume, and how to spend time. Commoditization turns commodities into objects of free choice. This requires people to make choices based on preferences they must formulate, thereby training people to form explicit preferences and demand the freedom to make choices based on them. Future research should explore how restriction of AR has combined with expansion of MP to form the integrated psycho-cultural construct of freedom. In particular, how does freedom interact with other moral motives to restrict the scope of some social-relational (and consequently moral) obligations, such

that beyond these boundaries people can and should pursue their own interests without regard to the needs and desires of others, and any attempts to forcibly impose social-relational obligations are regarded as illegitimate?

Relationship Regulation in religion

For the great majority of people in nearly all cultures throughout history, morality has been inextricably intertwined with religion. Indeed, for many people in many cultures, morality is religion: What is good consists of what the gods command or the ancestors will, observance of religious taboos that have intrinsic sanctions, or the correct performance of religious rituals (Durkheim, 1915/1965). Although modern theories of moral psychology have generally neglected religious morality (for exceptions, see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Shweder et al., 1997) a social-relational theory of morality naturally encompasses religion, because the core of most religions consists of social relationships with supernatural beings and among members of the congregation (Horton, 1960).

Religions often emphasize the need for respect and paternal responsibility. Hierarchy motivates followers to obey, respect, and praise gods, spirits, or ancestors. If these supernatural beings prohibit lying or stealing or adultery, such actions are ipso facto moral violations because they are acts of disobedience against these beings' will (e.g., Old Testament). Unity motivates followers of some religions to continually move toward and become one with God (e.g., New Testament). Religious taboos are often directly or indirectly concerned with protecting social relationships with others in the community, especially CS relations. Many religious rituals consist largely of affirming CS and AR social interactions with supernatural beings or among the congregants; totemic relations with animals are distinctly motivated by Unity. Sacrifices and libations, communion, baptism, marriage, funerals, initiations, and many healing rituals

constitute CS relationships with gods and among participants in congregations.

Eastern religions also motivate RR. Confucianism focuses on filial piety (Hierarchy), reciprocity (Equality), and other social- relational obligations (Young, 1983). Buddhism is structured by a worshipful AR relationship with the Buddha and, as actually practiced, often revolves around EM and other relationships with various supernatural beings (Spiro, 1967). The revered (Hierarchy) paradigms of Mahayana Buddhism are bodhisattvas who, motivated by profound compassion (Unity), seek to help others reach enlightenment and liberation. A foundation of Taoism is the teaching of Laozi about the Three Treasures:

> Here are my three treasures. Guard and keep them!
> The first is pity [compassion, love, kindness];
> the second, frugality [economy, not-wasting];
> the third, refusal to be "foremost of all things under heaven".
> For only he that pities is truly able to be brave;
> Only he that is frugal is able to be profuse.
> Only he that refuses to be foremost of all things
> Is truly able to become chief of all Ministers. (Waley, 1958)

Thus, the Three Treasures of Taoism are manifestations of Unity, Proportionality, and Hierarchy, though in practice, Taoism consists primarily of Hierarchy-driven worship of ancestor spirits and the eight immortals. The core of Jainism is Unity as universal com- passion for all things. In general, religious moralities consist of paradigms and precepts for relationships between humans and supernatural beings and relationships among the humans who worship them.

Moral emotions

Moral emotions, such as empathy and compassion (Batson & Moran, 1999; Eisenberg, 2000; Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; Hoffman, 1982), disgust (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009), contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), outrage (Goodenough, 1997; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009), guilt

and shame (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Fessler, 2004; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), pride and deference (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), awe (Keltner & Haidt, 2003), gratitude (Algoe & Haidt, 2009), elevation (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010; Silvers & Haidt, 2008), and embarrassment (Keltner & Anderson, 2000) function as proximate mechanisms for the moral motives by evaluating the social-relational potential of others, generating the desire to enter into social relationships with others, and regulating existing social relationships (Fiske, 2002, 2010a; Keltner & Haidt, 1999).

Further studies are necessary to reveal whether these and other moral emotions indeed map onto the particular kinds of social-relational models theorized by RMT and their corresponding moral motives. RR predicts that disgust, which has been linked to feelings of moral contamination and violations of purity, will be experienced most in response to violations of Unity, while emotions such as compassion and empathy will facilitate Unity motives toward caring for others in the group who are in need or have been harmed. At the same time, pride may support feelings of entitlement and responsibility among superiors that are motivated by Hierarchy, while respect and awe may facilitate subordinates in deferring to superiors. Gratitude is predicted to facilitate Equality motives that demand reciprocity in response to benefits received.

Moral development

In a series of studies, Hamlin and colleagues (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2010) found that infants as young as 3 months preferred "helper" blocks that aid a "struggling" block up an incline, compared to "hinderer" blocks that push the struggling block down. Even more intriguingly, Hamlin and colleagues have found that infants as young as 8 months preferred a puppet who helped a previously helpful puppet to one who

hindered a previously helpful puppet. Moreover, they found that infants preferred a puppet that "punished" a previously antisocial puppet to a puppet that helped a previously antisocial puppet (Hamlin et al., 2010). These findings indicate that young infants do not have a simple aversion to harmful behavior that blocks another's intentions but are capable of very complex social cognition incorporating motives for punishment. Similarly, Over and Carpenter (2009) found that priming 18-month-old infants with pictures that had images of social affiliation in the background increased infants' spontaneous helping behavior immediately following the prime. Future research will be required to determine the extent to which such cognition requires consideration of relevant social relationships versus more basic perceptions and appraisals.

RR also predicts that because relational models increase in cognitive complexity from CS to MP (Fiske, 1992), sensitivity to their corresponding moral motives should follow accordingly. This hypothesis is partially supported by Piaget's (1932/1965) finding that children's sense of egalitarianism emerged following an orientation to authority in the same manner that RMT predicts Equality motives will develop after Hierarchy motives. Further experiments are needed to determine whether the relational models and their corresponding moral motives emerge in a fixed order, cumulating to expand children's developing moral repertoire.

Neuroscientific underpinnings of Relationship Regulation

Neuroscientific research in moral psychology has been dominated by studies focusing on whether processing of moral dilemmas occurs via reasoning or emotion (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto, Ladavas, Mattioli, & di Pellegrino, 2010). Recent studies have indicated the right temporoparietal junction as important for processing intentions in moral judgments (Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). RR suggests that what is needed now is further

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understanding of the areas of the brain that are likely to be involved in processing social relationships (Iacoboni et al., 2004; see Chiao et al. 2008, for investigations into the neural underpinnings of hierarchy) as well as motivating them, such as those indicated in patients with frontotemporal dementia and patients with prefrontal lesions who are deficient in moral emotions and social motives (Fiske, 2010a; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005).

Conclusion

Relationship Regulation Theory

With some notable exceptions (Haidt, 2007; Shweder et al., 1997), approaches to moral psychology have traditionally followed the post-Enlightenment philosophical axiom that the bases for moral judgments and behaviors are restricted to rational, impartial, logical, universal principles of right actions. Consequently, studies of moral psychology have focused on examining moral judgments about actions independent of the social-relational contexts in which they naturally occur. In contrast, we have posited RR, in which moral motives, judgments, and behavior act to regulate and sustain the social relationships that are necessary for living in groups. We have categorized four fundamental, distinct moral motives aimed toward Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality that are constituted in four social-relational models people use to navigate their social relationships. These moral motives are very often incommensurable with each other, meaning that any given action may be considered right, just, and fair in the framework of one moral motive while being wrong, unjust, and unfair when employing a different moral motive.

The incommensurability of the models does not imply that there are no immoral motives. Within social groups and cultures, there are situations in which there is implicit or explicit consensus among all parties on the appropriate social-relational model to determine morally

appropriate behavior. Individuals may violate the requirements of moral motives for any number

of reasons (e.g., temptation, shortsighted self-interest), and such action would be considered a

genuine moral violation in our framework. Although individuals may justify their actions in

terms of another moral motive so as to draw on rationales to which other individuals can relate,

such post hoc reframing of a situation in no way makes the action moral. To prevent violations of

moralities we wish to sustain, RR suggests, we should direct our efforts toward constituting

social relation- ships. For example, Equality motives to enforce balanced exchange will increase

if randomness of selection, turn taking, or concrete one-to-one matching procedures are

emphasized. Like- wise, building a sense of shared essence among individuals should generate

Unity motives that foster a greater willingness to take care of each other and a greater sense of

safety through increased trust. Conversely, some forms of monitoring and mental bookkeeping

may deconstitute communal sharing, as suggested by findings that monitoring can reduce

cooperation and shift construal of the situation toward a business model equivalent to market

pricing (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). To the extent that a social-relational model is constituted,

an individual will have moral motivation to counteract immoral motives.

Moral disagreement

RR predicts that genuine moral disagreements may result from individuals and groups

applying different relational models to the same situation rather than merely disagreeing about

the relevant facts. For example, Connelly and Folger (2004) found that one source of unrest in a

company was that White men, African Americans, and women applied different relational

models to advocate three competing bases for promotions. Similarly, Giessner and van

Quaquebeke (in press) hypothesized that if leaders and their followers use different relational

models, followers may view leaders as unethical. As moral motives are not always explicitly

articulated in local cultural discourse, individuals can appear inconsistent or hypocritical if forced to justify their position using only the motives available (see Haidt, 2001, on moral dumbfounding). Thus, it has been found that although supporters of torture and other harsh interrogation techniques often defend their position using proportionality-based utilitarian justifications, support for such practices is best predicted by equality-based retribution motives (Carlsmith & Sood, 2008). RR suggests that recognizing the moral motives of all parties is the first step toward resolution of disagreements, because it enables opposing parties to understand their competing moral perspectives rather than condemn each other with reference to social-relational frameworks that are incongruent or unrepresentative of the actual motives underlying judgment (for cultural differences in available moral discourses, see Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001).

Moral disagreement can also occur within individuals, as they may face situations in which the appropriate moral motive is ambiguous. Additionally, people participate in multiple relation-ships, each with their own moral motives; often, these motives pull in different directions. Thus, if soldiers feel some sense of CS to all humans, killing an enemy can have traumatic consequences (Baum, 2004). Similarly, soldiers may feel morally motivated in their actions while they are in battle, but when they return home they may have difficulty reconciling what they have done with a new environment that constitutes different social-relational models and consequent moral motives and has no consistent process for reintegrating them into the social group. Ultimately, we must identify the socio-ecological conditions that support different social-relational models in order to understand how different circumstances lead individuals to favor one model and its corresponding moral motives over another (Kameda, Takezawa, & Hastie, 2005; Nettle, Panchanathan, Rai, & Fiske, 2010).

Ethical implications

Whereas the field of moral psychology is directed toward descriptively analyzing the bases for our moral judgments and behaviors, moral philosophy is directed toward determining how we ought to structure our societies and lead our lives. Efforts to elucidate moral psychology are important for guiding the development of prescriptive ethical conceptions insofar as contemporary philosophers seek to "naturalize" prescriptive ethics by taking into account human nature, culture, and development (Flanagan, Sarkissian, & Wong, 2008; Wong, 2006).[5] According to Doris and Stich (2008), "An ethical conception that commends relationships, commitments, or life projects that are at odds with the sorts of attachments that can reasonably be expected to take root in and vivify actual human lives is an ethical conception with - at best - a very tenuous claim to our assent." By grounding itself in the "relationships, commitments, or life projects" that "vivify actual human lives," RR delineates the constraints on the moral positions that make sense, while providing a conceptual language for debating moral issues.

The strength of RR is that it illuminates the fact that some judgments and behaviors, such as those related to violence toward others and unequal treatment, which we may view as prescriptively immoral and which some have described as resulting from non- moral, selfish, and social biases, can reflect genuine moral motives embedded in social relationships. What makes these practices seem foreign to us and sometimes abhorrent is that different groups or cultures understand otherwise identical situations with reference to different social-relational models or different implementations of the same model. What is true to the moral motives of one relational model may be antithetical to the moral motives of another. Of course, people often actively attempt to excuse or justify actions that violate one social relationship by reframing it as

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[5] It should be noted that philosophers have long debated as to whether and how descriptive facts of moral psychology should be used to generate a prescriptive ethical theory (Doris & Stich, 2008; Hume, 1739/1978; Moore, 1903; Wilson, Dieterich, & Clark, 2003).

consistent with another kind of relationship. Moreover, political leaders, governments, and religions often select and promulgate the moral motive that best suits their own ends. However, RR suggests that people often would not willingly go along unless the ideologically legitimating framing resonated with the moral motives that people are ready to employ. Thus, a practice such as slavery may have served selfish interests, but slavery could not have taken hold and been maintained in any of the cultures in which it has been prevalent without Hierarchy motives to morally legitimize it.

This raises serious questions about the ways in which the natural foundations of morality may be used as rationales for judging cultural practices that we intuitively believe are immoral. If some prescriptively "evil" practices in the world are facilitated by the same moral motives that lead to prescriptively "good" outcomes, we cannot blind ourselves to this truth. This is not to say that we must accept horrific acts because they have a natural and objective basis in human moral psychology. We may and we should assess which moral motives best promote human health, well-being, and peace. But we must understand the moral psychological bases of acts we aim to deter if we are to foster the tolerance that is necessary to relate to each other and to develop the wisdom to combat practices we cannot condone. Efforts to change practices we find abhorrent, or to foster practices we deem good, will require us to understand which social-relational models are most conducive to human welfare under specific socio-ecological conditions. On the basis of this understanding, we must then work to constitute the social relations that generate the moral motives we seek to foster. We hope this review is a first step in that direction.

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Chapter 3

Activating Social-Relational Schemas leads to Competing Moral Motives

How do people agree on the fairest way to make decisions, exchange goods, distribute resources and responsibilities, or determine whom to blame when violence occurs? Should a leader decide for everyone, or should they all take a vote? Should exchanges be tracked, or should people give and take freely from each other without the expectation of reciprocation? Should we give to those who are in need or should we give to those who have directly contributed? When violence occurs, should we blame perpetrators only, or should the rest of the group bear responsibility as well? And crucially, what happens when we disagree?

According to Relationship Regulation Theory (RR), fundamentally different schemas for social relationships entail fundamentally different moral motives that guide behavior (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Disagreements about what is morally correct often occur when opposing people, cultures, and organizations employ different social-relational schemas that entail conflicting moral motives. Similar to previous work on pragmatic reasoning schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), we conducted two experiments to investigate whether activating different social-relational schemas would activate corresponding moral motives that entail conflicting moral obligations and transgressions in the domains of fairness and violence as predicted by RR.

Previous Research

Perceptions of injustice trigger feelings of anger and resentment that have negative consequences for social relations (Haidt, 2007; Turiel, 1983). Skarlicki and Folger (1997) found that when workers felt they were being treated unjustly, there were higher incidences of retaliatory behavior, including shirking at work, wasting materials, theft, insubordination, spreading rumors, extended breaks, and passive-aggressive behavior. Similarly, in experimental

bargaining games, it has been consistently found that when people perceive that they are being treated unfairly, they reject offers even if doing so results in a worse outcome for all parties (Camerer & Thaler, 1995).

But what are the criteria people rely on to determine whether actions were fair or violence was just? For example, in the field of 'Distributive Justice', which refers to fairness in regard to the outcomes people receive, what counts as a "fair" outcome is often unclear. Is the fairest outcome one that allocates a resource *equally* among all parties, one that allocates most of the resource to those highest in *rank*, one that allocates most of the resource to the people who *need* it the most, or one that allocates *equitably*, meaning that people receive an amount proportionate to their contribution (Deutsch, 1975; Rai & Fiske, 2011)? Similar alternative models of justice exist in the domains of decision-making, exchange, and moralized violence. How do we choose amongst them?

Fiske (1991, 1992) outlined four universal schemas for social relationships (Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Matching, and Market Pricing) that capture the fundamental modes of coordinating social relations across cultures. Here, I use the term *social-relational schema* to refer to a structured mental representation that organizes knowledge and thinking about social relationships, where activation of part of the schema leads to activation of the rest of the schema, including any moral components it may have. Similar to research on pragmatic reasoning schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), I will argue that activating these social-relational schemas will brink online different sets of motives regarding morally correct judgment and behavior.

In Communal Sharing (CS) schemas, people in the same group or dyad are perceived as undifferentiated and equivalent in a salient feature. CS is common in families, teams,

brotherhoods, military units, nationalities, ethnicities, and some close friendships. When we rank or order individuals along a particular dimension, we are using an Authority Ranking (AR) schema. AR allows us to know the relative position of individuals in a linear hierarchy, such as between dominant and subordinate individuals, adults and children, military officers, and people of different castes, ages, or genders in many societies. When people use Equality Matching (EM) models they attend to additive interval differences in order to achieve and maintain balance. EM is manifest in activities such as turn-taking, in-kind reciprocity, even distributions, and randomization procedures such as coin flipping. Market Pricing (MP) schemas involve the use of ratios and rates to compare otherwise non-comparable commodities on a common metric, such as in the monetary exchanges between buyers and sellers in a marketplace or evaluations of costs and benefits of a social decision.

According to RR, each of the four social-relational schemas entails a distinct moral motive that is fundamental to understanding moral judgment and behavior across individuals and social groups (Rai & Fiske, 2011). From this perspective, our morality will always be framed within a particular model, and it is by virtue of people's shared understanding of the four social-relational schemas that they are able to decipher their use in a given context. To the extent that certain activities and behavioral domains lend themselves to particular relational models either out of necessity or functionality, there will be similarity in moral beliefs across cultures. For example, in the military, AR models employed between generals and soldiers are far more advantageous in terms of speed and decisiveness than structuring relationships based on EM. Imagine taking a vote on a course of action while the enemy is attacking! Cultural diversity in morality results from differences in the implementation rules applied to the use of each model in each domain and the relative importance and precedence of each of the models. Thus, in some

cultures, some social-relational schemas may take precedence over others across domains, or different schemas will be implemented quite differently in the same domains.

The moral motives are Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality. Unity is the moral motive that is engaged when people employ CS schemas for social relations. Unity is the motive to care for and support the integrity of in-groups by avoiding or eliminating threats of contamination and providing aid based on need or compassion. Unity motivates need-based distribution, consensus-based decision-making, free-exchange, and collective responsibility for wrongdoing. For example, it has been found that close friends (a relationship often characterized by CS) are less concerned with who receives credit for work done together (Clark & Mills, 1993), and people are more likely to allocate money based on need if told the recipients of the money are friends with each other (Lamm & Schwinger, 1980). In addition, violence is most strongly supported toward out-groups and most strongly prohibited when directed toward in-groups (Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006; Petrinovich, Jorgenson, & O'Neill, 1993; Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010; Swann, Gomez, Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010). Similarly, third parties are most likely to take action against perpetrators if the third parties are connected to the victim in a relationship typically characterized by CS, such as between close family members (Lieberman & Linke, 2007).

Hierarchy is the motive that is engaged when people employ AR schemas for social relations. Hierarchy is the motive to respect rank in social groups where superiors are entitled to deference and respect but must also lead, guide, direct, and protect subordinates. Hierarchy motivates rank-based distribution, leaders making decisions and controlling resources, and the prohibition of violence directed toward superiors. For example, Homans (1953) found that ledger clerks were upset that lower ranking employees received equal pay, even though the ledger

clerks believed their pay was otherwise fair and that they could not get a better offer anywhere else. Beliefs in superiors' entitlement may be shared by subordinates as well. In experimental bargaining games it has been found that assigning a high rank to someone leads them to make lower offers, but these offers are still accepted by people who have been assigned a low rank (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994). Although Hierarchy entitles superiors to more and better things, superiors are also responsible for the actions of their subordinates (Shultz, Jaggi, & Schleifer, 1987). Meanwhile, in socio-historical contexts that supported AR, Hierarchy entitle superiors to punish subordinates (Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng, & Fessler, 2007).

Equality is the motive that is engaged when people employ EM schemas for social relations. Equality is the motive for balanced in-kind reciprocity, equal treatment, and equal opportunity. Equality motivates equality-based distribution, one person one vote decision-making, matched, one for one exchanges, and eye for an eye revenge. For example, it has been found that people are more sensitive to whether they are receiving the equal amount to someone else than to the total amount they are receiving (Bazerman, White, & Lowenstein, 1995). In bargaining games, people often reject offers that are unequal even if the decision results in neither party receiving any money (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Tit for Tat reciprocity is characterized by cooperating initially, and then responding in-kind to the actions of your partner, even if those actions are aggressive (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).

Proportionality is the motive that is engaged when people employ MP schemas for social relations. Proportionality is the motive for rewards and punishments to be proportionate to merit, benefits to be calibrated to contributions, and judgments to be based on a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits. Proportionality motivates equity-based distribution, rational cost-benefit analyses to make decisions, payment in exchanges, and utilitarian rationales for committing

violence. For example, people who believe effort is important for life success are less likely to support welfare because they believe the poor must work harder to earn more money (Fong, 2001). Proportionality motives also underlie utilitarian judgments of collateral damage, as demonstrated in moral dilemmas where participants decide to sacrifice one person to save five (Foot, 1967).

A primary prediction of RR is that people who use different social-relational schemas to perceive situations will employ different, often conflicting moral motives. For example, in the context of distributive justice, Deutsch (1975) argued that equity, equality, and need-based forms of fairness are favored in different social contexts. Social contexts aimed toward economic productivity (conceptually similar to MP) support equity-based distribution based on prior performance, those aimed toward establishing group harmony support equality-based distribution, and those aimed toward caring for all group members and fostering personal development (conceptually similar to a combination of CS and AR) support need-based distribution to support future potential. Drawing directly on Fiske's (1991, 1992) social-relational schemas, Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner (2000) found that although setting prices was morally appropriate in contexts where people employ MP, such pricing practices generated outrage and confusion when participants employed a CS schema (e.g., in attempts to purchase votes or citizenship). These attempts to impose MP Proportionality in CS Unity settings can have disastrous results, as exemplified in the angry responses that some Israelis and Palestinians have when the opposing side offers material incentives for land that is perceived in communal sharing terms as sacred (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007). Similarly, when forced to apply Proportionality motives in CS contexts where objects have infinite value, people wildly overspend, such as in the prices they pay for funerals and weddings (McGraw, Schwartz,

& Tetlock, 2012). In an ethnographic study of an organizational setting, Connelly and Folger (2004) found that dissatisfaction at a company could be traced to social-relational schemas and corresponding moral motives for implementing promotions. White men believed that the company should be structured based on CS Unity, wherein promotions are given without relying on explicit criteria; women believed the company should be structured based on MP Proportionality and promotions should be based strictly on merit; and African-Americans believed the company needed to adhere to EM equality wherein promotions should be allotted equally among different ethnic groups. In a similar study, Vodosek (2003) used narrative data to demonstrate that dissimilarity in relational models scientists used to organize work reduced satisfaction and increased intentions to quit a lab group.

In the present study, we aim to experimentally investigate whether activating different social-relational schemas will lead to activation of distinct moral motives across various domains of fairness and violence as theorized by RR (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Although the implementation of different social-relational schemas differs greatly across cultures and groups, if we can successfully activate the social-relational schema in non-moral terms, then they should nevertheless lead to activation of the schemas' moral motives. In Experiment 1, we framed a social group in different social-relational terms and investigate whether the relational framing guides participants' judgments of morally correct behavior regarding how the group should make decisions, navigate exchanges, distribute responses, and handle cases of violence. Whereas Experiment 1 investigates whether participants think that the social relationships among a group should influence their moral behavior, Experiment 2 investigated whether activation of social-relational schemas would transfer to an entirely new context. We investigated whether priming participants to think of different social relationships affected attitudes regarding how to distribute

bonuses in a company. If activation of social-relational schemas guides moral judgments in ways predicted by RR, this will provide empirical support for distinct moral motives being embedded in corresponding social-relational schemas, and provide one avenue for the emergence of moral disagreement.

Experiment 1

According to RR, different moral motives emerge in different social-relational contexts. We hypothesized that providing people with information about the structure of social relationships in a group will influence their judgments about morally correct behavior in the group. Using a similar methodology, Mannix, Neale, and Northcraft (1995) found that presenting a company as existing in a social context aimed toward economic productivity led to rewarding past performance, while a social context aimed toward fostering personal development led to rewarding future potential, and a social context aimed toward establishing personal relationships led to balanced concerns with past performance and future potential. Similarly, Austin (1980) found that people shifted their allocation strategies from an equality-based distribution principle to an equity-based distribution principle when interacting with strangers. Expanding on these lines of research, we examined whether manipulating the structure of social relations within a hypothesized social group would influence participants' evaluations of the morality of different solutions to various collective action problems the group encountered.

Experimental Manipulation

Experiment 1 was a vignette-based between-subjects study. Participants were presented with a description of a group of adventurers on a quest. Each description was varied to convey one of Fiske's (1991, 1992) four social-relational schemas. Describing the group as a "communal brotherhood, almost as if they are all connected" was intended to activate a CS schema and

corresponding Unity motives; describing the group as a "hierarchy they all believe in, where some are higher ranking than others" was intended to activate an AR schema and corresponding Hierarchy motives; describing the group as "co-explorers in a partnership, where each individual is on the same level" was intended to activate an EM schema and corresponding Equality motives; and describing the group as "skilled professionals who each bring particular specialties to the table" was intended to activate a MP schema and corresponding Proportionality motives. For example, participants in the CS condition read:

Several hundred years ago, a group of men set out on a daring quest. They feel **like a brotherhood, almost as if they are all connected**. Given this information, please answer the following questions. (boldface not in original)

Dependent Variables

Following the description of the social group, participants were asked how the group should handle various morally ambiguous situations in domains related to decision-making, resource exchanges, distributive justice, and violence. For each domain, participants were presented with four options for how the men in the group should act, each of which corresponded to one of the moral motives as hypothesized by RR (see appendix 1). Participants were then asked to rate how morally appropriate each action was. For questions related to fairness, participants reported their preferences on a scale ranging from 1 (**not fair at all**) to 7 (**completely fair**). For the questions related to morally sanctioned violence, participants reported their preferences on a scale ranging from 1 (**completely unacceptable**) to 4 (**morally acceptable**) to 7 (**morally required**). For example, in the case of distributive justice, participants were told that the group had discovered a buried treasure and must decide how to distribute the treasure. Participants then rated how fair each option was, including an option where the treasure is used to acquire something they can all share with any left over going to those who need it the

most (Unity), an option where leaders get most of the treasure (Hierarchy), an option where the treasure is distributed equally to everyone (Equality), and an option where the treasure is distributed equitably based on everyone's contributions to that particular discovery (Proportionality).

In the domain of decision-making, participants were asked to evaluate whether decisions should be made by consensus (Unity), by leaders (Hierarchy), by a one-person one-vote system (equality), or by a rational cost-benefit analysis (Proportionality). In the domain of exchange, participants were told that sometimes one of the men needs something from one of the others, and were asked to evaluate the fairness of everyone having shared access to everything (Unity), leaders having access to the possessions of subordinates but not vice-versa (Hierarchy), a system in which a person has to get permission to borrow something and must replace what they borrow (Equality), and a system in which people must get permission and pay for anything they take (Proportionality). In the domain of violence, participants were asked to evaluate how morally acceptable different forms of violence were, including harming someone in retaliation for something done to the group (Unity), harming someone because a leader commanded it (Hierarchy), one for one revenge (Equality), and collateral damage where the benefits outweigh the costs (Proportionality) (see Table 1). Note that participants were not asked to imagine that they were in the group. Rather, they were simply asked as a third party about their moral opinions regarding how the group should operate (see Appendix A).

Table 1. *Requirements of moral motives across different domains*

	Decision-Making	Exchange	Distributive Justice	Sanctioned Violence
CS Unity	Decisions made by consensus	Free-exchange of all resources with no tracking	Give based on need, where neediest get first priority	More support for collective responsibility for violence
AR Hierarchy	Decisions made by leaders	Leaders have dominion over all resources	Give based on rank, where leaders get first priority	More support for violence committed under orders
EM Equality	Decisions made by a one for one vote	Must replace anything that is borrowed	Give equally, such that everyone gets equal share	More support for one for one revenge
MP Proportionality	Decisions made by a cost-benefit analysis	Must provide monetary compensation for anything that is borrowed	Give equitably, such that those who contributed the most receive a proportionately greater amount	More support for collateral damage

Hypotheses

We hypothesized that framing the social group in terms of different social-relational schemas would increase support for the moral options tied to those social-relational schemas.

Hypothesis 1A: Describing the group as a "communal brotherhood, almost as if they are all connected" should activate CS Unity motives. Unity motives will increase support for need-based and shared distribution, consensus-based decision-making, shared access to all resources, and collective-based forms of violence.

Hypothesis 1B: Describing the group as a "hierarchy they all believe in, where some are higher ranking than others" should activate AR Hierarchy motives. Hierarchy motives will increase support for rank-based distribution, leaders making decisions, leaders having dominion over resources, and violence due to following orders.

Hypothesis 1C: Describing the group as "co-explorers in a partnership, where each individual is on the same level" should activate EM Equality motives. Equality motives will increase support for equality-based distribution, one-person one-vote decision-making, one for one matching of any possessions that are borrowed, and eye for an eye revenge.

Hypothesis 1D: Describing the group as "skilled professionals who each bring particular specialties to the table" should activate MP Proportionality motives. Proportionality motives will increase support for equity-based distribution, rational cost-benefit analyses used to make decisions, paying for possessions that are taken, and violence as a result of collateral damage.

Participants

Participants (*n*=88) were recruited via the introductory psychology subject pool at UCLA. There were 67 women and 21 men in the study. 33% of the participants were Asian, 30% were Caucasian, 17% were Hispanic, 10% were Middle Eastern, and 5% were African American. The ethnicity of 5% of participants could not be classified. After giving consent to participate, each participant was randomly assigned to a condition and completed the study anonymously on a computer. Participants were told they were taking part in a study on judgment. Participants answered questions on the computer, after which the experiment was over and they were fully debriefed.

Results

The results of Experiment 1 partially supported the hypotheses. Judgments across the decision-making, exchange, distributive justice, and violence domains were collapsed to form measures of support for Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality motives. Within-subjects ANOVA analyses revealed significant differences in preferences for the moral motives, regardless of the social-relational framing of the group, $F(3, 84) = 168.73$, p < .001. Pair-wise

comparisons revealed that Equality motives were supported more than Unity (t(42) = 9.04, $p <$ .001), Hierarchy (t(42) = 20.26, $p < .001$), or Proportionality (t (42) = 6.45, $p < .001$) motives. Proportionality motives were supported more than Hierarchy (t (42) = 17.10, $p < .001$) and Unity (t(42) = 2.21, $p < .05$) motives. Unity motives were supported more than Hierarchy (t (42) = 12.69, $p < .001$) motives. Between-subjects ANOVA analyses revealed significant effects of social-relational framing for support of Unity (F(3,84) = 2.93, p < .05) and Hierarchy motives (F(3,84) = 2.77, p < .05), but not Equality (F (3, 84) = .20, $p < 1$) and Proportionality (F (3, 84) = .39, $p < 1$) motives. Planned contrasts revealed that participants who were given the CS framing for the social group expressed significantly more support for Unity moral motives (M = 4.47, SD = 0.97) than participants who received the AR, EM, and MP framings (M= 3.84, SD = .85), F (1, 84) = 8.23, $p < .01$, η^2 = .09). Planned contrasts also revealed that participants who were given the AR framing for the social group expressed significantly more support for Hierarchy moral motives (M = 4.47, SD = 0.97) than participants who received the CS, EM, and MP framings (M= 3.84, SD = .85), F(1, 84) = 7.09, $p < .01$, η^2 = .08 (see Figure 1). No effects of gender or ethnicity were observed.

Figure 1. Mean ratings of support for the moral motives across different social-relational framings of the group. Error bars indicate 1 standard error of the mean.

Discussion

Exposing participants to the CS and the AR framings for the social group led to greater support for the Unity and Hierarchy moral options, respectively. These results suggest that CS and AR social-relational contexts are salient for participants and that participants believe that in those contexts groups should act according to Unity and Hierarchy motives, respectively. However, exposing participants to the EM and MP framings of the social group had no effect on participants' support for Equality and Proportionality motives. Lack of support may be due to a failure of the EM and MP frames (i.e. "co-explorers in a partnership, where each individual is on the same level", "skilled professionals who each bring particular specialties to the table") to evoke EM and MP schemas, respectively. Alternatively, EM and MP schemas may be more difficult to shift in an American cultural context. Research suggests that EM Equality may be a default strategy that Americans use in some domains (Allison & Messick, 1990), while

individualistic ideologies that align with MP Proportionality are quite prevalent in U.S. culture. If EM and MP schemas are more ingrained in American culture, then attitudes about the appropriateness of Equality and Proportionality motives will be harder to shift through subtle manipulations like those employed here.

Experiment 1 provided some evidence to suggest that moral motives are tied to social-relational schemas. However, in Experiment 1 participants were provided with information about the social relations within the group and then asked how the group should behave. If moral motives are embedded in social-relational schemas, then activating social-relational schemas should activate corresponding moral motives, even if the social-relational schema is activated in a context that is irrelevant for the context in which the moral motives must be used.

Experiment 2

In Experiment 2, we aimed to provide further evidence that moral motives are embedded in fundamental schemas for social relationships. To do so, we activated the social-relational schemas in one context without referring to their corresponding moral motives, and investigated whether activation in the initial context would lead to activation of the moral motives in a separate, unrelated context.

Experimental Manipulation

Experiment 2 was a vignette-based between-subjects study. Participants were asked to write five sentences describing someone in a particular social role that was intended to activate one of the social-relational schemas. In the CS condition, participants were asked to think of "**someone you are extremely close to and could tell anything to**." In the AR condition, participants were asked to think of "**a leader that you deeply respect or someone you perceive to be higher-ranking than you but who you could imagine being a good, trusted source of**

advice and wisdom." In the EM condition, participants were asked to think of "**a typical co-worker, fellow classmate, or casual acquaintance that you view as an equal.**" In the MP condition, participants were asked to think of "**an investor in a marketplace who rationally thinks through and analyzes all situations without letting their personal feelings get in the way**."

In pilot studies, we have also used priming manipulations that provided even less information about the social-relational schemas (e.g. think of a close friend, think of a leader, etc.), or that asked participants to make a moral evaluation in a different context (i.e. a military setting). The general pattern of results was consistent with the results reported in this study and therefore we do not report them here.

Dependent Variable

After writing five sentences describing a social role, participants were presented with the following description of a company and its employees, which was presented as an unrelated task.

> There is a business called Forge Furniture. Forge is a fine furniture company that manufactures custom pieces. The three people who work there are Keith, Ben, and Mike. In terms of responsibilities, Keith is the leader of the group. He is the oldest member of the group, is highly respected by the others, and bears ultimate responsibility for any issues that arise. Mike is the best craftsman of the group. He works hard and his pieces bring in the most profit. Ben gives as much time as he can to the company, and more than anyone, everyone knows he will be there for them. Right now he's just had his second child, and so he is desperately trying to make ends meet, but he's doing his best.

Following the description, participants were told that the company had made extra profits and needed to disburse bonuses. Participants were asked how the profits should be dispersed among the three employees of the company.

Express your opinion by ranking the following options, where a ranking of (1) would be

your most preferred option while a ranking of (4) would be your least preferred option

It should be noted that unlike in Experiment 1, where participants were asked to report

how fair or morally acceptable options were, in Experiment 2 I asked participants to report their

"preferred option". The advantage of this approach is that it reveals whether activating social-

relational schemas changes participants preferences for what the correct action should be; the

disadvantage is that preferences are not exclusively moral. Given that I asked about explicitly

moral attitudes in Experiment 1, asking about preferences in Experiment 2 seemed acceptable

and it provides more breadth to the data. Participants were presented with four options for how to

disburse the bonuses, each of which corresponded to one of the forms of distributive justice tied

to the moral motives as theorized by RR. Participants were then asked to rank each of the four

options from 1 (most preferable) to 4 (least preferable). The Unity option specified that "the

group should give Ben a little more of the bonus money because they're all in this together and

he could really use a little help right now." The Hierarchy option specified that "Keith should get

a little more of the bonus money since he is the leader of the group and bears the most

responsibility." The Equality option specified that "They should just divide the bonus money

equally, so that they all get the same amount." The Proportionality option specified that "Mike

should get most of the bonus money because he contributed the most to the bottom line, with the

others receiving an amount proportionate to their respective contributions."

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 2A: Describing "someone you are extremely close to and could tell anything

to" will activate CS schemas and corresponding Unity motives that will lead participants to

prefer distributing more of the bonus money to Ben, since he needs the money the most.

Hypothesis 2B: Describing "a leader that you deeply respect or someone you perceive to

be higher-ranking than you but who you could imagine being a good, trusted source of advice and wisdom" will activate AR schemas and corresponding Hierarchy motives that will lead participants to prefer distributing more of the bonus money to Keith, since he is the highest ranking member of the group.

Hypothesis 2C: Describing "a typical co-worker, fellow classmate, or casual acquaintance that you view as an equal" will activate EM schemas and corresponding Equality motives that will lead participants to prefer distributing the bonus money equally among all the employees.

Hypothesis 2D: Describing "an investor in a marketplace who rationally thinks through and analyzes all situations without letting their personal feelings get in the way" will activate MP schemas and corresponding Proportionality motives that will lead participants to prefer giving most of the bonus money to Mike, since he contributed the most to the company's success.

Participants

Participants (*n*=81) were recruited via the introductory psychology subject pool at UCLA. There were 69 women and 12 men in the study. 40% of the participants were Asian, 25% were Caucasian, 15% were Hispanic, 7% were Middle Eastern, and 8% were African American. The ethnicity of 5% of participants could not be classified. After giving consent to participate, each participant was randomly assigned to a condition and completed the study anonymously on a computer. Participants were told they were taking part in a study on judgment. After the participants answered the questions presented to them, the experiment was over and they were fully debriefed.

Results

The results of Experiment 2 partially supported the hypotheses. ANOVA analyses

revealed no significant effects of social-relational priming on judgments of how to distribute the bonus money. However, within-subjects ANOVA analyses revealed significant differences in preferences for distribution options, regardless of the social-relational priming condition. Pairwise comparisons revealed that equal distribution (mean rank = 1.92, SD = 1.18) was supported more than need-based distribution (mean rank = 2.49, SD = 1.09), $t(79) = 7.43$, $p <$ .001; rank-based distribution (mean rank = 2.98, SD = .99), $t(79) = 4.85$, $p < .001$; or equity-based distribution (mean rank = 2.60, SD = .97), $t(79) = 3.97$, $p < .001$. Rank-based distribution was supported less than equality-based distribution, need-based distribution ($t(79) = -2.40$, $p <$ .05) and equity-based distribution ($t(79) = -3.20$, $p < .01$). No significant differences were found between need-based distribution and equity-based distribution ($t(79) = .69$, $p < 1$). Given that there was a floor effect for judgments of rank-based distribution and a ceiling effect for judgments of equality-based distribution, follow-up analyses were conducted that focused on the CS and MP priming conditions and their corresponding need-based and equity-based distribution options. Chi-square analyses revealed that participants who had experienced the CS priming were significantly more likely to prefer need-based distribution and less likely to prefer equity-based distribution than participants who had experienced the MP priming ($X^2 = 4.36$, p < .05) (see Figure 2). No effects of gender or ethnicity were observed.

Figure 2. Number of people who preferred giving most of the bonus money to Ben based on need or Mike based on his contribution. Bars in black are participants who thought about someone close to them beforehand, and bars in white are participants who thought about an investor in a marketplace beforehand.

Discussion

Experiment 2 provided some evidence to suggest that activating social-relational schemas can influence later judgment. When participants thought about a close relationship beforehand, they preferred need-based distribution more and equity-based distribution less for a completely unrelated task, whereas participants who had thought about an investor in a marketplace beforehand preferred equity-based distribution more and need-based distribution less. These findings are in accord with research on communal versus exchange relationships (Mills & Clark, 1994), which has shown that in communal relationships (conceptually similar to CS) people are more attuned to the needs of their partners, while in exchange relationships (conceptually similar to a combination of EM and MP), people are attuned to tracking costs and benefits to ensure reciprocity and equity in social relations.

Lack of support for Hierarchy and Equality being embedded in AR and EM schemas may be due to the preferences for equality and rank-based distribution being too strong to be

influenced by the social-relational priming. Across all conditions, equality-based distribution was more preferred than all other distribution options. These results are in accord with research on the equality heuristic (Allison & Messick, 1990) that demonstrates a strong preference for equality in distribution of resources. Meanwhile, rank-based distribution was least preferred across all conditions, similar to how it was perceived in Experiment 1. It is possible that participants in an American context see authority as illegitimate and are opposed to benefits being conferred based on rank.

General Discussion

Across two experiments, I investigated whether fundamental moral motives are embedded in schemas for social relationships. In Experiment 1, I examined whether framing the structure of social relations in a group in terms of different social-relational schemas would influence judgments of morally correct behavior regarding decision-making, exchange, distributive justice, and violence. In Experiment 2, I examined whether activating a social-relational schema in one context could affect judgments of distributive justice in an unrelated context. Results from the two studies were mixed. Experiment 1 provided support for Unity and Hierarchy motives being embedded in CS and AR schemas, respectively, but failed to provide any support for Equality and Proportionality motives being embedded in EM and MP schemas. Meanwhile, Experiment 2 provided some evidence to suggest that activating CS schemas supports need-based distribution while activating MP schemas supports equity-based distribution. However, no support was found for the hypothesized links between EM and equality-based distribution or AR and rank-based distribution.

As mentioned earlier, lack of support for Equality and Proportionality motives in Experiment 1 may have been due to the relational framings failing to adequately evoke EM and

MP schemas, respectively. The accessibility of the different social-relational schemas and the ways in which those schemas are implemented differs greatly between cultures (Fiske, 1991, 1992). If EM and MP schemas are relatively ingrained in American culture, then they may operate as default strategies that people use unless social-relational cues are especially salient. Similarly, in Experiment 2, asking people to think of different social relationships may not have been salient enough to shift perceptions of equality and rank-based distribution, particularly if people have a strong preference for equality-based distribution and a strong antipathy toward rank-based distribution, as suggested by the data. Given the high variability in how social-relational schemas are implemented across diverse domains, it is not surprising that it was difficult to consistently elicit the moral motives. At the same time, the existence of consistent differences in preferences for different moral motives suggests that the obligations and transgressions tapped by the moral motives provide a new method for investigating cultural differences in reliance on different forms of morality. Thus, while Equality motives may be particularly preferred and Hierarchy motives particularly disdained in American contexts, we may find different patterns of preferences in other cultures, such as greater preference for the moral requirements of Hierarchy in Indian contexts (Miller & Bersoff, 1992).

Limitations and Future Directions

To demonstrate that people may rely on some social-relational schemas more than others, future studies should include control conditions that provide no social-relational framing or priming. These conditions might reveal whether participants' default expectations for social interactions is aligned with one of the moral motives, such as equality or proportionality in an American context. I could also measure individual traits that would reveal default expectations, such as existing measures for capturing communal and exchange orientations (Buunk, Doosje,

Jans, & Hopstaken, 1993). Similarly, some traits may predict greater sensitivity to social-relational expectations of groups for morally correct behavior, such as proneness to feeling guilt (Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006). In addition, rather than relying on semantic framing and priming methods, future studies should examine moral motives using the distinct modalities within which different social-relational schemas are constituted across cultures (Fiske, 1991; 1992). CS is constituted indexically, including touch, eating together, and similarity; AR is constituted iconically, including differences in size, magnitude, and vertical space; EM is constituted through concrete operations, including one for one matching procedures and turn-taking; and MP is constituted symbolically, including the use of money as a medium of exchange. Devoe and Iyengar, (2010) found that people were more likely to favor equity-based distribution if they were allocating money than if they were allocating a non-monetary good. Similarly, Wiltermuth and Heath (2010) found that singing or moving in synchrony increased cooperative giving in a bargaining game.

Future studies should investigate whether using the constitutive cues that naturally evoke different social-relational schemas will activate their corresponding moral motives across a broad range of fairness and violence domains. Thus, will activating MP through the use of money lead to more utilitarian moral judgments? Will activating AR by placing someone in a position of authority or higher in physical space lead them to feel a greater sense of responsibility for protecting others? Will activating CS by being in physical contact with someone increase need-based distribution? Outside the lab, will people be motivated by different moral motives when they are eating together (CS Unity) than when they are shopping for bargains (MP Proportionality)? By combining the cues to different social-relational schemas with corresponding moral motives, RR provides a powerful framework for examining how different

social-relational contexts facilitate different forms of morality.

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Appendix A

Vignettes for Experiment 1

Below I have first written the vignettes with the different framing information in parentheses. Participants read these vignettes following a description of the group that framed it in terms of different social-relational schemas. Note that a given participant only saw one of the relational framings, otherwise the descriptions were identical.

1) During the course of their journey, they must make decisions about where to travel and how best to accomplish their goals. Please rate how fair each of the following means for making decisions would be.   (rating scale: 1 = not fair at all, 4 = moderately fair, 7 = completely fair)

2) During the course of the journey, there are times when one of the men needs to use someone else's possessions, such as food, tools, or money, but that person is away on another assignment. Please rate how fair each of the following means for determining whether to use somoene else's possessions would be.

   (rating scale: 1 = not fair at all, 4 = moderately fair, 7 = completely fair)

3) One day, they discover a buried treasure that is quite valuable. Please rate how fair each of the following means for distributing treasure would be.

   (rating scale: 1 = not fair at all, 4 = moderately fair, 7 = completely fair)

4) Occasionally during their journey and for various reasons, violence occurs and people are seriously injured or killed. Please rate how morally required, acceptable or unacceptable the following forms of violence that might be committed by the men are.

   (rating scale: 1 = completely unacceptable, 4 = acceptable, 7 = required)

Chapter 4

Moral Judgments as Assessments of Relationship Prospects

Why is Mother Theresa more revered than Bill Gates, even though the Gates' foundation has saved considerably more lives (Pinker, 2008)? Why are people judged more severely if they have character flaws, even when those character flaws have no bearing on the crime that was committed (Nadler, in press)? Why are people punished for events that were clearly unintended, as in honor killings of women after they have been raped (Zoepf, 2007)?

The dominant paradigm in moral psychology assumes that people make moral judgments by judging the rightness or wrongness of *actions* independent of the social-relational context within which those actions take place (for a critique, see Rai & Fiske, 2011). In this act-based paradigm, people will be found morally blameworthy if they acted *intentionally* to cause harm to another person when they reasonably could have done otherwise. "Intentions" reflect partial plans of action that people commit to in order to fulfill their goals through a specific means (Bratman, 1989). Indeed, experimental evidence has typically found that people are blamed or punished less severely if they acted unintentionally, even if the action itself remains identical (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007; Gray, Young, & Waytz, in press; Darley, Klosson, & Zanna, 1978; Cushman, 2008). In Western law, *mens rea* refers to an actor's mental states during a criminal offense; in order to justify maximum punishment, criminals often must be found guilty of having committed the crime intentionally (Duff, 1990). The tenets of the act-based paradigm fit with many contemporary western intuitions and philosophical perspectives about moral responsibility. However, it does not explain *why* intentions are often important for our judgments of blame, praise, and punishment nor does it explain cases in which intentions do not play as strong a role. The act-based paradigm also fails to explain why criteria that may be irrelevant to

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actions, such as an actor's desires or personality characteristics, may still exert an influence on others' moral judgments of them.

In this chapter, I propose that we must shift away from an act-based paradigm of moral psychology toward what I refer to as a *relationship-based* paradigm of moral psychology. To understand patterns in when and how people use intentions in moral judgment, I will argue that we must understand the functional role that inferences of intention play in moral judgment. According to Relationship Regulation Theory (RR), moral judgments cannot be separated from the social-relational contexts within which they take place (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Rather, the function of our moral psychology is to facilitate the generation and maintenance of long-term social-relationships with others which make human group living possible. Consequently, different ways of relating entail fundamentally different moral motives regarding morally correct actions. Whereas treating everyone equally may be morally correct in some social-relational contexts, it may be explicitly wrong in others. I extend RR to argue that when people make moral judgments, they are not only evaluating the rightness or wrongness of someone's actions, rather they are also evaluating what kind of social-relational partner that person is and will be. We care about someone's intentions to the extent that we view them as meaningful and informative for inferring the quality of the person as a *prospect for social relationships* (either with ourselves or with the social group at large). Someone who hurts me on purpose is generally not as good of a relationship prospect as someone who hurts me by accident. Thus, intentions are cues to the target attribute of diagnosing someone's social-relational potential rather than the objects of evaluation themselves. When people believe that someone is a poor relationship prospect for other reasons, such as inferences of underlying negative character traits, intentions will lose their predictive validity for evaluating social-relational potential.

The most common reason for inferring that someone is a poor relationship prospect will be when the person has negative underlying characteristics that are important for long-term social relationships. Vices that would make someone a poor partner in any social relationship include selfishness, impulsivity, carelessness, and laziness, while virtues such as honesty, wisdom, and kindness will make someone a good partner in any relationship. Additionally, a person will be a poor prospect if they cannot prevent their harmful behavior from reoccurring in the future, or if the harm caused by a transgression is so severe that the relevant social relationships cannot be repaired in the future and must be severed. Finally, the extent to which virtues and vices are moralized will depend on the relationship within which it is considered. For example, judging someone to be indecisive will take on more moral weight when the person being judged is a leader in a hierarchy, while kindness may be more important in a friend.

Whereas the act-based paradigm can only demonstrate that moral judgments often rely on inferences of an actor's intentions, the relationship-based paradigm provides a functional explanation for why and when we will use intentions to inform our moral judgments. Moral judgments that neglect intentions or "irrationally" use character information are test cases for investigating the argument that moral judgments are as much about evaluating relationship prospects as they are about judging the rightness or wrongness of actions. Specifically, **the relationship-based paradigm of moral judgment predicts that 1) the existence of negative character traits will make moral judgments more severe even when the traits had no effect on the outcomes that occurred, and 2) the influence of intentions on moral judgment will be reduced when people perceive someone to be a poor prospect for social relationships.** People will be perceived as poor prospects for social relationships if they have underlying negative characteristics (for all relationships or specific ones), if their harmful behavior cannot

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be prevented from reoccurring in the future, or if the damage they have done to the relationship is so severe that it cannot be repaired. Under these conditions, people will make judgments of blame and praise that are inconsistent with the harm committed or the help provided, while punishing others for accidents and uncontrollable events.

By shifting from an act-based paradigm to a relationship-based paradigm of moral psychology, I will reveal a broad class of very common moral judgments that neglect an actor's intentions. These moral judgments are unified by the fact that they reflect cases wherein the relationship prospects of a target individual are poor. By examining cases in which the influence of intentions are reduced because of negative character information, the inability to prevent harmful behavior from reoccurring, or the severity of the transgression to the relationship, I will demonstrate that in addition to judging the rightness or wrongness of actions, an essential function of our moral psychology is to make judgments about the relationship prospects of others.

The "irrational" use of character information

H1: The addition of negative character information will make moral judgment more severe even when character information is unrelated to actions or related to better outcomes.

According to the relationship-based paradigm, moral judgments are aimed in part at assessing whether someone is a good prospect for social relationships. Underlying negative characteristics are cues that someone is a poor relationship prospect, and therefore should result in more severe moral judgments even if the character information is unrelated to the actions that took place or the outcomes that occurred. In contrast, the act-based paradigm suggests that character information should only be consulted if it helps to disambiguate the actions that occurred. For example, if a car crash occurs, and people know that one of the drivers has a

reckless personality, then they can infer a higher likelihood that driver was the cause of the crash.

In recent years, results of several studies have suggested that inferences of an actor's underlying characteristics can influence moral judgment even if it is unrelated to outcomes (for a review, see Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011). Critcher, Inbar, and Pizarro (2012) found that arriving at a moral decision too slowly, such as if someone took a long time before refusing to sell their children, was viewed as less praiseworthy than if they refused immediately, while arriving at immoral decisions quickly was viewed as more blameworthy than arriving at immoral decisions slowly (but see Tetlock, Green, Elson, Kristel, & Lerner, 2000 for a different pattern). Mediation analyses indicated that judgments of blame were driven by the belief that quick and effortless decisions reflected the actor's underlying characteristics and preferences. In a related study, Pizarro, Uhlmann, and Salovey (2003) found that people were less severe in their judgments of immoral behaviors if they were done impulsively compared to if they were done following deliberation, but they were just as praising of moral behaviors done impulsively. Mediation analyses indicated these effects were driven by the meta-desires participants perceived in actors, where impulsive positive moral behaviors were seen as more reflective of actors' genuine preferences, while impulsive negative moral behaviors were seen as not reflective of actors' genuine preferences. Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, and Diermeier (2011) found that candidates for a CEO position were viewed less favorably if they intended to use a signing bonus on a frivolous purchase, such as a table with their face engraved on it. It was found that these evaluations were partially mediated by the extent to which participants viewed the candidate's actions as reflective of underlying negative characteristics. Inbar, Pizarro, and Cushman (2012) found that betting on negative outcomes occurring, such as investing in "catastrophe bonds" that only pay off if a natural disaster occurs, were judged as morally blameworthy even though such

investments were causally irrelevant to negative outcomes occurring. Although judgments of blame were not mediated by a global assessment of character, they were mediated by the extent to which participants believed that actors hoped a negative outcome would occur, suggesting that participants inferred that actors were the type of people to have "wicked desires" (also see Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006).

Even ostensibly less harmful actions may be judged more severely than more harmful actions if they indicate a psychopathic personality. In a typical "trolley problem", participants are asked to judge how acceptable it is for an actor to sacrifice one person in order to save five people who have been placed in danger. In the act-based paradigm, it is assumed that when participants judge that it is unacceptable to sacrifice one person to save five, they are reasoning deontologically, meaning that they are relying on a moral rule that prohibits using people as means to ends. However, an alternative possibility is that participants infer that even if sacrificing one person to save five is the "correct" action to take, willingness to undertake such an abhorrent action is indicative of negative underlying characteristics. It has been found that people who adopt the utilitarian option of sacrificing one person to save five are less empathic on average (Choe & Min, 2011) and more likely to have antisocial personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). If participants can reliably infer that choosing the utilitarian option is associated with negative underlying characteristics, the relationship-based paradigm predicts that they will judge the actor who adopts the utilitarian position negatively even if they agree that sacrificing the innocent victim was the right thing to do. Uhlmann, Zhu, and Tannenbaum (2012) have found exactly this dissociation. Even when participants agree that the utilitarian decision is correct, they may judge that it is incorrect to do so, and this effect is mediated by inferences of negative character traits.

Taken together, these studies demonstrate that character inferences influence moral judgments even when they are uninformative for evaluating the actions that took place. According to the relationship-based paradigm, character inferences affect moral judgment because part of the function of our moral judgments is to assess people's prospects for entering into or continuing with social relationships. To test this assertion, I will examine cases where intentions are neglected. In intentions are neglected under conditions where participants have inferred that prospects for social relationships are poor, this will count as positive evidence for the relationship-based paradigm.

Neglect of intention due to inferences of underlying negative character

H2: Differences in the severity of moral judgments between actions that occur intentionally versus actions that occur by accident will be reduced when unrelated negative character information is introduced.

According to the relationship-based paradigm, when people infer that an actor has underlying negative character traits, the actor's intentions will be neglected in moral judgment because whether they acted intentionally or accidentally is unimportant if their actions reveal character flaws that preclude a social relationship with them. Thus, even if someone hurt me by accident, I should still blame or punish them if the nature of the harm reveals that they would make a poor social-relational partner. Indeed, cases of negligence in the law are exactly those wherein a person is punishable for causing injury due to failure to exercise reasonable care, rather than any intentional malice. Carelessness is a character flaw that is predictive of poor prospects in future social interactions because it demonstrates that someone fails to think about how their actions might affect others. Cases of recklessness, which are associated with more serious crimes, such as accidental homicide, often imply more than the mere carelessness

associated with negligence. Specifically, recklessness signals that an individual is indifferent toward the potential suffering of other people (Duff, 1990), and as the relationship-based paradigm predicts, cases of recklessness are punished more severely than cases of negligence.

Given that people infer more negative characteristics from more serious offenses, an alternative explanation is that the more severe punishments in cases of recklessness are due to the more severe crimes generally at issue, rather than inferences of more negative characteristics. To examine this question, Nadler and McDonnell (2012) presented participants with a case in which a woman's dogs broke out of her yard and mauled a neighbor's child, and participants were either given unrelated positive character information or unrelated negative character information about the woman. Specifically, some participants were told that the woman lived a healthy lifestyle, had lots of friends, and spoiled her two nieces. Other participants were told that the woman lived an unhealthy lifestyle, had few friends, and did not care much for her nieces. It was found that judgments of blame and punishment were more severe for the woman who was described as having negative character traits, even when her knowledge of the danger posed by the dogs was explicitly kept constant.

Although these studies demonstrate that negative character information can make moral judgment more severe in the absence of intention, the relationship-based paradigm predicts that even when intentions are present, their influence on moral judgment will be reduced when negative character traits are inferred. Although no direct test of this prediction has been conducted, Nadler (2012) found that even mild character flaws can reduce the role of an actor's awareness of the risks (which is arguably tied to intention) in judgments of blame. Participants were told about Nathan, a ski instructor, who was either a lazy worker who spent his free time idling around town and watching television, or a hard-worker who spent his free time

volunteering and helping with his family's business. Participants were told that one day Nathan decided to ski down the mountain very quickly, and they were either told that Nathan was aware of the risks, or that Nathan was unaware of the risks of what he was doing. According to the relationship-based paradigm, the importance of Nathan's mental states should be reduced if he has negative character traits that indicate he would be a poor social-relational partner. As predicted, character information and mental state information interacted such that Nathan's awareness of the risks were important when he was described as hard working (i.e., Nathan was blamed less if he was unaware of the risks), but awareness of the risks made little difference when Nathan was described as lazy. However, I should note that there was no such interaction for judgments of punishment, even though both negative character information and awareness of the risks increased punishment.

Taken together, these studies provide support for the Relationship-based paradigm's prediction that intentions will be neglected in moral judgment when people infer that someone has underlying negative character traits. What is needed now are direct experiments that investigate whether character information will reduce the role of intention in moral judgment.

Neglect of intention because of harmful behavior cannot be prevented

H3: Differences in the severity of moral judgments between actions that occur intentionally versus actions that occur by accident will be reduced when behavior that is detrimental to a social relationship cannot be prevented in the future.

Beyond inferences of negative underlying characteristics, people will be poor relationship prospects if they cannot prevent their problematic behavior from reoccurring in the future. The most prominent examples of transgressions that are often unintended and cannot be prevented in the future are the social stigmas determined by a society. In the case of social stigmas, people are

blamed and punished for mental illnesses or addictions, physical deformities, or various group memberships, such as their sexual orientation or ethnicity (Goffman, 1959). The relationship-based paradigm predicts that even though social stigmas are often unintended, people will be blamed and punished more for social stigmas if they are outside of an actor's control and thus cannot be changed or prevented from continuing.

Working against the relationship-based paradigm's hypothesis, research on social stigmas has actually found that people are blamed more when stigmas are perceived to have been under an actor's control, such as in the more positive responses people have to HIV patients who were infected through a blood transfusion rather than sexual activity (Weiner, 1995). However, supporting the relationship-based paradigm's hypothesis, it has been found that punishment, in the form of greater discrimination and desires for social distance, may be higher for stigmas that cannot be controlled. For example, when schizophrenia is framed as emerging from a biological rather than a social cause (biological causes are seen as less alterable than social causes), people report that they are more likely to avoid the stigmatized individual (Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006).

In some cases, punishments may occur in the absence of intentions as a form of hazard prevention. Thus, cases of strict liability only require that criminals be found guilty of being causally responsible for bringing harm about. Their mental states are irrelevant. Strict liability is common for crimes where negative outcomes are inherently dangerous, such as product liability cases where a defective product could kill someone (Duff, 1990). Similarly, in non-western contexts, it has been found that in cases of witchcraft in West Africa, people are punished, avoided, or removed from the group. Importantly, it is understood within these villages that the "witch" may have no knowledge that they are a witch or any control over their witchcraft

(Pritchard, 1937). Thus, the witchcraft may be completely unintended, and yet is still punishable because witches pose a threat to the social group by their very presence. In this way, punishment in strict liability cases and of uncontrollable behaviors such as witchcraft may reflect the prevention of hazards to the community.

To directly examine the relationship-based paradigm's hypothesis regarding how moral judgments are affected by the (in)ability to prevent harmful behavior from reoccurring, we must cross levels of intention with levels of prevention. Interestingly, the research on stigma suggests a possible dissociation between blame and punishment. People may be punished just as severely for intentional and accidental violations if relationship harming behavior cannot be prevented in the future, but judgments of blame may still differ strongly between intentional and accidental transgressions.

Neglect of Intention because of severity of harm

H4: Differences in the severity of moral judgments between actions that occur intentionally versus actions that occur by accident will be reduced when transgressions are especially severe. This effect will be mediated by perceptions of whether a relationship can be repaired following the transgression.

According to the relationship-based paradigm, a crucial aspect of moral judgment is to assess relationship prospects. However, what happens when a transgression is so severe that a relationship is irreparable? The relationship-based paradigm predicts that when harm is severe enough, fostering a relationship will not be viable, and thus the intentional state of the transgressor will lose its predictive validity and be neglected.

"Outcome bias", wherein people appear to be biased by the outcomes of actions when making judgments of punishment even when the intentional state of the actions remains constant

has been repeatedly demonstrated (Berg-Cross, 1975; Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2009). For example, in Western law, someone who accidentally crashes into a tree while driving drunk may receive a stiff fine, but if they accidentally killed a pedestrian, they would be charged with vehicular manslaughter. Cushman (2008) used vignettes to tease apart the relative effects of intentions and outcomes on judgments of blame and punishment. Similar to the findings on stigma, it was found that judgments of punishment were less sensitive to intentions than judgments of blame, such that blame depended primarily on an actor's intentions rather than the outcomes of their actions, while punishment depended equally on intentions and outcomes.

In non-western contexts, honor killings following rape reflect cases in which a woman is severely punished (death) for something she had no control over and thus did not intend (Rai & Fiske, 2011). According to the relationship-based paradigm, honor killing following rape occurs because there is no hope of salvaging the relevant social relationships between the woman and her family or the larger community. Indeed, ethnographic studies indicate that the damage caused by rape is perceived as a defilement of the woman and her family that cannot be removed (Wikan, 2008). The permanence of the stain eliminates the possibility of future social relations between the woman and family, and the family has no choice but to remove her in order to salvage the relationship between the family and the larger community (Rai & Fiske, 2011). What is not known is whether women are blamed more or are more likely to be killed if they engage in non-marital sexual behaviors intentionally.

To test the relationship-based paradigm's prediction regarding harm and relationship prospects, we must cross levels of intention with levels of harm while measuring perceptions about the viability of relationships. Although previous studies have demonstrated that moral judgments can be biased by outcomes, no studies have examined the impact of perceptions of

relationships on this process.

Future Directions

Characteristics for particular relationships

H5: The effects of negative character information on how people use intentions in moral judgment will be mediated by the extent to which the character information is relevant for the social relationships being considered.

In some cases, how character traits influence moral judgment will depend on the relevant social relationships being considered. According to RR (also see Fiske, 1990, 1991, 1992), there are four fundamental schemas for social relationships that people employ across cultures that are each motivated by a unique moral motive. Speculatively, different characteristics may be particularly important for assessing whether people will be able to adhere to the moral motives in some relationships more than others. Thus, people may be particularly attentive to someone's empathy and selflessness when Communal Sharing, wherein people are motivated by Unity to care for, protect, and support the integrity of in-groups. In contrast, when Authority Ranking, wherein people are motivated by Hierarchy to respect superiors, who in turn must protect subordinates, people may be particularly attentive to whether someone's decisiveness, assertiveness, self-confidence, and dominance when evaluating superiors, while attending to a person's alacrity, eagerness to please, respectfulness, appeasing nature, or deferential personality when evaluating subordinates. People may be particularly attuned to a person's attentiveness or diligence in matching actions in Equality Matching relations, wherein people are motivated by Equality toward balanced, in-kind reciprocity, and equal treatment. Finally, people may be particularly attentive to how analytic, calculating, or rational someone is when Market Pricing, wherein people are motivated by Proportionality to make moral decisions based on a utilitarian

calculus of costs and benefits. The impact of character inferences on moral judgment may even

apply to specific social roles. For example, people may neglect negative character information

regarding a sports athlete if the character information does not bear any consequences for his

performance in the field of play. Thus, the corollary to our hypothesis regarding character

information is that it will only have an effect on moral judgment if the character information is

relevant for the social relationship that is being considered.

Blame versus Punishment

In reviewing the available evidence, some of the data was mixed in regard to blame and

punishment. Nadler (2012) found that differences in blame for actors who had knowledge of the

risks versus those who did not have knowledge of the risks was reduced when negative character

information was introduced, but no such effect was found for punishment. Meanwhile,

uncontrollable stigmas are blamed less severely but punished more severely, suggesting that

differences in punishment between intentional and accidental violations will be reduced when

transgressions cannot be prevented in the future, but that differences in blame should be

unaffected. A similar dynamic emerged for severity of outcomes, where Cushman (2008) found

that judgments of punishment increased when outcomes were more severe, while judgments of

blame were primarily driven by an actor's intentions. Future research should consider the

different functions that blame and punishment may serve in regulating relationships and how that

may explain why they respond differently to character, prevention, and outcome information.

The stability of character

According to the relationship-based paradigm, the function of much of moral judgment is

to make inferences of underlying characteristics in order to assess people as prospects for social

relationships. In support of this view, it has been found that people spontaneously and

automatically draw global inferences about the dispositional traits of others based on their actions, even when situational constraints are present (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Willis & Todorov, 2006; for a review, see Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). In particular, people draw strong inferences about social-relationally relevant character traits that a person has. Thus, a fundamental dimension of person-perception is our perception of someone's "warmth" (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2008). While the warmth dimension has components that tap into both morality and sociability, it has been found that the morality components of warmth (e.g., honesty, sincerity, trustworthiness) have the largest impact in informing our global impressions of other people's dispositions (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacci, & Cherubani, 2011).

Although these lines of research demonstrate that people are making trait inferences, the functionality of this process for regulating social relationships requires that people *actually have* characteristics that are stable enough to generalize from one situation to another. And yet, there is little empirical evidence for stability in character at least at a global level of analysis, as evidenced by correlations in behavioral indices meant to assess virtues and vices (Harman, 1999). According to RR (Rai & Fiske, 2011), the moral motives guiding behavior depend on the kind of social relationship people perceive, where different social relations entail distinct moral obligations and transgressions. Thus, people may be geared toward inferring underlying characteristics within particular patterns of social relations (e.g. someone is empathic when communal sharing). Determining the level (or levels) at which people make inferences of underlying character traits and how accurate those inferences are is critically important to determining when they play a role in assessing relationship prospects. If character inferences are not strong predictors of relationship prospects, then they should only be expected to play a major role in moral judgment when we have little information, such as when we are evaluating

strangers to determine whether to enter into a relationship with them. In contrast, to the extent that trait inferences are reliable at assessing relationship prospects, they will serve a complementary role to analyses of moral rules governing actions, even in continuing social relationships.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that we must shift from an act-based paradigm, wherein moral judgment is focused exclusively on evaluating the morality of actions, toward a relationship-based paradigm, wherein the essential function of our moral psychology is to regulate social relationships, a critical aspect of which is evaluating others' prospects as social-relational partners. From this perspective, criteria central to the act-based paradigm, such as an actor's intentions, are generally predictive of an actor's social-relational potential. However, when that predictive value is reduced due to other information that suggests an actor is a poor relationship prospect, such as inferences of negative underlying character traits, then intentions will play a reduced role in judgments of blame and punishment. The relationship-based framework of moral judgment accounts for all of the data explained in the act-based framework while making new predictions regarding when intentions are neglected and when character is "irrationally" influential; namely, in cases where relationship prospects are poor.

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Chapter 5

General Discussion

My dissertation focuses on the question of moral diversity. Where do our moral judgments come from and why do people disagree? In the Introduction, I reviewed two general lines of research that attempt to address this question in the field of moral psychology. The first line of research addresses *process.* What are the cognitive processes people undertake when making moral judgments? Much of my earlier work has focused on this problem, with particular emphasis on biases and heuristics that may influence processing downstream, as well as the meta-ethical perspectives people may have regarding what moral judgments are. The second line of research addresses *content*. What are the bases, goals, or motives that we are trying to satisfy with our moral judgments. My dissertation focuses on this problem. Specifically, I argued that our sense of morality functions to regulate our social relationships. Consequently, different ways of relating entail fundamentally different moral motives. Many moral disagreements occur because people are employing different social-relational schemas (and corresponding moral motives) to understand the same situation. Unlike existing theories, RR predicted that any action, including violence, unequal treatment, and "impure" acts, might be perceived as morally correct depending on the moral motives employed and how the relevant social relationships were construed (Rai & Fiske, 2011).

Chapter 2: Moral Psychology is Relationship Regulation

Once I made the argument that our moral psychology functions to regulate social relationships and that different ways of relating will entail fundamentally different moral motives, it became necessary to organize different relationships in a way that would enable theorizing about the kinds of moralities that people use. I drew on Fiske's (1991, 1992)

Relational Models Theory to outline four fundamental moral motives that corresponded to four fundamental ways of relating; Unity in Communal Sharing (CS) relations, Hierarchy in Authority Ranking (AR) relations, Equality in Equality Matching (EM) relations, and Proportionality in Market Pricing (MP) relations. Unity motivates people to care for and support in-groups; Hierarchy motivates people to respect rank in social groups; Equality motivates people toward balanced, in-kind reciprocity and equal treatment; and Proportionality motivates people to make decisions based on a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits.

In support of RR, I marshaled data from across the social sciences to support the argument that the moral motives I proposed were embedded in the patterns of social relations identified by Fiske (1991; 1992). Moreover, many cases of moral disagreement could be traced to the use of different moral motives. For example, research on taboo tradeoffs had found that whereas it is morally correct to exchange money for goods in market contexts motivated by Proportionality, the same action is morally prohibited in communal contexts motivated by Unity (Tetlock, Kristel, Green, Elson, & Lerner, 2000). In organizational settings, disagreement about morally correct promotion practices could be traced to the different moral motives people had (Connelly & Folger, 2004).

Future Directions

The four moral motives are universal, but cultures, ideologies, and individuals differ in the domains in which they activate the motives and how they implement them. If the moral motives that drive our moral judgments and behavior ultimately depend on the social-relational schemas people are using, then we must ask why are there different ways of relating and what are the conditions that lead people to shift between different ways of relating such that they act based on different moral motives? In some respects this question moves beyond issues of moral

psychology toward building a better theory of social relationships than any that presently exist. One way to approach the problem is to think of different social-relational schemas as strategies that have distinct functional affordances. Different strategies will be adapted to different social-ecological conditions.

Recently, I collaborated with Daniel Nettle (Nettle, Panchanathan, Rai, & Fiske, 2011) to analytically model the evolution of different patterns of resource allocation. Essentially, many people have focused on the question of how cooperation evolves at all. But few have considered that given cooperation, there are actually several ways one could cooperate. For example, when allocating a resource, partners could share it freely without tracking who takes what. Alternatively, one person could exert ownership of the resource and give it out to others at their discretion. Or partners could enact a lottery mechanism, like taking turns or rotating credit associations, where one person gets everything. Our question was simple; what ecological conditions favor different resource allocation systems (and by extension, lay the foundation for different forms of social relations and consequent moral motives)? We conducted a modeling study and found that as the costs of negotiating conflicts and managing a resource increase, then people will shift toward sharing and lottery strategies. Meanwhile, when the returns on resources were diminishing (i.e., more of a resource provides less of a return) and when levels of interdependence between people was high (i.e., the extent to which my welfare is benefitted by increases to your welfare), sharing strategies were favored.

Currently, I am designing studies with Daniel Nettle to empirically investigate the predictions of the model. Specifically, we are planning to look at whether variation in interdependence and returns will predict attitudes and behaviors related to generosity. We have already identified two neighborhoods in the same city that are matched in several ways but differ

greatly in SES. It is known that high and low SES populations are the most generous in terms of the proportion of income they give compared to middle class (James & Sharpe, 2007; Piff, Krause, Cote, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). We will examine whether we can predict giving based on the fact that low SES populations have the highest interdependence and high SES populations have the most diminishing returns. We are also planning studies to manipulate interdependence and returns experimentally. For example, in one study we plan to manipulate attitudes participants have about the extent to which they depend on others and whether returns are diminishing vs. linear and examine subsequent measures of generosity.

Chapter 3: Activating social-relational schemas leads to competing moral motives

The primary claim in RR is that distinct moral motives are embedded in different schemas for social relationships. To test this claim, I conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, I framed a social group in terms of different social-relational schemas. I then asked participants to rate how morally acceptable different options for correct action were across different moral domains. I found that participants expressed greater support for Unity and Hierarchy motives when groups were framed in CS and AR terms, respectively. In Experiment 2, I primed different social-relational schemas and then asked participants to determine the fairest way to allocate resources in a separate, unrelated context. I found that participants who were primed to think in CS terms were more likely to prefer need-based distribution (as predicted if motivated by Unity) than participants who were primed to think in MP terms, who in turn were more likely than participants primed with CS to prefer equity-based distribution (as predicted if motivated by Proportionality).

Future Directions

Both of the experiments provided only partial support of RR's predictions. Experiment 1

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found predicted effects for Unity and Hierarchy, but no evidence for the predicted effects of social-relational framing on Equality and Proportionality. Experiment 2 found predicted effects for Unity and Proportionality, but no evidence for the predicted effects of social-relational priming on Hierarchy and Equality. Both studies would be strengthened by the addition of control conditions that provided no relational framing or priming in order to determine what participants' default preferences are. For example, in Experiment 2, perhaps participants' default preferences were biased toward support for equity-based distribution, in which case the effects in the experiment would have been driven primarily by the Communal Sharing priming of Unity supported need-based distribution. In terms of additional studies, one approach would be to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis. The design of such a study would examine whether when participants describe specific relationships in their lives, do characteristics of different moral motives cohere. Thus, if a participant says that they give based on need with a particular partner, will they also state that they are more likely to take collective responsibility for any wrongdoing of that partner?

Although these studies would demonstrate that activating different social-relational schemas leads to corresponding activation of moral motives that lead to competing moral judgments, the studies do not directly investigate moral disagreement. Future studies should examine whether actual moral disagreement can be traced to different use of moral motives. For example, in organizational settings, I could measure the social-relational schemas and the moral motives people prefer in different domains of work, including decision-making, organization of work, rights and responsibilities, brain-storming, and promotion practices. RR predicts that people will report greater levels of moral disagreement in work domains where there is greater disagreement about the correct social-relational schemas and moral motives to use.

Chapter 4: Moral Judgment as Assessment of Relationship Prospects

Although the moral motives describe the morally correct actions people must take in different relationships, they do not specifically address the virtues and vices that play an important role in moral judgment. At the same time, there have been a number of studies and observations in moral psychology regarding behaviors that cannot be explained by existing theories, such as blame and punishment for transgressions that were accidental or outside an agent's control. In chapter 4, I argued that in addition to judging the rightness or wrongness of actions, a crucial aspect of moral judgment is to evaluate whether someone is a good relationship prospect. For example, people will blame and punish someone more harshly for an action if they have a negative character, even if their negative character traits were unrelated to the actions that took place. To test the theory, I argued for examining cases that appear to violate the rational use of intention; namely, cases where people are punished severely for transgressions even if they were accidental. I argued that part of the function of intention was to infer whether someone was a good relationship prospect. Thus, I predicted that differences in moral judgment for accidental and intentional transgressions would be reduced under conditions where people had other information to infer that someone was a poor relationship prospect, including information about negative character traits, the inability to prevent harmful transgressions in the future, and when transgressions are so severe that relationships cannot be repaired. I presented evidence in support of each of these predictions.

Future Directions

Each of the predictions regarding intention would benefit from direct empirical testing. One approach would be to create vignette-based moral judgment scenarios that cross levels of intention with levels of the independent variable. For example, to test predictions about outcome

severity, I would present participants with a moral transgression that occurred either on purpose or by accident and which involved either a minor harm or a severe harm. I would predict an interaction, such that the difference between intentional and accidental transgressions would be reduced under conditions of severe harm, and that this effect would be mediated by the extent to which participants believed the relationship could be repaired.

Conclusion

In my dissertation, I have endeavored to provide a different way of thinking about moral psychology. Rather than attempting to build a theory of the bases to moral psychology based on the particular content of moral rules, such as rules related to the prevention of harm, the enforcement of equal rights, or the maintenance of "purity", I have argued that our moral psychology should be reconceptualized as embedded in our social-relational cognition. From this perspective, an understanding of the bases of moral psychology requires an understanding of the basic forms of social relations employed across cultures. Using this as a starting point, I argued for the existence of four fundamental moral motives that guide moral judgment and behavior. I then conducted two experiments to investigate whether these moral motives were embedded in social-relational schemas as I had claimed. Finally, I argued that in addition to the moral motives, RR provides us with a new way to think about character and moral judgment; namely that moral judgment is just as much about assessing whether someone would be a good prospect for social relationships as it is about evaluating whether someone's actions were right or wrong. I consider the work reported in this dissertation as a first step toward developing a new relationship-based perspective of moral psychology.

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