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Publication Date

2015

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by

Justin Frank Martin

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Education

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

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Summer 2015

Abstract

Adolescents and Young Adults' Understanding of Others' Moral Decisions

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Education

University of California, Berkeley

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This study examined adolescents' and young adults' understanding of others' moral decisions in situations involving competing concerns. The study combines the work of theory-of-mind and social domain theory as it pertains to how people develop a social and moral understanding of others, respectively. The participants ($N = 102$), approximately equally divided by sex and from two age groups (adolescents and young adults), were posed questions about decisions made in hypothetical situations involving conflicts between a moral concern and a nonmoral concern. For each situation, half of the participants responded to the decision consistent with the moral concern and the other half responded to the decision consistent with the nonmoral concern. Participants were asked to attribute intentions to the actor, evaluate the decision, and provide justifications for their evaluations. Findings showed that participants generally endorsed the decisions consistent with the moral concern for two of the three situations. In addition, partial support was found for the hypotheses that their understanding of each situation would include multiple considerations and be related to the actor's decision. Findings are discussed in terms of the role of construals in understanding and evaluating moral decisions in multifaceted situations, as well as implications for future research.

Adolescents and Young Adults' Understanding of Others' Moral Decisions

The research presented in this dissertation is based on a cognitive-developmental approach to social and moral development, and particularly, social domain theory (Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014; Smetana & Turiel, 2003; Turiel, 1983, 2014). The study was aimed at ascertaining how adolescents and young adults understand how others make moral decisions in situations involving competing concerns. The study also assessed their evaluations of the actor's decisions in these situations, as well as their justifications for these evaluations. The study rests on the assumption that individuals make judgments about social situations and that their judgments encompass efforts to understand the social and moral thinking of others.

As a means of explaining the background of this research, it is necessary to provide an overview of relevant literature. The study builds on two broad areas of social-cognitive development that are increasingly becoming integrated (see Lagattuta & Weller, 2014): social understanding (often referred to as theory of mind; TOM) and moral understanding as conceptualized through social domain theory (SDT; Smetana et al., 2014; Smetana & Turiel, 2003; Turiel, 1983, 2014). I first summarize each approach and then identify some common themes that inform the present study.

Social Understanding

Research suggests that beginning in childhood, people are concerned with understanding how others make sense of social events, and use their understanding of motives (Reeder & Trafimow, 2005) and dispositions (Read & Miller, 2005) when making judgments about others in response to those events. Much of the work in this area initially focused on role taking or perspective taking (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968; Mead, 1934; Selman, 1980, 2003). More recently, work in the area of TOM (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989; Heyman & Gelman, 1998; Lagattuta & Weller, 2014; Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001; Lalonde & Chandler, 1995, 2002; Reiffe, Terwogt, & Cowan, 2005; Wellman, Phillips, & Rodriguez, 2000; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006) has expanded upon this notion of understanding others in two major respects. One involves the age at which children begin to demonstrate an understanding of others. The other involves clarifying the specific ways in which children demonstrate such an understanding.

Children as young as three years have demonstrated some understanding of the relationship between a person's perception and their emotion (Wellman et al., 2000). Young children also demonstrate an understanding that someone can hold a belief about something that is not true (Lalonde & Chandler, 1995). In addition, younger and older children demonstrate some understanding of the relationship between others' (a) mental states and emotions (Harris et al., 1989; Reiffe et al., 2005), (b) behaviors and traits (Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007), (c) motives and traits (Heyman & Gelman, 1998), (d) past experiences and present emotions (Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001), and (e) intentions and negligence (Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009). Collectively, this research suggests that at a very early age, children attempt to understand ways in which others' thoughts and emotions may be related and the role they play in their decisions.

Social Domain Theory

The social domain approach to moral understanding (Smetana at al., 2014; Smetana & Turiel, 2003; Turiel, 1983, 2014) has informed the present study in three ways. First, the present study builds upon the notion that social judgments rely on multiple concepts that are developed

within distinct conceptual domains and used to evaluate social interactions. Second, SDT posits that social judgments sometimes involve the coordination of concerns within and/or between domains. Third, SDT contends that how these concerns are coordinated is related to—but not determined by—how people construe or make sense of the situation in question (e.g., persons involved, their actions, etc.). Each of these notions is discussed briefly. It should be noted that when making judgments, these domain-specific concepts are usually expressed in the form of concerns or considerations (e.g., about fairness, rules, autonomy). Therefore, these terms will be used interchangeably throughout the remainder of this dissertation.

Distinct domains of social judgments. Turiel (1983) suggested that when studying social judgments, it is important to effectively isolate different types of social judgments for proper analysis, separating judgments belonging to one domain (e.g., moral) from judgments belonging to another (e.g., social-conventional). To this end, he emphasized the importance of criterion judgments, which are judgments used to determine which domain a particular act or issue falls under. For instance, judgments pertaining to rules or authority are used to distinguish moral acts (e.g., the act is wrong even if there's no rule prohibiting it) from social-conventional ones (e.g., the act is wrong if there's a rule prohibiting it). Issues that pertain to welfare, fairness (equality/equity), and rights are in the moral domain, whereas issues involving rules, consensus, and status fall under the social-conventional domain. Moreover, issues pertaining to autonomy, privacy, and other psychological characteristics are in the personal domain, which is distinct from both the moral and the social-conventional domains (Nucci, 1981).

Coordination and social judgments. Although SDT posits that these different domains are distinct from each other and have their own conceptual systems, the theory assumes that many situations involve an interaction between concerns within domains and concerns between domains. An interaction within domains could involve someone who must choose between helping one friend who just fell ill (moral) or fulfilling his or her promise made to another friend by going to their performance and supporting them (moral). An interaction between domains would be a fraternity member responsible for harming pledges for hazing purposes. In this situation, the member must choose between following the fraternity's pledging rules (a conventional concern) or maintaining the safety or welfare of the pledge (a moral concern). In these and other situations, people often attempt to coordinate, prioritize, and integrate relevant concerns when understanding and evaluating individuals and their decisions (e.g., Helwig, 1997; Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Turiel, 2009; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Smetana et al., 2014; Smetana, Killen, & Turiel, 1991; Tisak & Tisak, 1996a, 1996b; Turiel, 1983, 2014; Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998; Wainryb, Shaw, Smith, & Laupa, 2001).

Construals and social judgments. In addition to distinct domains and the coordination of multiple concerns, research in SDT suggests that how these domains and concerns are coordinated within social judgments is related to—but not predicted by—people's understanding of individuals and their decisions (e.g., Horn, 2003; Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Kahn, 1992; Smetana et al., 1991; Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991; Wainryb, 1991; Wainryb et al., 1998, 2001). Moreover, recent research suggests that how people construe their own social interactions also contributes to their moral understanding (Recchia, Wainryb, & Pasupathi, 2013; Wainryb, Brehl, Matwin, Sokol, & Hammond, 2005).

Saltzstein (1991) suggested that furthering our understanding of how people make judgments about multifaceted situations (i.e., situations involving multiple concerns) not only involves a better understanding of people's social construals, but how these construals are related to the ways in which they cognitively structure and organize their domains of social judgments.

To this end, research on social construals has identified some factors related to how people make sense of social interactions, thus affecting their decision to give priority to one concern over another. These include, but are not limited to, the salience or seriousness of the concerns within the situation (Komolova & Wainryb, 2011; Neff, 2001; Smetana et al., 1991) and the actor's understanding of their actions (Helwig, Hildebrandt, & Turiel, 1995; Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Shaw & Wainryb, 1999; Wainryb, 1991).

Moral Understanding

Research on people's understanding of others' moral decisions has focused on others' decisions to harm another (Helwig et al., 1995; Helwig et al., 2001; Shaw & Wainryb, 1999), restrict another's rights (Wainryb, 1991), treat another unjustly (Kahn, 1992; Smetana et al., 1991), and treat another in a moral or prosocial manner (Kahn, 1992; Metzger & Smetana, 2009; Saltzstein, Roazzi, & Dias, 2003; Shaw & Wainryb, 1999; Smetana et al., 1991; Wainryb et al., 1998; Wainryb et al., 2001; Witenberg, 2007). Collectively, research on children's, adolescents', and young adults' moral understanding has yielded two important findings relevant to the current study. First, they are able to distinguish moral issues from nonmoral issues, as evidenced by their evaluations and justifications (Helwig, 1997; Lahat, Helwig, & Zelazo, 2012; Nucci, 1981). Second, how they construe or understand moral situations—including but not limited to the people, actions, and consequences—relate to but do not predict their evaluations of those situations (Wainryb, 1991; Wainryb et al., 1998; Wainryb et al., 2001). These and related findings are elaborated in the following sections, first with regard to age differences, and second with regard to understanding situations that are multifaceted (i.e., include multiple concerns).

Age Trends in Social and Moral Understanding

Research on social and moral understandings has consistently found age-related changes in individuals' ability to understand others. It is worth noting that although both areas of research have examined age trends, much of the TOM research focuses on children, with research on adolescents and adults usually focusing on adolescents with social or cognitive challenges (e.g., Bosco, Gabbatore, & Tirassa, 2014; Kaland, Callesen, Møller-Nielsen, Mortensen, & Smith, 2008; Kaland et al., 2002; Ozonoff & Miller, 1995; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; Schenkel, Marlow-O'Connor, Moss, Sweeney, & Pavuluri, 2008; Sebastian et al., 2012; Sharp & Vanwoerden, 2014). Bosacki, Bialecka-Pikul, and Szpak (2013) highlight the need for more research on adolescents' TOM understanding, specifically on the relationship between adolescents' development of abstract thinking and their development of a more abstract (or general) form of TOM. Therefore, most of the research presented here and throughout the paper with regard to adolescents and young adults comes from SDT.

In terms of social understanding, there is evidence of an increased ability with age to take others' perspectives (Guroglu, van den Bos, & Crone, 2009; Miller, Kessel, & Flavell, 1970; Selman, 1980, 2003) and to develop more sophisticated understandings of them, which include more comprehensive understandings of others' mental states (Wellman et al., 2006) and more consistent coordination of multiple concerns when evaluating their actions (Jambon & Smetana, 2014). Specifically, findings suggest that compared to younger children, older children (a) better understand the relationship between another's beliefs or desires and the emotions they experience if those beliefs or desires are confirmed or fulfilled (Harris et al., 1989; Reiffe et al., 2005), (b) are more likely to attribute a person's present feelings to past experiences (Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001), and (c) better understand that two people can be presented with the same situation, yet interpret that situation differently (Lalonde & Chandler, 2002). Similarly, Beck,

Robinson, Carroll, and Apperly (2006) found some evidence for an age-related increase in the ability to consider multiple possibilities or courses of action.

Regarding moral understanding, young children's ability to distinguish between moral and nonmoral considerations is well documented (e.g., Nucci, 1981; Tisak & Turiel, 1984; Turiel, 1983). Moreover, their ability to coordinate these different concerns tends to increase with age (Killen, Henning, Kelly, Crystal, & Ruck, 2007; Nucci, 1981; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Smetana et al., 1991; Tisak & Tisak, 1996a, 1996b; Wainryb et al., 1998, 2001). The evidence for increased coordination suggests that with age, people generally are better able to take multiple considerations into account. This more developed coordination and integration contributes to the emergence of more nuanced and multifaceted patterns of moral understanding (Jambon & Smetana, 2014).

Given that the understanding of others' moral decisions is often assessed by evaluating their actions, understanding a person's decision to act a certain way may involve an understanding of the intentions and factors related to the person's decision. Along these lines, research suggests that as people get older, they become more attuned to individuals' mental and emotional characteristics (e.g., intentions, feelings), and the role they play in social interactions (Brehl, 2008; Helwig, 1997; Helwig et al., 1995, 2001; Kahn, 1992; Krettenauer, Jia, & Mosleh, 2011; Recchia et al., 2013; Smetana, Tasopoulos-Chan, Villalobos, Gettman, & Campione-Barr, 2009; Wainryb et al., 2005). In situations involving interpersonal harm or relational aggression, older participants are more likely to account for the psychological characteristics of both the victim (Helwig et al., 1995; Recchia et al., 2013; Wainryb, et al., 2005) and the perpetrator (Helwig et al., 2001; Wainryb et al., 2005), as well as account for multiple features relevant to the situation (Recchia, Brehl, & Wainryb, 2012; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Tisak & Tisak, 1996a, 1996b). Moreover, their judgments about an actor's behavior are also more likely to incorporate the actor's own account of his behavior (Brehl, 2008). This tendency to be more attuned to others' psychological characteristics with age also holds for real-life situations in which the participants were either perpetrators or victims themselves (Recchia et al., 2013; Wainryb et al., 2005).

Research on age-related changes in social and moral understanding provides a few important findings relevant to the present study. First, with age, people's understanding of others' mental states appears to become more comprehensive (Guroglu et al., 2009; Miller et al., 1970; Selman, 1980, 2003; Wellman et al., 2006), especially with regards to understanding others' psychological characteristics (Harris et al., 1989; Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001; Reiffe et al., 2005; Weisberg & Beck, 2010). This increased knowledge of others' psychological states also relates to a multifaceted understanding of others' moral decisions (Brehl, 2008; Helwig, 1997; Helwig et al., 1995, 2001; Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Kahn, 1992; Krettenauer et al., 2011; Recchia et al., 2013; Smetana et al., 2014; Wainryb et al., 2005), which entails both the coordination and integration of moral as well as nonmoral considerations (Killen et al., 2007; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Turiel, 2009; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Smetana et al., 1991; Tisak & Tisak, 1996A, 1996B; Wainryb et al., 1998, 2001). Although general age trends have been found, it is suggested that more specific age trends are difficult to identify. This is because many situations can involve multiple considerations varying in salience, thus making it hard to predict how exactly individuals will apply and coordinate these considerations as they construe and evaluate others and their decisions (Nucci & Turiel, 2009).

Understanding Others' Moral Decisions in Multifaceted Situations

It has been suggested that multifaceted situations that involve multiple concerns are common in everyday life, and thus may be an important part of social and moral decisions (Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2012; Saltzstein, 1991). Consistent with this notion, much of the research on moral decisions involves assessing people's understanding and evaluations of actions performed in multifaceted situations (e.g., Conry-Murray, 2009; Helwig, 1995; Horn, 2003; Kahn, 1992; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen & Turiel, 1998; Smetana et al., 1991; Turiel, et al., 1991). Multifaceted situations, also referred to as nonprototypical situations, differ from straightforward or prototypical situations.

Straightforward or prototypical situations tend to be characterized by one concern, or one concern is clearly the most salient. For example, a situation in which a qualified African American applicant is denied a job because of his race is prototypical because there's only one major concern that's relevant to the situation: how one views the fairness or unfairness of the decision (a moral concern).

Conversely, in nonprototypical situations, multiple concerns come into play in understandings and evaluations of the situations. Some situations are unambiguous in that the researcher explicitly includes multiple concerns within the situation. For example, a grounded teen (i.e., cannot leave the house) who considers sneaking out to check on a friend who has been physically hurt is faced with two competing concerns. One concern involves obeying his or her parents (a social-conventional concern), and the other is seeing about a friend's physical welfare (a moral concern). Some situations that have been labeled ambiguous have also been studied (Turiel et al., 1991). An example is a situation involving abortion, in which people vary considerably in their assessments of the most relevant concern (such as understanding abortion as a moral issue based on the definitions of the start of life). Moving forward, multifaceted situations will only refer to situations where the researcher makes clear the competing concerns, as these situations were the focus of the present study.

Jambon and Smetana (2014) found that although they found age-related increases in children's understanding of others' psychological characteristics in both prototypical and multifaceted situations, how they used their understanding of these characteristics to inform their moral decisions depended on the concerns involved. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that adolescents and young adults understand and evaluate prototypical situations differently from nonprototypical situations (Turiel et al., 1991). These and other kinds of distinctions between the relevant concerns within a situation, along with how these concerns are coordinated, prioritized, and integrated, is important for understanding and evaluating individuals and their decisions in multifaceted situations (Smetana et al., 2014; Turiel, 2014).

The Present Study

Research on adolescents' and young adults' understanding of straightforward and multifaceted situations has sometimes relied on assessments of evaluations and justifications as an indicator of their understanding of others' moral decisions (e.g., Helwig et al., 1995, 2001; Horn, 2003; Kahn, 1992; Wainryb et al., 1998, 2001). Little attention has been given to examining adolescents' and young adults' understandings of the intentions or factors adolescents think play a role in those decisions. Direct investigation of intentions can provide new insight into the ways in which adolescents construe and evaluate moral acts.

Therefore, the present study investigated adolescents' and young adults' understandings of intentions in others' moral decisions in multifaceted situations, as well as their evaluations and justifications of those decisions. Specifically, the study addressed four primary research questions. First, *what types of intentions are attributed to the actor in each situation by the type*

of decision of the actor? Is the use of intentions related to gender and/or age? Second, *how are acts evaluated in each situation by type of decision? Are act evaluations related to gender and/or age?* Third, *what are the reasons for the evaluations of the act in each situation by type of decision? Are these reasons related to gender and/or age?* Lastly, *what (if any) is the association of the types of intent attributed to the actor and the justifications of their evaluations of the act? Are these similar or different processes?*

In the type of multifaceted situations used in the present study, participants responded to hypothetical situations in which an actor decides between two courses of action: choosing a person for an activity on the basis of moral or nonmoral considerations (e.g., to keep a promise or fulfill a personal preference). Two types of assessments were made. One was of the participants' understandings of the intentions underlying the actor's decision. In contrast with other research, in the present study adolescents and young adults were asked to identify possible reasons for the actor's decision in hypothetical situations in which the intentions were not clearly outlined. The second type of assessment was of participants' evaluations and justifications of those evaluations of the actor's decision.

Two hypotheses based on previous findings guided the present study. Previous studies have shown that the understandings of adolescents and young adults in multifaceted situations involve increased understandings of others, increased psychological knowledge of others, and more consistent coordination of different concerns (Helwig, 1995, 1997; Killen & Turiel, 1998; Krettenauer et al., 2011; Neff, 2001; Nucci, 1981). Therefore, it was expected that adolescents' and young adults' understanding of the actor's intentions and their justifications for their evaluations would take into account multiple concerns.

Second, consistent with research on the role of social construals in social and moral understanding (Guroglu et al., 2009; Guroglu, van den Bos, Rombouts, & Crone, 2010; Horn, 2003; Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Kahn, 1992; Krosch, Figner, & Weber, 2012; Smetana et al., 1991; Turiel et al., 1991; Wainryb, 1991), it was expected that for each situation, adolescents' and young adults' understandings of intentions and evaluations of the situations would be related to the person the actor chooses (e.g., the decision consistent with the moral consideration vs. the decision consistent with the nonmoral consideration). It was expected that adolescents and young adults would explain the "moral" decisions by referencing more moral intentions and evaluate these decisions more positively. Conversely, it was expected that they would respond to the "nonmoral" decisions by referencing more nonmoral intentions and evaluating these decisions less positively. Although it was also expected that they would provide more moral justifications for their evaluations of the moral decisions, there were no hypotheses regarding their justifications for their evaluations of the nonmoral decisions. There also were no hypotheses regarding the relationship between their use of intentions and their use of justifications.

Method

Participants

Participants were 102 adolescents recruited from a public high school (19 females, 16 males, M_{age} = 15.34, age range 15–16 years) and young adults from a public university (35 females, 32 males, M_{age} = 18.98, age range 18–20 years) in Northern California. Fifty-three percent of the participants were female. Participants reported their race/ethnicity as White/Caucasian-American (22.5%), Black/African-American (19.6%), Multi-Ethnic (16.67%), Asian-American (11.76%), and Other (29.46%). Participants' socioeconomic status was obtained using a self-reported measure. They classified themselves as middle class (38.24%),

upper-middle class (25.49%), lower-middle class (15.69%), working class (9.80%), and other (10.78%). The majority of the participants (83.33%) spoke English as their primary language.

College students were recruited through flyers posted on campus and classroom announcements, and high school students were recruited through classroom announcements. Interviews with high school students were scheduled once they turned in their consent packets signed by themselves and their parents or guardians. College students provided their consent (via signature) prior to participation. Interviews were conducted in either an empty classroom during after school hours (high school students) or a research office (college students).

Assessments and Procedures

Participants were presented with three hypothetical stories in which an actor must choose between two people for a particular activity (see Table 1 for full descriptions of each story). Each story involves high school students and a conflict between a moral and nonmoral concern. In addition, each story ends with the actor choosing one person over the other. For each story, half of the participants responded to the actor choosing the person associated with the moral concern, and half responded to the actor choosing the person associated with the nonmoral concern. Therefore, the actor's decision (moral vs. nonmoral) was a between-subjects independent variable. In addition, the order in which the situations were presented was counterbalanced to control for order effects. Four story orders (Forms A, B, C, and D) were used. The breakdown of each form (i.e., the order each story was presented and the actor's decision for each story) is presented in Table 4.

In the *Basketball Game Story*, the actor chooses between two friends to take to a basketball game (a local professional team was identified). The decision is between the friend the actor originally told could go, and a friend she is now considering taking after getting into an argument with the friend the actor originally said could go. Thus, the conflict is between keeping a promise or agreement (moral concern), or taking the friend she is now considering as a result of the argument, and with whom she would have a better time (personal concern). In the *Class President Story*, the actor chooses between two friends to vote for class president. The decision is between voting for a friend he does not like as much but whom he thinks will be a good president (moral concern), and a friend he likes more, but does not think will be a good president (personal concern). In the *Newspaper Editor Story*, the actor chooses between two candidates to hire as a writer for the school newspaper. The decision is between a more qualified writer with no social qualities (moral concern) and a less qualified writer with social qualities (nonmoral concern).

After presenting each story, participants were asked a series of questions about the actor's decision. First, they were asked about the actor's intentions (e.g., *Why do you think he/she [decided Person A/B]?)*. Next, participants were asked to evaluate the actor's decision (e.g., *Do you think it was alright or not alright for him/her to [choose Person A/B?*). They were then asked to provide a justification for their evaluation (*Why?*). Whereas the first question assessed their understanding of the actor's intentions underlying the decision, their evaluations and justifications were elicited to assess their understanding of the actor's decision by focusing on the decision itself.

Dependent Measures

There were three dependent measures assessed in the study: (a) participants' use of intentions to explain the actor's decision (*Why do you think he/she [decided Person A/B]?*), (b) participants' evaluation of the actor's decision (*Do you think it was alright or not alright for him/her to [choose Person A/B?*) and (c) justifications for evaluations (*Why?*).

Coding

Consistent with coding systems used in other research (e.g., Horn, 2003; Killen & Turiel, 1998; Komolova & Wainryb, 2011; Neff, Turiel, & Anshel, 2002; Smetana et al., 1991; Turiel, 1983), participants' responses regarding intentions and justifications were coded as *Moral*, *Personal*, *Pragmatic*, *Relationship*, *Social-Conventional*, *Other*, and *Mixed*. Although each response category had multiple subcategories (e.g., *Moral-fairness*, *Moral-group welfare*, etc.), participants received only one code if a response category was present, regardless of how many subcategories within that category were mentioned. For example, a response that mentioned both fairness and group welfare concerns would only receive one *Moral* code. Responses that included more than one category (e.g., *Moral*, *Personal*, *Pragmatic*, etc.) were coded as *Mixed*. Responses that did not fit any of the aforementioned categories or were difficult to comprehend were considered *Uncodable*. See Tables 2 and 3 for full descriptions of codes for intentions and justifications respectively.

Intentions. Participants' responses regarding the actor's intentions reflected how they understood what the actor was trying to achieve by the decision. *Moral* intentions pertained to the actor wanting to be fair, improve the welfare of others, or be trustworthy. Examples include "they knew that…it just seems more fair to take the person [who likes the basketball team]…," "they [voted for the best candidate] because…it'll help the class more…," and "I think [he or she] may have wanted to…stick with their word." *Personal* intentions appealed to the actor maintaining autonomy, benefitting from the decision, acting on preferences or desires, and wanting to have a good time. Some examples are "he [voted for that person] cuz' for one, it's anonymous," "he or she wants to get some kind of privilege from the president [e.g., extra opportunities to do things and being able to know things before others]," "he or she played favoritism because they liked them more than the other person," and "they chose the…new friend [because] they know they'll have a good time with them."

Intentions coded as *Pragmatic* focused on the actor wanting to choose the person who was most qualified or best fit for the position, being concerned with the practical utility of choosing one person over the other, and the consequences of the decision. Examples include "a writer's job is to write well and then if he writes well then like he['s] fit for the position," "if the person who has more friends is in…more cliques…more clubs and more groups then they'll be able to get more material to write about," and "she's just voting for her because it's just whatever it won't really affect her." Intentions appealing to the actor wanting to maintain or strengthen the friendship, support their friend, or taking into account whether the choice would affect the status of the friendship were coded as *Relationship*. Some examples are "they can use that time together to repair that relationship," "they felt the need to be more loyal to them, and they wanted them to win and be happy," and "they knew that…even though they [got into] an argument, they're still friends."

Social-Conventional intentions focused on the actor wanting to choose a person who would best serve the interests of the group or who would work well with others. Examples include "when you put someone in office to serve other people you…want like the most appropriate [and] the most effective authority" and "they were looking for people who were more social and that could help others thrive in the…journalistic community they had going on." Responses about the actor wanting to avoid social disapproval were coded as *Other*. An example includes "if you don't vote for him, he's gonna be mad [at] you." Inconclusive responses— where participants were unable to ascertain the actor's intentions (either because they could not choose between the possible intentions or because they needed more information) —were also

coded as *Other*.

      Justifications. Participants' justifications reflected their reasons for evaluating the actor's decision as alright or not alright. *Moral* justifications involved reasons appealing to fairness, improving or protecting the welfare of others, or being trustworthy. Examples include "I think they were fair," "because everybody [will] expect to have a better life and…a person who [wants] to help the school," "the other friend…would've been a lot more hurt," and "I don't think you should change your commitments." *Personal* justifications were provided on the grounds of autonomy, personal benefit, preferences or desires, and enjoyment. Some examples are "they were the ones with the tickets so they have the choice of who to offer the tickets to," "apparently to that person [the actor] that friend [the one he voted for] could offer the most to him," "he obviously still wanted to hang out with the other friend," and "it's understandable why they would go together [because] both [would] enjoy the game."

      Pragmatic justifications focused on choosing the person who is the most qualified or best fit for the position, the practical utility of choosing one person over the other, the consequences of the decision, and the person's class standing. Examples include "because that's usually how a selection process works…[y]ou evaluate which candidate has strengths and weaknesses and…you pick the candidate based on the qualifications you look for," "because that can really help the newspaper and it can spread...his friends tell his other others…and more people [will] start reading the newspaper," "in this case because…he wasn't running for governor or anything, like the guy you know made the right decision…because there's no big consequences to it," and "if the first candidate is a junior or senior student he or she might not have that much time as the second candidate if he or she is like [in] year one [of high school]."

      Justifications focused on maintaining or strengthening the friendship, supporting a friend, or the decision's impact on the status of the friendship were coded as *Relationship*. Examples include "if you wanna maintain that friendship you should take that friend," "he's your friend you gotta support him and give him a chance to try," and "if they were actually good friends, then it wouldn't matter in the long run [who the actor voted for]."

      Social-Conventional justifications were made on the grounds of whether or not the person chosen would best serve the interests of the group, how well the person would work well with others, or whether or not the actor had the authority to make the decision. Examples include "[voting for class president] should be more…about the overall structure of the school and what would be better for everybody," "it['] s kinda like a team effort…if one person is really good at writing but doesn't get along with the staff, then I think that might be a problem, no matter how good he is," and "I don't think they should've had the right to be able to make that decision necessarily on their own." Reasons pertaining to social disapproval were coded as *Other*. Examples include "if he woulda never taken him…[t]he guy who he didn't take woulda been like mad with him" and "[t]hey probably did it out of peer pressure." Participants' evaluations were coded as 1 = *Alright*, 2 = *Not Alright*, and 3 = *Depends/Don't Know*.

Reliability

      One graduate student trained by the researcher independently coded the intentions and justifications for 25% of the interviews. The student was unaware of the hypotheses of the study. Overall agreement (intentions and justifications collapsed) was 88% with a Cohen's kappa of $\kappa = .60$. Agreement for evaluations was 96% with a Cohen's kappa of $\kappa = .91$.

Results

Analysis Plan

To examine whether participants' understanding of the stories took into account multiple concerns and whether their decisions and evaluations of the story actor's decisions were related to decision-type, a series of ANOVAs were run. The analysis was performed in two phases. The purpose of Phase 1 was to examine whether participants' responses to the stories were related to the form they received (see Table 4 for descriptions of each form), and whether this relationship was generally consistent with the study's second hypothesis (i.e., participants' responses would relate to the actor's decision). The purpose of Phase 2 was to investigate any relationships that did emerge in Phase 1 further by examining any effects the actor's decision may have had on participants' responses in each story separately.

This two-phase approach was used due to the nature of the study's design. Although each participant received the same story, each participant only received one of the actor's decisions for each story. As a result, it was not possible to perform traditional two-way ANOVAs with story and decision as between-subjects factors and with story as a repeated measure.

Each of the participants' response categories used in the analyses were dummy coded. For Questions 1 (intentions) and 3 (justifications), the presence of a category (e.g., moral) in the participant's response was coded "1", with a code of "0" indicating that that category was not present. For Question 2 (evaluations), participants who evaluated the actor's decision as alright received a "1" and participants who evaluated the actor's decision as not alright received a "0." Participants who responded depends/don't know were excluded from the analysis.

For each question, participants who did not provide a response to each story were excluded from analysis. For example, a participant who provided a response to Question 1 (intentions) for the Basketball Game and Class President stories but not for the Newspaper Editor story was excluded. Participants with any responses considered uncodable were also excluded. The final *n*s used for analyses in Phases 1 and 2 were 94 for intentions, 80 for evaluations, and 63 for justifications.

To account for the number of ANOVAs that were ran in Phases 1 and 2, the Bonferroni adjustment was applied to each of the study's hypotheses and grouped according to question type: (a) intentions, (b) evaluations, (c) justifications, and (d) consistency (analysis conducted in Phase 2 only). For each group of hypotheses, tests were initially set to $\alpha = .05$. The adjusted αs used in Phases 1 and 2 were .001 for intentions, .003 for evaluations, .001 for justifications, and .01 for consistency.

Phase 1: Analyses by Form

Descriptive statistics for each response category by story and decision are presented in Tables 5 (intentions), 6 (evaluations), and 7 (justifications). In Forms A and C the actor's decisions were the same, but the order in which the stories were presented were different. The same was the case for Forms B and D. Therefore, comparing Forms A and C to Forms B and D provides a first step in examining whether or not participants' responses related to the actor's decision.

Consistent with the study's hypotheses, it was expected that Forms A and C would not differ from one another, but would differ from Forms B and D (and vice versa; see Table 4). These comparisons were performed first using 4 (Form) x 3 (Story) two-way ANOVAs with story as a repeated measure to compare each form separately, and then using 2 (Form Pairs) x 3 (Story) two-way ANOVAs with story as a repeated measure to compare each form pair. Some response categories were only used in two of the stories. For these categories, the two-way ANOVAs performed were 4 (Form) x 2 (Story) for the individual comparisons and 2 (Form

Pairs) x 2 (Story) for the pair comparisons. The results presented focus on the comparisons between the form pairs (e.g., A and C vs. B and D), unless there is a reason to discuss a result from comparing the forms individually that contradicts a result from the form pair comparisons. The results for intentions are discussed first, followed by the results for evaluations and justifications.

　　　　Intentions. Adolescents' and young adults' use of intentions by story and decision are presented in Table 5. Moral intentions were sometimes used to explain the actor's decision when responding to Forms A and C (moral stories), but not to explain the actor's decision when responding to Forms B and D (non-moral stories), $F(1, 92) = 34.51$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .273$. Moral intentions were not used in the Newspaper Story regardless of the actor's decision. Results indicate an opposite trend for adolescents' and young adults' use of personal intentions, in that they were used more often when responding to Forms B and D than when responding to Forms A and C, $F(1, 92) = 30.21$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .247$. Lastly, results indicate that they used more social-conventional intentions to explain the actor's decision in Forms A and C than in Forms B and D, $F(1, 92) = 41.53$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .311$. Social conventional intentions were not used in the Basketball Game Story regardless of the actor's decision.

　　　　Although results do not suggest a difference in adolescents' and young adults' use of pragmatic and relationship-oriented intentions as a function of form pairs, descriptive statistics suggest that a relationship may exist between their use of pragmatic and relationship-oriented intentions and the actor's decision for certain stories. In the Class President story, 25% of adolescents' and young adults' responses to the actor's decision to vote for the more qualified friend focused on pragmatic intentions, compared to 6% when the actor voted for the friend he liked more. In the Basketball Game story, 28% of the intentions referenced were relationship-oriented when the actor took the friend she originally told could go to the game, compared to about 4% when the actor took the friend she believed she would have a better time with. Moreover, 45% of the intentions referenced in the Class President story when the actor voted for the friend he liked more were relationship-centered, compared to 6% when the actor voted for the more qualified friend. The potential relationships between adolescents' and young adults' use of pragmatic intentions and the actor's decision in the Class President story, and the use of relationship-oriented intentions and the actor's decision in the Basketball Game and Class President stories are examined in Phase 2.

　　　　Evaluations. Adolescents' and young adults' evaluations by story and decision are presented in Table 6. Form comparisons indicate that overall participants agreed with the actors' decisions in Forms A and C more often than in Forms B and D, $F(1, 78) = 49.53$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .388$. Descriptive statistics suggest that this trend only applies to the Basketball and Class President stories, in which in Forms A and C the actor made the moral decision. Whether or not this trend also holds in the Newspaper Editor Story will be examined in Phase 2.

　　　　Justifications. Adolescents' and young adults' use of justifications by story and decision are presented in Table 7. Results suggest that participants did not differ in their use of moral, personal, pragmatic, relationship-oriented, or social-conventional justifications regardless of the actor's decision. Therefore, analyses of justifications by decision for each story were not performed in Phase 2.

　　　　Phase 1 summary. Taken together, form comparisons suggest partial support for the hypotheses that adolescents' and young adults' responses would take into account multiple considerations, and their use of considerations and evaluations would be related to the actors' decisions. Specifically, Forms A and C differed from Forms B and D regarding their use of three

of the five intentions examined (moral, personal, and social conventional), as well as their evaluations of the actor's decisions. Form comparisons did not, however, indicate that the actor's decisions played a role in how participants evaluated those decisions (as assessed by their evaluation justifications).

Phase 2: Analyses by Story

To further investigate the study's hypotheses, one-way ANOVAs were run for each story, with form pairs (A & C vs. B & D) as the between subjects factor and the response categories (e.g., moral, personal, pragmatic) as the dependent variables. In light of the above analyses and the descriptive statistics (see Tables 5 and 6), some response categories were excluded from Phase 2. Some categories were not used in some stories, and thus were excluded from analyses. For each story, response categories that made up less than 10% of the total responses to an actor's decision were excluded from analysis. For instance, the use of personal intentions in the Newspaper Editor Story were not analyzed because they only made up 3% of participants' total responses when the actor made the moral decision, and were not mentioned at all when the actor made the nonmoral decision. Lastly, response categories that differed by less than 10% across decisions were excluded from analyses. For example, the use of pragmatic intentions in the Newspaper Editor Story were excluded from analyses because proportions were roughly equal across decisions (e.g., 88% for the moral decision and 82% for the nonmoral decision).

In order to examine whether participants' use of intentions related to their evaluation justifications in each story, participants received a consistency code of "1" if they used the same response category (or categories) when providing intentions and justifications, and a "0" if they did not. Given that some participants provided mixed responses, these participants received a "1" if at least one of their response categories were used when providing both intentions and justifications. For instance, a response that included moral and relationship categories when providing intentions but only used the relationship category when providing justifications would still receive a consistency code of "1." Participants who did not provide a response category for both intentions and justifications were excluded. The final *n* for consistency analyses was *61*.

For each story, the results for intentions by decision are presented first, followed by the results for evaluations by decision and consistency by decision. In light of the Phase 1 analyses, justifications by decision were not included in the analyses. Adolescents' and young adults' use of intentions, evaluations, and justifications, as well as the consistency of their use of intentions and justifications are presented in Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 respectively. Analyzing response categories by gender or age did not yield significant differences. As a result, subsequent analyses included all adolescents and young adults.

Intentions, evaluations, and consistency in the Basketball Game Story. Results indicate that the actor's decision played a role in adolescents' and young adults' use of moral, personal, and relationship-oriented intentions. Specifically, participants only used moral intentions to explain the actor's decision to take the friend he originally said could go to the game, $F(1, 92) = 31.16$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .259$. Of the participants who explained this decision using moral intentions, 95% of them focused on the actor being trustworthy and upholding the original commitment (e.g., "…they had already told him he could go"). Results of moral intentions by story and decision are presented in Table 9. Participants were also more likely to explain this decision using relationship-oriented intentions, $F(1, 92) = 24.44$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .209$, with most participants (about 83%) believing that the actor was trying to maintain his current relationship with the person he originally said could go to the game (e.g., "maybe to patch up the

relationship…kinda seal whatever happen"). Findings on relationship-oriented intentions by story and decision are presented in Table 10. The actor's decision also related to participants' evaluations of the decision, with most participants evaluating the decision to take the friend he originally said could go as alright, $F(1, 78) = 34.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .305$.

However, when the actor decided to take the friend he believed he would have a better time with, adolescents and young adults were more likely to explain this decision using personal intentions, $F(1, 92) = 16.18$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .149$. The majority of participants (60%) construed the actor as wanting to enjoy the game (e.g., "if you take someone that you're angry with…you wouldn't enjoy the game as much"), while another 25% understood the actor's decision as being based on preference (e.g., "…if you get in an argument with someone…you won't really wanna hang out with them"). A description of personal intentions by story and decision is provided in Table 11. Lastly, the actor's decision did not relate to whether participants' understanding of the actor's construal of the decision (assessed by their use of intentions) was consistent with their own construal of the actor's decision (assessed by their use of evaluation justifications), $F(1, 59) = 2.96$, $p > .01$. See Tables 14-18 for results on justification subcategories by story and Table 19 for results on consistency subcategories by story and decision.

Intentions, evaluations, and consistency in the Class President Story. Results also suggest that the actor's decision related to adolescents' and young adults' use of intentions to explain the actor's decision. When the actor chooses to vote for the friend she believes is more qualified, participants more often explained the decision using intentions that were social-conventional, $F(1, 92) = 41.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .31$, compared to when the actor voted for the friend she likes more. All of the social-conventional intentions appealed to the actor wanting to choose the candidate who would best serve the class' interests ("because it's for the sake of the whole class"). Social-conventional intentions by story and decision are presented in Table 13. In addition, participants were more likely to evaluate this decision as alright, $F(1, 78) = 60.06$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .435$.

As can be seen in Table 10, when the actor chooses to vote for the friend she likes more, participants were more likely to use intentions that were relationship-oriented, $F(1, 92) = 33.51$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .267$, compared to when the actor voted for the friend who was most qualified. Relationship-oriented intentions primarily focused on the actor wanting to support her friend (68%; e.g., "if you're friend's doing something even if they're not good at it you probably wanna encourage and support them") or maintain the relationship (18%; e.g., "maybe they're afraid if the person finds out, like that they didn't vote for him…that would ruin the relationship"). The actor's decision did not relate to adolescents' and young adults' consistency in their understanding of the actor's construal of the decision and their own construal of the actor's decision, $F(1, 59) = 1.33$, $p > .01$.

Intentions, evaluations, and consistency in the Newspaper Editor Story. The actor's decision in the newspaper editor story was not related to adolescents' and young adults' use of any of the response categories for intentions. Moreover, the actor's decision was not related to their evaluation of the decision, $F(1, 78) = 2.12$, $p > .003$, or their consistency in their understanding of the actor's construal of the decision and their own construal of the actor's decision, $F(1, 59) = 2.19$, $p > .01$.

Phase 2 summary. Results from the analyses of response categories by decision for each story (Phase 2) are generally consistent with the results from the analyses of response categories by form (Phase 1). Both provide partial support for the hypotheses that (a) adolescents' and young adults' responses would take into account multiple considerations, (b) their use of

considerations would be related to the actors' decisions, and (c) they would evaluate the actors' moral decisions more positively. In the Basketball Game Story, the moral decision was related to the use of more moral and relationship-oriented intentions, and the nonmoral decision was related to the use of more personal intentions. The decisions in the Class President Story were also associated with different response categories, with the moral decision related to the use of more social-conventional intentions and the nonmoral decision related to the use of more relationship-oriented intentions. Lastly, results suggest that adolescents and young adults viewed the moral decisions in the Basketball Game and Class President stories more positively than the nonmoral decisions. With the exception of two findings with medium effect sizes (the association of the moral decision with the use of relationship-oriented intentions and the nonmoral decision with the use of personal intentions in the Basketball Game story), the findings yielded large effect sizes.

Discussion

Research suggests that increased understandings of others' psychological characteristics and more consistent coordination of multiple concerns are important for helping adolescents and young adults make sense of others' social and moral decisions (Helwig, 1995, 1997; Killen & Turiel, 1998; Krettenauer et al., 2011; Neff, 2001; Nucci, 1981). In the present study, I examined adolescents' and young adults' understanding of others' moral decisions in multifaceted situations by assessing the intentions they attributed to the actors, their evaluations of the actors' decisions, and their justifications for their act evaluations.

It was hypothesized that (a) adolescents' and young adults' understanding of the actors' decisions would take into account multiple considerations and (b) these understandings would be related to type of decisions made by the actors. Specifically, it was hypothesized that adolescents and young adults would use moral considerations and provide more positive evaluations for the actors' moral decisions than for the actors' nonmoral decisions. It was also expected that they would provide more moral justifications for their evaluations of the actors' moral decisions, but there were no hypotheses regarding their justifications for their evaluations of the actors' nonmoral decisions. There also were no hypotheses regarding the relationship between their use of intentions and their use of justifications.

ANOVAs for adolescents' and young adults' use of intentions and act evaluations revealed partial support for the hypotheses pertaining to intentions and act evaluations, with findings consisting of medium to large effect sizes. Adolescents' and young adults' understandings of the actors' decisions took into account a variety of considerations (e.g., moral, personal, relationship-oriented, etc.) and their use of these considerations varied both according to the actors' decisions and the nature of the conflict within which the decisions were made (i.e., by story). Their understandings of the actors' decisions also related to their evaluations of the decisions. The findings contribute to our understanding of the processes involved in adolescents' and young adults' understanding of others' moral decisions in multifaceted situations.

Understanding of Others' Intentions When Making Moral Decisions

One main finding of the present study is that the intentions adolescents and young adults attributed to the actors were related to the kinds of decisions the actors made. In the basketball game situation, the moral decision (taking the friend he originally said could go to the game) was associated with the use of more moral and relationship-oriented intentions and the nonmoral decision (taking the friend he believed he would have a better time with) was associated with the use of more personal intentions. In the class president situation, the moral decision (voting for the more qualified candidate) was associated with the use of more social-conventional intentions,

and the nonmoral decision (voting for the friend she liked more) was associated with the use of more relationship-oriented intentions.

Adolescents' and young adults' responses to the decisions in the basketball game and class president situations suggest that they construed these situations differently. For instance, whereas adolescents and young adults construed the actor's motivations behind the moral decision in the basketball game situation as being driven by wanting to stick with the original agreement and maintain the relationship, they construed the actor's motivations behind the moral decision in the class president situation as being driven by wanting someone in office who would benefit the class.

Adolescents' and young adults' differing construals in the basketball game and class president situations were also evident in the nonmoral decisions. Whereas they understood the actor's motivations behind the nonmoral decision in the basketball game situation as being driven by wanting to enjoy the game, they understood the actor's motivations behind the nonmoral decision in the class president situation as being driven by wanting to be a supportive friend, regardless if the friend is qualified for the position.

Lastly, adolescents' and young adults' differing understandings were evident in the kinds of relationship-oriented considerations they used to explain the moral decision in the basketball game situation and the nonmoral decision in the class president situation. In the basketball game situation, they mostly understood the relationship consideration as one of maintenance. In the class president situation, adolescents and young adults primarily construed the relationship consideration as one of support. The implications of the relationship between the nature of the conflict in each situation and adolescents' and young adults' construals of the considerations in the basketball game and class president situation are discussed below.

Taken together, these findings on adolescents' and young adults' use of intentions between (e.g., moral vs. social conventional) and within categories (e.g., maintenance vs. support) are consistent with research suggesting that understanding others' intentions is an important component of social and moral understanding (Brehl, 2008; Guroglu et al., 2009, 2010; Heiphetz & Young, 2014; Helwig et al., 1995, 2001; Recchia et al., 2013; Shaw & Wainryb, 1999; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Wainryb et al., 2005). In addition, the fact that both the type of decision and the nature of the conflict influenced how adolescents and young adults made sense of the actors' intentions speaks to the role of social construals in understanding others' actions (Horn, 2003; Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Kahn, 1992; Krosch et al., 2012; Smetana et al., 1991; Turiel et al., 1991; Wainryb, 1991).

Evaluations of Others' Moral Decisions

Another main finding of the present study is that the type of decision made by the actor in the basketball game and class president situations affected how adolescents and young adults evaluated the decisions in those situations. Specifically, they evaluated the actors' moral decisions in these situations more positively than the actors' nonmoral decisions. This finding suggests that adolescents and young adults generally endorse others' decisions when they construe these decisions as giving priority to moral considerations. For the basketball game and class president situations—both involving personal considerations—they may have considered it more important for the actors to put the needs of others above their own (e.g., by not going back on an agreement with a friend and by choosing someone better qualified to run the class, respectively). This explanation is consistent with research showing that adolescents and young adults generally favor interpersonal considerations over personal considerations, and view doing so in part as a moral issue (Killen & Turiel, 1998; Neff, 2001; Neff, Turiel, & Anshel, 2002).

This explanation may also help explain why the actor's decision in the newspaper situation did not affect adolescents' and young adults' evaluations. Based on the descriptive statistics on their use of intentions and justifications, they primarily construed both decisions as pragmatic. As a result, they may have believed there were no moral considerations (or competing considerations) to take into account regardless of which writer the editor decided to bring on.

Consistency in Understanding Others' Intentions and Justifications of Act Evaluations

Although a close examination of the nature of adolescents' and young adults' consistency in their understanding of actors' decisions (e.g., examining which categories were prevalent in which situations) was beyond the scope of the present study, the fact that they were consistent in their use of categories when attributing intentions and justifying their act evaluations across decisions and situations (the only exception being the nonmoral decision in the class president situation) is generally consistent with research on how people make sense of moral and nonmoral acts. Judgments related to endorsing moral or interpersonal acts and/or being critical of unfair practices are often justified using moral or interpersonal reasons (Conry-Murray, 2009; Kahn, 1992; Killen & Turiel, 1998; Neff, 2001; Neff et al., 2002; Smetana et al., 1991; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994; Witenberg, 2007). In addition, judgments endorsing personal acts or conceiving of acts as personal matters are often based on personal considerations (Killen & Turiel, 1998; Komolova & Wainryb, 2011; Neff, 2001; Neff et al., 2002; Turiel et al., 1991).

One potential explanation for the consistency found in the present study is that it may be easier for people's understanding of the intentions underlying another's act to be congruent with their own understanding of the act (evident by their justifications of act evaluations) when the act is one they themselves endorse. It might be that when adolescents and young adults are trying to understand the reasons why another person performed an act they agree with—and possibly one they would have performed themselves—they may be more likely to assume the person did it for similar reasons they themselves would have performed the act. Indeed, on many occasions adolescents and young adults relied on their personal experiences when responding to the questions, prefacing responses with statements such as, "well, if it was me I would have been thinking…" or "when I worked for the school newspaper…"

Wainryb and Brehl (2005) argue that an increased psychological understanding of others is not sufficient for predicting how one will construe and evaluate moral situations. Along these lines, the present study highlights the need for more investigations into the relationship between people's understanding of others' intentions when making moral decisions in multifaceted situations, and people's evaluations of these decisions. Indeed, Lagattuta and Weller (2014) consider a better understanding of this relationship important for bridging the work on social understanding (via TOM) and moral understanding.

Research by Helwig and colleagues (1995, 1997) has helped shed some light on this relationship by investigating how children's understandings of an actor's intentions inform their evaluations of the actor's behavior resulting in psychological harm. They found that older children were less likely to evaluate an actor's behavior positively and more likely to assign punishment to the actor when the actor's intentions were negative. Moreover, Brehl (2008) found that when presented with actors' explanations of situations that included unintentional harm to another, children and adolescents generally considered altruistic intentions to be more legitimate reasons to perform the act than personal intentions. A similar relationship between intentions and evaluations was found in the present study, where the actors' decisions to take the friend she originally said could go to the game (basketball game situation) and vote for the more

qualified friend (class president situation) were evaluated positively, with the former also more likely to be explained using moral intentions. Given that the three aforementioned findings yielded large effect sizes, it is likely that future research investigating these relationships can further clarify the extent to which the type of act affects this relationship, specifically in multifaceted situations involving competing concerns.

Understanding of Others' Moral Decisions in Multifaceted Situations

Even though adolescents and young adults were more likely to endorse the moral decisions in the basketball game and class president situations, to some degree *what* they endorsed related to the nature of the conflict. Their emphasis on the actor being trustworthy in the basketball game situation supports the notion that fulfilling an obligation can be considered a moral issue (see Killen & Turiel, 1998; Neff, 2001; Neff et al., 2002; Smetana et al., 2014). In this situation, the important consideration was psychological in nature, pertaining to the actor's individual traits or character. Accounting for the actor's psychological characteristics, in turn, informed participants' understanding of the situation—a well-documented theme in literature investigating social and moral understanding (e.g., Harris et al., 1989; Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001; Reiffe et al., 2005; Weisberg & Beck, 2010). In contrast, the important consideration in the class president situation was social in nature, as evident in the emphasis on social conventional explanations for the actor's moral decision. People's concern with issues pertaining to group functioning and social interactions when making sense of others' actions is also well documented (Conry-Murray, 2009; Horn, 2003, 2006; Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvi, & Hitti, 2013; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Metzger & Smetana, 2009; Nucci, 1981; Richardson et al., 2014; Turiel, 2008; Wainryb et al., 1998, 2001).

Although adolescents and young adults did not explicitly invoke considerations of fairness when making sense of the actor's decision in the class president situation, they nevertheless believed the actor considered it important to vote for the most qualified candidate. This belief was apparent in their understanding of the actor's decision as involving considerations of choosing someone who would help the class function smoothly in terms of activities, etc., as well as their endorsement of the actor's decision to vote for the most qualified candidate. To this end, their understanding of the actor's decision provides further evidence for the role of individual qualifications in understanding multifaceted situations (Killen & Stangor, 2001; Richardson et al., 2014). Their understanding of the actor's decision may also be indirectly related to research highlighting the importance of fairness considerations in construing moral acts (Horn, 2003; Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Richardson, Hittit, Mulvey, & Killen, 2014).

The multifaceted nature of the basketball game and class president situations was also apparent in adolescents' and young adults' understanding of the actors' nonmoral decisions. They often explained the actor's decision in the basketball game as being based on enjoying the game, a finding consistent with research highlighting the importance of personal considerations in construing social and moral situations (Helwig, 1997; Krettenauer et al., 2011; Neff, 2001; Nucci, 1981; Wainryb et al., 1998, 2001). Although a personal preference component was built into the class president situation, they often explained the actor's decision as based on the actor wanting to be a supportive friend.

One explanation for adolescents' and young adults' differing understandings of the actors' decisions in the basketball game and class president situations is that the differences are related to the unique features of the situations. For example, in addition to the moral versus personal conflict, the basketball game situation also included friendship and mutual interest

elements (e.g., one of the friends was a basketball fan), and revolved around an entertainment event. Research on adolescents' and young adults' understanding of conflicts between interpersonal responsibility and personal concerns have found that justifications for endorsing interpersonal decisions incorporated both moral and relationship-oriented components (Killen & Turiel, 1998; Neff, 2001). Given the increased salience of interpersonal obligation due to the prior commitment and friendship considerations in the basketball game situation, a potential explanation for why the moral decision was associated with both moral and relationship-oriented intentions is that adolescents and young adults may have considered the actor's decision to stick to his original commitment as based not just on being trustworthy, but also on preserving the friendship.

Like the basketball game situation, the class president situation also included a relationship component. However, the relationship component was different in the class president situation because the actor liked one friend more than the other. In addition, the moral versus personal conflict in the class president situation occurred within the context of school politics, not a sporting event as in the basketball game situation. The different relationship and school governance components in the class president situation may explain why participants construed the actor's moral and nonmoral decisions in the class president situation differently from the actor's moral and nonmoral decisions in the basketball game situation. The increased stakes of voting for someone in a position that affects others may have led participants to prioritize social conventional considerations when explaining the actor's decision to vote for the more qualified friend, whereas the increased salience of the friendship component may have led them to prioritize relationship-oriented considerations when explaining the actor's decision to vote for the less qualified friend.

Examining the frequency and nature of adolescents' and young adults' coordination of various considerations was beyond the scope of the present study; yet, the finding that the basketball game and class president situations led to different construals within categories raises interesting questions about the relationship between construals and coordinations in multifaceted situations. For instance, it may be that construing a relationship-oriented issue in terms of maintenance may lead to different coordinations than construing a relationship-oriented issue in terms of support. In related research, Kahn's (1992) investigation of children's and adolescents' construals of moral acts provided some evidence that they distinguish moral acts that are considered discretionary from those considered obligatory. Similarly, Komolova and Wainryb (2011) found that adolescents' understanding of competing personal preferences was related to whether or not the preferences were equal in importance (i.e., both trivial preferences or weighty preferences). The aforementioned findings, along with the present study's findings on adolescents' and young adults' differing understandings of relationship-oriented considerations, further speaks to the need for future research to examine the relationship between how people construe and coordinate considerations in multifaceted situations; specifically in terms of how different considerations are construed, evaluated, and distinguished.

Unlike the basketball game and class president situations, descriptive statistics and the lack of findings related to the actor's decision indicate that adolescents and young adults considered the newspaper editor situation to be largely pragmatic and related to what the actor believed was best for the school newspaper. One potential explanation for the lack of findings is that they may have construed both decisions as equally beneficial for the newspaper and ultimately based on the actor's point of emphasis (e.g., advancing the newspaper through better quality writing or generating better content through social connections)—thereby making it

difficult to endorse the editor's decision to choose one writer over the other. Moreover, the newspaper editor situation did not state whether the actor was a friend to either candidate. Thus another potential explanation could be that the absence of the friendship element may have increased the salience of pragmatic considerations in their understanding of the situation by omitting considerations of interpersonal responsibility. This increase in pragmatics in turn enabled them to focus on what each candidate brings to the newspaper.

Gender and Age Differences in Understanding of Others' Intentions, Act Evaluations, and Justifications

Although some research suggests that females may prioritize moral (Horn, 2003; Killen & Turiel, 1998; Killen & Stangor, 2001) and relationship-centered (Goldstein & Tisak, 2004) considerations in some situations more than males, no gender differences were found in the present study. The lack of gender differences in the present study is in line with evidence from other studies showing that males and females are generally similar in their understanding of moral situations. For instance, some studies have found no gender differences in males and females' social and moral understanding (Horn, 2006; Komolova & Wainryb, 2011; Wainryb, 1991), and others have found few gender differences that were either minor or did not yield a discernable pattern (see Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Smetana et al., 1991).

Although research indicates that with age (a) people's understanding of others' mental states generally becomes more comprehensive (Guroglu et al., 2009; Harris et al., 1989; Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001; Miller et al., 1970; Reiffe et al., 2005; Selman, 1980, 2003; Weisberg & Beck, 2010; Wellman et al., 2006) and (b) their understanding includes more consistent coordination of relevant considerations (Killen et al., 2007; Nucci, 1981; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Smetana et al., 1991; Tisak & Tisak, 1996a, 1996b; Wainryb et al., 1998, 2001), age differences were not found in the present study. However, the lack of age-related findings is in line with Nucci and Turiel's (2009) suggestion that finding specific age-related trends can be difficult when analyzing responses to multifaceted situations, due to the various considerations that are potentially relevant. Thus, it may be that the multifaceted nature of the situations—coupled with the study focusing on construals and not how these consturals are coordinated—made it more difficult to identify age-related trends in the present study.

In sum, the study's findings support the notion that adolescents and young adults were not only aware of the multiple features of the basketball game and class president situations, but also they incorporated these features into their attempts to both understand actors' decisions and evaluate the acts resulting from these decisions. The present study thus contributes to the body of research investigating the factors relevant to adolescents' and young adults' moral understanding more broadly as well in multifaceted situations.

Implications and Future Directions

It has been suggested that people's moral judgments can involve multiple considerations (e.g., Nucci & Turiel, 2009; Turiel, 2014), especially when these judgments are applied to multifaceted situations (e.g., Horn, 2003, Richardson et al., 2014; Smetana et al., 2014). By examining the potential reasons adolescents and young adults understand to influence others' moral decisions, as well as their evaluations and justifications pertaining to those decisions, the findings of the present study have implications for understanding how adolescents and young adults construe moral decisions made in multifaceted situations, and for future research in this area.

One implication is that how adolescents and young adults make sense of moral decisions in multifaceted situations is related to both their construal of the decisions and of the nature of the conflict within those situations. Thus, one of the tasks of future research is to isolate the effects of decision type (e.g., whether the actor's decision is moral or nonmoral) from the effects of situation type (i.e., the nature of the conflict facing the actor) on adolescents' and young adults' construal of multifaceted situations. One way to isolate the effects related to the actor's decision from the effects related to the situation could be to have all of the adolescents and young adults respond to different decisions within the same situation. Isolating the effects of decision from the effects of the situation can be achieved either through a method similar to the one used by Krosch et al. (2012) where young adults first imagined they made a particular decision then imagined they made a different decision, or through a modified version of the method used in the present study (e.g., having people respond to both the moral and nonmoral decision).

A second implication is that future research should include efforts to better understand the role salience plays in people's construals of moral decisions, given the importance of coordinating moral and nonmoral considerations for the development of moral understanding (Lagattuta & Weller, 2014; Smetana et al., 2014; Turiel, 1983, 2014). For example, findings from the present study suggest that the salience or weight given to the friendship component in the basketball game and class president situations played a role in participants' construing these situations as more multifaceted than the newspaper editor situation, which did not include a friendship component. Future investigations in this area should include manipulating the salience of considerations both across situations (e.g., Kahn, 1992; Smetana et al., 1991) and within situations, as examined in the present study.

Lastly, the present study has implications for distinguishing adolescents' and young adults' understanding of how another person may construe a situation (assessed through their use of intentions) from their own construal of that situation (assessed through their act evaluations and justifications). As mentioned earlier, there were some instances where adolescents' and young adults' responses incorporated their own experiences. Incorporating their own experiences to understand the decisions of others raises the question of whether it is possible or necessary to examine people's understanding of others' intentions without relying on what they themselves think their intentions would have been if they were in the same situation and made the same decision. Although participants in the current study were not asked to make decisions with this constraint, it may be a relevant consideration for future research.

Limitations

There were a few limitations to the present study that should be noted. For one, the findings should be interpreted with caution due to the small sample size and the fact there were nearly twice as many young adults in the study as there were adolescents. Employing a research design where all the participants responded to both decisions in each situation would have addressed some of the constraints on analyses due to the small sample size.

A second limitation is that the overall kappa for intentions and justifications was below the acceptable standard. Relatedly, extending the length of the interviews by including follow up questions could have made it easier to code some of the responses and potentially resulted in a higher overall kappa. A third limitation is that there were a few instances where responses were excluded from analyses. Although descriptive statistics and subsequent analyses suggest that these exclusions did not affect the results, excluding responses should generally be avoided.

Conclusion

Since the latter part of the twentieth century, researchers have demonstrated great interest in uncovering the processes by which we come to understand the thoughts and actions of others, and the extent to which these processes change or remain constant over time. As social beings, how we make sense of others' minds and behaviors have important implications for how we relate to each other, and by extension our understanding of social interactions and morality. Thus, it may be that our ability to understand one another will prove crucial in addressing many of the conflicts we face in our present social interactions; as well as those we may face in the future.

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Tables

Table 1

Hypothetical Stories

Conflict	Story
	Basketball Game Story
Moral vs. Personal	Last week, someone won two tickets to a basketball game involving a Bay Area professional team. This person is a fan of the team. At the time, they told their friend who is also a fan of the same team that they could go with them to the game. This person knows that their friend would like to go the game. A couple of days before the game, the two of them get into an argument. As a result, the person who won the tickets is now considering taking their other friend to the game instead. The person knows that the other friend does not like basketball, but they think they'll have a better time at the game with this other friend. After careful consideration, the person decides to take the friend they originally told could go/the friend they think they'll have a better time with.
	Class President Story
Moral vs. Personal	Someone is deciding on which of their two friends to vote for for class president. The person likes one friend more, but they do not think that that friend will be a good class president. The person likes the other friend less, but they believe that the other friend will be a good class president. After careful consideration, they decide to vote for the friend they like more/the friend they think will be a good class president.
	Newspaper Editor Story
Moral vs. Nonmoral	The editor of the school newspaper just lost one of their writers, and is looking to bring on a new one. The person is deciding between two candidates. One candidate is an average writer. The editor knows that this candidate has a lot of friends, and tends to get along with other students. The other candidate is a very good writer. The editor knows that this candidate does not have many friends, and does not get along with other students. After careful consideration, the editor decides to bring on the candidate with a lot of friends/the candidate who is the better writer.

Table 2

Intention Categories by Domain

Code	Description	Example
Moral		
Fairness	Actor wants to be fair.	"they knew that…it just seems more fair to take the person [who likes the basketball team]…"
Welfare to Others	Actor wants to improve the welfare of others.	"they [voted for the best candidate] because…it'll help the class more…"
Trustworthiness	Actor wants to be trustworthy.	"I think [he or she] may have wanted to…stick with their word."
Personal		
Autonomy	Actor maintains autonomy.	"he [voted for that person] cuz' for one, it's anonymous"
Benefit	Actor seeks to benefit from the decision.	"he or she wants to get some kind of privilege from the president [e.g., extra opportunities to do things and being able to know things before others]"
Preferences/Desires	Actor aims to fulfill a preference or desire.	"he or she played favoritism because they liked them more than the other person"
Enjoyment	Actor wants to enjoy him or herself.	"they chose the…new friend [because] they know they'll have a good time with them"
Pragmatic		
Best Qualified or Fit	Actor wants to choose the person who is most qualified or best fit for the position.	"a writer's job is to write well and then if he writes well then like he['s] fit for the position"

Utility	Actor wants to choose what will provide practical utility.	"if the person who has more friends is in…more cliques…more clubs and more groups then they'll be able to get more material to write about"
Inconsequential	Actor is aware that the consequences of the choice are minimal to nonexistent	"she's just voting for her because it's just whatever it won't really affect her"

Relationship

Maintenance	Actor wants to maintain or strengthen the friendship.	"they can use that time together to repair that relationship"
Support	Actor wants to support his or her friend.	"they felt the need to be more loyal to them, and they wanted them to win and be happy"
Status	Actor is aware of whether or not the decision will affect the status of the friendship.	"they knew that…even though they [got into] an argument, they're still friends"

Social-Conventional

Group Functioning-Interests	Actor seeks the person who best serves the group's interests.	"when you put someone in office to serve other people you…want like the most appropriate [and] the most effective authority"
Group Functioning-Work	Actor seeks the person who works best within the group.	"they were looking for people who were more social and that could help others thrive in the…journalistic community they had going on."

Other

Social Disapproval	Actor seeks to avoid disapproval from others.	"if you don't vote for him, he's gonna be mad [at] you"

Table 3

Justification Categories by Domain

Code	Description	Example
Moral		
Fairness	Actor should do what's fair.	"I think they were fair"
Welfare to Others	Actor should choose the person who will help others.	"because everybody [will] expect to have a better life and…a person who [wants] to help the school"
Psychological Welfare	The actor's decision hurt or did not hurt a person's feelings.	"the other friend…would've been a lot more hurt"
Trustworthiness	Actor should stick to their word.	"I don't think you should change your commitments."
Personal		
Autonomy	Actor is free to choose whom he or she wants.	"they were the ones with the tickets so they have the choice of who to offer the tickets to"
Benefit	Actor will benefit from the decision.	"apparently to that person [the actor] that friend [the one he voted for] could offer the most to him"
Preferences/Desires	Actor fulfills a preference or desire.	"he obviously still wanted to hang out with the other friend"
Enjoyment	Actor is able to enjoy him or herself.	"it's understandable why they would go together [because] both [would] enjoy the game"
Pragmatic		
Best Qualified or Fit	Actor chose the person who is most qualified or best fit for the position.	"because that's usually how a selection process works…[y]ou evaluate which candidate has strengths and weaknesses and…you pick the candidate based on the qualifications you look for"
Utility	The actor's decision has practical utility.	"because that can really help the newspaper and it can spread...his friends tell his other others…and more people [will] start reading the newspaper"

Inconsequential	The position or skill will not have a significant impact.	"in this case because…he wasn't running for governor or anything, like the guy you know made the right decision…because there's no big consequences to it"
Class Standing	The candidate may not have another opportunity to occupy the position.	"if the first candidate is a junior or senior student he or she might not have that much time as the second candidate if he or she is like [in] year one [of high school]"

<div align="center">Relationship</div>

Maintenance	Actor is able to maintain or strengthen the relationship.	"if you wanna maintain that friendship you should take that friend"
Support	The actor is supporting his or her friend.	"he's your friend you gotta support him and give him a chance to try"
Status	The nature of the relationship justifies the decision.	"if they were actually good friends, then it wouldn't matter in the long run [who the actor voted for]"

<div align="center">Social-Conventional</div>

Group Functioning - Interests	The person chosen will best serve the interests of the group.	"[voting for class president] should be more…about the overall structure of the school and what would be better for everybody"
Group Functioning - Work	The person chosen works best within the group.	"it['] s kinda like a team effort…if one person is really good at writing but doesn't get along with the staff, then I think that might be a problem, no matter how good he is"
Authority	Actor did not have the authority to make the decision.	"I don't think they should've had the right to be able to make that decision necessarily on their own"

<div align="center">Other</div>

Social Disapproval	Actor is able to avoid disapproval from others.	"if he woulda never taken him…[t]he guy who he didn't take woulda been

like mad with him"

Table 4

Interview Forms by Story and Actor's Decision

Form	First	Second	Third
A (*n* = 26)	*Basketball Game Story* *(Moral)*	*Class President Story* *(Moral)*	*Newspaper Editor Story* *(Nonmoral)*
B (*n* = 26)	*Newspaper Editor Story* *(Moral)*	*Basketball Game Story* *(Nonmoral)*	*Class President Story* *(Nonmoral)*
C (*n* = 26)	*Class President Story* *(Moral)*	*Newspaper Editor Story* *(Nonmoral)*	*Basketball Game Story* *(Moral)*
D (*n* = 24)	*Basketball Game Story* *(Nonmoral)*	*Class President Story* *(Nonmoral)*	*Newspaper Editor Story* *(Moral)*

Table 5

Intentions by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball ($n = 52$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 50$)	Basketball ($n = 50$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 52$)
Moral	21 (25.9%)	7 (11.1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Personal	35 (43.2%)	9 (14.3%)	3 (6%)	47 (92.2%)	25 (40.3%)	0 (0%)
Pragmatic	0 (0%)	16 (25.4%)	44 (88%)	0 (0%)	4 (6.5%)	46 (82.1%)
Relationship	23 (28.4%)	4 (6.3%)	0 (0%)	2 (3.9%)	28 (45.1%)	0 (0%)
Social-Conventional	0 (0%)	23 (36.5%)	1 (2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	10 (17.9%)
Other	2 (2.5%)	4 (6.3%)	2 (4%)	2 (3.9%)	5 (8.1%)	0 (0%)
Total	81 (100%)	63 (100%)	50 (100%)	51 (100%)	62 (100%)	56 (100%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding. For analyses on intentions, $n = 94$.

Table 6

Evaluations by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball ($n = 52$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 50$)	Basketball ($n = 50$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 52$)
Alright	50 (96.2%)	50 (96.2%)	46 (92%)	22 (44%)	19 (39.6%)	40 (76.9%)
Not Alright	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (4%)	20 (40%)	24 (50%)	7 (13.5%)
Depends/Don't Know	2 (3.8%)	2 (3.8%)	2 (4%)	8 (16%)	5 (10.4%)	5 (9.6%)
Total	52 (100%)	52 (100%)	50 (100%)	50 (100%)	48 (100%)	52 (100%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding. For analyses on evaluations, $n = 80$.

Table 7

Justifications by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball (n = 52)	President (n = 50)	Newspaper (n = 50)	Basketball (n = 50)	President (n = 50)	Newspaper (n = 52)
Moral	21 (31.3%)	4 (8.3%)	2 (4.3%)	11 (22.9%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Personal	26 (38.8%)	8 (16.7%)	8 (17%)	24 (50%)	10 (20%)	4 (8.7%)
Pragmatic	0 (0%)	23 (47.9%)	35 (74.5%)	0 (0%)	23 (46%)	34 (73.9%)
Relationship	19 (28.4%)	7 (14.6%)	0 (0%)	13 (27.1%)	6 (12%)	0 (0%)
Social-Conventional	0 (0%)	6 (12.5%)	2 (4.3%)	0 (0%)	10 (20%)	8 (17.4%)
Other	1 (1.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (2%)	0 (0%)
Total	67 (100%)	48 (100%)	47 (100%)	48 (100%)	50 (100%)	46 (100%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding. For analyses on justifications, n = 63.

Table 8

Consistency by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball (*n* = 52)	President (*n* = 50)	Newspaper (*n* = 50)	Basketball (*n* = 50)	President (*n* = 50)	Newspaper (*n* = 52)
Consistent	27 (84.4%)	18 (56.2%)	21 (72.4%)	19 (65.5%)	12 (41.4%)	28 (87.5%)
Not Consistent	5 (2.6%)	14 (43.8%)	8 (27.6%)	10 (34.5%)	17 (58.6%)	4 (12.5%)
Total	32 (100%)	32 (100%)	29 (100%)	29 (100%)	29 (100%)	32 (100%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding. For analyses on consistency, *n* = 61.

Table 9

Moral Intentions by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball (*n* = 52)	President (*n* = 50)	Newspaper (*n* = 50)	Basketball (*n* = 50)	President (*n* = 50)	Newspaper (*n* = 52)
Fairness	1 (4.8%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Trustworthiness	20 (95.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Welfare to Others	0 (0.0%)	7 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Total	21 (100%)	7 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 10

Relationship Intentions by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball ($n = 52$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 50$)	Basketball ($n = 50$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 52$)
Maintenance	19 (82.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (50%)	5 (17.9%)	0 (0.0%)
Status	2 (8.6%)	4 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (50%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Support	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	19 (67.8%)	0 (0.0%)
Mixed	2 (8.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)
Total	23 (100%)	4 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (100%)	28 (100%)	0 (0.0%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 11

Personal Intentions by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball ($n = 52$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 50$)	Basketball ($n = 50$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 52$)
Autonomy	0 (0.0%)	1 (11.1%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Benefit	0 (0.0%)	3 (33.3%)	2 (66.7%)	1 (2.1%)	4 (16%)	0 (0.0%)
Enjoyment	31 (88.6%)	1 (11.1%)	0 (0.0%)	28 (59.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Preferences/ Desires	3 (8.6%)	4 (44.4%)	1 (33.3%)	12 (25.5%)	20 (80%)	0 (0.0%)
Mixed	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (12.8%)	1 (4%)	0 (0.0%)
Inconclusive	1 (2.8%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Total	35 (100%)	9 (100%)	3 (100%)	47 (100%)	25 (100%)	0 (0.0%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 12

Pragmatic Intentions by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball ($n = 52$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 50$)	Basketball ($n = 50$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 52$)
Best Qualified or Fit	0 (0.0%)	16 (100%)	33 (75%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (25%)	16 (34.8%)
Inconsequential	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (50%)	0 (0.0%)
Utility	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (13.6%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (25%)	18 (39.1%)
Mixed	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	5 (11.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	12 (26.1%)
Total	0 (0.0%)	16 (100%)	44 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (100%)	46 (100%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 13

Social Conventional Intentions by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball ($n = 52$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 50$)	Basketball ($n = 50$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 52$)
Group Functioning - I	0 (0.0%)	23 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Group Functioning - W	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (100%)
Trustworthiness	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Total	0 (0.0%)	23 (100%)	1 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (100%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 14

Moral Justifications by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball ($n = 52$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 50$)	Basketball ($n = 50$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 52$)
Fairness	1 (4.8%)	1 (25%)	2 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Psychological Welfare	3 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (9.1%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Trustworthiness	17 (80.9%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (90.9%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Welfare to Others	0 (0.0%)	3 (75%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Total	21 (100%)	4 (100%)	2 (100%)	11 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 15

Relationship Justifications by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball (*n* = 52)	President (*n* = 50)	Newspaper (*n* = 50)	Basketball (*n* = 50)	President (*n* = 50)	Newspaper (*n* = 52)
Maintenance	14 (73.7%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	11 (84.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Status	5 (26.3%)	7 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (15.4%)	1 (16.7%)	0 (0.0%)
Support	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (66.7%)	0 (0.0%)
Mixed	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (16.7%)	0 (0.0%)
Total	19 (100%)	7 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	13 (100%)	6 (100%)	0 (0.0%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 16

Personal Justifications by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball ($n = 52$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 50$)	Basketball ($n = 50$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 52$)
Autonomy	1 (3.8%)	2 (25%)	6 (75%)	8 (33.3%)	8 (80%)	3 (75%)
Benefit	0 (0.0%)	2 (25%)	2 (25%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (10%)	1 (25%)
Enjoyment	20 (76.9%)	1 (12.5%)	0 (0.0%)	11 (45.8%)	1 (10%)	0 (0.0%)
Preferences/ Desires	4 (15.4%)	3 (37.5%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (12.5%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Mixed	1 (3.8%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (8.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Total	26 (100%)	8 (100%)	8 (100%)	24 (100%)	10 (100%)	4 (100%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 17

Pragmatic Justifications by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball ($n = 52$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 50$)	Basketball ($n = 50$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 52$)
Best Qualified or Fit	0 (0.0%)	23 (100%)	32 (91.4%)	0 (0.0%)	20 (87%)	17 (50%)
Class Standing	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Inconsequential	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (13%)	0 (0.0%)
Utility	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (5.7%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (20.6%)
Mixed	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.9%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (29.4%)
Total	0 (0.0%)	23 (100%)	35 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	23 (100%)	34 (100%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 18

Social Conventional Justifications by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball (*n* = 52)	President (*n* = 50)	Newspaper (*n* = 50)	Basketball (*n* = 50)	President (*n* = 50)	Newspaper (*n* = 52)
Authority	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (12.5%)
Group Functioning - I	0 (0.0%)	6 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (100%)	0 (0.0%)
Group Functioning - W	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (87.5%)
Total	0 (0.0%)	6 (100%)	2 (100%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (100%)	8 (100%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Table 19

Consistency Categories by Story and Actor's Decision (Frequencies and Percentages)

	Moral			Nonmoral		
	Basketball ($n = 52$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 50$)	Basketball ($n = 50$)	President ($n = 50$)	Newspaper ($n = 52$)
Moral	9 (28.1%)	1 (5.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Personal	14 (43.8%)	4 (21%)	0 (0%)	19 (100%)	7 (58.3%)	0 (0%)
Pragmatic	0 (0%)	10 (52.6%)	21 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (8.3%)	26 (89.7%)
Relationship	9 (28.1%)	1 (5.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (33.3%)	0 (0%)
Social-Conventional	0 (0%)	3 (15.8%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (10.3%)
*Total	32 (100%)	19 (100%)	21 (100%)	19 (100%)	12 (100%)	29 (100%)

Note. Some totals may not equal 100% due to rounding. For analyses on consistency, $n = 61$. *Includes instances where participants were consistent in using more than one category (e.g., used personal and relationship categories for both intentions and justifications).