UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title
Speculative Statecraft: Logistical Media and the Culture of Chinese Cold War, 1945-1978

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8js0q5q5

Author
Yang, Zi-Qiao

Publication Date
2019

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California

Speculative Statecraft: Logistical Media and the Culture of Chinese Cold War, 1945-1978

By

Zi-Qiao Yang

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Chinese Language

and the Designated Emphasis

in

Critical Theory and Film & Media Studies

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Andrew F. Jones, Chair
Professor Weihong Bao
Professor Dan O'Neill
Professor Colleen Lye

Summer 2019

Abstract

Speculative Statecraft: Logistical Media and the Culture of Chinese Cold War, 1945-1978

by

Zi-Qiao Yang

Doctor of Philosophy in Chinese Language

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Andrew F. Jones, Chair

My dissertation explores the ways the media industries of the Chinese Nationalist Party turned Taiwan and Hong Kong—the Nationalist's industrial home-front and informational hub—into what I call a regime of logistics after 1949. As one of the greatest human migrations in modern history, the mass exodus of millions of Chinese people to Taiwan and Hong Kong upon the triumph of the Communist party has been relatively understudied. The movement of military personnel, intellectuals, technocrats, and business communities represented a singular mode of migratory culture, as they were not only victims displaced by the Chinese Civil War but also a powerful cluster of human resources with which the Nationalist regime engineered the image of a "Free China" with the support from the United States. In this context, I ask how military, industrial, and commercial logistics forged a propaganda media infrastructure that both circulated and represented the movement of labor, information, and affects in the supply-chain capitalism during the Cold War.

My dissertation inquiries into the specific ways state-sponsored cinema and literature turned the narratives of displacement into narratives defined by postwar developmentalism. It is my contention that in the process of being relocated and downscaled from a continental sovereignty to an exiled island-state, the Nationalists' pursuit of a techno-utopia forged a series of media environments from which new cinematic and literary aesthetics emerged within the intertwined milieu between warfare and development. How did Taiwan and Hong Kong reshape the Nationalists' narratives of nation-building and military logistics with their own aesthetic strategies? What do these strategies tell us about the relations among militarism, migration, and environment? To map out the interconnected conduits of aesthetic transformation between propaganda discourses and creative freedom, I read audiovisual images and literary texts against four principal enterprises for Nationalists' mobilization—military science, agricultural campaigns, transportation networks, and architectural planning. Each of these medium/environment clusters is centered around a state-run enterprise—transplanted from China to either Taiwan or Hong Kong—and its correlated technocratic discourses. In aggregate, these images and texts provide the basis for a new narrative of Taiwan and Hong Kong's Cold War culture.

Contents

Introduction

Logistics and the Arts of an Exiled State

I. Two Mornings in "Chinese" Taipei

The three years between 1964 and1966 were the most obscure period in the career of film director Bai Jingrui 白景瑞 (1931-1997). For over three years, the young filmmaker, who had just returned to Taiwan with a degree from the prestigious Centro Sperimentale di Cinematografia (Italian National film school), did not get as many chances as his friends and colleagues had promised. Hailed as the very first ethnic Chinese to study cinema in Italy, and widely expected to bring new hope to Taiwan's state-run cinema, Bai worked for the Nationalist-owned Central Motion Picture Company 中央電影公司 (CMPC), where he was initially given a small assignment to shoot a short documentary about Taipei City—the temporary capital of the exiled regime of the Chinese Nationalist Party (*Kuomintang*, or KMT, for short). The assignment, partially meant as an initial training berth for Bai, partially meant for submission to the 1964 Asia Film Festival as a promotion piece, turned out to be a 20-minute black and white short titled *A Morning in Taipei* 台北之晨 (1964), an experimental documentary reminiscent of city films such as Dziga Vertov's *The Man With Movie Camera* (1929) and Humphrey Jennings's *Listen to Britain* (1942), with extensive use of montage to depict all walks of life in Taipei without any voice-over or extra-diegetic music. The project, however, was disapproved of by Bai's CMPC superiors and quickly scrapped. This unfinished project of Bai, soon forgotten, was never considered as a component of Bai's decades-long oeuvre, and was not "discovered" by Taiwan's film archivists until the early 2000s.[1]

Before this "rediscovery," however, film historians had mostly considered Bai's debut to be the policy-oriented historical warfare film *Fire Bulls* 還我河山 (1966) – literally, "returning our rivers and mountains," co-directed with Li Xing 李行 (1930 -) and Li Jia 李嘉 (1923-1994). As a period piece aiming to allegorize the official ideology of "the counterattack" 反攻(*fangong*) —retaking Mainland China by military means — the film reenacts the historical siege of the city Jimo in the state of Qi during the Spring and Autumn period (771 BC - 476 BC) with a focus on the legendary General Tian Dan 田單 and his patient preparation in military logistics, including transportation, weaponry, communication, and the mobilization of citizens and animals— such as bulls armed with swords. With a clear reference not to be mistaken, *Fire Bulls* ends with the superimposition of a chariot of Qi on an ancient Chinese map, as the chariot sweeps through the Qi State city by city, battle by battle, eventually restoring all of the lost territory of the kingdom.[2]

---

[1] According to film scholar Shen Hsiao-ying, the film was abandoned by CMPC when it was unloaded to Taipei Film Archive after years in its film vault among many of the company's working copies. Bai's short has been discovered, preserved and held at the Chinese Taipei Film Archive (now Taiwan Film Institute) since 2004 (52).

[2] The allegorical reference to the fallen cities Jimo 即墨 and its ally city Ju 莒 in the state of Qi, were constantly evoked by Chiang Kai-shek himself as historical example of rallying a "counterattack" against a more prominent and encroaching enemy. A slogan "Never Forget the Time in Ju" 毋忘在莒 (*wuwangzaiju*), for instance, was inscribed on a big rock at the military base on Kinmen island in 1952 based on Chiang's calligraphy.

Bai's contribution to the co-directed film, in particular, is reflected in a spectacular scene during which a chariot sent by Tian Dan to transport weapons back to the city is chased by the surrounding enemies. With a montage sequence swiftly cutting among the galloping feet of horses, chariot wheels, and the face of the driver, the camera follows through the chariot's hurtling into the sky and crashing into a valley with its driver being thrown into the air (see fig.1 -4). This sequence of actions, as a journalist who interviewed Bai later comments, successfully creates an "an atmosphere of urgency and stunning power that never existed in previous Mandarin-language films" (Yang 16). In response to the compliment, however, Bai answers with a palpable sense of dissatisfaction: "There's not much to it" 不過如此而已(*buguo ruci eryi*).


Figure 1


Figure 2


Figure 3


Figure 4

Figure 1- 4. A montage sequence cutting from galloping horses, spinning wheels, a crashed chariot, to a human figure thrown into the air (*Fire Bulls*, 1966). Image courtesy of Taiwan Film Institute.

Indeed, Bai's dissatisfaction is understandable, if we compare his modest experiment in *Fire Bulls* to the stunning visual montage he had assembled less than two years earlier with *A Morning in Taipei.* As if in prelude to the besieged city of Jimo, Bai's Taipei turns the precarious Nationalist capital into a synchronized time-space constituted by the logistics through which all walks of life, with their seemingly isolated mode of production, can be connected to other parts of the city in a supply chain of goods, labor, and information. With a series of montage edits, the film opens with allegorical sequence as the camera pans across the dark sky of Taipei, cutting from a neon sign for the "China Travel Agency" to another saying "Hotel Taiwan," followed by the sign for the "Taipei Airport." This symbolic passage from China to Taiwan and Taipei is immediately followed by a single file line of woman farmers carrying loads across a bridge and a motorized tricycle carrying two men into the city. The tricycle passes through a wall painted with the slogan "Accomplish the Grand Mission of the Counterattack" 完成反攻大業 (*Wancheng fangong daye*), as the camera—presumably mounted on the tricycle—takes the vehicle driver's

point of view by slowly moving along a downtown avenue and zooming in on an issue of the KMT's mouthpiece paper, *Central Daily News*, lying on the ground (see fig. 5 - 10). For the rest of the film, the camera follows the motion of letters, vehicles, and products into an urban fabric that is woven together by the postal system, telephone lines, train tracks, buses, assembly-line, and printing houses. In hindsight, we may say that Bai's rediscovery of the city film, along with its implied political messages and fantasies about urban logistics, anticipated the experimental impulses in *Fire Bulls*, a recognizably propagandistic work.

Figure 5


Figure 6

Figure 7


Figure 8


Figure 9


Figure 10

Figure 5-10. A sequence linking the signs of China Travel, Taiwan Hotel, and Taipei Airport, followed by another sequence that links the movement of human bodies, a tricycle, and the KMT newspaper, *Central Daily*. (*A Morning in Taipei*, 1964).

This juxtaposition of *A Morning in Taipei* and *Fire Bulls* points toward several problems beyond mere historical contingency One of the most important issues at hand is the ambivalent relationship between KMT's propaganda media and the creative freedom that might have emerged within its institutional and ideological contexts. How do we, for instance, situate an experimental piece like *A Morning in Taipei* in relation to most of Bai's other works produced for policy advocacy, military mobilization, or market-oriented melodramas? Should one consider the montage sequence in *Fire Bulls* as a sign of Bai's compromise or frustration in terms of aesthetic innovation after the rejection of his montage documentary? Alternatively, these two cases might provide an entry into the ambivalent organizational space of KMT's propaganda media cluster, in which individual talents negotiated between the dictates of official anti-communist propaganda and their own artistic aspirations. Instead of seeing a film like *A Morning in Taipei* as an isolated experiment, one might see it both as a work demanded by its ideological environment and a critical response to such demand. For someone like Bai Jingrui, an exile from China to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War, his struggle and identification within KMT's propaganda machine also provides a different perspective on the creative agency—however

unlikely— of a group of filmmakers working within the state-owned studios out of concern for better incomes, filming facilities and career prospects.[3]

On the other hand, a comparison of these films necessitates an inquiry into the role of cinematic medium in KMT's campaign for "counterattacking the Mainland" 反攻大陸 (*fangong dalu*) through its representations of Taiwan— the KMT's military-industrial "home-front" during the long Cold War period. One should be reminded that none of *Fire Bulls*'s grand battle scenes were shot in the so-called Mainland China but produced by location-shooting in open fields close to Taiwan's army training base at Chenggongling and Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, the largest military airport in East Asia during the 1960s. Closely collaborating with the military, the historical war picture also recruited three thousand real soldiers from the army base, more than a hundred horses with their trainers, as well as eight-hundred locally-bred cattle with their owners dressed as ancient soldiers of Qi.[4] In short, the reconstructed city of Jimo and its military logistics itself already involved a series of paramilitary logistical operations done *on-site* in Taiwan's local environment. Compared to the experimental documentary featuring Taipei as the logistical base of capitalistic Free China, *Fire Bulls* was no less "realistic" in terms of its *actual* subjugation of physical surroundings and resources to the making of an ancient Chinese city. If a film like *Fire Bulls* allegorizes the restoration of China by Taiwan through the reconstructed Jimo, thereby tying the island to the rebuilding of an imagined Chinese nationhood, it does so not simply by creating a virtual Chinese city-state on the screen. Rather, its production was based upon the actual logistical mobilization of the environment of Taiwan so that the state-run film studio—armed with its unparalleled budget, organizational outreach, and advanced facilities—might build an ancient walled city in the open fields in central Taiwan. It might be fair to say that Bai's unfinished documentary captures the logistical flows of a "Chinese" Taipei under KMT's modern planning, while *Fire Bulls* changes the material environment so as to create a virtual Chinese state with the KMT's logistical support.

Informed by these intertwined lines of thinking about *A Morning in Taipei* and *Fire Bulls*— from the question of artistic agency to that of site-specificity—my dissertation embarks upon a journey through various virtual and actual sites at once shaped and represented by the KMT's propaganda films and media. In particular, I highlight the notion of logistics as the key to understanding KMT's migratory routes from China to Taiwan, as well as its extended influence in Hong Kong. Whether it is Taipei in the 1960s or Jimo in 300 BC, it is no coincidence that both cities presented in the film are highlighted with specific visual details regarding the circulating movement of transportation, communication, and connections within their military or commercial supply chain. This fascination with logistical movement, as my dissertation points out, characterize films and media products produced by state-run film studios and cultural agencies in the form of fiction, prints, feature-length narrative films, documentaries, educational/training shorts, and many other hybrid films meant for mobilizing, transporting, and deploying resources against a precarious Cold War environment.

---

[3] Bai, for example, serves as a production manager for almost two years at CMPC before he was actually given the chance to direct parts of *Fire Bulls*. In the immediate postwar period, state-run studios had superior facilities than most of the studios, as they took over the existing film studios left by the Japanese and received new facilities from the United States in the 1950s. See Z. Lin 12-13.

[4] The military command at the filming location also gave a code name, "Operation Fire Bulls," to help contain these horses and bulls. For a news report on the mobilization between the military and the civilian, see "Huanwo heshan."

My dissertation thus inquires into the specific routes and itineraries writers, artists, filmmakers, and technocrats took after the historical turmoil of Chinese Civil War while asking the following questions. Firstly, how do we describe the logistical movements presented in the KMT's state-sponsored film and media, and how do these images depict the military regime's own migration, occupation, and settlement into a new material and social environment? Secondly, how do we identify the aesthetics and sensorial conduits through which films and media recode the exigencies and immediacy of warfare, and memories of the traumatic defeat and exile, into a series of new developmental sensibilities of calculation, measurement, and management in postwar Taiwan and Hong Kong? Third, as artists and filmmakers collaborated with the state-run media organs, how might they have pioneered and experimented with technical, aesthetic, stylistic nuances beyond the control of propaganda machine? *A Morning in Taipei*, for instance, experiments extensively with montage aesthetics, casting an intense film gaze into a spatially fragmented yet temporally synchronized urban environment. A similar aesthetic impulse finds its way into a couple of moments in *Fire Bulls*, whose epic temporal design is occasionally destabilized by the use of montage sequences, such as the chariot-chasing episode filmed by Bai. One may thus also ask: what sorts of new temporal and spatial configurations were imagined in these works of propaganda, and did they alter the spatial and temporal schema dictated by the control of the military state? To answer these questions, however, we have to revisit the historical itineraries KMT took across the Taiwan Straits from Chinese Civil to Cold War. It is on their actual logistical routes and sites in history where we may further explore various modes of logistical fantasies produced within each of their own specific institutional contexts.

II. Crafting 1949: Logistical Mediations between Civil War and Cold War

If the opening montage sequence of *A Morning in Taipei* gave its intended viewers a veiled allegory of KMT's passage to Taiwan, these montage images might have echoed the memories emblazoned in the minds of those exiled technocrats, soldiers, and intellectuals, who were caught between the immediate aftermath of the Chinese Civil War and their new refugee home in Taiwan. The hustle and bustle of the street scenes, as presented through Bai's camerawork, are not random images providing an arbitrary overview of the city. Rather, the film presents Taipei as a series of production sites and communicational relay points though which a strong sense of synchronized plane of connectivity is achieved. This visual trope of connectivity and its reliance on the supply chain brings to the fore the very logistical environment KMT itself actually underwent as a result of the 1949 national division and its subsequent flight across the Taiwan Strait.

As historians of the Chinese Civil War have detailed, the KMT's "retreat and evacuation" 撤退 (*chetui*) to Taiwan was not only one of the largest human migrations in twentieth century history but one that involves a massive scale of movement and deployment in terms of logistics – in both the military and civilian sense of the word. Multiple waves of civilian refugees had already made their way to Taiwan between the period of 1945 and 1953, while the KMT's technocrats, military personnel, and their families mostly relocated to Taiwan between 1948 and 1949 as the Chinese Communists swept through China province by province, winning battle after

battle.[5] The flow of personnel, inevitably, was accompanied by the motion of goods, currencies, commodities, and government-owned properties that included various sorts of archives and facilities such as those from the National Central Library, Palace Museum, Academia Sinica, and the film archive and film production facilities owned by state-run studios such as the Agricultural Education Motion Picture Co. 農業教育電影公司(*Nongjiao*), Chinese Motion Picture Studio 中國電影製片廠 (*Zhongzhi*), and Central Motion Picture Studio 中央電影製片廠 (*Zhongdian*).[6] These military, technocratic, and civilian mobilizations of human and material resources, however, were not passively evacuated and relocated as government assets to Taiwan. They also served as the foundations upon which KMT planned a series of restored and newly constructed organizational, political, and cultural infrastructures for its campaign for counterattacking the Mainland while upholding Taiwan as the militarized base and home-front of Free China. My dissertation demonstrates how the exiled Chinese Nationalist regime and its cultural industries turned Taiwan and Hong Kong—the Nationalist's industrial home-front and informational hub, respectively —into what I call a *regime of logistics*, an industrial-military complex that both circulated and represented the movement of technologies, labor, information, and affect. The mass movement of Nationalist military personnel, technocrats, business communities, and their families represented a singular mode of migratory culture, as they were not only victims displaced by the Chinese Civil War but also a powerful aggregation of human resources, a technical-social ensemble with which the Nationalist regime sought to engineer the image of a Free China during the Cold War with the support from the United States.

Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines the term "logistics" as both "the activity of organizing the movement, equipment, and accommodation of troops" and "the commercial activity of transporting goods to customers." ("Logistics")[7] KMT's postwar evacuation and resettlement from China to Taiwan embody precisely such a duality, as the military retreat also involved a process of transforming state-owned enterprises and companies into portable assets and facilities while transporting and remobilizing them as sustainable business enterprises in the new environment and market of Taiwan. The emergency mobilization and transportation of resources also entailed a series of liquidations, restructurings and reorganizations of the original military units into enterprises that could suit the new environment of Taiwan, where the existing Japanese infrastructure and the new technological and financial support from the United States also posed challenges to a successful and smooth transition. An important case in point is the frequent change of the organizational status of the military film studio CMPS from a unit commanded by Ministry of Defense before 1949, to an organization under Joint Logistics

[5] The exact number of migrants and refugees moving from China to Taiwan during the period between 1940s to 1960s has been a debate among historians, as the estimation ranges between 540000 and 2.5 million. Using various different records and census, historian Lin Tongfa suggests that the approximate number can be around 1.2 million people, which took up 15 percent of the total population in Taiwan (324-336).

[6] The migratory routes of these state-owned properties varied with a prolonged period of time from 1946 to 1949. The migration and movement of the state-owned film studios, in particular, were related to the military and paramilitary logistics of KMT, which will be discussed in Chapter One and part of Chapter Two.

[7] The etymological root of the term logistics suggests two sources: the Greek root Greek *logistikos* suggests "skilled in calculating, while the French root *logis* suggests "lodging" based on Old French *logeiz*, "shelter for an army and encampment." See Online Etymology Dictionary https://www.etymonline.com/word/logistics#etymonline_v_12395 The term is usually translated in modern Chinese as *houqin* 後勤 (duty and service from the rear or back) in military contexts or *wuliu* 物流 (flow of goods) in commercial context. In Chapter One, I will further discuss the extended use of the term in KMT military after 1949.

Command during the removal from the mainland at the conclusion of the Civil War, which was in turn followed by its reestablishment in Taiwan as a merger between the formerly Japanese-owned Taiwan Film Studio and the US-aided Agricultural Education Motion Pictures. It might fair to say that KMT's epic migration and resettlement from China to Taiwan can be seen as a forced logistical operation that involved both the military and the civilian spheres.

As such, the logistical environment during and after the 1949 turmoil was necessarily an extremely porous and contingent milieu full of distractions, noise, violence, and failures in transportation and communication. For cultural workers and artists within the KMT's cultural agencies, therefore, to represent this chaotic environment as a coherent totality would prove to be a difficult, if not entirely impossible, task. This representational difficulty was not merely caused by the ideological divide between the Nationalists and the Communists, but rooted in the perceived gaps, fissures, and errors inherent to the lived environment across the so-called "1949 divide." What was at stake for writers and filmmakers living and moving across the divide, in this case, was how to recode the geopolitical divide on a national and ideological level into immediate aesthetic experiences on the part of audiences, readers, and spectators. If *A Morning in Taipei* failed to please Bai's CMPC superiors, it might have been that its extensive montage sequences touched upon the very gap between the KMT's projected logistical utopia— one defined by the smooth transportation and coherent narrative—and a fragmented urban reality experienced by the city's dwellers.

My dissertation observes and highlights the intertwined sites and routes between geopolitical divides and experiential gaps inherent to KMT's logistical movement from China to Taiwan, and its exterritorial influences over Hong Kong. My research inquires into the Nationalist propaganda media culture by exploring the ways cinema and literature turned a narrative of displacement, diaspora, and discordance into one defined by military developmentalism and streamlined efficiency. It is my contention that in the process of being relocated and downscaled—from a continental sovereignty to an exiled island-state — the Nationalist's pursuit of a techno-utopia forged new media environments. Yet the resultant cinematic and literary styles expose a series of gaps— or what I will refer to as sensorial apertures, and epistemological thresholds—within the logistical modernity posited in the historical transition from Civil War to Cold War. It is within these gaps that we can further explore a series of questions regarding the intertwinement of migration, infrastructure, and identity-formation: what happened when the exiled Chinese regime became the occupant and designer of this environment, while transplanting its cultural myths to places such as Taiwan and Hong Kong? How did these Sinophone refugee sites manage to reshape and challenge the Nationalist's narratives of nation-building and military logistics with their own aesthetic strategies?

Scholars in literary studies such as David Der-wei Wang and Xiaojue Wang have in different contexts brought our attention to the stylistic transformations undergone by intellectuals and artists across the 1949 "crisis" and "divide," as well as their distinctive aesthetic strategies. The scope of their works reminds us that the ramifications of Chinese Civil War can be viewed not only as an important watershed in political and military history but also a cultural condition to which artist, writers, and filmmakers needed to respond across a wide array of genres and mediums. David Wang, for instance, maps out an alternative "history with feelings" in the lyrical

mode of expressions, which are paralleled to a more dominant "history with actions" in the realm of politics and the military (369). Wang Xiaojue's work, similarly, terms the Chinese Civil War as a "divide" that necessitates the reassembling of aesthetic fragment in the pre-1949 world on the part of literary writers geographically located apart from each other across China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

While my project shares a similar transregional and transmedial scope in approaching the cultural aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, it carries forward two methodological premises that are quite different from the aforementioned work: firstly, in previous accounts, either the "1949 divide" or "1949 crisis" are presumed as a rupture, against which individual authors and artist needed to mobilize imaginary texts and virtual images to counter the *actual* historical events in question. My dissertation, however, suggests that the *image* of the 1949 experience itself—as rupture, divide, or crisis— was directly fabricated by the state-sponsored filmmakers, who were either entrusted with KMT's propaganda machine or mobilized under the party's official ideology. As such, they inevitably took part in the very decisions, actions, and planning that shaped — and sustained — the divide before and after 1949. Instead of treating the "divide" or "crisis" as general ontological space for the emergence of a post-1949 subjectivity, I treat it as an epistemological and affective threshold constantly engineered, tinkered with, maintained, and remobilized by the exiled cultural workers themselves. A massive project like *Fire Bulls* and its ideological message of remembering national injury, for instance, could not have been achieved without complex logistical coordination among party officials, military personnel, and an experienced crew of writers, directors, cinematographers, and technicians of various sorts. The virtual spectacle of an historical besiegement — a crisis defined by its spatial isolation with its intensified feelings of violence and victimhood — is precisely the "divide" itself, as constantly reconstructed by way of the KMT's local mobilization. Therefore, instead of pitting "history with feelings" against an "history with actions," individual talents against a monolithic system, I see the "1949 divide" as a technical-social ensemble whose affective intensity is deeply structured by its material forms and social relations in the post-1949 era.

A second premise this dissertation proposes is a new focus on the intertwinement of institutional history and aesthetic forms in the specific sites and routes of a new environment. While Wang Xiaojue's work emphasizes individual authors and artists in reassembling the pre-1949 literary fragments dispersed across various Sinophone states of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, the site-specificity of each place, as well as their correlations and tensions have largely been sidelined in this account. In the case of Taiwan and Hong Kong, for instance, the presence of the US-sponsored cultural agencies not only underwrote the cultural projects taken up by exiled Chinese intellectuals and artists, but also reshaped the organizational objectives and aesthetic sensibilities of these projects. The KMT's post-1949 military films and agricultural educational shorts in Taiwan, as cases in point, were products directly informed by a Cold War topographical imagination oriented toward a militarized way of seeing and representing the environment through a hyperbolic mode of intelligibility. In these films, communists and parasites are both visualized, animated, and narrativized insofar as they can be thought as the internal enemies within the larger rupture created by the Cold War system. With a focus on the routes and sites trodden by the KMT's propaganda machines, my project describes a topographical space between Taiwan and Hong Kong, where state-sponsored cinema and media map out different zones, areas, and spheres as their potential theaters of operation. On their

exiled itineraries, propaganda films and media vacillated between the control of the state and the contingencies of the local environment, struggling to maintain a sense of internal stability in the face of external distractions. It is within this struggle to establish a static interior/exterior boundary that we realize that logistics is not only about a military supply chain by which material goods and personnel get transported and distributed. The concept also entails the means by which logistical movement makes its own operations legible and plannable in an environment demarcated by a controllable periphery. In this case, the movement of cinema and media industries across territorial and sovereign borders during and after 1949—from China to Taiwan, from Taiwan to Hong Kong—also demarcates a zone for the potential emergence of new genres, medium, and aesthetics. These *local* experiments in form, I suggest, are where creative freedom and artistic agency can be identified.

These two methodological premises allow me to explore a new approach in situating KMT's propaganda film and media after the Chinese Civil War. Instead of seeing the relocation and remobilization of the state-run media industries as a series of passive reactions to an eventful 1949, I see them as the birth of a distinctive media environment, where cinema and media not only represented their immediate surroundings but also actively reshaped the environment in which they are situated. As films and media constantly being mobilized to reorganize a "home-front" in the face of a potential war between the KMT and the CCP, they themselves became an infrastructural environment where waiting, observing, calculating, and planning could be performed. Military training films, agricultural educational media, and films highlighting transport networks, as I discuss in different chapters, thus embody an emerging media/environment duality in KMT's post-1949 logistical planning.

My thinking about the KMT propaganda culture industries as both media and environment has been informed by the recent turn to the role of infrastructure in media studies, as well as the emerging scholarship in social sciences that pays attention to the role of logistics as an operational infrastructure in contemporary capitalism. In particular, I take inspiration from media theorists such as Bernhard Siegert and John D. Peters in calling KMT's post-1949 film and media industries a particularly "logistical" media cluster. Siegert's theoretical rendering of the notion "cultural technique" (from the German term *Kulturtechnik*, translated as agricultural or rural engineering) is particularly pertinent to my understanding of the KMT's propaganda media after 1949 as a social-technical ensemble that inscribes ontological distinctions and civilizational differences between "Free China" and "Communist China." Cultural techniques, as elaborated by Siegert, are fundamental operations or technologies involved in "operationalizing distinctions in the real," as "they generate the forms in the shape of perceptible unities of distinctions" (14). Operating a door by closing and opening it, or example, allows one to perform, observe, encode, address, and ultimately construct the difference between inside and outside. The technique of door operation, as such, is an "ontic operation" that inscribes an ontological distinction (9). KMT's agricultural cinema, aided and advised by the United States agricultural expertise, for instance, functioned as just such a civilizational "switch" by upholding the agricultural modernity in Taiwan as a proof of KMT's superior brand of land-reform compared to its Communist counterpart. The 1949 divide, viewed in this specific context, does not precede the birth of the Nationalist's exiled subjectivity. That subjectivity is instead fabricated by the audiovisual images produced through the landscape of post-1949 Taiwan.

Echoing Siegert, Peters further conceptualizes media technologies that introduce ontic differentiations in terms of their infrastructural function as "large, force-amplifying systems that connect people and institutions across large scales of space and time" (31). Thinking media in terms of its infrastructural tendencies suggest a new understanding of media as "fundamentally logistical." As he says: "logistical media have the job to organize and orient, to arrange people and property, often into grids. They both coordinate and subordinate, arranging relationships among people and things. Logistical media establish the zero points where the x and y axes converge" (37). Towers and clocks, for examples, are logistical precisely they function as the indexical axis along which space and time can made into perceptible units, areas, and zones — as logistical resources for future use. Peters's proposals for thinking media infrastructurally helps me problematize the organizational transformation of KMT sate-run media from a military war machine during the period of 1945-1949 to a technocratic system characterized by its constant measurement and management of the environment in Taiwan's planned economy during the Cold War. Logistics, in this specific historical juncture, does not simply mean the supply chain of a home-front in service of military battlefront, but rather its transformation into the systematic viewing, ordering, and organizing civilian environment for the circulation of commodities and marketable service labor. My chapters, in this context, delineate various modes of environmental mapping from the military battlefront to the civilian home-front.

However, insomuch as Peters's work tends toward a trans-historical universalist "infrastructuralism" across different cultures, it risks being blind to the specific forms of exclusion and exploitation accompanying the functioning of infrastructural media. We should be reminded that both "logistics" and "infrastructure" are terms originating with the rise of modern warfare and military system, thereby carrying highly masculine and patriarchal overtones in terms of their control and regulation of environment.[8] Narratives about streamlined efficiency and connectivity, from military mobilization to commercial transportation, therefore, inevitably encounter tensions, struggles, and negotiation with the different modes of labor and identities that they seek to manage and regulate as human resources. My research, in this context, also focuses on the mobilization and differentiation of class, gender, and ethnicities within the production and mobilization of logistical labor forces. Take, for example, the KMT's military narrative films and the transportation-themed melodramas produced by the pro-Nationalist studios in Hong Kong. Against very different backdrops, both genres fantasize a gendered form of labor manifested in the logistical service provided by females under the jurisdiction of masculine intellectualism, militarism, or professionalism. Cases such as these resonate strongly with recent works on logistical capitalism by scholars such as the geographer Deborah Cowen, who insightfully links the logistic flow of trade via transport to the "generational mobility" of heteronormative modes of reproduction of species (211). The melodramatic cycle of films on romance and family affairs — mediated by the logistical mobility through airplanes and automobiles — as shown in Chapter Three, are intertwined with male-dominated imaginaries about affective labor, social mobility, and the reproductive future of the family/factory infrastructure. The images of gendered labor involved in logistical movement are but one among many sources of frictions and tensions generated by KMT's fantasies about movement and mobilization.

[8] Firstly seen in 19th century in French, the term infrastructure means "the installations that form the basis for any operation or system in a military sense." See Online Etymology Dictionary. Peters also point out the military origin of the term in the context of World War II (30).

From a new statecraft marking the differences between the Nationalist self and the Communist other, to the vehicles that transport/transform labor and gender roles, the idea of logistical media serves as a powerful conceptual aperture with which to peep into the operational black box between the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War. A black box, as pointed out by Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, is a zone in which a machine's "actual deployment is masked or obscured by what they accomplish." To fully grasp the dynamic picture of logistical operations, they suggest, requires a conceptual and analytical "interval that separates the operation's trigger from its outcome," an interval where we may identify an operation's "uneven broken patterning of opening and closure that is constitutive of its unfolding" (67). Their view echoes my methodological premise that the so-called "1949 divide" is more a threshold for observation than a rupture between a historical cause and its latent effect. It is only by finding the uneven and broken patterning of logistical mobilization within this interval that we may identify subtle generic forms and new aesthetic impulses emerging within the KMT's media representation and mobilization of land, labor, transport, and urban space as potential resources. This dissertation not only stresses the logic of control within logistics but also foregrounds a series of alternative routes and sites filmmakers and writers mobilize so as to mediate among historical memory, current crisis, and an unknown future. An experiential project like Bai's *A Morning in Taipei*, is such an aperture into the black box of KMT's propaganda film production in at least two senses. On the one hand, it presents an analytical niche through which we can resituate a historical war propaganda film like *Fire Bulls* within a much more ambivalent artistic struggle on the part of the artist. On the other hand, it indexes the artist's critical engagement with a new urban space saturated with the crisscrossing lines of transportation, communication, and transmission in a new logistical center in Taiwan. Between propagandistic intentions and experimental impulses, the film epitomizes the aesthetic and political intertwinement I seek to highlight in each of the chapters.

III. Chapter Organization

To map out the interconnected conduits of aesthetic transformation between propaganda discourse and creative freedom within the post-1949 logistical environment, I focus on four types of media production, each linked to a particular environment from which a new generic style found its basic affective form or technical format. From Chapter One to Chapter Four, I read audiovisual images and literary texts against four principal enterprises for Nationalist propaganda mobilization—military science, agricultural campaigns, transportation networks, and architectural planning. Each of these medium/environment clusters is centered around a state-run enterprise — transplanted from China to either Taiwan or Hong Kong — and its correlated technocratic discourses, and in aggregate, they provide the basis for a new narrative of Taiwan and Hong Kong's Cold War culture.

In Chapter One, I bridge pre-1949 wartime memories in China with postwar Taiwan by way of a group of seldom seen and heretofore neglected military films, excavated from Taiwan's national film archive. These instructional films — from feature-length educational narrative films to military training shorts — provided viewers within the Republic of China's military with new kinds of "theaters of operation," visualizing warfare by way an aesthetics in which a new migratory military spectatorship was structured in the breach between memories of the Chinese Civil War and an eagerness to map out the civilian environment in Taiwan. What connected

these two modes of seeing was the catchphrase “revolutionary logistics,” coined by the KMT military to envision a future “counterattack” mode of warfare, in which a moving frontline could connect the Taiwanese home-front to the insurgent forces in the rest of Mainland China. The counterattack pedagogical films, as such, evoked a series of “virtual realities” that at once reanimated and distanced the immediacy of warfare and indexed a singular mode of connectivity, through which the “could-have-been” moments of the Civil War were grafted onto a set of postwar sensibilities regarding military operations and preparations in the post-1949 time and space. This counterfactual mode of counterattack, as I further argue, was supplemented by a mode of affective mapping practiced by a group of feature-length melodramatic narrative films. By dramatizing the tensions and violence between the military system and its surrounding landscapes, between men and women, these films demonstrated a new mode of military environmentality that translated a masculine national injury into a mode of control and aggression toward the crisis and contingency felt in the environment. It was during this immediate postwar juncture that a new military narrative replaced the consciousness of collective victimhood with a new spirit of paramilitary operation and management in Taiwan.

As the emergency of warfare and military occupation was gradually replaced by the imperatives of economic development in the 1950s and 1960s, the Nationalist media campaigned for agricultural modernization with media support from the United States Information Agency (USIA). Together, these cold war allies fabricated a rural landscape through mechanization and speed. Chapter Two argues that this agenda of acceleration paradoxically prepared the way for the emergence of Taiwan’s first *cinéma vérité* documentary style in the late 1960s, when visual suspension came back to challenge the politics of speeding up. By focusing on the early works of Richard Yao-chi Chen 陳耀圻 (1938), a pioneering documentary filmmaker in the 1960s and 1970s, I situate the putative birth of the documentary avant-garde in Taiwan within a broader media ecology during the 1960s and 70s, a period when Cold War geopolitics, agricultural modernization, and propaganda media converged to shape the rural landscape across different cinematic mediums and genres. In the first half of the chapter, I analyze a series of policy/advocacy films produced or sponsored by the Sino-American Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) with a focus on an aestheticized politics of speed characterized by acceleration, exchange, and streamlined connectivity. In the second half of the essay, with a group of excavated pedagogical documentary films on the rice farming of “free China”—directed by Chen but funded and advised by the American Universities Field Staff and the National Science Foundation, I argue that Chen, whose pursuit of social critique through documentary is usually understood to have been silenced in the early 1970s, still managed to invent a hybrid cinematic language that “deaccelerated” the JCRR's visual rhetoric. Chen ended up utilizing aesthetic tropes from the JCRR-sponsored agricultural cinema while staking out a singular documentary aesthetics beyond the generic conventions designated by the imperative of using agricultural modernity to fight the Communists.

Turning my eyes to Hong Kong in Chapter Three, I investigate an interstitial contact zone between leftwing and rightwing cultural industries, looking in particular at works that thematized the mobility of a highly-gendered form of knowledge labor through the movement of transportation. Focusing on an intellectual coterie that moved between Taiwan and Hong Kong from the late 1950s to the early 1960s and adhered to the ideology of "Free China," I close-read male author Zhao Zifan 趙滋藩 (1924 - 1986), situating his fictions, film adaptations, and

editorial work within a Hong Kong pro-Nationalist rightwing media cluster of pictorial journalism, in which images of aeronautics and aviation were ardently promoted with the support of the USIA, Central Intelligence Agency, and Asian Foundation. This real and imagined "aerial" corridor between Hong Kong and Taiwan established a series of logistical itineraries controlled and regulated under the airspace of Free China, while upholding male "free intellectuals" or "freedom fighters" as the human resources to be deployed in the propaganda air-fight with the Communists.

In Chapter Four, I map out a topographical transformation from the sky to the ground manifested in two propaganda narrative films, *Flying Tigers* 飛虎將軍 and *Terminal Bound* 關山行, coproduced by the Nationalist government and Hong Kong's "free" filmmakers. Featuring Free China's air force as well as Taiwan's long-distance coach bus service and motorway network these propaganda films anticipated a series of more famous transport-themed urban comedies and romance such as *Air Hostess* 空中小姐, *Sister Long Legs* 長腿姊姊, and *My Dream Car* 香車美人. Set against Hong Kong's commercialized urban space and transnational airlines, these films foregrounded airplanes, automobiles, and transportation networks against Hong Kong's predominantly female service sector, showing how they were intertwined. I argue that a new Cold War imaginary about gendered human labor was recoded in Hong Kong's urban melodrama, and was further mediated by the movement between laboring subjects in the air and on the ground, between freedom and control, between a male public sphere and female domestic care.

By the 1970s, the primitive accumulation of capital through land reform had channeled itself into Taiwan's booming industrial cities and service sector, which, in turn, necessitated the need to visually *display* the legitimacy of Free China through the glamour of built environments. KMT's palpable anxiety about display was underscored by its precarious diplomatic status in the 70s, a period marked by the death of its leader Chiang Kai-shek, the loss of its seat in the United Nations, and the severing of formal diplomatic ties with the United States. Against this tumultuous backdrop, my concluding chapter treats the resultant architectural systems as a logistical medium in and of themselves, one through which the KMT propaganda state at once reinforced its Chinese legitimacy and inscribed its own nostalgia, even as in fell into the process of becoming ruins. I focus on the architectonic forms in propaganda film *Tracing to Expo'70* 萬博追蹤. Half documentary and half narrative drama, the film was meant to promote the friendship between the Japanese government and Nationalist government through Taiwan's R.O.C Pavilion at Osaka Expo'70, while the pavilion itself, designed by the renowned modernist architect I.M. Pei 貝聿銘 (1917-2019), also hosted a vertical screening projection showing another promotional/propagandist short within the building. This "double-vision" generated inside and outside the ephemeral modernist pavilion, however, testified to the fragmentation of KMT's fantasy of Chinese monumentality into individualized grids, frames, and screens. In transporting spectators and circulating information between Taiwan and Japan, between the pavilion and the world's fair, the architecture-media assemblage also revealed itself as an extraterritorial projection of logistical regime.

At the end of the dissertation, I discuss a fantasy narrative, *Phantasmagoria* by modernist architect Dahong Wang 王大閎 (1917 - 2018), who was also part of I.M. Pei's Harvard cohort

under the guidance of Walter Gropius (1883 - 1969). As the designer of Nationalist monuments such as Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall and the National Palace Museum in Taipei, Wang fabricates a highly anti-monumental spatial journey taken by an exiled crown prince carried by a drifting spacecraft. The novel, left unfinished writing project until Wang's death, mirrors his unbuilt monument dedicated to NASA for the successful Moon-landing in 1969. Together, the unfinished novel and the unbuilt monument allegorize the becoming-ruins of the Chinese propaganda media and its eternal home-front, Taiwan.

In these chapters, media and environment function as an intertwined assemblage, through which new forms of body, labor, and affective modes became visible and legible. The transregional and transmedial framework of this project allows me to treat the perceptual field of the Chinese Cold War as constituted by a set of affective-technical clusters associated with the changing materiality and distinctive organizational sensibilities during and after 1949. As a project of media archaeology, it connects intimate feelings of crisis, anticipation, and speculation to the broader historical entanglement between the pathos of warfare and displacement and the ethos of occupation, settlement and development. In its interdisciplinary nature, this project approaches the aftermath of the "1949 divide" as a *Benjaminian stillstellung*—the objective interruption of a mechanical process, or the freezing of movements through which all the affective energies invested in the question about "what can China become" were embalmed in a set of postwar spatial-temporal deployments. I delineate the aesthetic and technical conduits through which the immediacy of warfare was remediated into a lasting status quo, one maintained by the ethos of logistical labor and its cinematic, literary, and artistic renderings in the time-space beyond 1949, and, eventually, beyond China.

Chapter One

Fire and Fog

Post-1949 Military Cinema and the Rise of Environmental Image-making

War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors
on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater
or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for;
a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.
— ***On War,*** **Carl von Clausewitz**

Truth is a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short
a sum of human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical
intensification, translation and decoration.
— **"On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense," Friedrich Nietzsche**

George Chueh Wang 王玨 (1918-2015), an actor in the Nationalist-owned China Motion Pictures Studio (CMPS, or *Zhongzhi* 中製, for short) and colonel of the Chinese Nationalist Army, faced an unprecedented challenge in terms of military logistics. With People's Liberation Army crossing the Yangtze River, and the city of Shanghai under siege by the encroaching Communists, CMPS was split into two groups: those who decided to join the CCP and those who decided to move to Taiwan with the KMT regime. Wang and his cadres, determined to move the company's facilities to Taiwan with twelve military trucks, sensed an imminent crisis within the company, as anonymous mails and gossip denigrating the KMT managerial class had been circulated among the studio, breeding a contagious mutual distrust among the military film crew. On May 5th, 1949, disregarding the warnings by the guards of Shanghai's Qiujian Dock by Huangpu River, Wang and his crew stormed all twelve trucks onto the already overloaded cross-strait steamer Haihua— the last cargo ship heading to Taiwan that day. Four days later, Wang and more than 300 boxes of CMPS's film production equipment would land at Taiwan's northern harbor Keelung, a hub through which waves of Nationalist technocrats, businessmen, military personnel, and their exiled families would settle on the island. On May 27, 1949, just as the PLA declared the "liberation" of Shanghai, the state-run military film studio CMPS began its afterlife in Taiwan.[1]

In an interview later, Wang, already in his late eighties, recalls this exigent retreat in 1949 with a rather heroic tone, crediting this swift logistical action as the beginning of CMPS's rebirth in Taiwan. In fact, his belief in the significance of this decision and action was so firm that in a group meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo, the designated heir of Generalissimo Chiang, he

[1] In addition to the official history of issued by the Ministry of Defense, my account regarding how CMPS moved to Taiwan benefits from available memoirs and interviews with veteran cinematographers, actors, and key military personnel involved in the exigent mission of evacuation and transportation. Photographer Hua Huiying, for instances, detailed the different routes and stops taken by CMPS's Nanjing branch and Shanghai branch, which entered Taiwan from Kaohsiung Harbor and Keelung Harbor, respectively, on different dates. For more accounts, see Hua 2000: 21- 45; Wang 2011: 94-101.

indignantly refuted another "exile narrative" by the chairman of Central Film Studio (or *Zhongdian* 中電, for short), Zhang Daofan 張道藩(1897-1968), who claimed to have moved *Zhongdian's* property and production equipment to Taiwan before *Zhongzhi*. Right after Zhang's self-congratulating report to Chiang, Wang stood up: "*Zhongdian* didn't moved even a single nail to Taiwan, while we (*Zhongzhi*) have moved most of the production facilities here. We did so because we did not want to cooperate with the Communists!" (Wang 123-124). With such a retort to Zhang, Wang was basically calling Zhang's story a lie. There is a reason for Wang's indignance over what exactly had happened on the eve of the paramilitary actions of shipment. Wang's retort to a party official of a higher rank might have reflected a general anxiety about the control of the Party's material resources during the turmoil of the 1949 civil war.

Feelings of suspicion and mutual distrust were prevalent among the KMT propaganda media workers, as the last days of the Nationalist regime on the so-called Mainland were indeed characterized by a series of dramatic failures in terms of communication, espionage, organization, which made it hard to distinguish the "communist bandits" 共匪 (*gongfei*) from the KMT loyalists.[2] As Wang and other former CMPS staff have pointed out in their memoirs, the atmosphere within the film studio around and after 1949 was filled with a strong sense of uncertainty and precarity regarding the individual fate of the studio workers and the broader political divide between CCP and KMT, a divide that would set the motion picture studio literally into a logistical motion toward a new home-front, Taiwan, where they would continue producing anti-Communist films about "counter-attacking and retaking the Mainland" during the long Cold War era.

Wang's affectively-charged testimony about the emergency relocation of CMPS's property and personnel to Taiwan also epitomizes the concern about how to artistically represent a highly volatile and unpredictable logistical environment in a critical historical juncture across the 1949 divide, which made questions regarding who and what to move, where to move to, and how to move all the more problematic in the newly militarized environment of post-1949 Taiwan. These questions, as I argue in this chapter, are embedded in CMPS's historical transformation from a full-fledged propaganda studio producing films about clearly-defined external enemies (such as the Japanese Imperial Army) to an exiled film group that had to audio-visually record and represent its own liquidation and dispersion while it was literally on the move. As the CMPS moved across the Taiwan Strait and faced an entirely different social and material environment in the 1950s and the 1960s, KMT's film industries changed its role from a weaponized infrastructure for frontline mobilization to one defined by the logistical management of resources control, communication, and security on the home-front.[3]

---

[2] According to former KMT Major General Yuan Congmei, also former head of CMPS, as early as March 1949, the communists "lurking" inside the studio already began their preparatory move to take over CMPS by sending anonymous threatening mails to the managerial personnel and lobbying among the crew and staff with potential "rewards" promised by the CCP. This looming threat had expedited the decision among the pro-KMT filmmakers to move CMPS to Taiwan. See Yuan 2002: 93.

[3] In her influential work on wartime Chinese cinema before 1945, Weihong Bao traces the concept, which sees cinema as an infrastructural weaponry, to renowned CMPS filmmakers such as Zheng Yongzhi 鄭用之(1902-1983) and Luo Jingyu 羅靜予(1911-1970). Zheng's essay "How to Grasp Film as a Weapon" 如何抓住電影這武器, for instance, pioneers the idea of a state-run cinema industry as a statecraft to fend off foreign dominance in the film market (276 - 282).

Specifically, in this chapter I highlight two major lines of transformation in genres that would distinguish CMPS's later production in Taiwan from its pre-1949 era: first of all, while the earlier CMPS production was symbiotic with the war of "Resistance" 抗戰 (*kangzhan*) in its sense of affective exigency, its later production in Taiwan was characterized by a conspicuous absence of temporal immediacy. Instead, as KMT's media industry was gradually disassociated from its immediate war environment, what we see is an emerging counterfactual mode in CMPS's military pedagogical films, which simulates the scenarios of a future "counterattack" by reconstructing all the "could-have-been" moments in pre-1949 Mainland China. Informed by the new military thinking on logistics as a sort of "spiritual frontline," these pedagogical films project a series of make-believe spaces —rendered though set designs, architecture, and landscape—as the virtual locus of future counterattack. This spatiotemporal reconfiguration carves out a liminal *theater of operation*— in both its military and performative sense, which affords the possibility of bridging the "divide" between the invisible and invisible, the past and the future, the partial and the total, and most importantly, the world before and after 1949.[4]

In the second half of this chapter, I turn my focus from military pedagogy films to a group of military-themed melodramas consisting of feature-length narrative films, which still carry pedagogical intentions but, more importantly, highlight dramatized moral and emotional tensions between military personnel and their immediate environment in Taiwan. Through a series of highlighted cases, I identify an emerging mode of affective mapping triggered by the navigational activities of male characters and their visceral and emotional entanglements with women, friends, family, and a social-material world filled with threats and contingencies. Caught between the internal stasis of the military system and a broader social space, these films (melo)dramatize sites and routes of vulnerability, violence, and victimhood, thereby marking the spatial transition of the military profession from battlefield to the emotional struggle of everyday workplace.

Finally, combining my discussions of military pedagogy and melodramatic mapping, I conclude the chapter by proposing to think both genres as an integral part of an officially-sponsored affective public, one symbiotic with Taiwan's drastically militarizing environment. I close-read an important anti-air strike film *Chances of Life under Atomic Bomb* 原子彈下的生機 and parse out its narrative intertwinement of civil defense pedagogy with family melodrama, highlighting the totalizing sphere that connects the threats of nuclear bomb to the future lineage of nuclear family. It is with this speculative "theater of operation" in the age of nuclear attack, I suggest, the CMPS film production evokes a new notion of military environmentality.

[4] My use of the term "counterfactual" in the context of CMPS's post-1949 cinema resonates strongly with Catherine Gallagher's important work on counterfactual speculation and imagination about history. While I situate the counterfactual mode of visualization at the center of KMT's military campaign for counterattack, Gallagher traces counterfactual thinking back to the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who emphasized that the military art of future planning is hinged upon the ability of "not only knowing what had occurred in the previous wars but everything that could have occurred" (4-5).

A Theater of Operation: the Counterfactual Mode of Counterattack

The best entry into this theater of operation is CMPS's very first post-1949 film production, *Waking Up From a Nightmare* 惡夢初醒, a 1950 adaptation of a serialized novella "The Bandit Cadre Woman"女匪幹.[5] The film features CMPS's leading actor George Wang and Lu Biyun 盧碧雲 (1922 -), a stage play actress active in early1940s Shanghai in Fei Mu's 費穆 (1906-1951) troupe and a wife of Nationalist air force officer. The story is told by a journalist who claims to "faithfully" record and retell the real-life story of a former CCP female cadre, Luo, who is found in a ruined mansion by the narrator along with a group of refugees en route to the KMT-held "free zone." In a series of flashbacks, Luo tells the group about her tragic journey from a patriotic college student to a young party functionary recruited by her lover. Through her retrospective narrative, we know that the couple went through a series of fateful disillusionments, including her merchant family's being humiliated during a struggle session, her marriage being denied and manipulated, her rape by a party superior (played by George Wang), and finally, her being sent to the party's "comfort woman team," where she contracts syphilis and is eventually cast away.

As CMPS's very first feature-length production in Taiwan, the film shies away from representing any battlefield or heroic narrative of victory. Rather, it opts for a testimonial mode of "truth-telling" from the mouth of a CCP enemy, whose mental theater is framed as a series of mnemonic confessions made only accessible by the distinctive optical and epistemological aperture formed by the film's extensive uses of architectural elements such as arches, gates, grates, and the edges of dilapidated walls. Through this aperture, the audience revisits their traumatic memories about the pre-1949 world through an affectively-charged theater while maintaining a safe distance from its atrocity and immediacy. [6]

A case in point is the scene where the reporter hears sounds of sobbing and talking in the house and tries to seek out the source. Framed by long shot, he walks toward the camera in a narrow corridor filled with debris and fallen roof beams, and eventually finds Luo behind a half-fallen wall—crying, talking, praying and confessing to a "cross" formed by parts of a broken window frame. It is through this aperture structured between the hole on the wall and the broken frame that the reporter stands and observes Luo's theatrical self-revelation before he finally decides to step across the wall and check on Luo (see fig. 11-13). The architectonic design here allows for a temporal procession, as the viewers follow his footsteps while granting a safe vintage point and distance from Luo's emotionally intense stage performance. The reporter's stepping across the aperture (the cross projected onto the hole on the wall) signals a sensorial threshold through which knowing, sensing, remembering, and reporting can be made possible. In this case, the spatial and temporal framing of Luo's mental "theater" through camera and set

[5] According to George Wang, the change from the original fiction title to its film title was suggested by no other than Chiang Ching-kuo himself, who considered the original title "too vulgar and straightforward" (2015: 125-126).
[6] This conspicuous distance that keeps viewers from the direct representations of warfare is an intriguing trope recurrent in many of CMPS's postwar films in Taiwan, as many so-called military films either render war an opaque subject or simply make it irrelevant to the development of plot. This aesthetic tendency of keeping a distance from war is echoed in Kent Puckett's work on British wartime films. He accentuates the paradoxical cognitive and affective link between the notion of "aboutness" and war. War has been an encompassing and totalizing experiences, and even when it is apparently invisible and absent in the works of art, it maintains an "animating spirit" behind them by becoming an abstract universal knowledge that can be looked "in distance" (vii - viii).

design become the condition of possibility for any acts of witnessing, narrating, intervening, or operating.


Figure 11


Figure 12


Figure 13


Figure 14


Figure 15


Figure 16

Figure 11-16. The extensive use of architectonic frame, silhouette, and aperture in *Waking Up From a Nightmare* (1950). Images courtesy of Taiwan Film Institute.

As the reporter and other refugees follow Luo's testimonial narrative back to the heart of her memories and figure out the causes of her miseries, the abandoned house itself becomes a camera obscura, through which the nightmarish defeat of the civil war and the putative causes behind the defeat can only be rendered intelligible to one another in a newly carved out theatrical space, where a variety of hidden failures, errors, missteps, became knowable with their traumatic atrocity still kept at bay. This point can further be illustrated by the scene of Luo being raped by her superior. The terror and violence in her memory are presented in slow motion through two shadowy figures projected on the window screen, through which the tangibility and immediacy of memory are at once dramatized and dematerialized (see fig. 14). The camera obscura also serves to project a speculative future at the end of the movie, as Luo decides to stay in the house and sees the group off through the arch in the garden, after entrusting the reporter with the mission of broadcasting her miseries to the rest of China, so as to foster its "freedom-loving" spirit (see fig. 15-16). *Waking Up from a Nightmare* is an important case for our understanding of KMT's post-1949 propaganda mobilization through cinema, arts, and literature, as it provides a prototypical spatiotemporal configuration as a new representational strategy with which to connect the recent past to the precarious present, to discern the invisible form the visible, and to project a sense of futurity in "counter-attacking" the enemy with an alternative, albeit speculative, world of truth and fact.

Indeed, te metaphor of camera obscura and its hyperbolic mode of intelligibility was explicitly theorized by Sun Ling 孫陵 (1914-1983), one of the pioneering authors in the KMT-sponsored anti-communist campaign of "Combat Literature and Arts" 戰鬥文藝 (*Zhandou wenyi*) in Taiwan.[7] In his 1951 essay collection titled "A Treatise on the Spiritual Frontline of Anti-Communism" 論反共精神戰線, Sun proposes a rather complicated theory of "counter-attacking" the Chinese Communists by way of a spiritualized camera device through which the relationship among body, mind, and physical environment can be reconfigured. Once that relationship is altered, the causal determination between the material and the spiritual, the visible and the invisible, and that between frontline and home front, can also be reversed. As a result, the fatally predetermined dynamic between victory and defeat in warfare can also be turned around. What is at stake here for Sun is the possibility to refute the notion that the military defeat of KMT on the Mainland is a result purely determined by material forces such as weapons, resources, soldiers. On the contrary, he argues that such an outcome in war is *predetermined* by an invisible "spirit," which consists of a hodgepodge of consciousness, cognition, vitality, integrity— a notion, perhaps not too surprisingly echoing the KMT's party theorist Chen Lifu 陳立夫 (1900-2001) and his Bergson-informed vitalism.[8] What is more intriguing, however, is Sun's turn toward the capacity of media as a sort of immersive environment in cultivating an anti-Communist spirit with very specific reference to cinematic/photographic mechanism as a sort of organic system that can reconfigure the relationship among body, mind, and environment, a reformulated relation of which could produce alternative modes of temporality and causality.

For instance, in an effort to define what "spiritual frontline" is, Sun states that "spiritual expressions are the shadows of the activity of the mind" 精神表現是心靈活動的影子(*Jingshen biaoxian shi xinling huodong de yingzi*) while comparing "the activity of the mind" to the spinning movement of celluloid reels on a film projector, and the spiritual expressions as the moving images projected onto the silver screen. The "filmstrip of the mind" 心靈底片(*xinling dipian*), according to his formulation, functions in two ways: on the one hand, human eyes and ears act like camera lens, as they record the material world outside and store reels after reels of film-based memories as "raw materials" 素材(*sucai*) or "stock" 貨(*huo)* subject to later editing, cutting, and supplementing. On the other hand, the human mind as a whole runs like a "film company" 影片公司(*yingpian gongsi*), which constantly reassembles and reedits the bits and pieces of these mental "filmstrips" into new individual films. Instead of emphasizing the human mind as repetitively projecting the film stock, Sun highlights the infinite possibilities for reassembling these film negatives into new productions: "Great minds have infinite space for a

[7] Sun's role as the fervent, and even overly fervent, champion of KMT's anti-communists campaign can further be illustrated by his famous 1949 military song "Protecting the Great Taiwan" 保衛大台灣 (*Baoweidataiwan*), a product initially encouraged by KMT's Propaganda Director Ren Zhuoxuan but later banned, as the homophone of the song tile is similar to "Encircling the Great Taiwan" 包圍大台灣(*Baoweidataiwan*).

[8] There has been a recent revival in the scholarship on Henri Bergson's influence on modern Chinese intellectuals during the period beteeen1910s to 1930s. Weihong Bao, for instance, describes in details how a Japan-mediated notion *élan vital* has informed the intertwined discourse of affectation, sentiment, action, and a new understanding of the Chinese "national character" defined by the lack of "life force" (2015: 63-75). Importantly, Maggie Clinton traces how Chen Lifu combined a Bergson-informed vitalism with New Confucian thinking to form a new militant Taylorism, which in turn buttressed KMT's nation-wide campaign of New Life Movement before 1949— a prelude to the Chinese Cultural Renaissance campaign in Taiwan during the 1960s (2017: 128-159).

rich stock of film strips, which are all accumulated over time. Once the stock negatives are numerous, they can reflect on and testify for each other, while editing each other into a new film" (30-32). In short, he suggests, the more quality filmstrips one can stock as mnemonic images, the more types of combinations, and hence better films, can be projected for future use.

Once the mind/film analogy is established, Sun launches his criticism of the "film stock" accumulated during the war against the CCP, as he rhetorically asks: "Exactly what sorts of raw materials did our anti-communist filmstrip capture on the Mainland?" 我們反共的精神底片在大陸攝取些什麼素材 (*Women fangong de jingshen dipian zai dalu shequ xie shenme sucai*) (32). To answer his own question, Sun then uses a series of cinematic terms, such as "close-up," "medium-shot," "long-shot," "sound effects," and "original sound track," to describe how an endless series of errors, missteps, miscalculations, and misguidance on the part of the anti-communist campaign before 1949 have been made into the key "impressions" and "images" of the KMT regime' recent memory. These spiritual filmstrips, as he suggests, once replayed and projected onto the "mind screen" of the people in Taiwan, could only lead to the theme of defeatism in the regime's effort to counter-attack and retake the Mainland.

The cinematic metaphors mobilized here carve out an alternative spatiotemporal configuration, where all the errors committed during the Civil War can be visualized and made intelligible through a metaphorized camera obscura. This rhetorical construction of a cinematic mental space resonates strongly with the architectonic confessional "theater" in *Waking Up from a Nightmare*, as both conjure up an aesthetic threshold through which a traumatic recent past can be projected onto another alternative temporality, therefore affording potential vantage points for observation and, eventually, a theater for future operations and actions from which historical missteps could be avoided or redeemed.

The ultimate payoff of this "theater of operation," perhaps unsurprisingly, is the possibility of an alternative historical causality that could counter the "material frontline" 物質戰線 (*wuzhi zhanxian*) of the Communists. Sun mobilizes a series of aphorisms on the difference between the spiritual and the material frontline by repeating the following syntactic pattern: "the material frontline does not exist until…; Spiritual frontline already exists when…" 物質戰線…之時才算存在/精神戰線卻在… 之中早已存在 (27-28). With the first half of these sentences focused on all sorts of conventional frontline activities such as battling and diplomatic maneuvering, the latter half of the sentences highlight the superiority of mental and intellectual activities such as reading, viewing, listening, thinking and conversing. While emphasizing the temporal antecedence of the spiritual, Sun's spiritual frontline also switch its focus from the conventional military environment to the everyday civilian sphere as the training ground for "spiritual combat capacity" 精神戰鬥力 (*Jingshen zhandouli*). This sort of militarized civilian environment can, for instance, be embodied by sites such as factories, storefronts, offices, theme parks, and family houses, which in turn are connected through art and media venues such as theaters, radio stations, newspapers, music halls, galleries, and public lectures. In short, through the everyday spaces between the sites of labor and the sites of media communication, the "society as whole can be our classroom" and, therefore, become a militarized environment aimed at the reversal of past failures.

By prioritizing the temporal antecedence of the spiritual front over the "material frontline," while totalizing the entirety of social space as a military environment, Sun's metaphoric filmstrip and camera obscura reconfigure the topographical hierarchy between the frontline and the home-front and destabilize the historical determinism between memory and actions. If the "filmstock" captured and accumulated in the pre-1949 world is defined as a sort of negative—in both optical and moral sense of the word—which documented the military missteps and strategic failures of the KMT army, a new militarized social and media space in Taiwan can produce a new accumulation of "film stock" with which to project an alternative future and a different configuration of war, as Sun says: "Once the mind moves, the limbs moves; once the limbs move, equipment and gear move; once equipment moves, the materiality of warfare takes its shape and form" 精神動則四肢動/ 四肢動則裝備動/ 裝備動則戰爭之型態以物質而成具體表現 (23). In short, a social space saturated by media and arts, based on Sun's formula, can potentially re-assemble the mnemonic images of the society at large, thereby reversing the military missteps of the past in the future "counterattack" against the Communists.

Sun's spiritual home-front frames the logistical spaces of work and arts through a series of cinematic metaphors bestowed with the power of translating between the military and the civilian, between the material and spiritual, between the historical aftermath and the prelude of future. This line of thinking, however, is much more than a random fantasy from a literary author. Instead, it can be seen as part of an emerging cultural discourse in dialogue with the changing definition of military logistics within KMT's overall transformation in terms of strategic thinking and organizational forms. I am here specifically referring to the KMT military's changing perceptions of the function of military logistics from one informed by wartime exigency and immediacy to that characterized by constant speculation about future development and the possibility of projecting and extending the resources of Taiwan into the future total war with the Communist China. Indeed, it is only against this context can we fully grasp Sun's eccentric coinage of the phrase "the Spiritual Marshall Plan" 精神上底馬歇爾計畫 (*Jingshenshang di maxieer jihua*) as a cinematic machine that can *counterfactually* project the partial—yet tangible and programmable—environment of Taiwan into a virtual future of China with its territorial totality restored and rebuilt. The specific evocation of the Marshall Plan, in this case, further highlights the quintessential role of virtual images in transforming the home-front—the everyday environment of Taiwan—into a "frontline," where the distinction between the civilian spaces and military spaces become ambiguous.

Indeed, the emphasis on the affective, the spiritual, and the virtual also dominates KMT's official military discourses regarding the role of logistics, especially its function in mobilizing, organizing, and transporting materiel supply and personnel in the civilian environment to the virtual battleground across the Taiwan Strat in the near future. *The Logistics of National Defense* 國防後勤概論, one of the most systematic scholarly accounts of the role of military logistics in KMT's schemes for a counterattack and U.S.'s Cold War military science, is a case in point. Authored by the Nationalist Major General Zhang Zaiyu 張載宇 (1914 -1987) and published by the elite Research Institute of National Defense in Taiwan, the book is both a historical overview and a strategic proposal for military logistics during the 1960s—during last days of the decades long US-Aid in Taiwan (1951-1965). Zhang's works epitomizes a singular combination of two strands of thoughts after a decade of logistic supply from the US military. On the one hand, Zhang echoes the mainstream view of logistics theory developed by the US after World War II,

which sees the civilian environment within a sovereign territory as the site for resources supply. In this case, logistics is organizational "science" regarding the calculation, management, and circulation of the resources *presently available*.

On the other hand, Zhang is not satisfied with keeping the definition of logistics within the realm of science, as he points out that the material supply provided by the US-Aid in Taiwan is far from enough to effect KMT's counter-attack schemes against the CCP. The aid provided under the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, after all, was meant to maintain a relatively cold front across the Strait rather than to start a new hot war. To compensate this lack of material resources, Zhang coins terms such as "revolutionary logistics" 革命後勤 (*Geming houqin*) and "frontline government" 戰地政務(*Zhandi zhengwu*) to designate a realm of potential actions dependent on the mental capacity to project a virtual environment *in the near future*. In this realm, the home-front of logistical supply should not be built upon the limited land and resources of Taiwan, but instead the recovered territories of the Mainland, where the newly "reclaimed" territory can provide necessary material and human resources to fuel the counterattack's movement from village to village, from province to province, eventually connecting all the insurgent forces in the "rear" of the CCP enemy 敵後(*dihou*) to the advancing "front" of KMT. [9]

What is at stake for Zhang, therefore, is not only to organize and distribute the limited material supplies for the defense of Taiwan but to turn it into an asymmetrical force to "ignite" 引爆( ) the offensive power hidden on the CCP home-front, or its rear. To further accentuate the significance of the spiritual over the material, the future over the present, and the rear over the front, Zhang provides a flowchart and a graph (see fig. 17-18) to illustrate this topographical asymmetry between the partiality of the home-front in Taiwan and the totality of the counter-attacking schema projected to the "rear" of the Chinese Mainland. The flowchart basically echoes the notion that logistics should be seen as a "bridge between the economic and the military," insofar as a strong military-industrial complex can both boost the domestic economy and project its material bounty to the military front. This is, naturally, a typical formulation under the scenario of total war, where there is not clear distinction between soldier and civilian, between wartime and peacetime.

In another graph, however, this notion of totality based on a militarized domestic space is rendered secondary, as Zhang, similar to Sun, focuses on the spiritual capacity to catapult the Taiwanese home-front beyond the limits of material front. He highlights a symmetrical projectile power of "spirit" with explanations such as "Thirty percent should be placed in front of the enemy; seventy percent placed in the back of the enemy" 三分敵前七分敵後(*Sanfen diqian qifen dihou*) and "Thirty percent for the military; seventy percent for the political" 三分軍事七分政治 (*Sanfen junshi qifen zhengzhi*))— two lines derived from Chiang Kai-shek's meditation on British military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart's "indirect approach," which advocates for a

[9] The conceptual play between "rear" and "front" is rooted in the Chinese term for military logistics, *houqin* – the duty or service from the rear or back. The etymological origin of the English term "logistics" – the man in charge of calculation, however, does not carry the spatial connotation in Chinese. Fully aware of the etymological differences, Zhang deliberately translate the temporal connotation in *calculating beforehand* and coin the term *xianqin*— the service before or ahead—to reverse the original spatial hierarchy in Chinese. See Zhang 4-5.

military victory achieved mostly by dislocating the enemy's physical and psychological balance.[10] Zhang's chart, however, further visualizes this asymmetrical thinking by placing the figure of a soldier's head facing a miniature map of the Chinese Mainland, with the word "spirit" printed on the soldier's head and the word "politics" placed on the map. The brain and the land are connected by a dotted line that places the soldier as a spectator who sees across the material frontline. Departing from the notion of logistics as purely objective science of management and calculation, Zhang instead situates revolutionary logistics within the realm of "art" where systematic "calculation must stop" and yield its place to spontaneous action, intuitive judgement, and the ability to connect the partial resources of Taiwan to ignite the "totality" 全面性 (*quanmianxing*) of China.

Echoing Sun's literary and artistic manifesto, which treats Taiwan's civilian environment as a sort of media environment so as to reassemble and re-edit the "film stock" inscribed with the negative memories of the Civil War, the theoretical shift in KMT's military thinking on "revolutionary logistics" situates counterfactual image-making at the center of the military viewing subject. In short, the counterfactual here is not a denial of reality but the very infrastructure that affords KMT the possibility of engineering connections among the precarious present in Taiwan, the erroneous recent past in pre-1949 China, and a volitional near future to be actualized in the Mainland. It is against this context we can make sense of the spatial-temporal trope in *Waking Up from a Nightmare*, which relies on a very similar temporal frame to render the abandoned house the site of encounter between the KMT home-front and the CCP home-front. With a self-referential gesture, the CMPS film turns the house into a camera obscura, a memory black-box where the KMT journalist/narrator has to walk through a series of physical thresholds— arcs, frames, grids, and corridor—that afford only a partial view into the foggy recent past. On the other hand, it is only within this partial aperture that a "theater of operation" allows the former CCP cadre to provide her testimony to "counter" the story of success told by Socialist China. Like CMPS's exigent retreat to Taiwan, the mnemonic "film stock" of the civil war as retold by the CCP cadre woman in *Waking Up* is also treated as a sort of cargo transported, delivered, and distributed in post-1949 Taiwan's media environment. Within this mnemonic supply chain, an alternative "truth" could be told, as an alternative causal relationship that could be operated upon, and an alternative future that could be anticipated.

[10] Similar military slogans based on the same syntax are constantly evoked by Chiang Kai-shek himself. Chiang found inspirations from Hart's idea that the "dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance has been the vital prelude to his overthrow," and elevate it to the general strategy of counter-attack warfare in the late 1950s and early 1960. This can be evidenced by Chiang's own written sentence: "On top of the principles of 'seven for politics, three for military' and 'seven in the front, three in the rear,' I will add 'seven for psychology, three for physics,' and 'seven for indirect approach, three for confrontational action'" (1-2).



Figure 17. A flowchart saying "logistics is the bridge between the economic and the military."



Figure 18. A graph featuring the head of a soldier-spectator seeing a map of China through "revolutionary logistics" and "revolutionary wars."

II. Partial Totality: Military Pedagogy and its Operational Threshold

The cinematic logistics represented by the CMPS film production and KMT's military discourse resonates strongly with what philosopher Paul Virilio terms as the "dematerialization" of warfare in the post-WWII era. The immateriality of warfare entails that the actual battleground has been replaced by a contested perceptual field, across which the "true war film did not necessarily have to depict war or any battle. For once the cinema was able to create surprise (technological, psychological etc), it effectively came under the category of weapon" (10). In this case the military concept of "theater of operation," is redefined as a delimited realm of media practices that can simulate a series of scenarios in anticipation of war. To take this line of thinking a step further, one may argue that such a process of dematerialization actually entails the task of "re-materialization"— to map, to imagine, to reenact — warfare situations while the actual military engagements are not visible to the eyes.

This process of re-materialization can best be represented in the following pedagogical genres: first, training films on a wide array of topics such as formations, fortifications, scouting, mapping, surveying, and anti-espionage. With professional military advisers and actual military personnel as actors, these educational shorts are usually less than 30 minutes and all companied by non-diegetic summaries, lecturers, or commentaries. A second group consists of feature-length narrative films which either simulate scenarios of KMT army fighting the CCP in a projected near future or re-enact a pre-1949 battle in the recent past. The latter usually features professional actors and actresses of CMPS with an aim to produce an immersive dramatization. These two group of films, as I will show in the following case studies, create a sense of "virtual totality," whereby simulated military operations— however fragmented and limited to its technical and sensorial immediacy—can be integrated into a broader future totality in terms of time and space. Echoing the strategies of "revolutionary logistics" and "frontline governance," this projected totality not only displays "what might have gone wrong" before the 1949 but also envisions "what can be done" to win the future counter-attack and reclaim the Chinese territory in its totality. The dialectical relations between the partial and the total, between the technical

and the dramatic, determine the CMPS's paradigmatic shift from pedagogical actualities to feature-length narrative films in the post-1949 Cold War era of the 1950s and the 1960s.

It is worth noting that purely CMPS-made educational actualities are relatively few and far between. Many of these educational shorts in the archive are in fact translated films based on the reels imported from either the US or the West Germany and are dubbed with instructional commentary or instructional lectures in mandarin Chinese. This might not be a surprise, given that the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) had been operating in Taiwan since 1951, while their German counterpart also began their secret cooperation with the KMT in 1963 under the code name: Project *Mingde* 明德專案 .[11] My discovery of these imported military training films, however, indicates something more than military cooperation within the anti-Communist bloc. Rather, it showcases the hybrid nature of the KMT military machine, as well as the necessity of the overdubbed lecturer/narrator/interpreter in synthesizing various organizational forms and technical expertise for the post-1949 context of counter-attack preparations.

Within the highly unstable institutional environment of the KMT military and CMPS in Taiwan, what is stake is not simply to teach new military tactics or drills but to present these images within a coherent system of meaning. Through this system, knowledge of military operations is expected to go beyond its fragmented technicity, territorial limits, as well as its original linguistic and cultural origins. That is, film lectures and commentary in the CMPS took on the special role of bridging the realm of technical immediacy and the dramatization of narratives about the future. This narrative strategy is very close to that described by Tom Gunning in his discussion on the historical role of the lecturer from early cinematic actuality to early narrative film. As Gunning points out, the use of the lecturer in early American narrative film was one way to bridge the gap between the exhibitioner's ambition to elevate film into a new narrative art and the constant concern over its comprehensibility to the general audience. Entrusted with the dual task of "correctly" interpreting the film content and integrating its technical novelty into the narrative of a higher cultural register, film lecturers "support[ed] claims that film was an educational medium" but also created the "fragmented and possibly dialectic effect" of "discontinuity between a film unfolding on the screen and a lecturer commenting upon it" (93). This split was the condition of possibility for an active, dual consciousness on the part of the spectator, who would simultaneously be absorbed in and critically engaged with a film.[12]

In the context of CMPS's pedagogical films, this "dual consciousness" is embodied through both displaying the mechanism of new military technologies/tactics and framing them within a

[11] There has not been much research done about KMT's covert military training under the guidance of West Germany between 1963 and 1975. A recent donation of archival documents to Stanford's Hoover Institute in 2014 has revealed the continuous cooperation between the KMT and Germany before and after WWII. In addition to the imported German-made training films dubbed in Chinese, KMT military also produced a series of army training shorts in Taiwan based on the curriculum and advice given by the German military consultants. The collaborated project, noticeably, was directly ministered by Chiang Wei-kuo, another son of Chiang Kai-shek. See Y.Wang 203-204.

[12] In another context, Alice Lovejoy discusses the emergence of a potential critical spectatorship from the military training films of postwar Czechoslovakia. She highlights the trope of "model/modeling" as the key to a self-reflexive spectator on the level of the technical, the experiential, and the textual (95-100). Partially inspired this formulation, my postulation of partial/total, immediate/future, and technical/cultural also points toward a potential self-reflexive consciousness centered around a series of applicable "cases" in teaching military counterattack.

broader cultural and geopolitical narrative. The film titled *Tunnel Warfare* 坑道戰 (*Kengdaozhan*), for instance, features a separate mini-lecture episode contextualizing military tactics before the fictional narrative unfolds. The voice-over lecture, however, takes the form of a singular theatrical fantasy: two fully-dressed Peking opera actors fight on the stage as the Jing 淨 (male painted face) and Dan 旦 (female face) warriors in the popular historical romance "Xuerengui Conquers the West" 薛仁貴征西— a story about the Tang dynasty's military expansion into the western frontier. As the Dan chases the Jing into a dead end, the latter suddenly disappears from the stage, leaving his chaser shocked and baffled: "I wonder if this brat is capable of burrowing!" As the warrior reappears beneath the stage in an animated cross-sectional view (see fig.19-20), the voice-over explains how tunnel warfare works in modern three-dimensional battlefield while citing Sun Tzu's motto to justify the historical context of this military novelty.

The most intriguing design of this lead-in lecture/theater, however, is not the dramatization of tunnel warfare through Peking opera and its evocation of the ancient Chinese military mind. Rather, the novelty lies in its attempt to connect its historical lecture/theater to a subsequent dramatized narrative on a *future* tunnel war fought with the CCP. Shifting from an extra-diegetic lecture to diegetic voice, the narrative film projects itself into a near future when a KMT military squad lays siege to a CCP-held village by breaking into its subterranean tunnel system. In the lead-in lecture-theater, the Jing warrior reappears and freezes in the tunnel with a cross-sectional view of a tunnel landscape moving through an animated strip, adumbrating the later educational graphic chart used by the squad officers meeting before the siege (see fig. 21-22). The cross-sectional view of tunnel is painted on a charted map specifically detailing all sorts of subterranean routes, traps, dynamite, and military personnel the squad members might encounter later. As the siege begins, these simulated scenarios are demonstrated by a purpose-built film set, where all of these rehearsed encounters are neutralized one by one. The simulated battleground, in this case, evolves from the animated theater stage with extradiegetic lecture, and a topographic chart accompanied by the diegetic voice of a military officer, to the actual tunnel environment where the soldier-actors demonstrate how these theoretical tactics can be practiced.

From the partial side view of animated theater, to the cross-sectional floor plan, and the military actions simulated in the tunnel, the film internalizes the lecturing/commenting voice navigating different modes of spatial configuration and spectatorship. On the one hand, the lead-in theater/lecture with Peking opera prevents the audience from immediately identifying with the highly narrativized and dramatized film plots that follows. On the other hand, the Peking opera lecture set against the animated cross-sectional view of the stage prepares the spectator for *both* the following dramatization of warfare and the diegetic instructional voice in the film. From stage, map, and chart, to the outdoor on-site shooting and film set of tunnel system, the pedagogical voice itself serves as a medium bridging and organizing the spectator's various experiences between military technicity and theatrical narrativity, between a sense of temporal immediacy and a dramatized time that goes beyond its partial and fragmented purview. To frame this dual narrative structure between partial and total, in Gunning's words, we might say that the CMPS's military pedagogy was experimenting with a narrative strategy that allows for a "dialectical" dual consciousness to connect the post-1949 military home front of Taiwan to future total warfare.

Figure 19

Figure 20

Figure 21



Figure 22

The dialectical spectatorship between the partial and the total also places military knowledge as both a local experience and universal case applicable to other geopolitical and cultural environments. Another film, titled *Ambush* 突襲 (*Tuxi*), which also features the use of tunnel warfare, begins with an instructional text before the dramatic rendering of the guerilla tactic applied in another "counter attack" operation. Echoing the theater/lecture scene in the previous film, the text here contextualizes the history of tunnel warfare within the collective efforts of a global anti-Communist campaign by evoking the tunnel system used by Vietnamese Communists in trapping US soldiers. The lecture accompanying the text, however, claims that tunnel warfare is not an "Communist invention" but an indigenous technique developed by the Chinese during the Republican era but usurped by the CCP. Here, the pedagogical reference to tunnel warfare goes beyond the mere introduction of some technical knowledge. Once again, it functions more like a linguistic placeholder through which the geopolitical limitation and technical fragmentation of military information can be translated and connected to other different organizational and political forms within the same ideological bloc. As such, the translation and circulation of military content within CMPS's pedagogical context reveals to us multiple communicational dimensions.

This pedagogical communication, importantly, is often intertwined with the specific spatial forms created within the films. As the cases above suggest, the topographical variations of the military tunnel system thematize the scenarios of counter-attack through a series of self-enclosed "operational sites" such as a theater, an occupied village, or the confined physical environment of a tunnel or bunker. Through these delimited sites rendered by the camera, pedagogy films fabricate a series of operational spaces within a communicational or an organizational environment, linking the home-front and frontline, the partiality of the site and the potential application of the single "case" to the many foreseeable cases in the future total war. In other words, the military campaign of "revolutionary logistics," *transport* the military base limited within the present into a virtual environment, where technical operations and their fragmented sensorial experiences could be connected to the space behind the enemy.

With this distinctive notion of military logistics, CMPS's cinematic practices embody a set of spatial and temporal modulations that can connect the typical case presented in the film to many other outposts beyond the limitations of the Taiwanese base. In this process, they often self-referentially highlight the cinematic medium as part of this optical supply-chain, while further transforming the figure of the passive spectator into a laboring agent—delivering messages, information, and emotions—within the supply chain. The feature-length film *Before and After the Dawn* 天亮前後, for instance, presents a fictional scenario where the KMT military has just taken back a previously CCP-held village and is struggling to establish the village as an outpost by converting the villagers formerly ruled by the CCP into potential human resources for KMT. The movie thematizes the notion of "frontline governance" by depicting a porous informational environment, where a handful of former CCP cadres and collaborators still remain in the village, spying on the KMT, spreading rumors, and jeopardizing the efforts of the "reconstruction" projects. The central plotline lays bare the process of purging the Communists within this environment and restoring the communication between the frontline outpost in China and its Taiwanese home base.

The film's general theme of counter-attack and counterintelligence, once again, is rendered through cinematic presentations of a delimited environment, where spectatorship within the diegetic world connects the KMT soldier-actors, their CCP enemies, and the civilian collaborators caught between them. It is through this spatially confined spectatorship that an alternative historical time and causality becomes visible. A case in point is a scene where a CCP-recruited schoolboy spies on his own pro-KMT family, as he observes his aunt hanging a portrait of Chiang Kai-shek in the family shrine. The camera begins by tracing the boy's movement through the outside entrance—an opening formed by the enclosing walls of the yard, and then follows his sneaking steps to the entrance to the shrine. Across his shoulder, the audience can see the partial portrait of Chiang Kai-shek between two door planks. As the boy slowly approaches the aperture formed by the door planks and the threshold, the camera adopts his voyeuristic point of view to observe his auntie's symbolic act of hanging the portrait. This act of observing, however, is then interrupted by a cut to a reverse shot from the point of view of *the portrait* itself, as we see the rest of the pro-KMT family members suddenly emerge in the distance behind the boy right before he flees the scene (see fig. 23 -28).


Figure 23


Figure 24


Figure 25


Figure 26


Figure 27


Figure 28

This unusual sequence of "shot-reverse-shot" between the spy/boy and Chiang's portrait creates a form of double spectatorship with two distinctive temporal frames: firstly, although set in an unknown future, it reenacts the historical question about "what happened" within the KMT's organizational and communication networks during the civil war. The boy/spy, in this case, epitomizes a corrupted channel within an KMT-family organization. Secondly, by connecting the portrait's gaze to the familial allies emerging behind the spy/boy, it presents the possibility of correcting and fixing this failure in communication, as the spy is now encircled by the "home" front to his rear. The sequence, therefore, thematizes the architectonics of the domestic space as a cinematic medium that both makes historical causality legible and its reversibility possible. As a spy who both observes and labors between the two camps, the boy is secretly observed and later corrected by his KMT family through their later counterintelligence actions.

If the sequence above foregrounds an architectonic-cinematic threshold between the past and the future, the spectator watching between inside and outside, the film's ending further situates this liminal spectatorship between military actions and logistical supply. In a striking parallel sequence of actions at the end of the film, the villagers are called to meet for an outdoor film screening, where an advocacy film titled "Formosa the Beautiful" 美麗寶島(*Meili Baodao*) is projected onto a portable screen to show the KMT's spectacular development in Taiwan—a pedagogical practice anticipated by a previous scene of outdoor photography exhibition, where the spy/ boy is gradually indoctrinated into the virtues of Free China. With the civilian audience enthusiastically watching the "model province" 模範省(*Mofansheng*) in its magical development, another series of military actions take place simultaneously: behind the audience, a group of underground communist collaborators sneak by the crowd to gather in their own secret meeting—completely unaware of a fully-armed KMT squad trailing behind them.[13] As the raid successfully eradicates this last batch of communists, the screening on the plaza is also concluded by an in-person narrator-soldier, who happily announces: "Good evening everyone, I have a good news for you: while you guys were enjoying the movie just now, we have also eliminated the last group of communists hidden in the village!" The villagers, who are now fully converted KMT supporters and workers, realize that they can support the frontline simply by engaging in the leisure activity of movie-watching (see fig. 29- 33).

Figure 29

[13] The idea of reconstructing Taiwan as a "model province under the Three People Principle" was a notion and slogan developed by Chiang Kai-shek over the period between 1946 and 1949, responding to Taiwan's "restoration" from Japan and later KMT's flight to the island, respectively (1950). The idea of using Taiwan as a "blueprint" for the future of Mainland China also echoes the projection of the partial onto the total that I discuss in this chapter.

Figure 30

Figure 31

Figure 32

Figure 33

Once again, we encounter a bifurcated spectatorial structure connecting the Taiwanese home-front (on the screen) to the military frontline literally moving *behind* the former CCP collaborators and sympathizers. The developmental spectacle of Taiwan moves on the screen, with its promise to bring the villagers to a near future. Meanwhile, it also keeps the spectators on their seats and the military mopping up action on the move. The newly-appointed governor in the village, who is supposed to interpret the meaning of the film after the screening, perhaps not surprisingly, is later replaced by a soldier-actor, who now functions like a film interpreter/narrator connecting the movement of a developmental future on the screen to the actual lived time-space of the spectators in the village. As an exemplary case for teaching military personnel how "revolutionary logistics" and "frontline governance" might look in the future counterattack, the film presents a paradigmatic trope for many other CMPS pedagogical films by synthesizing two narrative modes— the lecture explaining the technical details of military operation and dramatic immersion seeking to identify the viewers with the characters. As a military educational film itself, *Before and After Dawn* not only mobilizes these two narrative modes but complicates their relationship by presenting the act of watching films itself as part of the logistical labor in support of *actual* military actions. In this case, the audiovisual media featured in the film — photography, portraits, the screen—not only play the role of educating the characters in the story but foregrounds mediated reproduction as a device for organizing the narrative on the screen and mobilizing the action off the screen.

This discussion of CMPS's experiments with pedagogical voice and a potential critical spectatorship lead us back to the questions regarding the actual spectatorial environment of these military films in the wake of the global Cold War. Two fundamental changes in Taiwan's military environment and geopolitical significance urge us to reconsider the role of the military counterfactual image-making in its actual exhibition context: first of all, the KMT military had to face the decreasing probability of a successful amphibious attack on the Chinese coastline. In fact, military offenses such as this were not supported, if not actively discouraged, by the US military expertise, which merely planned to keep the island state as an defensive outpost for logistical supply instead of a springboard for "counter-attack" in the midst of the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Vietnam War (1955-1975).[14] Secondly, CMPS had to face a changing

[14] In his important book *The Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan*

audience base in light of the changing sources of military personnel from China to Taiwan, as the majority of the soldiers after 1949 were drafted from the local Taiwanese male population through the new conscription system. These changes inevitably led to the de facto separation of the diasporic KMT military from their ties with the Mainland, as well as a new audience consisting of soldiers who would eventually become civilians after two to three years of military service. The central question posed by these changes is: How did CMPS manage to render the virtual "counter-attack" theme relatable to most of its local spectators? Given Taiwan's status as a former Japanese colony, where many Taiwanese either fought or died for the war against China and the US, it could have been highly difficult for CMPS to transport and translate the mnemonic "film stock" about the Chinese Civil War for an audience that had not directly experienced the KMT's historical failure in 1949 and the urgency for an anti-Communist campaign.

Indeed, this discrepancy between the imagined audience and the actual reception can be inferred from many of the CMPS films featuring scenarios of family reunion after the KMT's imaginary success after the counter-attack. These films present a marked shift from the demonstration of military knowledge to a series imagined domestic disputes arising in the newly reclaimed territory in the Mainland of the near future. They often feature, for example, a KMT military unit reconstructing a village community, where officers of soldiers struggle to reconnect with their family members previously left in the "Occupied Areas" (淪陷區). Common scenarios may include a soldier from Taiwan returning to his hometown in the Mainland only to find his wife remarried to a former CCP cadre, or a son from a gentry family returning to a ruined mansion to reunite with his old mother. Other scenarios included two villagers fighting for a piece of farmland in the KMT court, as the land ownership was wrongly transferred or calculated under the CCP rule. But a shared trope across these family affairs in the counterattack genre is a common pursuit of affective reconnection. This can perhaps be best illustrated by a scene wherein a series of close-ups highlight the upward-looking faces of some senior villagers in an unknown CCP-held village. After focusing on these expressive faces, the camera cuts to group of floating balloons in the sky festooned with a slogan saying: "Long Live President Chiang." As the counterattack operation prevails, the senior villagers, along with other insurgent collaborators in the CCP-held village, eventually reconnect with the KMT soldiers— many of whom turned out to be their own children or family members returning from Taiwan. The family reunion theme, not surprisingly, is the prelude for a series of rectifying operations on the part of the Nationalists, as the new military government takes over and sets out to implement new policies based on the idea of "frontline governance" (see fig. 34-37). These small family dramas can be seen as a sub-genre within the military pedagogical films, many of which could have meant to target KMT cadres and soldiers of the Mainland origins. With these family affairs largely being resolved by the proper arrangement and re-settlement under the new KMT reign, they promise a future Mainland in which information flows are reconnected, property reprocessed, land re-measured, and family reunited.

, historian Hsiao-ting Lin details the change of United State's attitude toward KMT's military actions from its initial ambivalence to the final decision to take defensive stance, a change articulated and made permanent by the signing of Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954. Since then, defense rather than counterattack has been a geopolitical reality, as the territorial claim of R.O.C. has been permanently confined to the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (340-341).

Fig. 34

Fig. 35

Fig. 36

Fig.37

Themes of family "reunions" and "reconnections," as such, manifest an unusual attempt by the CMPS to visualize an already lost, therefore unseen, battleground as a series of affective thresholds. Through these thresholds, the geopolitical limits and confinements associated with the island state Taiwan— with its relatively smaller population, resources, and isolated diplomatic situation— are transformed into a series of family-kinship units capable of mobilizing their Mainland networks of knowledge, labor and social relations to instigate rebellions or incite defections within the enemy's camp. In short, they represent an extended logistical network that can bridge the systematic—ideological, institutional, organizational— differences between the "free" Taiwanese home-front and the "occupied" Chinese mainland. An inevitable question arising from these family-kinship imaginaries is: given the new geopolitical and demographic reality in Taiwan during the 1950s and the 1960s, how do the counterfactual narratives of family reunion/reconnection counter the site-specificity of Taiwan and translate these tropes of connectivity and communication to a local environment full of divides, gaps, and frictions? If the possibility of counter-attack was gradually considered improbable, if not impossible, how did the CMPS sustain these optimistic affects associated with the theme of reunion and reconnection? I will explore these questions in the following case studies of a domestic turn in CMPS's feature-length narrative films, through which the imagined battlefields on the Chinese front are remapped onto the domestic home-front in Taiwan, where we discover an intertwinement of body, labor, knowledge, and affect in a series of melodramatic presentations of KMT military's tense engagements with the environment of their new home and real base — Taiwan.

III. Melodramatic Cartography: Mapping the Domestic Front between Control and Contingency

So far, the chapter has focused on the ways military pedagogical films project scenarios of a future counterattack onto the Chinese Mainland with its cinematic fabrication of a series of partial views informed by the new understanding of logistics epitomized by neologisms such as "revolutionary logistics" and "frontline governance." These partial views, as my case studies suggest, serve as the optics with which the panoramic totality of battlefield can be captured and connected to the Taiwanese home-front. The tropes of connection and communication between outpost/frontline and base/home-front are repetitively thematized against the background of Mainland China with a willful view toward future success. Another group of feature-length narrative films, however, turns its gaze from speculation on the future of counterattack warfare to the domestic front in Taiwan, where the CMPS's pedagogical ambition is placed on the training of individual civilians in their social roles and the mapping of potential social contingencies that might pose potential threats to the stability of the KMT military system.

Departing from the earlier pedagogical films normally set against a battlefield in China with characters heroically executing a military operation, this group of films usually feature paramilitary or civilian spheres, where characters are presented as social individuals exposed to the everyday temptation and distraction of desire, anger, jealousy, or fear. Instead of highlighting them as fighters in the field, they foreground their instrumentality as military workers situated within the social fabric of family, friends, and colleagues, as they suffer from external forces or influences that might hinder either their personal growth or moral integrity. These characters might be an ROTC cadet tired of tedious training drills, a squad leader tormented by his desire for a waitress and his resentment toward a superior, or a military finance officer bribed by a civilian contractor to give favor in a competitive bidding.

While the military pedagogical films highlight family-kinship as the infrastructure for inciting future rebellions, most of the narrative films in this group tend to dramatize the discrepancies between the KMT military system and a contingent social space that might pose threats to its systematic stability. In the process of identifying and narrativizing these crisis-ridden sites and spaces, they also practice two formal experiments: first of all, they recode the systematic discrepancies between the military and the civilian into melodramatic incidents on a personal scale, blurring the boundary between the individual and the collective. Secondly, they remap the military battlefield onto all sort of social topographies in Taiwan, turning the civilian environment into potential sites of emotional tensions, frictions, and dramatic redemptions. Together, they operate a sort of affective mapping that turns local sites in Taiwan into a mobile threshold between feeling and acting both within and *beyond* the confined spaces of the military system.

The phrase "affective mapping," naturally, invokes Fredric Jameson's influential idea of "cognitive mapping," which designates a social-spatial map "to enable a situational representation on the part of the individual subject to that vaster and properly unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble of society's structures as a whole" (277-287). To extrapolate this notion in my reading of CMPS's dramatization of environments situated between the military and the civilian spaces, I argue that an affective map is also needed to fully grasp the affective sites, routes, itineraries, and ambience experienced by both the characters in the film and the

civilian-turned-soldiers who watch them. Presented as entertainment for the moral education of an audience of soldiers, these melodramatic films present their characters as social beings caught between the controlled spaces of military system and the broader social-material world in which they are situated. As these characters navigate across institutional borders, they develop a sense of environments through purposive activities, bringing them a range of intentions, beliefs, desires, moods, and affective attachments to their navigational activities. These affective valences mapped onto sites ad routes, in turn, affect how they create itineraries and potential actions. In this context, the (melo-)dramatization of the everyday spaces through the military eye maps Taiwan as an environment that needs to be affectively felt, identified, adjusted to, and, eventually, conditioned. In providing visceral pleasure, moral virtue, and the ethos of the military profession, these melodramatic narratives can be seen as a cinematic mode of cartography, with which the battlefield of counterattack can be extended, sustained, and transformed into a logistical environment, where fighters become laboring workers grappling with their everyday emotional struggles within and beyond the military.

Take the film titled *The Routes to Victory* (勝利之路) for example. The film experiments with an intriguing generic hybrid between military pedagogy and dramatic narrative by framing four small stories within a ROTC academy lecturer's rather didactic explanation and stipulation as to the four psychological traits necessary for a good military officer: calmness, self-possession, perseverance, and optimism, each of them illustrated by a light-hearted personal story told by a cadet student sitting the classroom. The most interesting part, however, is the ways these personal traits and anecdotes were compared and mapped onto various sites and locales, as the film begins by giving an overview of all the walks of life in Taipei city through a series of high angle long-shots of the city's daily activities, traffic and commerce, punctuated by close-ups of some civilian individual's facial expressions of distress and anxiety. The sequence is accompanied by the military lecturer's monologue, which meditates upon the correlations between one's success in society and his/her personality, as the camera follows his steps from the city's hustle and bustle into the campus and classrooms of the military academy.

This panoramic mapping links Taipei's urban space to the military academy. This spatial mapping is immediately intensified by the first story told by the lecturer's student, a cadet who is called by the lecturer to share his story about learning the lesson of "perseverance" in one of the academy's organized hiking races along a trail leading to the Taipei's famed tourist site Zhinan Temple. The hiking route is designed in a way that it maps and indexes the major cities of the Chinese Mainland along the hike, as the cadres begin from a foothill named Taiwan—as inscribed on a carboard placed by the roadside — and then proceed to hike uphill while stopping over at "Nanjing," "Beijing," as well as other sites renamed in honor of famous sights in China such as the Sun Yat-Sen Mausoleum, the Summer Palace, the Temple of Heaven, and The Great Wall. As the ROTC cadets move uphill toward the local Daoist temple, passing checkpoint by checkpoint, the images of these Mainland tourist sites are superimposed onto the moving bodies of the military cadets, as if the reserve military manpower is vertically sweeping through the Mainland in their leisure time. Echoing this rather light-hearted alternative counterattack route, the narrator gives a personal account about how he and his friend are left behind by the group and are surpassed by two other female cadets. Excited, if not a bit angered, by the fact they were surpassed and somehow belittled by their female cohorts, the two male cadets rise up from their physical fatigue and follow in the steps of other hikers, eventually reaching the destination at the

hilltop temple. The famous temple in Taipei, however, is now superimposed with the image of the Temple of Heaven with two huge characters saying *Beiping* 北平 (the old name of Beijing before 1949), symbolizing the reclamation of the old Chinese capital.

Routes to Victory is a representative case among a series of CMPS's geospatial mappings which connects the topographical memory of pre-1949 China to the post-1949 landscape of Taiwan. Not only does it remap the Chinese landscape cinematically onto a local site, it also transforms the desire for a counterattack into the light-hearted one-day drama wherein sexual attraction, physical competition, and recreation among young men and young women take the center stage. The superimposition of the image of Great Wall on the ROTC cadets climbing the steps is meant to project the physical training of military manpower in Taiwan onto the Mainland (fig. 38 -39), but the actual labor of climbing and the narrative of perseverance are epitomized by a scene where the two male cadets are framed between the two female cadets in front of the camera and the overview of Taipei City in the long distance (fig. 40). As the two male cadets rest beside a stone lantern from the Japanese colonial period, the camera identifies with the female cadets by gazing— and sneering—at their struggle through an aperture formed by the shoulders of the female cadets. This aperture symmetrically aligns with another aperture formed by the Japanese lantern and a tree in medium distance. Between these two apertures, Taipei's present (the overview of the city) and the recent past (the colonial relic lantern) are literally superimposed on the struggling male bodies in their transformation from ROTC cadets to full-grown military officers. Ironically, "the route to victory" and the reclamation of the Chinese territory are not motivated by the aspiration to "reconnect" with the families left in Mainland China, but by the desire to literally catch up with the legs and thighs of their cohorts (fig. 41). The allegorical correspondence between the epic scale of counterattack and the one-day hike in Taipei metonymically replaces China with Taiwan, and, more importantly, situates the emotional and the sensational at the center of mapping a new environment.

Figure 38



Figure 39

Figure 40



Figure 41

This affective and cognitive mapping of environment, I suggest, pioneers a recurrent melodramatic mode shared by a significant number of CMPS narrative films. These films highlight a variety of contingencies, distractions, temptations, and frictions encountered by military or paramilitary personnel, as they navigate Taiwan's social environment. By thematizing these encounters as a series of melodramatic affairs entangled with crime, desire, and their moral resolution both inside and outside of systematic time-space, they project a cartographical imaginary that is not based on objective documentation of geospatial reality. Rather, these films fabricate an affective environment where sensational and visceral pleasures *both disrupt and re-orient* a masculine military viewership situated in the systematic gap between a fixed military space and a new social space it constantly finds itself at odds with. Through this temporal and spatial reorientation by way of melodrama, sites and situations located outside the military system are identified, integrated, and made morally legible.

It would be helpful for us to briefly elaborate on the intertwinement between the concepts of the melodramatic and the cartographical—one usually associated with affective intensity on a personal scale and the other with rational instrumentality on a universal scale. We may parse out this seemingly unlikely pair by taking a look at David Harvey's emphasis on the instrumentality of cartography: "Cartography is about locating, identifying and bounding phenomena and thereby situating events, process, and things within a coherent spatial frame. [I]t depends heavily on a Cartesian logic in which *res extensa* are presumed to be quite separate from the realms of mind and thought and capable of full depiction of within some set of coordinates" (220). Harvey points out the presumed dichotomy that treats cartography as a *res extensa* (extended and unthinking thing) excluded from the realm of *res cogitos* (thinking substance; soul) in light of Descartes's radical dualism between body and mind. This putative dichotomy inherent in the ideology of cartography, however, blinds us from seeing the affective dimension implied by the term *res extensa*, which necessitates a sense of automaticity in its "unthinking" and "extending" movement of covering and ordering the globe with grids, lines, and coordinates.

Despite its function as a technical extension, the automated movement of "locating, identifying, and bounding" the objective world presupposes a moving eye *affectively* drawn to the contours of the landscape, constantly being attached to (and stimulated by) a map's automatic sensing and ordering activities. In this case, the sense of automaticity in cartography resonates strongly with Giles Deleuze's rendering of affect as a "continuous variation" moving between ideas that can be represented, as nothing but a "mode of idea which represents nothing" and an intermediary force of existence, a lived passage or transition, moving between ideas. The automaticity of this continuous mode of existence in between, as he evokes Spinoza's term, "spiritual automata," refers to a mode of pre-individual position defined by a succession of ideas in "a kind of slide, a fall or rise in the power of acting" (2007). In this case, we might say that a cartographical map is always already imbued with "unthought" affects with their potential to draw the viewing eye into future actions. The cognitive sense-making in cartographical imaging through grids and coordinates, therefore, cannot be separated from the affective mapping of environment.

Viewing *Routes to Victory* with this affective map, one finds its moral lesson of militant perseverance—sticking to the itinerary, controlling one's emotions, managing one's physical fatigue— intertwined with the visceral sensation and potential aggression toward (female) bodies

and the overcoming of the anxiety about (male) vulnerability. This juxtaposition of violence and vulnerability is repetitively evoked in other CMPS's narrative dramas, where military masculinity constantly falls victim to the temptations and distractions inherent in the surrounding environs, whereas a future violent retribution is either guaranteed or implied. Like the routing and detouring conducted by the ROTC cadets, most of the dramatic situations and their resolutions in these films require a touring or mapping of specific sites, venues, and locales beyond the military spaces.

A squad leader in another film titled *The Maze of Fog* 迷霧茫茫, for instance, embarks upon a tragic journey beginning with his flirtatious encounter with the wife of a veteran who runs a grocery café right beside the base. His fervent pursuit of the married woman turns him into an aloof husband and father at home, a constant money-borrower among his friends, and most fatally, a rebellious and dangerous cadre in the eyes of his superior. After committing a series of violent altercations, and an attempted murder of his commanding officer, the squad leader is sentenced to life in the military jail, leaving his son aspiring to be "a better person" to make up for the father's crime. As explosive and disorienting as these incidents may seem, the film maps out a coherent overview of the institutional and geospatial environments around the military base.

Echoing the overview of Taipei City presented in *Routes to Victory*, the film begins by giving a high-angled establishing shot of the base surrounded by the military service housing and other affiliated facilities. Moving from a sea of roofs, to an alley, to a house, the camera finally focuses on the squad leader's wife, who is going door by door to collect loads of laundry to earn extra income— as her husband has been spending money on his new love interest. This shot establishes the general theme — the dangerous entanglements of money and desire between the military and the domestic— by mapping out its spatial configuration. As the story unfolds and tensions escalate, the audience is then given a tour along the specific sites affiliated with the base: the grocery store/café, military hospital, primary school, and finally, the military prison. The film ends by returning to the long high-angled shot on the squad leader's wife, who, together with the military village, is swallowed by a sudden wave of fog.

By visualizing the ambivalent zone between the military and the domestic along the specific routes and sites taken by the characters, the *The Maze of Fog* escalates the vacillation between violence and vulnerability seen in *Routes to Victory*. The melodramatic sensation not only drives the narrative flow but, more importantly, map out the military-civilian compound by giving each of the sites a very specific affective valence: the potential cuckoldry in the café, the humiliation received by the child in the affiliated school, and the wife's weeping and crying in another living unit of the military service housing. In the process, the film practices a cognitive mapping in a militarized society, where individuals struggle to make sense of his/her own partial role in relation to an invisible, or foggy, totality. On the other hand, it conducts an affective mapping though which injured manhood, suffering domestic femininity, and the ethos of the military system are all spatially mapped onto specific sites and places where crimes, missteps, and virtuous actions can take place and be disciplined.

Both *The Routes* and *The Maze* mobilize the tropes of sensational female lure and implied male violence to map out a mobile frontier between the KMT military system and its proximate

spaces. However, these highlighted sites and institutes, such as the training field, hospital, service housing, and prisons are still *within* the direct control of the military organizational complex, whereas the exterior social world is merely referenced or inferred. In both films, individuals and their bodies— violent or vulnerable alike— are still represented as agents moving, clashing, and crisscrossing in the interior milieu of the KMT military system. In this case, the display of victimhood (or injured masculinity) and the aggression toward the system (or women) end up confronting the violence of a higher level: the military state and law. In most of CMPS's melodramatic narrative films, this divide is clearly maintained, as the military realm is always safely separated from the contingencies in a gradually commercialized society and its logic of commodities.

Such a well-maintained distinction makes a film like *In the Nick of Time* 千鈞一髮 a special case, as it explores military system's direct contact with its "exterior" milieu of urban commercialism, the entertainment sectors, as well as the visceral and disorienting affects experienced by the military personnel stepping outside the military control. The story highlights a series of actions that might lead to the crime of bribery or insider trading: Approached and coached by a local building contractor, an Engineer Officer (EO) tries to influence his high-minded colleague, an Administrative Officer (AO), regarding a competitive bidding project of which they are both in charge. With an aim to lure the AO— a single young man—into his conspiracy, the EO introduces the AO to his charming female cousin, a morally ambiguous figure who takes orders from her cousin but has genuine feelings for her target. Although the actual crime never happens— the EO decides to withdraw the scheme after hearing about the potential charges against the military personnel, this scheme of sexual allurement and peer coercion almost does its trick.

Despite its spelled-out moral lesson about resisting the lure of wealth and lust, what the audience actually see is the vulnerability of the military masculinity in the face of a much vaster social fabric imbued with affective disturbances. As the "couple" go out for date after date, they roam through Taipei's famed tourist spots and landmarks, including a museum, a movie theater, a theme park, a botanical garden, a beach, and a lake for boating. Not only does the officer have little power to resist his "enemy"— a femme fatale under the command of her money-driven cousin, his militant righteousness is also gradually stripped off as the story unfolds. One does not fail to take note of the constant visual and visceral juxtaposition of the officer's body with various forms of female nudity, including a half-naked dancer in a restaurant, a pinup girl on the wall, and his enemy/lover in a bikini swimsuit. In parallel, the very symbol of military ethos, his uniform, is gradually stripped off, as he turns from a fully-suited officer in the office to someone who runs half-naked on the beach with his enemy/lover.

In the Nick of Time complicates the relationship among military masculinity, victimhood, and the visceral affects circulating in a commodified social environment. In *The Route to Victory* and *The Maze of Fog*, the sources of crisis come from malfunctioning components within the military system, while the affective intensities of injury, humiliation, and suffering are constantly regulated and modulated by the sites and routes designated by the system. The physical fatigue and mental frustration of the male ROTC hikers, for instance, can be compensated by their female cohorts. The rage and jealousy of the squad leader, as uncontrollable as they may seem, are actually conditioned and regulated by the paramilitary spaces of his son's school, his wife's

network of neighbors, and the military legal system. In other words, they belong to a self-regulating system which manages to maintain its own internal stasis. *In the Nick of Time,* by contrast, presents a much more contingent environment of marketplace and entertainment beyond the control of military system. The two officers are prevented from actually committing the crime after the intervention by a *deus ex machina* – a formerly jailed colleague who abruptly shows up only to tell them the severity of charges for bribery. What the film demonstrates before this intervention, however, is a series of sites and corners where money is spent, leisure enjoyed, and seduction achieved. As the Administrative Officer slowly falls for the charm of his enemy and the coercion of her cousin, we immerse ourselves in his materialist, romantic, and sometimes erotic journey in and beyond Taipei City with the military base rendered almost invisible.

At the end of the day, no crime is committed, but the military ethos is gradually replaced by the speculation for future wealth and marriage and the calculation of profit and risk. In short, sensational violence is saved but only in exchange for the vulnerability of military masculinity, which is now literally wedded with the constant and contingent flux of the urban space and marketplace, as the film ends with the arranged couple rejoining each other in an urban park of Taipei for a renewed partnership. It is fair to say this "marriage" between military ethos and civilian pathos already surrenders the internal stasis of the military space to the crisis-ridden social-material space.

The three films discussed above showcase a singular melodramatic mode made possible only in its affective vacillation between the military and the civilian, between action-based masculinity and domestic femininity, between violence and vulnerability. Through mapping affective valences onto specific sites, they allegorize a transitional identity of the KMT military in its new environment. In the process, they stake out a new notion of cinematic melodrama. As Linda Williams has pointed out, melodrama is built around the identification with the position of the victim. Suffering, in this context, signifies inner goodness; to suffer, and to do so publicly, is a mark of virtue (45). As Williams and Ben Singer have both suggested, this identification with suffering and female victimhood alternates with another set of appeals centered around sensational action and male violence. The oscillation between these two poles has structured melodrama since the early nineteenth century. The CMPS-made melodrama films, in this context, complicates this bifurcation by repetitively placing the agency of military men in an emotionally vulnerable position, as their "routes to victory" are constantly disrupted and disoriented by the contingent forces within and beyond the military system. Females characters— from the ROTC cohorts, the grocery owner's wife, to the *femme fatal* lover/enemy, on other hand, are usually assigned as part of the fluctuating environment which keeps stimulating or distracting the military system and its affective ambience. Yet, instead of presenting sensational violence, these films opt for an affective map of sites, routes, and itineraries through which the otherness of gender is connected to the otherness of the environment, and against which the anxiety about the lack of agency can be conditioned and channeled.

IV. Under the Mushroom Cloud: the Affective State of a Militarized Environment

The above discussions on the affective mapping of military and civilian spaces, as such, point toward a new role for melodrama in both mapping the environment and evoking a mobile spectatorship that keeps looking into the new environment. They show us how CMPS mobilizes various melodramatic modes to map out the cognitive and affective gaps between the internal stasis of military system and the broader social fabric in which it is embedded. A question can be further asked: how does this melodramatic mapping of the domestic front help the military collective— confined to its partial and immobile position on the island — sustain the possibility of a counterattack operation and an imagined national identity in the future? How do these films, at the end of the day, translate this affective landscape into a thinkable, plannable, and programmable future for the rest of the society? This chapter has thus far presented these two genres in the CMPS archive as two separate modes—military pedagogy films relying on a counterfactual simulation of a future counterattack in China while the military melodrama films focuse on the immediate sensorial and affective environment in Taiwan. Between the virtual "front" in the future and the actual "home" at present, what sort "home-front"— with what kinds of affective attachments— is really constructed for an imagined nationhood in Taiwan?

To answer these questions, I suggest, we see the home/front duo not as a binary dichotomy but as two dialectical tendencies pointing toward a deeper understanding of the nature of an emerging public sphere *affectively* attached to the militarized environment in post-1949 Taiwan. If the military pedagogy films project an optimistic future promised for all the people in Taiwan, they have denied the fact that not all military personnel and civilians in Taiwan share the same affective attachments and collective prospects in relation to the imagined "home" divided by the Taiwan Strait. In trying to sustain a public desire to fight for an intangible battleground, the KMT military propaganda films resort to a kind of virtual image-making to project a divided home, with its promised intimacies still worth waiting for. In the meanwhile, this future-oriented affective optimism is buttressed and structured by KMT's *actual* mobilization of society under the control of Taiwan's martial law and the militarized secret police/state security of the Taiwan Garrison Command 台灣警備總司令部 (*Taiwan jingbei zong silingbu*), which implemented decades of white terror, with its regime of political prisoners, censorship, and a widely-distributed network of information and intelligence.

There has been a recent surge of scholarship focusing on the affective experiences of the white terror victims in Taiwan, as more and more previously classified documents, memoirs, and testimonies surface to form an alternative histography and a potential counter-public from the bottom. Little, however, has been done on how propaganda media—military films, in particular— structure an affective public sphere by connecting them to the actual lived space of the everyday, as well as recoding the highly gender-specific space of militarism and its national/nationalist feelings of victimhood as a universal and totalizing experiences for the general public. In this context, the seemingly dichotomized narrative modes of military pedagogy and melodramatic maps are actually two faces of the same coin, because they collectively project a totalizing public sphere where family, institutes, organizations, and physical sites can be imagined as an organic whole, and where individual feelings of jealousy, shame, fear, hope, and ambition can be mapped onto a legible temporal and spatial grid.

Within this totalizing space of the public, therefore, soldiers and civilians alike are inteperllated into a normative public sphere characterized by a state similar to what Lauren Berlant terms as a kind of "cruel optimism"— an affective structure of relationality that keeps one constantly attached to the possibility of attaining something— a person, an object, a concept, a way of life, or a political project, even when that something is precisely that which makes it impossible to attain the transformation one hopes for. Such a paradoxical structure, however, promises an environment where "the pleasure of being inside a relation ha[s] become sustaining regardless of the content of the relation, such that a person or a world finds itself bound to a situation of profound threat that is, at the same time, profoundly confirming" (2). CMPS's bifurcated genres of pedagogy and melodrama, seen in this new light, present a very similar structure. In this case, the melodramatic mapping of an environment of threat and crisis is precisely that which helps sustain the optimistic hope of counterattack, as its depiction of immediate surroundings and emotional outbursts anchor the counterfactual worlds fabricated by the military pedagogy films.

Therefore, the dramatization of victimhood and vulnerability on the part of the male-dominated military space becomes necessary for the display of a righteous nationhood constantly under potential threat and attacks on behalf of the general public.[15] This also resonates strongly with Berlant's rendering of an affectively-charged "visceral" rhetoric in forging a national sentimentality, as she suggests a "shift from the notion of a rational critical public to an affective public," whereby feelings become the basis of attachment to or identification with a national public sphere (47). While Berlant's emphasis on a "visceral politics" oriented around the performative, the immediate, and the transparent expression of feelings to enliven the vulnerability of the nation, the melodramatic modes of the CMPS films show that such victimhood and vulnerability function actively as a militarizing device, which transplant the injured nationhood and military masculinity of the pre-1949 historical memory onto the specific sites, locales, and organizational environment in post-1949 everyday space of Taiwan. In the process, the "home" divided by the spectacular Chinese Civil War is recoded onto the domestic everyday sensorium, whereas as any threatening disruption or distractions can be seen as both a threat to the system and a binding device to connect individuals to the survivability of the whole society in the future.[16]

This understanding of pedagogy and melodrama both as the integral parts of an affective national public equip us with a better analytical lens to engage with a complicated CMPS film narrative such as *Chances of Life under Atomic Bomb* 原子彈下的生機 , which is an unusual hybrid of military training, scientific education, family melodrama, and counterfactual imagination of future. Importantly, it is also a film allegorizing a totalizing sphere of a nuclear warfare waged against Taiwan, which tightly binds the survival and victimhood faced by the military to the emotional lives of the whole population on the island. Except for a short

[15] In her discussion about the identity politics based on "resentment," Wendy Brown also highlights a very similar affective structure where the feelings of righteousness overwhelms the hurt and externalizes what is otherwise unendurable (68).

[16] Echoing Berlant's project on the construction of righteous "national feelings" through visceral display of victimhood and vulnerability, Judith Butler highlights the affective "responsiveness" inscribed on the surface of body. This affective responsiveness in turn buttress the feelings of "responsibility," thereby framing the transition from visceral vulnerability to national violence under the condition of war (33-36).

introductory as a lead-in narrative, the film is a family melodrama featuring a young male protagonist, a medical officer returning to his home in Taipei from the frontlines of the island of Kinmen. As he joins the anti-air raid civil defense drills, his professor/engineer father helps the government design a fallout shelter and popularize knowledge on nuclear attack. During his short stay in Taipei, the medical officer is joined by two young women: one is his colleague in Kinmen, a nurse returning to help with the anti-air raid drills while bearing the traumatic wartime memory in China; the other is the protagonist's friend since childhood, who feels entitled to the protagonist's future and resents the professional bonding between the doctor and the nurse. As the protagonist and his female friends are all deployed in Taipei's city-wide civil defense mobilization, a drama of love and jealousy is intertwined with the pedagogical narratives on civil defense and the use fallout shelter in anticipation for a potential nuclear bombing in Taipei.

At the first glace, *Chances* seems to be nothing but an advocacy film meant to educate the general public on the importance of civil defense, duck-and-cover drills, and new bunker technologies in the face of a potential nuclear attack. The timing of the film's production and the degree of seriousness with which the film is framed, however, give it a much greater geopolitical significance in the picture of KMT's counterattack campaign. First of all, *Chances* was released around 1961, right before PRC's successful nuclear bomb testing in 1964. Given the KMT's early acquisition of the intelligence about the testing, the film can firstly be seen as an attempt to quell any potential outbreak of panic and anxiety among the general public.[17] It is, therefore, not surprising that the film begins with a short lecture given by the Commander of Taiwan Garrison Command, General Huang Jie –one of KMT's top military leaders and later the Minister of Defense. With a solemn face and serious tone, Huang faces the camera and spells out the objectives of the film by emphasizing the "scientific knowledge" needed to debunk the myth that a nuclear attack to Taiwan is equal to total destruction. "There are still chances of surviving for mankind," says the general, "but what is more horrible and powerful than the atomic bomb itself is our own mental illusion and the wrong attitude of resigning oneself to fate."[18] The film, in this case, like many other military pedagogical military films in the CMPS archive, promises to debunk a myth and introduce a specific field of knowledge or a set of skills. The biggest different between *Chances* and most military pedagogical films, however, is that its theme of city/nation-wide civil defense mobilization and the imagined enemy, atomic bomb, both exceed the scale of normal military operations and their limited "theater" of operations. Given the fact that nuclear weapons in China were still in its rudimentary stage in the early 1960s, any speculation as to its potential damage and coverage could have been dramatized to the degree that only a totalizing spatial imaginary would captured its sense of fear, anxiety, and contingent hope of survival.

In this context, the intertwinement of family melodrama and the all-out mobilization of the city's civil defense network not only enact but also escalate the melodramatic mapping of site and situations I have discussed in previous cases. The recurrent trope of male-dominated military or paramilitary systems and their mapping and overcoming of its "exterior milieu," once again,

[17] According to Lin Hsiao-ting's historical research, as early as 1961, Taiwan's air reconnaissance squad "Black Cat" had already gained information regarding the progress of nuclear testing in Northwestern China. The temporal coincidence of this information and the production of this film cannot be underestimated (259).

[18] In this introductory remark, Huang Jie also takes the efforts to recognize the guidance and advice given by the nation's top political and military leaders such as Chiang Ching-kuo and Zhou Zhirou. This can be seen as the evidence that this film production itself, like the national mobilization of civil defense, is a cross-departmental efforts.

loom large. A case in point wound be the film's emphasis on the male intellectualism embodied by the father-son duo of professor/engineer and the military medical doctor. The son's return from the outlying island Kinmen—the very battlefront with the Communist China—to the KMT's home/base in Taipei itself is a symbolic reconnection of the frontline and the home-front.[19] This masculine connection of knowledge and expertise, importantly, is further metaphorized by a social-technical assemblage of mapping and networking. This is epitomized by a series of images that superimpose on the professor/engineer father's body on the movement of locomotives and railway tracks, as he gives speeches on nuclear warfare and sheltering to different audiences across the island. On the other hand, as the father travels *horizontally* along the railroad network explaining his new shelter/bunker system to the public, his son also plays the double role of educator/doctor for his colleague, the nurse, by showing her around both the city and deep inside his father's model bunker, as the nurse is emotionally plagued by her traumatic encounter with an air strike in China during the Sino-Japanese War, which is constantly evoked for her by the civil defense sirens in Taipei, but later calmed by way of the intellectual guidance of the male protagonist (see fig. 41-45).


Figure 42


Figure 43



Figure 44


Figure 45

The two occasions when her traumatic memories are reanimated are particularly worth noting in terms of the ways that the affective intensities of war memories are spatially and acoustically registered in the environment. The first time we encounter her wartime memories is when the couple takes a stroll after their lunch date in downtown Taipei, when the civil defense siren suddenly goes up in the air. Suffering from a panic attack, she covers her ears and hysterically looks around before her doctor boyfriend calms her down. The doctor, after hearing her story about losing her parents in the air strike during the Sino-Japanese War, says: "This is a morbid state of mind. You have to get treatment as soon as possible!" As he lectures to her on the power of science and technologies in modern civil defense efforts and condemns the harm done by superstition and ignorance of the general public, the camera cuts to a local religious folk parade, and then slowly pans from the parade to one of the city's Qing dynasty gates. "Look at them" says he, "I am really worried if an air strike hit them here. The damage and casualties would be so much worse." Echoing his engineer father's island-wide lecture tour to spread the knowledge on nuclear bombing and sheltering, the doctor pins down "the morbid state of mind" shared by both his girlfriend and the general public— the one enslaved by memories and the other by ignorance. The sequence succinctly connects the pre-1949 wartime memories to the local social space of postwar Taiwan, where ponderous parades and imperial architecture still reign.

[19] The symbolic role of Kinmen as the very frontline between CCP and KMT, as well as its geopolitical and military site-specificity, renders the island a frequently referenced background in many other CMPS's films. For more on this, Michael Szonyi's work, *Cold War Island: Quemoy On the Front Line* (2008).


Figure 46


Figure 47


Figure 48

The sequence, contextualized within the film's highlighting of intellectualism and masculinity, succinctly allegorizes the military system's logistical support (medicine and bunker engineering) by connecting the frontline of Kinmen to its base in Taipei, while turning it into a mapping device through which the "morbid" mind of nurse and the local public can be indexed and identified in the environment. In another sequence, memories of air strikes and their affective intensity is, once again, reanimated by a multiply mediated domestic scene, as the nurse switches on an electronic fan in her room. As she stares at the turning blades, the movement of the fans is suddenly superimposed on the image of an airplane engine and its swirling propellers, followed by a series of war actualities and footages that show aerial bombings of a Chinese city. As if cinematically transported back to the Sin-Japanese war in China, the nurse screams and bursts into tears (see fig. 49-54). More than a simple flashback sequence, the series of images present a multiply-coded interstitial space between site-specific affect and a general military perceptual field.

This flashback sequence, first of all, is triggered by a "Da-Tung" electric fan—the very first massively produced household electric fan in postwar Taiwan with a strong symbolism of the island's rudimentary local industries. Its magical swirl links domestic femininity and mental instability—or a "morbid state of mind," to use the protagonist's phrase— to the broader historical contingency of warfare presented in the subsequent war actualities of aerial bombardment. It is worthy to note that the war footages used here are images cut and re-edited from Frank Capra's (1897 – 1991) famous 1945 documentary *The Battle of China*, a propaganda documentary within the *Why We Fight* series sponsored by the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) for its own use in WWII.[20] These images of aerial bombardment are basically framed from impersonal, even *impossible*, viewpoints to the nurse in this film, as they are shot either from the vintage point of the bombing airplanes or nearby planes— that is, it is a view only accessible to the military personnel involved in the bombardment. Indeed, as *The Battle of China* was dubbed in mandarin Chinese and used constantly for military education since 1944, many viewers of these footage images could have been KMT military personnel themselves already. Within such a short sequence, a highly symbolic Taiwan-made industrial domestic appliance triggers the military vision of US-made war footage on China, which in turn affectively mobilizes the responses from a nurse serving in frontline Kinmen. The affectively-charged sequence would soon drive the nurse closer to her colleague and love interest, as the medical

[20] The *Why We Fight* Series consist of seven documentaries that map out the each of the operational theater and fronts during WWII. As a pioneering film project directly encouraged by General Marshall, the footages and documentary used in these films become later the visual resources for cutting, editing, and dubbing in other propaganda films of different countries. *The Battle of China*, or example, is shown to the Chinese military and civilans under the title of *The Roar of China* (中國的怒吼), whose images are constantly cut and split into other military films. For an account of Hollywood film industry's involvement in war, see Koppes and Black 124.

officer takes her into an underground fallout shelter for an educational, or even therapeutic, tour and date.

This duck-and-cover romance between a doctor and a nurse, as shown in the two sequences, transforms national victimhood before 1949 into a post-1949 civil defense effort against a speculative nuclear future. In the process of integrating the city and the island into a logistical environment in support of civil defense, the father-son expert duo anchors a social-technical tie between family lineage— father, son, and a potential wife/daughter-in-law— and an island-wide network of intelligence and information mobilized for the nation's future. Throughout the film, as their intellectual superiority and moral clarity penetrate and expand into the local environment, intercut images of bunkers, radar, railways, loudspeakers, radio, and telephone are evoked to parallel the family drama entangled with love, jealousy, greed, fear, and anxiety(fig. 55-56).


Figure 49


Figure 50



Figure 51


Figure 52


Figure 53


Figure 54

This parallel environment between the city-state and the family, once again, needs a domestic "outside" as its imagined frontier and enemy. The protagonist's childhood friend, Jialing, and her risk-taking, money-borrowing parents, in this context, take up the role. While the memory-burdened nurse bears the burden of the KMT's national injury and victimhood, Jialing embodies a potential threat to the paramilitary environment and the collective efforts of organizing and defending it. Her attention-seeking, emotional blackmail, and the manipulation of her parents to influence the protagonist's family, for instance, sustains the real dramatic tension of the film. And the situations created by her emotional outbursts are precisely that which needs to be tamed and domesticated by the militarized environment of the civil defense system. It is, therefore, not surprising to see her parents being portrayed as greedy and superstitious opportunists who care for nothing but the fluctuation of stock market— another contingent realm influenced by the speculation of future. Perhaps not surprisingly, the film ends with their catastrophic failure in stock market and Jialing's failure in her own war of love and jealousy (fig. fig. 57-58).




Figure 55 56 57 58

Chances serves as the final and concluding case of this chapter, one that traces the origin of CMPS's post-1949 production and their experiments with various genres, themes, and motifs within a new military and civilian environment in Taiwan. The film, as my reading shows, epitomizes a general anxiety about systematic failure in the face of an encroaching total war, as well as the aspiration to reverse a sort of historical causality that forecloses the possibility of their collective dream of counterattack. It might be fair to say that *Chances* summarizes CMPS's post-1949 film experiments in military pedagogy, melodrama, and its affective mapping of a domestic "spiritual frontline" after the catastrophic Chinese Civil War.

Reading CMPS's archive of military films through this new lens, we are pushed to look into the singular practices of affective and cognitive mapping they embark upon in the 1950s and 1960s. In the military pedagogical films, a counterfactual scenario is simulated in a sort of future-past paradox between memory and action, as they invoke all sorts of historical "could-have-been" moments by framing them in a volitional future of counterattack. Taking back a CCP-held village or mobilizing for a potential CCP-launched nuclear attack, therefore, are two faces of the same coin.

In this context, the cinematic mapping and engineering of the environment in military films, including charts, graphs, maps or the architectonic arrangements might be seen as a sort sheltering bunker, a camera-obscura that at once protects the human sensorium from over-stimulation and allows a narrow aperture to map, measure, and calculate the distance between an observing self and a moving target. Yet, just like a fallout shelter presented in *Chances*, a bunker is anything but an isolated material object but instead a technical-social assemblage situated within an intersectional fabric of logistical support structured among gender, class, ethnicities, and the division of labor. The melodramatization of military space, therefore, practices a mode of affective mapping that keeps identifying and marking the fissures, gaps, and discrepancies between the interior of military system and an exterior milieu filled with potential threats and their catastrophic outcomes. As the cases selected and presented in this chapter show, military operations constantly designate and circumscribe the "theater of operation" while actively creating new outsides within the domestic sphere of home, city, and state. Family melodrama and romance, generic modes that are usually considered the opposite of action-based drama of militarism, paradoxically, become the necessary "home-fronts" in the representation of a militarized environment.

To situate CMPS's postwar practices of counterfactual thinking and melodramatic mapping within the geopolitics of the Cold War, these films actually metonymically "mirror" the greater Cold War machine that keeps mapping divides along the Western and Eastern blocs. The cinematized tensions between military control and its self-generated threats, to certain degree, is a miniaturized reflection of a general ideological and territorial divides of the global cold war—

a fact that can be illustrated by the presence of imported military education films from West Germany and US-made footages with Vietnamese or Korean subtitles or dubbing found in the CMPS archive. Yet, while the conventional discourse on the Cold War in Asia tends to accentuate the "coldness," of the conflict and the "divide," and "disconnection" between the opposing system of thought and ideology, CMPS's pedagogical and drama films embody the KMT's military campaign for "spiritual frontline" and KMT's "revolutionary logistics," manifesting an organizational sensibility that bridges the ideological, institutional, and geopolitical discrepancies between the two contesting systems across the Taiwan Strait. In the process, memories were turned into "film stock" and the battlefields themselves are framed as a kind of camera-obscura—at once a sensorial and an epistemological black box— whereby systematic differences could be translated and modulated.

These films, I suggest, point toward a unique mode of *military environmentality*, with which the materiality of warfare and its technical, immediate, and instrumental operations can be grafted onto an immaterial realm of future reunification, reconnection, and retrocession. In short, we may say that through the cinematic medium the geopolitical "partial view" of Taiwan becomes the very condition for CMPS to project an imagined totality and completeness in terms of territory, sovereignty, and ideology. This desire for logistical connectivity in the form of a cinematic mirroring between parts and whole, between fragment and totality, as my next chapter will show, also informed the aesthetic mapping of agrarian landscapes in postwar Taiwan, where soldiers have retreated from the battlefield to the farm, and the issue of survival hinges upon the choice of pesticides over bombs.

Chapter Two

Soil and Scroll
The Agrarian Origin of a Cold War Documentary Avant-Garde

On October 12, 1959, Jiang Menglin 蔣夢麟(1886-1964), former Principal of Peking University and the acting chair of the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction 中國農村復興聯合委員會(JCRR), wrote a letter to novelist Wang Lindu (1908-1980), better known by his pen name Jiang Gui. After reading Wang's *Whirlwind* 旋風(*xuanfeng*)—a family saga depicting the rise of a Communist rural base, the renowned technocrat and educator lamented the "new wrongs piled on old grudges" 新仇舊恨 (*xinchou jiuhen*) while vividly recalling the loss of the Chinese mainland to the Communists a decade after the KMT fled to Taiwan. He maintained to Wang, who had served as a military officer himself before 1949, that the novel could be read as "a realistic record of the development of CCP rural bandits and a history of its usurpation of our power" (Jiang 1959: 580-581). He further supported this reading by testifying to the author that what happened in the fictional Fang Village resembled what he had eye-witnessed in other actual places before 1949.

The reason for Jiang's strictly realistic, if not didactic, reading of the novel's "real" background seems obvious: the fictional Fang Village in *Whirlwind* strikes him as a microcosm of the rural Chinese that could have been redeemed through JCRR's campaigns for land-reform, scientific agriculture, and community collectivization — all policies advocated by Jiang himself and his fellow technocrats such as Y. C. James Yen 晏陽初(1890-1990) and the Cornell-trained agrarian Shen Zonghan 沈宗翰(1895-1980). At the very end of the letter, Jiang's affectively charged memories of battling for Chinese hearts and for Chinese land abruptly switches to his concerns over the pressing demographic issues in Taiwan, where the JCRR technocrats were being aided by United States expertise in agriculture, forestry, husbandry, and population control:

> China has always taken pride in her own vast land and massive population, but the land has not been able to produce enough agricultural products to sustain its people plagued by poverty, illness, and ignorance. After the reign of Qianlong, China's overpopulation has damaged its quality of living. Situating this unprecedented overpopulation within China's historical cycles of peace and chaos, we wonder if the catastrophes the Mainland has suffered for the past hundred years is a repetition of history? JCRR's work in Taiwan has managed to achieve both land-reform and production, thus making rural Taiwan stable and prosperous. But the drastic increase in population in the recent years might still bring upon concerns. (Jiang 1959: 581)[1]

Jiang's reading of the novel, in this sense, should not be taken simply as a nostalgic lament over the lost Chinese mainland but an inquiry into the possibility of applying industrialized agriculture, land-reform, and machineries to the rest of the Chinese soil. It might be fair to say

[1] My own translation from Chinese.

that Jiang's work in JCRR for modernized farming and rural reconstruction—an effort initiated in 1948 Nanjing, only to be briefly conducted in rural Guangdong, Sichuan, and Hunan—mirrored the novel's narrative impulse of conjuring up all that "could have been" if not for the disorienting historical whirlwind of civil war and revolution.[2]

Indeed, Jiang's letter entails something beyond the sheer remembrance of things past, as for most of the Nationalist technocrats in Taiwan, the memory of the Civil War was perhaps still palpable right after the 1958 Second Cross-Straits Crisis (more commonly known as the "823 Artillery Bombardment") only one year before Jiang's letter. With the memory of 1949 and the sounds of bombardment still in the ears, Jiang's realism manifests an intriguing attempt to connect the memories of the recent past to a precarious present which requires immediate visualization of the current situation. For Jiang, his rural reconstruction plans, originally designed for the vast land of rural China, were mostly transformed with a prolonged sense of urgency by the island's singular demographic and ecological environment. The same can perhaps be said about Wang, whose major novels did not appear until he made it to Taiwan, where his magnum opus was written and eventually selected by the Political Warfare Bureau as part of the "Rank and File Book Series" 基層連隊文庫 (*jiceng liandui wenku*), meant to be internally circulated among military personnel. For both the technocrat and the novelist, it was the exiled status of the Nationalist government, along with its military and agricultural exigencies on the island, that allowed for a transitional view from the eyewitness testimony of the lost Chinese landscape to the technocratic report on the island's developmental future.

For both Jiang and Wang, the geopolitical site-specificity of Taiwan was a condition of possibility for visualizing, mapping, and narrativizing the pre-1949 world in their present. In projecting a wishful end to the Chinese Civil War through this site-specific lens, both the technocrat and the writer conjure up a virtual reality through which the historical question about "what exactly went wrong in 1949" was turned into the phenomenological question of how the past could be accurately represented, perceived, and constantly made "real" for potential audience and actions *on-site*. Jiang's realism, in this sense, leads to a question regarding the aesthetic sensibility of the KMT technocracy: How should an exiled regime report and re-envision—to see, map, measure, and plan—for the precarious present and unknown future? In this chapter, I highlight this distinctive perceptual field that links memory, crisis, and action within a broader media ecology of the Nationalist propaganda culture in postwar Taiwan. With a focus on the JCRR-sponsored advocacy cinema, newsreels, as well as technocratic discourses centered upon land-reform and agriculture, I ask: how were natural environment, human labor, and forms of techno-industrial organizations integrated into a cultural milieu where aesthetic perception and political planning were connected to define a thorny reality? Previous scholarship tends to treat KMT's land-reform propaganda narratives—literature and cinema, in particular—as merely a social construct that distorts reality for the sake of a political campaign.

[2] As a product directly resulted from Act 407 of Foreign Aid Act of 1948 (Marshall Plan), JCRR was founded in Nanjing in October 1948 but relocated to Taipei in August 1949 during the Chinese Civil War. The central committee of JCRR consisted of representatives from both the United States and the Republic of China (Formosa) appointed by the presidents of both countries. It is worth noting that the original China Aid Bill was only intended for one year. Due to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, however, the Truman administration reversed its original stance by resuming the Aid by passing the new Mutual Security Act. From the very beginning, therefore, military exigency was integral part of JCRR's organizational sensibility in postwar Taiwan. For a more comprehensive picture of JCRR's institutional history, see Huang 1991 and Chou 1995.

However, such an approach leaves both the category of "propaganda" and "land" unquestioned, as it treats cultural representation as a separate realm from the material environment. It risks being blind to the fact that the postwar KMT in Taiwan was itself a "regime of truth"— to use Michael Foucault's term—whose very mechanism hinged upon the valorization of discourses and techniques that governed, managed, and distributed truth-statements (Foucault 12-14). It is thus worth noting that technocrats and writers such as Jiang and Wang were not simply the producers of truth-statements, but also the planners of the regime's infrastructural space, a space that distributed their speech and acts.

This self-reflexive feedback loop between discourse and materiality, inherent to the postwar agricultural planning in Taiwan, is especially palpable in the audiovisual images produced by the US-aided projects of JCRR, through which the ecological environment and technological media are emphatically yoked together to distribute truth-claims over what the post-1949 reality is and how such reality can be engineered and altered. In this case, JCRR's rich archive of newsreels, documentary, photography, and advocacy films provide a treasure trove with which to glimpse into this singular historical interval, as the unrealized promise of land-reform is constantly turned into self-referential enunciations across mediums and genres. Indeed, through JCRR's filming and exhibiting practices, for the first time in history, Taiwanese audiences were exposed to unprecedented number of cinematic and photographic images that depict their own struggle: working, fighting, surviving, and thriving both on and off the screen. A series of questions can be further asked about this intriguing self-reflexivity. When images of one's own movement were distributed by mobile-projection teams, island-wide railway networks, and the distribution of illustrated agricultural journals, what sort of spectatorship and readership were produced in postwar Taiwan? When the emergency of warfare was constantly simulated and transformed into the imperative to produce faster on the side of the Taiwanese "home-front," what does it mean when agricultural planners, designers, and engineers—in a sense, the producers of the landscape themselves—decided to *slow down* and become the observers and reporters of the newly politicized landscape?

To probe these questions, I treat the media cluster of JCRR as a singular genre of audiovisual reportage. Echoing Yingjin Zhang's Althusserian reading of literary reportage in China during the 1980s, I see JCRR's audiovisual images neither in terms of journalistic realism nor literary dramatization but a "discursive operation" in its endless pursuit for an always already absent "Real" beyond the grasp of symbolic representation (211-214). Between the inaccessible landscape of the Chinese Mainland and the futuristic modernity in rural Taiwan, film makers involved in the JCRR media production might have been "interpellated" into the official ideology of rural modernization. Yet, their intersectional positionality in the society might have also prepared them for a derivative and differential subject-position endowed with nascent subversive potential.

Standard literary historiographies of Taiwan tell us that reportage as a genre was mostly silenced by KMT's censorship in the 1950s and the 1960s, and that it was not until the late 1970s and the early 1980s when an emerging group of writers and photojournalists began to engage with literary and journalistic reportage informed by either middle-class humanism or the more Marxist-leaning investigative journalism. Literary and journalistic reportage promoted by influential journalist Gao Xinjiang 高信疆 (1944-2009) and Marxist writer Chen Yingzhen 陳映

真 (1937-2016), in the mid-1970 and the mid-1980s, respectively, are generally considered the onset of postwar Taiwanese reportage literary genres.[3]

If we look into the reportage practices of Taiwan in the 1960s and early 1970s beyond literary production, however, a slightly different picture emerges. A small group of film makers were already experimenting forms of audiovisual reportage when the freedom of speech was still unattainable for most of the writers and journalists in Taiwan. Unlike their fellow travelers in literature and journalism, who were easily targeted by the censorship agency, film makers such as Richard Yao-chi Chen and Bai Jingrui were exposed to the movement of direct cinema, Cinéma vérité, or Italian neorealism by studying abroad in the U.S. and Italy, where they experimented with cinematic forms that could be grouped under the so-called "observational mode" of documentary cinema described by film scholar Bill Nichols.[4] Chen and Bai, importantly, ended up returning to Taiwan and practicing some of their audiovisual reportage in government-owned film studios or through projects of policy-advocacy films, including those contracted and sponsored by JCRR to propagate Taiwan's agricultural modernity. Despite their different institutional contexts, literary/journalistic reportage and documentary reportage in Taiwan inhabited in the same contested social space and interacted frequently with each other through their social networks and circles in the 1960s and the early 1970s. Richard Yao-chi Chen and Chen Yingzhen, for instance, were both involved in a leftwing study group and subjected to state-policing in the late 1960s, the ramifications of which will be discussed later in this chapter. It is important, therefore, not to treat literary-journalistic reportage and documentary reportage during this transitional period as isolated experiments but rather as trans-medial manifestations of their shared pursuit for artistic realism and its subversive power.

In the first of half of the chapter, I focus on earlier JCRR advocacy films in the 1950s and 1960s, highlighting the sensorial threshold through which the pathos of wartime logistics was turned into the ethos of postwar development and deployment.[5] As my case studies in this chapter show, this transformative process was symbiotic with the emergence of a new aesthetics

[3] According to scholar Lin Qiyang, literary reportage in Taiwan can be traced back to three major sources: the reportage literature in 1930s China, the reportage writing pioneered by leftwing writer Yang Kui in colonial Taiwan also in the 1930s, and the investigative journalism from the United States in the 1970s. Gao's editorial efforts in promoting the genre *baodao wenxue* 報導文學 (literary journalism) began with the establishment of the op-ed column "On the Edge of Reality" on China Times Literary Supplement in 1975. Chen Yingzhen, a Marxist writer inspired by American photojournalist W. Eugene Smith, founded the important reportage magazine *Ren Jian* 人間 in 1985 and claimed his influences from both Yang Kui and his Chinese counterparts in the 1930s. Reportage in the 1950s and the 1960s, however, are considered obscure or nonexistent under KMT's censorship. See Lin 25-30.

[4] Nichols famously categorizes documentary cinema into six modes. The observational mode—also described as "fly on the wall" documentary—include direct cinema pioneered in the U.S. and *Cinéma vérité* in France, both during the 1960s and the 1970s. Due to the advance in technology during this time, sound and camera equipment became easier to use and manoeuvre. This allowed filmmakers more freedom and the ability to observe events without being intrusive to their subjects. The concept of observational documentary is that the best way to see truth is to view it without any involvement or influence—to be a fly on the wall. See Nichols 38-44.

[5] The term logistics here naturally evokes Paul Virilio's famous thesis that cinema technologies were symbiotic with modern warfare. See Virilio 1984. My treatment of the JCRR logistical system as postwar planning technologies and infrastructure also speaks to John D. Peter notion about the kind of medium that can "organize and orient, that can arrange people and property often into legible grids" or mediums in charge of "ordering fundamental terms and units. With this definition, logistics can refer to the media infrastructure that make things visible or sensible but also make things potentially useful and ready for operations and actions. See Peters 37-38.

centered upon the legibility of land, crops, plants, population, and the logistical infrastructure that put both human and non-human agents in constant motion and anticipation. In the process of making its own logistical movements visible, the postwar KMT propaganda machine fabricated a politicized landscape through texts and images centered upon land, crops, livestock, and the possibility of accelerating them into visible flow and growth. By turning the invisible, the contingent, and the precarious into legible and calculable sensory data, the films and texts produced by the JCRR should not be treated as a medium passively recording and reporting a pre-existing reality. Rather, they are better understood as a series of framing techniques that actively shaped what was considered true and what was not, what was considered real and what was not. I see this cultural-technical ensemble that kept producing and circulating truth-statements and reality-effects as an infrastructural environment pioneered by KMT's pre-1949 practices in propaganda media, which sought to connect military actions and agricultural planning though cinematic production and exhibition.

JCRR's cinematic mediation between the military and the agricultural can be traced back to the propaganda warfare between the USSR-backed CCP and the USA-aided KMT, when the latter was in retreat all around China before their final flight to Taiwan. In fact, it was precisely during these last years when the Nationalist technocrats such as Chen Lifu 陳立夫 (1900-1983) , Chen Guofu 陳果夫 (1892-1951), Zheng Yongzhi 鄭用之 (1902-1983) , and Luo Jingyu 羅靜宇 (1911-1970) began developing a distinctive discourse that treated cinema both as a weaponized medium and an infrastructural environment.[6] In the meantime, they planned to build one of the biggest government-sponsored film studios, Agricultural Education Motion Picture Co. (AEMPC) in Nanjing. AEMPC was firstly initiated by Chen Guofu to promote land-reform, grarian mechanization, and war newsreel and documentaries with mobile projection teams. But with its military cameras and personnel retreating to Taiwan after 1949, the media group transformed itself into Taiwan's first postwar film studio Central Motion Pictures Co. (CMPC) and continued to produce propaganda/advocacy films featuring mechanized industry, agriculture, transportation, as well as feature-length war and spy films. Audiovisual images, like literary texts, were therefore from the beginning an integral part of KMT's nation-rebuilding and site-mapping before and after 1949. In such a critical historical interval, audio-visual images represent a militarized will to see clearly in a dynamic perceptual field full of unknown information, noise, and the anxiety about the imminent life and death of sovereignty. Among all the turmoil and disturbances, it was particularly crucial for the KMT to survey, calculate, organize, and mobilize their newly-acquired land, labor, and natural resources with the help of both logistical infrastructures and media technologies. JCRR's military site-mapping and agricultural engineering, in this case, played a crucial role in creating a singular social-technical milieu, where war and work were connected and organized by the technical ensemble of textual and optical media.

[6] The Nationalist technocracy's discourse on cinema as an infrastructural system such as railway, telegraph, and water supply can be traced back to another wartime propaganda cinema organ China Motion Picture Cooperation (*Zhongguo dianying zhipianchang* or *Zhongzhi*, for short). Regarding the subtle discursive bifurcation within *Zhongzhi* between cinema as military weapon and cinema as technical infrastructure, see Bao 276-282. Zhongzhi's postwar co-production with JRCC's movie units in Taiwan further solidified this discourse of "medium as environment" with their cinema/photography exhibition circulated through the railway networks of the colonial sugarcane field and the "movie trucks" provided by the United States Information Service.

The audiovisual images of JCRR's agricultural campaign, as I hope to show in the second half of this chapter, serve as the sensorial database from which a distinctive postwar avant-garde aesthetics of documentary reportage was envisioned and experimented.[7] This nascent cinematic aesthetics was epitomized by a series of US-Taiwan cosponsored documentaries on rice-farming and rural collectivization in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Highlighting the unusual trajectory of director Richard Yao-chi Chen, who was in charge of directing these government-sponsored films, I suggest that an ambiguous audiovisual aesthetic of slowness emerged within the JCRR's cinematized landscape but in turn destabilized the kind of geopolitical and ecological mapping designated by its ideological core. [8] I will also contextualize Chen's work within the emerging literary and cinematic discourse on reportage, including his own theorization of observational cinema, as well as his involvement with the leftwing study group led by Chen Yingzhen — the celebrated pioneer and advocate of literary reportage and investigative journalism in Taiwan.

Both JCRR's early policy-advocacy films and Chen's cinematic experiment within the Taiwan-US cosponsored production can be considered different sub-genres of documentary reportage recording and responding to the social historical realities of postwar Taiwan. The former, while blending documentary actualities into the dramatized story of developmentalism, serve as an index to the changing landscape engineered by the JCRR expertise. The latter, while working under the JCRR-USA sponsorship, serve as a critical reflection on the outcome of JCRR's postwar rural planning. The early JCRR films, in this case, are ideologically-driven documentary reportages that sought transformation of the rural space and establishment of a new socio-economic order. Meanwhile, they provide the basic cognitive frames and sensorial modules through which rural space was imagined as a series of programmable landscapes. Through cinematic techniques of mapping, framing, measuring, scaling, and animating, these imagined landscapes point toward an aesthetic regime that demands the sensorial abstraction of concrete lifeworlds into legible patterns of nodes, grids, and flows. With these abstract lines and patterns in place, the postwar rural world of Taiwan becomes what W. J.T. Mitchell calls a "social hierograph" mediating between humans and nature, the self and the other, concealing the actual basis of its value but expressive of "a potentially limitless reserve of value" (Mitchell 2002: 5).

On the other hand, it was Chen's documentary style that showed that the fragmented worlds of crops, humans, machines, and animals are not necessarily ready-made images to be absorbed into the teleological narrative of flow, growth, and development. Rather, his camerawork ushered in a subtle critique of such politics of speed and abstraction by exposing the

[7] My purposeful application of the notion "avant-garde" in this chapter returns to the original military-industrial connotation of the word proposed by utopian thinker Henri de Saint-Simon, who believed in the social power of the arts and saw artists, alongside scientists and industrialists, as the leaders of a new society. In this case, JCRR's wartime cinematographers, who turned themselves into post-1949 reporters and narrators of industrial modernity in Taiwan embodied a literal shift from "vanguard" (reporting ahead of the army) to rearguard (reporting from the home front). For more discussion on the relationship between avant-garde and modernity, see Călinescu 1987.

[8] The JCRR propaganda/advocacy films might have inspired a more famous state-funded brand called Healthy Realism, which drew inspiration from many JCRR newsreels and documentaries but integrated them into longer narrative genres such as romance and melodrama in the 1960s-1970s. For these initial inspirations of JCRR on Healthy Realism films, see Chang 2012 and Gong 2005. I also discuss the specific aesthetic ties between JCRR's documentaries and Healthy Realism elsewhere.

frictions, gaps, and fissures within the diegetic worlds fabricated by the Nationalist agrarian technocracy and its agenda of modernization. By foregrounding the fragmented and abstracted rural landscape while toning down the discursive and expositional ambition intended by the JCRR advocacy, Chen's films strategically record and report a reality increasingly estranged by JCRR's earlier policy of rural world-making during the 1950s and the 1960s. In doing so, he also managed to transform the meaning of documentary reportage within its institutional and socio-political contexts.

Accelerating, Fragmenting, Memorializing

Before I plunge into the detailed discussions about the visual language of the JCRR-made films, it would be helpful to take a glimpse of the general organizational sensibilities of the JCRR media cluster, especially its transformation to a postwar advocacy/propaganda organization that was highly aware of its own power of image-making in both political and visual sense. First of all, it should be noted that the JCRR's rationale for rural reconstruction, far from being motivated by a purely agriculturalist sentiment, was propelled by the agenda of jump-starting a series of projects under the rubric of international developmentalism, which linked Taiwan to other Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia—countries that were also under the technical and financial support from the United States. As a G. H. Huffman, USAID's Representative to the Republic of China (Formosa) stated clearly in a multi-country seminar held by JCRR in Taipei, the ultimate purpose of the seminar is "to consider ways to make practical application of the Taiwan experience applicable in other countries; that is the transferability of the Taiwan success story" (Huffman 1966: 13). This sensibility based on Taiwan as a transferable case in terms of agrarian productivity underpinned the visual and textual rhetoric of JCRR media representations of Taiwan's rural world. It highlighted the possibility of speedy transformation through technical expertise and a universalizable know-how facilitated by instant communication and smooth flow of information.[9]

With this basic agenda at the heart of JCRR media production, readers and audiences of the JCRR-funded pictorials and films often encountered images of two "characters" that serve to speed up the process of transmission and transformation: the expert and the machine. The rural lifeworld of Taiwan as seen through the lens of JCRR media is often through the individual human faces, such as those of technicians and experts, that give the vast rural landscape a unifying voice across the boundaries of humans, animals, machines, crops, and the invisible worlds of bacteria, minerals, and chemicals. Faces, voices, and words of expertise are ubiquitous in the JCRR media products: They belong to high-ranking technocrats such as the founding fathers of the committee or to American technicians. They are sometimes anonymous veterans,

[9] Kate Merkel-Hess's recent research on the rural reconstruction movement in pre-1949 China provides an important account as to how an increasing dependence on international (mostly US) funders and technical expertise during the 1930-40s turned the local movement's early focus on self-transformation of farmers into a new priority placed on fostering an internationally-networked cadres of technical expertise (Merkel-Hess 2016: 139-164). This international character, as I will show later in this chapter, would only be further developed and strengthened in Taiwan with the renewed support of USAID after Korean War. For an account of how this international development in China was related to the domestic ideology of the New Deal in US, see Ekbladh 25-39. The discussion about the international league of expertise and its focus on finding "universal solutions" to jump-start the process of modernization, see Timothy Mitchell's work on Egypt (54-55).

engineers, or the associates at the Farmers' Association. But oftentimes, they could simply be your neighbors, cousins, nephews, or lovers who happened to possess the secret to high-productivity and the happiness of life. In their multifarious incarnations, technocrats and technicians served as a central interface through which information, data, knowledge, and even feelings were exchanged, circulated, and made *transferrable*. In terms of cinematography, technocrats also serve as the key agents—either as characters or voiceovers—that help fabricate a diegetic world in which lessons and growth can be learned and developed.

In the earliest JCRR films, especially documentaries, the authority of technocracy usually takes the form of extradiegetic voiceover that comments, explains, or dictates the movement of images. Voiceovers frame a specific topic within the general direction of policy or a broader mapping in relation to other industries and other geographical areas beyond Taiwan. Technocratic voices of this classical sort echo the editorial style in the USIA-sponsored agricultural journal *The Harvest* 豐年 (*fengnian*). Reading the magazine, a reader is usually initiated into an issue by its cover, immediately followed by a page consisting of an editorial policy piece and the latest news in Taiwan, USA, and other parts of the world. These opinion pieces are usually written by high-ranked JCRR technocrats, such as Jiang Menglin or Shen Zhonghan, addressing policy-level issues such as land-reform, mechanization, food security, or the significance of agriculture as the ultimate home front in the war against communism. On the screen or on the pages of the magazine, these voices control the flow of images by giving a panoramic view of the status quo and the future waiting to unfold, which becomes a narrative trope in many other educational shorts and advocacy films as well, with the help with diagrams, charts, and photos that lay claim to scientific objectivity.

The panoramic view or omnipresent voice, however, often give way to different sorts of experts in longer narrative films, where more humanized faces or subjective voices of technical expertise can be found. These more personal and intimate narratives, however, still foreground the notion of accelerated transformation based on a synchronized plane of nature, labor, and machine facilitated by the voice of technical knowledge. In an advocacy movie called *Mulan the Power Tiller Driver* (*nongji huamulan*), the audience encounters a farming family made up of an aging father, a brother drafted to the navy, and a daughter who tries to fill in for this vacancy of labor by learning to steer a power-tiller, and eventually winning a prize by displaying her driving skills. Behind this compelling story of successful transformation, however, is the handsome cousin of the girl, a technician working for the government-owned factory of The National Agricultural Engineering Co., whose president was no other than the renowned architect of KMT's postwar land reform, Xiao Zheng 蕭錚 (1904-).[10] Not only does the power-tiller technician enlighten the family as to the benefits of mechanization, but, as the film's ending suggests, he becomes the love interest of his tiller-driving cousin, instantly transforming agrarian productivity into a potential domestic economy of reproductivity. The technician cousin is just

[10] The importance of Xiao Zheng—the chief planner of Taiwan's land-property reform policy—cannot be underestimated, especially his policy that sought to minimalize the local landlord class by exchanging farmland with the stocks of government-owned factories. The campaign for large-scale mechanization, which demanded the combination of fragmented farms the transfer of surplus rural labor into the emerging industrial sector, therefore fit into Xiao's general land-reform agenda, as well as KMT's general direction toward economic developmentalism. The power-tiller here in this move, from this perspective, could also function as a sort of land-grabbing machine by the State.

one among many humanized faces of technical expertise. Viewing other educational films, audiences might encounter characters such as a pesticide-savvy brother saving his careless younger brother from poisoning, a fertilizer technician winning the heart of a farmer's daughter, and a vet recalling the process of initiating a whole village into his scientific pig breeding in place of the slower process of local pig farming.

These overtly dramatized and humanized voices/faces of technocracy and miraculous speed of transformation engineered by them, however, betray a certain anxiety about the impossibility of synchronizing the status quo with the proclaimed scientific objectivity and the desired agenda planned by JCRR technicians. That anxiety might have been deepened by the physical limitations of 16mm celluloid film, which required the compression of each triumphant narrative of change into 15 to 30 minute segments. This anxiety about jump-starting, speeding-up, or transforming the status quo might have contributed to the appearance of two distinctive but interrelated visual techniques: abstraction and animation.

By abstraction, I am referring to the extensive use of slides, charts, and diagrams, graphic forms of telling used to replace the dramatization achieved by acting. Abstracted forms appear mostly when a long process needs to be shown within seconds. These include things such as the outcome of breeding pigs, harvesting, or the spread of traffic networks. For instances, in the short film on pig-breeding, the opening features a sketched outline of a pig, followed by a series of geometric patches covering different parts of the pig's body. Finally, the "patched" pig is replaced by a real pig (fig. 59). A similar visual game is used when the film tries to show the increase in the number of pigs raised and exported under the new regime of scientific breeding and corporate-style management (fig. 60). We see a sketched outline of a pig again, whose back now forms a curve aligning with the moving curve in a diagram with numbers and figures. Abstract visuals such as this implies a hidden tension between the personified technocracy and the impulse to turn the concrete animal body into abstract commodities in global flows of trade.



Figure 59. Pigs made real by animated patches. Courtesy by Taiwan Film Institute.



Figure 60. A chart indicating the increase in the numbers of pigs after 1945. Courtesy by Taiwan Film Institute.

Animated visuals are combined with abstract diagrams and graphs, but its power can be seen most clearly when applied to situations in which the objects of representation are invisible to the naked eye. The circulation of virus, bacteria, and parasites in the bodies of humans, animals, and the broader ecological network is usually presented with hand-drawn animation. In

an educational short on the spread of viruses in a rural ecological network of irrigation, farm, drinking water, and housing design, the filmmaker simulates the life of a village in constant motion. A couple of microscopic views of the movement of a virus through the human body, insects, soil, water, and crops are vividly provided with zoom-in shots, thus making the precarious and the unknown legible to the human eyes (fig. 61). On the other hand, a macrocosmic view of hygiene management is embodied by a huge human hand—at times moving houses and beds, at times holding a pen to draw lines on the land. The hand intervenes as an omnipresent JCRR expert, who is determined to reconfigure the village and root out the invisible routes the virus take (fig. 62). Microcosmic or macrocosmic, animated or abstracted graphics such as these present a fluid flow of shapes that can be easily accelerated, transformed, or exchanged. [11]

Figure 61 . A close look at the feet of a virus virus-spreading fly. Courtesy by Taiwan Film Institute.

Figure 62. A giant hand penning the routes take in a village. Courtesy by Taiwan Film Institute

If the earlier JCRR films had visualized the Taiwanese rural world through abstraction, animation, and the possibility of accelerating the process of change via machines and experts, this constant movement of surveying and mobilizing, interestingly, evolved into a technique of world-making and truth-stating, which not only turned invisible elements in water, air, and earth into legible grids and graphs, but also integrated and mobilized them into a flow where object-images were *always ready to be acted upon*. This world-making technique, I suggest, was best captured by the 1960 color documentary *A City of Cathay* 清明上河圖, where we find the camerawork constantly seeking to correlate the memorialization of the pre-1949 landscape and the measurement of postwar Taiwan, thereby rendering the Taiwanese soil a perpetually programmable, plannable demonstratable pictorial in the name of China.

The film was shot by JCRR chief cinematographer Zhuo Shijie 卓世傑 and sponsored by the Government Information Office (GIO) of the Nationalist government. The production team included the producer Lu Yizheng 陸以正 (1924-2016) , the head of GIO's Department of International Information, who collaborated with Don N. Frifield of the U.S. public relations firm, the Hamilton Wright Organization, in drafting the voiceover narrative.[12] *A City of Cathay* is

[11] The animation film I discussed here is dubbed with Mandarin voiceover. From the visual representation of the crops, land, and clothing of the farmers, it might be a film originally featuring the rural hygiene of an unknown Latin America country. This also testifies JCRR's transregional outreach and the circulation of media contents made possible through JCRR's network of experts and technocrats.

[12] Hamilton Wright Organization was a professional PR/Media firm in charge of Republic of China's (Formosa) postwar lobbying and advertising operations in the United States. A large part of the firm's job was to produce

a 24-minute cinematic rendering of the renowned twelfth-century Chinese landscape painting "Along the River During the Qingming Festival" (*Qingming Shanghe Tu*), which depicts the flow of traffic, labor, and commerce in capital of the Song Dynasty, Kaifeng. Produced by a government-sponsored film crew and shot inside a temporary storage bunker in central Taiwan, it was meant to be a showpiece of the KMT's preservation of Chinese cultural traditions in Taiwan.[13] The film went on to win the Best Documentary Award in Edinburgh Film Festival, the very first time Taiwanese documentary had won any international film award, thereby fulfilling its role as an advertisement for the "Republic of China" in Taiwan.

Despite being a propaganda piece, *A City of Cathay* presents a series of impressive trans-medial moves, shifting across painting, cinemtaography, and voice-over narration. Almost prefiguring the Palace Museum's 3D recreation of the same painting half a century later, the subtle camerawork of the film animates the scroll by creatively using close-ups, cuts, framing, and zooming to simulate a visual feast of movement that is necessarily lacking from the original scroll.[14] It is worth noting that throughout the film the scroll is never presented in its totality. Instead, what we find is a commitment to details, odd corners, and the myriad of lives which appear incidentally in the original work, including four thousand human figures, a monkey surrounded by spectators, horse racing, and an ox tilling the fields of a farm. This visual fragmentation of the pictorial landscape allows for a series of imagined diegetic worlds narrated by a voiceover. The narrator constantly refers to the performances (an opera and a puppet show), contests (a horse race between members of the imperial guard) and life events (a marriage procession) depicted in the scroll as a "frame within the frame," a "show within the show," or "scroll within a scroll," thereby creating the impression of an infinite mirroring between life and its pictorial miniaturization (fig.63). This infinitely self-referential gesture culminates at the end of the film, when the famous archivist and artist Chuang Yan, the only living human figure shown in the camera, appears, only to fold the scroll back up, and thus bring the whole film to its conclusion (fig.64).

---

pictorials, books, photos, and movies that could promote the image of Taiwan as a legitimate and favorable ally for the United States. *The City of Cathay*, however, marks the very first film production that was solely produced and directed locally by the Taiwanese government, except for the script of voiceover narration by one of the HWO's employees. For more history on HWO's operations, see Cutlip 1994.

[13] The renowned painting, along with other artifacts removed from Beijing's Palace Museum, was stored in a bunker in Taichung, Taiwan, until the completion of Taipei's Palace Museum in 1964. The transportation of the artifacts themselves, according to my interview with Chuang Yan's son, Chuang Ling, was itself a logistical operation via navy vessels, railways, and trucks. The Chuang's family was in charge of monitoring the transportation and storage of these artifacts.

[14] As one of the most high-profile paintings in both Beijing's and Taipei's Palace Museum(s), the Song original and the Qing copy of *Qingming Shanghe Tu* are categorized as "national treasure" and have become a showpiece for Chinese orthodoxy. For a three-month period in the World Expo 2010 at the China Pavilion, for instance, the original painting was remade into a 3D animated, viewer-interactive digital version, titled "River of Wisdom," about 30 times the size of the original scroll. In 2018, a new digital animated version is being produced by Phoenix Television— on an exhibition tour planned to echo Beijing's "one-belt and one-road" initiative. The *City of Cathay*, in this case, can be seen as the earliest attempt to animate and cinematize the scroll for political propaganda.

Figure 63. The camerawork zooms in on a crowd watching a puppet show. Courtesy by Taiwan Film Institute.

Figure 64. Art historian Zhuang Yan folding up the scroll at the end of *City of Cathay*. Courtesy by Taiwan Film Institute.

Fragmented as this cinematic landscape may seem, its mini-diegetic worlds do not present an anarchic world-picture. Nor do they lack synchronicity. In fact, the camera's movement maintains a clear spatial and temporal progression throughout, panning from right to left—from East to West Kaifeng. The spatiotemporal movement of camera flows like the river Bian itself in the unfolding scroll, connecting the movement of labor, goods, and commerce into a series of frames, grids, and panels. This teleological velocity becomes visible when the narration relates the nature of the shipping on the river to its English-speaking audience: "loading and unloading. Is it wine or soybeans? Is it rice, wheat, or silk and spices that will follow the Silk Road north and west to Europe, and the continents beyond endless plains and mountains." Enabled by the perpetual motion of cropping, cutting, and animating, the memories about the Chinese Civil War, the lost landscape, and the awkward shipment and displacement of the scroll is turned into a triumphant discourse of global connectivity.

A City of Cathay marks the turning point from which postwar KMT propaganda media looked away from the bitterness of war and took a self-referential look into the nature of the "movement" inherent to its own exiled existence since 1949. Their lost sovereignty might have been deeply buried in an invisible recent past, but through cinematic framing and animating, a new landscape of flow emerges as a perceptual threshold, through which mnemonic images of the past could be transformed into a narrative of global connectivity. It might be fair to say that the silk scroll—a transported object itself—provides an operative potential for the propaganda machine to define the object of their memory and to assume a subjective position in observing, mapping, surveying, and engineering the reality literally at hand. In other words, the meaning of watching oneself fight, work, struggle and survive (on the screen or on the scroll) is no longer about engaging with the activity of remembering but re-*membering*—dissecting, categorizing, and reassembling. In this case, the audiovisual theater of *City of Cathay* mirrors JCRR's advocacy/policy media practices in the 1950s and the 1960s in their measuring, engineering, and aestheticizing of the Taiwanese land and soil through a "streamlined" form with minimal friction or resistance (Scott 237-238). The most interesting part of the story is: while most authoritarian technocrats preferred images carrying a futuristic sense of sleekness, such as jets or locomotives, the technocrats behind *A City of Cathay* chose to foreground silk, the fabric loaded with an ancient agrarian imaginary and China's westbound routes and networks. As a visual token of streamlined regularity, legibility, and connectivity, the cinematized scroll transposed the organizational aesthetics of postwar Taiwanese soil to the mythic scroll of medieval China. The propagated international image, paradoxically, came back to fixate Taiwan's geopolitical site-specificity as a temporary storage bunker for both arts and grains.

Viewing the JCRR's films is like touring through a series of sensorial expansions and conceptual extensions: from the mini-diegetic worlds streaming goods and people from ancient Kaifeng to Europe, to the humanized vehicles transporting labor, love, and leisure via the face of the technician/cousin, from the plastic movement of diagram, maps, and numbers that takes one to an invisible cosmos, and suggests the unlimited potential of market value. What this visual rhetoric shares is their mobilization of an affective-epistemological infrastructure through which life practices can be mirrored and engineered by the experiences of watching films. If we further consider the very traffic mechanism through which this media content was circulated and exhibited island-wide—mostly by USIA-funded mobile cinema trucks and the sugarcane field railways systems— a new politics of speed comes clearly into view. With this new politics of speed, media and milieu, expression and environment, culture and nature become a series of mutually-implicated notions. The regime of truth fabricated by the landscape of JCRR, thus bespeaks a future horizon captured by disembodied ears and eyes with technology. By synchronizing bodies, object, and sites as an immediately legible and tangible plane on the silver screen, landscape becomes a method of seeing for objective reality, through which the truth of the exiled sovereignty was turned into a series of site-mapping and miniature world-making. The audiovisual regime of truth, in this case, became the infrastructure underpinning the documentary reportage in postwar Taiwan.

Mapping, Worlding, and the Politics of Slowness

The technocracy of JCRR established a specific regime of truth based on an audiovisual rhetoric of realism during the critical period between the 1950s and the 1960s. It was a truth-producing machine buttressed by the humanized face of expertise, the speedy movement of technical objects, and the containment of invisible danger through optical media. Within this regime, films of JCRR tend to impose a preexisting script/grid informed by the logic of abstraction, replication, and immediate exchange and connectivity. This organizational aesthetics both embalms the "past-ness" of the lost Chinese territory—as land, soil, and fertilizer—and contains the explosiveness of the precarious present. By presenting a "reality" immediately seeable, legible, and plannable, it trains the human sensorial faculty for a *second-nature*, with which to synchronize the action between body and object, between war and climate, between fighting enemies and killing parasites. The important questions here are: when such a second-nature was established in the post-1949 world based on speed and immediacy, what room was left for slowness? Did filmmakers in Taiwan learning and practicing cinema within the JCRR's regime only *repeat* its ways of observing, reporting, and documenting the rural world? If not, how did artists represent a different world-picture beyond that which had already been accelerated and mechanized, and with which aesthetic strategies? [15]

So far, the chapter has focused on the self-reflexive training of propaganda media that had kept affirming the subjective position of seeing, knowing, and doing—based on a synchronized plane of body-image, object-image, and a virtual landscape imbued with

[15] Miriam Hansen's important interpretation of Walter Benjamin's notion of mimetic faculty and play-form has been influential to my thinking about this alternative aesthetics within JCRR's visual regime. In her rendering, the acts of repetition in child play with a toy (technology) point toward an alternative, even utopian, mode of simulating, experimenting, and reordering of nature when nature itself is necessarily absent from the player. See Hansen 183-204.

immediacy and urgency. It might be a good time to think about how the opposite might have been possible. In the following discussions centered around the career of Richard Yao-chi Chen and some of the JCRR-sponsored projects he was involved, I suggest that when the immediacy of warfare was absent in the late 1960s and the 1970s an alternative aesthetics of speed could have been possible. I will firstly outline Chen's refreshing discourse on documenting and then contextualize his earlier cinematic experiment within his later JCRR co-sponsored projects. Through close-reading his discourse and films within the geopolitical area-mapping of the late 1960s and early 1970s, I argue that Chen had been consistently utilizing on the JCRR world-making principle based on fragmentation and abstraction while transforming JCRR's agenda of acceleration and change by going slower. Chen's politics of slowness, as I hope to show, might have questioned the truth-stating and world-making of KMT in the 1960s and 1970s Taiwan, when the exiled sovereignty began to face its own disappearing legitimacy and visibility within a world-picture defined by area studies. Mass-mediated propaganda images of the JCRR, in this case, might have provided a sensorial module, through which a new cinematic perception would usher in the catastrophic images of human body, landscape, and mechanical objects within the politicized regime of Cold War agricultural and military programming.

Born in Sichuan, China to a family from Beijing, Chen and his parents moved to Taiwan in 1945, where his father, a Cornell-trained agricultural specialist, worked under JCRR. Chen's family later immigrated to the U.S. where he would study documentary and animation at UCLA and later return to Taiwan to collaborate with a group of young writers, artists, and photographers in founding the journal *Theater Quarterly* 劇場季刊 (*juchang jikan*).[16] Chen's brief involvement with the journal turned out to be an important benchmark not only in his long career but an indelible birthmark of an emerging avant-garde visual culture during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Not only did Chen co-produce stage plays and translate film criticism into Chinese, he introduced the term *cinéma vérité*, or truthful cinema, to Taiwanese audiences in a 1965 article titled "Methods of Documenting and the Nature of Truthfulness/Realness" 記錄方法與真實性 (*jilufangfa yu zhenshixing*), where he meditates upon the meaning of *zhenshi* (reality, actuality, truth, authenticity) by referencing early pioneers of documentary cinema, such as Robert Flaherty, Jean Rouch, and James Blue, among others. As an introductory piece, however, the article does more than summarize the development of an ambivalent genre. In fact, Chen's article reads more like his meditative treatise on the definition of cinematized reality shaped by cinema's technological apparatus and human beings' struggle in their situated social milieu or natural environment.

So called "truthfulness/realness" 真實 (*zhenshi*), according to Chen's observations, does not carry its own ontological identity. Rather, it is something constantly shaped by the "the distortion of the machine" 機械上的曲解 (*jixie shang de qujie*) and a spectator's cognitive

[16] Founded in January 1965 and ended in November 1966, the relatively short-lived journal was one of the first attempt by local Taiwanese to systematically translate literary and art criticism, as well as the scripts of modernist drama and cinema. Beyond the function of a printed journal, *Theater* also played a very important role in gathering some of Taiwan's most experimental writers, visual artists, film makers, and intellectuals, who also maintained a friendship with a group of avant-garde youth in Honk Kong in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I will address this trans-regional tie between Hong Kong and Taiwan in Chapter Three.

synchronization with the machine through "the organs of his body and intellect" 身體與智能上的器官 (*shenti yu zhineng shang de qiguan*). Despite the elusive nature of reality and its resistance to representation, Chen rejects the notion of pure subjectivism, which shuts down any hope for external objectivity. Nor does he appreciate the sort of naturalism that favors the abstract themes of human struggle with the environment. Cinematic naturalism might be touching, but for Chen it still lacks the essence of truthfulness/realness by turning a site-specific actuality into a trite vernacular or a cliché not applicable to other sites. To resolve this epistemological impasse, Chen maintains that a filmmaker should give up the illusory idea of presenting an "unprocessed reality" on the screen. Instead, he or she should strive for the "unification between the reality of life and the reality of the camera" (R. Y. Chen 189-196) That is, a filmmaker should face the contingency inherent to the materiality of media, the human sensorium, and the unpredictable happenings of everyday encounters. Rather than shunning the physical presence of cinematographer and camera in the field, one should take both as the constitutive elements of cinematic realness/truthfulness. For Chen, it is almost an ethical imperative for a filmmaker to turn himself from a passive observer into a spontaneous participant and catalyst in co-producing the always already shifting scenes of reality.

Chen's unusual emphasis on site-specificity and contingency might have been one of the first articulations on what is called "truthful cinema" for the Taiwanese readers in the mid-1960s. It might also imply his later decision to return to Taiwan to film his graduation thesis film while participating in the nascent avant-garde cultural scene. In 1967, *Theater* held a screening event in Taipei to show some of Chen's early essay films, including two documentary shorts *The Mountain* 上山 (*Shangshan*) and *Liu Pi-Chia* 劉必稼(*Liu Bijia*), an animated film *The Archer* 后羿 (*Houyi*), and an experimental narrative film *Years Gone, Years Came* 年去年來 (*Nianqu nianlai*). The 1967 showing of Chen's essay films and his article on *cinéma vérité* have established Chen's reputation as the maverick in the postwar cinema scene dominated by propaganda/advocacy films. To many, Chen's debut even marked the birth of documentary cinema beyond the twisted world as seen through propaganda.[17]

Indeed, *Liu Pi-chia*, Chen's UCLA graduate thesis film in 1965, seemed to echo his ground-breaking article. Inspired by Robert Flaherty's *Nanook of the North* (1922), the film captures the existential anxiety of the exiled political regime by featuring the lonely laboring body of Liu Pi-chia, a Nationalist army officer of a lower-rank, in his repetitive daily labor in a frontier settlement of eastern Taiwan.[18] Since its very first showing, the film has been hailed as

[17] Thanks to the efforts of Taiwan Film Institute (TFI), these early experimental films by Chen have recently been digitally restored and shown to the public in 2018 Taiwan International Documentary Festival (TIDF). My access to *Liu Pi-Chia* was also granted by the curatorial team of TIDF. For this precious opportunity, I want to express my gratitude to curators Wood Lin, Juli Chen, and Shr-tzung Tsai, as well as the Film Restoration Unit at TFI.

[18] Generally regarded as the first documentary in film history, *Nanook of the North* pioneered the generic tradition of what would later be called "salvage ethnography" by capturing the struggles of the Inuk man named Nanook and his family in the Canadian Arctic. The film, however, is rather a curated docudrama with reenactments and staged sequences. Based on a recent interview conducted by TFI, Chen's access to the film was partially from his study at UCLA and partially form the media loan provided by Taipei's United States Information Service (USIS), from which Chen borrowed and showed to his friends experimental films otherwise unavailable in Taiwan at the time. This also showcases how USAID and USIS functioned as a kind of media infrastructure to both the state and individuals in postwar Taiwan.

the very first *cinéma vérité* in Taiwan. Some have even gone so far to call it the first "modern documentary" (Chang 2016) in Taiwan for its non-propagandist rendering of Liu's solitary life devoted to rather futile public works and construction projects. Just like tens of thousands of other Nationalist veterans, the protagonist Liu was a farmer from Hunan, China before being drafted to Chiang Kai-shek's army. In the 1950s and 1960s, tens of thousands of former military personnel like Liu were relocated to different construction sites in Taiwan to conduct government-sponsored projects that were meant to be part of their retirement plans. Focusing on the awkward reality of this "surplus" military manpower, the film's subject matter itself was believed by many to challenge the official ideology of the Nationalist government. In contrast to the aesthetics of "Healthy Realism" endorsed by the Nationalist's propaganda machine, Chen's camera managed to reveal an aesthetic divide between modernist truth and the propagated reality.[19] This putative dichotomy between truth and reality was further fortified later in 1968, a year after the screening of *Liu Pi-Chia*, when Chen was arrested and detained for being connected to a leftwing intellectual cluster that included renown novelists such as Chen Yingzhen and artist Wu Yaozong 吳耀宗 (1938-1987).[20] After being released from the jail, Yao-chi Chen opted for a career in commercial narrative films and was considered politically "silenced" ever since. The convergence of the cinematic critique and real-life violence imposed by white terror has shaped the basic interpretive framework for the film's historical meaning in the 1960s: cinematic truthfulness/realness achieved through *Liu-Pi-Chia* is achieved through its revelation of the corporeality of the Nationalists armies subsumed to the regime's transformation into a developmentalist polity. That revelatory moment, as Chen Yingzhen suggests, was silenced, jailed, and put into commercial use after the State policing.[21]

The dichotomy between a preexisting reality and a veil that distorted it, however, blinds us from seeing that a regime of truth is not a veil distorting the nature of things by covering a preexisting reality, but a spatiotemporal deployment that organizes relationships among bodies, words, and labor within an aestheticized polity where truth-statements are produced by

---

[19] Introduced by the head of CMPC studios, Gong Hong— the official who proposed the project of *City of Cathay*— Healthy Realism was a government-led genre/movement superficially influenced by the Italian Neorealism, but with entirely opposite ideological core of anti-Communism. Under the banner of representing a "healthy and positive" Taiwanese reality, various genres in the 1960s were converged into the "healthy realism" mode, including comedy, melodrama, musical films, historical epics. Two pioneering feature-length narrative films in this movement, *Oyster Girl* (*Kenu*, 1964) and *Beautiful Duckling* (*Yangya renjia*, 1965) were also inspired by JCRR's rural construction campaigns. As my chapter will show, Richard Yao-chi Chen's early documentaries before his career with CMPC, offers an alternative genealogy to this JCRR-inspired genre.

[20] Known as "The Alliance of Democratic Taiwan Incident" 民主台灣聯盟案(*Minzhu Taiwan liangmeng an*), the 1968 prosecution and imprisonment are considered the most severe thought-policing actions that targeting artists and writers in postwar Taiwan. The "Alliance" consisted of a group of loosely connected students, writers, and artists with left- leaning ideals, who also met occasionally for study group meetings. Among the thirty-six people being arrested, Chen Yingzhen and Wu Yaozhong were sentenced to ten years in prison. Richard Yao-chi Chen, whose grandfather was close to Chiang Kai-shek's family, was released after being detained for about month.

[21] Chen Yingzhen made this observation in a special symposium/screening of Liu Pi-chia in 2005 held by the National Film Institute of Taiwan. He recalled how he was shocked and touched by Yao-chi Chen's debut in 1967 and how he had been disappointed by Chen long silence since the arrest—a long silence that even extended to the emergence of the Taiwanese New Wave in the early 1980s. See Zhou 2005.

audiovisual world/image-making. It is based on this understanding of politics, aesthetics, and truth that I seek to revise the primal scene of the documentary avant-garde in Taiwan. Rather than placing Yao-chi Chen' works as an emblem of a preexisting reality in opposition to the distorted landscape imposed by the State, I situate *Liu Pi-Chia* as an integral part within a broader media ecology during the 1960s and 70s, a period when the Cold War geopolitics, agricultural science, and propaganda mechanisms converged to redefine the visual rhetoric of cinematic realism. If the early JCRR films tend to present the rural landscape in a continuous and congruous flow of objects, bodies, and environment, *Liu Pi-Chia*, if read comparatively with another group of lesser-known documentaries produced in the early 1970s, points toward something beyond the simple notion of realism based on the epistemological unveiling or revealing.

Excavating a series of pedagogical films on Taiwanese rice farmers and Hong Kong (South China Seas) island fishermen—directed by Chen, but funded and produced by the American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) of the United States, I argue that Chen's pursuit of social critique through documentary, which was considered dead in the early 1970s, still managed to invent a hybrid cinematic language by grafting the critical thrust in *Liu Pi-chia* onto the government-sponsored projects in the early 1970s.[22] In the process, he ended up problematizing the pastoral landscape, the notion of universal humanism, and the power relations propagated by the early JCRR films. In these 1970s films, the naturalized development among land, machine, and human body—an artificially-made "natural history" made invisible by most propaganda media—was re-historicized through the subtle management of sounds and images shared by individual work *Liu Pi-Chia* and the later officially sponsored documentary projects.

It would be helpful here to know the general intellectual and institutional context from which these documentary films were made in the 1970s. Firstly, it should be noted that these films by Chen belong to a larger area-study project titled "Faces of Change" (FOC), which had its own specific methodological awareness and a more oblique ideological overtone unique to Cold War geopolitics. As a visual ethnography initiative conducted by the AUSF and NSF, "Faces of Change" series consists of twenty-five films featuring five chosen "cultural and ecological" areas—South China Sea, Taiwan, Afghanistan, Kenya, and Bolivia—to address the notion of change in terms of economic, social, and cultural issues. With five designated themes, including "Rural Society," "Educational," "Rural Economy," "Women's Role," "Political and Religious Belief" as predesignated topics, film makers in charge of these areas must all deal with

[22] American Universities Field Staff (also known as American Universities Field Service) was an international news and educational agency with a training program inspired by its predecessor, Institute of Current World Affairs (ICWA), which was an international information service network founded by Charles Crane in 1925. Since the end of World War II, AUFS was entrusted with the public mission of sending young reporters as correspondents in "foreign areas." In addition to sending back regular reports to the sponsoring colleges and universities—Stanford, Brown, Caltech, Harvard, among others, each of these "field" reporters returned to the U.S. every two years to visit the campus of each of the sponsoring institutions to report in person on current conditions, problems, and personalities in the area he/she was studying. It might be fair to say that an organization like AUFS, which connected fieldwork, reporting, and academic pedagogy, was one of the early pioneers of "area studies" in postwar U.S. For an account of the organizational history form ICWA to AUFS, see *Engineering and Science* 1951:18-20.

these putatively "common" features of humanity within five documentary films ranging from 13-17 minutes each. The purpose of such a design, as emphasized repetitively by the producer Norman Miller, was to provide "visual evidence" and "raw data" to American college-level social science courses, where the instructors could freely combine films of different areas to compare them with one single theme, or the other way around.

The repetitive evocation of the evidential power of documentary footage and the emphasis on how they can be freely combined shows an obsession with scientific "objectivity" based on the presumed universality of human visual faculty. As Miller states: "The greatest excitement of the revolution still lies in its potential. Nearly every human being reacts to visual stimuli and instructors in the social sciences are finding new ways to capitalize on this fact." (Miller 1976: 3) This trans-individual capacity of human vision is in turn paralleled with the presumed commensurability among the five themes cutting across different areas. Indeed, in the Instructor Guide, a diagram further visualizes such a presumption by mapping the five areas vertically from sea level to mountain top, each being indexed with a specific altitude (fig. 65). The diagram evinces a sense of confidence in its ability to project a graspable miniature ecology as the sample of the rest of the planet Earth.



Figure 65. A diagram showing the five "cultural-ecological" zones chosen by the "Faces of Change" project funded and advised by AUFS, NSF, and JCRR

A closer look at Miller's "Visual Evidence," however, indicates that the proclaimed objectivity of the raw data is anything but free from the ideological mapping of area studies within the framework of global Cold War. Take two geographical areas, "South China Sea" and "Taiwan," for example. Although Yao-Chi Chen was responsible for filming and writing about these two designated areas, it was Albert Ravenholt, a former navy intelligence officer turned journalist, who served as the area-specific adviser to Chen's films. The very choice of the subject matter about rice-farming for the documentaries on Taiwan is representative of the kind of knowledge base provided by a specialist such as Ravenholt.

As the most important sources of staple food in East Asia, rice has always been the targeted crop for JCRR's agrarian experiment and cultivation, a specific line of inquiry that harks

back to the famous Cornell-Nanking collaboration on agronomy and rural economy.[23] A look at Ravenholt's AUFS field reports suggests that his area-specific interest lies mostly in food security, water supply, and infrastructural changes in places such as Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and China. From the 1950s to the 1970s, for instance, Ravenholt reported extensively on Taiwan's rice farming technology in his reports to AUSF and several news articles. It is quite clear that his rendering of rice farming was directly linked to the geopolitical agenda of the U.S. in this area. In a *Washington Post* article, Ravenholt treated the impressive annual yields of rice crops improved by JCRR's land-reform, not only as a strategic weapon to keep the Communists at bay, but as material evidence with which KMT could claim their mantle of future management of mainland China:

> For the prosperous farmers here, who mostly own their fields and enjoy the highest rural living standard in Asia outside Japan, are the Chinese Nationalist' strongest claim to competence for returning to manage the monumental problems of mainland China. It is one of ironic twists of history that the Nationalists, who lost China largely through neglecting the needs and aspirations of Chinese farmers, should on Formosa have engineered a showpiece of rural progress with a speed unmatched elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia (Ravenholt A20)

From Miller's claim of objectivity through visual evidence to Ravenholt's report on Formosa's speedy success, the audiovisual, graphic, and textual strategies mobilized by "Faces of Change" manifest two different temporalities regarding the positions of observer: one claims a scientific and universal point of view enabled by the cinematic tracing of slow cultural-ecological changes. The other shows that objective seeing is underpinned by an anxiety about teleological progress in the face of crisis and contingency. The two temporalities together manifest a politics of speed centered upon contingency, crisis, and, most importantly, an aesthetic ambivalence between entertaining contingency and erasing it. The ambivalence, I suggest, would also surface in Yao-chi Chen's documentaries on rice farming in Taiwan.

Despite the aforementioned subtext that treats rice-farming as a propaganda showpiece of US and Taiwan's collaboration via JCRR, the five films in the "rice" series inherit and transform the critique in Chen's earlier work *Liu Pi-Chia*. Although these films still showcase the achievement of the JCRR as the major actor behind a series of efforts in advancing agrarian technology and rural organizations, they allow for the oppositional voice to be heard and seen. A case in point would be the cinematic presentation of mechanization. Commonly seen in the JCRR campaign through all kinds of media and print advertisements, mechanization of farming and transportation had always been the key to increased production and the catalyst to transfer surplus manpower to urban industries since the 1950s. As discussed previously, the said campaign assumes forms of visual rhetoric that emphasize tropes of continuity, connectivity, and immediacy, while naturalizing the gap between human body, machine, and environment. In

[23] A whole generation of agronomic technicians and scholars affiliated with JCRR, including Chen's father, were trained by this program, where rice-breeding and scientific irrigation were not only experimented but later exported to Africa and South East Asia as a diplomatic vehicle under the rubric of "international cooperation and development." For a detailed discussion on the history of the program, see Lin 2015.

Chen's documentaries, these spatiotemporal tropes are constantly challenged or destabilized through the disassociation of sound, images, objects, and identities.

First, the ethnographic mode of camera allows the interviewers to speak for themselves, as is the case in both *Liu Pi-Chia* and the FOC series. This "freedom of speech," however, is achieved through an unusual handling of the relationship between the original recording and the English voiceover that is meant to translate mandarin Chinese or Taiwanese Hokkien for the non-speakers. In *Liu Pi-chia*, the English voiceover dominates the narration while Liu's heavily accented mandarin is still preserved but almost rendered as an inaudible background noise. In a scene when Liu falls asleep on the train from his settlement to downtown, a close-up shot zooms in on Liu's face against the moving window scenes, while the non-diegetic English narration intervenes to read nostalgic lines in first-person voice—presumably recorded beforehand. The same co-presence of original recording and voiceover is dramatized in the later FOC documentary series, but the presence of the Taiwanese-speaking farmers is rendered much more audible and spontaneous, as the spoken speech of the interviewers is given more uninterrupted time free from voiceover.

This new spontaneity in speech is best exemplified in *Fields are Small, People are Many* by a mild altercation between the JCRR technician and a rice farmer, who gets visibly suspicious about using power-tillers and the pesticide promoted by the local Farmers' Association. In front of the camera and the technician from the Association, the rice farmer lodges a long complaint about the feasibility of applying power-tillers on fragmented farmlands, the financial burden of buying a power-tiller on loans, and the dubious effectiveness of the pesticides advertised by the JCRR. In probably one of the most clearly articulated retorts to the policy of agricultural mechanization, the humanized face of technocracy and its associated prospect of future profits, social mobility, and the mastery over contingency—as is shown in the old JCRR film such as *Mulan the Tractor Driver* –is now revealed as awkward and dubious. In general, the FOC series thus presents less controlled diegetic soundscape, as the technocratic voice that used to dictate visual images in old JCRR films is now being talked back by on-site interviews that would invite contingent encounters and even improvised performances catalyzed by the presence of a camera.

The emergence of a diegetic world based on the synchronized image of body-sound-site might have challenged the dominance of voiceover in conventional propaganda genre.[24] Yet, an opposite logic of delay, displacement, desynchronization may also be mobilized to create a world where the interpenetration between onscreen and offscreen, and that between the diegetic and the extradiegetic, can become a self-referential critique of the romanticized pastoral landscape. In most of Chen's documentaries, the intrusion of offscreen clues—either through images or sounds—usually metonymically leads to an *abstract or artificial order* within the relationship among human bodies, animals, machines, plants, and even weather. The self-referential critique

[24] The difference between diegesis/extradiegesis and onscreen/offscreen must be distinguished. The diegesis includes objects, events, spaces and the characters that inhabit them, including things, actions, and attitudes not explicitly presented in the film but inferred by the audience. Offscreen sound can still be diegetic as it may be inferred by the audience as coming from a source within the narrative world. Although the "diegetic world" of the documentary is considered simply the world itself, but there are exceptions. In many of Yao-chi Chen's documentaries, for example, the offscreen/onscreen distinction can sometimes be mobilized to create a quasi-diegetic world with characters-like figures.

of abstraction and artificiality via diegetic boundaries, I suggest, is initially developed in *Liu Pi-Chia*. When high-ranking Nationalist military officers come to Liu's construction settlement to give opening remarks to the Dragon Boat Festival, we find the camera zooming in on two things that were ambiguously placed at the threshold of the film's diegesis: a group of roosters and chickens and a shivering flower in the wind. The pastoral farm life embodied by the yard is eerily accompanied by a military marching song in the distance. The moment when the camera zooms in on the roosters and chickens pacing, we hear the loud "Salute" shouted, followed by a loud "Stand at attention" with the camera zooming in on a purple flower shivering in the wind. The off-screen sounds of "salute" and "stand at attention" are grafted onto the pastoral lifeworld of chickens in their daily pacing and pecking. While it can be implied that the chickens and flowers in the yard are part of the military settlement, there is no reason for the audience to believe that the animals, flowers, the marching song, and the festive event were synced on-site with coherent spatiotemporal proximity. Rather, the images of pastoral domesticity were very likely to be edited *afterwards* to accompany the triumphing tune.

This points toward an audiovisual ambiguity that sways the audience from the onscreen/offscreen distinction to the diegetic/extradiegetic split. That is, it implies the existence of a narrative plane where the repetition of military speeches and the domesticated life of poultry converge, and the futility of labor is subtly thematized. Indeed, as the subtitle suggests, after two years of collective laboring, the 300 acres of farmland created from the riverbank were but sold to a modern paper factory invested in by the transnational capital of Japan, against which these old Nationalist Army fought two decades ago. These details, read together with long shot focused on a water tower painted with "Long Live President Chiang," point toward an ironic, if not dangerous, sense of displacement: the Nationalist military bodies are now treated as surplus manpower, repetitively conducting the futile labor of "reclaiming" farmland from a river. These political ironies, however, rehearsing the later innovative audiovisual plays in the NSF-funded documentaries on rice farming technologies and food security issues.

This kind of audiovisual ambiguity— with its implied political critique — is usually considered to have been silenced after Chen's arrest in 1968. I suggest, however, that in the NSF/AUFS and JCRR co-sponsored documentaries such as "Fields are small, People are Many" and "Wet Culture Rice," this offscreen/onscreen and diegetic/extradiegetic "world-ing" takes on much subtler forms within the mixed genre of pedagogical film and advocacy/policy film. As previously discussed, the FOC film series manifests a tension between scientific objectivity for research purposes (as proclaimed by Norman N. Miller) and the geopolitical importance invested in rice-farming and food security (as suggested by Albert Ravenholt). This tension makes the five documentaries on rice farming a contested site, where Chen continues the use of offscreen sounds to imply the ambivalence of diegetic/extradiegetic boundaries, thereby problematizing the abstracted relationship among land, machines, animals, and human bodies. At the centered of all these formal plays of sounds and image is a subtle critique of mechanization and its related cultural discourses whereby the spatiotemporal contiguity and continuity of the film are constantly disrupted.

In *Fields are Small, People are Many* and *Wet Culture Rice*, the issues of food security, demography, land-reform, and rural credit system are all boiled down to the question of the machine. As the most representative symbol of mechanized agriculture, the power-tiller was firstly presented as the utopian locomotive that carries a series of promises, including labor-

saving, time-saving, efficiency, productivity, and most importantly, the possibility of reducing the farming population and increasing industrial labor. In short, the power-tiller epitomizes the story of success achieved through the transformative capacity of machine in turning the labor of human and animal into the perpetual motion of engine, while the perceived concrete lifeworld is turned into abstracted form of personnel and capital. The machine-triggered abstraction of land and body is engaged by Chen's unique audio-visual strategy: Instead of dramatizing the process of mechanization and abstraction by resorting to the image of speedy transformation– commonly seen in the conventional propaganda, Chen thematizes the notion of "change" by exposing how abstract forms are always already at work in the production of landscape. By making the world of the technical indistinguishable from that of the pastoral, the world of speed blends into the world of slowness, as his camerawork reveals how a presupposed distinction among machine, human, and landscape have always been constitutive of a specific sense of reality.

For instance, the opening titles of *Fields are small, People are Many* begins with a low-angle close-up shot of a bulky valve for irrigation waterways, followed by a superimposed image of two valves—as if they are multiplying, and then the camera pans rightward to be superimposed by a row of betel nut trees next to the rice field, which is in turn superimposed by a row of strawmen standing in the field, captured by a leftward panning. This sequence of "multiplication" of objects in horizontal movement is accompanied by an extradiegetic folk tune sung by a choir. The sequence introduces the rural landscape by leading the audience from the periphery (waterways) to the center (rice fields) with the absence of any real human figures in sight. For the audience, this absence of the human prefigures a series of interviews with the farmers, who in different ways reveal the lack of available labor, the difficulty of buying or using power-tillers, and their hesitation when faced with the choice of inheriting ancestral farmland or leaving for jobs in the factories. The opening sequence, in short, is a gesture pointing toward the abstract core of a rural reality, one that has been surrounded by nonhuman objects in its serialization and multiplication.

The absence of human labor and the multiplication of abstract object-forms within the pastoral assumes another turn when Chen stages a dialectical relationship between two other non-human entities: the power-tiller, referred to as an "iron ox," and a real ox, between animal power and mechanical power. If the previous JCRR films constantly emphasize the unification of mechanical power, humanized expertise, and the prospect of jump-starting social and natural change, Chen's rendering of the ox and its mechanized cousin in "Wet Culture Rice" resort to a logic of co-presence, once again through the subtle play between onscreen/offscreen and diegetic /extradiegetic ambivalence. In a sequence of shots tracing the movement of power-tiller entering the fields, the diegesis is firstly established by the repetitive sounds of engine followed by a medium shot focusing on its awkward entry into the field. The audience's expectation of seeing the power-tiller performing, however, is interrupted by a cut to a previously unseen ox slowly tilling, as the sounds of the engine keeps humming offscreen. The temporal duration fixed on the movement of the ox is long enough for us to perceive a transient interval whereby the ox seems to move eerily like a mechanized animal. That strange moment was gradually erased by the camera zooming out, far enough to include the power tiller moving in parallel in the same direction but, interestingly, also too far for us to clearly tell the difference between the ox and the tiller. Once again, this transient interval of the coincidence of animal and machine is quickly negated by another zoom, as the ox is cropped out from the frame. These two intervals, echoing

the pastoral yard with roosters and flowers, reveals a sensorial threshold whereby the dispensation of what is on and off-screen suddenly takes the audience to an extradiegetic plane of existence. On this virtual plane, the massive mechanization and the jarring strangeness of machine is blended into the pastoral landscape presented in earlier JCRR productions.

The motif of man-machine-animal coexistence, as well as its subtle critique of the prominent mechanization discourses promoted by the JCRR, can be contextualized within various emerging issues in the early 1970s, including the depopulation of the rural towns and the commodification of farmland boosted by the combination of smaller farmland to better suit grand-scale machine-tilling. This motif is repeated in *They Call Him A-Kung*, in which the middle-school farm boy, A-Kung, and his friends express their desire to grow up and leave farming business for jobs in the urban factories. In an amazing sequence of shots, the camera traces A-Kung and his friends biking from school to downtown. It follows the biking group racing across the rice fields, passing by a huge movie billboard on the edge of the town. When the bikes disappear from the frame, the camera begins to zoom in on a small hand-painted motorbike stunt on the billboard (fig. 66). As the motorbike gets larger and larger in the frame, we suddenly hear a loud engine sound bursting out, only to realize via the subsequent shot that the group of bikes have got themselves into the hustle and bustle in downtown. The extradiegetic play of sound-image mismatch, once again, turn the biking group into a disembodied billboard movie image, a virtual motorbike frozen against the rural sky. The energy and velocity of the kids on biking, interrupted by this temporary suspension, thus becomes an empty engine—trapped between forward progression and an historical impasse.

Figure 66

As a government-sponsored project, Chen's "rice farming" series in Faces of Change inherited the earlier ideological core of JCRR by showcasing Taiwan as the forerunner in the game of accelerated transformation. Yet, by utilizing on the audiovisual world/image-making based on the fragmentation and abstraction of landscape, Chen retooled these aesthetic tropes not to represent an accelerated and mechanized rural space and its hierarchy, where the technician dictated machines, fertilizers, pesticides, which in turn dictated the life of farmers. Rather, Chen's play with off-screen/on-screen and diegetic/extradiegetic—coupled with his long shots and long takes—allowed the fragments and abstracted objects to emerge on the edge of the cinematized world of diegesis, where the abstract plane of existence itself became thematized. The thematization (and subtle critique) of abstraction and fragmentation of the Taiwanese postwar rural space, I suggest, anticipated a nascent avant-garde gesture within the JCRR documentary reportage. On the other hand, it was an ambivalent area-studies project such as

Faces of Change—with its commitment to mobilize the technological accuracy of cinema to document cultural-ecological transformation—that allowed Chen to debunk the intertwined mapping of geopolitical area, ecological zones, and cultural milieus.

Conclusion

Form the early 1950s to the late 1960s, Jiang Menglin and his US-aided JCRR technocracy transformed the rural landscape of Taiwan with an aim to secure a rural base with stable food supply, surplus labor, and most importantly, to usher in an era of acceleration, speedy exchange, and global connectivity. This modernizing agenda, set against a specific geopolitical mapping of the Cold War and the Chinese Civil War, pivoted the exiled regime from its awkward displacement toward a global display of produce, products, labor, and an accumulated capital. In the process of speeding up the flow of crops, goods, personnel, and landscape, it created a logistical modernity and an aesthetic perception that relied on the reproduction of a self-referential flow of textual, audial, and visual images to form an archive of sense-data and information. This self-reflexive imaging and mapping, as my cases studies show, was at once an attempt to embalm the traumatic violence and displacement inflicted by the Chinese Civil War, and the utopian/technocratic vision that sought to transcend that historical whirlwind through developmental imperatives. By turning the mnemonic images of the past into sensorial modules for mapping, surveying, and planning a postwar reality, the JCRR media machine managed to preserve the emergency and exigency of warfare, yet erect a new regime of truth, an ethos of spatiotemporal deployment that ensured the construction of an infrastructural system for the flow and exchange of capital. This postwar regime of truth through media, with its constant dividing, cropping, and calculating, however, also reconfigured the relationship among human bodies, technical objects and environment, thereby designing and implementing a singular second-nature along the paths it traces.

Considered as a special form of audio-visual reportage, earlier JCRR-sponsored films in the 1950s and 60s carry a strong discursive and expositional intention that project an unified voice/vision of postwar rural landscape, which is no less than a diegetic world that features technocrats, experts, and machines as key agents producing successful stories about the ongoing process of "rural reconstruction" activities. Documentary footages and actualities used in these films— coupled with the uses of animation and abstracted charts and graphs— are therefore used not just to document but to augment a reality envisioned for Taiwan's postwar rural space. Yao-chi Chen's experimental camerawork within the later JCRR-USA coproduced documentaries, by contrast, weakens this discursive ambition and reveals the porous constructiveness of such diegetic fabrication. His documentary reportage complicates the earlier rural landscape narrated and dramatized by the JCRR advocacy films. Acting like an internal reporter commenting retrospectively on JCRR's own diegetic world-making from the early 1970s, his camera both historicize and demystifies the narrative time of agricultural modernity while exposing its logic of capitalistic abstraction. Instead of objectively reporting a changing material environment, his strategic reportage lays bare the very process through which objective reality—understood through the scientifically engineered agrarian landscape—comes into being. This distinctive reportage consciousness, however, needs to be understood in its multiply-intersected social space and media environment.

In this environment, JCRR's earlier advocacy films provide the basic thematic schemes and narrative frames to the co-produced documentaries in the early 1970s, therefore forming a "collective reportage" on JCRR's rural campaign and mobilization. The unifying voice/vision and the interiority of characters presupposed by the earlier docudrama, however, were problematized by the audiovisual realism in Chen documentary reportage, which features the absence of human agency and the suspension of personal growth and development. Such disintegration of a coherent and self-enclosed diegetic world, in turn, implies the individual agency of the cultural workers within the KMT-JCRR propaganda cluster. It might be fair to say that JCRR's collective reportage form the 1950s to the 1970s self-referentially reveals the underworking of its own collective consciousness as a reporting and mass-organizing agency.[25]

Yao-chi Chen's subtle critique within the JCRR media machine, looks at first glance like a political compromise after the 1968 incident of jailing and policing. In the eyes of his former comrades, his collaboration with government-sponsored projects might signal the foreclosure of an emerging avant-garde spirit, whose legacy was silenced and made excavated again only in the 1980s, when the Taiwanese New Wave emerged as the vanguard of a new era.[26] By connecting the early JRCC media in the 1950s-1960s to Yao-chi Chen's early "collaborative" projects, this chapter excavated an alternative to the politics of speed, a technique of slowness, that has long been considered nonexistent in the 1960s. The avant-garde impulses in the history of Taiwanese cinema, as I have shown, might have emerged much earlier in an unlikely milieu of the agricultural-industrial complex produced by the global Cold War.

[25] The notions of "collective reportage" and "reportage consciousness" are borrowed from Charles A. Laughlin's pioneering work on Chinese reportage literature before the Cultural Revolution. Laughlin emphasizes on a sort of Lukacian totalization of the interior world by an external relationship, with which individual consciousness is always already saturated/sutured with the diegetic narrative of the Socialist collectivity. In the case of the JCRR collective, however, I hope to highlight a possibility of destabilizing such a diegetic boundaries between inside and outside through Chen's self-referential aesthetic gestures. See Laughlin 231-234.

[26] Taiwanese New Wave, or Taiwanese New Cinema, was a cinematic movement from the early 1980s to the late 1990s. The movement is generally considered by film historians as a major break from the policy-oriented propaganda films of Healthy Realism and other commercial genres of the 1970s. Some of the most renowned stylists of the movement include Edward Yang, Hou Hiao-hisang, and Tsai Ming-liang, who practiced their signature camerawork often through slow and still movement and the extensive use of long takes with long shots. In this sense, my reading of Richard Chen's aesthetics of slowness, suspension, and juxtaposition, can be seen as pre-New Wave gesture in experimenting with various forms of modernist cinematic language.

Chapter Three

Grounding the Air

Knowledge, Flight, and the Free Intellectuals of Hong Kong

The airplane is an indictment.
It indicts the city.
It indicts those who control the city.
--- Le Corbusier, *Aircraft*, 1935

Air, Wind, and Wings: A Short History of Hong Kong Airspace

"There is no single particle of free air in the Communist world!" (428). In an op-ed article published in 1949, Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (1919-1969), one of the most influential public intellectuals and political thinkers in postwar Taiwan, emphatically maintains the ideological difference between the authoritarian Communist China and the constitutional democracy claimed by the Chinese Nationalist Party, which had upheld the legitimacy of "Free China" in Taiwan since its exile to the island after the Civil War. Yin's metaphor of "free air" has usually been considered one of many propaganda terminologies in the immediate post-1949 era, when the KMT regime sought to reestablish its political legitimacy by aligning itself with the "Free World" led by the United States. Yin's efforts in the political magazine *Free China*, however, were later silenced by the KMT due to his critique of the latter, which showed that the political "air" in Taiwan was anything but free when the island-state, like its allies in South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia, was under military authoritarianism, whereas the freedom of speech, publication, and physical mobility of the so-called "free intellectuals" were still under severe control and censorship. [1] Yin's comment, however, highlights the central metaphor of "air" as an ambiguous rhetorical figure circulating among the pro-KMT intellectuals outside Communist China—mostly exiled intellectuals who followed the party to Taiwan and Hong Kong. The metaphor, in this case, not only captures an atmosphere of crisis invisible to the human eyes, but, more importantly, signals the fear of a contagious ideological disease of communism and authoritarianism that might spread across territorial and sovereign borders via a fluid, uncontrollable medium. In the preface to his Chinese translation of Friedrich von Hayek's *Road to Serfdom* four years before his death, Yin turns this metaphor of air into a figure for the directional velocity of wind:

> Now I am like a feeble candle standing on top of an iceberg. The fire flickers in the wind blowing from Mongolia. I only hope that this candle may

[1] As a vocal advocate for scientific empiricism and logistical positivism in China, Yin's proposal for democratic reform in Taiwan was considered by the KMT government as toxic while his editorial work with the political magazine *Free China Journal* 自由中國 (*Ziyou Zhongguo*) later triggered a series of banning on all of his books after 1960. His students at National Taiwan University were also quickly silenced after the incident. For a more comprehensive understanding of his view on the Chinese Communist Party, see Yin (2009).

> light up many others before the Mongolian wind puts it out. These candles will be bigger and lighter than I am, and their light of freedom will eventually shed light on the vast land of the East (7)[2]

The "Mongolian wind" Yin evokes here refers to the northeast monsoon sweeping through the Eurasian continent during the winter. In the context of Hayek's classic treatise that Fascism and Communism both share the same totalitarian root in their abandonment of individualism in exchange for central planning, Yin's metaphor perpetuates the image of "free air" as the marker of ideological difference between the Free China and the Communist China. But the specific geophysical reference and the transformation from air to wind signals a will to engineer and even reverse the velocity of the windy cold front of Communism in all of its continental brutality.

Yin's metaphor of air and wind reflect a general anxiety about a contingent but imposing *airspace* above the "free intellectuals" of Taiwan and Hong Kong, as Yin's academic friends and colleagues also fought their own anti-Communist war under the banner of New Confucianism in the US/KMT-funded New Asia College in Hong Kong. In fact, given the KMT's tightened control over the freedom of speech in Taiwan, it was actually through Hong Kong's anti-Communist journals such as *Democratic Review* 民主評論 (*Minzhu Pinglun*) and *China Weekly* 祖國週刊 (*Zuguo Zhoukan*) that intellectuals like Yin could freely air out their political passions and aspirations. His influential book *A New Introduction to Logic* 邏輯新引(*Luoji Xinyin*) was also published by the famous Hong Kong-based publishing Asia Press— an anti-Communist media outlet funded by the CIA-backed Asia Foundation.[3] The image of free air, in the context of the anti-communist cluster of Hong Kong and Taiwan, indexes both an atmospheric environment situated between freedom and control, as well as a medium through which intellectuals hoped to engineer the contested airspace of territory, ideology, and eventually, sovereignty.

Indeed, this multiply imbricated airspace between Taiwan and Hong Kong had been concretely inscribed in Hong Kong's porous legal, political, and informational environment, which allowed the KMT and the US to extend their anti-Communist battlefronts after 1949 through the city. Hong Kong, with its geographical proximity to the Chinese Mainland, functioned as a logistical hub linking the itineraries and networks of intellectuals in an airspace free from the claws of the Communists. On the other hand, it also served as a paramilitary outpost from which the "free air" of political liberalism could be injected back to the Chinese Mainland. Indeed, Hong Kong's contested airspace during and after 1949 was also manifested by a series of legal and military actions centered around the contested property rights for a fleet of KMT-owned airplanes right after the establishment of the new People's Republic. These events further accentuated Hong Kong as a singular Cold War city where air transport, military logistics personnel, and media/culture industries converged.

---

[2] My own translation from the original Chinese.

[3] New Asia College— later integrated into the newly-founded Chinese University of Hong Kong—served as the most important academic home for a group of exiled Chinese intellectuals active between Hong Kong and Taiwan. New Confucian scholars such as Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 and Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, for instance, were close to the Nationalist government. *Democratic Review* was founded by Xu himself under initial financial support from the Nationalists. Grace Ai-ling Chou's book details this historical intertwinement between Cold War politics and academic institutionalization (2012).

On November 11, 1949, a fleet of twelve airplanes belonging to the Nationalist-owned China National Aviation Co. (CNAC) and Central Air Transport Co. (CATC) defected to the communist-held cities of Beijing and Tianjin from Hong Kong. The fleet, which consisted of fout Convair CV-240 airliners, four C-46 transport aircraft, and four C-47 transport aircraft, took off from Hong Kong's Kai Tak Airport and landed in Beijing to receive a heroes' welcome by the members of the CCP, which had just taken control of the city in January of the same year. The defection immediately triggered a series of legal, military, and media actions that involved the exiled Nationalist government in Taiwan, the British colonial government, the United States, and the newly-founded PRC. The Chinese communists saw these airplanes as shining tokens bestowed upon a new regime in need of a secure territorial airspace free from air reconnaissance attempted by the Nationalists across the strait and Americans in Hong Kong. For the defeated Nationalists, however, the defection symbolized not just the loss of the mainland but the imminent loss of an invisible territory that could only be guarded by their edge in aeronautical technologies and expertise.

To prevent the rest of the 71 CNAC and CATC planes from being transferred to China by Hong Kong's colonial government and thus potentially deployed as weapons to attack Taiwan across the Strait, the Nationalists registered the remaining planes under Civil Air Transport (C.A.T.), an US-based airline company founded by the legendary aviator Claire Lee Chennault, known as "the General of the Flying Tigers" for his heroic assistance to the Chinese battles against the Japanese air force during WWII. The transition of ownership from the State-owned companies to an American civilian airliner was more than a local legal tactic, as its ramifications bespoke a convoluted and highly ambivalent logistical network that linked sovereign space, airspace, and urban space through the colonial city of Hong Kong.

First, the transfer of the property rights to C.A.T. took place right before the United Kingdom formally recognized the Communist China in 1950, so theoretically these planes should have been "returned" to the American proxy company supported by the Nationalists. Yet, all the subsequent international litigation over the property rights took place after the UK had recognized the new People's Republic, which insisted to UK that these planes were "Chinese" properties and should be returned to the new China. In the prolonged legal battles that resulted, this legal deadlock prevented these airplanes from either returning to the Nationalist government in Taiwan or flying northbound to China. These flying machines, as an embodiment of cutting-edge technology and upward mobility, became immobile objects tied to the runway of Kai Tak Airport in Hong Kong until 1953. As these planes became the symbols of legitimacy for the Chinese statehood, the Nationalist government even sent special agents to bomb, and manage to damage, some of these grounded airplanes.[4] Regarding this unprecedented legal and military tug-of-war, one may say that it was both Hong Kong's singular geopolitical site-specificity and airplane's technical-specificity that allowed for this intriguing legal vacant space, where the meaning of the *Chinese* state became de-territorialized by a series of legal protocols and

[4] The special agent managed to bomb and damage seven of the airplanes. Declassified documents from Taiwan's Academia Historica indicate that the Executive Yuan of the KMT government was directly involved in the bombing (1974).

technical terminologies regarding airspace, commerce, and the rhetoric of international diplomacy.

C.A.T. was anything but a normal civilian airliner. Under the aegis of Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Soong Mei-ling between 1946 to 1949, the company oversaw the logistical transportation on behalf of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in China, transporting industrial machinery, tools, textiles, gasoline, medication, and technical personnel to the vast Chinese inland devastated by the Sino-Japanese War. As the Nationalists later ended up on the losing side of the Civil War, C.A.T. took on various paramilitary missions such as air-reconnaissance on behalf of CIA and—as the KMT military finally lost the Chinese Mainland—the evacuation of the party's exiled technocrats, experts, intellectuals, and military personnel to Hong Kong and Taiwan.[5] The headquarters of C.A.T., itself, like the cargo and personnel it had helped transported, temporarily relocated to Hong Kong before following the regime to settle in Taiwan. Even in the years after 1949, as the flag carrier of the Nationalist regime in Taiwan, C.A.T. symbolized a modern, technologized "Free China" capable of serving both the island state and the overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and southeast Asia with diplomatic missions such as sending Taiwan's industrial goods and agricultural produces to Hong Kong or flying high-profile supporters of the Free China when they visit the island (fig. 67).

In 1964 when the pro-Nationalist Singaporean mega-billionaire—the head of the Cathay Organization and the founder of Hong Kong-based Motion Picture & General Investment Co. (MP&GI), Dato Loke Wan Tho 陸運濤 (1915-1964) died from an air crash in central Taiwan in one of C.A.T.'s C-46 airplane, the media fallout from the pan Chinese-speaking world saw the incident as a major setback for a rightwing cinema enterprise that could have linked Hong Kong , Taiwan, and other Southeast Asian countries in their conjoined fight against the CCP propaganda. The air crash, as an explosive media event broadcasted and framed as a national tragedy and shame, in turn, marked the decline of C.A.T.'s business in Taiwan and its subsequent replacement by its major competitor, China Airlines, as the flag carrier of Free China.


Figure 67

[5] The military and logistical operations of C.A.T. in the late 1940s also included the transportation of weaponry, ammunition, and equipment for the KMT military in their fight against Communists. These experiences in logistics, eventually helped them set up a temporary civilian logistics transport company, International Supply Co. in Shanghai, before the company's relocation to Hong Kong, and eventually, Taiwan. See Leary 94 - 98.

These transport incidents between Hong Kong and Taiwan, as epitomized by C.A.T.'s paramilitary itineraries, the fight over the "national" property, and the air crash framed as "national" tragedy, pointed toward an anxiety about the control over the ephemeral airspace on the part of Free China (Taiwan). The amorphous air of freedom, in these cases, was also where the logistical flows of objects, labor, and information might encounter friction, turbulence, the uneven surface of the ground. This anxiety about extending and controlling Free China's airspace— and the necessity of an extraterrestrial war on the ground of Hong Kong—formed an interesting dialogue, and tension, with Yin Haiguang's metaphors of "Free Air" and "Mongolian wind." These terms connoted an alternative utopian airspace of freedom as both an atmosphere and an invisible force maintained by the free-spirited intellectuals traveling between Taiwan and Hong Kong. From the metaphor of air, the velocity of wind, to aeronautic control over the "Chinese" sovereign space, the anti-Communist airspace manifested an ambivalent oscillation between security and contingency, between aerial control and airborne freedom. At the center of all these was the figure of aeronautic flight and the ground of Hong Kong as a contested logistical hub, through which the intangible free air could be identified, concretized, and eventually circulated beyond Taiwan through the mobile academic networks or the media network provided by freedom-fighters like Yin and Loke, respectively.

The friction between the idealized movement of logistics and the rough geopolitical reality embedded in Hong Kong, as I try to delineate above, allows us to reconceptualize the complex media environment of the city's pro-Nationalist media industries, as well as the various modes of logistical labor they produce through literary, journalistic, and cinematic platforms across various genres and mediums. Two fundamental questions I am asking in this chapter are: how did audiovisual and textual images engineer an ambivalent "free air" as an aesthetic experience? Between the liberating freedom of air and the control of gravity, how did Hong Kong's site-specificity figure into the characterization and thematization of labor in relation to emerging modes of transportation and forms of social mobility?

With this new scaling lens that zooms between flow and friction, between the sky and the earth, I situate the images of transport in Hong Kong's pro-Nationalist cinema, print culture, and literature within the city's struggle to see and act between the geopolitical aerial view and the local street-view. Transportation systems portrayed in these fictions, pictorial journalism, and films, I suggest, are defined by a singular intertwinement among the laboring body, vehicular machines, and a highly gendered social mobility imagined alongside the deployment of intellectual labor, service labor, and emotional labor. In this context, "free intellectual" Yin Haiguang and "free film maker" Loke Wan Tho— the one suffocated by Taiwan's political air, the other killed in Taiwan's turbulent airspace—epitomized two social-technical assemblages linking Taiwan and Hong Kong: civic journalism and cinematic entertainment. In fighting for the cause of promoting Free China, these two media industries recruited two group of cultural workers characterized by their social and physical mobility between Hong Kong and Taiwan: male writers and journalists under the support of USIA and KMT, as well as female stars and celebrities created by Loke's new media empire. Transportation, as I suggest in this chapter, functioned prominently as both a powerful rhetorical device and visual image that constantly recoded gender roles, and the division of labor in the representations of these "freedom-fighters." In "switching gears" among different means of transport between the sky and the ground, these

representations reveal the systematic friction between Cold War's logic of control and a contingent ground that kept challenging its totalizing aerial view.

This chapter, therefore, argues against a long-standing interpretative truism regarding the images of airplanes, automobile, and their correlated tropes of speed, movement, mobility in the rightwing cinema and media culture in Hong Kong during 1950s and 1960s. An impressionistic view might suggest that the navigational vehicles represented in Hong Kong's rightwing cinema— such as those appearing in MP & GI's Mandarin-speaking romance and comedies— are symbols of material affluence, consumerism, and tourism in a city characterized by urban modernity. In MP & GI's own official company history, for instance, the writer explains the appeal of their own movies in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia by claiming that the audience of Hong Kong's Shanghai émigré community "identified with the cosmopolitan life-style portrayed with that which they once enjoyed as elite of Shanghai," while the immigrant Chinese in Southeast Asia, with their "relatively lower standard of living" aspire for the glamourous setting and endlessly rich life portrayed in the films. "They adored the jet-set" the writer concludes (Lim 152). The idiomatic use of "jet-set" is no random choice. Any fan of MP& GI movies would not fail to recognize the reference to the company's most popular production, *Air Hostess* (1959), a musical piece about the professional and romantic life of a flight attendant. The film is constantly evoked as an example of the "cinematic containment" buttressed by US and Taiwan to "draw attention away from the Communist influence" by showing "a life of glamour, material success, independence, and above all, the thrills and freedom of jet-setting around the globe (Fu "More than Just Entertaining" 35). These descriptions, albeit valid at the first glance, risk simplifying the material objects in the film— airplanes, in particular— as "Americanized objects of fantasy displayed for the voyeuristic pleasure of the audience."

One problem with such interpretation is that they presume that means of transport are tantamount to any other kinds of commodities that lure the passive spectator-consumer into what Guy Debord terms as "the society of spectacle" with its empty promise of happiness and fulfillment. Such a view might have reduced an emerging culture of speed to the issue of *stylistic* choices of urban consumerism. Instead, echoing Enda Duffy's studies on the trope of speed in Anglophone modernism, I see airplanes and automobiles—with their massively-circulated images though media—as a highly mediated "hybrid commodity," whose use value, "far from being superseded or obscured by its exchange value, complemented it" (115-116). Vehicles, in particular, afforded the spectator-consumer a wide range of visceral pleasure, behavioral freedom, and tools to improvise social protocols and professional identities. Within this newly-gained mobility and flexibility, the transportation system "stretches" the conventional site of production into the mobile network of communication, delivery, and time-space coordination. As Marx reminds us in *Capital*, transportation can be a source of value and a form of production in itself, as he outlines how "use value, realized in the consumption of commodities, may require a "change in location" and thus an "additional process of production, in the transport industry" (Vol.2: 52).[6]

[6] Marx further articulates the duality of transportation in the movement of capital: "The transport industry forms on the one hand an independent branch of production and thus a separate sphere of investment of productive capital. On the other hand its distinguishing feature is that it appears as a continuation of a process of production *within* the process of circulation and *for* the process of circulation" (Vol 2: 152).

In the context of Hong Kong, specifically, I further highlight this affordance through the figure of labor mediated by the image of transportation in pro-Nationalist/US-sponsored media. These images showcase how human labor is being gendered and deployed to support a fantasized logistical flow in the fight over political control or domestic freedom, where female service work— communication and coordination, in particular— is often put under the command of male-dominated intellectualism or professionalism. In the meanwhile, I also map out the historical trajectory through which this speed/gender fantasy might have traveled, with the help of trans-regional media industries, between the military space of Taiwan and the commercial space of Hong Kong.

To delineate these interconnected routes, sites, and itineraries between airflow and ground friction, I focus on Hong Kong's urban print culture and cinema, that took an unusual interest in the capacities of transport systems such as automobiles, airplanes, and aeronautics. In the first half of the chapter, I closely examine the literary and visual productions of a US-funded media group consisting of Asia Pictures, Asia Press, and *Asia Pictorial*. A specific focus will be placed on the writer/editor Zhao Zifan, who served as the Chief Editor of *Asia Pictorial* while producing his own novels, science fictions, poetry, and pictorial journalism tinged with anti-communist sentiments. I contextualize Zhao's writings within the collective cinematic/pictorial images produced by the CIA-funded "Asia" media group. Together, they project a singular organizational sensibility that yoked aeronautic images, intellectual expertise, and skills to buttress a fantastic "aerial view" of freedom, one which linked Taiwan and Hong Kong as a portable polity defined by technocratic protocols, scientific empiricism, and plannable economic growth through the transportation of knowledge as a strategic resource.

In my next chapter, I will focus on a topographical paradigm-shift in textual and visual representations from airspace to ground transportation. From the early 1950s to the late 1960s, Hong Kong witnessed explosive population growth and subsequent difficulties in supplying public housing and transportation to its refugees and immigrants from China after 1949. In the late 50s to 60s, the city also saw the appearances of some of the earliest government-led masterplans to expand motorway systems and construct new mass transport networks, through which the urban workers in factories and service sector would become daily commuters and potential consumers.[7] It was against this new urban environment that the aerial view of Cold War was leveled down to the ground by a miraculously productive device: the automobile. Functioning as a machine swiftly transforming/recoding value and identity, automobiles as represented in Hong Kong's urban romance and melodrama films not only put commodities, labor, and social mobility into circulation but also trapped, delayed, and disrupted the smoothness and swiftness of urban logistical flows. These films also feature women as commuters/consumers laboring between domestic space and public sphere, whereas the automobile figures in a series of urban "flyovers"— overpass, shortcuts, stairways— that are

[7] The population of Hong Kong jumped from 2.02 million to 3.13 million during the decade between 1951 to 1961, a 55 percent increase. (He 70-71). The severe traffic congestion of the Hong Kong island and Kowloon peninsula finally prompted the colonial government to expand the city's asphalt motorways to the suburban Kowloon and the rural New Territories, where a couple of new satellite cities were established for working class residences (77). The city's Mass Transit Railway system, however, was not planned until 1967 with its actual construction in the early 1970s (103).

supposed to help these female figures navigate across the gaps among various social protocols and identities in a congested urban space.[8]

What we see, however, in these transport films is a symptomatic tension between a controlled interior of vehicle/home and the constant threats posed by its exterior. Automobiles and their itineraries, in this case, carry female characters around the city— either as commodity or labor—but constantly fall inches short of making them fully mobile subjects. The routes toward upward mobility, therefore, are surprisingly fragile, precarious, and always in need of maintenance and repair. Beneath the liveliness and swiftness of melodrama, therefore, is an anxiety about contingency, crisis, and the conflict between domestic economy and public identity. This trope of flow/friction and domestic/public, surprisingly, can be traced back to the earliest propaganda films co-produced between Hong Kong's rightwing filmmakers and the Nationalist military in Taiwan. These transnational hybrid films between military propaganda and urban melodrama, I argue, ushered in a series of romances, comedies, and musicals centered upon the transformative magic of airplanes and vehicles in Hong Kong's urban context. Like C.A.T.'s immobile airplanes tied to the runway of Kai Tak Airport, they move in unfulfilled lines of flight with an unrealized promise of delivering freedom.

Intellect, Expertise, and the Aerial View of "Freedom"

An entry point into the cultural airspace of Hong Kong in the 1950s-1960s is by way of the media complex centered around Asia Press, Asia Pictures, and their flagship monthly magazine, *Asia Pictorial*, which claimed to have "the largest circulation in the Far East" with its subscription outposts in Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia, among many others. The media group, with its diversified business in cultural production, based its headquarters at Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, and had demonstrated a distinct interest in systematically fostering a pro-Taipei/pro-US intellectual cluster in Hong Kong's transitory migrant community.

A quick glance at the titles of the major rightwing journals in Hong Kong reflects USIS's interests in recruiting Hong Kong's "free intellectuals" through agencies such as the Ford Foundation and the Asia Foundation (previously Committee for Free Asia, or CFA): Asia Press, like its major ally, Union Press 友聯 (*Youlian*), served as the bridgehead of US cultural agency in Hong Kong, surrounded by other related journals such as *The Chinese Student Weekly* 中國學生週報 (*Zhongguo xuesheng zhoubao*), *College Life Monthly* 大學生活 (*Daxue shenghuo*), and *Children's Paradise* 兒童樂園 (*Ertong leyuan*). One can easily notice that their targeted audience was intellectual youth and students in Hong Kong. Some of these journals, with their

[8] My use of the term "flyover" echoes the work by feminist scholar Neferti X. M. Tadiar, who, in the context of urban Manila, points out the duality of highway overpass network both as the infrastructure for the movement of the metropolitan subject and global capital, as well as the sites of "life-enabling and self-consolidating" for the city's marginalized dwellers (217-219). Airplanes and cars, as my cases studies show later, carry a similar duality in terms of its regulatory and liberating power.

stable salaries, budgets, and social networks, also served as career training hubs that prepared college graduates as professional editors and cultural workers.[9]

A similar focus was also reflected by Asia Press's recruitment of refugee intellectuals from the Chinese mainland, such as Xu Xu 徐訏 (1908- 1980), Zhao Zifan 趙滋藩 (1924-1986) and Yi Wen 易文 (1920 -1978) as contracted writers, whose fictions were oftentimes conveniently turned into films produced by rightwing studios such as Asia Pictures and MP&GI, among others. From the consumption side to the production side, therefore, the US-funded Asia Press/Asia Pictures cluster fostered a strong connection between Hong Kong's Chinese refugee intellectuals and students as human capital and the kind of geopolitical landscape they could actively project.

A case in point is how "the air of freedom" was codified by images and narratives that mapped Hong Kong and Taiwan as a corridor of "freedom"— propagating a specific notion of freedom denoting the free exchange of knowledge, science, expertise, and arts without barriers. These lofty goals, consequently, were sought in the selection and importation of the best Chinese talent for their skills, expertise, and artistic sensibility— immaterial assets that could transform intellectual labor outside the Communist China into potential powers of resistance and containment. Asia Press's notion of freedom, which was defined by the mobility of body, mind, and the portability of knowledge, was first articulated in an editorial piece in 1957, as the editorial board of Asia Press reflected upon the press' three goals and four major achievements upon its 5rd anniversary.

The three goals of the media group, according to the piece, were as follows: first, to "maintain human integrity, protect human rights, and develop human nature"; secondly, to "rebuild the national spirit", and finally to "rebuild a scientific perspective of the society" (54: 29). These were statements suggestive of a restorative mentality that treated the post-1949 reality as the aftermath of an unscientific and irrational violence that had distorted human nature and destroyed the soul of the Chinese nation. More than a random word choice to dehumanize the Communists, the emphasis on a scientific view in relation to human nature suggests a particular Cold War mentality that sought to demarcate the enemy and the allies by resorting to discerning eyes and minds trained by scientific empiricism.

While science was not exclusive to US liberal capitalism—as the Communist and Fascist states were also obsessed with the high modernist discourses of science and technology—US cultural agencies or advocacy groups deemed it necessary to highlight the scientific mode of life (and state of mind) that was somehow "freer" from the brutal control of the State. This insistence on a relative freedom of mind is shown in the same page when the editors further emphasized the role of "exiled intellectuals" as cultural agents who may "enrich the scope and content of free

[9] According to former editor of *The Chinese Student Weekly* Law Kar, his first paying job after college was offered by the newspaper, by way of the introduction by the chief editor of *College Life*. The majority of thee editors were college students either close to New Asia College's New Confucius scholars or Taiwan-based "free" scholars like Yin Haiquang (Lu and Hung 2014: 31-35). The two-volume interview collection 香港文化眾聲道 (The multichannel of Hong Kong culture) co-edited by Lu Wei-luan (aka Xiao Xi) and Hung Chi Kum provide invaluable clues to the highly volatile and ideologically-charged media scene of print culture during the 50s and the 70s.

creation" and "facilitate the cultural exchange among Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese communities" ("Wunianlai" 29).

It is understandable as to why the U.S. cultural agency in Hong Kong would have put so much emphasis on recruiting exiled intellectuals— a sensibility that harked back to the New Deal era in the 1930s, when the inclusion of non-governmental expertise in public works projects could both tone down the image of "socialist" state-control and mobilize a path already pioneered by the private sectors (Ekbladh 3-4). In the case of the late 1940s and early 1950s Hong Kong, the US domestic planning rationale was further joined internationally by the members of the China Lobby and the CIA-funded Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, Inc. (ARCI)— a highly symbolic relief campaign that targeted intellectual Chinese for assistance and migration, first to aid the Nationalists on Taiwan (by way of Hong Kong) and then to the United States in fulfillment of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. Although generally considered as a failed operation, ARCI signaled the emergence of a discourse that sought to identity a highly ephemeral and heterogenous group of Chinese migrants as *potential human capital*, whose educational level, expertise, skills, and creativity could be further invested and trained to support the Free World. They were imagined as "the best type of Chinese" (Hsu 150).[10] Campaigns such as ARCI ended up helping many exiled intellectuals find temporary employment in Hong Kong. Together with the covert work of the CIA-funded Committee for Free Asia (CFA) in the realms of broadcasting (eg. Radio Free Asia), they boosted the establishment of publication organizations such as Union Press and Asia Press, among other channels of cultural production in Hong Kong.

In previous studies regarding this covert media network, the focus of research has been mostly on tracing the historical contours of the network's institutional mechanisms and its influence upon the local cultural landscape. As important as it is, this approach tends to take a top-down view by treating Hong Kong's local intellectuals merely as instruments in carrying out the covert media network's cultural mission. What has been largely neglected, however, is a closer examination of the formative process of so-called "free intellectuals" and the ways they contributed their own intellectual labor to negotiate between the agenda of global cold war and the environment in which they were situated. It is in opposition to this "aerial view" that I hope to investigate what the term "free intellectual" could have meant in the complicated media environment of Hong Kong in the 1950s and the 1950s. Treating the "free intellectual" as a rhetorical and visual category embedded in the cinematic, literary, and journalistic genres produced in and through the city's geopolitical ties to Taiwan, I suggest that the "free intellectuals" is a multiply-coded image indicating a fantasized capacity for transporting and transforming knowledge from one node to another.

As Shuang Shen has insightfully pointed out, the "empire of information" fostered by the Asian Foundation (previously CFA) could have entertained an internal tension between its rather homogeneous references to the "overseas Chinese" and the heterogeneity inherent to this transient community scattered among Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the rest of Southeast Asia (589-591). Yet, what needs to be further pointed out is that the original designers of the CFA were

[10] My use of the term "human capital" generally follows the classic definition popularized by economist Gary Becker in his 1964 book *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education*, which suggests that human capital is a means of production, into which additional investment in education, training, and medical treatment yields additional output, hence a higher rate of return.

actually quite aware of the heterogeneity of the group and planned out very specific routes, passages, and nodes that could *anchor* and *limit* an amorphous and transient network of "free intellectuals."

According to a 1951 declassified CIA document, which stipulated the basic policy and structure of CFA's media empire, US intelligence had a fairly structural view as to what exiled intellectuals meant for their propagandist agenda. Echoing Asia Press's view on mobilizing exiled intellectuals to form a transmission corridor between Taiwan and Hong Kong, the planners of CFA envisioned a highly horizontal and locally distributed organizational network built upon key "local leaders" and selected talent. Instead of treating the exiled Chinese intellectuals as a homogeneous group, the planning draft foregrounds the necessities of keeping the operations "as decentralized as possible" and conducted by local personnel that could "communicate with and ultimately influence Chinese overseas and on China mainland" ("Committee for a Free Asia"). The same principle was applied to the organization of Radio Free Asia (RFA), whose operations, as indicated in the same draft, should be "transferred to Asia, […] so that broadcast can be made under the sponsorship of local groups, through local stations, as near as possible to the target audience." As an organizational sensibility was hinged upon the intermediating and relaying activities on the ground, a special value was placed on the role of local knowledge—not its specific content but the very transporting/transmitting agency it provided in each and every local situation.

What the plan indicates here is an organizational paradigm-shift that asked us to reconsider the role of Hong Kong's rightwing intellectuals—publishers, writers, film makers—in a crisis-ridden milieu where the capacity to distinguish information from noise is contingent upon their ability to navigate from a vertical aerial view to a relatively local and limited network on the ground. Instead of taking commands directly from their sponsors, exiled intellectuals in Hong Kong functioned more like voluntary intermediaries, whose limited modularity rather than infinite mobility defined their value as human capital. They were intermediaries who could collect, represent, and transfer useful *local* data on the ground through the invisible sphere of media established in print, radio, and cinema, thereby creating an intangible air of freedom. Meanwhile, this modulated freedom also manifest an intense interest in regulating, ordering, and organizing local sensorial data into universal knowledge. The following studies of the works of Zhao Zifan—his fiction, film adaptations, science fiction, and his editorial career with *Asia Pictorial* — serve as telling cases about this double-bind between mobility and modularity, between freedom and control, and most importantly, the kind of labor involved in navigating between the two poles.

As a German-born Chinese, Zhao returned to China at fourteen for high school and college education. As a major in mathematics, he answered the Nationalist government's call to join the Intellectual Youth Army to fight the Japanese army. Returning to university to finish with a degree in economics, the Chinese Civil War again exiled Zhao in Hong Kong's Tiu Keng Leng (or Rennie's Mill), which was a famous refugee camp populated with former personnel and families associated with the Nationalists. Before being expelled to Taiwan in 1964, Zhao produced in Hong Kong a series of intriguing texts full of anti-communist sentiments. A singular image common to the major works by Zhao is his constant juxtaposition of a precarious environment and a strong will to navigate across the chaos of warfare based on scientific

reasoning and empiricism—a willpower embodied in images of aeronautics, spaceships, or other vehicular spaces piloted or engineered by intellectual figures such as professors, students, technocrats, and technicians.

A good example is his 1953 debut novel *The Half-Way Down Society* 半下流社會 (*Ban xialiu shehui*), written after being recruited as the editor of *Asia Pictorial* and later adapted into film in 1957. The novel and the film were issued by Asia Press and the Asia Pictures respectively, two major media outposts funded by The Asian Foundation hosted in the same building on Hong Kong Island. As one of the earliest titles published by Asia Press, the novel depicts a transient refugee community consisting of KMT intellectuals, officers and veterans, whose life struggle in Hong Kong's Rennie's Mill was characterized by their collective effort to stay alive and alert both to the allure of "high society," which had been corrupted by predatory capitalism, and to "low society," where people toiled and suffered without reflecting upon the meaning of existence. The heroic leader of the refugee camp, Wang Liang, thus defines "halfway down society" as a "laboratory for social experiment" 社會的實驗室 (*shehui de shiyanshi*) that can "integrate different ideals, link up different forces, and store various forms of creative vitality in life" (7). Wang's definition frames the KMT-refugee camp both as a social enclave distinct form the rest of the Hong Kong society and a laboratory where heterogeneous labor, skills, and knowledge in the city can be harmonized and mobilized for the fight against Communism. The image of an self-sustained enclave, however, is not simply marked by its local stratification in Hong Kong but also its geopolitical ties to Taiwan, as many characters in the novel are "undocumented" intellectuals waiting for the authorization and screening process that would allow them to relocate to the island held by the Nationalists.

A nexus intersected between the local social ladder and a transregional passage linking China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, the "half-way down society" represented both an urban enclave and a geopolitical node that might transport intellectuals as human resources between Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the meantime, the novel transposed the grand scale of Cold War geopolitics onto Hong Kong's street-level environment with its contingencies and crisis. This transposition in space and scale is subtly reanimated through the opening of the film adaptation, which shows a C.A.T airliner descending to the runway of Kai Tak Airport, followed by a documentary footage of an aerial view of Hong Kong's hustle and bustle with tramcars and automobiles. The opening credits of the film further visualize this motif of "descent" by arranging the movement of the credits in the form of a runway, along which the names of passengers, like an airplane gliding on the ground, roll from near to far, merging into Hong Kong's coastline (fig. 68).



Figure 68

The motif of air transport, as exemplified by the group's integration of various modes of labor and expertise across different sites, could be seen as an metaphorized airplane moving between the Cold War airspace between Taiwan and Hong Kong. What makes the metaphor really work, however, is the specific way labor is divided and deployed within the exiled group of free intellectuals. In a manner similar to a civilian airplane with flight attendants in charge of communicating, connecting, and caring for the pilots, the plane, and the passengers, the novel and its film adaptation also highlight the service labor of an attendant-like figure, embodied by the female protagonist Li Man, Wang's intimate partner, and a charming college graduate. Utilizing Li's pretty face, physical charm, poetry writing, and her social skills, the predominantly male intellectuals of the "half-way down" society transform their exiled group into an "essay company" 文章公司 (*wenzhang gongci*) comprised of a clear division of labor between a mathematician, a philosopher, a political thinker, and other writers in charge of producing think-pieces for local magazines and journals. By submitting literary criticism, philosophical treatises, political reviews and popular science under Li's name, the "company" makes her a new superstar in Hong Kong's cultural scene—a diva who navigates through the city's highbrow society by attending salons, advertising for products, or serving as the cover girl for magazines.

As Li ascends the city's cultural scene, achieving an unlikely stardom with a wide-reaching fanbase through print media, she also becomes the company's major financial source, as she supports the exiled group through income earned from advertisements, lecture honoraria, contract payments, and finally, her own employment by—and marriage with —a local publishing tycoon. One of the most interesting aspects of the company's design, however, lies in the role of Li also serving as the budget bookkeeper for the group, making her a working subject laboring to navigate between the "low" and "high" social strata while connecting the isolated male intellectuals to Hong Kong's local networks—socially, culturally, and financially.

The agency of Li Man as an intermediary connecting a visible social network and invisible flows of commodified intellectual labor make her a personified media infrastructure—

she sustains the company's material environment and she is the very medium through which the exiled KMT male intellectuals collectively broadcast their ideas, thoughts, and feelings to Hong Kong. Indeed, in the process of turning her into a figure of both medium and environment, the narrator of the novel begins to portray Li as a "conceptual term" 觀念名詞 (*gainian mingci*), the "sum total of the intellect" 智慧總和 (*zhihui zonghe*) of the company, and finally "a flamboyant flag" 鮮豔的旗幟 (*xianyan de qizhi*) that flies above the sea of the urban crowd (72). Li's persona is a platform through which the imagined audience (local Hong Kongers) and cultural laborers (KMT intellectuals) become connected on a plane, wherein the relationship between the Nationalists and the local Hong Kongers is constantly adjusted and modulated.

A telling moment about the precarity of this highly gendered labor can be found in a rather disturbing scene in which all the male intellectuals are debating Li's "betrayal" of the company by enjoying too much of her freedom and fame in the city and her gradual self-distancing from the exiled slum community. The debate, interestingly, quickly escalates from a discussion about Li Man's attitude to the debate about whether Li's "artistic freedom" 藝術的自由 (*yishu de ziyou*) has gone too far and become an atomizing force spinning away from the "center of gravity" 重心 (zhongxin) of the exile community. As such, she is seen as jeopardizing the "spiritual life" of the modern world and distorting the "criteria of objectivity and truth" (162-163). This debate over values, in this case, shifts into a metaphysical reflection laced with references to cosmological/astronomical bodies. The underlying message is that there should be a limit to the mobility that Li could enjoy. Like a satellite, Li is expected to travel through the urban cosmos along a fixed orbit, without ever breaking free from the intellectual gravity of the KMT intellectual group.

This formulation designates a singular notion of freedom within the novel's general political mapping of the KMT's epic "exodus" to Taiwan via Hong Kong. At first it appoints a communication channel (Li Man) who is imagined to transmit high fidelity signals against the presence of Hong Kong's floor of noise. Yet, as the story proceeds, Li's upward mobility is gradually suspected of the "infidelity" and "data-corruption" caused by her physical and mental engagement with both the city's commercial culture and the exile group's daily logistics of accounting and bookkeeping. In response to her ascent and descent, the narrator resorts often to a passionate, even religious, language of vitalism, replete with cosmological metaphors. At the very end of the novel, a catastrophic fire burns down the refugee camp, as Li commits suicide in her luxurious apartment. Lamenting both the destruction of lives and place, the saddened crowd chants a slogan-like set of lines: "We would rather take the Sun off the universe, if Freedom does not shine forth" (246). The definition of "freedom" is paradoxically articulated at the moment of the physical destruction of the company's face and the most important source of income. For the male intellectual group in the novel, Li Man's freedom is understood in terms of her mobility as a navigational vessel anchored by the collective scientific expertise of the males. Defined by a restricted path of travel, the vessel is designated to fly from Hong Kong to the KMT-ruled "Free China" and eventually return to China proper. Li's mental corruption and physical destruction, however, bespeaks an inevitable clash between her aerial freedom and palpable male "gravity" that keeps modulating and regulating her urban itineraries.

The friction between freedom and control, interestingly, would also buttress the visual and rhetorical strategies of Zhao's work in two other genres in Hong Kong: pictorial journalism

and science fiction, specifically in *Asia Pictorial* and a 1956 space journey trilogy of "science stories" 科學故事 (*kexue gushi*) published by Asia Press for young adult readers. The series, importantly, was meant to be a pedagogical/propaganda text introducing middle-school "Chinee youth" to the 1957 International Geophysics Year (IGY), an event that marked the first world-wide scientific exchange between the Western and the Eastern Blocs on planet Earth, noticeably excluding the participation of PRC and favoring the presence of Free China. Together these two groups of texts in the late 1950s, I argue, further radicalized the motif of aerial mobility by recoding it into a series of textual and visual images of aeronautic and astronomical sciences. If the medium of literary texts belonged to a high-brow readership, the novel's success did help him land a decent, and lucrative, editorial job at *Asia Pictorial*, with which he could further spread the air of freedom beyond Hong Kong through mass-produced and circulated pictorial magazines and pop-sci fiction.

If in *Half-way Down Society*, the cosmological images of sky, air, and atmosphere embodied a redemptive force transcending the streets of Hong Kong, these images were by no means arbitrary; rather, they were integral to a large visual-textual archive associated with the Asia Press/*Asia Pictorial* cluster, which popularized images of aeronautics, space science, and its capacity to deliver the abstract and intangible airspace of Cold War from the universe, the planet, the Free World, the city, to the hands of general readers. As mentioned earlier, the subscription network of Asia Press and *Asia Pictorial* across the "Free World" allies in East and Southeast Asia had determined its role as a transregional platform connecting the heterogenous groups of "overseas Chinese" as readers. With the aim of recruiting and mobilizing the collective intellect in these transient and scattered groups, pictorial foregrounds the importance of technological advances and technical innovations as the index of "Free Asia's" claim to civilizational legitimacy. The readers of *Asia Pictorial*, therefore, would encounter an unusually large number of visual images and texts that advertised Free China's (by the same token, U.S.'s) aeronautical technologies. With news and reports on the Nationalist's latest purchase of aircraft, its collaboration with other free Asian nations, and the occasional defections of PRC's flight-jets to Taiwan, the geopolitical and ideological messages in these journalistic images and texts are not to be mistaken.

Yet, beyond these obviously politicized visuals, a parallel and more intriguing aspect lay in the editorial efforts to frame aeronautical technologies as a daily gadget or device that afforded the reader the possibility of operating, interacting, and participating. Instead of placing images of aeronautic vehicles exclusively within military and geopolitical contexts, for instance, photos of airplanes, helicopters, and rockets were constantly grouped under headlines such as the "the new gadgets in the space age," together with innovations on a smaller scale, such as mini-helicopters, plastic gliders, drones, parachutes, among others. Departing from the relatively neutral English texts, the Chinese texts or captions often reflected a more casual tone in framing these high-tech aeronautics as "mere" devices, toys, or hobbies that could be bought and grasped by the hand by the readers/consumers. In one of the short pieces, for instance, the narrator takes on a kind of tabloid tone to describe the photos of "high-speed activity in the space age" and invites the readers to "participate in the colorful and kaleidoscopic activities so as to avoid being left behind by the age." In fact, a general reader could have no access to any of the aeronautical "gadgets" in the photos.

Such a scaling-down strategy can also be found in a series of visual juxtapositions in which Sony's full page advertisements on a new radio model were paired with three different news reports on military missions and scientific surveys done by airplanes. The Sony advertisement featured a world map on the top of the page with the images of the actual radio at the bottom and a line in bold Chinese and English fonts in between asking: "If the Earth Were Flat" (figure 69- 71). The texts in the ad explained that the new model, with its high-sensitivity, fully transistorized body splendidly solved the blocking of radio wave reception by the roundness of planet Earth—and of course, since the Earth couldn't be flat, you must buy one of the radios. Here the readers were presented with an affordable domestic appliance that could flatten the Earth into a map on the desk. Across the page: a supersonic airplane is being built, a research aircraft is surveying the arctic landscape, and a missile is being intercepted by man sitting in the situation room. From the left page to the right, the serial juxtapositions not only boosted the radio signals across the world map but implicitly turned the border-crossing mobility of aeronautic technologies into an affordable gadget that one can freely operate. In the meantime, the grand scale of military aeronautics was being miniaturized into a domestic device on the pages available for a reader's flipping and browsing.

Figure 69

Figure 70

Figure 71

Coupling this downscaled aerial view with the figure of personal gadget/device, other ads in the pictorial further showed an increased sense of personal interaction between users and machines, especially through the notion of professional *service* as part of the necessary expertise/skills needed to navigate a world of noise, crisis, and contingency. Just like the advertisement of transistorized radio, which was meant to help the users/readers navigate across the uneven surface of planet Earth through its pages, a series of ads sponsored by C.A.T. highlighted their expertise not just in acquiring the latest airplanes but the service they provided on a network of itineraries connecting Taipei, Hong Kong, Seoul, Tokyo, Okinawa, Bangkok, Manila—the cities of Free Asia. The serial ads of C.A.T. are particularly worth noting for two reasons: first, the long period over which these ads repeatedly appeared made them a serial navigational index for the pictorial itself. Appearing uniformly as a vertical long streak on the edge, these ads punctuated the pictorial from page to page, section to section, and issue to issue, providing a reliable road sign as the readers navigate across the pages.

The design of these ads further buttressed the navigational experience of stability and stasis in time and space. Readers would not fail to recognize the artistic objects and motifs featured by the ads: they were exclusively visual patterns, textual inscriptions, museum antiques, mythical figures, and architectural motifs associated with ancient China. The mythologized time

of China as seen here may not be surprising itself, given C.A.T.'s projected image as the carrier of traditional pre-1949 China. What was striking was that these motifs and symbols were mobilized as yet another series of gadgets *at the service of* the passengers: a carved stone monster of Shang Dynasty stored in Academia Sinica was placed kneeling under the phrase "Only Yes to You" 諾聲連連(*nuosheng lianlian*); a stone rubbing of a warring-states coachman driving a passenger with the famous quote from Confucius: "The young and the inferior would take on toil for you" 有事弟子服其勞 (*youshi dizi fuqilao*); Daoist gods emblematizing the popular myth of "Eight Immortals Crossing the East Sea" 八仙過海 (*baxian guohai*) display a variety of supernatural skills: calming the sea, stopping the storm, or halting the thunder. All these designs pointed toward a distinctive sensibility about the work of customer service as part of the expertise of aeronautical navigation in entertaining or erasing the inconvenient or contingent in air travel. This double motion between service and crisis was perhaps best captured by a juxtaposition of one of the "Eight Immortal" ads with two full pages of photojournalism that showed the aftermath of a severe typhoon that had just ravaged the streets of Hong Kong.

This visual and textual rhetoric mobilized by *Asia Pictorial* in the late 1950s and early 1960s marked the emergence of a subtle editorial sensibility that gradually transformed the abstract geopolitical aerial view into the operative potential for managing crisis on the ground. This shift of focus from observation to interaction and participation, interestingly, echoed Asia Press's pedagogical efforts to equip its young readers with the abstract knowledge of aeronautics and space science by turning it into concrete, graspable, and portable pocket-size readers. In a way similar to the wide array of student/intellectual-oriented journals supported by the Union Press, Asia Press's educational texts were a mixed genre of fiction, pictorial, and journalism with a large number of them being titles on the latest technology and science in aviation, aerostation, geophysics, and astronomy. If the editors of *Asia Pictorial* emphasized an aerial space that could be downscaled to fit a static vantage point for a reader, this "user-consciousness," as my case study shows, was further grafted onto an obsession with a male-dominated aeronautical knowledge and expertise in speeding up the transformative development from school boy into freedom-loving man.

Into the Space: the "Free China" Association from the Earth to the Cosmos

A singular case in point here is a three-volume science fiction for young adults by Zhao Zifan in 1956. Probably one of the earliest sci-fi narratives in the Chinese-speaking world after 1949, the main plot features a space journey around the solar system taken by a Chinese family of three generations—a boy named Xiaoming, his rocket scientist father, and his astronomer grandfather. Xiaoming's mother, a female technician based on Earth, is in charge of maintaining the telecommunication and logistical support to the three male astronauts. Contracted by the Asia Press to serve as supplementary educational materials aimed at middle-school students, the volumes—*Into the Air with the Flying Saucer* 飛碟征空 (*Feidie zhengkong*), *The Space Adventure* 太空歷險記(*Taikong lixianji*), and *The Earth Viewed from the Moon* 月亮上看地球 (*Yueliang shang kan diqiu*) —were also a political allegory in which the family's journey through space was mapped onto the geopolitical landscape of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China. Xiaoming's family, for instance, was from a self-governing island called "The Free Island" 自由

島 (*Ziyoudao*) at the southern end of the South China Sea that belonged to Free China. Xiaoming's scientist family was part the first-generation settlers who came to rule the island by setting up a scientific station called "The Institute of Cosmological Studies" 宇宙研究所 (*Yuzhouyanjushuo*) with its meteorological observatories, nuclear-powered rocket science platforms, and telecommunication facilities. These political references had their origins in two events with world-historical and geophysical significance.

As a publication project of Asia Press, the sci-fi series was created in celebration of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) between 1957 and 1958, the first grand-scale scientific project collaborated between the US-bloc and the Soviet bloc after Stalin's death (fig. 72). The event, concurring with the peak of Solar cycle 19 with its heightened activity of sunspots and influences on the Earth, launched a series of ground-breaking research programs in eleven sub-disciplines in meteorology, geophysics, astronomy, aeronautics, and astronautics. Despite an unprecedented effort seeking to break the deadlock between the West-bloc and East-bloc, the event excluded the participation of the PRC and listed the Nationalist regime in Taiwan as the legitimate representative of "China".[11] In this case, Zhao's fictions, perhaps not so surprisingly, served as a propagandist text with the aim of boosting the image of a scientifically superior Free China.

The fictional setting of the "Free Island" as part of the archipelago in the South China Seas echoed the increased militarization of the Taiwan-held Taiping Island (better known as Itu Aba Island), the biggest among the disputed Spratly Island cluster. From 1956 to 1960, for instance, the Nationalist regime conducted a series of symbolic naval cruises around the island and began upgrading the island's scientific facilities and military infrastructure. In this case, Zhao's fictional techno-utopia did not simply serve as the index of real-life geopolitics but further accelerated it by setting up a hyper-modernized island that could connect Hong Kong (the fiction's place of publication) and Taiwan (the major targeted audience of the fiction). It was perhaps no surprise that the family's epic journey was initiated by an abrupt "whirlwind" hitting the island the day before their space adventure. In short, it was a whirlwind that threatened the sovereign terrain of the Free Island, whose scientists must seek help from extraterrestrial resources.

It is against these broader geopolitical references that Zhao's rhetorical mobilization of astronautical, astronomical, and meteorological knowledge reveal a special form of modulation defined by the knowledge of balancing between the macrocosmic and the microcosmic, between the ancient and the present, between a sublime cosmological openness and the meticulous details

[11] Ronald E. Doel's work reveals the role of U.S. Department of State in in making this political arrangement possible. The PRC did protest against their exclusion from it (49-76). The idea of IGY was hatched in the early 1950s when physicist Lloyd Berkner proposed a worldwide effort to track geophysical data. The idea was to collect and share scientific data about the Earth—its atmosphere, oceans, glaciers, and its sun—regardless of political boundaries. IGY, importantly, also marks the beginning of the so called "Space Race" between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as a series of scientific and technological projects were launched from both sides: Soviet Union successfully launched *Sputnik 1* using a military intercontinental ballistic missile on October 4, 1957. The first American satellite to reach orbit, *Explorer 1*, went up on January 31, 1958 as part of the IGY. NASA itself was created in July,1958.

of techno-scientific control. This knowledge is firstly articulated in the forward, where Zhao points out a principle of cosmological "free association" 自由聯合(*ziyoulianhe*) governed by a "mathematical constant" 常數 (*changshu*). Zhao emphasizes the infinite scalability of this universal constant by highlighting its bonding of a proton and an electron, a planet and a satellite, a star and a planet, a nebula and another nebula, and the layers within Galaxy. The fundamental constant across different scales, in Zhao's words, manifests a spirit of "equality and friendly affection," "harmonious coexistence," and a "relatively static material cosmos with peace and order" (1-4).

A discerning reader would not fail to detect a striking similarity between the notion of "free association" and the sort of "limited freedom" seen in the *The Halfway Down Society.* In the novel, the limited freedom and mobility is embodied by Li Man's expected role as a service worker who could connect, circulate, and maintain the flow of symbolic capital and actual flow of money for the male intellectuals. Her role is metaphorized in the narrative as a subtle balance between the ground and the sky and marked by the purity of the male intellectual circle and her "corruption" in Hong Kong's urban environment. In the novel, if the body of the female "medium" proves to be untrustworthy for the task of transmitting data in Hong Kong's urban cosmos, the task in the sci-fi narrative is passed into the hands of a boy, whose innocence and susceptibility is now armed with a knowledge of astronautics and astronomy taught by his father and grandfather. As Xianming's astronomer grandfather exclaims when the spaceship takes off from the Free Island and the two look back to the Earth:

> When the Earth was in its coma, it was only children's perspective that stood out;[…] The Earth has been too twisted that it cannot see innocence and purity or hear the call of Nature. Now, the dawn of human civilization has arrived and the sound of slaughter has receded. The aurora from both poles of the Earth have cheerily extended their arms. The new world belongs to the kids (32-34).[12]

Through this monologue, the vertical flight against gravity is intertwined with the "wisdom" that is made possible by the aeronautical and astronautical upward movement. The flight upward, in this case, promises not only to jettison the backwardness and narrow-mindedness of human ignorance but to turn the blood-thirsty "two-dimensional animals" into the "three-dimensional animals" that can transcend the sticky embeddedness of the Earth. A rather ironic discrepancy, however, can be found between the grandpa's dramatic gesture to jumpstart the acquisition of an aerial view and the long narrative passages in the form of excessively meticulous catechism with the astronomer grandpa lecturing to Xiaoming on highly condensed scientific knowledge with abstract figures and numbers. These predominantly informative lectures, instead of pushing the development of the story, construct a series of roadblocks that slow down, even hinder, the reading experience, as a middle-school kid would have to painstakingly navigate across these blocks until Xiaoming responds to the grandpa's questions once in a while.

Yet, even when the technocratic family is on the move, their momentary escape does not guarantee a "moving" horizon truly detached from earth, as the journey involves mostly peaceful tours and guided-sightseeing from planet to planet, and they are hosted only by outer space

[12] My translation from the original Chinese text.

natives who either "looked exactly like Chinese" or admire the great Chinese civilization. The first alien astronaut, who crashed on the Free Island and offers to take the family into the outer space, is described as a tall energetic young man with black hair, yellow skin, and a highly intelligent protruding forehead with a look that could "pass as a Chinese man from the Qin or Han Dynasty" (22). The family later encounters more familiar faces and places, such as an astronautic hostess who looks like a typical "lady from Suzhou" or an air-dome with technologized climate control that makes its interior like "the land south of the Yangtze River" 江南 (*jiangnan*) (42). Even when Xiaoming and his grandpa are discussing how literary portrayals of Martians, such as that by H.G. Wells, go too far beyond any scientific principle, Xiaoming feels compelled to joke about this by alluding to the familiar Chinese political reality: "Aren't those villains in tilted octagonal combat hats the living specimen for Mr. Wells?" (54). The Grandpa, inspired by the joke, thus jumps into another series of "scientifically-guided" comparative anatomies between H.G. Wells' imagined Martians and the Communists in real-life: firstly, the heart of Martians feels no fatigue, just like the Communists who are always planning the next scheme; secondly, Martians rely on asexual self-reproduction, just like the Communists; thirdly, Martians have a thick skin to resist external change, resembling the self-sufficient "ideological system" with which the Communist "hypnotize themselves inside and fool the enemies outside" (55).

All in all, what the space journey narrative offers is anything but a flight away from the Earth. On the contrary, the supposedly unknown excitement in the outer space is contained and stabilized in a smooth movement of stasis and normalcy—a commonplace that might as well have happened on earth. This heavily pedagogical astronautical view testifies to Zhao's preface, where he articulates the objective of distinguishing the feelings of "the sacred from the downright mysterious." He maintains that the world had been ruled by superstition, ignorance, and ideology, and that his book is meant to provide an antidote. Freedom, in this case, is specifically defined as the ability to fly above the surface of the ground to gain a scientific/masculine vintage point, as the son-father-grandfather trio does. The flight to freedom, therefore, is hinged upon the ability to regulate crisis and contingency in the steady hands of male intellectuals. In *Halfway Down Society*, similarly, the sense of crisis and chaos was radicalized by sky-born disasters such as whirlwind, and typhoon—chaos that was linked to Li Man's inability to maintain and control her multiple "flights" in the city as the diva of Hong Kong's cultural industry, the male group's breadwinner, accountant, and the lover/muse for its male leader, Wang Liang. Her inability to control and regulate her emotional and moral crisis, not surprisingly, is constantly compared to the authoritative order and moral clarity of Wang Liang, the Sun and "center of gravity" of the KMT intellectual universe in Hong Kong. To situate this trope of regulation and control within the massive amount of aeronautical images in *Asia Pictorial* framed as gadgets/device on the pages, what we have seen is actually a specific cultural sensibility that recodes aeronautical flight and its downcast eyes as a *managerial and operative knowledge* centered upon the development of intellectual (mostly males) from the crisis-ridden household, city, into the geophysical universe of the Cold War.



Figure 72

Figure 73

It is this through these aeronautical/astronautical images across different media and genres centered around the career of Zhao Zifan that one can identify a new cultural sensibility structured by the double bind between control and freedom regarding the physical and social mobility of the Chinese free intellectuals as human capital. Zhao's personal flight from China, Hong Kong, and to Taiwan, perhaps not by coincidence, resonated with those in his stories. Through the male intellectuals of Hong Kong and the grandfather-father-son trio from Free Island, his works project a fantasized masculine mobility and stability through images and narratives of flight, navigation, and intellectual transformation.

From the cosmological metaphor in *Half-Way Down Society*, the gadget-aesthetics in *Asia Pictorial*, to the obsession with numbers and figures in the space propaganda, the images of aeronautics/astronautics treat aeronautical mobility as a collective body of social knowledge defined by Hong Kong as an exchange hub and the kind of expertise required in sustaining the hub's transportation/transaction during the Cold War era. These images have shifted our focus from flight to groundwork—skills, learning, morality, and emotional sensibilities that can support a smooth flight. They are exemplary of a general recodification of the labor of cultural production into a series of units of territory, class, gender. Li Man's labor of balancing within and without the KMT company, for instance, can be seen in her code-switching in clothing, speaking, and housing. Similarly, navigational knowledge of the Solar system is achieved through endless exchanges of numerical figures between Xiaoming and his astronomer grandpa, who constantly fact-check the accuracy of Xiaoming's utterances. This *substitution* of real flights with social protocols and information is not unlike the substituting process Gilles Deleuze points out in "Postscript on the Societies of Control," where he indicates that the transition from disciplinary sites of enclosure to the new spirit of a corporate system characterized by perpetual training of expertise, which re-codes individuals into an endless series of "dividuals" of numbers, data, figures that can be managed and controlled beyond the conventional space of work (3-7).

This notion of dividuals rather than individuals allows us to reconsider Hong Kong's exiled intellectuals and the kind of cultural ground work they perform within the context of

localized media networks constituted by a tension between control and freedom. Viewed from this perspective, aeronautical/astronautical images in local anti-Communist fiction, pictorial, and films are better considered not as the representation of concrete machinery but as a series of visual and textual codes indexing the changing identity of Hong Kong's anti-Communist intellectual coterie. They at once celebrate the free circulation of knowledge—or rather, thematize the mechanical mode of such mobility—and reveal to its readers/audience the valorization of the work of flight as a series of artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and public opinions. In short, the transportational technicity of aeronautics/aeronautics is itself turned into image that *mirrors* the communicational and informational labor of Hong Kong's intellectuals.

While thinkers such as Antonio Negri focused on the autonomy of immaterial—informational and affective—labor, thereby suggesting that more autonomous freedom breeds more resistance, this is not the view I take in seeing Hong Kong's rightwing intellectual cluster. Instead of seeing the "free intellectuals" as being either free or controlled, I see it as collective regulating force within the Cold War regime of dominance. Knowledge or pseudo-knowledge of aeronautic/astronautics were less cultural content than a series of metastable forms that recoded the sensibilities of transportation into images of mobility and stability in terms of personal development and transformation. The enclosed space of airplanes and spaceships, in this case, serve as a topological space that kept transforming the aerial control of Cold War into a process of *service* that maintained the smoothness and security of aerial flight in the face of contingency and crisis. The social individuals involved in this service, echoing what Karl Marx points out in "Fragment on Machines," no longer "appears so much to be included within the production process" but comes to "relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself (705). In providing their "general productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body," the freedom-loving intellectual collective had projected onto the aeronautical/astronautical machine its own mode of labor, one that was defined by constant communication, connection, and navigational knowledge that linked Hong Kong to Taiwan as a corridor of informational transmission during the Cold War.

In the airspace of Cold War Hong Kong, the ambivalent work of *serving* both Hong Kong and Taipei required a massive amount of site-mapping, territorial coding, and code-switching. The milieu of this intellectual labor went beyond the conventional disciplinary spaces to form a mobile network of ever-switching identities made up by students, spies, soldiers, and technocrats. Take the "Third Force"—a branch of CIA-funded paramilitary, technical, and cultural troops based in Japan, Okinawa, Saipan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines, for instance. With Hong Kong as the major hub for recruiting exiled intellectuals to be trained on US-held islands, the Third Force's original plan was to replace Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime with its own brand of "Free China" based on its own military and cultural expertise. In the vein of the islands and stars of "free association" imagined in Zhao's *Into the Air with Flying Saucer* and Asia Press's claim to a "free" information corridor, the island-constellation for the training of the Third-Force formed a singular space that was neither Taiwan or Hong Kong but a connection between the two in the air. Most importantly, this "air" was buttressed by the fantasized power of the exiled "free intellectuals" as an infinite source of artistic creativity, scientific objectivity, and mobility. Together with the fantasy of airborne guerilla warfare waged by Third Force's island paratroopers, the visual and rhetorical images of aviation and aeronautics had thus fostered a

technological sublimity, a ubiquitous airspace for the prosecution of warfare and linking the non-Communist islands.[13]

This imagined capacity of the exiled intellectuals, however, was quickly debunked, as the Third Force proved to be nothing but a money-sucking enterprise that never succeeded in either infiltrating the CCP or overthrowing the KMT. Instead, a significant number of the Third Force personnel ended up staying in Hong Kong and became important players in Hong Kong's cultural scene. At the end of the day, the trajectory of the Third Force exemplified a general entropy of work and labor among Hong Kong's rightwing intellectuals. If *Halfway-Down Society's* Li Man needed to turn herself from a college graduate into the accountant and the face for the anti-Communist enterprise, the exiled author Zhao also needed to transform himself from political refugee into an editor for *Asia Pictorial* by processing a massive amount of stock photos—including images of the latest aeronautical and astronautical technologies—distributed by the USIS and Associated Press. Zhao's narratives might have imagined individual cultural heroes/heroines who could transform arts and science into military actions, but the reality is that their general social knowledge was oftentimes turned to bookkeeping, accounting, hosting, editing, and socializing. In the process, airspace became static, the ground mobilized, and aerial flight turned into ground work.

It was within this regulated airspace that the images of aeronautical flight turned the machinery of airplanes into an objectified form of general social knowledge involved in the reproduction of a specific Cold War value called "freedom". Machineries of transportation became an infrastructure that projected a collective organizational aesthetics of free movement while grounding and delimiting it as the work of service, maintenance communication on the ground. The transition from the air to ground will further help us reconceptualize a group of rightwing urban comedies and melodramas, which had recoded this modulated freedom of the airplane into the images of automobiles. The urban routes of automobile, as I hope to show, turned the knowledge of navigating the Cold War airspace into a specific sort of urban navigation through a gendered battlefield between domestic space and public sphere.

[13] The Third Force Movement consisted of Hong Kong refugees including ex-Kuomintang soldiers and warlords, and for a time received covert support from the American government Truman administration (Mark 188–193). According to my own interview with film critic Law Kar, former editor of the *Chinse Student Weekly*, some of the more famous cultural celebrities and journalists during the 1960s, such as Sima Changfeng 司馬長風 could have received paratrooper training in Okinawa under the guidance of U.S military.

Chapter Four

Car as Code

MP & GI's Speed Drama and the Groundwork of Gendered Labor

Everyman needs some invisible means of support.
---Loke Wan Tho, *A Company of Birds,* 1959

Nature builds no machines, no locomotives,
railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc.
They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand;
the power of knowledge, objectified.
---Karl Marx, *The Grundrisse*, 1858

In Chapter Three, I have focused on how the aerial sovereignty of "Free China" was recoded through Hong Kong's rightwing media cluster, which turned the fantasy of free movement into an operational relationship between gadgets and users, thereby affording an interstitial space where the explosiveness of warfare was turned into a managerial plane of mobility and security. Whether it was KMT's exiled "cultural economy" in *Half-way Down Society* or the space journey of the anti-communist technocratic family, they collectively project an imagined freedom of movement imbricated with the groundwork of maintenance, care, service, and learning. In the following, I will show that this projection of aerial movement was inseparable from an equally significant *introjection* manifested in a series of Hong Kong's rightwing urban cinema featuring the circulation of commodities and laboring bodies as service. This introjection, embodied by the movement of ground transport—— automobiles, buses, trains —retained the velocity of aerial navigation but turned the territorial codes of Cold War airspace into the protocols of class, gender, and working ethos in Hong Kong's marketplace. By mobilizing vehicles, these films downscaled Cold War intellectual labor by turning territorial war over airspace into more everyday games of calculation and speculation in an urban economy defined by customer service and domestic labor.

I want to return to my initial criticism of an interpretive truism which treats the images of transportation merely as stylistic symbols of consumerism, tourism, and the influence of Americanization, especially when we consider a film like *Air Hostess*. As I point out in the beginning of the chapter, previous understandings of the film often frame it as a pro-Nationalist production exclusively based on MP& GI's close ties to the Nationalist regime and its portrayal of an "Americanized" life style of jet-setting and modern professionalism. While this interpretation might not be wrong, it does not account for the general milieu of logistics and the cultural imaginaries of aviation and navigation that linked Taiwan and Hong Kong's rightwing media culture. Specifically, this line of reading of MP& GI's celebrated piece does not explain two facts: firstly, in the 1950s and the early 1960s, rightwing film studios also produced a great number of urban films that foregrounded the movement of automobiles rather than airplanes. Secondly, other than the aeronautic/astronautic images, the images of automobiles also made

their way into right-wing print culture as symbolic tokens of economic calculation and competition.

As I try to show in the following, beyond mere symbols of consumerism, the images of ground transport could be manifestations of an emerging cultural sensibility that turned the movement of aviation towards Hong Kong's horizontal and vertical urban fabrics. Some of the most representative rightwing melodramatic films, I argue, showed that ground transport vehicles actively functioned as a device that connected different modes of human labor across different urban scales, linking the most banal local tensions of the market to the Cold War knowledge production. The automobile, in this sense, was not simply a luxury good but an abstract machine that grounded the Cold War's media operations in the vitality of urban circulation of values and identities. If the control of aerial view tended to highlight the communication-oriented service of the exiled intellectuals in maintaining a secure airspace, ground transport in these films foregrounds the service work of skilled laborers, white collar employees, and service personnel. However, unlike the imageries of aviation that often smoothed out the sense of crisis regarding the obstructed flow of knowledge and commodities, the "transport melodrama" often opted for a visual logic that exposed the toil and labor involved in the flow of urban logistics, especially its digressions and friction within a city full of contingent cross-purposing of commercial competition.

In Zhao's *Half-way Down Society*, the self-enclosed community of the Nationalists resembled that of a small firm or factory that mobilized the skills, intellect, and emotions of individuals to navigate the Cold War corridor between Hong Kong and Taiwan. This infrastructure of knowledge, in the form of an enterprise, also highlighted the danger of mistaking communication, affection, or social skills as true knowledge— Li Man's self-destruction, for instance, was constantly attributed to her "sentimentality" and "susceptibility" and her lack of "real content" possessed by other male intellectuals. Here Li's affective labor was posited as something in direct tension with "true" knowledge such as mathematics, political science, and philosophy. In the same vein, Zhao's propaganda sci-fi opposed the objective aerial view from the spaceship to the earthbound ignorance of a world polluted by Communist ideology. In short, those who were affectively susceptible to stimulants outside the system might lead the system astray into tragic collapse.

The tension between systematic equilibrium and failure became a central trope in a series of transport-themed propaganda films co-produced by Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 1950s. Unlike the communicational labor exemplified by Li Man, which was considered a corruptible element in the system, in these films service labor—with its professional ethos and protocols related to transportation system—was central to the shaping of a distinctive melodramatic mode common to the rightwing cinema of this period. If sensational melodrama, as Ben Singer points out, was needed by modern capitalistic society for its coding and simplification of an environment full of contingent encounters and cutthroat competition (131-145), I want to point out that Hong Kong's transport melodrama used the motif of transportation both to unleash the explosiveness of dramatic conflicts while containing them with an *operational* aesthetic, through which the invisible cause-effect of the social machine was laid bare, codified, and made legible by the velocity of vehicles With this operational aesthetic, these films managed to facilitate a series of transformations in the knowledge and mentality of the protagonists, as they calculated

and strategized for an increasingly competitive urban economy based on emerging retailing and small-scale manufacturing sectors, and changing gender and labor identities between home and workplace.

The transformation from the air to ground—with its recodification of territorial, economic, and identitarian protocols as "melodrama", could be traced back to two attempts made by Hong Kong's pro-Nationalist film studios and Taiwan's Ministry of Defense in their production of the propaganda films *Flying Tigers* 飛虎將軍 (1956), *The Terminal Bound* 關山行 (1956), as well as *Air Hostess* 空中小姐 (1959). These three interconnected films all feature the importance of female service labor through a character-making process that turned the musical diva Grace Chang into a figure who could navigate by way of airplanes and buses while transforming military sentiments into civil or commercial uses.

As one of the first movies featuring the Nationalist air force, *Flying Tigers* (*Feihu Jianjun*) was a product attempted by the KMT government to broadcast the legitimacy of its military clout to Hong Kong, Macau, and the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Produced by Hong Kong's pro-KMT film studio Yonghua Pictures under the leadership of Li Zhuyong 李祖永 (1903-1959), whose ties with KMT dated back to the 1940s, the film had full support from Taiwan's Ministry of Defense, which would provide the production crew with military consolers, cameramen, and access to air force base for location shooting. Projecting Taiwan's sphere of influence across the pan-Chinese speaking world outside the People's Republic, the film portrayed the ROC Airforce as the hub that could attract and connect diverse talents and expertise scattered around the network of "Free Asia." This trans-regional network was embedded in four young cadets at the Air Force Academy in southern Taiwan, as they were portrayed as a timid rural Taiwanese, a wealthy Philippine *Huaqiao* 華僑 (overseas Chinese), a dandy Hong Konger, and an exiled Chinese to Taiwan after 1949. Set against the air force academy, the film presented not battles in the air, but training grounds for future pilots. Grace Chang—known as the musical diva in rightwing romance comedies—was cast as the younger sister of a military instructor in the academy. Like Li Man, Chang was not only the love interest of the male group but also the key catalyst in transforming the cadets' diverse personalities and social background into a new mold as future fighters against communists, as the four male cadets evolve from unruly trouble-makers into full-fledged Air Force officers.

The narrative of collective transformation from cadets to fighters, for instance, is initiated by the moment of traffic "transfer" with Grace Chang alighting from a bus before getting onto a rickshaw. Charmed by a transitory glimpse of Chang's beauty, the four drop their idling on the streets and get on bikes to follow the rickshaw, only to find that Chang is the sister of their own flight instructor in the academy. In this case, Chang's role functions as an ambivalent agent shuttling between the military personnel and the civilian passengers, connecting these separate realms by her daily routes via ground transport. Ironically, her daily itinerary also draws the cadets back to the academy's institutional context of learning, training, and competition. Indeed, the location-shooting of the air-force academy in southern Taiwan becomes the backdrop for the melodramatic tension among the cadets, who compete for her attention, break rules, face military trials, but finally learn the virtues of discipline, patience, and empathy before their graduation test flight. By turning their military training into the process of resolving tensions on the streets, the film becomes a *bildungsroman* through which the cadets learn to discipline their aggression, desire, arrogance, and inferiority complexes. The benevolent face of Chang—seductive,

sensitive, but also disciplinary, turns the science of flight into a procedure to control bodies and emotions.

Flying Tigers presents a process that recodes the explosiveness of warfare into the ethos of professional training and the dramatic tensions of love and jealousy. In this process, territorial differences or ethnic conflicts ate located, antagonized, and finally resolved through Chang's navigational activity in and out of the academy's institutional space: on the one hand, as the sister of the flight instructor, she serves as the agent for the system, enjoying easy access to military facilities while indoctrinating the cadets into the military protocols—she is, for example, granted visits to the cadets' dormitory and invited to confer the rank of "officer" upon her lover, the once dandy and rebellious Hong Konger. On the other hand, however, she plays the role of *distracting* the cadets from their daily training routines with her charm. Chang's doubleness on the threshold of the system, in this case, creates an itinerary through which the work of care, communication, maintenance, and pedagogy are interwoven into the spatial movement from the air to the ground. In this case, although the film's title was meant to rekindle memories of Chennault Lee's C.A.T. and its battles for the Nationalists, what it actually does is reimagine invisible networks of flight into the routes of bikes, rickshaws, and cars. Swinging between distraction and attention, between spiritual transformation and transportation, the film portrays the pursuit of a military uniformity as the daily management of bodies and emotions.

As *Flying Tigers* creates a character serving the system affectively, the production of the film itself also marked the birth of a new star-system that would turn Hong Kong into a training ground for actresses and actors who "served" the rightwing propaganda cinema and urban melodrama in the late 50s and early 60s. Grace Chang and Peter Hou Chen, two major stars in *Flying Tigers*, for instance, would go on to assume different roles in a series of melodramatic romances and comedies with urban transportation themes, including *Terminal Bound*, *Air Hostess*, *Our Dream Car*, *The Story of a Fur Coat*, and *Holiday Express*, among many others. Their trans-regional stardom across the "free" Chinese world, importantly, was a direct result born of a series of commercial and political transactions among Taiwan's military government, Hong Kong's Yonghua Pictures, and Singapore's Cathay/MP&GI, which was seeking to transform itself from a cinema distributor to a producer with its own studios and line-up of actors and actresses. The co-production of *Flying Tigers* between Yonghua and the Nationalists, importantly, played a crucial role in pioneering a unique mode of collaboration, as the film was part of the three-party package deal involving the Nationalists' intervention into Yonghua's huge financial debt to Loke Wan Tho's Cathay/MP&GI. In an arrangement proposed by the Nationalist government, Yonghua's studio and facilities became part of the collateral for Cathay/MP&GI. The deal would subsequently allow the Singapore-based company to transform itself into a full-scale film industry with its own studio and star-system reaching into the vast Chinese-speaking market outside the PRC.[1]

This transition was accompanied by an unprecedented experiment with the company's organizational form based on Hollywood's assembly line production, as Loke Wan Tho and his team implemented a strict division of labor, hierarchical structure, and a series of star-making practices. They include an independent scouting and training program, compulsory dorm-living,

[1] For a detailed discussion on the property transaction, see Fu 21.

and control over actress/actors' public image mediated by professional spokespeople and the company's own film magazine *International Screen*. MP&GI, importantly, also established their own screenplay units called the Committee of Screenplay Editing and Reviewing, which included many "free" writers such as Yi Wen, Yao Ke and Eileen Chang, who were usually considered either anti-communists or KMT sympathizers. With the vertically integrated production-line and trans-Asian network of distribution/exhibition linking Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, MP&GI consolidated its ties to the Nationalist's propaganda policy and turned the studio into a platform through which a group of pro-Nationalist directors, actors/actresses, and technicians could be trained, circulated, and exchanged as a cluster of cultural workers.

Against this context, Grace Chang's role in *Flying Tiger* indexes a crucial moment in the rightwing film industry, as her role as transforming/transporting agent signaled the emergence of a human resources network that connected Hong Kong and Taiwan via the "free" corridor of Cold War. The narrative cycle based on a service agent capable of affectively coordinating different expertise and transforming/transporting also influenced *Terminal Bound* and its sequel *Air Hostess*—the former co-produced by the Nationalist government and Cathay/MP&GI while the latter by MP&GI alone, both directed by Yi Wen. While *Terminal Bound* was set against the routes of long-distance bus and the latter the airplane, both films again feature Grace Chang as the hostess/stewardess serving as a communicator between the driver/pilot and the passengers onboard, as she coordinates the various forms of expertise, skills, and emotions of the passengers so as to navigate across natural catastrophes, social turmoil, and even crime.

As the first collaboration between MP&GI and the Nationalist regime, *Terminal Bound* follows a bus journey along the island-wide motorway network in Taiwan. Placing a group of urban passengers of mixed social backgrounds in a bus blocked by a landslide in a mountain village, the film focuses on Chang's role as the bus hostess who believes deeply in the professional protocol of the state-owned bus company. As the passengers abandon the bus for their pleasure-seeking and sightseeing in the roadside village cut off from contact, Chang tirelessly serves as the go-between connecting the bus driver, the passengers gone astray, and the villagers, trying to bring everyone back to their original itinerary.

Grace Chang's uniform and her physical labor of communication form a stark contrast with the anarchistic flow of passengers dispersing into the mountains, as her efforts to mobilize their labor and expertise to restore the damaged motorway are constantly thwarted by all sorts of contingent and distracting situations in the village. There is a moment when the bus hostess feels so discouraged that she doubts the meaning of her service in fostering the "public spirit" among the passengers. Her navigational lines to bring her passengers back on route, instead of being presented through location-shooting, are mostly shown in domestic spaces, as the bus-riding urbanites—an alcoholic surgeon, a professor, a businessman, a gambler/swindler, a former prostitute, a school girl escaping from an arranged marriage, and a banker absconding with embezzled funds—continue to carry all sorts of urban conflicts, schemes, crimes, and transactions into the mountains, drastically changing the emotional and material dynamics among the villagers. Urbanity and domesticity—transported to the wilderness by the state-run coach service motorway networks— is prefigured early in the film by the simulated scene of the

landslide, staged by way of an artificial miniature landscape, complete with a toy bus, artificial rain, plastic trees, rocks and cliffs made of clay and papier-mache (fig. 74 - 75).

Fig. 74

Fig. 75

Echoing this interiorized exterior, the film's melodramatic plotlines also harbors multiple plot lines constantly cross-purposing through the mediation of interior spaces. In the process, their itineraries turn the rural village into a miniature urban space that has a medical clinic (where the surgeon helps deliver a baby), a casino (where the villagers are lured into gambling and debts), a nursing center (where the baby is taken care of), and even a therapy session (where the school girl reconciles with her parents). These domestic conflicts, tensions and emotions interestingly are gradually resolved via Chang's role as a highly communicative agent, convincing, negotiating, arguing, and debating. At the plot's climatic moment, her body is even turned into a physical medium of communication, as she donates her blood to a village woman in the throes of childbirth. At the level of cinematography, Chang's emotional labor is visually rendered through the extensive use of close-ups on her confrontational facial expressions, invariably done through a constant switching between high-angle shots and low angle shots. This gives the viewers a strong sense of vertical compression and dramatization of the emotional tensions among the transportation personnel, passengers, and the villagers. The use of high and low angle close-ups, in this case, also dramatizes the interiorized space in the film, thereby turning the rural village into a melodramatic domestic space dictated by the fast-paced urban itineraries at all sort of cross-purposes.

From *Flying Tiger* to *Terminal Bound*, the two co-produced propaganda films between the Nationalist government in Taiwan and Hong Kong's rightwing studios in the mid-1950s were pioneering a new narrative cycle to be repeated, popularized, and further renovated in many other urban comedies and melodramas. In these cycles, female labor— emotional or physical— is constantly thematized against an urban transport network that buttresses the speedy exchange of commodity goods and social identities within a logistical supply chain. Their struggle between their old role and new role between family and marketplace, as presented through these films, are thus oftentimes intertwined with the airplane or the automobile's streamlined mobility in providing a home (front) with material and emotional support. In the case of *Terminal Bound*, for example, this sentiment is captured by its advertisement tagline, which frames the bus service in terms of military logistics: "The generals and sergeants fighting bravely on the frontline; their fellow countrymen contribute avidly on the home front" (fig.76).

Fig. 76

Terminal Bound is a rather little-known piece compared to its much more famous and less political sequel three years later, *Air Hostess*, but it anticipates some of the basic narrative cycle to be seen in the latter. This includes an exact the same character setting that features Grace Chang as a flight attendant facilitating among the pilot, passengers, while struggling between her role as both a service laborer in the workplace and a desired object in the marriage market. The itineraries of the island-wide in *Terminal Bound*, is now projected into a trans-Asian network linking Taipei, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Bangkok as key nodal points of a non-Communist international. In *Air Hostess*, the geopolitical presence of Taiwan as Free China is toned down for a less political audience of Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, but whose importance as the logistics home-front in the Cold War is still evoked in the lyric of a musical number called "A Taiwanese Tune" written by the director Yi Wen himself: "Extending in all directions are motorways/ South and North connected via Railways/The frontline outpost of the Pacific/Taiwan the famed treasure island". Performed by the flight attendant in one of her trips to Taipei, the rest of the lyrics highlights the abundant supply of agricultural produce that can be transported via motorways and railways.

Despite the general similarities in terms of theme and political overtone, *Air Hostess* recodes some of the tropes and motifs in *The Terminal* to suit an increasingly commoditized society and emerging service labor. These differences, I suggest, are manifested in the changing role of female service labor in relation to the new urban topography defined by a different transport system and its sensibilities. First of all, the same affective and communicational labor, as seen in *Terminal Bound*, is intensified in *Air Hostess*, as a series of training and controls over facial expressions, the callisthenic body, language skills, and the capacity to accurately schedule time and actions among different terminals and flights. While in *Terminal Bound*, the service of

the bus hostess is done through a rather simple pattern of one hostess speaking to a group of passengers on behalf of one driver, in *Air Hostess* the pattern of communication involves a whole team of pilots, stewardesses, and an anonymous group of travelers, some of whom, as it turns out, even abuse the service of flight attendants by asking them to smuggle fake jewelry and pirated products on their routine itineraries. In this film, the work ethics of a flight attendant—exemplified by punctuality and prioritization of the customer's needs— ironically leads to the abuse of the transport system to break legal codes of commerce. The change of scene from a self-enclosed village in Taiwan to the transnational airport of urban Hong Kong, therefore, signals the attendant's increasing inability to control the movement of her passengers' intentions and destinies, thereby raising the bar to be a qualified labor and generating a deeper sense of precarity.

This double tendency of airplanes — engineering streamlined efficiency and incurring potential social breakdown — provides a new analytical approach to the meaning of transportation systems represented in postwar Hong Kong rightwing melodrama and urban comedies. Instead of seeing vehicles and planes as mere symbols of material affluence and wealth, I suggest that we take them as indexes to a different mode of logistical movement, as service workers and the labor associated with the transport system constantly "switches gears" from one to another, while simultaneously changing identities, social registers, and gender roles in their struggle toward social mobility. And this transitory juncture, involving code-switching, social crisis and contingency, is by the same token recognized, identified, and eventually resolved by the transport system itself: a process which also generates the melodramatic effects of the films themselves.

Take, for example, a critical scene in *Air Hostess*. As the protagonist, flight attendant Lin Keping (Grace Chang) is mistaken as the accomplice of the smuggler of fake jewelry—her colleague Zhu, played by Yeh Feng, is the real accomplice — it is her love-interest, the copilot Lei, who drives a convertible sports car to replace Zhu with Lin on her habitual smuggling itinerary, thereby exposing the international scheme between Hong Kong and Bangkok. The replacement is done paradoxically by pushing the limits of the airline's service protocols: Lei spills a drink on Zhu's uniform on purpose, causing Zhu to panic about breaking the dress-code on the flight. Offering to immediately solve the problem 45 minutes before boarding, Lei drives Zhu to her service apartment for a change while sending Lin to the boarding gate in place of Zhu. The sports car, in this case, repairs the crime embedded in the airline system only when certain organizational protocols—dress-code and schedule—themselves are also pushed to the limit by the car's speedy transport and exchange of (Lin and Zhu's) professional identities. In the meantime, Keping's upward mobility is also marked by her value in the eyes of Lei, whose driving skills, professional knowledge and patriarchal presence rescue both the company and her lover from a potential catastrophe. This process, in other words, allegorizes a process through which the streamlined airflow of logistical supply—marked by the delivery of goods— must force-land on the murky and sticky ground of Hong Kong. The switch from the airplane to the automobile also marks the code-switching of the female service labor in delivering goods, as flight attendants navigate in and out of the system, swiftly shifting among identities between laborer, lover, and potential wife.

From the air force academy, the bus terminal, and the civilian air transport, the three films discussed above highlight the magical function of vehicles, which function like a gimmick or device that quickly lures and transports someone into an uncharted, ungoverned, territory— be it unruly mountains or uncharted airspace; and yet is quickly retooled to reveal and repair the very mechanism of the trick itself. The sports car in *Air Hostess*, as a case in point, quickly repairs the company's broken protocol and yet also reinforces the female-specific physical and semiotic protocols—dress, body, face, rank, schedule— on which the airline business is built upon. Similarly, in *Terminal Bound*, bus and motorway also allow for the bus hostess's speedy toggling through various identities, among them, baby-sitter, blood-donor, and finally, an entertaining singer. Her role as the symbolic "vehicle" of the state-run motorway system also repairs the physical damage done to the autoroutes, most importantly, screening out criminal passengers—a smuggler, a gambler, and a bully—who free-ride along with the bus-based community. As the earliest mixed genre of propaganda/melodrama in Hong Kong and Taiwan, these films provide us a singular entry point through which to inquire about the notion of "chance" and "contingency" in relation to the logic of control in the cold war security society.

As Ben Singer insightfully points out, the question of "chance" and the anxiety about social atomization in the city were central to the birth of modern sensational melodrama in capitalist modernity. In a competitive marketplace, where atomized individuals were constantly framed as competitors for profits and value, it was necessary for melodrama to provide an element of chance—artificial or natural catastrophes, for instance—to intervene and redeem a chaotic moral universe. In this case, one of the most important functions of melodrama is to grant "an ethical simplicity and legibility that made the world more secure, if not socially or economically then at least psychologically" (131-148). *Terminal Bound*, directly sponsored and produced by KMT's state-owned film studio, generally avoids any negative portrayal of capitalism as competitive individualism in any urban setting. Yet, by using the long-distance bus ride to the mountains of eastern Taiwan, the catastrophic elements of chance in the city are allowed in the form of urbanized rural space made accessible by the new motorway network. Similarly, the smuggling of fake jewels in *Air Hostess* takes place on the ambivalent terrain of airspace between Hong Kong and Bangkok, avoiding specific references to any sovereign jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, the only moment we do "see" this airspace is at the beginning with a simulated sky and an animated aircraft model. The static artificial sky, likewise, provides a simulated free zone where the seemingly out-of-control competition and crime can still be made legible, contained, and therefore, controlled.

If the issue of chance and contingency in the above cases is identified and valorized through vehicles and airplanes for the sake of security, the social drama it presented is rather static and controllable within the itineraries, routes, and schedule of the territorial and sovereign spaces of the State. In a series of MP&GI-produced urban films, these public transportational spaces have been atomized into individual households and their individually-owned automobiles. Films like the *Story of a Fur Coat* (1956); *Our Dream Car* (1959), and *Sister Long Legs* (1960), for instances, turn cars into a magical device that unleash the explosive drive of capital though the speedy transaction of expertise and commodities. In the previous discussions, transport systems such as the airline and the bus easily regain their systematic equilibrium; these automobile-themed urban films, by contrast, tend to revolve around the mutual hostility bred by the city's competition for social prestige, properties, and speculative value. And the speedy gear-

switching/code-switching in the urban space is often accelerated to the point of near social collapse— or, in Singer's words, a "paranoid" state of mind that cannot be rebalanced by the path-tendency of routes, tracks, or itineraries shown in the KMT and MP&GI co-production films.

Sister Long Legs and *Our Dream Car*, in particular, can be seen as two important works that mark this tumble from air to ground, from the geopolitical to the urban scale. Indeed, in a quite literal manner, these films were produced almost concurrently with *Air Hostess* with the same four major actors/actresses: Grace Chang (stewardess Lin Keping), Lei Zhen (cockpit technician Li). Qiao Hong (pilot Lei), and Yeh Feng (Lin's competitor, Zhu)— with the first two staring in *Our Dream Car* and the latter two in *Sister Long Leg*s. Such casting and scheduling reflect a seriality and continuity in the assembly-line style of the MP&GI production, which is also manifested in the specific roles created for them. And perhaps not surprisingly, both films center their social drama of competition around the figure of the automobile.

In *Sister Long Legs*, a cutthroat competition is staged between two families' pursuit of higher social prestige and wealth through marrying their daughters to the son from a rich family. Living with her poor family, Tingting (Yeh Feng) plays a tall, nerdy, school teacher, who often acts awkwardly during dates and seems to show little interest in men, while her mother and younger sister Binbin (Lin Dai) are eager to arrange a date between her and a young playboy from a rich family surnamed Jin –a homophone for "Gold" in Chinese. Against their will, Tingting prefers another Mr. Jin (Qiao Hong) who works as an apprentice in an automobile body shop, who, despite being very tall, handsome, and well-educated, is despised by Tingting's mother for his job and clothing. The melodramatic plotline, not surprisingly, ends by revealing the true identity of the apprentice as none other than the son of a wealthy car dealer, who makes his son to learn all the mechanical details of all kinds of automobiles.

A major source of the comic effects and melodramatic tensions in the film comes from social connections and disconnections mediated by automobiles, which constantly recode the characters' class register and reroute their movements and itineraries in the city. Tingting's mother, for instance, mistakes the apprentice for the playboy Jin by asking him on phone: "how many cars do you have over there?" The apprentice/heir looks around the auto body-shop and shrugs: "Quite a few!" Reassured by the number of cars, the excited mother invites the apprentice for tea. On other occasions, despite the mother's disapproval, the auto apprentice drives different cars to pick up Tingting after work for date. Upon returning to Tingting's home, his car, once again, helps hide his identity, as Tingting's mother only gets to see him from the second-floor balcony with a top-down view of the car's roof (fig 78).

Figure 78

Figure 79

Automobiles, therefore, serve both as a device resignifying the apprentice's class register— both linguistically and physically — and a vehicle that allows Tingting to get away from her mother's control and scrutiny and gain physical proximity to the male driver. On another level, any viewer who had seen *Air Hostess* a year before *Sister Long Legs*, could not have failed to recognize exactly the same scene of automobile-enabled identity switch, re-enacted by the same actor, the same actress, and even the same convertible car (fig. 79) The car, in short, recodes the characters' identity not only within the film but also invokes a sense of seriality among MP&GI's urban comedies.

On another level, the car-generated recoding of social identities in *Sister Long Legs* is accompanied by the excessive sensations of mechanical velocity and visceral proximity provided by an automobile's "gear-switching" among different speeds. In a picnic to the suburbs of Hong Kong, the apprentice/heir drives Tingting and his potential parents-in-laws in a vintage convertible. Tingting's mother, who hopes to accelerate her daughter's marriage with the other Mr. Jin, constantly complains about the slowness of the car and the sluggishness of her husband, who—with his low income and social status—often takes a back seat in her wife's matchmaking schemes. This mismatch, quite literally, ends up causing a car crash, as Tingting's father tries his hand at driving the car but loses control on a motorway constantly disrupted by constructions, ducks, and even cows (fig 80). The malfunction of the speedy machine, in this case, smashes and also reveals the inner differences between the clueless businessman and his calculating wife. Yet, it also drives the young couple to look for help on foot, thus getting even closer to each other both physically and emotionally. The car crash, quite magically, brings them to a luxurious mansion in the mountains, where the seemingly low-born apprentice reveals his true wealth gained from the sales of automobiles. The automobile, as a *deus ex machina* in a quite literal sense, brings the melodramatic fiasco back to a happy ending for everyone with its self-destruction: both the daughter, who disregards social protocols for marriage, and the mother, who follows the protocols to a tee, find their answers. At the end of the day, however, the plotline's 'gas pedal' is never under Tingting's control, as her potential value on the marriage market boils down to the semiotic signals, speed, and ownership of the cars, while we never see her behind the wheel.

Figure 80

Figure 81

If the image of automobile in *Sister Long Legs* risks commodifying the value of female in terms of the speedy calculation of value exchange brought about by automobiles, *Our Dream Car* provides an alternative picture of the relationship between gender and automobiles within Hong Kong's commercializing urban space. Released in 1959, coinciding with *Air Hostess*, *Our Dream Car* turns the flight attendant into an urban clerk on Hong Kong island, working and commuting daily back home by ferry with her architect husband. It is on their daily routines by public ferry where her ex-boyfriend, a car dealer, runs into the couple and successfully talks them into buying a private automobile by bank installments. The purchase, despite giving the couple the momentary pleasure of hurtling across the city, later generates a series of intense conflicts regarding their daily scheduling, budgeting, socializing, and even potential extramarital affairs. As the monthly installment bill comes to the young couple through the hands of the wife's ex-lover, economic pressure and jealousy arise and daily altercations increase, eventually culminating in a climax after an automobile exhibition, where Grace Chang is invited to compete for the title of "Car Exhibition Beauty."

The most interesting part of their dramatic confrontation, however, is the way automobile—a commodity forcefully sold to them— figures as the object of the couple's dreams and imaginative life. Throughout the film, we never see the couple actually driving together. Instead, the sensation of speeding up is rendered through a series of virtual "simulations" in the following key sequences: before they can actually drive the car, the couple constantly play with a toy model car borrowed from the landlord's son. The toy car keeps appearing in the domestic scenes throughout, serving as a tangible object with which they can visualize their new life with a car. A case in point is a sequence where the wife holds the toy car and sings of her dream of hurtling across the city, flying across the sky and above the clouds, and even "soaring like a rocket into outer space." As she sings, a diagonal split screen creates two moving worlds—on the right side is her singing with her husband in the room, on the left are images of another Grace Chang holding the wheel, stepping on the throttle, and touring across Hong Kong. The only occasion on which we do see the couple "drive" is when they practice all sorts of simulated operations in the new car out of curiosity— they try everything from turning the wheels, operating the brakes and pedals, wipers, signals, and even honking the horn. In short, they are still treating the real car as a toy, simulating and imitating the actual driving while watching their own simulation of reality.

By the end, the wife's public image does "soar" into the sky as her virtual image as a "Car Exhibition Beauty" being broadcast on television (fig). This virtual, yet quite visceral, contact with the machine, finally, turns their own bodies into automobiles precisely at the moment when the couple's conflict in real life rushes to the dangerous brink of violence: in a scene where the husband fiercely argues with the wife about her social life, soaring popularity, and her negligence of domestic chores, their panting and breathing is accompanied by the overdubbed sound of a car engine. As the altercation escalates, the engine sound gets louder, and we even hear an outburst of honking before the husband raises his hand as if to slap the wife. The confrontation can be epitomized by the wife's retort to his complaint about her absence in the house: "You forgot I have my day job, too!" Even the best driving practices cannot simulate a car crash scenario, and it is in this almost cyborg moment of human-machine synchronization that we reach the core of the film: it presents the very image of female service labor caught between the domestic and public realms, in relation to a new machine-enabled regime of speed.

Contrasting the protagonist in *Sister Long Legs*, who is like an automobile in the sense of a domestic object desired by male drivers, the automobile in *Our Dream Cars* offers the protagonist an automatic pleasure of speed under her intimate control over either the toy car or the real car. By representing her driving in a series of virtual frames— toy, split screen, TV screen, through which she watches herself drive, the film turns her automatic visceral pleasure into a form of autobiographical spectatorship. In this context, her decision to sell the car in exchange for domestic harmony should not simply be seen as a setback in her fight for time and leisure. Although the film ends with a close-up of a wheeled baby carriage— as the couple is expecting their first baby — the visceral pleasure of the machine keeps haunting the family, as we still see the model car placed behind the carriage.

From the influences of *Flying Tiger* and *Terminal Bound* on *Air Hostess* to the two melodramas of automobile, the cold war "air" between Hong Kong and Taiwan is captured by a series of cinematic recodings through the transportation films from MP & GI. *Flying Tigers* and *Terminal Bound*, directly sponsored by the KMT military forces with the strong support from Hong Kong's rightwing studios, pioneered this melodramatic cycle coupling the female service labor with the services of transportation system, one which is repeated in *Air Hostess* along different geographic coordinates. *Sister Long Legs* and *My Dream Car*, concurrently produced with *Air Hostess*, further recode the transportation/gender trope within Hong Kong's urban commercial space of social stratification, intensifying the motif of control and freedom within the contexts of commodity/marriage exchange. The military environment of Taiwan and the commercial world of Hong Kong, through a transnational network of film production and distribution, are thus connected. Automobiles and airplanes as represented in these films, therefore, not simply as symbolic objects of free market capitalism but also an index to a broader geopolitical network of logistics supported by the groundwork of female labor.


我就不用多擔心，能開多快就多快


不好，你這剛提太快了



A Company of Birds

Loke Wan Tho, the director of MP&GI and the chairman of Malayan Airways, had an unusual passion for birds— or, more precisely, taking photographs of birds. That passion was ignited during his time as a refugee in India after escaping from Malaya in 1942 when the Japanese imperial army invaded the colony. In the preface of his photobook, *A Company of Birds*, Loke recalls this wartime experience in visceral detail, relatinghow he lost his sight when the ship he took was bombed by an aircraft: "I did not realize what happened until I put my hand to my forehead, and to my surprise it seemed to stick to it; I looked down at my hands and arms then, and saw the skin, black and crinkly, like charred paper. My eyes, which had become burnt offerings to the Japanese god of war, soon closed, and it was not long before I began to lose my sight" (13). It was during his week-long blindness and the following months of recovery when Loke developed his love for photography, which in turn led him to a life-long pursuit of ornithology with a series of expeditions to catch the images of birds all around the globe in the late 40s and 50s. With these "means of invisible support," Loke meditates, "I follow in the footsteps of those great artists of China who make the countryside and the birds a vehicle of their self-expression" (15). And indeed, until his own plane crashed in Taiwan in 1964, his films would use vehicles and planes as a prosthetic means to capture the invisible air of cold war. Right after the KMT's collaboration with Yonghua on *Flying Tigers* and *Terminal Bound*, Loke

took over the film studio and began producing his own stories about automobiles and airplanes. In 1959, perhaps not by coincidence, he published *A Company of Birds* and released *Air Hostess.*

The transportation fantasies of MP&GI connect the cold war states of Taiwan and Hong Kong through the lines of flight mapped out by fighter jets, civilian airplanes, buses, and private automobiles. The cinematic representation of these speed machines, however, entails something more than the commodity fetish and material affluence. As my cases studies have shown, they also need to be thought of as a response to a new sensibility associated with logistics— both in its military and commercial definition. The co-production between the military government of the KMT and Loke Wan Tho's commercial empire of MP&GI, in this case, signals a joined effort to tap into the vast market of the so-called "overseas Chinese" both for their latent role as modern consumers and their potential role as freedom fighters against the CCP. In doing so, they also tapped into the ambivalent political status of Hong Kong in order to set up a media outpost that could connect and bridge the scattered networks of human resources across other anti-Communist clusters across the Southeast Asia.

These transnational collaborations, however, need to be specifically anchored within the Hong Kong-based rightwing media cluster buttressed by the US-sponsored propaganda organs in concordance with KMT's anti-Communism campaign. It was, after all, the city's porous financial, political, and cultural environment that allowed exiled intelligentsia such as Zhao Zifan and Yi Wen to earn their living while trying their hand at a variety of media platforms and genres ranging from pictorial magazine, fictions, screenplay, popular songs, and films. Instead of diminishing their agency and creativity as authors and artists, this chapter highlights their experiments centered around the trope of mobility and speed despite the highly volatile ideological split between the rightwing and leftwing in the city.

In this case, Zhao and Yi spearheaded two very different aesthetic tendencies in response to Hong Kong's geopolitical and spatial specificities. Zhao's *Halfway Down Society*, *Into the Space* trilogy, contextualized against *Asia Pictoria*l's exhilarating aeronautical images, takes his readers on a flight away from earth, as his characters explore and aspire for a sense of freedom defined by modulated connection via the routes, corridors, and orbits within the harmonious and safe cosmos of Free China— a journey also reflecting his own flight from Hong Kong to Taiwan. Yi, who lent his services as the screenwriter for the film adaptation of *Halfway Down Society*, takes such modulated mobility and its ideological baggage in an entirely different direction. Instead of mapping transportation systems as an infrastructure for cosmological harmony, his collaborative works with the KMT studio and MP &GI map out a route that brings us from the aerial view of Cold War back down to the messy cross-purposing of domestic melodrama. From airplanes, buses, to automobiles, vehicles not only atomize the social collective into individual drivers and passengers in competition with one another, but also accelerate their clashing values, smashing into each other with catastrophic velocity. These "car clash" melodramas, importantly, recode the gendered labor of service work between the public and the private settings, as the social role of air/bus stewardess and "car exhibition beauty" clash with their daily labor as wife and daughter.

These dreams of social mobility, in particular, are mapped onto the routes and sites of the city's traffic map. *Sister Long Legs*'s happy ending, for instance, hinges upon a car ride that

physically transports the poor family to the hilltop mansion, where the family's dream of moving upward in the society is realized. On the other hand, the automobile in *Our Dream Car* takes a storefront employee between Hong Kong island and Kowloon peninsula in a series of virtual rides that "skyrocket into the outer space" of social aura and success. Collectively, Zhao and Yi's collaborative works demonstrate a singular topography woven together by lines of vertical flight and horizontal drive, situated between the aerial view of geopolitics and the street view of gender politics.

Epilogue

Ruin Technologies

Osaka 70, Wang Dahong, and the End of Logistical Fantasies

Building Osaka, Projecting China

When Apollo Lunar Module landed successfully on the Moon on July 20, 1969, more than a decade after the International Geophysical Conference, it also marked the end of the decade-long space race between the US and the USSR. The event, hailed by a scholar in business logistics as "supply chain management at its finest" (Thomas), not only launched human's great leap into the extra-terrestrial but marked a global media sensation supported by the largest ever public relations campaign in history, as audiences world-wide watched Neil Armstrong's steps through live television broadcasts transmitted through the new technologies of satellite communication. The planetary event, intensively mediated and propagated through TV screens around the world, also prepared the stage for the Nationalists in Taiwan to propagate themselves as the only legitimate "Chinese" representative in the murkier realm of earthy geopolitics— an effort epitomized by the Republic of China pavilion at EXPO '70 at Osaka, Japan, where the United States pavilion also managed to lure more than 14 million people with its lunar rock exhibition at the first world's fair ever held in Asia. However, the world's fair, themed "The Harmony and Progress for Mankind" would end up being a farewell for "brand R.O.C." in the following decade, a catastrophic period marked by its replacement by P.R.C. in the United Nations in 1971, the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, and the severing of formal diplomatic ties with the U.S. in 1979.

Indeed, as if prefiguring these domestic and diplomatic setbacks, the ROC pavilion at Expo 67 in Montreal was deliberately set on fire, and the ROC planning committee at Osaka—a five person team led by the world-renowned Chinese-American modernist architect I.M. Pei—also expressed concerns about potential vandalism by Maoist students in Japan, who vowed to damage the country's display of its rebirth after WWII under the auspices the U.S imperialism.[1] To make things worse, a looming crisis centered around the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands since 1968 had put the Nationalists in an awkward position in relation to both Japan and US.[2] All this roiling anxiety, at the level of f architectural design, translated into a growing dissatisfaction with the eclectic "Chinese palace style" 中國宮殿式 (*Zhongguo Gongdianshi*), which selectively applied ornamental motifs and decorative components of imperial palaces or temples to roof, façade, and interior décor of modern reinforced-concrete structures. As an immediate display of Chinese-ness as national monumentality, the style was pioneered by the KMT's masterplan for Nanjing in the 1930s and ardently revived in Taiwan during the 60s under Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist campaign, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance movement. Younger architects in Taiwan, such as Li Zuyuan 李祖原 (1938 -), also a member of Pei's team, however, considered the imposition of ornamental Chinese motif on a

[1] For instance, the
[2] Epxlain the disbute

tectonic structure a "vulgar" display of Chineseness (Xu).[3] Between an officially endorsed Chinese monumentality and Free China's crumbing identity, the China pavilion at Osaka ended up becoming a test site for an unprecedented experiment combining thw extensive use of media technologies with modernist architectural design, and completely breaking away from the elaborate Chinese imperial façades adopted by the previous two China pavilions in Montreal and New York, respectively, in 1967 and 1964.

The I.M. Pei-led committee of the 1970 China Pavilion created an unusual exhibition space based on the extensive use of screens, display windows, panels, and plaques to demonstrate the successful transformation of ROC in Taiwan from an agricultural society to a vibrant economy based on export-oriented industrialization. A wall of photocollages, for instance, showed the work of the JCRR in agricultural modernization and its export of agrarian technologies to Africa (fig.). Another wall continued this developmental narrative from agriculture to industry by displaying another visual collage formed by the business logos and icons of most of Taiwan's major manufacturers (fig.). In addition, for fear of potential vandalism to some of the precious ancient artifacts, paintings and calligraphy originally meant for physical display, the curators set up a 16 mm film screen to project calligraphic writing accompanied by a series of wall panels printed with enlarged replicas of calligraphy and paintings. As a reporter commented later on, this systematic substitution of real objects with virtual displays was indeed an "unprecedented attempt" in the history of China pavilions (*Central Daily News*).

These installations were placed in ten gallery rooms housed in a pavilion-like structure formed by two gigantic concrete triangular prisms in white, whose surface was deprived of any ornamental motifs. Between these two halves, two red tube-like corridors connected and transported viewers from room to room, and floor to floor, in an upward movement. The viewing experience culminated at the top floor, where viewers exited the gallery floors and entered a huge 30-meter high spiral staircase with a screening setup vertically projecting a promotional film to the bottom of the circular ramps (fig.). As one of the earliest government-sponsored expanded cinema projects, this ramp/theater system allowed visitors to immediately recap and reintegrate the viewing experiences in the gallery compartments as they moved downward in a

[3] 1970 年 5 月《建築與計畫》雙月刊。 李祖源

spiral movement while watching both the motion pictures and the moving bodies of other visitors gradually descending into the circular screen. At end of this immersive visual journey, the bodies of the visitors themselves would be ejected out of the building and sent back to the microcosmic world of the Expo park.



As I.M. Pei himself made it clear in the pavilion's press conference, he did not intend to limit the notion of Chinese culture within a small physical pavilion with its rigid form. Instead, he hoped to express through the exhibition space a "combined theater experience with its ever-changing liveliness and playfulness" (*China Times* A3). While Pei's articulation might be read as a veiled criticism of the dominant, yet increasingly unpopular, Chinese palace style and its didactic monumentality, his emphasis on the quality of lively forms, movement, and the possibility of change actually strongly resonated with the central design concept of the Osaka Expo masterplan itself. With the renowned Metabolist architect Tange Kenzō 丹下健三 (1913 - 2005) as the chief designer of the fair's masterplan and infrastructure facilities, the entire site was conceptualized as a growing organism centered around a linear axis called Symbol Zone, where a Festival Plaza and the Theme Pavilion served as the transportation center of the fair by connecting individual national pavilions with moving walkways, promenades, a gondola lift, and a monorail, which not only encircled the entire site but linked the exhibition site to the train system and highways outside. Indeed, as Tange himself articulated in an interview, the Symbol Zone was meant to be a "tree trunk" out of which the transportation network grew like its "branches and leaves" (Lin 214-216). As media scholar Yuriko Furuhata points out, Tange's organic metaphors were rooted in his Metabolist belief of treating urban and architectural systems as series of metabolic process of digestion, energy transfer, as well as the regulation of internal equilibrium (66). This process, as she further argues, could also be informed by an emerging "control room aesthetics" centered around the role of the screen and projection in executing surveillance and governance.[4] Furuhata's research directs us to the issue of control

[4] Metabolists find inspiration from Cybernetic theories and the notion of "information society"

over the circulation, exchange, and encounters between information, material goods, and human bodies. What is entailed but never really articulated in her study, however, is that such control room aesthetics is also related to the fascination with temporal immediacy, as well as its inevitable tension and negotiation with the representability of national memory and history. If the masterplan of Osaka 70 was in general construed by its designer as a "simulated" city for an immediate near future and for the immediate legibility of its current environment, what is left unquestioned is how this media-enhanced vision of immediacy converges or contradicts with the self-representation of national history, heritage, and trauma in individual pavilions. The question, in short, points toward a conflict and negotiation between technical immediacy and representational historicity, and not only of the sort found in the highly specific context like a world's fair, but also in most of the propaganda genres I have discussed in this dissertation.

The dilemma between immediacy and historicity is particularly relevant to the regime of logistics established by Republic of China in Taiwan. On the one hand, the KMT government carried to Taiwan the historical memory of Sino-Japanese War with the missed opportunity to lead postwar East Asia based on its status as a member of the Allied coalition after WWII. On the other hand, the counterfactual image-making of Free China, as my discussions of military and agriculture cinema show, was also a process made possible by KMT's control and mobilization of Taiwan, a former Japanese colony for fifty years before 1945 with the majority of its people familiar with Japan linguistically and culturally. In this context, for the Nationalist to advertise a "Chinese" nationhood in Expo 70 amongst a new round of geopolitical and territorial turmoil was itself a process of negotiating among various contesting identities and grappling with a key question: how to present an coherent and convincing image of a Chinese nationhood— R.O.C in Taiwan—to the world? The renunciation of the Chinese palace style by the new China pavilion, for instance, might have indexed a growing discontent about this awkward nationhood at the level of architectural design and PR media practices. The gigantic staircase/theater in the China pavilion projected a series of images of traditional Chinese art and dance, aiming to remind the visitors that Taiwan had indeed preserved (or embalmed) the best of (non-Communist) Chinese culture from the pre-1949 era. But the downward spiral and spatial confinement experienced by the moving spectators might have rendered this self-representation of Chinese historicity more a virtual spectacle than an intimate identification. The immediate sensation enabled by this cinematic-architectural display, instead of exerting control over a coherent Chinese body-polity coordination, might have further engendered and reinforced the very absence of a "real" China in the fair. If the whole Expo 70 theme was a simulation, pointing toward Japan's immediate near future, what China pavilion was struggling with was how to retain a fading sense of Chinessness with its anti-monumental façade and media technologies.

It was perhaps out of such an anxiety about the conflicted temporality inherent to the Chinese nationhood in Taiwan that Gong Hong, general manager of KMT's largest state-run studio Central Motion Picture Company, decided to launch a promotional feature-length color film to accompany the two-month exhibition period of the 1970 China pavilion. Scripted by Gong himself and specifically tailored for location-shooting concurrent with the opening of China pavilion, this unusual film project, titled *Tracing Expo '70* 萬博追蹤, was meant to be filmed, edited, post-produced, and released as "immediately" as possible so as to cash in on the general curiosity about the Osaka Expo from the Taiwanese audience, the majority of which could not see the pavilion in person under the strict travel controls of martial law enforced by

Taiwan Garrison Command. To achieve this goal, the propaganda film was made into hybrid genre blend of musical, historical mystery, and most importantly, tourist documentary. The film's central ideological message took inspiration from Chiang Kai-shek's famous political catchphrase "repay injuries with virtue and kindness" 以德報怨, which referred to the mercy he showed to the Japanese government during the immediate post-WWII period of power transition. That virtue, as the propaganda narrative went, allowed 2 million Japanese army to return to Japan from China while keeping Japan's imperial system and territories intact, thereby contributing to the country' s swift postwar reconstruction and economic success.

Viewers trace this historical route by taking a tour to Expo '70 along with an expat Chinese/Taiwanese college girl, Yukiko Lin, accompanied by her Japanese boyfriend/neighbor Tetsuo Fujimoto. While Lin works as a docent at the China pavilion, Fujimoto serves as a part-time bartender in the fair. Tapping into the fair's appeal to global tourists, especially to Taiwanese or Taiwanese expats in Japan, the couple also hope to solve a mystery in Lin's family history. Lin's father was killed in the Sino-Japanese war in China, leaving her and her mother penniless, but an unknown benefactor has been sending checks to them from Taiwan since they moved to Japan in Fujimoto's neighborhood. Lin, utilizing her role as the pavilion docent, keeps networking and inquiring about the background of her secret benefactors, but only to realize that these checks have been sent from Taiwan under the orders of a group of Japanese men. At the end, Lin and Fujimoto find out that these men, including Fujimoto's own father, were former members of Japan's Imperial Army, who killed and robbed Lin's wealthy father during the war, but have managed to return to Japan due to Chiang Kai-shek's merciful policy. With guilt and gratitude, these former war criminals decided to fund the widow and her daughter, Yukiko Lin, until she graduates from college.

The narrative, of course, is an attempt to reconstruct a historical causality framed within a strong sense of presentism, even futurism, buttressed by the architecture-media infrastructure of Expo '70. The double bind between technical immediacy and representational historicity, as embodied by I.M. Pei's China pavilion, once again troubled the film production. The director Liao Xiangxiong 廖祥雄 (1933 -), who was active both in film and Taiwan's newly established TV industry, in his autobiography articulates the difficulties in filming a tourist documentary about the ongoing world's fair within the framework of narrative drama. One of them originated from the fact that Liao's film crew could only enter the fair site under the government-sponsored application affiliated with China pavilion, which only allowed the crew to shoot news footage and documentaries but not narrative films. The film crew, therefore, had to smuggle in the drama part when shooting their "documentaries." This, however, was a tricky task, as the protagonist was played by Judy Ongg 翁倩玉 (1950 -), a famous Taiwanese-Japanese singer and actress who also enjoyed popularity in Japan, and who might have incurred unnecessary attention. On top of all of this, the world's fair itself was a busy site full of noise and crisscrossing lines of massive tourists, which posed a great challenge to the control over any desired aspect of the *mise-en-scène* (Liao 50 - 57).

These were not simply technical concerns but rather issues rooted in the tension between the urge to present the site in its spontaneity and immediacy and the need to integrate such immediacy into a longer historical— and propogandist—narrative that required linear development in terms of plot, characterization, and scenes. The dialectic of these two

temporalities was visibly translated into the film's cinematography, which applied extensive use of long and extreme long shots, repetitive zooming in and out, as well as subjective perspective created through hand-held camera. These techniques were used heavily, for example, in a series of scenes starting with the couple identifying their potential informant on the spiral ramp, where they move downward to watch the vertically projected film at the bottom of the staircase (fig.). The hand-held camera initially focuses on the moving images on the ground floor but is soon distracted by the informant moving on the ramp, as the couple hurry downward to chase him outside the building. Once outside, however, their pursuit was suddenly becomes a prolonged tour around the world's fair, meticulously documenting their progress from pavilion to pavilion, escalator to escalator, promenade to promenade, in a rather static movement with mostly long shots. Yet, as if reminding us that such a scenic "tour" was still within the diegetic world of the story, the camera sometimes abruptly zooms in on a specific human figure in the crowd, or adopts a perspectival view with medium shot, simulating the act of "tracing" someone in the crowd.

The chase sequence, in this case, is initiated by a "film on film" moment, when the vertical projection displays a group of ancient folk dancers simulating a vaguely "Chinese" arcadia through the narrow aperture formed by the spiral ramps. Through this partial gaze into an imagined "Chinese" past, however, the couple is sent out to the cosmopolitan world of pavilions, where the vacillation between "chasing" and "touring" becomes indistinguishable. Moments such as this remind us of some the military pedagogical films in the 1950s, in which the images of the Taiwanese "home-front" were virtually transmitted as a simulated "battlefront," connecting the act of watching to the act of military operations. In the case of *Tracing Expo '70,* the home-front of Taiwan was framed by the architectural theater as a mythical Chinese past, which in turn triggers the act of chasing/touring of the characters in their tracing of the source of money back to wartime China. In the process, however, the vacillation between documentation and narrativization also turns the mythical Chinese past in the vertical projection into a series of visual fragments, situated between chasing the plotline and touring the pavilion site. In this case, it might be fair to say that both I.M. Pei's China pavilion (with its architectural theater) and *Tracing Expo '70* manifest a tendency towards anti-monumentality, through which the coherent national image of "China" and its historical continuity are constantly disturbed, disrupted, and even dissected into screens, panes, frames, and grids in pursuit of technical immediacy. Indeed, the film begins with Judy Ongg's singing and dancing on a white floor dissected by the geometric lines of a grid-form, while viewers could not have failed to note the exact same grid-pattern structuring the ceiling of I.M. Pei's China Pavilion (fig.).

The pursuit of technical immediacy— in cinema or architectural production— was pushed to its limit even in the post-production process of *Tracing Expo '70.* According to Liao, the film crew managed to send the film negatives produced out of the hurried location-shooting in Osaka immediately to Tokyo for development into stock footage— a process that could not have been done in Taiwan due to its inferior film development technologies. By doing so, the cinematographers could review the quality of the footage the next day and decide if extra shooting was needed (52). Ironically, this fascination with speedy production and post-production did not, however, lead to speedy success. The release date of *Tracing Expo 70* was delayed by about a month, as CMPC's general manager Gong Hong hoped to add a news footage on the "Republic of China Day" at the exhibition, held by the Vice-President of the Nationalist Government. The delay may have been lethal to a film that was meant to be an immediate report on the sensational world's fair. With Taiwan's newly established television stations—Taiwan Television in 1962 and China Television in 1968— also managing to send back satellite-transmitted images from the Expo, the film itself fell days or even months short of its own promise for technical immediacy, and became a largely failed attempt to revive pre-1949 memories about Chiang Kai-shek's merciful policy toward Japan.[5]

The Moon-Watcher of Chinese Taipei:
Unbuilt Propaganda and Interiorized Monumentality

Just as the media fallout of the Moon landing forged "a genuine experience of global intimacy" (Rothman) with unedited, live, and immediate transmission of images around the world in 1969, its media effects also triggered all sorts of futuristic imagination and architectural-media experiments in Expo '70. This newfound sense of cosmopolitan intimacy, however, formed a stark contrast with the coldness still felt by some architects who struggled to promote a new version Chinese monumentality beyond the didactic archaic Chinese palace style, and beyond the territorial control of the Nationalists in Taiwan. A case in point was Dahong Wang 王大閎, a member of I.M. Pei's graduate cohort at Harvard University, where both students worked under the direction of Walter Gropius, founder of the Bauhaus School and pioneer of modernist architecture. In fact, before Pei planted his unorthodox China pavilion in Osaka, Wang was already fighting his own war against the Chinese palace style on the home-front Taiwan, where he designed numerous museums, government offices, and memorial halls

sponsored by the Nationalist government. However, if Pei's global fame and mobility allowed him to freely experiment his high modernism in Osaka and other metropoles, Wang's career in Taiwan was marked by a series of compromises in his government-sponsored projects. These real-life struggles with political propaganda, however, also triggered his architectural fantasies through fictional writings and unbuilt designs, such as his unfinished semi-autobiographical fantasy novel, *Phantasmagoria,* and an unbuilt monument dedicated to the successful Moon-landing by the United States.

Wang's dissatisfaction and struggles with the officially-endorsed Chinese palace style were best embodied by his designs for two highly politicized projects, with one being scrapped and the other being significantly altered: the National Palace Museum (1961) and the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall (1965). At the heyday of Chiang Kai-shek's propaganda campaign for Chinese Cultural Renaissance, these two projects were considered the most important architectural monuments to uphold the legitimacy and orthodoxy of Chinese nationhood in Taiwan. They were meant to show that Taiwan was where China's artistic heritage and political legacy was preserved and practiced. Such a strong will to connect the Taiwanese home-front to Chinese Nationalist's pre-1949 battlefront and post-1949 migration, once again, was in tension with the technical immediacy, transparency promoted by architectural modernism.

His original design for the National Palace Museum in Taipei, for instance, did not apply the overpowering imperial roof but three abstract reversed v-shape structures. He also opted for non-bearing curtain walls and glass walls for the façade to achieve a sense of lightness and simplicity (fig.). Wang's design was placed number one in the open competition but was directly scrapped and replaced by a design proposed by one of the competition's judges favored by the high "client" in the government (Shyu 127- 128). That design, as we know it now, is in every sense typical Chinese palace style with highly symbolic imperial roof decoration and front entrance stairs. That experience prompted Wang to compromise in another Nationalist monument, Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall four years later, as he once again altered his original plan (fig.) after hearing Chiang Kai-shek's personal comments, which directly called out Wang's design as "a western building" (Shyu and Ni 41-42). These two major setbacks might have prompted Wang to write an essay vehemently criticizing the admiration for Chinese palace style as a "unhealthy nostalgia for the old" (D.H. Wang 28).

These uneasy collaborations with the Nationalist government and its propagandist campaign for a "Chinese Renaissance" had gradually turned Wang to other pursuits for alterative forms of monumentality beyond the murky and earthy politics involved in government projects. His unbuilt monument "Selene" (named after the goddess of the Moon in Greek mythology) was deigned during the period of 1965 and 1969— even before the actual Moon-landing by Apollo Lunar Modular on July 20th, 1969. Meant to commemorate the moon-landing and the "long-standing friendship between the Chinese people and the American People," the monument consisted of two white narrowly-shaped slate-like concrete towers, rising as high as 252.71 feet, which symbolized the distance between the Moon and the Earth (252,710 miles). Facing each other with a narrow gap in between, the two white slates encircled a sacred altar and half-open chamber, whose interior mural walls were inscribed with the images from the Chinese mythology of the Moon goddess Chang'e and her husband Hou Yi, the archer who shot down the nine suns and spared one for the prosperity of mankind. Designs such as this interiorized Chinese

motifs, and was praised by Stanford art historian Michael Sullivan (1916 - 2013) as a "poetic, elegant, simple but inspiring design" (Shuyu and Ni 191). Wang envisioned it to be placed either on the Angel Island of the San Francisco Bay or close to the NASA headquarter at Houston, but the project fell though in the end due to both the difficulty in fund-raising and the increasingly dire diplomatic status of R.O.C. Taiwan.

In fact, this commitment to architectonic interiority and its promise to transcend the force of political gravity resonated strongly with the narrative structure and imagery in Wang's unfinished sci-fi novel *Phantasmagoria*. Translated from English to Chinese and published in 2013 five years before Wang's death, the novel was based on a series of unorganized manuscripts accumulated over sixty years from mid-1940s to early 2000s. As if echoing the architectonic structure of the lunar monument "Selene," the novel consists of two ongoing narratives. One is a space journey taken by a nine-year-old crown prince in 3069 A.D. with the crew and spacecraft designated by his benevolent dictator father. The other narrative is first-person, semi-autobiographical, portrait of the life of a young man of nobility living in mid-20th century Europe. The latter narrative, as suggested by the former, could be "a memoir of his last life" written by the crown prince himself. The spaceship carries the crown prince and his equally young friends onto a "training journey" requested by the dictator, who benevolently rules the Earth after eliminating a catastrophic counter-culture revolution and riots across the globe. The kingdom Earth is under reconstruction with the help of a special drug called Drefu, a government-issued stimulant that can control the content of dreams and satisfy all sort of fantasies, desires, and wants.

The spaceship and crown prince, in this case, is supposed to return to the Earth to take over the task of national reconstruction. Yet, throughout the narrative this return trip never happens, and the crown prince himself is finally confused by the "educational meaning of this long interstellar journey" and is suspicious of the "secret motivation" of his dictator father to send them off (40-41). To quell the boredom of the silence of outer space, the prince and his pals play simulated war games that resemble Chinese Mahjong and immerse themselves in the spaceship's vast collections of books, paintings, artifacts, records, and videos saved from the counter-culture riots. Indeed, the spectacular spacecraft, named Medusa, is said to be a "flying palace" with libraries and museums stored with the best cultural memories of the human civilization. With a highly controlled interior simulating the biosphere of the Earth, the passengers engage in endless philosophical conversation and discussions about arts, war, dreams, and human nature. "To survive in the outer space, one has to shut that space outside" says the narrator (42). Wang's space odyssey is more an intellectual exile than an adventure where the hero is expected to return with the mission to exact revenge.

The radical interiority regulated by the life-sustaining system of the "flying palace," however, triggers a series of discussions among the passengers about the meaning of "freedom," as they evoke Jeremy Bentham's prison reform to question the definition of happiness. "We are flying in space, as free as birds; we are no longer tied to the Earth by gravity. But does this freedom make us happy?" the crown prince meditates (77-78). The space journey, like the unbuilt monument for the Moon, has no end or destination. It thus resembles a freely drifting monument, where its passengers transport the memories of human civilization to an unknown constellation at the behest of the dictator king in the highly regulated interior of the spacecraft.

From the two Nationalist monuments in Taipei, the unbuilt Moon-landing monument, to the allegorical flight into the space, the body of works of Wang from architecture to literature, manifests his intention to fabricate an interior space for freedom, dreams, and art; yet this intertwinement of architectonic and psychological interiors betrays an ambivalent anxiety about the difficulties of maintaining a systematic equilibrium between inside and outside.

Coda: Pavilion as Method

The unbuilt monument "Selene" and the unfinished novel *Phantasmagoria* can be together seen as attempt to soar beyond the realities faced by the image of R.O.C/Taiwan in the early 1970s. Both of them, however, never really free the architect/writer from the gravity of terrestrial politics. The Moon-landing monument, in particular, echoes the China pavilion in Osaka, as both were projects vacillating between the control of propagandist agenda and the freedom to move beyond its influence with their "escape velocity." Both are also meant to project the R.O.C's soft power in the extraterritorial space of Japan and the U.S. at the critical juncture of early 1970s, when the brand of Free China was gradually pushed out of the world stage. In this case, they can be seen as the final monuments of the KMT's decades-long efforts to fortify Taiwan as the military home-front. The two architectural monuments, one demolished and the other unbuilt, pointed toward the alternative lines of flight the architects undertook within the institutional and organizational contexts they were situated. The ephemerality of these projects also suggests that the efforts to project a battlefront, in all of its counter-factual spectacle, had run out of steam.

The politics of these monumental pavilions serve as both as an architectonic figure and conceptual frame with which to recap the KMT's propaganda media cluster. The migration, occupation, and resettlement of a regime of logistics in Taiwan can be understood as a process of site-planning— an organizational arrangement of zoning, land-use, circulation, security, privacy, and access—*before* the development can actually take place. This process entailed the use of different optical lens, frames, and apertures with which to see, to map, and to calculate available material and human resources on site. On the one hand, it also involved actual operation and mobilization of these resources toward the construction of specific domestic and international images. Taiwan, in this case, was not only construed by the KMT as a "model province" of Free China but a model "pavilion" building through which viewers might look for different itineraries, vantage points, outlooks, entrances, and exits, both inside or outside its boundaries.

In this architectonic context, each genre/medium cluster discussed in the previous chapters targeted different groups of audience and provided very different modes of affordance for the viewers to tinker, and sometimes alter, the designated use of a space. Military cinema, for instance, with all its technicity and instrumentality, was turned into a cognitive and affective map through which crisis and contingencies were identified, and oftentimes, fabricated. The agricultural cinema of the JCRR, itself already a showpiece in the China pavilion of Expo '70, reanimated the landscape paintings from the Palace Museum to effect its politics of speeding up and economic take-off. But it also opened up an operational niche for filmmakers like Richard Yao-chi Chen to experiment with an alternative way of seeing Taiwan's rural landscape by way of an aesthetics of slowness. The transport-themed print culture and melodramas of "Free China" afforded an operational platform for transregional cooperation among players from Taiwan,

Hong Kong, and Singapore, wherein different local identities and positions of gender and labor were thematized. As such, the R.O.C/Taiwan "pavilion" was not an isolated showpiece in the world's fair but a logistical portal through which flights from China, Hong Kong, Japan, and U.S encountered, socialized, and co-produced a variety of themes and motifs for display.

Yet Pei's pavilion and Wang's monuments always remind us that an architectonic establishment also involves the political and military operation of circumscribing a site, calculating resources, and controlling the contingent factors hidden in the environment. A logistical regime, just like a security setup in a world's fair, is also a system of control and regulation, a dark side evinced by almost all the cases discussed in this dissertation. Every display setup in a pavilion, in this case, also serves as a surveillance mechanism imposed upon the formation of laboring bodies, ethnic identities, and gender hierarchy. When Japan's Leftist/Maoist students vowed to vandalize the Theme Pavilion of Expo 70, they also threatened Japan's display of postwar developmentalism based on the biopolitical control of bodies and labor. And the very location of the R.O.C./Taiwan and Korea pavilions on the wing side of the fair's main theme tower told a shadowed history of labor exploitation and colonization. Kenzo Tange, after all, was a major technocratic architect/planner during Japan's colonial expansion into Asia— a fact disguised by his discourse centered around metabolism and organism in the 1960s and 1970s . By the same token, the "China" pavilion was also the site where technocrats and artists managed to present a miraculous developmentalist temporality by reporting on and covering the site of Taiwan, as a home-front, a militarized base of logistics, and a black box where the violence and exploitation involved in the development could not be seen.

The end of the 1970s marked the beginning of the crumbling of R.O.C.'s national identity, when gaps, fissures, and tensions could no longer be covered or bridged by either media or architectural spectacles. In the meanwhile, the definition of logistics and its operation had also been fully transformed into an emerging commercial network of trade, transaction, and on-demand service. TV screens, rather than film screens, had thus loomed large in the new logistical capitalism and operational logic. Taiwan, the site on which China pavilion was built, would surface again, as its monuments began to crumble, as a nation reassembled.


SELENE




自由神像
紀念碑
台北希爾頓飯店
高度示意圖

Bibliography

Bao, Weihong. *Fiery Cinema: The Emergence of an Affective Medium in China, 1915-1945*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015.

Becker, Gary S. *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education*. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975.

Berlant, Lauren G. Cruel Optimism. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 2011.

Brown, Wendy. *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Butler, Judith. *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* London: Verso, 2009.

Calinescu, Matei. *Faces of Modernity: Avant-garde, Decadence, Kitsch*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.

Chang, Shih-Lu 張世倫.. "Zuowei jilupian xiandaixing qianxing guxing de liubijia" 做為紀錄片現代性前行孤星的劉必稼 (Liu Pi-chia as the pioneering star of documentary modernity), *Jinyishu* no. 284, 2016: 142-145.

Chen Yao-Chi 陳耀圻. "Jilufangfa yu zhenshixing" 紀錄方法與真實性 [Methods of documenting and the nature of realness]. *Theater Quarterly*, no. 3, 1965.: 189-196.

CIA. "A Committee for Free Asia", Central Intelligence Agency, December 13,1951. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DTPILLAR%20%20%20VOL.%201_0085.pdf Accessed August 10, 2019.

Chou, Grace Ai-Ling. *Confucianism, Colonialism, and the Cold War : Chinese Cultural Education at Hong Kong's New Asia College, 1949-63*, BRILL, 2011.

Clinton, Maggie. *Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925-1937*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2017.

Cutlip, Scott. *The Unseen Power: Public Relations. A History*, Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994.

Deborah, Cowen. *The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade*. University of Minnesota Press, 2014

Deleuze, Gilles. "Postscript on the Societies of Control." *October*, vol. 59, 1992, pp. 3–7. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/778828.

---. "Lecture Transcription on Spinoza's Concept OF Affect". https://www.gold.ac.uk/media/images-by-section/departments/research-centres-and-units/research-centres/centre-for-invention-and-social-process/deleuze_spinoza_affect.pdf

Doel, Ronald E., Dieter Hoffmann, and Nikolai Krementsov, "National States and International Science: A Comparative History of International Science Congresses in Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, and Cold War United States," *Osiris* 20 (2005): 49–76.

Duffy, Enda. *The Speed Handbook: Velocity, Pleasure, Modernism*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.

Ekbladh, David. *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Foucault, Michel.. "The Political Function of the Intellectual," *Radical Philosophy* no.17 (Summer), 1977: 12–14.

Fu, Poshek. "More than Just Entertaining: Cinematic Containment and Asia's Cold War in Hong Kong, 1949–1959" *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture*, vol. 30, no.2 (Fall 2018), 1-55.
--- "Modernity, Diasporic capital, and 1950's Hong Kong Mandarin Cinema," *Jump Cut: A Review of Contemporary Media*, no. 49, 2007: 1.

Furuhata,Yuriko. "Multimedia Environments and Security Operations: Expo '70 as a Laboratory of Governance," *Grey Room 54* (Winter) 2014: 56 –79.

Gallagher, Catherine. *Telling It Like It Wasn't: The Counterfactual Imagination in History and Fiction.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018

Gong Hong 龔弘. *Yingchen huiyi lu* 影塵回憶錄 (Reminiscences of a Cinematic Career: a Memoir). Taipei: Crown Publishing, 2005.

Gunning, Tom. *D.W. Griffith and the Origins of American Narrative Film: The Early Years at Biograph*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991.

Hansen, Miriam.*Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012

Harvey, David. *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography*. New York: Routledge, 2001.

He, Pui-yin. *Ways to Urbanisation : Post-war Road Development in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008.

Hsu, Madeline Yuan-yin. The Good Immigrants : How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority /Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015.

Hua, Huiying 華慧英. *Buzhuo yingxiang de ren: Hua Huiying sheying bu tu Wu Shi Nian* 捕捉影像的人 : 華慧英攝影步途五十年 [The image catcher: Hua Huiying and fifty years of Cinmetogrphy]. Taipei: Yuanliu Publishing, 2000.

Huang, Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. 1992. *Zhongguo nongcun fuxing weiyuanhui koushu lishi fangwen jilu* 中國農村復興委員會口述歷史訪問紀錄 (Interviews and records on JCRR). Taipei: Academia Sinica.

Huffman, Gerald H "Opening Remarks" in *Summary Report of Seminar on Agricultural Development.* Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1967.

Jameson "Cognitive Mapping," in *Marxism and The Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Lawrence Grossberg and Cary Nelson. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), reprinted in *The Jameson Reader*, ed. Michael Hardt and Kathi Weeks (New York: Blackwell, 2000), 277–287.

Jiang, Menglin. 蔣夢麟. "Mr. Jiang Menglin's Letter to Jiang Gui" in *Xuanfeng* 旋風 (Whirlwind). Taipei: Jiu Ge Publisher, 2016.

Koppes, Clayton R, and Gregory D. Black. *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.

Laughlin, Charles A. *Chinese Reportage: The Aesthetics of Historical Experience.* Durham: Duke University Press. 2002.

Leary, William M. *Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia*. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 2015.

Lin, Zanting 林贊庭. *Taiwan dianying sheying jishu fazhan gaishu, 1945-1970* 台灣電影攝影技術發展概述 [Cinematography in Taiwan 1945-1970: history and technical development] Taipei: Taiwan Film Institute, 2003.

Lin, Zhongjie. *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement: Urban Utopias of Modern Japan*. London: Routledge, 2010.

"Huanwo heshan paiwaijing qingquangang shang huoniuzhen" 還我河山拍外景清泉崗上火牛陣 [On-location shooting placed Fire Bulls on Qingquangang base]. United Daily News, 22, June, 1966, p.8.

Lin, Hsiao-ting. *Accidental State: Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan.* Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 2016.

---. *Kunshou yu fangong: lengzhan zhong de Taiwan xuanze* 困守与反攻：冷战中的台湾选择 [Besiege and counterattack: the choice of Taiwan in the Cold War]. Beijing: Jiuzhou chuban she, 2017

Lin, James. "Sowing Seeds and Knowledge: Agricultural Development in Taiwan and the World, 1925–1975," *East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal*. 9 (2), 2015: 127-149.

Lin, Qiyang. 林淇瀁. *Zhaojian renjian buping Taiwan baodao wenxue shilun* 照見人間不平：台灣報導文學史論 [Shedding lights on the unjust human world: a history of reportage literature in Taiwan]. Tainan: National Museum of Taiwan Literature, 2013.

Lin, Tongfa 林桶法. *1949 dachetui* 1949 大撤退 [1949 great retreat]. Taipei: Linking Publishing, 2009.

"Logistics," *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, edited Angus Stevenson and Maurice Waite. OUP Oxford, 2011.

Lovejoy, Alice. *Army Film and the Avant Garde: Cinema and Experiment in the Czechoslovak Military*. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 2015.

Lu, Weiluan 盧瑋鑾, and Zhiqin Xiong 熊志琴. Xianggang wenhua zhongshengdao 香港文化眾聲道. Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 2014.

Mark, Chi-Kwan. *Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations*, 1949-1957, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004.

Marx, Karl, Ernest Mandel, Ben Fowkes, and David Fernbach. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy.* London; New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1978.

Merkel-Hess, Kate. *The Rural Modern: Reconstructing the Self and State in Republican China*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016.
Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neilson. *The Politics of Operations: Excavating Contemporary Capitalism*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2019.

Miller, Norman N. "Visual Evidence: An Instructional Approach." American University Field Staff, 1976.

Mitchell, Timothy. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Mitchell, W. J. T.."Imperial Landscape," in *Landscape and Power.* 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

Nichols, Bill. *Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.

Peters, John D. *The Marvelous Clouds. Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015.

Puckett, Kent. *War Pictures: Cinema, Violence, and Style in Britain, 1939-1945*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2017.

Ravenholt, Robert. “Where Chinese Farmers Flourish,” *The Washington Post.* (Jul 12, 1962). ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post: A20.

Scott, James. 1998 C. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.

Singer, Ben. *Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2005

Szonyi, Michael. *Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Shen, Shiao-Ying. “A Morning in Taipei: Bai Jingrui's Frustrated Debut.” *Journal of Chinese Cinemas*, vo. 4, no.1, 2010, 51-56.

Shen, Shuang. “Empire of Information: The Asia Foundation’s Network and Chinese-Language Cultural Production in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.” *American Quarterly*, vol. 69 no. 3, 2017, 589-610.

Siegert, Bernhard, and Geoffrey Winthrop-Young. *Cultural Techniques: Grids, Filters, Doors, and Other Articulations of the Real*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2015

Sun, Ling 孫陵. *Lun fangong Jingshen zhanxian* 論反共精神戰線 [On the spiritual frontline of anti-communism]. Taibeishi: Huoju chubanshe, 1952.

Tadiar,N.X.M,.*Things Fall Away: Philippine Historical Experience and the Makings of Globalization.* Manila: Quezon city Ateneo de Manila University, 2011.

Thomas. Andrew R. “The Moon Landing: Supply Chain Management at Its Finest.” Industry Week. https://www.industryweek.com/supply-chain/moon-landing-supply-chain-management-its-finest Accessed. August 10, 2019.

Taishi Ershi Nian 台視二十年 [Twenty years of TTV]. Taibei Shi: Taiwan dian shi shi ye gu fen you xian gong si, 1982.

Virilio, Paul. *War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception*. London: Verso, 2010.

Wang, Dahong 王大閎. *Wang Dahong Zuopinji* 王大閎作品集 [Collected works of Dahong Wang] Taibeishi: Guoli taibei jishu xueyuan jian zhu she ji ji shu xi, 1995.
---. Wang, Dahong 王大閎, and Qiuhua Wang 王秋華. Huan Cheng 幻城 [Phantasmagoria] Taibeishi: Diancang yishu jiating, 2013.

Wang, Dewei. *The Lyrical in Epic Time: Modern Chinese Intellectuals and Artists Through the 1949 Crisis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.

Wang, Jue 王玨, and Dezheng Lin 林德政. Guoji mingxing Wang Jue xian sheng yanyi shengya fang tanlu 國際明星王玨先生演藝生涯訪談錄 [An interview with international star Wang Jue]. Taipei: Academia Historica, 2010.

Wang, Xiaojue. *Modernity with a Cold War Face: Reimagining the Nation in Chinese Literature Across the 1949 Divide*. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Asia Center, 2013.

Wang, Yuqi 王玉麒. *Mingde zhuanan: deguo junshi guwen zai tai gongzuo shishi*. 明德專案: 德國軍事顧問在台工作史實 [Project minde: a historical account of German military consulting in Taiwan]. Taibeishi: Zhuangwei chuban, 2011.

Williams, Linda. *Playing the Race Card: Melodramas of Black and White from Uncle Tom to O.j. Simpson*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002.

Yang, Wei 楊蔚. "Baijingrui cong dapao dao sanfēnzhiyi" 白景瑞從大砲到三分之一 [Baijingrui: from Cannon to one-thrid] *United Daily News*, 30 July, 1966, p.16.

Yin, Haiguang 殷海光. *Zhengzhi yu shehui* 政治與社會 [*Politics and society*]. Taipei: NTU Press, 2011.
---. *Guangming qian zhi heian: zhongguo gong chan dang zhi guan cha* 光明前之黑暗：中國共產黨之觀察 [Darkness before dawn: observation on the Chinese Communist Party]. Taibeishi: NTU Press, 2009.
---. *Dao nuyi zhilu* 到奴役之路 [Road to serfdom]. Taibeishi: Guiguan, 1990.

Yuan, Congmei 袁叢美, and Ren Huang 黃仁. *Yuan Congmei congying qishinian huiyilu* 袁叢美從影七十年回憶錄 [Yuang Congmei's seventy years in film industry: a memoir]. Taibeishi: Yatai tushu, 2002.

Zhang, Zaiyu 張載宇. *Guofang houqin gailun* 國防後勤概論 [*The logistics of national defense*] Taibeishi: Guofang yanjiuyuan, 1969.

Zhang, Liangbei. 張靚蓓 2012. Gonghong zhongying shinian ji tuwen ziliao huibian 龔弘中影十年暨圖文資料彙編 (Hnery Kung). Taipei: Ministry of Culture.

Zhang, Yingjin. 1993. "Narrative, Ideology, Subjectivity: Defining a Subversive Discourse in Chinese Reportage." In Kang Liu and Xiaobing Tang eds., *Politics, Ideology, and Literary Discourse in Modern China:Theoretical Interventions and Cultural Critique.* Duke University Press, 211-242.

Zhao, Zifan 趙滋藩. Ban xialiu shehui 半下流社會 [Half-way down society]. Xianggang: Yazhou chubanshe, 1954.
---. *Feidie zheng kong* 飛碟征空 [Into the air with the flying saucer]. Gaoxiongshi: Sanxin, [1956]1977.

---. *Yueliang shang kan diqiu*.月亮上看地球 [The earth viewed from the Moon]. Gaoxiongshi: Sanxin, [1956]1977.
---. *Taikong lixianji* 太空歷險記 [*The space adventure*] Gao xiong shi: Sanxin, [1956] 1977.

Zhou, Xiuhuan 周琇環. 1995. *Nongfuhui shiliao* 農復會史料 (Historical records of JCRR) Taipei: Academia Historica.

Zhuang, Wanhua 莊琬華. 2005. Cong tuohuangzhe Liu Bijia dao shitoumeng 從拓荒者劉必稼到石頭夢 (From the Frontier Man Liu Bijia to Stone Dream). *United Daily News (Feb 25, 2005) URL (Accessed Dec 23, 2017): https://udn.com/news/index*